It is the 8th month of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Much has happened on the
battlefield and the diplomatic front in the first half of October, but, unfortunately, we
are not moving closer to the end of this war. Ukraine continues its liberation efforts, while
Russia has started sending its first mobilized troops into the battlefield. Stakes are getting
higher, and the situation is escalating with the nuclear threat looming in the background. Welcome
to our video on the events of the Russo-Ukrainian war that took place in the first half of October.
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Ukrainian advance east of the river Oskil. On October 1, the Ukrainian army reached one of
the main targets of its operations in Northern Donbas by liberating Lyman as the 81st Airmobile
Brigade, the elements of the national guard, and the Klyuchevski Battalion entered the city.
Russia also lost Yampil, Stavki, Zarichne, Torske, and several other settlements in this
direction. At this point, the objective of the Russian command was to establish a relatively
stable defensive line from Svatove to Kreminna. The loss of Svatove would mean the loss of
a critical logistical line in North Donbas, and the liberation of Kreminna would increase
the threat on the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk agglomeration, which Russia lost many men
and equipment capturing. Russia retaliated for its losses with a missile strike on
Kharkiv, which took the lives of 24 people. Russian setbacks since September have caused
significant discontent in the elite as well. The Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov heavily criticized
the commander of the Central Military District, General Lapin, for the Russian losses on this
front and accused the Chief of Staff General Valery Gerasimov of protecting Lapin. The
oligarch and the owner of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, supported Kadyrov. Both
Prigozhin and Kadyrov have armed groups, and they have been among the most vocal supporters of the
invasion and consistently urged Putin to escalate in Ukraine. It seems like there is some fight for
power and status between the Ministry of Defense on one side and Kadyrov and Prigozhin on the
other. On October 7, The Washington Post published a story claiming that a member of Putin’s inner
circle criticized him personally for military setbacks in Ukraine. Around the same time, several
Russian military bloggers theorized that cracks were forming in the Russian elite as pro-war
and pro-peace groups developed in the Kremlin. Prigozhin and Kadyrov are the prominent
members of the pro-war faction, who intend to discredit the Russian military command and
strengthen their political positions through their actions in Ukraine. The pro-peace
group consists of Russian officials who want a negotiated settlement with the West
to avoid losing their assets and links with the West. We don’t have sufficient information
about internal processes in the Russian elite. Still, it is noteworthy that following Kadyrov’s
and Prigozhin’s criticism, drastic changes were made in command of the Russian occupation
force in Ukraine. In early October, it was reported that Lieutenant-General Roman Berdnikov
replaced Colonel-General Aleksandr Zhuravlev as the commander of the Western Military District,
while Lieutenant-General Rustam Muradov became the commander of the Eastern Military District
instead of Colonel-General Aleksandr Chaiko. Interestingly, Lapin has not been
replaced, despite heavy criticism, as it seems like Putin does not want to acquiesce
to the public demands of one of the factions, as balancing these factions has been one of
the key factors behind his long reign. Putin cannot afford to look weak at this point. Still,
Putin’s promotion of Kadyrov to general colonel, the second such promotion since the beginning
of the war, created some discomfort among the nationalist groups worried that the Chechen
leader was gaining even more prominence. At the same time, Putin also understood the gravity of
his military’s situation in Ukraine and appointed the overall commander of the Russian invasion
of Ukraine and General Sergey Surovikin, known for his brutal targeting of civilians in Syria.
He was appointed to this position on October 8. Very soon, he started implementing his usual
tactics in Ukraine, and we will talk about it in a bit, but for now, let’s go back to describing
the developments on the North Donbas front. Following the liberation of Lyman, the Russian
withdrawal along the front continued. In the south of the front, the 81st Airmobile Brigade
and the 95th Air Assault Brigade pressed the Russian army units, which had earlier retreated
from Lyman, namely the elements of the 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division, the remnants of the
battered 201st Military Base and the BARS 13 and 16 Volunteer Units, further towards the outskirts
of Kreminna. Also, on October 2, the 71st Separate Jaeger Brigade pushed back the 61st Naval Infantry
Brigade of the Russian army from Nevske, while the 66th Separate Mechanized Brigade liberated Terny.
By October 3, Russian telegram channels claimed the Ukrainian forward units had been able to
reach the P66 highway around Kreminna, which threatened the Russian units in Svatovo, Rubizhne,
and consequently in the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk agglomeration. Along with that, Nyzhe Solone,
Pidlyman, Nyzhnya Zhuravka, Borova, Shiykivka, Bohuslavka, Borivska Andriivka on the eastern
bank of Oskil were liberated by the 80th Air Assault Brigade and the 92nd Mechanized Brigade,
as the Russian army in this area retreated to the east bank of the river Zherebets to create a
new defensive line between Svatove and Kreminna. On October 5, the 71st Brigade continued its
advance with the liberation of Hrekivka and Makiivka villages of the Luhansk oblast, as
the 61st Naval Infantry brigade retreated towards the Russian defensive line around the
P66 highway. In the next few days, Ukrainian forces liberated Hlushkivka, Stelmakhivka,
Novolyubivka, Novojehorivka, Berestove, Pishchane, Krokhmalne, Kyslivka, Kotlyarivka, as the Russian
army continued retreating to their defensive line to presumably make a stand there. Reports of
the newly-mobilized Russian troops arriving at the new Russian defensive line between
Svatove and Kreminna emerged on October 11. Mixed information about Russian attempts to push
back the 81st Airmobile Brigade and the 95th Air Assault Brigade from the outskirts of Kreminna
towards Zarichne and Torske has been refuted by Ukrainian military bloggers, as the Russian
counter-offensive launched on October 11 failed. Nevertheless, the arrival of Mobiks, as Russians
call mobilized soldiers, may have pushed the Russian command to attempt to reverse the momentum
on this front. Surely, mobilized Russian soldiers are untrained or extremely poorly trained, but
the early indications demonstrate that Russia intends to send the bulk of its new conscripts to
the North Luhansk frontline to stabilize it, and the sheer quantity of Russian troops in this area
can potentially slow down the Ukrainian advance. As of October 16, Ukraine has been advancing
toward Svatove from three directions. The Ukrainian command intends to capture
this town before the number of mobilized troops becomes a problem. For now, Mobiks and
the remnants of the Russian army routed in the Kharkiv oblast are the best hope of Russia to
prevent the Ukrainian advance on Svatove and, eventually, Starobilsk, which, as we noted before,
are critical logistical hubs for the Russian military presence in North Donbas. Losing them
would mean that Russia would have to supply its troops in Donbas via a much longer route - from
M04 and E40 highways and railroads along them, which would only exacerbate the Russian supply
problem and could potentially become a heavy blow for the whole Russian occupation campaign
in Ukraine by becoming a massive problem for the Russian group in Severodonetsk-Lysychansk
agglomeration, putting the Russian control over vast land north of the city of Luhansk under
serious threat. We must mention that both the Wagner mercenaries and LDNR separatists started
constructing a line of World War-style trenches in the Hirske-Zolote area, which is currently
20 kilometers from the front. This raised some eyebrows, as this is the only general area
where Russian forces have any momentum, and the Ukrainian advance is happening elsewhere.
Russians also experienced severe problems on the Kherson front, where the battles intensified. On
October 2, Ukraine breached Russian lines along the right bank of the river Dnipro and forced
them to retreat up to 30 kilometers south. The Ukrainian 60th Brigade capitalized on the fact
that the Russian 98th Guards Airborne Division was pulled out for rotation and cut through
the understaffed 80th Motor Rifle Brigade. As a result, within a day, Ukrainian forces,
reportedly spearheaded by 17 tanks and 11 infantry fighting vehicles, managed to advance
for almost 30 kilometers from Zolota Balka to Dudchany as Russians hastily retreated. To the
west of Dudchany, Khreshchenivka, Shevchenivka, and Lyubymivka were also liberated. This attack
aimed to reach Nova Kakhovka and the P47 highway to divide the remaining Russian forces on the
right bank of the Dnipro. The 35th and the 36th Naval Infantry Brigades of Ukraine were not able
to achieve similar success around Davydiv Brid initially. But they finally managed to defeat
the Russian units in the area, as on October 4, Ukraine broke through the Russian defenses in
Davydiv Brid, liberating this long-contested Russian stronghold in the area, along with Velyka
Oleksandrivka, Mala Oleksandrivka. Russian retreat along Dnipro continued as they blew a road bridge
in the area to delay the Ukrainian advance. The long frontline in the Kherson oblast, sparsely
manned by the Russian units, was tough to defend for the Russian army suffering from diminishing
manpower, and as their defenses had been breached, they decided to drop back and establish
a narrower frontline roughly going along Bruskynske — Borozenske — Mylovo. The liberation
of Dudchany means that Chaplynka, which Russia used extensively as an airbase and logistical
hub, is now in range of the HIMARS missiles. Russian defenses in North Luhansk and Kherson
oblast had to rely on establishing strongholds in towns and villages since Russia simply did
not have enough men to defend the whole frontline properly. Such strongholds are vulnerable
to flanking and attacks from the rear, which the Ukrainian army took advantage of.
Some Ukrainian commentators have criticized the Ukrainian command for not pursuing the routed
Russian units and hence deepening their advance, as, instead, they preferred to mop up villages and
settlements on the way to prevent any surprises. The Ukrainian leadership probably chose this
tactic not to overextend its supply lines, but this has allowed the Russian army to build some
defensive fortifications on their next line of defense. There are reports of the construction of
fortifications in the city of Kherson and Vesele. These fortifications cover a small area, and it
looks like their purpose is to buy just enough time for the orderly retreat of the Russian
units from the western bank of the Dnipro, if holding it becomes too costly. On October
9 and 14, Russia attempted to counterattack Ternovy Pody, Nova Kamyanka, and Sukhyi Stavok,
but this attempt was repulsed. It is reported that another common destination of mobilized Russian
soldiers is the Kherson front. Putin wants to hold the right bank of Dnipro, particularly after
annexing Kherson oblast, even though he is not sure where the borders of his annexed territories
are, according to his spokesperson Dmitry Peskov. Military commentators predict Russia will have
to withdraw to the eastern bank of Dnipro in the foreseeable future. At some point, the Ukrainian
pressure, accompanied by the Russian inability to adequately supply its troops against the
background of ever-present HIMARS strikes on pontoon bridges and crossings on the river Dnipro,
will force them to make this tough and unpopular decision. It is claimed that Putin ordered his
commanders not to retreat in the Kherson front. On October 8, a huge symbolic, strategic, and
operational event occurred. A major explosion significantly damaged the Kerch Strait Bridge
linking Russia with occupied Crimea. This bridge consisting of a highway and a railroad,
completed in 2019, is a project considered very personal for Putin and has a symbolic meaning in
terms of his perception of himself as a “unifier of Russian lands.” The bridge was a statement
project, conveying the message that Russia is now forever linked with Crimea. The Kerch Bridge
allowed Russia to establish a land link with the illegally occupied peninsula, enabling the Russian
army to supply its units on the Southern Front. This explosion destroyed one lane of the
road bridge and damaged the railroad track. Russia immediately started repairing the bridge,
which is already open for passenger rail and light road traffic. However, it looks like the bridge
is still too damaged for the movement of heavily armored vehicles and rail freight transport, which
exacerbates the supply issues of the Southern Front. There is another railway and highway
connecting Russia to the occupied Kherson oblast, but the Melitopol-Tokmak railway is too close to
the Zaporizhian front, and the road connecting Mariupol to Kherson is of lower quality. The
damage to the Kerch bridge will likely cause delays in Russian logistics as the government
intends to complete the repairs by July 2023. There have been different
explanations for this explosion. The most common version corroborated by footage of
the incident is that a truck carrying explosives exploded on the bridge and caused the explosion of
7 fuel tanks moving on the railroad at this point. Unmanned kamikaze boats and missile strikes
were among other versions. Whatever the cause, the blast was received very differently by
the sides. Ukraine did not officially claim responsibility, but some officials openly
celebrated the damage to the Kerch Bridge. Some have speculated that the explosion was caused
by internal fighting in the Kremlin, possibly to sow more seeds of suspicion within Russian ranks.
The Russian reaction was disbelief and anger. After all, the Kremlin guaranteed the security
of the Bridge on numerous occasions but failed to protect it from what looks like an ingenious
operation of Ukrainian intelligence. At first, Russia did not officially blame Ukraine and opened
an investigation, which predictably concluded that Ukraine was behind this attack. It is essential
to mention that the commentators claiming that Ukraine committed a terror attack are wrong –
the bridge was used for military logistics and, as such, was a valid military target,
even though civilian casualties occurred. Russia retaliated with a series of strikes on
the Ukrainian civilian infrastructure lasting several days. It was arguably the biggest
such attack since the early days of the war. On October 9-11, six missiles hit several
apartment blocks in Zaporizhia, killing dozens. This was followed by an airstrike on targets in
16 different cities in Ukraine. Russia launched 83 missiles and 24 drones, according to the
Ukrainian command. Ukraine managed to shoot down 43 missiles and 13 drones, but Russia still
inflicted significant damage on the Ukrainian infrastructure in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Lviv,
Ternopil, Zhytomyr, Kremenchuk, and other cities. At least 11 civilians were killed in this
attack, which seemingly had little to no military significance, as Russia wasted its limited
precision missile and drone stockpiles to damage Ukrainian energy and heating infrastructure,
parks, playgrounds, residential buildings, a German consulate, and the pedestrian Klitschko
bridge in Kyiv. For several days, Russia continued its airstrikes using Kh-101, Kh-55, Iskander
missiles, and Shahed-136 drones supplied by Iran. These retaliatory airstrikes aimed to break
the resolve of the Ukrainian people to fight, damage their morale, and cause problems with
power and heating for ordinary Ukrainians. Surovikin notorious for destroying Aleppo in the
Syrian War, was putting his stamp on the Russian invasion using similar tactics. But this was an
ineffective use of precision missiles. There is no indication that these airstrikes have broken
the Ukrainian will to fight. On the contrary, it has made them angrier. Ukraine has responded
by striking the energy infrastructure of Belgorod, along with targeting Russian ammunition depots
stationed in the region. The Russian reserves of precious precision missiles have further
decreased: according to the Ukrainian defense minister Oleksii Reznikov, Russia has used
1,235 out of 1,844 Iskander, Kalibr, and air-launched cruise missiles since the start of
the war. Production of such missiles takes time, and sanctions imposed on Russia may impact further
production. Moreover, this attack has prompted the Western coalition to provide more air defense
systems to Ukraine. Germany delivered IRIS-T air defense systems, Spain pledged 4 Hawk air defense
systems, the United States decided to expedite the delivery of the NASAMS air defense systems,
France promised to provide Crotale short-range anti-air missiles, while the United Kingdom agreed
to donate AMRAAMS missiles compatible with NASAMS, while NATO is going to provide 100 drone
jamming stations to counter the Iranian drones. The Russian mobilization, the declared annexation
of the occupied Ukrainian lands, and the brutal attacks on the Ukrainian infrastructure have
pushed the West to provide more military support throughout the first half of October. The
United States pledged 155mm and 105mm howitzers, Excalibur precision-guided artillery shells,
other artillery shells, HIMARS and HARM missiles, more armored vehicles, claymore mines, anti-tank
weapons, and so on. Canada promised to deliver winter uniforms, drones, and satellite services.
The United Kingdom will provide 18 more howitzers and aerial drones. Germany agreed to send
more PzH2000 howitzers and MARS II MLRS. The West managed to maintain a steady supply
of weapons to Ukraine in October, too. There are fears that this arms support will
diminish the Western weapon reserves, but for now, the support is strong, and there is no indication
that it will decrease. Russia also made moves to replenish its weapon stocks. They have regularly
used Shahed-136 loitering munitions on Ukrainian military and civilian targets in its mass air
attack following the explosion on the Kerch Bridge and earlier on Bila Tservka near Kyiv.
According to the Ukrainian Southern Operational Command spokesperson, Nataliya Humenyuk,
Russia possesses between 300 to several thousand Shahed-136 drones. Later, reports from
Ukraine claimed that Russia had asked Iran for 2400 more drones. Iranian Telegram channels also
reported that Russia had ordered Arash-2 drones and Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar missiles from Iran.
The efficacy of these missiles is debated, but we know that they can respectively hit targets 300
and 700 km away. On a separate note, Russia also decided to take 800 T-62 tanks and some WW-2 era
D-1 howitzers out of storage to use in Ukraine. There are reports that the main Russian tank
factory – Uralvagonzavod, could only produce 24 tanks in September, primarily by cannibalizing
old tanks, which is not nearly enough to replace their losses in armor. Simultaneously, it
became known that Russia failed to deliver the T-90C tanks ordered by India and is using
them in Ukraine. These tidbits show that Russia has problems in terms of hardware production.
Interesting developments occurred in Belarus, a staging point for the initial Russian
attack on Kyiv in February, also used for the missile strikes. It has been relatively less
involved since the early days of the invasion, but throughout the war, rumors have been
circulated about the impending deployment of the Belarusian army against Ukraine. So far,
this has not happened, even though it has been reported that Putin has been pushing Lukashenka
to send in his troops. But this might be changing: On October 8, Belarus officially accused
Ukraine of preparing to attack its territory. On October 10, it was reported that Belarus sent
several dozens of its T-72A tanks to Russia. Moreover, Lukashenka announced the deployment of
the Union State’s Regional Grouping of Forces. Currently, it seems that only 9 thousand Russian
soldiers will be in this regional grouping, mainly consisting of the 1st Guards Tank Army and several
airborne units, which have suffered heavy losses. Ukrainians claim that Belarus is preparing to
host 20k mobilized Russians within the framework of the RGF. This may allow these men to be trained
appropriately, and to fix a considerable number of Ukrainian forces near Kyiv, to be ready for any
incursions from the northern borders of Ukraine. The fact that Belarus is sending tanks and
military equipment to Russia instead of stationing it on the border with Ukraine indicates that,
at this point, Russia and Belarus do not plan to attack Ukraine from the northwest. On October
14, Lukashenka proclaimed a counter-terrorism operation regime in Belarus without explaining
what it meant. It looks like Belarus is trying to appease Russia by giving its tanks and weapons,
and fixing some Ukrainian forces in the region with its posturing. We also have reports that some
Shahed drones will be stationed in the Belorusian Luninets airbase, creating a new vector of aerial
threat for Kyiv. It is difficult to say if it was another attempt to put pressure on Ukraine or
a symptom of a future escalation of just the routine governmental procedure, but some countries
diplomatically close to Russia, including China, asked their citizens to leave Ukraine.
This gives us a good segue to talk about diplomatic events. The UN vote to condemn
Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory passed with 143 countries in favor and
only 5 – Russia, Belarus, North Kore, Nicaragua, and Syria against. Rumors that Zelenskyy and Putin
might negotiate during the G20 Summit in Indonesia were circulated. Turkey announced its commitment
to facilitate the talks between the two countries. Armenia and Azerbaijan have seemingly taken steps
towards a peace treaty, and they managed to do it without Russian participation in the process,
showing how the situation changed in the region Russia considered its backyard. Simultaneously,
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries decided to decrease oil production amid
the price drop of the commodity. We also learned that the US had intensified the negotiations with
Venezuela to normalize the relations and get more of the Venezuela oil to the international markets
to keep prices stable. China’s lukewarm support of Russia continued, but their officials also stated
that any nuclear escalation is unacceptable. Not much changed on Zaporizhia and Donbas fronts.
In Zaporizhia, sides continued artillery battles without any significant movement. In Donbas,
Russia went on with its frontal assaults on Bakhmut and Soledar. Reports of attacks by
the Wagner and DPR units on this line emerged on October 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14. The 93rd
Mechanized Brigade continued its defense against Russian attacks, which were heavily taxing
for both sides. For the first time in a while, Russia managed some advance by occupying
Mykolaivka Druha, Zaitseve, Vesela Dolyna. The DPR separatist forces claimed they took
control of both Opytne, which Ukrainians have denied, and Ivanhrad. It is an interesting wrinkle
that Prigozhin denied the DPR claim, stating the battles near Ivanhrad were going on while the
Wagner group captured Opytne singlehandedly. In the first half of October, Ukraine maintained
its momentum by advancing on two different fronts. Russia is hastily sending in mobiks to bolster
its thinly manned defensive lines. However, the conduct of mobilization continued to be criticized
in Russia. Putin stated that “the Ministry of Defense did not make timely changes to the legal
framework on the list of those who are not subject to mobilization; adjustments have to be made,”
while the chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee, Andrey Kartapolov called
the Russian Ministry of Defense to stop lying. It is quite a heavy accusation showing the Russian
elite's frustration. But the problems with the Russian mobilization are so evident that even
Russian officials cannot help but criticize it. For instance, on October 15, the Russian defense
ministry stated that 11 conscripts were shot dead, 15 were injured on the military fire range
by two of their fellow soldiers, possibly on religious grounds. Russia continued its efforts
to recruit inmates. According to Russian human rights organizations Sitting Russia (“sitting”
is a slang term for spending time in prison), Gulagu.net, the Foundation for
the Rights of Inmates, at least, 15130 inmates have been deployed in Ukraine.
700k Russians have already fled their country since mobilization was declared, according
to Forbes Russia’s report of October 4. Other reports claim that the number is higher than
1 million at this point. Russia may claim that the mobilization is partial, but the events on the
ground show that it will continue indefinitely. Training, supply, and command of the mobiks
remained a big problem for the Russian army. Tens of thousands are already on the frontlines
with no training, hundreds dead or captured. The United States continued asserting that
there are no indications of Russia preparing for a nuclear strike, but the tension is still
there. This tension presumably pushed Elon Musk to suggest his peace proposal, which offered Ukraine
to accept the annexation of Crimea by Russia and to hold referendums in 4 occupied oblasts
of Ukraine supervised by international monitors. This caused an angry response from many Ukrainian
officials. The American political scientist Ian Bremmer accused Musk of making this suggestion
after talking to Putin, which Musk vehemently denied. This story developed with reports of
SpaceX asking the Pentagon to pay for the use of Starlink in Ukraine. But whether it was due to
the reports of the federal investigation of Musk’s attempted controversial Twitter purchase or some
other reasons, on October 15, Elon Musk made a U-turn and agreed to continue supporting Ukraine
with Starlink. It is good news for Ukraine, as Starlink is a crucial component of the
communication system of the Ukrainian army. Now let’s talk about the losses the sides
have endured. There were no recent credible reports on the Ukrainian manpower losses,
but according to the October 12 report of the independent Russian media outlet Meduza, 90k
Russian troops have been killed, disabled, or gone missing since the start of the war. Meduza’s
report is claimed to be based on an FSB source. By October 16, the visually confirmed losses of
sides, according to the Oryx blog, are as follows: For Russia, they are 1342 tanks, 2773 vehicles,
169 command posts and communication stations, 23 heavy mortars, 414 artillery pieces and
vehicles, 137 multiple rocket launchers, 62 aircraft, 53 helicopters, and
138 drones. On the Ukrainian side, the visually confirmed equipment losses are the
following: 298 tanks, 778 vehicles, 7 command posts and communication stations, 127 artillery
pieces and vehicles, 25 multiple rocket launchers, 52 aircraft, 15 helicopters, and 38 drones.
We are going to continue covering the illegal and unprovoked Russian invasion
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