Historians go to great lengths emphasizing
that the so-called Byzantine Empire was not a separate entity from the Roman Empire, but
served as a persistent remnant of the larger structure which survived for 1,000 years after
its western half-collapsed. Despite this indisputable heritage, there
were differences between Rome under Augustus, Marcus Aurelius and Honorius, and the Byzantine
Empire of Justinian, Basil and Nikephoros. One of the foremost ways in which the Byzantines
broke from their predecessors was in military doctrine. Although not nearly as elevated as the notorious
legio in terms of sheer power, Byzantine armies did adapt in true Roman fashion to fit the
methods of the age in which their empire existed, becoming in the process one of the greatest
armies in the Medieval world. Join Kings and Generals once again as we progress
into Late Antiquity as the Romans did, and describe the armies of the mighty Byzantine
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code âKINGSANDGENERALSâ! Belisariusâ personal historian Procopius
penned one of the most seminal pieces of ancient literature relating to the early Byzantine
Empire, and specifically Justinianâs herculean attempt at reconquering the west. After his introduction, we might expect the
chronicler to describe the emperor, Belisarius or the background of his work following the
fall of the west. While such profiles do come later, the very
first thing Procopius details is a piece on the nature of military change, and resistance
to it. Calling out those readers who might decry
âmodernâ achievements as unworthy in favour of, essentially, recalling the good old days
of Classical Rome, the historian further goes on to outline how some individuals choose
to narrow-mindedly deride Byzantine archers, while at the same time lauding close combat
fighters who resemble the Roman legionaries of old. Whilst acknowledging that, yes, sometimes
in the past âbowmenâ were forced to hide and seem cowardly, Roman archers were different. Clad in protective armour, these expert horsemen
used a bow as their primary weapon, but also might carry a shield, spear, or sword. Still, Procopius laments, âthere are those
who take into consideration none of these things, who revere and worship the ancient
times, and give no credit to modern improvements.â Essentially, the great historian is giving
sixth-century Byzantine traditionalists a verbal slap in the face and telling them to
get with the times. Fortunately for Romeâs eastern remnant,
the diminished empire did just that, adapting constantly. This example from Procopiusâ first book
is just a single, but an incredibly stark instance of how the standard military doctrines
of Rome as a centuriesâ old unquestionable hegemon began evolving and molding into that
of a limited empire on a controlled and incredibly slow decline in power. The fact that the Byzantines were able to
make this transition without succumbing to inaction shows us just how resilient the empire
was. In essence, to change from iconic Roman military
styles was in fact more Roman than maintaining outward trappings. The âdrill and disciplineâ legions of
Caesar and Augustus had been reformed by emperors at the end of the Third Century Crisis into
the Late Imperial forces of limitanei, comitatensis and more, detailed in the Notitia Dignitatum. Fifth century disruption and collapse, barbarian
incursion, monetary shortage, purposeful change and other factors led to the reborn, small
and elite army of Byzantium in the early sixth century, where strategy and generalship were
more important, and cavalry increasingly prominent. Still, we must also quash the simplistic notion
that the Byzantinesâ new emphasis on cavalry led to the utter dereliction of infantry forces
as nothing more than cannon fodder, herded at an enemy as a meager distraction while
mounted troops did the real work. To begin this process, we must describe this
new premier man of the Roman army - Procopiusâ vaunted armour-clad archer mounted on horseback. The glacial process leading to the development
and adoption of Byzantine hippo-toxotai heavy horse archers of the sixth century and beyond
might be viably said to have begun as early as the late first century. However, if a single date has to be chosen
for the date that the transformation from Roman to Byzantine military truly began, one
might choose August 9th 378 - the Battle of Adrianople, when invading Goths tore an entire
eastern field army apart, triggering a number of unprecedented responses within the buckling
Roman Empire. As the Great Migration continued and disparate
barbarian coalitions, most prominently the nomadic horselord Huns, shunted others to
the west throughout the fifth century, these groups brought their practices and tactics
with them. Particularly following the Hunnic Empireâs
collapse at Nedao in 454, a vast quantity of barbarian mercenaries spilled out from
the steppe, using their exotic mounted skills to gain employment in armies of the Byzantine
Empire. Procopius details many a foreign cavalry unit
hired on behalf of the emperor in Constantinople, such as the Heruli, and how they played a
direct role in the Byzantine military and a key part in ensuring its conquests went
well. However, the mercenariesâ battle tactics
also found their way into textbooks and manuals for training homegrown cavalry, while nomadic
equipment and âloadoutsâ were adapted and sometimes even improved by imperial generals
for use in the future. The model heavy mounted bowman of Procopiusâ
first book, for example, most likely wielded a standard symmetrical composite bow as his
primary weapon, replacing the spear and javelin-armed horse of earlier days. This design of bow in particular contrasted
with the asymmetrical bow favoured by nomadic horse peoples such as the Huns. The modification was almost certainly made
because this more âstandardâ model was simpler to manufacture in large numbers, and
therefore equipping the troops would be easier. For protection, this ideal trooper donned
armour including a mail corselet and greaves, but notably did not wear any kind of helmet,
so that the accuracy of his archery wasnât significantly impaired. Instead, the toxotai would rely on the use
of a small shield to protect his face from enemy attacks. Contrary to popular belief, it is also probable
that, unlike cataphractarii, hippo-toxotai did not clad their mounts in armour. Making effective use of the empireâs terrain-specific
resources, the Byzantines reared notably powerful Cappadocian steeds which, bred in military
stables especially established for the purpose, could easily maintain high speeds despite
the fact that armoured men were mounted atop them. Nomadic influence can also be seen in the
training and tactics of the armies of Justinian, such as in the practice of archery, both mounted
and on foot. In contrast to the method of their Sassanid
enemies, which relied on blocking out the sun with a massive blanket of massed fire
to inflict casualties, the Byzantine modus operandi was to depend on accuracy, precision
and stopping power. This âquality rather than quantityâ approach
was derived from the Huns. Different types of mounted troops supplemented
Procopiusâ armoured cavalry archers depending on the situation, and, as mentioned, many
of these horse warriors were allies or mercenary foederati brought into the empire from outside. Much like the eponymous Germanic troops of
the united empireâs final decades, these Byzantine foederati were unassimilated barbarians
armed in their native styles, but fighting under Byzantine command. Among the myriad peoples who served in Justinianâs
armies were the Huns themselves, Gepids, Goths, Heruli, Slavs, Bulgars, Berbers and many,
many more whose names were either not noted down in the historical record, or whose contribution
became overshadowed by other barbarian groups with whom they served. So in this domain, we see clearly continuity
in that the early Byzantines kept up the Roman practice of welcoming barbarian troops into
the army, except they did so more eagerly and in a more controlled fashion. Such a vigour for drawing in the best of âbarbarianâ
military talent is exemplified clearly by the array of foreign leaders who became high
generals in Justinianâs service, despite the taboo that may have developed against
such a practice after the collapse of the western empire. Much like the retinue of vaunted commanders
under Alexander the Great or Napoleon, those of Justinian were skilled at their craft. Four names early in Justinianâs reign come
to the fore: Sittas, Mundus, Chilbundus and Belisarius, only one of whom was a âRomanâ. Roman to Byzantine Continuity wasnât only
maintained and expanded upon in the realm of foreign recruitment. Contrary to popular belief, as we have already
mentioned, credit must still be given for the maintained quality of infantry troops
which, although no longer the neatly polished, standardised soldiers of the old Roman legions,
were still a considerable force to be reckoned with, and who played their part well in the
new Byzantine warfare. They were also far less one-dimensioned than
the old legionary heavy infantry. Armed with roughly two-meter-long spears and
bows as standard, supplemented by a spatha like sidearm, the new âlegionariesâ, known
as protostate, would drive their primary weapon into the ground at the approach of an enemy,
loosing bow fire into the foe until their progress began to slow, at which the spear
was retaken up again. Such a formation of relatively short-weaponed
spearmen provided a good middle-ground between the flexibility of gladius wielding maniples
and the rigidity and range of an old sarissa phalanx. In his work, Procopius details an occasion
in which some Byzantine heavy spearmen; the armour-clad protostate elite, were charged
by Gothic cavalry who thought these footmen to be an easy target. They were badly mistaken. Gathering into a compact but not overly cramped
space, the infantrymen raised their shields and thrust forward their spears, holding ground
and pushing on. Most impressive is Procopiusâ detailing
of how none of the spearmen interfered with any of their comrades, so sophisticated was
their training and proper interval maintenance. Regular, leather-armed spear, javelin, sling,
throwing axe, or dart wielding infantry formed the inner mass of Byzantine infantry behind
the outer shell of heavy spearmen and in front of the archers. They were perhaps trained in a lesser manner,
but ability and some level of discipline were clearly maintained. In this way, the so-called protostate infantry
of the Byzantine Empire was a throwback to the Polybian legion. A heavy triarii equivalent was in the vanguard,
followed by mid-range throwing missile troops and then archers at the back. One aspect of Byzantine warfare that wouldâve
made earlier imperial emperors and military leaders scratch their heads in confusion was
the bucellarii. We know a significant amount concerning these
household troops, named after the bucellatum ration biscuit, from Belisariusâ contingent
in the Vandal and Gothic Wars. Unlike many of the other military phenomena
of the age, this was a completely alien practice. Bucellarii were essentially privately-hired
personal guards who held direct loyalty to the general by whom they were hired, rather
than to the emperor in Constantinople or to the wider concept of âthe empireâ. Such mercenaries often formed the core comitatus
of a general - his closest companions and personal army, and were often professional,
elite troops which a larger army could be formed around. They might be Roman, but many bucellarii consisted
of steppe nobles and their retainers who were hired by a general before or during their
campaign. This kind of powerful private army was an
unquestionable danger to the emperor in Constantinople, who risked deposition at the hands of soldiers
who owed no loyalty to him. However, the famous Nika Riots were suppressed
primarily by the small contingents of bucellarii under generals Mundus and Belisarius. Had these key power-brokers leaned the other
way, however, Justinian might have had a real problem on his hands. To many scholars, this lack of a monopoly
on military force is a symbol of the decrease in imperial authority. When compared to the imperial legions of old,
the Byzantine armies of Justinianâs age of reconquest, as we have detailed, were often
incredibly small by comparison. While four centuries before, Trajan was able
to rally up to 200,000 men for his conquest of Dacia, Belisarius was only able to bring
about 7,000 to bear during his initial landings in Italy, although he was reinforced significantly
in the later years. This decline was due to the simple fact that
the old class of Roman Imperial citizens, upon which the ever-expanding legions depended
for manpower, was all but gone by the time of Late Antiquity. What replaced it was this smaller, but infinitely
more surgical and balanced Byzantine army developed by absorbing equipment, training,
tactics and doctrine from some of the empireâs greatest enemies, and greatest failures. Such a comparatively restrained amount of
military power provided the impetus for Byzantiumâs sophisticated and tactful approach to warfare
and relations with foreign powers as a whole. It might even be said that this latter approach,
by necessity, was far more intelligent than that of the united Roman Empire which came
before, simply due to the fact that the hegemonic Romans did not, before the very end, need
to be overly smart when dealing with foes. Those foes could just, most of the time anyway,
be crushed under the weight of a legionaryâs boot. Still, when laymen and even some historians
look at the Byzantine army in comparison to the old Roman one, they rightly see a diminished
force. But it is worth considering Caesar, Germanicus,
Trajan or any of the other greats, and how they would view the new military if they were
transported forwards in time. Given the available resources and situation
that the Byzantine Empire faced, matters could have gone far worse. In our next episode on the army of the Byzantines,
we will examine the unique phenomenon of military manuals that arose in that empire. Specifically, we will file through the ancient
pages of the strategikon authored by Maurice, and probably some others, relating how this
text became the handbook for imperial warfare for centuries to come, so make sure you are
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