India’s role in the international order

good morning good afternoon good evening depending on your time zone thank you for joining us I'm Bruce Jones I'm at the Brookings institution where I'm part of the strobe Talbot Center on security strategy and technology and it's my distinct pleasure to host us today for a discussion on India's role in a changing International order this event is timed to coincide with the wrap-up of India's participation in the G7 Summit in Hiroshima as well as the planned quad Summit didn't quite take place given Biden's uh unexpected detours uh but India's participation in two mechanisms that I I've come to indicate or to reflect a growing partnership between India and the West on some key strategic questions but it also comes after a year in which there's been a lot of debate and a lot of confusion about India's posture on International order and its role of the world stage in particular arising from confusion even consternation in the United States and Europe over India's posture vis-a-vis Russia during the Ukraine war to help us understand how India actually sees its role in the international order we have a terrific panel to discuss the issue I'll introduce each of them as we go and we'll cover a range of topics and bring in uh several questions from the audience which were received by email I want to start with Raja Mohan he is a senior fellow at the Asian Society policy Institute was the director of The Institute for South Asian studies if you can find a highly credible Think Tank Raja has worked there if you have had a thought on Indian Grand strategy he's written a book about it uh one of the most accomplished Scholars and authors on Indian Grand strategy and in uniform policy so Raja let me ask you first to help us understand how India sees itself in this wider debate around an international order and one of the themes that's constantly in the discussion is this notion they need to do is looking for some form of strategic autonomy or or updated non-alignment within this kind of wider terrain and perhaps you could give us your thoughts on how you see that set of issues don't forget to unmute Raja you're muted still okay is it can you hear me now yeah sorry I was saying thank you for inviting me for this conversation and to this uh important discussion about uh India and the international order uh when you asked me about strategic autonomy as some kind of a defining feature of India's engagement with the world but I think there tends to be a mystification of this concept uh the way the discourse takes place in India and how the rest of the world reacts to it I would say that essentially three elements to this uh you know idea of strategic autonomy one is a fairly mundane one which is all countries all sovereigns in the International System uh seek to maximize their autonomy I mean I think that's the essential feature of International System of multiple sovereigns so there I think there's nothing uh special about it but I think as a large country uh with a major power ambition of its own I think the emphasis on India in India on Independent decision making uh we have here that in the US too which is the powerful nation in the world often says look we don't want to take orders from the U.N or some kind of a committee that wants to run my boards or my nature of my politics so I think that way it's very similar to what the US thinks that it needs an independent decisions of its own concern second I think uh which is the post-colonial India that India won its independence after prolonged colonial rule therefore protection of independent judgment and foreign policy became one of the key features that it was simply not going to seek that choice of judging the world politics to some other centers of power so that is the second second feature and I think what we've seen in India is somewhat deploying the concept of strategic autonomy in the last 30 years largely against the West because I think post 1991 the US and the Western policies of intervention uh in the internal affairs of other states I think that produced the reaction apprehensions so partly I think the emphasis on strategic autonomy was to defend against that kind of interventionism in the west and I think today there's self-reflection in the west itself the benefits and costs of of such intervention the third aspect I think which is really the the imperatives of nation building the impurities of State formation of Economic Development often put India at odds with the presumed norms and demands of the developed States uh like if India does what it what the US has actually done of putting stitching together a state through violence I mean violence is endemic State makes War what makes State that's common to every single modern States history but I think there's a tendency to be judgmental in the west often how the state formation is taking place in India and I think that creates a whole range of problems where I think India wants the way it can secure its own State Building from the interference and the attempt by the others to to set the agenda but I would conclude with one important thought the emphasis on strategic autonomy does not rule out alliances coalitions and Partnerships so I think often there's a tendency to to conflict the two after all it was nehru uh who invented non-alignment to turn to the U.S after after China attacked India in 1962. uh India turned to Soviet Union in 1971 when the U.S and China seemed to be supporting Pakistan's repression in Bangladesh and now Mr Modi has brought India very close to the United States to deal with the the challenges from China that that it faces so so I think it must be important to remember whether we talk about strategic autonomy or multipolarity Indian State responds to the threats and circumstances so the ideology is adapted to the need and not the other way around the actions are not defined by ideology but the actions that the state needs to take uh will be justified by modifying the ideology that's extremely helpful um it's also subtle which means it's incapable for Washington to relate to uh but we'll come we'll come to that in in due course um garima you work at the German Marshall Fund in Brussels you run the India trilateral Forum uh you've written a great deal about Europe's relations India and vice versa with the EU for a while as well as gppi in Berlin can you give us your thoughts on how this looks from Europe and how you see Europe fitting into India's overall approach to International order and Grant strategy sure thank you thank you very much uh Bruce for for inviting me and uh making me a part of this discussion I'll just pick up from where uh Raja ended um talking about strategic autonomy he mentioned in his second point that it was often used in a postcolonial context and um I think Europe is a case in point that illustrates his second Point as well as his third point that strategic autonomy uh doesn't preclude having alliances or building coalitions and the India Europe relationship is a extremely interesting example of that um so you can see a visible increase in India's Outreach towards Europe as early as 2012 2014 which even predates the current downturn in India China ties um it was since then New Delhi has started crafting a policy for Europe sub-regions breaking away from the sort of Cold War era subdivisions of east and west Europe that includes nordics central eastern European countries Brussels as well as the EU now this sort of turn towards Europe and a way of looking at Europe Beyond people's Colonial sort of lens beyond the tensions that stemmed from this relationship um has been driven largely by convergence around the question of how to deal with China now everybody has sort of heard of the very famous 2019 European formulation of China as a partner competitor and rival what is less well known is a few months before that in December 2018 Europe had a new strategy on India calling it an essential partner in maintaining a multi-polar Asia so it's since then that sort of both India and in Europe started grappling with the question of how to deal with China and the consequences of China in their respective neighborhoods that sort of these Bridges between New Delhi and various European capitals started building another factor for India is of course course in reaching out to Europe is developing National capacities needed to balance and respond to China and so we see all the European Indian conversations focus on Technology Innovation particularly 5G AI semiconductors Green Tech on trade and investment security and defense let's not forget France is the second largest defense equipment partner for India after Russia but also India is now intensifying cooperation with Italy Sweden the UK Etc so it sort of fits with the broader trend of increasing strategic engagement with the West um then we will talk about the us we know about the quad countries G7 um what I found really interesting was Minister Jay Shankar spoke at the black Forum in Slovenia and he spoke about the fact that all binaries of West and East are not relevant anymore now that's very interesting point coming from an Indian foreign minister and since then we've heard him talk about India being a Southwestern power a bridge between the west and the global South you know developing democracies Etc which really sort of shows you um how differently India is positioning itself from what we intuitively think of when we think of Indian foreign policy of course their limits to this convergence and that became quite apparent with Ukraine um India's dependence on Russia has of course constrained its strategic autonomy in this case um and it has India has found difficult to take positions as critical of Russia as its Western Partners would want surprisingly though this hasn't completely derailed India Europe ties in fact we've seen more engagement from European member states in trying to understand delhi's position I think one reason for that is that post Ukraine convergence on China is only deep root as Europe has learned crucial lessons on reducing dependencies on Russia is now applying them to China Taiwan is discussed like never before in in Europe um how difficult it was to build coalitions in Asia sort of has pushed your Europe to think a little bit more about understanding the nature of China as an actor as well um on the question of Russia China alignment I think Europe and India don't exactly have similar assessments of where that stands but in the long term both understand that the consequences of Moscow dependent on China would would have consequences for the balance of power in both regions um I'd like to end with since we're talking about strategic autonomy I'd like to end with the European debate on strategic autonomy uh now that's very different from from the debate in Delhi uh Europe sees itself caught between U.S China competition and not all European leaders have this position but um influential ones like president macron do and are thinking of looking at a middle path or um you know a third wave for Europe and how to sort of not be caught between these two blocks for India on the other hand it seems the the bigger question is China that is the consequential challenge um and and for India the idea is that all sort of foreign policy relationships are seen through the lens of China who can help balance China and they would rather see more engagement with the United States and the US in the indo-pacific and so I think that is one big difference is you'd asked in the original question of you know where does India converge with the Western in this case with Europe that's that's a crucial difference and I found it interesting I was speaking to a um former official in DC yesterday and I asked what is easier to work with the quad or the EU ustdc the quad hands down thank you foreign just imagining that conversation but yes indeed uh let me turn to tanvi Madan who's my colleague at Brookings in the center for East Asia policy also directs the India project at Brookings and the author most recently of the Fateful triangle looking at India U.S China relations um Tandy you're also a close Observer if U.S India ties of the two plus two mechanism and of the Quad so I'd like to bring you in for your thoughts on on how this has unfolded over the last year and how you see India's posture in the international order at this juncture thanks Bruce and and it's a great great pleasure to be on a panel with Raja garma and you and and thanks to our our colleagues Hannah Laura and Sophia to help put this together as well as a communication and Conference staff um you know I think the way particularly you know come at this from on on thinking about where you know how the India sees the U.S and I think the fundamental difference you've seen particularly from the 70s and 80s to where we have been in the last 20 years is in anything you largely saw in the Indian government you largely saw Society the you the US was seen as the spoiler to it for India and the international order logic whether that was the security economic order even technological so in the security order the U.S was the country that was aligning with China and Pakistan um at the and enabling um them uh in many ways including uh looking the other way at best uh while China enabled Pakistan's nuclear program for example uh in the economic order there really wasn't you know India was going through still a phase uh where uh you know it was looking at trade it was starting to open up in the 80s but nonetheless um other than kind of brief moments of alignment these weren't countries that looked at openness in the same way uh and then even on technology India saw the us as the country kind of blocking it there were export controls after India's 1974 a nuclear uh peaceful nuclear exposure nuclear test however you want to see it and so it was largely seen the U.S was seen in antagonistic terms as the spoiler as the Blocker of India's Ambitions and objectives I think today it's almost diametrically opposite if you look at the last few governments and their uh how they see the US broadly and I'll come to where the differences are but broadly and generally these governments now see the us as the enabler a supporter of India's rise and its role in the international uh order and you've seen this for example in terms of the security partnership where you know speaking to to government's point about uh the major challenge for China India being China uh the kind of U.S as a fundamentally a fundamental partner in both uh being a balancer of China and shaping a favorable balance of power ensuring a multi-polar Asia but also in terms of enhancing India's own capabilities so in academic terms both in external and in helping internal balancing for India as well um I think you've also seen in terms of the economic uh partnership after India is kind of opening up and liberalization there's a lot left to be done but nonetheless post the 1990s you really see uh kind of uh some more convergence now there's still differences on openness trade used to be uh kind of a subject of Divergence these days the US and India seem to be the same page on trade so perhaps some are differently but nonetheless even on things like Economic Security discussion strategic trade your stuff you see a lot of convergence with the us and it is seen as a partner as India tries to build its own resilience and reduce its vulnerabilities and exposure so China even in the economic space that's true of Technology as well um us you know us seen as a country that is going to help India's economic and technological transformation perhaps the country that can most do that and you've seen a technological partnership that's also going into Innovation partly because of uh you know the the talent Dimension and uh labor Mobility uh and and uh you know r d facilities for example American companies being set up in India so you see now this idea that whether in terms of Defense Technologies or non- kind of defense or Dual Purpose Technologies commercial Technologies the U.S scene as a partner and then finally you know other than kind of seen as a secure in the security order economic order technological order uh even in the global order in in many ways you are start you have seen now uh India see the us as the one along with perhaps France being the other country uh essentially kind of help uh India in terms of both its interests and membership in international organizations whether that for example is at the U.N security Council where while kind of sometimes in the Indian public discussion you know people still remember oh you know the Russians and this or the Soviets uh deployed it used its veto for India the last Soviet veto for India Russia veto was in 1971. uh Russia's been bandwagoning with India uh with China sorry um on some questions or at least not as forward-leaning about India in the last decade or so at the Euro Security Council it's been the US and France the U.S helping enable India's waiver uh at the nuclear suppliers group and going to bath for its membership and so I think you find many such instances now the US and India working together even in terms of coordinating this was in the quad statement a few months ago the ministerial statement about working together in international and Regional organizations to think about the leadership of those organizations so I think you've largely seen uh kind of India now seeing the US differently or at least the Indian government let me just kind of come to the the differences uh just very briefly I think you where you see some of uh and and this coordination taking place both bilaterally and and kind of this this through these coalitions or mini laterals and we can maybe come to a little bit about that later but on the differences I think uh you know it comes down to there's some principles that you know as Raja said as a postcolonial country and actually the US is also a postcolonial country just you know has a lot more years of being postcolonial um but India sees the issue uh for example sovereignty uh in a very different way so it's a bit it's less so than it was perhaps 20 years ago but a bit of a sovereignty Hawk uh in terms of domestic issues and so you know non-interference now India hasn't if you're in in other countries get ever spoken out on Indian other countries domestic development so it's not that this is a hard and fast rule but generally in terms of if you compare the US and India U.S a lot less sensitive if say somebody comments about what's Happening Here internally more many people would actually agree and say yes you know we do need to do more on X we do need to do more on you know uh Democratic uh uh uh strengthening our democracy in India that comes comes across and not just with this government this has been a general case where there is this um there's this skepticism if not suspicion uh of uh and pushback against countries not just the us but others commenting on India's internal developments and this this spills over into the sanction space where there is a sense that the US too has weaponized interdependence and used its power economically so I think those are the differences and then it comes down to this basic question of strategic autonomy I think the Indian governments have now come to the conclusion that the U.S for the reasons I said is its role as an enabler can actually help through perhaps through particularly its enhancement of India's capabilities and its other Partnerships through its other allies and partners can actually help provide India space that it is China that is actually the bigger constraint on Indian strategic autonomy and not uh and not the us having said that there are still a number of folks in India maybe not in government but I think the view also exists in certain quarters of government uh that and whether this is because it's the U.S per se or the US happens to be the Grand hegemon in the world um is there is this reaction of saying among some who stay look the U.S is still the US is the country that is constraining India's economy I mean India's autonomy and therefore India needs to be conscious of that I think what the Indian government's view is is look the U.S can be helpful it could possibly also constrain but the way to actually deal with those the U.S constraint and strategic autonomy is to build other Partnerships is to diversify India's Partnerships which is where Europe comes in but it's also where Russia comes in for India though I think we'll see that rule perhaps get more constrained as a russia-china relations deepen terrific um very very helpful uh it's also a good segue to a question I want to ask each of you when you could answer in your own ways we'll go in the same order as we initially did which is around sort of major fault lines in the Indian debate so sort of where are those in this in this period either inside government or between government and the wider Community uh around the United States around the economic quarter what are the major issues that continue to to drive debate in the in the Indian firmament from Russia yeah I mean I think on the economic side I mean it's quite clear that that it's often framed as you know universities for globalization or the investors for globalization or India is hesitant about it today's mentioned or garima mentioned the U.S policy itself has changed I mean I think those of us who saw Jake Sullivan's speech at the uh at Brookings institution a few weeks ago that the system the question that how globalization has panned out uh has not been helpful to large number of countries and sections of people within those within those countries so I think much of the arguments about globalization today are going to be reframed and I think as we do that my sense is there is going to be a lot more convergence between India and the US in terms of how do we build a new resume and Supply chains uh to limit uh weaponization by one country building trusted Partnerships those kind of areas I think today there's actually more convenience but the key to this is of course how do you it's not just Indian government that's supposed to uh you know opening up its Market it's really the Indian capital after all Indian Capital has its own interests and I think unlike in many countries in Asia India had a developed Capital by the time of Independence and this developed Capital wants to you know Safeguard its own market and that's where I think greater collaboration uh over a period of time might open up new possibilities and not see it as merely some of India is some kind of a anti-diluvian uh when it came to the logic of globalization second I think on the logic question of International Security my sense is uh for a long time uh in the 90s I mean we thought U.S was the problem and that's the reason why you know when you have said look we want to take your nuclear weapons away uh we want to you know maybe fix the Kashmir problem uh we prefer what we think what the Pakistan is saying is right then India tried to you know balance that by talking about a multiple Award of Rick and bricks in those kind of areas but today it is China that is blocking India's nuclear aspirations this China that messes around in the customer question it is China that difference Pakistan on the question of terrorism therefore I think the the logically today as the contradictions with China become the principal problem for India India's capacity to do uh unwillingness to do more things with the U.S have dramatically grown and the third aspect I think my sense is if you look at the larger questions of economic growth uh this year India U.S trade is 190 billion dollars with a bit of surplus for India and the potential for this trade the far overwhelms anything we can think of is that we China or with with Russia for that matter Russia is really lost a bit seen some surge but otherwise uh the trade with Russia in 2021 was just nine billion dollars and then we have this Indian diaspora in the U.S which is really and the West as a whole in the English-speaking world uh the Anglo-Saxon world if you will where the Indian diaspora has done well so I think there's a number of connections that we have today with the West are beginning to produce I think a new template in which Indian U.S and the India and the West will have differences but today there's a lot more common between them to manage those differences finally I would say that the West two needs as we saw the d7s shared in the global GDP is coming down and if U.S wants to retain uh kind of any kind of leadership in the International System it needs to find a way to accommodate India into the larger Western Coalition into the global hierarchy of power so therefore the U.S needs India too and I think this is not what is not understood widely in which in Indian debate or in the U.S debate and that's one reason why people accuse the U.S why is it being so soft in India because I think U.S is looking at this over the longer term that emits the rise of China and the challenges that it presents that India being part of the western Coalition will make the prospects for that coalition to succeed higher and for India which faces its main contradictions from China working with the US and the West gives it the security needs so I would say we're really at a historic moment where for the first time since India's independence India and the US India and the West can actually collaborate in producing a better order and the terms of that endearment will have to be negotiated it's not that the U.S will come out to Delhi and sail guys this is what here is our checklist are you signing off or not to one where actually the terms of endearment the terms of Engagement will have to be negotiated and I think Delhi is open that's very very helpful and um uh it's interesting you know when the body Administration took office there were some who were exploring G7 expansion but very striking to me that in their mind did not include India uh which I thought would have been a major mistake to have gone for a round of G7 expansion and not including India that struck me as a as a very unwise move I want to come back to the question of how it might be that the United States and Europe which would have to be part of this too uh can't have that negotiation and find the right structures in which to accommodate and negotiate over India's participation in the order so that's also then a Segway government to you how you see some of these fault lines or picking up on on Russia's point and how Europe reacts to this because of course one way to think about uh the changing dynamics of order is that European power has diminished somewhat in terms of its share of GDP who the US has been relatively constant and share of world GDP uh and in some of the key institutions where India would have a stake and and helping set the terms of order Europe would have to give some ground for that to happen uh so karma um yeah so on the on the question of fault lines I think particularly in the Europe India partnership is one on the question of economic policy and I think a lot of European engagement with India rests on the promise of India as an economic partner uh for for a lot of European member states who are looking to reduce dependence on China uh move towards the China plus one model in terms of moving Supply chains away from China companies who are looking to invest away from China um they're sort of rediscovering India and hope that India lives up to the economic potential and I think they hear the right sounds from the Indian government when when they reach out uh but perhaps that's not quite met when when they actually go to India and and try to work both with the state level and the federal level so in terms of delivering on the economic promise I think that is that is a challenge also for India to ensure that the promises and the the aspirations let's say of of its government are met by other institutions and agencies within the country uh that make this sort of diversification that Europe Longs for easier and and sort of facilitates that I think that is still that is still an issue another issue particularly I mean when I I work on Europe so I would be remiss if I didn't bring it up I think then we brought up in the case of U.S India relations as well this General suspicion of the western um it often feels like the Europe India partnership will be easily derailed uh with one or the other um you know areas where they don't agree or um even when it comes to convergence on China if they're not speaking exactly in the same terms if they're not fully like-minded um then it feels they're they're many constituencies in Delhi um and Beyond who would like to sort of write off the partnership with Europe so I think that's that's another fault line that sort of needs to be managed um however as Raja mentioned um the need India really needs other partners and and the need to develop Partnerships with Europe is also to um you know diversify not just have dependence on on one the United States or um the other countries um and then finally I think India's relationship with Russia and how that develops will of course also be a factor that largely impacts the Europe India relationship and I think many in Europe are trying to understand our understanding of I mean New Delhi has been very candid about its constraints when it comes to the Russia relationship with European interlocutors so I think they do understand where India stands however how this relationship will develop that's that's a question mark and I think as as you mentioned for Europe Russia is the primary challenge it is um how Ukraine unfolds will have quite a few consequences in terms of Europe as a geopolitical actor um how much weight it has not only in its own neighborhood but also in the indo-pacific um so I think in in those terms there are definitely voices in Europe that still don't understand what is India's position on Russia how is this relationship going to develop what does that mean does it have a veto power on how much India engages with Europe Etc let's just say that from my own observation the first phase of the Ukraine uh War uh I thought there was some validity to the Europeans criticisms of of India on his U.N votes but also some some pretty bizarre positions for example criticizing India for buying oil when the Europeans were still buying vast amounts of of Russian gas um so you know these things are uh are not straightforward tanvi um so I think you know I will say and I'll talk about kind of some of the fault lines I see I I will say to something you said Bruce that I actually think official Washington now gets some of this nuance and to your point uh to garma on kind of differences over the kind of Russia question you also there's learning going on and I think you've seen even in the last year when it comes to the US and India learning on both sides um I think the the fundamental kind of fault line through which a lot of the others flow when it comes to I think India is thinking about the international order is this question of how open to be uh to the world and there is um again this is It's not that it's not understandable uh India has been subject to sanctions before India has been subject to its partners and that's not just the US it's the Soviets as well changing their mind so this under it's understandable that India is concerned about dependence about exposure about vulnerability but I think there's frankly sometimes in the public debate more concerned about what the world can do to India and not enough discussion about what the world can do for India uh and that can sometimes lead to kind of missed opportunities and so even when it comes to the U.S it's not there isn't really to me you know when people say where will India stand in U.S China competition I think for one the India's primary kind of prism is not U.S China competition it's India's in China Challenge but nonetheless India can't take the same position it did in the cold war with U.S Soviet competitions just fundamentally different to India the debate in India to me is not kind of that India will it's not the U.S versus China I think India does tilt it does align and in this it's it's aligning very much with the Us and other countries that are concerned about uh China's uh actions and intentions uh the the debate is between how close to get how far and fast I don't think there's a China debate anymore in India it's how far the debate is how far and fast do you partner with countries like the US and particularly the U.S because I think the debate is about uh how much do you open yourself to these Partnerships versus how much you do got a loan and I think the the correct the the thing that eventually I think the government realizes is that actually even to eventually build India's own capabilities to be able to go it alone when it wants to those Partnerships are inherently important to build India's capabilities it will it will be faster for India rather than trying to go it alone so I think the the fault line being is there's a spectrum when you think about if India wants to build resilience and power it is the spectrum is self-sufficiency uh versus kind of this uh diversification approach uh and you know I think that's a spectrum and people uh you know come down on different sides so what does self resilient Reliance mean for some it means they want to be self-reliant sorry self-sufficient and for others it means self-reliance with the sense of a kind of a more resilient sort of thing where you do have your own capabilities and power and influence and that actually gives you some space even with that Diversified portfolio Partners I think couple of others I think uh something um garima mentioned which is kind of the Russia question because for India Russia does has traditionally whether in terms of enhancing India's capabilities or being a strategic balancer to China Russia has very much been part of that Diversified portfolio of Partners and I think you know this is a fault line I think people now to some extent understand it might not like it in the US and Europe but have a better understanding of it uh the question I think is you know India is still uh wants to to kind of um have China Russia as a balancer but as Russia the contradiction is as Russia China relations become closer this is posing you know this is going to be a fault line for India with Russia and it will have to sit and grab you know figure out how to Grapple with it I think the many in India who convinced that Russia and China will there will be another sign of Russian split as there was during the Cold War but as then it's today as well yes it might happen the thing is about timing and right now they're getting closer they're not splitting and right now is when India is facing this Challenge from China so I think that's the kind of other fault line but it's one in that's in play I think and I think finally uh there is this aspect of uh I don't think the two I think the the US and Indian governments for example when it comes to these International order if you want to break them down security or the economic order even them they are cooperating they're managing differences I think the governments are actually engaging well I what I would say though is I I think they need to do more to take the publics along uh for the reasons Raja said the U.S the Indian public is is through societal economic other links connected to the US but you see even in the Indian kind of government uh you know government um discussion this is perhaps the most open to the to the West government we've ever seen in India but the the public discourse what is going on on WhatsApp channels what is being discussed on prime time TV is kind of how the West is the foreign hand that's out to constrain India and this is not this is totally uh disconnected with the government's official approach and I think there's a sense that you can continue to do both those things and it'll be fine uh but it speaks to something that I think needs to be addressed which is this idea that this relationship with the US with the West is natural the reasons for it are evident and this mirrors in the U.S that you know where is the case being made other than to kind of Indian media channels or in the you know in Indian Prime Minister who come to the US and talk about why is the U.S important to India when do do the governments make the case about why they are actually aligning with each other and you just don't hear that so you know they'll sometimes be criticism or you know track one is moving along track two is behind well the governments need to make the case this is it might be a natural partnership natural allies as as prime minister uh but it needs a lot of nurture and it needs Communications to the publics about why and shopping hiding the fact that these are important countries for each other good and you know as you said I do think there is a a new degree of subtlety in official Washington's understanding of this issue you and I have talked about this a little bit it's one of the sort of Silver Linings in a way or the fault lines of the debates uh uh on Ukraine at the U.N is it has raised uh awareness and understanding of some of these questions in in official circles and as you say maybe a little less so in in the commentary ad um what I want to do at the stage is uh two things at the same time I want to bring in some questions from the audience and have you respond to them you don't each have to respond to everyone and feel free to pick and choose but I'm going to structure it um uh based on a remark that tonby made because one of the things you did tell me in your opening was you talked about different dimensions of the order the nuclear the economic the security the political et cetera and it seems to me that that's often missed and discussions of the international order okay there's one international order in terms of the balance of power but there are major domains or major topics and major institutions of order and a country can have differential relations to those so I'd like to move through some of those topics I also want to come to the the formulation that garma mentioned of uh India or some in your India thinking of itself as a bridge to the global South and I want to kind of come to that um one of the most uh well sorry let me rephrase we've got a lot of questions from the audience the topic that was in most of them uh was the security Council and the question of the lack of in earned seat for the security Council we saw Biden this year at the un uh or sorry laughter at the UN talk about sort of Leaning into this we've seen the U.N Ambassador engage in this you know I would say with a kind of mixed degree of enthusiasm but nonetheless and openness is this something that India still cares about in a deep way is it just the the ministry of external Affairs cares does this matter to India uh how would you all see that and just volunteer if you want to jump in okay I mean I mean let me let me step in here and as a realist I would say look it's like a you know I don't think initial I mean India wants to be in the U.N security Council but it should know that it's not going to happen anytime soon uh that the Russians and the Chinese are not going to Chinese certainly not don't want another Asian country or they forget India they don't even want Japan there so I think the important thing for India is really not the formal membership of the UNSC but India that becomes the third largest economy which is an India that works closely with its Partners its net weight in the global FS is going to grow so I would put more emphasis on building a coalition with the Western powers on range of global issues rather than depending on you know waiting for the U.N security Council gates to to open uh but I don't think you need that to actually perform a larger role in the International System because I think our growing weight will give that possibilities for India certainly yes U.N security Council sitting there all the time gives you some diplomatic influence but structurally it is the nature of India's economic power and the kind of Partnerships that it builds and the coalitions that will build actually will increase India's impact and my sense is uh that the UNSC is already marginal when it comes to security issues it's largely marginal when it comes to economic issues so so uh you know with the security Council deeply divided I don't think uh getting in at this point I mean it anyway makes a much difference to India's interest so I would say focus on interest focus on expanding Global role in partnership with your close partner like-minded countries rather than just waiting for uh there's something to drop from the the security Council and I think our problem is here as I mentioned before China is the principal you know obstacle to a large number of India's International aspirations and I think if we deal with that in partnership with our friends in the west a lot of issues will get sorted out automatically in terms of India's aspirations for a larger role in the International System that is the goal Security Council membership is only one element of getting there now remember anything you want to add on that I agree with uh fully with what Roger said just I feel like sometimes the the issue of human a ship and support for India's candidature becomes a good signaling device and it's often used by Partners particularly in the west so when France says it when Germany says that it's a easy way of carrying points uh also in Delhi signaling that you see India as an important International actor acknowledging that International institutions as they exist need reform and perhaps are not the most you know favorably constructed and I think it is it does carry some weight particularly when coming from Europe given the sort of historical baggage well and if uh if it drives towards China and Russia blocking it then all to the better are seen from Washington's perspective but as you said it just it's in a way of sort of a cheap signaling um another question which came up frequently and I also want to ask more about and in a way I think builds directly uh Russia on your point is around uh the International Financial order the global economic order and whether India needs a sort of official seats to the table or whether the economic weight is enough does it need a membership and an expanded G7 does it need expanded shares at the fund uh does it need you know leadership roles in the bank Etc to what extent the the institutional Arrangements of the global economic and financial order matter or is it sufficient for India to grow and and simply exert the weight uh that it increasingly has in international economic Affairs anybody want to chime in my sense is I'll just briefly I mean I think the US is actually talking about reforming those institutions probably this time a lot more seriously uh given the larger crisis that we have on the economic front uh and I think these issues matter to India and I think for the first time really we can engage with the US and the West on these in a far more productive way than we have in the past merely criticizing these institutions to one of actually uh formerly uh engaging in how do we reform multilateral lending institutions Global Financial order and I think India has been part of the G20 Finance track uh India has been engaged with the us today on the on the quad and other forums I would say there's a lot of potential here and the agenda that the button Administration has put again going back to Jake Sullivan's speech there is a lot out there wanting to do and I think India as one of the large economies this time around uh we'll have a a reasonable role to engage in a productive a negotiation with the with the with its best and partners I think yeah you know I would say it's it's kind of interesting where you again see some of the convergence and Divergence where I think on the one hand you know there's you've seen kind of progress especially in terms of these mini laterals uh now uh I mean I remember when the CBD or then TPP the trans-pacific partnership was the first proposed uh part of the reason it was proposed is because the WTO the World Trade Organization was seen as kind of not being able to move partly because you know the West settle countries like India are blocking it um and so the TPP comes up which India criticizes a plural lateral and that there should be kind of good old-fashioned multilateralism today you've seen uh kind of India become one of the innovators in terms of mini lateralism I mean they still used um pluralateral but has even in some of these economic issues you know the quad is a good example where you see a lot of these the same kind of Dimensions you're seeing uh the G7 discuss Supply Jane's critical infrastructure protection talking about critical minerals diversification Etc you're seeing some of these telecommunications you're seeing some of these same issues being discussed thinking about standards thinking about those issues even in ipf I mean the much maligned indo-pacific economic Forum you know you do see India taking a more forward-leaning approach even on some trade issues and having to Think Through even if though it's not in that pillar but through the supply chain pillar of that coming at some of these questions about Imports for example so you're seeing some movement on that but at the same time you know you also do still see and and government could probably speak to the EU India trade and Technology Council um as well that's that's a form of this and you see this in bilateral but I do think you know you there are still these issues and um about uh the economic order where while India and the Us and other partners are coordinating in the G20 which is another form I think where you've seen a lot of uh activity on issues like debt sustainability uh you know how do you issue get at the debt repayment issue which the every rate restructuring rather than sustainability um how do you actually get at those issues so there is that work but I think there is still fundamentally uh some differences in India in terms of official uh mem you know the kind of the amount of weight and influence it has formally in the World Bank in the IMF and their fundamental difference on the use of the the U.S use of the power of the dollar uh and the US and Europe's use of sanctions because India itself has been a subjects of sanctions before so I think you're largely seeing more Cooperative than before but there still are these areas um where there kind of are differences and then of course you know the US and India these days are kind of more protectionist or more focused on Industrial policy than I would say a number of other European and indoor Civic partners of both countries are the things you know that goes to Russia's Point earlier that this is not just a question of the United States saying hey okay you can come and join the table as it currently exists but actually in a negotiation about the terms uh of the international economic order going forward um I want to raise two other questions and and suggest garama that you take a first run at them um in my mind they're connected perhaps we don't see them as connected uh and again these are pulling in questions from the audience one is about climate diplomacy where India has played quite an important role over the last uh sort of decade decade and a half one of the sort of shaping powers of the emerging climate regime um occupying obviously a very different position than the United States uh and Europe in that debate and in my mind that's a little bit connected to the point you made about the possibility of India serving as a bridge to the global South and I wanted you to unpack that a little bit because of course there are places and and issues where the United States and the West is in a very different place uh from the large majority of developing countries and India is in this sort of interesting position where it's both a major economic player and has still a substantial developmental uh challenge ahead of it so uh those two questions uh any of you should feel free to pick either or both but garmo why don't we start with you um let me start with the second bit of the question of the bridge between the the global South and the Western um it was interesting to have these formulations coming in from the from the Indian government side and this sort of the first remarkable Administration we made predated Ukraine but I think in the wake of the Ukraine crisis and when it came to talking about the second order consequences of the war on a number of countries in the world that were already dealing with the consequences of the pandemic the debt crisis and and sort of collating all of that in India's G20 presidency I think we see this articulated the most clearly uh where India mentioned for example in Bali that it played a role in making sure that the final language of Ukraine uh bridged some of the differences between its Partners in the global South and what its Western Partners wanted um so I think these are sort of some of the concrete examples by which India is trying to do so it's really centering it as part of the G20 presidency and climate is is is yet another um example of that because India's discourse on climate diplomacy has shifted radically from a few years ago when it was a sort of development centered read before green that we we need to develop first and then we'll deal with climate um and now it's it's it's very different in terms of looking at the climate challenges an integral part of um not just development but also Economic Policy industrial policy Etc and I think in terms of rhetoric at least um India tries to put that forward um and but I think not just on climate but also on a number of other issues for example the role that India can play in places like brics for example or Shanghai cooperation organization where there are sort of Russia and China playing a certain role and can India play a different sort of role a more balancing role can it sort of bring in some of the conversations it's having with Western Partners um or or you know have exert a different type of influence in these institutions uh that would be something interesting and I would want to watch for that how that develops projects on the other where you want to come in on this I mean the only thing I'll say on this these times there's this view of India is a static it is non-aligned it's difficult it doesn't do stuff with the US it doesn't move it's another place where you've seen change and you've seen kind of in India go from saying we didn't create this problem and we're not going to do anything about it it's on you to uh saying look we this is going to affect us and so we need to be part of the solution as well even though we didn't contribute to making this a big a bigger problem so another place where you've actually seen this go from a kind of India versus West or in you know Global South versus global North sort of discussion to a more and this is where India and China actually used to if you remember the Copenhagen Summit um you know in online it was kind of where Indian China used to work together but now you're actually seeing even in terms of the solutions uh where India is working with uh you know not just the global South countries but also kind of the West for technology and finance would like to see them who do more on both these things in terms of transfer but you know the prime example I'll give you is you know the the single largest um financing kind of the the initiative of the U.S development Finance Corporation is financing a large uh you know solar panel manufacturing facility in India that will help not just India but potentially others diversify away from uh you know dependence on China so you know there are kind of these interesting dynamics that are also happening in kind of the climate space which are again much more nuanced than you would see with some of the top line statements about where India stands on these questions or frankly you know the cooperation or lack of it between the the west and India good um we're getting close to the end but I want to bring in another major question that came through from the audience which is around human rights uh human rights and and quality of democracy uh and obviously both the United States and and China sorry and India have some some challenges here uh human rights in particular on the Indian side uh several of the questions were aimed at the the topic of of whether the United States should alter its perception of India because of Human Rights and quality of democracy issues I will say that in my own observation talking to the Brits when they had the the G7 presidency this Administration as they were thinking about G7 expansion the human rights situation in India did bear on on their thinking about to you to what extent there was going to be a kind of values alignment um I would say the Biden Administration has not taken that approach we've seen it although it talks a lot about democracy in the International System hosted the Democracy Summit et cetera we haven't seen it being particularly preoccupied about human rights issues or democracy issues in India but so anybody who wants to comment on how India sees this set of issues uh in relation to its posture and international order at large and then we'll wrap up certainly it certainly doesn't worry me too much the in the human rights debate I think it's it's got the U.S domestic ideological arguments but as someone who's followed the U.S foreign policy for a long time so it's a bit uh you know I think it's a self-deception in the U.S debate that some of the US has always promoted democracy or human rights abroad or the claim that human rights were integral to its international relations that doesn't stand scrutiny I mean I think given what the US has done in the region I'm not blaming viewers that's a record that when the US was in competition with the Soviet Union it dined with the devil in most places and if you remember there was a lady called Jane kid Patrick who said Patrick who said Kilpatrick Doctrine was uh as long as he's my son of a it's fine yeah like confronting the Soviet Union was the principal challenge for the U.S and not looking at the nature of the individual regimes that that aren't uh that that you've got to decide your policies to them so I think it's really a post 91 belief in Washington that somehow this is the central way of organizing in America international relations it never worked it was tried during Qatar period it didn't work it tried initially during a period of uh Clinton it didn't work I don't see that working and my senses take the Biden Administration itself started in January 2021 as democracies and autocracies and much of the U.S strategy since then has been to tone that down to adapt to the reality of a growing competition with China just one example of MBS in Saudi Arabia January 2021 it didn't matter so it was going to be made a pariah February 22 he mattered a lot he matters a lot now so I think look I think U.S is realist and I understand U.S has its own ideological uh debates too just like we have our non-alignment strategic autonomy arguments the U.S has its internal debate on these issues but I don't think it is consequential for foreign policy because in the end U.S like India is a pragmatic state that will balance its interests between its economic interests its security interests its geopolitical interests while continuing to talk about an ideology just as we do so so I think that is the reality in which the US is operated I'll just conclude with this thought I've seen the U.S support the worst anti uh you know modernist groups like The jihadis in Afghanistan saying that these are Freedom Fighters that was just 40 years ago I'm not even going back in history and now you come and say oh guns are corrupt they don't know how to run the country we're going to judge them they score them look I think it's it's really it's I mean it's really an internal argument in the wealth way but I don't see it has any effect on U.S foreign policy we've already seen in the National Security strategy about an Administration where the importance of contestation with China demands that you reach out to other people and on the question of Indian democracy I think you should leave it to the Indians it's too big uh for you to come in and fix that problem I mean you can't and I think it's a battle that Indian Civil Society Indian political parties have to fight and I think they will fight I mean the Assumption oh the some of these India's democracy is falling apart this is really elevating again into serious headlines what is without understanding the complex processes that are going on and my sense is wait till 2024 elections and see India there will be a royal a Battle Royal for the Soul of India and I think you'll see that so so to write off large countries and societies with the with the stroke of hand Indian democracy is dead I'll give you a score of 3 out of ten I mean I think this is a ridiculous score making in the US but it has really no effects on the on the ground I think on U.S foreign policy it's a very good Tandy I think you know there are a few things here as you as you said Bruce the Biden Administration has essentially reached made made seems to have made a call uh along the lines of what Roger said that this is something Indians need to kind of Indian civil society and and and and and the political uh uh Community needs to sort out themselves also I think this idea that whatever concerns will be largely brought out discussed uh uh privately and and third that you know there's this question of would a public uh a good public kind of discussion of this from the administration be effective or actually counterproductive so I think they've made their judgment I know there's some discussion in India that somehow there's this very coordinated good cop bad cop approach going on right now frankly that assumes a certain amount of coherence that I'm not sure any democratic government necessarily has and that's exaggerated but I would say there's there are a couple of things to keep in mind which is that um the it is where kind of India is different from all the examples that uh um Raja pointed out and yes you know as as somebody who's a historian I can add to the cases that Raja pointed about about U.S relationships and Partnerships with its Origins but one of the the issues is that India itself is making the case for itself as a democracy and saying that look whether as a security partner whether it's a trusted technology partner whether it's an alternative for companies the reason that it is different from the country that shall not be named that is China what makes India differences is openness it's transparency it's a democratic nature so I think it the thing is it will set expectations and there will be discussion in open societies then on that basis since India has put that metric out the second thing is I suspect what the concern here will partly also be and and something that will India will have to Grapple with in in 1980s India is a good example as the Us and other countries invest in India as a partner and invest in its rise it's think about it as a balancer to China uh part of that is not you know that we've discussed a lot India's willingness to do these things with the west or for itself but in partnership with the West the question comes to the other questions that have in the past been a stumbling block to this is India's ability to do it and India has been most effective effective uh in terms of its ability when it is uh kind of United and it adds to India's power and strengths and ability to do things for itself in partnership with others but alone and so that I think that question of internal stability and security that is for Indians to decide yes but I think it will affect potentially there will be discussions about what's going on in India can India play the regional and Global role that it wants do that the West wants it to uh if it is uh in kind of argumentation uh with itself Beyond a certain point perfect Karma you you have the final word I'll be quick uh because I know we are hitting the mark soon um the Europe India partnership in the past was seen primarily through this lens human rights democracy and a lot has changed since then um European Parliament resolutions on ABC problem in India used to get a lot of attention that was the dominant frame and since then there has been a lot of introspection in Europe and there's been an understanding that this approach is a not useful B scene it's lecturing uh see what leverage does Europe actually have to lead to internal change in India but I do want to caution on one thing I do want to bring it up because of a lot of the criticism of China in Europe is based and rooted in the values piece uh particularly what's happening in xinjiang human rights Hong Kong it is natural that other Partnerships will also be evaluated through that lens and as India invests more capital in in European uh member states I think this is something that it'll have to Grapple with that is just normal this sort of scrutiny will uh will only increase um going forward particularly because a lot of the China question is rooted so much um in the values piece but I do want to want to mention that there's been a lot of pragmatism and a more pragmatic approach when it comes to this and limitations of what Europe can do and not wanting to be perceived as um sort of lecturing Colonial uh you know um partner perfect we are out of time as we wrap I want to thank Hannah Forum Laura McGee Sophia Harden our conf team for putting us together uh a particular thank you to our panel for joining us one of the great privileges of this line of work is you are constantly being afforded an opportunity to learn uh which is an astonishing privilege especially at my late Advanced stage of Life uh and I could not think of a better team of people um to help us understand these issues in front of us I thought this was nuanced and Rich and actually quite uplifting and quite optimistic and that's increasingly rare So my thanks to you all for your thoughts and for joining us at Brookings today thank you Bruce thank you

Channel: Brookings Institution

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Length: 65min 50sec (3950 seconds)

Published: Sat May 27 2023