Operation Postern - The Battle of Salamaua and Lae 1943

on january the 14th 1943 in one of the most important conferences of the war the entire politico military elite of the western alliance met to determine the future of the second world war the whole locus of allied strategic decision-making was now at the anfa hotel in casablanca before the arrival of churchill and roosevelt a body of military officials met to discuss the details of allied strategy this little-known administrative committee called the combined chiefs of staff was one of the western allies most important organizational developments in fact you could consider it a secret weapon in the meeting room at the anfa hotel sat six of the most important military officers in the western alliance the three american chiefs of staff marshall king and arnold were joined by their british counterparts brook pound and portal it was through this body of six men that the immense power of the united states and the british empire would be fused into one an alliance with a common coherent strategic purpose to which their combined resources would be applied no other two allies integrated so successfully at the highest levels of military leadership a unity which was a truly foundational ingredient in allied success mussolini as an example did not even inform hitler the italian military was about to invade greece opening up a new front in the war that is how effectively the axis powers coordinated their policy as much as combining the chiefs of staff generated unity in the allied cause that does not mean there was unity within the body all throughout the week-long conference intense debate raged although both the british and american generals had agreed that europe should be the top strategic priority there was fierce disagreement about what the strategy should be in the war with germany and just how much of the allies resources should be allocated to the war with japan the americans especially general marshall the us army chief of staff were advocating an early cross-channel offensive in their typically aggressive and perhaps a little simplistic strategic calculus the americans argue that the german center of gravity could be most easily attacked by france therefore that should be where the next allied blow would fall direct straightforward and nutritional marshall's idea was perhaps paradigmatic of the american way of war a doctrine which had its roots in the overland campaign the more experienced british however were not so optimistic about the prospects of a cross-channel invasion in 1943 only a small number of u.s forces had gained any combat experience essentially one core in north africa and most of the rapidly expanding u.s army was not fully trained their experience at dieppe had underlined just how difficult an undertaking the invasion of france was likely to be delaying that operation by a year would grant the allies substantial time to both improve the quality of their land forces and allow their growing air power to weaken the formidable german defenses instead the british were firmly advocating a mediterranean strategy considering the large lands air and naval forces already in north africa the allies could continue to advance into sicily and perhaps italy hopefully knocking mussolini out of the wall in general terms the americans viewed the mediterranean theatre as a strategic dead end one that was unlikely to fatally weaken germany in terms of the war with japan the british were completely disinterested in virtually any major allied offensives during 1943. although allied economic and industrial resources were immense there were still crippling bottlenecks unlike the germans or soviets the allied armies were amphibious meaning that wherever they attacked they needed large numbers of landing craft and aircraft the british were concerned that even a moderate offensive against japan would [ __ ] potential operations in the mediterranean admiral king argued perhaps a little dishonestly that only 15 of all allied resources were being devoted to the war with japan across both the asian and pacific fronts including aid to china although this was obviously an exaggeration the americans were adamant that although germany should still be the number one priority the allies should not relinquish the initiative in the war with japan that had been won at so high a cost after a week of argument including between churchill and roosevelt by the 23rd of january the combined chiefs had agreed upon an allied strategic concept for the prosecution of the war in 1943 japan was agreed upon as the fifth priority after the battle of the atlantic aid to the soviets operations in the mediterranean and the buildup of u.s forces in the united kingdom to keep the pacific war this high on the priority list the americans had to accept the primacy of the mediterranean in 1943. everyone agreed that there should be a limited offensive against japan but only in two theaters burma with the objective of opening the road to mainland china and reball in burma there was little hope of success in the whole indian theatre field marshall wavel commanded some 14 divisions and 24 independent brigades but generally speaking the vast majority of these units were at both a poor level of training and were poorly equipped on the burma frontier he had five divisions opposing him were the four japanese divisions of the burma area army all of which were first-rate formations weivel opened a limited offensive against akiyab in march 1943 but confronted by hellish terrain the monsoon and skilful japanese defense they were soon back where they started the only operation of note in burma during this period were the daring exploits of the chindits under brigadier wingate who led a fighting patrol deep into japanese held territory thus the locus of the pacific war in 1943 would be in the south west pacific area the great and famous offensives in the central pacific would not begin until the end of the year and really not gain steam until 1944. just before the casablanca conference martial ordered macarthur to submit his plans for the 1943 offensive the war in the pacific was divided amongst three primary theatre commands the central pacific under admiral nimitz the south pacific under halsey and the south west pacific under macarthur in the plans submitted to marshall on february 28th macarthur required an additional five american divisions and three thousand combat aircraft in addition to command over halsey south pacific theatre macarthur's plan called elkerton was quite lavish it involved joint airborne and amphibious operations against the two major japanese bases in new guinea by southwest pacific forces and advance up the solomons by halsey's south pacific forces followed by a joint attack on reball marshall informed macarthur that he could expect only two american divisions but these would not be available until the end of the year limiting their employment to 1944. about a thousand additional aircraft were being delivered to the fifth air force to understand the war in the southwest pacific area particularly new guinea one simple fact needs to be remembered in this theatre allied land forces were largely supplied by air this meant that the whole campaign revolved around the possession of air bases the further forward allied air bases could be established the greater the area that could be provided with fighter cover which was the primary limiting factor for c-47 operations this was the foundational rationale behind macarthur's campaign plan a series of operations designed to take specific base areas that could be developed as forward airfields once one japanese base was taken it would support operations against the next it was this fundamental operational principle that would take the allies all the way to the philippines in march admirals nimitz and halsey met in yumiya to discuss future american strategy after guadalcanal both agreed that capturing reball itself was beyond their capability given the forces at their disposal there was significant tension between the army and navy over who should be an ultimate command in the pacific as a whole during 1942 having three separate theatre commands effectively fighting their own wars was not really a problem given the allies were on the strategic defensive however as the war was now entering an offensive phase it was clear that the actions of the three theater commands should be coordinated to ensure unity of purpose the navy led by king argued that the war with japan was primarily a naval problem and thus nimitz should be in overall command macarthur resisted this idea fiercely arguing instead for his own elevation as was evident all throughout the pacific war the rivalry between the u.s navy and army would prove to be a constant problem for the allied war effort on the 12th of march representatives of macarthur nimitz and halsey all met in washington to plead their case to king and marshall a compromise was finally met as the primary allied offensive in 1943 would be directed against reball it was decided that the south and southwest pacific area commands would be coordinated by macarthur halsey and macarthur would still maintain their positions as supreme theatre commanders halsey was simply ordered by king to take his strategic direction from macarthur and was thus not formally under his command nimitz would only be bound by instructions from the joint chiefs of staff with macarthur now elevated to strategic command his talents began to shine as had been revealed all throughout 1942 macarthur had proven himself to be a poor battlefield commander he lacked the flexibility cool temperament and low level command experience to be an effective battle manager and his command of forces that were actively engaged with the enemy had been both panicky and often disconnected from conditions on the ground nevertheless despite his often overlooked weaknesses macarthur certainly had substantial strengths and campaign planning was definitely amongst them the fundamental concept for the allied advance in 1943 was developed by macarthur's headquarters called elkerton 3 this campaign plan revolved around the establishment of air bases on both the left and right flanks of new britain with the objective of bringing the full weight of allied air power to bear on reball this plan involved two simultaneous offensives by the south west and south pacific theaters respectively on the right flank halsey's forces would begin advancing up the solomon islands from their base at guadalcanal with the immediate objective of establishing air bases on the island of bougainville on the left new guinea force was to drive up the coast of new guinea with the objective of taking the major japanese forward bases of lei finshafen madang and securing the huan peninsula once these air bases had been taken reball would be within medium bomber and fighter range this was an excellent campaign plan certainly one that marks macarthur out as a very capable strategist and strategic to theater level operational planner additionally now that macarthur had more confidence in his subordinates and perhaps was a little more secure personally he was much more comfortable leaving operational control of deployed forces to more experienced generals in the south pacific halsey commanded a well-balanced and formidable fighting force his main strength was naval a powerful fleet composed of six battleships two aircraft carriers and three escort carriers which deployed 350 aircraft 13 cruisers and roughly 50 destroyers halsey's land strength was no less formidable totaling some seven divisions although three were recuperating after guadalcanal two marine divisions second and third four army divisions the 25th 37th 43rd and america and the third new zealand division rounding out this formation was the 500 land-based aircraft of the 13th air force and royal new zealand air force it was a well-oiled balanced and formidable fighting force strong in all three areas macarthur's south west pacific area was not quite so well balanced in this theater the allies deployed very formidable lands and air forces the fifth air force and r-double af deployed nearly 3 000 aircraft and their respective strengths were growing by the week but it was in the naval sphere that the southwest pacific theatre was badly lacking although macarthur nominally commanded the impressive sounding seventh fleet the formation was little more than a ragtag conglomeration of various australian american and dutch vessels as opposed to the battleships under halsey's command macarthur's primary surface assets were three cruisers hmas australia hmas hobart and uss phoenix which had replaced chicago eventually some landing craft and lsts would be made available but certainly not in lavish numbers nominally macarthur had three field armies under his command the first australian army second australian army and sixth american army although this last force was only a core in strength there were now three american divisions in the southwest pacific the exhausted first marine division had just been transferred to australia to recuperate after their heroic defense of henderson field the first marine division was a very high quality formation but it would need months of reconstitution before it was ready for combat operations the 32nd division was perhaps in worse shape after the gruelling battle for booner thus the only american formations which were battle-worthy in the first half of 1943 were the two regiments of the 41st division that had not been committed down the san andrea track therefore just as it had the year before the bulk of the land fighting in the southwest pacific area would fall upon the shoulders of the australian army just as in 1942 the vast majority of macarthur's land forces were australian under the direct command of general thomas blamey the southwest pacific area land force commander and australian commander-in-chief the australian army deployed some 13 divisions 10 infantry and 3 armoured or motorized more than the americans had committed to the entire war with japan to this point the australian military as a whole was now very well prepared to defend the country from a japanese invasion in april 1943 the army deployed 1 672 tanks with an additional 775 on order and the fighting strength of the raf was now 1441 aircraft including 523 fighters but clearly the time in the war where the japanese posed a realistic threat to mainland australia had now passed although home defense could not be ignored completely it was clear that large elements of the army had to be reformed for offensive operations powerful armoured divisions and independent armored brigades each of which deployed hundreds of armoured fighting vehicles would have been critical in any fight to save the homelands but they were practically useless in the jungles of new guinea it was also at this point in the war that australia began to face a manpower shortage the australian army was now half a million strong but this was only supported by a population of seven million thus nearly seven percent of the population was currently serving in the army a figure that does not include the hundred thousand rwaf personnel this is a much higher level of mobilization than was seen in either britain or the united states the australian military as a whole was receiving around 4 000 additional personnel per month but during major combat operations the losses soared to 11 800. this number called wastage included losses from all sources the largest of which were tropical diseases therefore although a large proportion of these casualties would return to service during every major battle the australian army shrank by nearly 8 000 men a month to address both the manpower shortage and specifically the unique challenges of jungle warfare the australian army instituted a new formation the jungle division this was a new pattern infantry division that was optimized for jungle operations all australian infantry formations were organized as standard patent british infantry divisions large units that were designed to operate in the wide open spaces of france and north africa the standard infantry division not only included countless motor vehicles but as the formation would always fight concentrated in north africa centralize the formation's firepower at the division level for example a battalion would always be able to rely on heavy firepower from the division's powerful artillery regiments however in the dense jungles of new guinea battalions and brigades were often fighting in dispersed areas far from divisional hq with a powerful centralized fire support could not aid them the hundreds of trucks and bren gun carriers were useless in a place with no roads thus throughout the papuan campaign large elements of the division indeed a large element of its combat power the heavy guns and vehicles remained stuck in base areas while the infantry fought alone all of these useless supporting elements still had to be watered and fed increasing the burden on the very limited logistical assets that were made available to the australians instituted in february 1943 the jungle division was a much lighter formation it was still composed of the same infantry strength nine infantry battalions in three brigades and one combat engineer battalion which are called pioneers in australian service but the supporting elements were drastically reduced the artillery complement of the division was reduced from three regiments to one with 24 guns instead of 72 the division's medium and light anti-aircraft regiments and anti-tank gun regiment were also dissolved the greatest change was in the number of vehicles an infantry battalion was now only equipped with eight jeeps or universal carriers and the whole division's motorized supply was reduced to a single company with the great reduction in vehicles and heavy equipment the division could also harvest supporting elements such as vehicle workshops this led to 4 000 fewer men per division because these formations had so much of their firepower taken from them these supporting arms were now centralized at the core command level therefore if a division required more firepower or mobility armored regiments or commando squadrons could be allocated to it by the corps or army commander greatly increasing the australian army's tactical flexibility to compensate for the reduction in the division's firepower especially the artillery upon which the infantry typically depends so much the structure of the infantry battalion was altered if a weapon could not be carried by a soldier it was culled the universal carrier and anti-aircraft platoons were disbanded reducing both the number of men in a battalion and the vehicles it required to compensate the battalions each received an additional medium machine gun platoon with 12 vicar's guns and the size of the mortar platoon was increased from three to four weapons roughly half of the australian army six divisions or essentially one of its field armies would be converted to the new pattern these formations would be the three aif units the sixth seventh and ninth and the third fifth and eleventh militia divisions these six divisions would eventually form the first australian army and it would be these new jungle formations that would act as the nation's offensive force for the rest of the war the remainder essentially the second australian army would be kept as standard patent infantry and armoured formations for home defense although these units would slowly be disbanded and absorbed into the jungle divisions as the war dragged on and more and more australian casualties were sustained this was the first time in the army's history that it deviated from standard british formation another way in which the nation really came of age during the second world war in comparison the united states never adopted a specialist jungle division one light division was raised the 71st but ironically this formation was deployed to europe unlike australia the united states could simply afford to be wasteful largely the invention of general blamey and general northcutt the jungle division proved to be a highly effective australian innovation and greatly added to the increasing superiority the australian army would display over their japanese opponents in 1943 and 1944 but it was not only the army structure that the harrowing battles of 1942 had shown to be wanting but also its training along the kokoda track australian formations have been thrown into intense jungle combat without any specialised jungle training even the veterans of the 7th division had suffered a kind of claustrophobia in the dense jungle in jungle warfare often one can only see 10 paces or less and at all times there is a feeling that the enemy could be close enough to kill you with their bare hands a report of the third australian division noted the particular challenges of jungle fighting especially in the mountains of new guinea such conditions of rain mud rottenness stench gloom and above all the feeling of being shut in by everlasting jungle and ever-ascending mountains are sufficient to fray the strongest nerves but add to them the tension of the constant expectancy of death from behind the impenetrable screen of green and nerves must be of the strongest and morale the highest to live down these conditions accept them as a matter of course and maintain a cheerful yet fighting spirit for men who had been fighting in the western desert this imposed a devastating mental strain as early as mid-1942 it was apparent to australian command that a large-scale jungle warfare training school was desperately needed and by november the kanungra military training area had been established here in the dense rainforest of southern queensland replacements and new recruits would be processed through a thorough and tough course of jungle warfare exercises called the blood and guts course by the men the itinerary involved dangerous live fire exercises and nights spent in the jungle with minimal equipment one of the instructors described the training we try to give him an insecure sense of his security in jungle warfare against the [ __ ] we teach him the difficulties and the measures to overcome them and then train him to use his thinking processes and moral courage in the application of those measures however he must be impressed with the fact that only the highest order of mental and physical alertness and condition will ensure his survival an american officer who inspected the conundrus school in late 1943 reported that every instructor had battled experience and all would have been rated by the u.s army as either excellent or superior in addition to the jungle warfare school at konongra the australian army developed a specialised large unit training area in the atherton tablelands in northern queensland here whole brigades could conduct week-long exercises in jungle conditions for the men of the 9th australian division these training areas were invaluable the rats of tobruk and victors of el alamein for the men of the ninth division the transition to the jungle from the desert was difficult but unlike the seventh division which had been thrown into battle along the kokoda track the ninth was able to undergo a thorough and three month long process of retraining including large-scale jungle warfare maneuvers when it went into battle it would be ready interested in australian jungle warfare innovations in mid-1943 the british set a military mission to inspect the australian army's training program which reported the australians have seen more fighting against the japanese than anybody else and are morally absolutely on top they are confident man for man that they can beat the japanese anywhere and at any time their ideas on training are eminently sound and they have all the facilities for training large numbers even though the australians had defeated the japanese in papua general hatatso adachi's 18th japanese army were about to face an even more formidable enemy now with a divisional organization that was optimized for jungle operations and men that had been extensively trained in jungle warfare adachi's task of holding southern new guinea had become far more difficult japanese high command had been counting on the 51st division to hold the salamau and lay area but with its almost utter destruction at the battle of the bismarck sea tokyo began to grasp the gravity of the situation in new guinea allied strength was growing by the day and if the australians were able to take salamawera lay and the huon peninsula allowing access to the bismarck sea then it would not only be reball that was threatened but the philippines with its southern defensive line breached and the establishment of allied air bases on the north coast of new guinea the japanese would struggle to stop the americans from simply bypassing their garrisons using amphibious forces to leapfrog down the coast under the cover of land-based air power at that point they would be within striking distance of mindanao the vitiaz and damper straits which lie between the huon peninsula and new britain are the last natural choke point at which the japanese could feasibly prevent this kind of offensive on the 25th of march imperial general headquarters issued a new directive to lieutenant general hitoshi imamura's eight area army headquartered at rabal the eighth area army commanded two japanese field armies in the solomon islands based on bougainville was lieutenant general harukichihai kotake 17th army which were facing halsey's americans and new zealanders the japanese forces in new guinea were primarily composed of general hatato adachi's 18th army imamura was ordered to immediately shift his focus to the defense of new guinea concentrating his main effort against macarthur's australian forces specifically imamura was ordered to do everything he could to hold salamawa and lay with the bulk of air naval and supporting forces to be concentrated there even if this was at the expense of hayaketake's 17th army in the solomons with the receipt of this new directive from tokyo on the 12th of april imamura summoned a conference at reball with generals imamura adachi hayakitake and the commander of the sixth air division lieutenant general gaichi itahana in attendance the japanese generals forged the following campaign plan for 1943. the 17th army would contract its area of defence to the northern solomons centered on the island of bougainville the 18th army would focus on holding salamau and lay including moving elements of the 20th division to the forward area base structure was to be improved especially along the huon peninsula coast and land communications were to be established between ley and medan this was a great plan but its implementation was as ever hampered by the scourge of allied air power the air environment had only deteriorated after the bismarck sea battle as now not even fast destroyers could make the run from a ball to finch half and safely the japanese were relying on submarines and small craft to supply lay the first actions taken to improve the japanese position were in the air clearly the allied air forces had to be disrupted if the reinforcement of lay was to be achieved this situation was deemed critical enough to merit the personal intervention of admiral isakaru yamamoto commander in chief of the combined fleet who personally oversaw the last major japanese air offensive in the southwest pacific area yamamoto ordered the 11th air fleet and third fleet to concentrate a massed assault on the three major allied air bases in papua from which the devastating attack in the battle of the bismarck sea had been launched the imperial japanese navy masked a combined force of 72 land-based medium bombers 81 carrier dive bombers and 182 fighters for the operation after a strike on guadalcanal the papuan offensive began on the 11th of april where 72 zeros and 22 medium bombers attacked allied shipping south of buna sinking a transport this force was intercepted by the 50 american fighters based at dobadura shooting down six japanese aircraft on the 12th of april the largest japanese air raid seen in the south west pacific was launched against port moresby 131 fighters and 43 medium bombers 44 allied fighters intercepted the japanese air raid japanese sources claimed this was a devastatingly effective attack with heavy damage inflicted on the air base and 28 allied aircraft destroyed however allied accounts of the action were much more accurate the damage inflicted on the air base was light and the allies only lost two aircraft claiming five kills but according to the japanese they actually lost 7 aircraft all fighters showing that the allied kill claims were actually low the final act took place on the 14th with a large raid against the australian air base at milne bay gain a reasonably small formation of 37 medium bombers was protected by a massive fighter escort 149 zeroes forewarned of the incoming raid the japanese were met by three squadrons of r-double-af rwaf kittyhawks the japanese claim they shot down 44 aircraft more than the australians had in the air on the 14th for the loss of 10 zeroes australian sources show that three kitty hawks were lost during the battle although these heavy air raids were generally ineffective in terms of inflicting major damage on the allied air forces they did allow the movement of two fast destroyer convoys to finch often nonetheless in overseeing this air assault admiral yamamoto had made himself personally vulnerable in a fatal era the admiral decided that he should make an inspection of the forward japanese elements on boganville but what the japanese did not know is their secure communications had been compromised an encrypted radio message was detected by allied intelligence and deciphered by u.s navy cryptologists it included the precise details of yamamoto's movements including the time his aircraft would depart reball for bougainville at 9 34 on the morning of the 18th of april 18 p38 lightnings detected yamamoto's aircraft a pair of g4m betty bombers escorted by six euros within two minutes both bombers had been shot down with andrew yamamoto's death the air offensive in papua immediately abated the shock of his loss only compounded the very difficult supply situation facing the japanese air forces in the south west pacific and solomon's although there were continued attacks on dobadura milan bay and wow these were never conducted in the same strength and did little to change the dominant position of the allied air forces nevertheless the lull in allied air activity allowed general ledachi to finally deploy his headquarters to new guinea by the 19th of april five months after he had taken command of all japanese forces in new guinea he finally arrived at madang and was now ready to personally direct the defence of the lay area on the 10th of may fresh from several months home leave lieutenant general herring the new guinea force commander arrived at southwest pacific area land force headquarters in brisbane to confer with general blamey the two men had forged a very capable team during the desperate battles in papua and blaming informed his friend that they would soon be leading the australian army into new guinea after receiving his orders from the joint chiefs of staff on the 7th of may macarthur had discussed his wider operational plan with blamey guinea force had been given the task of seizing the lay salamawa finchhafen and medang areas this included two of the three major japanese bases in new guinea and if the australians were successful they would have effectively broken the back of japan's southern defenses blaming had been preparing for an advance in this area from mid-1942 including the forward deployment of logistical assets but the grueling battle for buna and gona had robbed him off the opportunity in broad strikes the plan given to blamey by macarthur was good phase one was an amphibious and airborne operation designed to outflank salamala and take lei phase two involves the capture of the huon peninsula by forces in the lay area with the ultimate objective of taking medang however as was typical of macarthur's plans early in the war the details needed work macarthur's operational concept envisaged only limited operations against salamawa just one faint to cover a sixth army attack on good enough island nonetheless given the limitations of allied logistics including the fact that only small landing craft were available a forward staging area would have to be taken in the selimau area before any attack on lake could be contemplated thus rather than just a faint a significant attack would have to be made around salamawa to secure a staging area for the landing craft additionally drawing japanese forces into battle around salamawa would only aid in the capture of lei and increase the possibility that large elements of the japanese 51st division would be cut off and destroyed thus a revised and more detailed plan which was developed by herring and blamey was submitted to macarthur the third australian division would attack selamar from wow the 162nd infantry regiment of the 31st american division was to make an amphibious landing at nassau bay just south of salamawa which would act as the staging area for the amphibious assault on lay the americans would be reinforced by elements of the 5th australian division once this was completed the allied forces would engage the japanese 51st division in battle around salamawa pinning it there and reducing its combat strength then once all preparations had been made the final blow would be struck by the australian first corps aided by the 503rd parachute infantry regiment mcarthur approved the revised plan and tasked general blamey to take personal command of the offensive the operational plan produced by macarthur blamey and herring code-named operation postern was excellent the japanese would be drawn into battle around salamawa and then smashed by a simultaneous amphibious landing to the east of lay by the 9th division and an airborne insertion of the 7th division into the markham valley if properly executed these daring series of maneuvers would impose an impossible situation on the japanese but it also served a deeper purpose with the australian first corps now established on either side of the huon peninsula they would be well placed to execute a double in development on medang the only problem was the 7th and 9th divisions were still being reconstituted in queensland and the 7th fleet simply didn't have enough landing craft experience in kokoda and bunagona had shown that due to their training and battle experience the three aif divisions had to be the spearhead of the next advance they were by far the best formations in the southwest pacific area but none of them would be ready for quite some time thus for the next three months the allies would have to focus their limited assets on salamawa the japanese commander general adachi viewed salamawa as the keystone of the japanese defensive position the small village of salamawa sits on the shores of the huang gulf around 30 kilometers south of lei sited on a small isthmus the village is surrounded by the towering peaks of the cooper range the japanese had constructed an airfield and anchorage facilities in the area there are a few native tracks that link selamau with the inland villages such as wow but these are as challenging and precipitous as the kokoda track for example the black cat track that connects salomow to wow through the small mountain village of mubo runs for 58 kilometers through some of the most hellish terrain in either papua or new guinea jungle covered mountain peaks that rise 2 000 meters above the ocean below this makes salomow salomower very defensible the long overland approach from wow both stretched allied supply lines and exhausted their men and the various ridgelines and mountain peaks are ideal defensive positions for infantry lay conversely has none of these natural advantages it sits in the open grassy markham valley where the river enters the human gulf therefore holding salamal was the key to adachi's campaign plan if he could slow down the allies for long enough in the cooper mountains then the much anticipated road between lei and madang might finally be completed allowing the deployment of the whole 20th division to lay as the allied and japanese high command planned for the coming campaign the australians were tightening their hold on the bololo valley although a reasonably small encounter fought between two brigade-sized units the strategic significance of the battle of wow was immediately evident with command of the blowlow airfields the allies had a vital staging area from which they could simultaneously threaten the selimau and lay bases certainly if wow had fallen to the japanese the battle of salamal would have essentially been impossible to fight at least until allied naval forces in the southwest pacific area had been greatly reinforced aided by the commandos of the independent companies brigadier moton's 17th brigade had been enough to defend the base against a carbage attachment however it required substantial reinforcement for any advance on selamar to be a realistic possibility on the 24th of march general mckay the temporary commander of new guinea force while general herring was on leave summoned major general stanley savage to his forward headquarters in port moresby savage the commander of the third australian division was ordered to move his headquarters too well take command of kangaforce and hold the balolo valley savage was perhaps an archetypal australian general as opposed to the aristocratic british officer class many of whom had their roots in the minor nobility savage was the son of a butcher born in the rural town of morwell in victoria savage left school at the age of 12 to work with his father like most young men of his generation with the outbreak of war in 1914 he enlisted in the first australian imperial force as a private savage was a natural soldier and his talents for the martial life led to rapid promotion deployed to gallipoli as a lance corporal with the 24th infantry battalion his actions at the battle of lone pine were so meritorious that he was selected to serve as the battalion sergeant major the most senior nco in the formation he was just 25 years old on november 5th 1915 with his battalion still in the trenches at anzac cove second lieutenant stanley savage received his battlefield commission after the evacuation and withdrawal from gallipoli the 24th battalion was redeployed to the western front where it fought until the end of the war after serving as the reconnaissance company commander which included personally leading numerous trench raids savage was promoted to brigade intelligence officer where he performed well at the second battle of bullet court 1917 now captain savage found himself in the front trench line in effective command of the whole battalion isolated after penetrating the hindenburg line the 24th battalion was hammered by several german counter-attacks and the position was only held due to savage's cool command throughout the engagement for his actions at bullacore savage was awarded the military medal in 1918 major savage was awarded a bar to the military medal for his gallantry at the battle of passchendaele with the collapse of the russian position in the caucasus in 1917 as part of a group of military advisers savage was deployed to baku to aid the armenians and assyrians in halting the turkish advance for his actions at the battle of urmia where a small rearguard force under his command defended the withdrawal of tens of thousands of assyrian refugees civilians who were facing immediate genocide savage was again awarded for gallantry this time with the distinguished service order in the second war brigadier savage was given command of the 17th brigade the victors at the battle of wow which he led in north africa greece and syria the story of stanley savage is one of the many reasons why the australian army proved to be so effective in both world wars as the son of a rural butcher with minimal education the chance of achieving general rank in the british army would have been practically zero orkenleck wavel montgomery mountbatten alexander dempsey in fact practically any british general of note were either members of the minor nobility or had been educated at an elite public school but in a country of settlers one without a real aristocracy the australian army enjoyed a meritocracy that allowed for rapid mobility natural soldiers like savage men who had been educated by battle itself could not only achieve battlefield commissions but eventually attain the very highest levels of command it is this classless meritocracy that goes a very long way to explaining the quality of the australian officer corps throughout both world wars on the 23rd of april savage landed wow and conferred with brigadier moton although the belolo valley was now officially under the command of third division headquarters the forces under savage's command were still based around the former kanger force basically a polyglot division the third contained a number of independent companies and battalions from other divisions although there were several brigades around port moresby gona booner and milne bay that were available the number of aircraft limited the forces that could be deployed to the battlefront savage had around four battalions under his command from two brigades and a single independent company of commandos these included brigadier moton's veteran 17th brigade composed of the second fifth second sixth and second seventh battalions the 24th battalion of the 15th brigade and the second third independent company including supporting units the total strength of the third division was around 6500 men savage had a very large area to defend with such a small force the below low valley is around 100 kilometers in length and there were three potential japanese axis of attack along the black cat track from mubo to wow a secondary route that ran from salamawa through missim to the town of bololo and finally from lei along the markham valley savage struggled to cover all of these vulnerabilities with the limited forces at his disposal thus he decided the best way to hold the valley was through an active defense he would attack along the mubo front to fix japanese attention there while simultaneously dominating the other two sectors with aggressive patrolling opposing savage was the remnant of lieutenant general hidemitsu nakano's 51st japanese division which was also under strength one of its regiments the 102nd had been badly mauled in the fighting around wow although there were perhaps a thousand men of the japanese navy base units in salamawa this formation formed the foundation of the salamal garrison the first and second battalions were concentrated around the mubo area while the third was deployed on the japanese left flank holding a potential landing area at nasa bay another of the division's regiments the 115th had been basically destroyed in the battle of the bismarck sea losing around half of its strength and all of its heavy equipment despite this catastrophe adachi was able to sustain a small but steady flow of men to the salomawa sector by a small barge and submarine thus the japanese and allied forces were roughly equal in and around salamawa after pursuing the okabe detachment brigadier motion 17th brigade had encountered the main japanese defenses around mubo one cannot emphasize how treacherous the terrain is in this area every bit as formidable as the kokoda track the few routes that connected the villagers were little more than single-file walking tracks cut into the precipitous cooper mountains from wow the black cat track reaches an altitude of over 2 000 meters before it descends along the belowli river valley through mubo to salamawa this 40 kilometer march not only tested the men's fitness but made forward supply extremely difficult allied c-47s could drop suppliers to the forward elements but this was contingent on both the weather which in the mountains of new guinea is rarely conducive to flying and the availability of aircraft which were already employed flying supplies to wow thus motin could only support a single battalion in the mubo area as the men scrambled up the track they were constantly wet and in the higher altitudes the weather was cold to maintain their physical condition and morale motion ordered the construction of designated rest areas between wow and mubo an oasis in the jungle at each of these little villages of tents and tarps the men could spend a few days recuperating eating hot food washing their clothes and sleeping warm and dry this was so effective that some of the men even put on a little weight practically a miracle in the jungle by april the 2nd 7th battalion had advanced over the cooper mountains and was now closing in on the main japanese defenses around mubo surrounded by the towering lubabia and tambu ridges the tiny mountain village of mubo sits in the precipitous belowley river valley about 20 kilometers from salamawa here the japanese had dug in on a line that dominated mubo from three sides arranged in a horseshoe the japanese physicians were anchored on three hills observation hill green hill and the pimple to the south the 2nd 7th battalion had taken its own high ground with rifle companies holding lubabia ridge and matmat hill despite the strength of the japanese position the australians were determined to attack the first objective was the southernmost japanese defenses on the pimple a position that was less than a thousand yards from the australian line on the ridge the jungle in this part of new guinea is particularly dense with a tall tree canopy and thick undergrowth a japanese company commander wrote of the area that one advances as if in the dark on the morning of the 24th of april with the code word remember anzac the attack began after a faint on the australian left flank at observation hill and an air raid on the japanese rear areas captain pringle led his company against the pimple the company was divided into two columns a pair of rifle platoons would attack along the main track to the south whilst the remaining platoon and company hq would flank around to the left the attack immediately bogged down as the first column advanced down the [ __ ] track towards the main defensive perimeter they were met by intense medium machine gun fire from well concealed positions the pimple was a small hill on the end of a ridge with very steep approaches each of which the japanese had covered with entrenched medium machine guns to the flanks of these positions were light machine gun pits arranged in depth with supporting infantry for two days pringle's men tried to outflank the japanese positions with little success and by the 25th it was clear the japanese reinforcements were moving up to the area over the next two weeks the 2nd 7th battalion tried in vain to take the pimple with two further company attacks the last led by captain tatterson nearly ended in disaster on the morning of the 9th of may tannerson advanced behind an artillery and airborne bardman and attacked the pimple from the south but again the australians bogged down in front of the main japanese positions not only was the forest thick in the terrain steep but the japanese defenses had been very well sighted with cleared lanes of fire for their medium machine gun positions as tatterson's men assaulted the main defenses their flank sections began engaging enemy to their left and right then worryingly tatterson lost telephone communications with battalion hq the japanese had cut the track behind him unbeknownst to the australians the japanese had reinforced their forward positions and several companies were now at the pimple hitting tatterson with an immediate flanking counter-attack by 4 pm the australians were cut off and surrounded tatterson immediately deployed his forces for 360 degree defense pulling his platoons into a circle after a long dark and sleepless night of skirmishing around the australian perimeter at dawn the japanese began their assault the japanese probably outnumbering the surrounded australians by two to one attacked tatterson's men from multiple directions but the terrain favored the defender and the australians were able to hold their ground as the japanese infantry advanced through the thick dark jungle undergrowth they stumbled into the australian right flank positions concealed by the forest the bren gunners tore into the japanese infantry with a devastating ambush at just 20 paces range stung by the initial reverse the attackers began probing the perimeter for weaknesses constantly keeping the australians engaged in one example of the fighting here a bren gunner private waters engaged in a two-hour long battle with three nambu light machine guns that were all directing their fire on his position despite having the bipod and sights shot off the bren gun waters kept engaging the enemy positions until he was finally wounded handing off the gun to his number two private bowen manned the weapon alone and despite not having any sights silenced the two japanese lmg positions in an excellent display of battlefield leadership the wounded captain tatterson spent the day moving between his platoons showing himself wherever the fighting was fiercest both directing the defense and engaging the enemy with his own gun by nightfall on the 10th of may the rest of the battalion had finally broken the encirclement by a left flank attack pulling tatterson's men back to the main position at la babia ridge despite the heroic stand of tatterson's company the initial operations in the mubo area were not going well both general savage and brigadier moton agreed that considering the strength of the japanese defenses the arduous terrain and the small australian forces in the area attacking these positions directly was simply a waste instead it was decided to rely on active patrol activity to harass and ambush the enemy developed in the trenches of world war one the australian army's infantry doctrine always emphasized aggressive patrolling typically conducted at night small units from platoons to companies would leave the perimeter and venture out into no man's land probing for weaknesses and ambushing the enemy wherever they could the objective was to dominate the space between you and your enemy or no man's land as it is called rather than simply sitting inside your fixed defenses this concept was as effective in the jungles of new guinea as it had been in the trenches of the western front it both generated confusion and had an increasingly negative impact on enemy morale even if the australians were not attacking there was no time when an enemy could feel safe as their outpost line and rear areas were almost constantly engaged furthermore in the jungle there was no front line just a series of japanese and australian high ground positions which meant patrols could operate in enemy rear areas interdicting communications perhaps the greatest example of just how effective this concept could be were the feats of the second third independent company who were operating the mountains overlooking salamawa about 10 kilometers to the north of mubo the commandos of the independent companies were australia's first special forces graduates of australia's special warfare school in the frigid wilderness of wilson's promontory in victoria these formations manned with around 250 volunteers from regular aif infantry units were designed to operate behind enemy lines ambush raid and sabotage were their forte the country in which the second third was operating the francisco river valley was even worse than the mubo area here the men had no tent oasis to eat ready-made hot meals or wash their clothes they simply slept in the jungle but the commandos were hardy men toughened by the most fearsome training the australian army could provide and their morale was practically inexhaustible despite their small numbers and lack of any heavy weapons such as mortars and media machine guns although the men of the second third had commandeered a couple of vickers guns the commandos were able to confound the japanese simply by the use of aggressive patrol tactics led by the eternally aggressive major wharf the independent company constantly attacked the japanese in this area cutting the track from salamawa to mubo and ambushing resupply columns on several occasions one patrol even reached the coast between ley and salamawa wharf deployed his command over a very large area with individual platoons operating over a hundred square kilometers of mountainous jungle these were eminently fit men a trait which allowed them to move across this fearsome terrain quickly hitting the enemy in one area and then rapidly relocating to another by using mobility rather than firepower the 200 commandos were able to pin down substantial japanese forces by constantly menacing their right flank japanese command estimated that at least a battalion was operating in this area in an example of these actions wharf's men assaulted one of the major dominating terrain features in this area the bobdube ridge rather than attacking it directly warth deployed small detachments to move through the jungle and set up ambush positions covering the track from salamawa one of these elements about 20 strong had been waiting silently for two days lying prone in the marshy ground engulfed by swarms of mosquitoes the commandos were so close to the enemy outpost line that they could not speak to one another when the noise of battle erupted on the ridge a japanese element about 60 men began moving up the track to reinforce their frontline positions as the column moved to their front the commandos opened up on them at a range of just 20 meters the point-blank ambush was devastating in the hailstorm of bren and owen gun fire 20 japanese men fell dead and the remainder fell back along the track in confusion dragging their many wounded with them the commando simply disappeared back into the jungle after the success wharf's ambitions only grew bolder he began planning a raid on the outskirts of selimau itself savage had to remind the major that as good as his men were they weren't capable of taking on the whole japanese 51st division alone despite the failure to take the pimple over the two months of fighting since savage arrived the australian forces had certainly performed well by the end of may 3rd division intelligence staff estimated that they had inflicted over 400 casualties on the japanese 323 killed and 57 wounded over the same period third division had lost 20 killed in action and 58 wounded obviously the australian kill estimates may be high although it was relatively easy to count japanese dead bodies however it seems likely they at least inflicted a 10 to 1 exchange ratio on the japanese these lopsided casualty numbers are a result of the shift in australian tactics from direct assault to aggressive patrolling another indication of just how effective australian infantry doctrine was nevertheless even as the commando's use of aggressive patrolling was keeping the japanese off balanced around miss him in the mubo area the balance of forces was shifting against the australians by the use of submarines and a relay of small barges macabre was able to move substantial reinforcements to salamawa and by the end of may 1750 additional troops had reached the forward area the bulk of these reinforcements were two battalions of colonel katutoshi araki's 66th regiment which had been moved up from reball a formation that numbered around a thousand men along with the 66 some 200 reinforcements for the 115th regiment made it to salamawa in addition to 200 gunners of the 14th artillery regiment and 150 sappers from the 51st engineer regiment although most of general nakano's units were under strength there were now three regiments opposing the four and a half battalions of the australian third division major general nakano ordered colonel iraqi to begin moving suppliers and men to mubo in preparation for an offensive against the australians who were both poorly supported by artillery and at the end of a very precarious supply line savage had a second brigade headquarters on route the 15th with an additional battalion but these could not be moved up to the mubo area the attention of allied high command was now beginning to focus on nassau bay which sits around 20 kilometers to the south of salamawa this picturesque sandy inlet was critical for the wider allied plan by establishing a position there the australian forces in the mubo area could be supplied by sea but perhaps more critically nassau bay would serve as the jumping off point for the amphibious operation at lay herring ordered the commanders of the 3rd australian and 41st american divisions general savage and fuller to report to new guinea force headquarters at popandedo the three men quickly worked out an operational plan savage's forces would reckon enter the nassau bay area to facilitate the landing of a battalion group from the 41st division the americans would then join the australians in the battle for mubo and follow-on forces would be provided by the fifth australian division at milne bay d-day was set for june the 30th and savage assured fuller that adequate australian forces would be available to cover the landings on the 7th of june an australian patrol reached nassau bay and found it undefended as the australians were preparing for the american landings the japanese began to move against their main defensive positions around mubo on the 15th an observation post counted 486 japanese soldiers moving towards the pimple the next day two heavily laded landing craft were spotted at selamauer and on the 20th mubo was hit with a heavy japanese air attack involving 83 aircraft third division headquarters was increasingly concerned about the australian position at mubo but the forces in the immediate area amounted to a single battalion the second sixth which had replaced the second fifth the critical australian defensive position was lababia ridge a key piece of terrain that dominates the mubo valley and links the tracks with wow to the nassau bay area its loss would have certainly jeopardized the 41st division landings which were now just 10 days away the reality was much worse than savage knew at the time rather than the 500 or so that had been detected the japanese were moving up the first and second battalions of the fresh 66 regiment a force of over 1500 on the 20th there was only a single company on the ridge just 80 men and only one other company close enough to be of any aid the australian position had quickly become desperate manning the defenses on the ridge were four platoons of captain dexter's company one of which was the anti-tank gun platoon deployed his infantry lobabia ridge is an excellent defensive position its steeper sense rise nearly 500 meters above the valley below on its northern slopes are the primary japanese positions at the pimple and green hill the australian defenses rested on two peaks of the saddle which sat at the top of the ridgeline the forward most position through which the [ __ ] track ran was held by three platoons arranged for 360 degree defense whilst the rear position contained the company hq and a further rifle platoon the australians had been in possession of this ground for well over a month and had cited their machine gun positions well in a new tactic rather than camouflaging their fighting positions they had cleared the vegetation creating interlocking fire lanes because of the steepness of the terrain even though the japanese could locate the australian positions it was difficult to bring accurate fire to bear on them the engagement began on the 20th of june at 1 pm a patrol led by private what encountered a japanese force estimated to be 50 men moving up the [ __ ] track which he determined to be the lead element as the two units engaged in a confused firefight the volume of enemy fire quickly led what to believe that he was gracefully outnumbered heavily engaged what barely escaped annihilation when he reached the cover of the main defenses for three hours sporadic contact continued all along the perimeter as the japanese felt around the flanks dexter concluded this was a strong patrol designed to find the main australian positions the next day they made their main effort at dawn the quiet mountain air was pierced by the sounds of automatic fire dexter watched a section deployed down the [ __ ] track desperately scrambled back to the company although the australians could not see their enemy the sound of detonating booby traps all along the perimeter indicated large japanese elements were moving around both flanks writing of the encounter one japanese officer complained that the enemy had strung piano wire everywhere booby traps that detonated hidden grenades by midday brigadier moton was growing increasingly concerned by dexter's reports and immediately ordered reinforcements to move to the ridge at 1 pm the first major blow fell arranged on either side of the track hundreds of japanese charged lieutenant hedeman's platoon holding the forward position behind a torrent of mortar and machine gun fire the japanese charged behind their glistening bayonets despite their bravery automatic fire tore into the line as the attackers entered the cleared kill zones as was typical the japanese assault was conducted with the utmost gallantry despite the murderous defensive fire they were halted just 10 metres from the platoon's vicar's gun positions as the weight of fire drove the japanese infantry to ground they immediately began to suffer heavily from rifle and hand grenades weapons that were greatly aided by the advantage in height with the attack along the tracks stopped the pressure immediately shifted to both flanks both lieutenant rock and exton splatoons were engaged by enemy forces numbering in the hundreds again the japanese charged behind their bayonets and again they were cut down by the company's bren and vickers guns dead and dying men lay strewn just 20 meters from the australian positions for two hours the japanese infantry bravely assailed the defenses in one assault after another but they could not overcome the australian automatic weapon positions at 3pm there was a brief lol in the fighting as the japanese withdrew to regroup dexter decided that he had to reinforce his forward positions however all he had was a single section from his hq company these men were ordered to reinforce lieutenant hedeman's platoon as the men arrived at the front line they found hederman's men led by corporal smith fixing bayonets as hundreds of japanese infantry were charging through the cleared ground before them as they moved into the fire lanes the japanese were met with withering bren gunfire but this time the attack was so fierce it appeared the forward positions would be overrun just as the japanese reached the main defensive line the australians burst out of their fighting positions charging the enemy with bayonets drawn the bold counter attack proved to be too much in the face of this heroic resistance the attack melted and the japanese retreated down the hill and back into the cover of the jungle dexter's meager reinforcement had stabilized a desperate position and by five o'clock cameron's company began to arrive effectively doubling the australian strength by some miracle or more precisely because of the quality of their fighting positions australian casualties for the day were just nine killed and nine wounded it had been an eerie night for the defenders the noises of movement beyond the perimeter and the cries of the japanese wounded filled the darkness daybreak of the 22nd found the australians in a much better position they now had two full rifle companies on the ridge and were able to bring up ammunition overnight the japanese moved their attention to the rear australian position the other peak of the saddle where dexter had his company hq but the story of the 22nd was practically identical to the 21st the japanese attacked with vigor and courage but wilted under the weight of automatic fire as they entered into the cleared kill zones by midday these attacks too had been beaten back a japanese mountain gun was brought into action but beyond cutting the telephone wires to battalion hq its fire did little damage with the pressure quickly abating in the afternoon dexter dispatched a pair of patrols to make contact with the japanese force but could not find them on the 23rd no attack developed and the retreating japanese were hit with accurate fire from a supporting mountain gun battery the defense of lababia bridge was later described by major general savage as one of the classic australian engagements of the war it is still taught today at the army war college the battle is a clear example of how a small number of highly motivated men can hold off 10 times their number by using the terrain and well-sighted and constructed defenses it underlined the australian advantage in company level firepower both in the number of automatic weapons and the skill of their employment an advantage that had imposed such devastating japanese losses at the battles of milne bay gorari and wow lobia ridge could now be added to that list dexter's men were quite literally outnumbered 10 to 1 and were able to inflict a comparable exchange ratio australian casualties were 23 11 killed and 12 wounded while the japanese suffered 41 killed and 131 wounded with the decisive defeat of the 66th infantry regiment at lubabia ridge the allies were free to move ahead with the nassau bay operation with his company miraculously intact dexter was ordered to relocate to napier on the far end of la bavia ridge from this position he was able to cover the approaches to the landing areas whilst maintaining contact with the main australian positions at mubo the landing was to be made at midnight and it was critical that an australian force not only dominated the beach but was able to set up landing lights to guide the force in nassau bay had been under constant surveillance by a section of papuan rifles a task for which the native men were eminently suited however they had to be reinforced by the evening of the 29th dexter was in a position to cover the landings and that afternoon he dispatched a platoon to make the eight kilometer march to the beach as they approached the coast in the darkness they entered a maze of mangrove swamp a tangled mess of roots and mud although they had arrived early they soon became lost in the morass as their leader ercart could not trust his compass after two hours of marching in circles a small party following the sound of the waves broke through to the beach they were able to set up landing lights just after zero hour about five minutes late and by 12 30 the first landing craft crashed into the beach on board the amphibious craft were the men of the 41st infantry division a national guard formation raised from the pacific northwest states of idaho montana oregon and washington during the large-scale pre-war maneuvers conducted by the united states army the 41st performed so well it was rated to be the best national guard formation and one of the three best divisions in the army as a whole elements of the division had seen limited combat in the battle of buna and gona but for these men it would be their first battle the landing force was composed of the 1st battalion 162nd regiment under the command of lieutenant colonel harold taylor with attached artillery and engineer elements the first battalion had spent the prior month leapfrogging up the north coast of papua eventually securing the port of murobe here in preparation for this operation they met elements of the second engineer's special brigade the cape cod commandos by the 27th the amphibious force arrived at maro bay 20 higgins boats one larger landing craft mechanized and four captured japanese barges on the evening of the 27th a dress rehearsal of the landing was conducted and perhaps foreboding events to come the landing ended in failure the actual operation on the 30th went badly for taylor's men complicated by the tidiness of the australians nassau bay proved to be a very difficult beach to find the first pt boat overshot the landing area and had to turn around causing confusion in the following landing craft but after the beach lights were sighted the landing began however only two of the three landing lights were visible which caused the landing craft to bunch together these were only minor inconveniences in comparison to the surf uncharacteristically for this part of the world a heavy swell was running with 10 foot waves crashing into the beach unable to see the beach clearly the landing craft approached too fast and smashed into the sands where they were pummeled by the surfed they hit the beach so hard they immediately became stuck some of the boats that followed crashed into those that were beached and only one was able to be immediately floated to return to morobay despite this utter disorder the first battalion was organized on the beach without major incident by some miracle not a single injury had been sustained as their reputation would suggest the morale of the 162nd regiment was high and despite the setback they immediately linked up with the australian beach party despite their cheery spirits the americans inexperience was immediately noted by the small australian detachment as groups of men stood together smoking and talking in loud voices but within an hour taylor had them digging in tragically several americans were lost to friendly fire incidents during the night of the first some 18 men were killed and 27 wounded the outpost line believed their position had been infiltrated by the enemy and fired on what they thought to be infantry between their foxholes however they were almost certainly just firing on friendly positions no japanese bodies were found and the australians made no contact during the night the nights in new york were truly pitch black and the noise of the swamp surf and jungle quickly frayed nerves especially for the inexperienced it is exactly these kinds of incidents the australian army's jungle warfare training scheme was designed to avoid dexter's company was ordered not to approach the american perimeter after dark luckily for all the japanese forces in the nassau bay area were strangely inactive the 3rd battalion of the 66 regiment was reportedly holding an area to the north end of the bay this position was assaulted by dexter's exhausted command but found to be empty much to general nakano's disgust upon the arrival of the americans the japanese withdrew towards salamawa itself instead of attacking the beachhead that afternoon dexter advanced down the coast to the american position and reported to colonel mccachney the commander of the 162nd regiment the american radio equipment had been destroyed in the landing and motin was unable to make contact with his new american battalion as communications between mccashney and moton were established first by letter tension within the command structure immediately began to surface by the 4th of july the americans had landed 1477 troops at nassau bay and in line with the original plan agreed to in april moton ordered mckenzie to have four rifle companies ready for the attack on mubo which was planned for the seventh makeshift replied that given his supply situation he could simply not comply with these orders despite being nominally placed under general savage's command mckechnie had been ordered by his division commander major general fuller that he should not embark on offensive operations if not adequately supported by artillery and heavy weapons it would take he thought three weeks rather than two days to have his forces ready for the attack mccashney told moten to be very frank we have been in a very precarious position down here for several days and my sending the rifle troops inland was contrary to my own best judgment therefore these troops who are up there now are in no position to embark upon an offensive mission until we are able to get food ammunition and additional weapons up to them in short i must advise you at this time that it will be impossible for me to comply with the orders as they now stand both men immediately referred the problem up their national chain of command until it landed on general herring's lap savage was technically correct mccachney's men had been unequivocally placed under australian command and moton was only asking them to operate with a level of fire support that the australians had been provided with for three months mckechnie was simply refusing orders from an australian brigade hq but herring was concerned that if pushed fuller would simply involve macarthur which would only make the situation worse this was really no one's fault but rather just a symptom of how the two armies operated and what they were capable of motin was treating the green 41st division just as if it was another one of his veteran aif battalions ready to advance into the jungle with minimal fire support and little rations confident enough to be supplied by air this was after all their first battle clearly a more accommodationist tone was required by the australians martin informed mccachney that the position he wanted them to move to was already held by australian troops and the heavy machine guns he was waiting for were not useful in this terrain although the mortars certainly would be at most all he required from the americans was one or two rifle companies to move to the right flank position and cover the australians to aid in supply motion arranged for the transfer of a thousand australian rations his fear is delayed mckeshny gave moten permission to deal directly with colonel taylor moten found taylor to be much easier to work with an aggressive and capable battalion commander taylor was eager to engage the enemy with mccachney's blessing taylor rapidly moved his forces and linked up with the australians around la babia ridge his rifle companies were indeed ready for the attack on the seventh despite the genuine friendship of the fighting men this was not the first time that u.s officers chafed when placed under australian operational command and issues like this are one of the reasons why macarthur completely separated the australian and american forces in 1944 the mubo attack would be launched in three phases the first planned for july the first would be launched 20 kilometers to the north around missim here wharf's commandos had been placed under the command of 15th brigade which had been reinforced by the 58-59 battalion the primary objective in this area was bob dube ridge which if taken would dominate the main track between mubo and salamawa threatening the japanese rear the 58th 59th was a militia battalion partially composed of conscripts and the attack would be their first battle as the americans were landing at nassau bay the battalion advanced across the treacherous francisco river utilizing a rope bridge erected by the pioneer platoon and by morning they were at their start lines the four companies attacked simultaneously with two advancing along the river valley floor against a position called old vickers and the other two moving to the right flank against the ridge on the right the terrain was steep and although the japanese were not in great strength their position at the summit of the ridge was formidable even after approaching to within 20 yards the men could not see the japanese positions because of the pitch of the slope after a failed attack the militiamen decided to contain this position with one platoon and move the rest of the fourth to the left down along the river two companies attacked old vicars here the japanese were in the greatest strength with deeply entrenched machine guns nonetheless the attack initially made progress driving in the outpost line and clearing the village as the australians moved around the right of a large hill they were flanked by a japanese platoon which was approaching them from the area they had just cleared a confused firefight amongst the kunai grass ensued with the lead company close to being outflanked though the militiamen held off the counter-attack with heavily entrenched enemy positions on the surrounding high ground they withdrew back to their start lines although the three days of fighting in this area failed to make an impression on the formidable japanese defenses it certainly made an impression on japanese command on the 2nd of july the 1st battalion of the 80th infantry regiment had just arrived in salamawa from madang rather than reinforcing the mubo area which was savage's real objective these were immediately deployed to the bob dube ridge in fact nakano had ordered the 51st division's infantry commander major general chuichi muratani to personally lead two infantry battalions to this sector reinforced by the commandos of the second third independent company the militiamen held off the japanese counter-attack and began to make slow but steady progress isolating the main japanese positions and threatening to cut the track to mubo the japanese were utterly confused as to what the australian's intentions were evidence of the quality of savage's generalship on the fourth colonel iraqi convinced that the main attack was being made at bob dube ordered all japanese forces to withdraw from the mubo area towards salamawa however on the fifth spooked by australian patrol activity in the area he ordered his forces to hold their positions now convinced this was the primary axis of attack this retraction averted disaster but as some units had already begun to move the japanese forces in the mubo area were needlessly disordered with phase one of savage's operational plan working well the main attack against mubo was launched on the morning of the seventh moton's 17th brigade veterans of the battle of wow had quietly moved to their start positions during the previous day elements of two battalions would make the attack the second fifth and second sixth both of which were under the operational command of colonel wood the australians switched the weight of their attack to the left flank ignoring the pimple and instead attacking observation hill on the north bank of the batoya river at 9 30 am the opening of the attack was announced by the roar of over 100 heavy and medium bombers b-25s b-24s and boston's which made repeated bombing runs over the area for over an hour the entire mubo valley was blanketed in smoke and dust as hundreds of tons of bombs were dropped on the japanese positions as the bombers departed the infantry began to advance up the hill by noon they had reached their first objective a cleared area 1 000 yards up the slope without meeting any opposition pressing on at dusk they finally encountered the primary defenses at the top of the hill and although they were able to clear one position before nightfall it was decided to wait for dawn to renew the attack on the morning of the eighth the strength of the japanese position became apparent two platoons were left to cover the fixed defenses and the rest of the force continued to move around the japanese right flank on the allied right at la bavia ridge rather than attacking the pimple head-on the australians continued their aggressive patrol tactics several platoons advanced down into the jungle around the flanks of the japanese defenses where they clashed with enemy elements on the far right colonel taylor's americans made good ground their main objective batoy ridge was behind the primary japanese positions and was thus undefended but the terrain here was truly fearsome led by captain george's company the americans had to cross the treacherous batoy river using nothing more than hand ropes after passing that ordeal the guardsmen began climbing the ridge which was so steep and slippery that if a man fell off the one foot wide mud track he would slide until a tree stopped him the ascent took the men two days but at 3 pm on the 8th moton received news that taylor had two companies on the upper slopes and a forward element on the summit with allied elements on the high ground on both the right and left flanks the japanese position was beginning to deteriorate in the center of the allied line along the valley floor two companies of the 2nd 6th battalion were pushing on towards the americans at batoy ridge as a result of the allied tactics the combat in the valley over the next two days was highly confused rather than attacking the japanese fixed defenses as formed companies and battalions the australians advanced with platoon-sized patrols each of them moving through the thick jungle and down the various minor tracks and pathways probing for weaknesses japanese and allied elements would stumble into one another in the nearly impenetrable undergrowth this rapidly disorganized the japanese defenses as although their strong points at the pimple and observation hill stood firm they struggled to reinforce and supply them with japanese casualties steadily mounting the initiative of the company and platoon commanders and the high fighting spirit of the men was beginning to tell already disorganized by colonel iraqi's vacillations the japanese defenders fought desperately to try and hold mubo as an example lieutenant usoy's company of the 2nd battalion 66 regiment consisted of three officers and 87 men at the beginning of july by the 10th misue had only three officers and 46 men left to the far right the americans were now in place to outflank the whole japanese position taylor aggressively pushed elements forward cutting two of the main tracks and pushing on to make a junction with the australians to the west one patrol was led by lieutenant marvin b noble on the ninth noble led his platoon on a separate track from the rest of the company at dawn he came upon a grass hut with no century in sight and inside noble's men found 10 japanese soldiers fast asleep they awoke to meet their firing squad after making short work of this element noble pushed on alone until he stumbled into the main japanese force ambushed and heavily outnumbered noble lost nearly half of the platoon deciding to move back along the track to kotamium the small band of guardsmen met another large body of japanese noble was killed in the ensuing firefight as was the platoon sergeant the remnant of the force just 10 men were lucky to make it back to their company on the 11th no one had any idea where they had been the story of noble splatoon is a good example of just how confused the fighting was around mubo on the 12th the americans and australians met at the betoye river linking the left and right wings on the same day aided by a battery of 105 millimeter howitzers at nassau bay taylor had several platoons operating to the north of the japanese positions at green hill and the pimple as they approached the pimple under the cover of a persistent artillery barrage they found the japanese weapon pits deserted after visiting the salomon up front general adachi moved additional reinforcements into the area on the seventh he ordered the 238th infantry regiment of the 41st division which had moved up to madang from wewak to advance to lay by finchafin in order to reinforce the 51st division just as blamey and herring had foreseen adachi had decided to hold salamawa at all costs there were now elements of three japanese divisions in the lei and salamaw areas but it was clear to japanese command that they could not hold a line of this length in a very skillful operation despite the interdiction of the main tracks by american and australian elements during the night of the 13th of july the japanese quietly left their positions but the escape of substantial japanese forces did not doubt the elation felt at savage's headquarters mubo had fallen and the casualties had been relatively light at least in comparison to the bloodbath of buna and gona by striking first to the north savage had wrong-footed iraqi drawing japanese reinforcements away from the main attack and by the use of aggressive patrol tactics the australians had imposed a chaotic battlefield on the japanese one which inhibited their ability to support and supply their fixed defenses finally by acting boldly tailor's americans had outflanked the whole japanese position araki was left with little choice but to withdraw despite this being their first battle and the unfortunate incidents at nassau bay the americans had fought well colonel taylor had shown himself to be an able battalion commander and the men he led were physically fit well trained and showed a good fighting spirit they certainly upheld the high reputation of the 41st division the australian official history concludes by the 13th of july the troops of the third division had inflicted a heavy defeat on the enemy the japanese had lost mubo and their hold on bob duby ridge was insecure and subject to increasing attack the australian division aided by an american battalion had defeated their enemy under appalling conditions which required the highest qualities of physical endurance grit and determination after the fall of mubo araki contracted the main japanese defensive line to a row of ridges and hills that surround salamawa and the francisco river valley these positions were every bit as formidable as those which the allies had just taken underlining just how good of a defensive position salome was to support the next phase in the battle general herring wanted a forward artillery position within range of the town of selamar itself given the problems with aerial resupply the best way to achieve this was obviously another seaborne landing which would allow savage to supply his forces near the coast in a conversation with macarthur herring requested another of the 41st division's battalions be moved up the coast to establish a new position at tampu bay essentially a repeat of the nassau bay operation from this position taken in early july and just seven kilometers from the salamawa isthmus all of the japanese defenses and facilities would be within 105 millimeter howitzer range generals herring fuller and savage met at port moresby to discuss the operation herring decided that given the 41st division would be supplying the coastal drive fuller should retain operational command of these units however savage clearly misunderstood this conversation as his notes of the meeting showed that he believed the forces would be under third division command the first companies of the 3rd battalion 162nd regiment under the command of major roosevelt landed a tampu bay unopposed and began developing the area for the arrival of the artillery savage thinking that much like the other american forces in the area the third battalion was under his operational control placed it under brigadier moton's command upon the receipt of orders from the australians to advance and take one of the surrounding ridges major roosevelt responded with a remarkable series of messages not only informing moton that he was not under third division command but openly questioning the brigadier's technical military understanding and skill another american officer had shown his distaste for operating under australian command the problem was referred up the chain of command until herring had to resolve the situation ultimately by placing all of the us forces in the area under savage effectively making the 162nd regiment one of third division's three nominal brigades this certainly made the most sense considering the 41st divisional headquarters was 250 kilometers away but roosevelt was deeply unhappy with this arrangement the australian liaison officer captain sturek reported that roosevelt clearly resented working with the australians despite it being his job to keep third division headquarters informed about events in the american sector of operations roosevelt almost refused to answer any of his questions the only way sturrick could learn anything was by hanging around battalion headquarters and listening into phone conversations from their new position savage ordered the americans to advance to the ground between tambu bay and dot inlet and despite major roosevelt's concerns this was achieved without incident although caution was warranted given the experience of the 32nd division of buna it seems as though american officers of the 41st division often underestimated the quality of the fighting men they led the 160 second regiment now with two of its battalions in action faced a difficult task although there was now an australian american artillery regiment in support some four 25 pounders eight 75 millimeter mountain guns and four 105 millimeter how it is operational the japanese were well entrenched on a feature called roosevelt ridge directly in front of the high ground they were now occupying on the 20th of july they made their first attack on the japanese ridge top positions the operation initially made good progress as the two lead companies advanced from scout hill down the valley and up onto roosevelt ridge before nightfall they were halted by heavily entrenched japanese on the high ground however rather than holding the important ground they had now taken roosevelt ordered the men back to their start lines for two weeks the americans probed the formidable japanese defenses but failed to make substantial headway further to the west the australian 17th brigade was also facing a daunting task the fortress of mount tambu this feature the highest ground in the immediate hill surrounding salamawa was every bit as formidable as the pimple had been after initial attack was stopped cold motion decided to repeat the same tactics used in mubo his main plan for displacing the japanese forces at mount tampu and the town of komiatum was to isolate them from salamawa to do this he needed to entrench a good part of a battalion up on the komiatam ridge behind mount tampu but this area was nothing more than virgin wilderness on the 1st of august savage approved martin's plan and the next three days were filled with extensive patrol activity at any one time the 2nd 6th battalion had three or four platoons advancing down the various tracks around the flanks of the japanese positions the australians made slow but steady progress and by the 5th of august they had elements on the comey item ridge dominating the main supply line to mount tampu on the left flank the 15th brigade was still probing the japanese defenses at old vickers and by the use of similar tactics was able to cut the bobduby track cut off from supply and reinforcements the main japanese positions began to wilt on the 23rd of july sergeant kobayashi of the 115th regiment wrote in his diary this is our 71st day at bob duby and there is no relief yet we must entrust our lives to god every day there are bombings and we feel so lonely we do not know when the day will come for us to join our dead comrades can the people at home imagine our suffering eight months without a letter there is no time even to dream of home by the middle of august the noose was tightening around salamawa savage's tactics had worked although the progress had been slow by avoiding direct assaults on the main japanese defenses the australians had avoided the mistake the japanese had made on the bavia ridge and by the use of aggressive patrols had been able to disrupt japanese logistics thereby compelling them to abandon their formidable defenses on the 19th it was clear that the japanese were now withdrawing from mount tambu and on the bob dube ridge the starving defenders had also finally been compelled to retreat from the towering heights of mount tambu the allied forces looked down upon salamara itself which was now under constant artillery bombardment on the right the reinforced americans had finally cleared roosevelt ridge a task certainly made easier by the replacement of major roosevelt and brigadier general cohen by macarthur that day savage received a letter from general herring informing him that headquarters of the third division would be relieved all forces in the salomawa area would be placed under the command of major general milford's fifth australian division which would along with an additional australian brigade arrive at tambu bay within the week the relief was welcome savage and his staff had spent nearly six months living in rough terrain with his forces constantly engaged his command had certainly been successful originally ordered to simply defend wow the third division had taken mubo and driven the japanese into the outskirts of salamawa itself with general adachi's attention and resources now firmly fixed on the ongoing salomow campaign the time was right for the lay operation the centerpiece of operation postern the assault on lay aimed to unleash the whole australian second core on a duchy via a simultaneous airborne and amphibious operation the single largest offensive the western allies had yet launched against the japanese anywhere in the pacific the newly constituted second corps contained australia's premier fighting formations the 7th and 9th divisions to lead this formation the commander of the 9th division leslie moore's head was promoted to lieutenant general his replacement would be the very capable major general wooten who had masterfully led the 18th brigade at the battles of milne bay and booner moore's head's legendary shoes were hard to fill even for a man of wooten's girth but the new 9th division co was undeniably one of australia's best brigadiers a man who was intimately familiar with the challenges of jungle warfare because of the limited amphibious assets available the initial planning for operation postern had envisaged nassau bay as the staging area for the offensive but by mid-1943 macarthur now had sufficient capability to lift the division as a whole thus after a substantial process of retraining for jungle operations in australia the 9th division was moved to milne bay which would be the jumping off point for the operation the pristine shoreline of milne bay also provided a perfect opportunity for rehearsal as the 9th division arrived at milne bay major general vasi 7th division was headed for port moresby the victors of kokoda and goner vassi's men were certainly no strangers to jungle operations but by the end of the papuan campaign the seventh was almost at half strength the transition to the new jungle division pattern helped but the shortfall in men could only be made good by the disbanding of the first motorized brigade just like the ninth vassy seventh spent may and june conducting extensive jungle warfare exercises and by august the formation's fighting strength was again at its peak camped at gordon vale queensland was colonel kenneth h kinsler's 503rd american parachute regiment born in the small hamlet of deep river iowa kinsler was a highly respected officer intelligent and aggressive from its embryonic stages operation postern envisaged an airborne operation and thus on the 19th of june macarthur ordered kinsler to begin training with the australian second corps unlike the unhappy inter-allied relationship around salamawa kinsler and vassi quickly forged a harmonious team with the three australian brigades of the seventh division each conducting exercises with the 503rd kinsler was especially interested in the experience of many of the divisions officers at the battle of crete including brigadier doherty who was a battalion commander at the successful defense of heraklion along with the 7th division by mid-august the 503 had been transported to port moresby in great secrecy on the 19th of august herring held a conference at port moresby to discuss the lay operation which was attended by vassi kinsler wooten and colonel m.c cooper of the us army air corps the bedrock of the whole operation was the fifth air force it not only had to provide air cover for the invasion convoy and amphibious operation but it then had to do the same for the airborne landing and air bridge all in addition to providing close air support and interdiction of enemy airfields by this time in the war the fifth air force was a very potent formation with seven american and three australian fighter squadrons operational and papua but its assets were certainly not infinite its opposition was also growing stiffer with the deployment of the seventh air division to wiwak and madang from reball thus the main limiting factor was the amount of time the fifth air force could provide assets to cover the various operations as there would be no moon on the 4th of september wooden was guaranteed only four and a half hours of daylight fighter cover given the time constraint the planned pre-landing aerial bombardment was rejected allowing the men to hit the beaches at dawn the plan called for three landings all to be conducted about 15 kilometers to the east of lay d-day was set for september 4th first the 20th brigade supported by the 26th would begin landing at 6 30 a.m on red beach to protect the flank of the main beach head and provide an alternative landing zone the 2nd 13th battalion would simultaneously land at yellow beach this force numbering 7800 men in total would be primarily transported on four apds converted destroyers that contained both landing craft and the forces to be deployed these could rapidly steam to the landing area conduct the amphibious operation and then depart before the air umbrella was lifted the second wave some 2 400 men which contained the rear elements of the two brigades and bulk stores would land at 11 pm that night these would be transported on lcts and lcms the third wave would land a reserve brigade group and additional stores this force would land on the night of september the 5th red beach was in the vicinity of the bulu plantation luckily the owner of that plantation lieutenant w.a moaney of angow was serving in the australian army he provided brigadier windair of the 20th brigade and his battalion commanders a detailed description of the country although this area had the most suitable beaches for a landing it posed some operational problems red beach was some 25 kilometers march from lei in this area a five kilometer wide flat coastal plain followed the line of the coast north of which were the rugged foothills of the rawlings and range this plane was covered with dense jungle interspersed with patches of 10 foot high kunai grass and mangrove swamp near the coast on its approach the knight would have to cross five rivers all of which would be swollen by rainy season downpours as with many areas of new guinea there were no roads at all just native paths and tracks and even without resistance the advance on lay would be a difficult challenge to the west of lei bassey's objective was the old airfield of nadzab about 25 kilometers up the markham river valley from lane the markham valley is very different country to the mountainous swamp and jungle of salamawa and the huon peninsula a wide open grassy plain almost devoid of trees vassi's objective was not lay itself but simply nadzab after the airfield was taken and the seventh division was in the markham valley it would have cut the main line of communication between lay and medang inserting itself between the 51st and 20th divisions once the air base was developed vassi would be free to begin advancing up the markham valley towards medang the second phase objective of operation postern the op was scheduled for the 5th of september codenamed z day by the 7th division the 503rd would take the nadzab area by parachute on the 5th that day they would be reinforced by australian engineers these pioneers would be deployed into the bololo airfields and drive down the valley into the markham there were already small australian elements at the base of the blowlo valley it had originally been planned to stage the 7th division in the airfields at wow and bololo but these were simply not large enough to sustain the salamawa and lay operations simultaneously once the australian engineers had arrived by land and their american counterparts had been landed by glider their objective was the construction of a c-47 rated airstrip which would allow the seventh division to be flown in allied intelligence estimated that there were about fifteen thousand men in the lei and salamawa areas evenly split between the two bases with more combat troops around salamawa in fact as august passed through september and the pressure on salamawa increased so did adachi's determination to hold it on the 24th of august as the japanese forces fell back again from the bob dube komiatum and mount tambu areas to the outskirts of salamawa itself adachi ordered that a final stand be made at these positions the mission of our division is to hold salamal without yielding a single foot of ground our existing positions constitute the very last line of defense as a matter of fact despite the looming threat to lay adachi was still sending reinforcements into the selamar meat grinder including the 238th infantry regiment which had just arrived from madang clearly adachi did not comprehend the scale of the blow herring and blamey were about to land on lay although the japanese had been substantially reinforced by the deployment of the seventh air division to we whack and madang general kenny was about to show just how lethal the fifth air force had become by transferring the eastern fighter sectors including good enough island to reaf command he was able to mass six p-38 lightning squadrons for a major attack against the air bases in northern new guinea most of the australian number nine operational group had been busy supporting the third and now fifth divisions in the salomer campaign in any case in august general imamura the 8th area army commander had deployed the headquarters of the 4th air army commanding the 6th and 7th air divisions to weewak complete with its 10 000 additional personnel during this period the fourth air army deployed some 480 aircraft in the major basing areas around weewak both in the town itself and at a subsidiary airfield at butt on the 17th of august kenny's men struck at dawn a force of 47 heavy bombers a mix of b-24s and b-17s caught the japanese as they were preparing to launch over 200 aircraft were lined up on the airfield wingtip to wingtip with ground crew busily preparing them for operations only a couple made it into the air before sticks of bombs began tearing into the airfield with the runway heavily crated the japanese aircraft were sitting ducks for the low-flying b-25s and p-38s that made strafing runs at 9 00 am in just two hours the americans had left over 100 japanese aircraft burning on the ground for the loss of only three allied planes over the next two weeks beaufighters and mitchells prowled the coast of the huon peninsula hunting for the barges and small craft the japanese were using to supply the salamawa and lay front and by d-day over 200 of these vessels had been sunk in late august blaming decided to change the command structure in new guinea he would take personal command of new guinea force which would be exercised through general mckay and his staff formerly the first army commander lieutenant general herring would now command the australian first corps which contained the fourth brigade and 5th 7th 9th and 11th divisions essentially all of the australian forces in the combat area once lay had fallen lieutenant general moore's head's second core would take command of the 7th and 9th divisions for the drive to madang finally giving herring staff some rest blaming was ready his plan had thus far worked splendidly savage's third division had drawn adachi into battle around salamawa leaving lay practically defenseless a task that was now being ably continued by general milford's fifth division the enemy's air forces had been devastated by american air power and waiting on the beaches of milne bay and the airfields of port moresby were 30 000 of australia's finest fighting men in two of its most famous formations these divisions now not only well trained for jungle warfare but specifically equipped and organized for jungle operations were amongst the best in the western alliance and blame these generals had proven themselves to be more than a match for their japanese opponents the time had come for the opening of the largest land defensive the western allies had yet launched against imperial japan as dawn broke on the 5th of september the gloomy sunlight revealed the presence of a large allied naval force in the huon gulf the convoy consisted of dozens of amphibious ships lcis and lsts protected by a force of 10 destroyers 32 fighters roared overhead as kenny's fifth air force provided a constant air umbrella for the men of the ninth division who were used to the wide open spaces of north africa it had been a tough three-day journey from milne bay on board the cramped amphibious vessels those men lucky enough to be transported by the american destroyers were treated like kings on board uss glimmer the ship's cook served the australians roast beef and the captain opened the ship's canteen when glimmer put these men ashore the rats of dubrook would do so with pockets full of american chocolate and cigarettes a more generous friendly goddamn crew would be hard to find wrote one australian soldier despite the eagerness to get off the cramped vessels a quiet nervousness came over the men as they boarded their landing craft each of the four converted destroyers had eight lcps on board and as these were rapidly lowered into the calm water the men clambered down cargo nets into the small vessels as the first wave motored towards the beach the shoreline bristled with explosions seven destroyers covered the landing with a six-minute bombardment five inch shells detonated all along the beach in a dispersed fire pattern that was primarily designed to suppress rather than actually destroy any defending forces at 6 25 am the bombardment lifted and the landing craft hit the beach watching his brigade from the deck of an lci brigadier windair was satisfied with the operation meaning no resistance the first wave rapidly disembarked dispersed into lines and advanced off the beach and into the jungle three minutes after the landing the american shore battalion had set up beach markers and the heavier amphibious vessels approached after the initial assault waves of landing craft arrived in 15 minute intervals 15 on red beach and three on yellow beach which were interspersed by the arrival of the lcts big vessels that beached themselves like whales each one carried over 150 tons of supplies and vehicles by 6 45 five of these behemoths had beached and were unloading the artillery as the fifth waves of smaller lcis were just a hundred meters from red beach six japanese zero screamed in at low altitude strafing the landing craft which were followed quickly by three kate bombers one bomb hit lci 339 just forward of the bridge killing the commander of the 2nd 23rd battalion lieutenant colonel wall and accompany commander captain reeds despite this setback the landings preceded a pace by 8 am a wave of 5 lsts were landing heavy engineering equipment and the allied sappers were already pushing roads inland through the swamp at 10 30 with all 7800 men put ashore the great armada began steaming south for the safety of buna the landings had gone almost exactly to plan the only vessels that had not been unloaded by the time the air umbrella withdrew were seven bulk loaded lcts which were full of supplies these would not be ready to depart until 2pm as the engineers unloaded material on the beaches the combat troops rapidly pushed inland issues with the radios prevented communication between the various battalions but all had been well briefed on their objectives and needed no direction by the end of the day the two beaches had been linked the east bank of the buso river was secure and at 11 pm the second landing was conducted on schedule while the japanese resistance on land was minimal they made a concerted effort in the air in the afternoon several small air attacks were made against yellow and red beaches one of which inflicted 14 casualties on the shore battalion imamura ordered a large-scale air attack to be launched from a ball totalling some 80 aircraft as these approached the area they were detected by the destroyer uss reed which was acting as a radar picket just off the coast of finchoffen reed's on-board fighter controller directed a force of 48 lightnings to intercept and in the ensuing battle the americans claimed 23 kills for two losses although none of the japanese aircraft reached the beaches three detected reed on their way back to reball as the three aircraft made their attack runs reed downed one with anti-aircraft fire completing a truly excellent day's work despite the air cover provided several japanese aircraft attacked the convoy as it sailed for the safety of buno two of the six lsts that composed the second landing group were hit by japanese torpedo bombers on board lst 471 were the commandos of the second fourth independent company 34 were killed or missing and seven wounded a disaster for such a small unit nevertheless by the morning of the 5th of september wooton's men were well established as the knight division were busy expanding their beach head on the hughon peninsula the airfield deport more to be buzzed with activity as the ground crews prepared their aircraft for takeoff thousands of young paratroopers gathered around their steeds checking their equipment and weapons the young men of the 503 were ready and eager for their first combat jump they had been training for this operation for eight months generals macarthur and kenny walked amongst them as they waited chatting to the men and smoking cigarettes macarthur puffing his trademark pipe through ceaseless training and preparation kinsler had honed his command into a fine instrument their morale was high and all knew the importance of their mission amongst the hundreds of highly trained and elite american paratroopers were 30 very nervous australians two weeks earlier a concern had been raised that the americans would not have any artillery support until the nadzab airfield was operational hearing of this problem lieutenant colonel blyth of the second fourth field regiment said he would be happy to help the next day blythe issued a request to his regiment for volunteers to undertake a special mission and by the 22nd of august 34 men were placed under the command of colonel kinsler when the colonel inspected his new australians he asked the men how many of them had volunteered to be paratroopers no one stepped forward nonetheless paratroopers they would become on the 1st of september they conducted their first and only practice jump the men survived although one broke his leg on z day along with a pair of disassembled 25 pounders kinsler's australian paratroopers would be thrown out of a c-47 not one of the men objected much to their credit as the men of the 503rd boarded their c-47s mcarthur and kinney joined them kinsler's plan for the jump separated the landing zone into three areas one for each battalion these three lz's would cover the average news of approach from the north and east with the regiment's position anchored on the south by the markham river the artillery detachment would land in the centre and set up their guns allowing them to support all three battalions at 7 30 87 c-47 dakotas departed port moresby and three hours later the great air armada 302 aircraft in total was approaching nadzab as b-25s bombed and strafed the landing areas three columns of c-47s rolled into the valley low and slow each about 30 strong arranged in three ship elements generals macarthur and kenny enjoyed a box seat view of a textbook airborne operation as the dakotas came in at 600 feet flying straight and leveled directly over the lz's the sky was filled with white parachutes the transports made a single pass and then returned to port mosby above over 100 fighters orbited at 7000 ft and a squadron of b-17s remained on station for close air support unusually for a world war ii airborne operation the vast majority of the men landed in or around their designated lz's allowing kinsler to rapidly organize his command by midday he had companies of all three battalions extending his defensive perimeter the only casualties had been a small number of broken legs the australians had survived the jump with one injury although the scattered elements of the disassembled 25 pounders were hard to locate in the tall kunai grass meaning it was 3pm before they had an operational gun luckily and despite their bravery their services were not needed as no opposition was encountered while the american paratroopers flew overhead the australian pioneers under lieutenant colonel lang began advancing from the mouth of the bololo valley using some small boats they rapidly crossed the markham building a small floating bridge and within hours the 728 men were advancing on nadzab by 5 pm his lead elements had linked up with the 503rd and the construction of the air base had begun at 10 am on the 6th of september the first transport landed at the new airfield one that had barely been cut out of the tall grass and on the 7th it was declared operational in port moresby the men of the seventh division began the now well-practiced operation of loading c47s in the preceding weeks kenny had allocated a number of dakotas to the seventh division for training and the laborious task of loading 20 men and stores onto the aircraft as quickly as possible was practiced by every battalion at 4 am on the morning of the 8th members of the 2nd 33rd battalion were awaiting embarkation at jackson's air base as they waited in their trucks at the end of the airfield a b-24 liberator took off for a bombing mission heavily loaded with bombs and fuel the lumbering aircraft struggled to gain altitude until it clicked a tree as the plane hit the ground it erupted in an enormous fireball smashing into the five trucks loaded with the australian infantry 59 members of the battalion were killed and some 92 were injured but survived most badly burned in one moment a whole company had been destroyed none of the 11 aircrew survived despite this tragedy the seventh division continued to move its forces into the markham and by the evening of the 8th of september brigadier ether's 25th brigade's battle hq was deployed and operational as the 7th division was pouring into the newly established air base at nadzab the 9th began advancing on lay from the east wooten's men had been given the task of taking the japanese base while the 7th would block the main avenue of escape and reinforcement two brigades of the ninth division the 26th and 24th advanced on lay with one retained in reserve around the landing areas although some japanese resistance was met on the sixth the main problem facing wooton's men was the terrain in this part of new guinea rivers entered the ocean every five kilometers or so all fed by heavy rains in the rawlings and range the lead japanese elements had begun forming a defensive line at the buso river as there was no heavy bridging equipment immediately available a downside of the new divisional structure crossing the swollen buso would be a real challenge for the 2nd 28th battalion under the cover of darkness the men plunged into a strong current forming a human chain not all made it across thirty were swept down towards the sea thirteen of which drowned nonetheless by the tenth a firm bridgehead had been established with the advance along the coast taking longer than expected herring decided to reinforce the beachhead with the fourth brigade which could then hold the landing areas allowing all of the ninth division to focus on its objective between the buso and bulan rivers the two brigades advanced down the two main tracks one along the coast and one further inland by the 11th the lead elements were within artillery range of lay itself with 14 25 pounders now in place on the east side of the burep river blamey had imposed an impossible position on adachi indeed the japanese general now faced a bitter choice in a little more than a week the fortunes of the 18th japanese army had been totally revolutionized throughout late august despite being driven from mubo and much of the high ground the 51st division with elements of the 41st and 20th was still clinging on to positions around salamawa adachi had given orders that the line in this area was to be held at all costs but now instead of simply facing a single allied division around salamawa the 51st was surrounded by three with two fresh formations sitting on the main avenues of supply and withdrawal he had two options adachi could order the defenders to simply hold their ground and fight to the last however to do so would mean the sacrifice of fifteen thousand men forces which would have no hope of survival or escape if they allowed the allies to invest lay in a siege although salamal was defensible from the south lay had no such geographical advantages and there was only about two weeks worth of food in lei itself the only other alternative available to adachi was flight he could try and run evacuate his forces from salamawa and take to the jungle to the north of lei that meant some chance of escape from most of his forces however there was no chance of removing the large stockpiles of supplies and heavy weapons that had been amassed at lay over the last 12 months critical equipment that could not be easily replaced from japan on the 8th adachi decided to run issuing orders to the 51st division to withdraw to lay and then up the buso river valley to co but he would struggle to extricate his forces from this disastrous operational situation if the allies could block his remaining escape routes the position was bleak but he had one element on his side the weather poor visibility over the owen stanley mountains was seriously disrupting the movement of the seventh division to nadzab with flying usually only possible in the morning hours and the wet weather was making river crossings difficult for the ninth the japanese had perhaps a week after that time any forces in the lay area would certainly be destroyed on the 11th of september the 51st division began abandoning its positions around salamawa general milford's fifth division was rapid in pursuit at dawn on the 10th the 42nd battalion crossed the flooded francisco river and advanced rapidly on salamawa met on their right flank by mccachney's two leading battalions which advanced through some fearsome terrain by the evening of the 11th the australians had captured the village and its airbase and the 15th battalion was driving up the coast towards lei the japanese had spent six months defending salamawa but in the end the allies took it without firing a single shot nevertheless the japanese were able to withdraw the bulk of the 51st division ii lay what was left of it anyway mainly by sea during the night of the 10th or 11th of september by the 12th there were around 9 000 combat troops in lei although most of these were badly depleted nikano had elements of the division holding the seventh at the small village of yalu and were trying to slow the ninth by retreating from one river to the next japanese sources claim the situation was so desperate that the wounded joined the defense ahead of them was a fearsome challenge a 200 kilometer march across the formidable 4 000 metre high jungle covered rolling stone range to co on the north coast of the huan peninsula although the thick forest and mountain weather would protect them from air attack such a march would involve the men quite literally only keeping what they could carry artillery any aircraft guns any tank guns ammunition stockpiles all of the material a modern army needs to function would have to be abandoned as the 51st division began its arduous march towards the upper busy river valley stubborn rearguards fought desperately often to the death to slow the australian advance although vassy had suspicions that nakano would withdraw from lay confirmation came to australian command on the 14th in the form of a captured japanese evacuation order blaming immediately ordered vassi and wuten to deploy forces to cover the japanese avenues of escape however this was easier said than done bassey ordered brigadier doherty to prepare his brigade to deploy to nadzab immediately and march on the upper busu but bad weather again hampered its deployment on the right flank wooten deployed an independent company to cover one of the major crossings but there were not sufficient forces to cover every possible track as he told herring consider impossible prevent enemy evacuating as cannot block the many unknown native paths nor prevent bypassing of our posts where established on tracks in jungle movement south by 26 brigade will impede movement north enemy parties between river bumbu and river busu but not prevent enemy free to move from jacobson's emery's north west along the western side of the river bumbu recommend 24th battalion move at first light 16 september to area museum gowan and have issued orders to that effect two days journey just as the third division had found around salamawa you could compel the japanese to withdraw by interdicting their supply lines but in new guinea a country of dark impenetrable jungle and mountainous ravines effectively surrounding them was quite another thing entirely on the 16th of september the 7th division was now on the outskirts of town the 2nd 33rd battalion advancing down the markham valley road crushed a final pocket of resistance at jacobson's plantation killing 10 japanese men who had decided to fight to the death expecting further resistance they continued to advance down the road just three kilometers away to the east four battalions of the ninth division were also in sight of lay massing for the final assault all were expecting a strong rear guard within the town itself sergeant turner a station hand from glen innes in new south wales volunteered to lead a patrol forward as the section marched down the road they entered the cratered wasteland that was once the small town of ley the whole area had been subjected to the fifth air force's attention for two weeks the destruction was impressive the roads were littered with destroyed vehicles houses and debris meeting no resistance turner advanced rapidly and by 11 30 he was standing on foco point having cleared the whole town in fact he had advanced a little too quickly as turner and the rest of the company that was following his lead patrol were immediately strafed by american aircraft lay had fallen and just like salamawa it did so without a shot being fired the battle of salamawa in lay was a great allied triumph indeed a great australian victory the largest land defensive that had been launched against imperial japan by the western allies had gone largely to plan remarkably so blamey and herring had intended to draw the 51st division into battle around salamawa in order to make the defensive lay essentially impossible and adachi had played right into their hands dispatching reinforcements to the forward area even in late august by using maneuver specifically via the utilization of the allies domination of the air and sea the australians were able to impose an indefensible situation on the japanese they could either run abandoning all of their heavy weapons or stand and face annihilation although nakano was able to extract about two-thirds of the forces under the command of the 51st division in september four thousand japanese men were killed in the final drive on salamawa and lay the battered remnants now faced a retreat of nightmarish proportions towards seo one could argue that it was a blessing that the japanese escaped lay considering the bloodbath of buna and gonna the wider strategic plan elkerton3 never emphasized the destruction of the japanese army but rather its isolation that isolation was to be achieved by the establishment of airbases blaming had been tasked with capturing lay a job that had been achieved with remarkably few casualties 547 in the ninth division only 77 of whom were killed 38 killed and 104 wounded in the seventh furthermore the total number of casualties suffered by the seventh division in the lay campaign was 9 less than those suffered by the 2nd 33rd battalion in the disastrous air crash at port moresby had the japanese decided to hold lei to the last man and adachi had been free to fortify it the cost would have been far more severe losses the australian army was already struggling to sustain the ultimate objective of macarthur's campaign plan was to break through the japanese defenses in new guinea and establish air bases on the north coast this would both isolate reball and allow the us-6 army to leapfrog the japanese garrisons in dutch new guinea taking them all the way to the philippines whether the japanese 18th army was destroyed in the process or not was ultimately not strategically relevant the first element in the japanese defensive line had been penetrated one hinge of the door had been wrenched loose but there was still more to be done if the allies were to break out into the philippine sea and the western pacific the huon peninsula had to be cleared and madang had to be taken in designing this campaign plan blamey always had this secondary objective in mind from its base at nadzab the seventh was now free to drive up the markham river into the ramu valley and approach medain from the south while the ninth division could advance along the coast to finchoffen and ceo for lieutenant general moore's head's second core the pinter attack on lay was just the beginning of the campaign the end would come with a pinter attack on medang as much as the daring double envelopment of lei is the most remarkable element of operation postern perhaps the most impressive part of the battle was the performance of the third division around salamawa over months of grinding combat in hellish terrain the australians had clearly shown their mastery over the japanese in jungle warfare as can be seen at la bavia ridge and around old vicars an action that was not covered in detail here in attack the japanese were routinely defeated but it was the australian patrol activity that had a decisive effect as time and time again the japanese would be forced to abandon nearly impregnable high ground fortresses simply because they could not be supplied in the jungle there was no front line just a number of dispersed fortified positions and by utilizing aggressive patrols the australians especially the commandos and motion 17th brigade were able to not just dominate no man's land but disrupt the japanese rear areas moreover one cannot forget the excellent generalship of stanley savage the butcher's son from morwell savage immediately realized the need for an alteration in the australian approach approving the change to patrol and infiltration tactics and through the skillful employment of his infantry formations he continually unbalanced nakano pulling japanese reserves away from the actual allied objective he is certainly an australian officer who is under-appreciated by modern historians the americans of the 41st division had shown themselves to be fine soldiers men who were more than up to the task that was demanded of them however the first cracks in the relationship between australian and american command were beginning to show in a remarkable episode after the battle colonel mccachney would be relieved of command by general fuller who charged his subordinate with the crime of following australian orders and disregarding u.s interests this is despite the very obvious fact that macarthur had placed the 41st division under the operational command of new guinea force headquarters and thus by following savage's commands mckechnie was absolutely acting in accordance with macarthur's orders this kind of parochial pettiness and chauvinism would drive the complete segregation of the two armies in 1944 but as one campaign was coming to a close another was already beginning just three days after the fall of lay the australians were in pursuit of their defeated enemy although the 51st division was now a shattered remnant the bulk of the 18th japanese army the 20th and 41st infantry divisions still opposed new guinea force adachi was still in the fight there were over one hundred thousand japanese soldiers and airmen under his command in the three months of fighting across the huwan peninsula some of the toughest combat in the whole new uni campaign was still to come battles with names like shaggy ridge places that are still australian sacred ground to this day as 1943 turned to 1944 the final chapter in the pacific war was about to begin and the defeat of the japanese empire would be almost within reach

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Length: 128min 30sec (7710 seconds)

Published: Wed Mar 02 2022