Few armies in history have a reputation as
fearsome as those of the Mongol Empire. During the height of the empire, the Mongol
Horde carried a well-earned reputation for invincibility, inflicting devastation upon
enemy armies and cities. So thorough was this carnage that many writers
who experienced it first hand could only describe it as a punishment sent by Heaven: for how
else could one explain how so many cities and armies fell so quickly? In our next series of videos, we will attempt
to do just that, explaining various aspects of the medieval Mongol military, and providing
insight as to what made the horsemen of the Great Khan so successful. By the way, did you know that we have a whole
podcast dedicated to the History of the Mongols? Because we do! And you can find the link to it in the description
and the pinned comment! Our first episode will provide an overview
of the evolution of the thirteenth century Mongolian military, offering a brief comparison
to earlier and later steppe armies. The Mongols are of course most well known
for their horse archers, the byproduct of their lifestyle. In the great grass seas of the Eurasian steppe,
the Mongols and other nomads spent their entire lives on horseback, learning to ride before
they could walk in order to manage their great herds of sheep, goat, oxen, camels, and horses. A lifetime in the saddle in the often harsh
conditions of Inner Asia left the nomads excellent riders with incredible endurance, able to
endure hardships beyond that of sedentary peoples. Each Mongol learned to shoot and construct
their bows and arrows from a young age, beginning with a child’s bow to hunt marmots and small
mammals, gradually increasing the strength of the bow until able to master the powerful,
composite recurve war bow. Highly mobile, deadly at range, and strategically
swift compared to infantry armies, the horse archer, when used properly, could be the master
of the medieval battlefield. Many aspects of the above description of nomadic
life and warfare as mounted archers, are easily recognizable to a scholar of earlier nomadic
steppe peoples like the Xiongnu and Scythians. This Chinese description of the Xiongnu in
the 2nd century BC is just as applicable to the Mongols well over a thousand years later: “The little boys start out by learning to
ride sheep and shoot birds and rats with a bow and arrow, and when they get a little
older they shoot foxes and hares, which are used for food. Thus all the young men are able to use a bow
and act as armed cavalry in time of war. It is their custom to herd their flocks in
times of peace and make their living by hunting, but in periods of crisis they take up arms
and go off on plundering and marauding expeditions. This seems to be their inborn nature. For long-range weapons they use bows and arrows,
and swords and spears at close range. If the battle is going well for them they
will advance, but if not, they will retreat, for they do not consider it a disgrace to
run away. Their only concern is self-advantage, and
they know nothing of propriety or righteousness.” For these earlier peoples, many of the same
basic tenets of mounted warfare were utilized by both them and the Mongols, such as hit
and run tactics, envelopment, and the infamous feigned retreat. Contemporaries to these earlier peoples remark
on their endurance and hardiness, their skill as horsemen, and the danger of their arrows. There are however, several aspects in which
the Mongol warrior found himself better equipped than his forebears, in the form of several
technological advancements to their tack and weapons. The Scythians, for instance, had only soft
padded saddles for their mounts. Essentially two leather pads held to the horse
with a girth strap, it provided minimal shock absorption for the rider and little for him
to maintain his place beyond his thighs. The Xiongnu and Huns were better supplied
with the development of the treed saddle, a sturdy wooden frame cushioned for the rider. It was a more secure base for the archer to
shoot from, which also made it more difficult to unhorse him. Leaning into the front of these saddles lifted
them, allowing the hips to absorb more of the shocks from riding and reduce jostling
from the horse’s movement. What these early riders lacked, from the Xiongnu
and Huns to the Parthians and the Romans, was the paired stirrup. When the stirrup emerged is a matter of controversy-
the earliest stirrups were made of materials like wood which do not preserve well archaeologically. But it seems likely the stirrup, in a form
easily recognizable today, was developed around the third century AD in northern China or
Mongolia, spreading west via Turkic tribes, arriving in Europe with the Avars by the sixth
century. Stirrups provided several advantages: they
provided a much more secure platform, allowing the rider to raise himself in the saddle for
extra leverage and reach in close combat, or for the horse archer to stand and use his
leg and core muscles to help draw heavier bows. Further, the knees could better absorb the
jolts from the horse’s movement and guide the horse in the heat of battle. Outside of combat the benefits were more significant,
particularly for the nomad. Needing to be on horseback all day while tending
their herds, the stirrup helps take pressure off of the horse’s back. A skilled rider on a strong horse could now
travel further and longer. When coupled with multiple remounts, the distance
horsemen could march rose dramatically. The famed weapon of the horse archer was their
composite bows. Rather than a self bow, such as the Welsh
longbow, which is made from a single piece of wood, the composite bow was made from layers
of wood, horn and sinew. The horn and sinew increased the strength
of the bow, transferring more energy to the arrow. Most composite bows of the steppe world were
also recurved, the “ears” of the bows storing yet more energy while providing leverage
to aid the archer. Whereas a self bows strength can only be increased
by making the bow larger or the archer stronger, the recurve composite bow remains relatively
short without sacrificing power. The shorter bow made it more maneuverable
on horseback, allowing Mongol warriors to even travel with heavier and lighter bows
on them as the situation required. The composite bow was however in danger of
warping from prolonged exposure to humidity; not an issue in the generally dry steppes
of Central Asia, but in wetter climates dangerous to the bow’s health. To offset this, bows of the Xiongnu and Huns
had the ends of their limbs strengthened with bone plates to reduce warping, but this made
the bow heavier and decreased arrow velocity. In contrast, Mongol bows of the conquest era
lacked bone plates, transferring more energy to the arrows and granting them greater penetrative
power and range, but making them more susceptible to climate changes, perhaps accounting in
part for reduced Mongol military effectiveness in South East Asia and Europe. Despite some modern claims, the Mongol conquests
were not a result of a technological innovation in horse archery, as the technology itself
had changed little once these above mentioned developments were completed by the 4-5th centuries
AD. For that, we must look to the military leadership
of the Mongols and their innovations upon existing steppe traditions. Many aspects of this we will explore in the
next videos in this series. Beyond these technological changes, the Mongol
army of the 13th century shared many traits with steppe armies of the preceding centuries. The method of organizing armies using the
decimal system was present among the Xiongnu: the highest commanders led divisions nominally
of 10,000, while the smallest were squads of just 10 men who operated together. Traditionally this system was based within
the tribe, but it was the innovation of Chinggis Khan to largely break down the tribes of Mongolia
and almost entirely replace them with the decimal system, removing minor chiefs and
Khans from power to ensure no alternatives to his rule. Earlier steppe confederations like the Xiongnu
generally had an important imperial bodyguard and retinue which often provided a number
of the major leaders and generals of the empire. For the Mongols, this was originally the nököd
of Temujin, the basis for the famed keshig, which he expanded upon when he took the title
of Chinggis Khan in 1206. The keshig under the Mongols evolved beyond
just bodyguards, but into a general staff, where top officers learned the ropes of command. From there they were appointed not only to
lead armies, but to conquer and govern regions as the Mongol Empire expanded, and acted as
important administrators. Sons of the royal families of subject kingdoms
were taken into the keshig as hostages, to help secure the loyalty of their dynasty,
but also to be essentially indoctrinated in Mongol imperial destiny. Going through trials alongside the Mongols
and amply rewarded, when they returned to their homelands they were loyal servants of
the Khan who helped to uphold his rule. While the following video will detail the
matter of Mongolian military tactics more fully, the following example should prove
illustrative of how Chinggis Khan innovated upon and evolved, rather than invented, traditional
nomadic lifestyle and tactics. All nomadic horsemen learned to hunt from
a young age; a means to protect their herds from predators and provide extra sustenance
for their families. It also proved an excellent means to practice
for war. For the Khitans of the Liao Dynasty and the
Mongols, large scale hunting expeditions served as training for unit operations. In an operation called nerge [e more like
eh than uh] by the Mongols, an army of horsemen would form a rough circle, at times several
days journey in diameter, gradually tightening and driving all game before them into an arena,
where the nobility would take their pick of the hunt before leaving the rest to the men. While simple on paper, organizing this properly
took considerable skill. Given the size of the operation, a time table
was set for each group, operating in their military units, to reach their destination
and begin to push the game forward. To prevent animals from escaping, the various
units had to be in contact and be coordinating to prevent holes in the line which would allow
herds to slip through their grasp; allowing animals to escape resulted in punishments. Following orders, meeting time tables, unit
tactics, and discipline were the basic building blocks of Mongol successes, and what allowed
their armies to outmaneuver their foes. While large scale hunting expeditions were
practiced across the Eurasian steppe, and its rules applied to warfare and battles,
under the Mongols the nerge itself became a military strategy. Time and time again a nerge was set over an
entire region, designating a major city to be the meeting point. Mongol units would spread across the region,
attacking small towns and villages, driving the rural populations towards the major city
as the nerge tightened. Refugees fled into the city, not just overwhelming
its resources and thus reducing the length of the siege it could withstand, but also
sewing chaos and confusion, for the terrified population brought stories of Mongol atrocities
and spread fear, increasing the chance the city would submit rather than face Mongol
wrath. Mongol army structure will also be explored
in an upcoming video, but to detail its evolution over the 13th century we will give it a brief
overview. At the founding of the Mongol Empire in 1206,
perhaps the entirety of the Mongol army was lightly armoured horse archers, made up of
the Mongolian and Turkic tribes who had submitted or been conquered up to that point. The keshig may have had heavier armour, but
were still armed with their powerful bows, closing with the enemy only once they had
been weakened by arrows. Chinggis Khan understood well the effectiveness
of this force in the open field, but upon his first campaign against a sedentary society,
that being the Tangut Kingdom of Xi Xia in 1209, he found that unless he could draw the
enemy from their walls through a feigned retreat or starve them out, that fortifications could
prove impassable. With his invasion of the Jurchen Jin Dynasty
in 1211, a solution presented itself in the mass defections of Jin forces to his army. Not just Khitans, a Mongolic people who loathed
the Jin and were themselves skilled horse archers, but also numerous Han Chinese, who
provided the Mongols with infantry, crossbowmen, and numbers. More significant was the defection of Chinese
catapult specialists and engineers; one of whom, Xue Talahai, defected to the Mongols
early in the invasion, and was rewarded handsomely for sharing his knowledge, teams, and experience. Further capture of Chinese engineers, stonemasons,
and carpenters brought further knowledge of how to attack cities and build siege equipment. This adoption of warriors and knowledge of
defectors, vassals, and captives proved perhaps the greatest deviation from earlier nomadic
empires. In order to conquer not just the fringes of
sedentary states, as per earlier nomadic empires, but the sedentary state itself, the Mongols
required the manpower and knowledge of those sedentary societies. Each culture the Mongols encountered, and
conquered, provided them new resources and tools for their arsenal. With the Mongols themselves remaining primarily
light horse archers, they used Northern Chinese and Iranian infantry and siege engineers,
Southern Chinese and Korean naval knowledge, Khitan, Jurchen and Turkic horse archers,
Armenian and Georgian heavy cavalry, and more. Within a few years of the start of the Mongol
conquests, the Mongol leadership and Mongol-Turkic army core of horse archers was supported by
a large, heterogeneous army. Able to pick the most effective tactics, weapons,
armours, and warriors from the cultures of Eurasia, the Mongolian army was thus able
to adapt to a variety of situations, well beyond what earlier nomadic empires could
accomplish. It was the job of subject peoples to fill
the military roles the Mongols themselves either could not fill, or had no interest
in filling themselves. The poor Khwarezmian defense in 1220 can be
explained in part as the Khwarezm-shah Muhammad anticipating pillaging horse archers, not
a large, disciplined army, ably utilizing siege weapons and technology. The Mongols also showed themselves willing
to use gunpowder weapons in their wars in China, a subject we will explore in a future
video as well. The Mongol Empire fractured in the second
half of the 13th century. Debate rages as to how the Mongolian military
in each independent Khanate continued to develop, and to what extent they were influenced by
local military tradition. Generally, the debate steers towards questioning
if the Mongols converted to heavier forms of cavalry. The presence of true Mongolian heavy cavalry
in the early years of the empire is not universally accepted, with it often said that the small
Mongolian horse lacked the strength to carry heavy armour. In the Ilkhanate, scholars like A.P. Martinez
have suggested the Mongols adopted medium or heavy cavalry to better contend with Mamluk
forces, and artwork from the Ilkhanate shows a preponderance of heavily armoured Mongolian
forces. An aspect of this argument is that the Mongols
even began to sedentarize in the Ilkhanate, abandoning nomadism altogether, while their
horses mixed with larger Persian breeds in order to carry the greater weight of armour,
but making them less suited to the open steppe. Other scholars such as Reuven Amitai have
found the argument unconvincing, suggesting that it remained the job of oft-mentioned
Armenian and Georgian vassals to act as heavy cavalry while the Mongols themselves continued
as light horse archers. Similar arguments have been put forth for
the Mongols within the Yuan Dynasty, where it has been suggested that Mongol troops adorned
heavier armour taken from stores of the fallen Song Dynasty. In the territories of the Golden Horde and
Chagatai Khanate, where Turkic influence and access to the steppes was greatest, there
can be no doubt in the continued predominance of light horse archers. By the latter half of the 14th century, it
was lightly armoured Chagatayid horse archers which Temur led to begin his conquests. Much like Chinggis Khan, Temur incorporated
outsiders into his army to utilize their skills and knowledge, overcoming the deficiencies
that came from an army entirely of horse archers. Despite a growth in the percentage of heavy
cavalry in Central Asia, in the steppe, heavy armour remained difficult and expensive to
manufacture and maintain, especially for the average nomad. The vast majority of post-Mongol successor
states, from the Northern Yuan, the Timurids, the Kazakhs, to the Crimean Khanate, saw their
warriors continue to fight in a fashion recognizable not just to the Mongols of the 13th century,
but to the Gokturks of the 7th century, the Huns of the 4th century, to the Xiongnu and
even the Scythians. The Mongol conquests were not a result of
a sudden transformation in the technology and lifestyle of nomadism, but of skilled
leadership innovating upon existing customs and taking advantage of the tools of both
nomadic and sedentary cultures. This is what allowed the Mongols to expand
far beyond the scope of earlier nomadic empires, and what we will explore in our coming videos
in this series, so make sure you are subscribed to our channel and have pressed the bell button. We would like to express our gratitude to
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we will catch you on the next one.
The pronounciation of "Khan" always bugs me. The "h" is there for a reason. The "k" is there just to make the "h" harder, not make it disappear ffs.