The unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine
by Russia continues. Previously, we switched to producing videos
describing 15-day periods of the war in Ukraine, when changes on the battlefield happened more
often. But since the situation on the battlefield
remained almost unchanged for more than a month due to the weather conditions, this
time, we decided to create a video on a month-long period of December 16 - January 16. Battles on the Donbas front, particularly
in and around the towns of Bakhmut and Soledar, remained the bloodiest, as the Russian forces
finally managed a breakthrough. In this video, we will talk about this breakthrough
in Soledar, the situation on other fronts of the battlefield, and critical political,
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in the description to skip it right now. As usual, let’s start by examining the situation
on the battlefield. The Kherson front remained unchanged despite
information about Ukrainian deployment to the Potyomkinski Island on January 2nd, ongoing
battles in Kinburn Spit on the left bank of Dnipro on January 8th and the constant exchange
of artillery fire across the river. Neither of the actions on the left bank of
Dnipro has been confirmed by any footage. So, on the one hand, there are reports of
action on this front, but on the other hand, both sides have been redeploying their personnel
from this front to more active fronts of the battlefield. The stalemate on the Zaporizhian front mostly
continued amid reports of the deployment of troops from both sides to this area. The most notable development has been minor
Ukrainian progress toward Dorozhnyanka, but it does not look like a component of a larger
offensive at this point. By now, it has become an open secret that
Ukraine is particularly planning offensive operations on this front, but this may have
been delayed due to a deteriorating situation on the Donbas front, where Russia has finally
achieved a minor breakthrough. The immense pressure the Russian army, Wagner
mercenaries and separatist forces have been putting on this front for months has taken
its toll on the defenders. The Ukrainian command to deploy some of the
units it may have been preparing for an expected spring offensive declared by the Ukrainian
Military Intelligence Chief, Kyrylo Budanov, to Donbas. Heavy battles in Bakhmut continued during
this period, where the 71st Jager Brigade, the 57th Motorized Brigade and the elements
of the Ukrainian special forces largely withstood almost daily attacks by Wagner mercenaries. On several occasions, Russians managed to
enter the outskirts of Bakhmut before being pushed back by the Ukrainian army. The importance of the Bakhmut section of the
battlefield prompted President Zelensky and Budanov to visit it in late December to boost
the defenders’ morale. Nevertheless, Russia achieved progress in
this area for the first time in months. By the end of the year, Wagner made progress
towards Yakovlivka, Kurdyumivka, Klishiivka, Pidhorodne and Vodyane. Since progress inside Bakhmut has been repelled
by Ukrainian defenders on numerous occasions, which was confirmed by Wagner’s boss Yevgeny
Prigozhin, Russia turned its focus on the town north of Bakhmut - Soledar. On January 6, Wagner groups and Russian airborne
units broke through the defensive line manned by the 46th Airmobile Brigade and the 17th
Tank Brigade in Soledar. This allowed Russia to capture Soledar by
January 15, as Ukrainians retreated to a fortified high ground west of the town. Russians also occupied Bakhmutske and advanced
in Pidhorodne, Krasna Hora and Sil. The Russian movement indicates they intend
to advance on another supply line to Bakhmut and complete the pincer movement on this town. The fall of Bakhmut is far from being a foregone
conclusion and would not give Russia a strategic advantage. Still, it would be its first meaningful victory
on the battlefield since the capture of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in the Summer of 2022. Russian pressure on this front has forced
Ukrainians to divert some of its forces to this area, with as many as 30k Ukrainian soldiers
fighting in this direction against 50 to 60k Russians. Both sides suffered very heavy losses in the
battles of Soledar, Bakhmut and other sections of this front. According to the former Danish defence attache
to Ukraine Claus Mathiesen, each side has lost more than 10k soldiers in the battle
for Soledar. He does not specify whether this number reflects
all casualties since the start of the battle of Soledar or perhaps all casualties in the
Bakhmut-Soledar section of the front. In any case, this is a huge number for such
a small section of the battlefield, which seems to lack strategic significance. On the North Luhansk front, the Kreminna-Dibrova
section has been the hottest. The Ukrainian 95th Air Assault Brigade has
achieved notable progress, reportedly reaching Kreminna. Liberation of Kreminna would cut one of the
Russian supply lines to Severodonetsk and put pressure on the Russian defensive line
on this front from the south. Fighting has been ongoing throughout the entire
front, but neither side has achieved a decisive breakthrough in this period. The worsening of the situation in Donbas is
not the only factor which may hinder the Ukrainian attempts to prepare a strike force for its
planned offensive. A possible attack on Kyiv and the Northern
border of Ukraine continues to worry the Ukrainian command. Putin met with Lukashenko in Minsk on December
19, and the Belarusian president stated that Russia would deploy S-400 air defence systems
and Iskander missile complexes to Belarus and paid lip service to friendly relations
with Russia. Still, he stopped way short of making any
statements that may lead us to believe that Belarus is actually going to join Putin’s
Operation Z. But Russia continued bringing in more military
assets to Belarus. For instance, on December 20, some 30 Russian
T-80 tanks were deployed to Belarus. The Belarusian government announced restrictions
on entering three districts bordering Ukraine the following day. On December 27, British intelligence reported
that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army significantly weakened after Ukraine’s
Izium counter-offensive had been brought to Belarus. Earlier in December, the Ukrainian Commander
in Chief, Valery Zaluzhny, stated that he was sure that Russians would launch one more
attack on Kyiv. However, at this stage, most Ukrainian authorities
believe it is not likely. The Military intelligence chief Budanov told
the New York Times on December 24 that Russia is conducting a disinformation campaign with
the movement of its forces to Belarus to persuade Ukraine to commit more units to its Northern
Border. He claimed that Russian forces in Belarus
were not in an offensive formation, and the mobilized soldiers were sent to Donbas after
their training. Budanov also argued that Russia does not have
sufficient armoured vehicles to plan an attack on Ukraine from Belarus. According to him, Russians would send a train
full of Russian soldiers to Belarus, close to the Ukrainian border, and wait for several
hours before returning as part of their disinformation work. But Budanov still warned against complacency,
as he indicated that an invasion from Belarus could not be ruled out. According to the chief of the Ukrainian border
troops Serhii Deyneko, Russia had 10000 soldiers in Belarus as of December 28, which is insufficient
for a meaningful offensive campaign. On January 11, Zelensky mirrored Budanov’s
statements on the unlikeliness of an imminent Russian attack from Belarus but still emphasized
the importance of preparing for any potential offensive from Ukraine’s northwestern border. Ukraine’s defence minister Reznikov also
argued that a Russian offensive from Belarus does not look likely, as Russia lacks resources
and needs more time to create a formidable strike force from that axis and claimed that
Russia’s next offensive would probably come from the occupied Ukrainian lands. We will continue monitoring the situation
in Belarus to understand whether Russia is actually planning another attack on Kyiv or
if it is just a feint to force Ukraine to commit units to the border with Belarus instead
of using them for de-occupation efforts in the South and the East of the country. During this period, Ukraine struck several
deadly HIMARS on Russian military assets while Russia continued attacking the Ukrainian civilian
infrastructure. Russia attacked Ukrainian cities with Iranian
drones, cruise missiles, and airstrikes on December 16, 19, 29, 30, 31, January 1, 2
and 14. The last of these attacks was particularly
bloody, as at least 40 people were killed after a cruise missile hit a residential building
in Dnipro. These strikes further damaged the energy infrastructure
of Ukraine. Ukraine retaliated with several strikes of
its own on Russian soil. On December 26 and 29, Ukrainian UAVs attacked
the Engels airfield in Saratov, launching several drone attacks on the energy infrastructure
of the Bryansk oblast. But Ukraine’s HIMARS strikes were particularly
sensitive. On December 16, the HIMARS strike on Lantarivka,
Luhansk oblast, killed dozens of Russian trench diggers, while another strike destroyed two
ammunition depots in Zaporizhia oblast, killing several Russian soldiers. The strike on December 31 garnered the most
attention. It is reported that several hundred Russian
mobilized soldiers were in their barracks in Makiivka celebrating New Year’s eve and
listening to the Dear Leader’s speech when HIMARS hit them. There were so many casualties that even the
Russian MoD acknowledged 78 dead and 138 injured. But independent accounts talk about anywhere
between 200 and 400 killed in this strike. On January 5, Ukrainian sources reported about
a strike on a Russian military base in Tokmak, which hosted military equipment and several
hundred soldiers. These strikes have been so deadly due to the
Russian command continuing to inexplicably host hundreds of soldiers together with ammunition
depots within the range of HIMARS. The Russian Ministry of Defense tried to offset
discontent in Russian society with these losses with a fabricated claim that a Russian strike
on Ukrainian army barracks in Kramatorsk killed 600 soldiers on January 8. But journalists who visited the strike site
reported that a Russian S-300 hit an empty school, and there were no signs of any dead
soldiers. This war has already proven time and time
again that Western arms support to Ukraine is making a massive difference. Ukraine’s allies have continued providing
military, economic and humanitarian support to ensure that Ukraine can stand up to Russia
and will continue to do so. The period we describe has been particularly
noteworthy in terms of pledges. Western countries made about the supply of
tanks, which they have been reluctant to do until now. On December 16, the United States stated that
it expanded its training program to 500 Ukrainian soldiers monthly. On December 28, Spain pledged to train 2400
Ukrainian soldiers in 2023. Earlier other EU members made similar commitments,
and some military experts believe that Ukrainian soldiers trained in Western countries will
be used later during the Ukrainian army’s counter-offensive operations. In this period, the United States made several
significant pledges of weapon support to Ukraine. On December 16, the US Senate passed the 2023
military budget, which included additional 800 million dollars of military assistance
to Ukraine. The White House has also requested that Congress
provide additional 38 billion dollars to assist Ukraine. President Zelensky’s visit to the United
States, which was his first foreign visit since the start of the war, on December 20
arguably played an important role in expediting American military support to Ukraine. Zelensky’s speech in Congress was met with
the almost universal approval of American representatives. His meeting with Biden was important in coordinating
the future American support to Ukraine. On December 21, the US announced another package
of military aid to Ukraine worth 1.8 billion dollars, which included JDAM precision-guided
bombs, which we talked about in the previous video, HIMARS ammunition, AGM-88 HARM missiles,
artillery shells, ammunition, trucks, military vehicles, other types of assistance, and most
importantly, Patriot air-defence battery. One battery includes 4-8 launching pads with
four air defence missiles in each. Patriot is effective against both cruise and
ballistic missiles and will play an important role in Ukraine’s air defense after training
on this system’s use is completed in 2023. On January 5, the US announced another military
aid package worth 3.75 billion dollars, which included 50 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 100
M113 armoured personnel carriers, 55 MRAP vehicles, 138 HMMWVs, Sea Sparrow air defence
rockets, Excalibur precision projectiles, 18 M109 self-propelled howitzers, HIMARS ammunition
and so on. Notably, the US government has not used Lend
Lease to provide military support to Ukraine. Instead, it uses the means of its federal
budget not to add additional pressure on the Ukrainian economy. Other countries also made pledges and deliveries
of weapons to Ukraine. On December 19, 39 Canadian Armored Combat
Support Vehicles arrived in Ukraine. On December 23, the Dutch government pledged
2.5 billion euros for military and infrastructure assistance to Ukraine. On January 4, French President Macron promised
Zelensky to supply Ukraine with AMX-10 armoured fighting vehicles with large calibre tank
guns. On December 5, the German government pledged
40 Marder infantry fighting vehicles and a battery of Patriot to Ukraine. On the same day, Norway donated 10000 artillery
shells to Ukraine. On January 10, it was reported that Pakistan
would send 159 containers of 155-mm artillery shells to Ukraine, while Canada pledged to
provide another NASAMS air defence system. On January 11, Polish President Duda announced
that Poland would provide a company of Leopard tanks within the framework of a coalition
effort. This was followed by a British pledge to send
Challenger 2 tanks and increased pressure on Germany to supply Ukraine with Leopards. On January 13, Italy announced its intention
to give SAMP/T air defence systems to Ukraine. On the same day, Poland gave 8000 Starlink
terminals to Ukraine, while the Ukrainian defence ministry announced that it had allocated
almost 500 million dollars for the purchase of different types of UAVs. On January 16, the UK announced that it will
supply a squadron of Challenger 2 main battle tanks, 30 AS90 self-propelled howitzers, and
hundreds of armored vehicles, including Bulldog armoured personnel carriers, to Ukraine. The most notable difference in weapon assistance
to Ukraine in this period is that the West has finally started pledging Western-produced
tanks to Ukraine and increasing the supply of armored vehicles. This arguably serves the purpose of creating
necessary military conditions for a Ukrainian offensive. But Ukraine will need more to have a chance
at a decisive strike in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, as of January 16, according
to Bloomberg, Ukraine’s allies have provided and pledged 410 tanks, 300 armoured vehicles,
1100 armoured personnel careers, 1540 infantry mobility vehicles, 300 towed artillery units,
more than 400 self-propelled artillery units, 38 HIMARS, more than 40 Soviet-produced MLRS,
17 Su-25 jets, 31 helicopters of Soviet production, 30 TB-2 drones, hundreds of Switchblades,
37 Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, 8 NASAMS batteries, 2 Patriot Batteries and
so on. The difference this support has made so far
for Ukraine cannot be understated. But according to Kyrylo Budanov, Ukraine is
waiting for more modern weapons from its allies to break the stalemate. On January 20, NATO members and other allies
of Ukraine are planning another meeting at the Ramstein air base. Eyes are on this meeting, as they often led
to weapon pledges in the past. In comparison, reports on weapon supplies
to Russia were almost non-existent in this period. The US government’s sole claim regarding
this stated that Wagner had been purchasing artillery shells from North Korea. Pyongyang has denied this. There have not been any dramatic changes on
the diplomatic front either. The European Union adopted the 9th sanctions
package against Russia on December 16. Reuters reported that the EU members have
agreed on the price cap for Russian gas at 1900 euros per thousand cubic meters. Arguably in response, on December 27 Putin,
signed a decree banning the sale of Russian oil to countries that have agreed on price
caps. But a few days later, Putin backed out on
his earlier decree, and allowed “unfriendly countries” to pay in euros or dollars for
gas, if this was a payment for an outstanding debt. So far, the European policy of decreasing
dependence on Russian energy has worked to a certain extent, as Russia is struggling
to maintain the same level of energy revenues. According to the Wall Street Journal, Russian
oil exports transported via sea decreased by 22% in December 2022 compared to December
2021, as it will take time for Russia to establish a market for its energy exports in the East
as profitable as it has been in Europe. Sides continued making statements about possible
peace negotiations in this period. The CIA chief William Burns told PBS on December
16 that he does not see any “seriousness on the part of the Russians… about a real negotiation”. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov’s statement
of December 27 confirmed this, as he insisted on recognizing the illegal annexation of Ukrainian
territories as a pre-condition for talks. Putin reiterated this stance in a phone call
with Turkish president Erdogan on January 5. At this point, Ukraine is clearly counting
on its army and Western support to liberate all of its territory and does not intend to
bow down to Russian demands, while Putin does not want to budge from his position either. Putin announced a unilateral cease-fire dedicated
to Orthodox Christmas for 36 hours on January 6-7. Still, Ukraine rejected this proposal, as
they believed that Russia would use this opportunity to regroup. So, at this stage, the sides are very far
apart in their positions. But some believe that sides will be forced
to come to agreement, after understanding that neither of them will be able to achieve
a breakthrough on the battlefield. According to former NATO general Hans-Lothar
Domröse, Ukraine and Russia will stop hostilities in the summer, as offensives of both sides
will fail to change much on the ground. For now, Ukraine maintains its position of
insisting on its territorial integrity. Much will depend on how the military situation
develops in the first half of 2023. The comparison of armies conducted by Forbes
is a good starting point for understanding the advantages of Ukraine and Russia. According to Forbes, the firepower advantage
of Russia is diminishing due to the high degree of losses by Russia, the inability of its
industry to compensate for these losses, and the West’s continued military support of
Ukraine. Ukraine has an advantage in long-range artillery
(35-50 km), largely thanks to HIMARS and other Western systems supplied to Ukraine. But Russia enjoys a dominating superiority
in long-range missile systems (over 100 km), as Ukraine officially does not have any weapons
with this range. That is why Ukraine has been lobbying for
ATACMS missiles for several months. For now, Russia also has an advantage in short-range
artillery too, which enabled Russian to advance in the Spring-Summer of 2022. But according to the UK Ministry of Defense,
Russia won’t be able to sustain its level of use of short-range artillery necessary
for large-scale offensives. CNN recently assessed that Russia had decreased
the intensity of its artillery strikes by 75% in certain sections. A similar sentiment was echoed by Budanov,
who said that Russia had decreased artillery strikes from 60k artillery shells per day
to 20k shells per day. It is worth monitoring whether Russia actually
has an artillery shell shortage at this point, but it is hard to believe this, as short-range
artillery shelling has long been the cornerstone of first, the Soviet and then the Russian
military doctrine, which is predicated on massing of artillery on sections they intend
to advance on. Having said that, we can see the trend of
increased reliance on infantry by the Russian army, especially on the Donbas front. It is noteworthy that signals show that Russia
is planning to increase the number of its ground forces. On December 17, a chief of a military conscription
office in the Moscow Oblast stated in a video, which he later deleted, that conscripts will
serve for two years instead of 1.5 years starting in the autumn of 2023. On December 21, Putin agreed with Shoigu’s
proposal to increase the size of the Russian army to 1.5 million people. Earlier, Putin decreed to increase the size
of the army to 1.15 million people, so evidently, Putin believes that the Russian army needs
more men to have a chance of victory in Ukraine. There have also been numerous claims of the
second mobilization in Russia, but this has not happened since January 16. There have been changes in command of the
Russian army too. On December 26, Lieutenant General Evgeny
Nikiforov became the new commander of the Russian Western Military District. On January 10, the former Central Military
District commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin, dismissed for the disastrous Russian
defeat in the Izium counter-offensive following a campaign of criticism probably orchestrated
by the Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, became the Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces. On January 11, the Chief of the General Staff
of the Russian Army, Valery Gerasimov, assumed the position of the commander of the Joint
Grouping of Forces in Ukraine, replacing General Sergei Surovikin in this position, who became
a deputy commander. Gerasimov was in charge of the initial offensive
on Ukraine on February 24, in which Russia failed to reach its goals. Nothing suggests that he will be capable of
changing the situation on the battlefield as an effective commander. We do not have information on the inner workings
of the Kremlin and the Russian ministry of defence, but this shuffling seems like a continuation
of the power struggle between the official Russian army and the Wagner chief Prigozhin. Prigozhin and his men have been vocally critical
of the Russian army for a while now. They have taken center stage in the war from
the Russian side since the loss of the Kharkiv oblast. But it seems like the tide is turning in favor
of the official authorities. Prigozhin’s organization still lacks an
official status, in fact, it is illegal to create and join private military companies
in Russia. Even though the Russian government still allows
Wagner to recruit inmates and will most likely ignore the illegal nature of the organization
under Russian law, as long as it is useful in Ukraine and elsewhere for Russian foreign
policy goals, Prigozhin is walking a fine line and may well be punished if he crosses
this line. There has been an interesting development
in connection with the Ukrainian army too. In late December, a draft law increasing the
criminal liability of soldiers for disobeying orders from commanding officers was submitted
to the Ukrainian parliament. It was supported by Zaluzhny, who stressed
the importance of discipline in the army. This indicates that the Ukrainian army has
at least some problems with discipline in some of its units and the Ukrainian command
intends to address this issue. Nevertheless, part of Ukrainian society is
against this law, as thousands have joined a petition against it. The full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine
is in its 11th month. The war has had a wide range of consequences,
from thousands of deaths, widespread destruction, and economic problems to less publicized consequences,
such as the looting of art from Ukraine by Russia, which international art experts assess
as the most significant art heist since WW2. The most recent estimate of casualties in
the Russian army has been suggested to be at least 60k killed and three times more injured
by the French Admiral Herve Blejean. This means that Russia has essentially lost
close to 250k people killed and wounded. Blejean claimed that the Ukrainian losses
are smaller but are still significant. What about military equipment losses on both
sides? According to the Oryx blog, the visually confirmed
equipment losses for Russia as of January 16 are 1614 tanks, 3436 vehicles, 220 command
posts and communication stations, 556 artillery pieces and vehicles, 166 multiple rocket launchers,
68 aircraft, 75 helicopters, and 161 drones. For Ukraine, these are 449 tanks, 1255 vehicles,
8 command posts and communication stations, 215 artillery pieces and vehicles, 37 multiple
rocket launchers, 56 aircraft, 29 helicopters, and 57 drones. Our series will continue in the coming weeks,
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