Nuclear 101: How Nuclear Bombs Work" Part 2/2

welcome everybody thanks for tuning in again today we're gonna talk about how do you make the nuclear material that are needed for making a nuclear bomb in the last talk I talked about how you need plutonium or highly enriched uranium are the materials that are used in the nuclear weapons that exist today although there are some other isotopes that conceivably could be used to make nuclear weapons so there are two paths to the bomb the plutonium route and the uranium route on the plutonium route you need a reactor you put uranium fuel into that nuclear reactor in that reactor the reaction is taking place in releasing neutrons their uranium fuel absorbs neutrons some of it turns into plutonium okay then you have to take that spent fuel as it's called out of the reactor and you have to chemically separate out the plutonium that you want from all of the uranium and the fission products which are very radioactive and you don't want them in the stuff that you're handling for your nuclear bomb so you need a reactor and you need a reprocessing plant that does that chemical semi rate separation on the highly enriched uranium root you need an enrichment plant that is something that takes these almost identical I atoms of uranium-235 and uranium-238 and separates them out okay let me talk for a moment about what uranium 235 and 238 are and a little bit of the physics here so an element is a kind of material characterized by how many protons it has in its atomic nucleus so hydrogen has one helium has two uranium has 92 plutonium has 94 okay now different kinds of an element can have different numbers of neutrons so last time when we were talking about fusion thermonuclear weapons I talked about deuterium which is hydrogen with a neutron along with the proton in its nucleus so it has a dual nucleus of one unit of proton and 1 unit of neutron or and I talked about tritium so three things in the nucleus the proton because always one proton defines that it's hydrogen plus two neutrons makes three for tritium okay so uranium-235 is an isotope of uranium that has 92 protons and the rest adding up to 235 are neutrons so neutrons plus protons gives you the isotope number like uranium-235 okay uranium 238 has three more neutrons okay there's three extra neutrons make uranium 238 very difficult to split and incapable of sustaining a nuclear chain reaction either a chain reaction in a reactor or an explosive chain reaction in a bomb so you need the uranium 235 to get that chain reaction going so the uranium that you dig up out of the ground includes less than 1% of the uranium-235 it includes 0.7% uranium-235 all the rest almost all the rest is uranium 238 okay so how do I separate out the teeny amount of uranium-235 from that huge amount of uranium 238 well there's several techniques and I'll talk about them today there's gaseous diffusion centrifuges laser now as I mentioned last time none of these materials occur in nature all of them are very difficult to produce and one thing to remember in some past year some students have used the terms reprocessing and enrichment interchangeably as though they're the same thing they're not reprocessing is on the plutonium route it's a chemical process enrichment is on the uranium route it's usually not a chemical process it's usually a physical process based on the mass of these different isotopes being slightly different okay so we're processing is not equal to enrichment all right so this is just another version of these two paths to the bomb they both start with natural uranium you've got to dig it up out of the ground millet and get it ready okay on one path on the uranium path you send that to an enrichment plant and you might end up and with your product if you're making bomb material being something like 90% uranium-235 as opposed to 0.7% you started with and 10% still uranium 238 whereas your waste which are referred to as the tales from enrichment might be for example 0.2 percent u-235 rather than 0.7 percent you started with takes up a lot of energy to get all of the u-235 out so the tails usually have a fair amount might be 0.2% might be 0.3% might be 0.4% somewhere in that range and the rest uranium 238 okay on the plutonium route you have the reactor in the reactor the uranium absorbs neutrons turns in some of it turns into plutonium you have the spent fuel that has about one percent plutonium and then the other 99 percent is the uranium and efficient products okay how much is the fission products depends on how long that spent fuel has been in the reactor how much power it's generated how much efficient has taken place okay so then you do the reprocessing and that separates that spent fuel into three heaps a heap of plutonium a heap of uranium and a heap of high-level waste which is efficient products go okay the both routes start from mining uranium both end with converting the products either the uranium or the plutonium to metal and then from that metal making bomb components these are just some pictures to help you with that same way of thinking so you start with mining you see a picture there of uranium bearing rock now when you dig it up out of the ground it's literally a rock and the rock contains some uranium but you know it's mostly rock so you need to do what's called milling to get purified uranium from those rocks and usually you end up with a particular oxide of uranium that's you 308 which is referred to as yellow cake so you can see the picture under milling there is a bright yellow powder that's why it's referred to as yellow cake okay so then if you're going the enrichment route you need to figure out a way to take that uranium which is a solid when it's in the yellow cake floor and make it into a gas because almost all of the enrichment techniques that people have thought of involve a gas going through a process okay now it turns out more or less by accident that the only chemical compound of uranium that is a gas at reasonable temperatures and pressures is uranium hexafluoride that is uf6 so one uranium atom six fluorine atoms now any of you who know very much chemistry can probably guess that anything with 6 fluorines in it is going to be a nasty toxic substance and that is certainly true of uranium hexafluoride all right so you take your rhenium hexafluoride i have a picture of one of the huge barrels that that's stored in here and that goes to an enrichment plant we'll talk more about enrichment later but that separates out the slightly lighter uranium-235 atoms from the slightly heavier uranium 238 atoms and then you go to conversion to metal and fabrication you can see there a ring of I believe it's plutonium metal in that picture now on the lower route which is the plutonium route you take that yellow cake that you've got from milling the uranium that you mind and you send it you convert it to some different thing you might convert it to metal or you might convert it to oxide depending on what kind of fuel you're using in your reactor so then you fabricate it into fuel you put that fuel into the reactor it sits in the reactor for a while generates some fishing you end up with plutonium in the spent fuel you take the spent fuel and after storing it in a pool for a while to let it cool off a little bit you send it to the reprocessing plant where which chemically separates out the plutonium and then you send it to the conversion and metal fabrication stage so this is just a picture of the civilian fuel cycle which gives you a feel for the scale so you start off with a hundred and seventy tons of uranium as uranium oxide on the left side of the picture that's coming from your milling plant after your mining and you end up with only 24 tons of fuel actually going into the reactor and then as I which is on the right side and then as I mentioned after it's been in the reactor for a while you put it in literally a swimming pool of water and of course you don't do a whole lot of swimming in that particular pool and you let it cool for a while and then you can either reprocess it you can do that for civilian purposes as well to get plutonium that you would then use as civilian reactor fuel instead of bomb material or either reprocessing can also by bomb until this is one of the basic problems of the nuclear age is that the enrichment that's needed to produce highly enriched uranium is also needed to produce low enriched uranium for civilian power and it's more or less similar technologies that can do either bombs or fuel for civilian power plants and similarly the reprocessing that some countries use to treat spent fuel can then provide either plutonium for civilian fuel or plutonium for nuclear weapons all right so it turns out that all of the all of the ways that humans have thought of so far to enrich uranium only do a little bit of enrichment at a time so it concentrates the uranium-235 a little bit more than it used to be concentrated so you have to hook a whole bunch of them together in what's called a cascade so you have lots of separating units whatever technology of separating unit you've got and you put the feed in more or less in the middle of the cascade and then the stuff that is a little bit more enriched goes toward the product end of the cascade and gets more and more and more enriched at each stage and at each stage the stuff that's a little bit less enriched gets fed back to the previous stage so you can strip more of this stuff out so these cascades can be fairly complicated to model and certainly complicated to build and operate but the basic notion is you've got a flow of more and more enriched stuff heading toward the product and a flow of less and less and less enriched stuff becoming tails heading toward the tails end of the cascade so if you want to make highly enriched uranium you need a lot of stages where you have smaller and smaller numbers of separating units at each of those stages as you get toward more and more enriched material so you would put the feed in at the largest of those green bars and then as you get toward the smaller and smaller and smaller number of machines at each stage you're getting to the more and more and more enriched material and then this stuff toward the left of the tallest green bar is where you're stripping out the u-235 from the tails and then that relatively small green bar at the far left is where the tails would eventually come out of the cascade now if you weren't going to enrich it as much if you only wanted to produce low-enriched uranium you wouldn't need as many stages are in your cascade all right so one way that you can set up these cascades one technology that you can use is called gaseous diffusion and so what this is is you put in a gas uranium hexafluoride at fairly high pressure and you have a barrier that has tiny microscopic holes in it okay and these atoms are bouncing around in the gas and the uranium-235 atoms because they're lighter for the same amount of energy bounce a little bit faster so in order to have the same kinetic energy with less mass that gotta go do you bit faster and so there's a slightly higher chance that one of those atoms will find one of the holes in the barrier material and pass through to the other side of the barrier okay there's only a slightly different chance very slightly different chance so you need to have another barrier and another gaseous diffusion unit and another barrier and another gaseous diffusion unit and insulin and so on and so on and in fact you need gigantic facilities the facility in the picture there is one of the u.s. enrichment plants that since been dismantled it was absolutely huge I mean they used bicycles to go up and down the enrichment halls because it was just too far to walk to to get there at any reasonable amount of time and this process because you're putting this stuff in at high pressure you need these big pumps to get it to go through it requires a huge amount of electricity a giant amount of electricity it is essentially a process of turning electricity into enrichment electricity is is overwhelmingly the the major cost that you have when you're operating one of these gaseous diffusion plants in the United States we still have a gaseous diffusion plant while we're in process of shutting down the last gaseous diffusion plant as is France but we've been the last country still operating big gaseous diffusion plants in the world and they're in the process of replacing them with centrifuges which I'll talk about now which are much more efficient so in a centrifuge what happens these now dominate world enrichments partly because they are just dramatically more efficient you know factor of 20 or more reduction in the amount of power required so what's happening in a centrifuge is that you have a tube which is spinning I'll get to that in a moment actually when I have the picture let me talk about what's on this slide first so the technology of centrifuges is problematic from the point of view of nuclear weapons proliferation because since they're so much more efficient they're small and easy to hide a plant to produce enough bomb material for a bomb each year one bomb a year would fit easily on this floor of this building and would use less power than a typical supermarket so there's a lot of buildings in any country that could easily be a centrifuge plant for all you know when you're looking at it from for example a satellite photograph so it's a problematic technology in that respect it is technologically demanding although as I'll mention there debates as to how technologically demanding it is that a black market network led by Pakistan's Abdul Qadeer Khan was marketing centrifuge technology which is really the technology of choice for the determined nuclear cheater to countries all over the world they marketed they sold them to Libya they sold them to North Korea they sold them to Iran they also provided at least to Libya a bond design and possibly to their other clients they attempted to sell centrifuges to sodomist Saiyans Iraq they didn't have a chance to take them up on the offer before the 1991 war intervened North Korea now has a centrifuge plant we don't know yet whether they are making HEU there or not and whether they have another plant but they haven't shown the outside world or not all right so let's get back to what a centrifuge is and how it works the basic idea is to spin tube with this uranium hexafluoride gas in it at very high speeds and then because the slightly heavier atoms it it's harder to deflect their course than it is with the slightly lighter atoms the slightly heavier atoms end up getting flung against the outer wall of the tube and the slightly the area toward the center of the tube ends up being slightly enriched with the lighter atoms now because designers are clever they managed they figured out a guy named agar nut zippy in particular figured out that if you add a flow going up and down to the spinning action you can actually make the whole system much more efficient so you have this flow going up and down in the centrifuge that is caused by certain baffles and so on that you put in the rotating thing and so you take the product out from the middle and the tails out from a little bit further away from the middle now what is hard about making a centrifuge well first of all you need really strong and yet lightweight material because this thing is spinning at incredible speed and you have it's experiencing accelerations thousands of times the acceleration of gravity and so if it's not very very strong it's gonna tear itself apart in the early days of the u.s. program I'm told that the workers referred to the centrifuges as explosive self disassembly machines because when they got unbalanced they would tear themselves apart and chunks of metal would literally go flying around the room at something like the speed of sound said this one of the things that they have developed since then is putting casings around the spinning tube so that it's the spinning tube does fail the trunks aren't going flying around the room all right so you need very strong material and you need a really great bearing so that this thing can keep which is fairly heavy can keep spinning for a long long time and there are different kinds of bearings that people have developed over the years a lot of the technologies work are remain classified originally it was they were resting on a basically a piece of piano wire but as you might imagine that didn't work too awfully well so there are for example ball bearings with tiny grooves cut in particular ways in them to allow certain kinds of oil to go in there and keep the thing lubricated or there are magnetic bearings where the whole thing is just floating in a magnetic field that the magnetic bearings are usually used for the top of the centrifuge but in some advanced centrifuges are also used on the bottom these are this is Zen President Ahmadinejad of Iran visiting the centrifuges in Natanz you can see they're sort of it's almost like an experimental facility and that they're they're hooked together in a very complicated way to create this cascade flow of uranium hexafluoride there this is a more standard sort of cascade but in order to do it you need lots of centrifuges together to get substantial enrichment going as I mentioned now one important thing to understand is enrichment is a very nonlinear process once it gets going a little it accelerates and accelerates and accelerates so when you have take gun from the 0.7% u-235 that you dig up out of the ground up to four and a half percent for a civilian power reactor you have already done three quarters of the work of going all the way to ninety percent so that's why the international community is so concerned about r1 building up this these stockpiles some of them which are at four and a half percent or so some of which are at 20% or so you know they're far from 90 percent in the actual percentage but in terms of the actual the amount of the enrichment work that's already done it's a huge fraction once you get to the 20 percent enrichment level you've already done about 90% of the work of going to 90 percent enrichment so that means if you have a stock of that kind of stuff then it's much easier to have a small number of centrifuges somewhere secret and and do the final enrichment up to 90 percent with that smaller number of centrifuges we'll talk about that later in the class so one obvious question is well how difficult is it to do enrichment and in particular to do these centrifuges that are relatively small and easy to hide and there are different views on on this difficulty and there's differing evidence to support those differing views so Iran for example which has other than Israel the most advanced indigenous science and technology base in the Middle East probably had complete centrifuge designs way back in 1987 and it took them something like 20 years to get a functioning cascade actually enriching uranium despite that so building those kinds of centrifuges requires hard to get specialty materials so remember I said you needed these very strong and yet lightweight materials so you will often see references to a particular type of Steel called Mirage Eng steel this is a type of steel that is actually quite difficult to produce and there's only a few companies that make merging steel and that's used in some centrifuges also these days carbon fiber is used in centrifuges but again carbon fiber of the requisite quality is often not easy to get or easy to make they also require exquisite balancing if the centrifuge is even a teeny bit heavier on one side than another when it's spinning at these very high speeds it will tear itself apart so we the centrifuges from the AQ Khan Network were discovered in Libya for example a colleague that I was speaking to at the International Atomic Energy Agency there was a centrifuge expert was shown the centrifuge rotors that they were going to use for these centrifuges and he told me the first thing I did was I took my bare hand and I grabbed each of the rotors because there's enough well on my hand just naturally that no matter how much you cleaned as rotors after that you'd never be able to use centrifuges again so they require exquisite balancing the bottom bearing as I mentioned is often difficult to make for this type of centrifuge and a number of countries have been working on that kind of sensitivity but on the other hand you also have a number of countries who have developed relatively simple centrifuges with a relatively small number of people in a relatively small amount of time so there are people who argue we shouldn't be spending so much time trying to restrict the technology essentially just because countries if they do it properly can develop them themselves without requiring all of this specialty stuff now as I mentioned centrifuge plants can be fairly easy to hide they take up relatively little space and little power the plant to make enough hu as I mentioned would for a bomb every year would fit in this building the leakage of uranium yes a little bit of uranium but it's fairly modest partly because the pressure inside a centrifuge is actually less than the atmospheric pressure outside so if there's a little bit of a leak it's the air going in rather than the array in hexafluoride coming out from the centrifuge so how to find them is an interesting problem some years ago the US intelligence community had a big meeting to talk about all the different ways people and we're thinking about you know how would you detect centrifuges could you could you hear the hum of the spinning centrifuges from some distance away could with the signal of the spinning get back into the electrical system and could you detect that coming over the wires of certain frequencies and so on and colleague of mine was given the job of being the reporter for this meeting and going around to the individual groups that were working on different kinds of things and it was all very classified meeting of course but his summary of the situation was nobody has a good idea all right so this is a picture of the North Korean centrifuge plant which nobody knew was there until the North Koreans decided to bring a former US nuclear lab director Siegfried Hecker to visit it so until they decided to tell us it was there we didn't know it was there it's in a building that used to be a fuel fab building the only thing unusual about that building is they put a fancy blue roof on it why there it's almost as though they were trying to tell the Americans look at this building something interesting is happening here and what's happening in this picture is it appears that they are in process of doubling the size of this centrifuge operation they're basically building an identical sized thing next to the original building this is a picture from a few months ago and now there's an identical blue roof on over that area next to this building all right so let's talk about producing plutonium for a minute all right so you irradiated uranium in a nuclear reactor as I said u-238 absorbs neutrons and it becomes plutonium and then you reprocess the spent fuel to get the plutonium out from the other things so what is reprocessing involved well in the main technique that has been was originally developed during World War two and has been used since then you chop the spent fuel into little pieces the pieces get dumped into boiling nitric acid to dissolve the uranium and plutonium and fission products and then you take that nitric acid and you contact it with some organic material these days they use a an organic solvent called tributyl phosphate and if you do certain chemical steps you can pull the plutonium into the organic the tributyl phosphate into the solvent and leave the rest in the acid so and then typically you separate at the same time you separate the uranium from the fission products as well so as I mentioned before you have really three files a pile of plutonium a pile of uranium and a pile of fission products resulting from reprocessing and this typically boasts the reactors and the reprocessing plants are typically though not always large and observable facilities so this photograph here is a photograph that a Senate staffer took on a visit to the North Korean nuclear reactor that has produced the plutonium that North Korea has so far which was the focus of the first phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994 this is a schematic of that reactor you have a fuel handling machine at the top the reactor itself is basically a big pile of graphite reflector blocks and you have these tubes of fuel that go down into the reactor core and a concrete shield around the outside of the whole thing this is the North Korean reprocessing plant at the same site at Yum Goong you can see it's a fairly observable facility one thing if you look closely you will see a tall tower with a longshadow that is the stack for releasing some of the gases from reprocessing that's fairly characteristic of a reprocessing plant usually these are fairly detectable facilities but again if you think hard about it you might be able to do reprocessing in smaller places that would be less detectable all right so one key question is how close a connection is there between civilian nuclear power and the military use of nuclear energy between power plants and bombs so again enrichment and reprocessing are really the key technologies that pose serious proliferation risks if you don't have enrichment you don't have reprocessing you can't really make the material you need for a nuclear bomb if you do have a plant for either of those purposes in your country then you're in a certain sense a decision away from being able to make nuclear bomb material you could use those plants anytime you wanted to make nuclear bomb material yeah some people I think a lot of people assume when they're first learning about this topic oh but surely to make a nuclear bomb I must need a bigger more complex fancier plant than just to make you know the relatively low-grade material I need for a nuclear power plant unfortunately exactly the opposite is true you need a much bigger and nicer plant to do enrichment for civilian purposes or reprocessing for civilian purposes because you need to actually be able to make money out of it so it has to be efficient and so on then you need for nuclear bomb purposes and one key element of that is just the scale so remember you when you're making three four or five percent material for a nuclear power plant you've already done three-quarters of the work of going all the way to 90 percent you need a lot of material for that nuclear power plant you might have 30 tons of that four or five percent enriched material in the core of a nuclear power plant whereas remember the Hiroshima bomb which is a very inefficient bomb that used a lot of material as nuclear bombs go was only 60 kilograms and an implosion type bomb might be only 15 20 kilograms so the official IEA significant quantity numbers are 25 kilograms of u-235 contained in highly enriched uranium or 8 kilograms of plutonium so we know given that the Nagasaki bomb was about 6 kilograms of plutonium and that as we talked about implosion devices have been developed that are more efficient than that original solid core device that bombs can be made with less than the IAEA significant quantity number but the OEE number is designed to refer to not only the amount that actually goes into the bomb but also of the amount you would need counting wastage and and you know various scrap and so on that you'd end up with and to refer to you know the relatively crude bomb that a country might make for their first one there is a lot of controversy even so over whether those IEA numbers should be reduced in any case the key technologies you need to worry about with respect to nuclear proliferation and the intersection with civilian nuclear power are enrichment and reprocessing so if a country builds a nuclear reactor and doesn't build enrichment and reprocessing then it does not help it much in getting closer to the bomb does help certainly the reactor produces plutonium in the spent fuel but if you haven't got a reprocessing plant to get out that plutonium then you can't use it to make a bomb the reactors civilian reactors are typically under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards they're all under IAEA safeguards unless they're in states that already have nuclear weapons so removing that material to separate out the plutonium would be detected okay the fresh fuel in the reactor is this low enriched material that can't be used in nuclear weapons it can sustain a chain reaction in a reactor but it can't sustain an explosively growing chain reaction okay the spent fuel does contain plutonium as I mentioned but it would take reprocessing to get it out but at the same time civilian reactors provide a base of trained people who understand nuclear reactions and may it may give you the opportunity to build up contacts with other countries for example the country selling you the reactor and helping you build it which may lead to more sensitive transfers so for example in the 1990s when Russia first contracted with Iran to build a nuclear reactor at Bashir actually to finish off one the West Germans had started before the Iranian Revolution the United States tried to convince Russia not to go ahead with that contract and we were concerned about that contract not because the US government thought that plutonium for an Iranian nuclear bomb was going to be made in bushier but rather because hundreds of Iranians were coming to Russia and training at various nuclear institutes in Russia and making the personal contacts that might help them get other technologies as it turns out they were already getting the technologies that we were most worried about centrifuge technology from the AQ Khan Network and not from Russia so part of my career in the 1990s ended up being wasted trying to stop something that was hard happening through another channel so they provide a base of personnel a set of contacts they provide a justification for pursuing enrichment or reprocessing whose military purpose would otherwise be obvious so Iran for example argues our enrichment program is entirely peaceful we're only making fuel for our powerplant and fuel for our research reactor we don't understand why everyone is so worried about what we're doing finally a nuclear power program provides a bureaucratic power base involving you know control of billions of dollars you know a large organizational infrastructure and so on for nuclear advocates who in many cases may also end up advocating for nuclear weapons they're also opposite cases where the nuclear power industry partly to maintain its supply from foreign countries has argued against a nuclear weapons program in particular countries so these issues are at the heart of several current controversies about nuclear proliferation and nuclear power as I mentioned Iran says its enrichment is purely for peaceful purposes and completely legitimate South Korea at the moment is in a situation where it's right across the border from North Korea which already has nuclear weapons something like two thirds of the people in South Korea think South Korea should develop nuclear weapons and South Korea is asking the United States in the negotiation of a new civil nuclear cooperation agreement to give it prior approval to go ahead with enrichment and reprocessing of the u.s. origin nuclear material and the United States is reluctant fearing that that might increase the proliferation risk in South Korea that it might make it impossible to convince North Korea to stop doing those things or that it might make it more difficult to convince other countries beyond South Korea not to establish their own and and reprocessing capabilities similarly there's a significant controversy in the US government over what is sometimes referred to as the gold standard for civil nuclear cooperation the United Arab Emirates some years ago signed the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States that explicitly prohibited the United Arab Emirates from building enrichment or reprocessing facilities and some people said well we ought to have that requirement and all of our civil nuclear cooperation agreements that ought to be the standard that we insist on but a variety of other countries say I don't want to give up my rights I have every right if I want at some point in the future to build an enrichment plant or a reprocessing plant to support my civil nuclear program Japan as both enrichment and reprocessing why don't see why I should give up my right to be able to do this not that I want to do it right now but I don't want to negotiate away my rights so other people say we shouldn't insist on an explicit agreement to ban enrichment and reprocessing because if we do other nuclear suppliers that don't insist on that will come in and sell their reactors and will have even less proliferation controls than we would if the United States entered into civil nuclear cooperation agreements without such an explicit ban similarly there is a group of the major countries that export nuclear reactors or nuclear materials which is called the Nuclear Suppliers group and they've just agreed on a new set of criteria that says basically we will not export enrichment and reprocessing technology to a state that doesn't already have it unless the state meets this set of criteria we've now agreed to and we'll have more on the link between civil nuclear power and proliferation later in the class so again just to recap two paths to the bomb the plutonium route uranium route the plutonium route involves a reactor the uranium absorbs neutrons in the reactor some of it turns into plutonium you take it out of the reactor then it's called spent fuel you chemically process it a process called reprocessing separates out the plutonium on the uranium root you take your the rhenium that you've mined you convert it to uranium hexafluoride you put it into an enrichment plant that separates the uranium-235 from the uranium 238 and you end up with the weapon-grade uranium that you want for you and nuclear bomb thanks very much

Channel: Belfer Center

Views: 318,878

Rating: 4.8679519 out of 5

Keywords: Nuclear Weapon (Invention), matthew bunn, Harvard University (Organization), managing the atom, bombs, making bombs, belfer center, nuclear terrorism, terrorism, nuclear energy, energy, Atomic, Destruction, Weapons, Nuclear Power (Industry)

Id: MnW7DxsJth0

Length: 45min 3sec (2703 seconds)

Published: Tue Sep 10 2013