Kim Jong-un is becoming
a more prominent figure on the world stage. He now frequently
leaves North Korea and welcomes top officials
in Pyongyang. And when looking
at the dictator’s high-profile
public appearances, it would be difficult not
to notice that they all share something in common: Mercedes. Mercedes. Rolls-Royce
and more Mercedes. But how did Kim manage to
get these luxury, bulletproof vehicles — in open violation
of an international ban on luxury goods —
to North North Korea? To answer this question, we teamed up with the
non-profit research group Center for Advanced
Defense Studies, which published a detailed
report on sanctions evasions. Using shipping and
corporate data, satellite images and interviews, we investigated a shipment
of two bulletproof Mercedes. These vehicles cost
at least $500,000 and are primarily
marketed to world leaders. We followed them through a
circuitous network of ports, apparently designed to
cloak their movement, and onto a ghost ship owned
by a Russian businessman whose company has been
accused of evading sanctions. Our story offers a glimpse
into how North Korea skirts sanctions and how
it likely uses similar techniques to procure
far more dangerous goods. So first, let’s take a look
at the actual route. And the trail starts: in a shipping terminal
in Rotterdam in June 2018. The first part of
the journey looks like a regular shipment. Nothing out of the ordinary. The cars are on two
of the containers on this ship. From here,
they’re transported on a major international
shipping line. After a 41 day journey, the cars arrive in China. We track them to
the port of Dalian. From here, the cars
are shipped to Japan, and from there they
are sent in yet another ship to another port
in Busan, South Korea. And here,
the Russian-owned ship at the center of
our investigation enters the picture. It picks up the
containers and when it leaves the port,
mysteriously vanishes, turning off its
required transponder. Eighteen days later,
the ship reappears, but now the cars are gone. And instead,
it’s carrying coal. So, what just happened? Let’s take a closer look
at this ghost ship. Its convoluted
background offers clues as to why it was not at all
a regular transport. It used to be called Xiang Jin
and had links to North Korea. But shortly before
it gets the cars, its name changes to DN5505 and its ownership
is transferred to Do Young Shipping,
a shell company in the Marshall Islands. It’s Do Young Shipping that’s owned by the
Russian national. But you’d never know it
because it sails under the flag of the
West African nation Togo. And its safety manager
is based in Hong Kong. Confused? That’s the idea. Using that many jurisdictions is a classic sanctions
evasion strategy. Our reporting also
shows that this ship was trailing the cargo as
soon as it entered China. Do you see it? It’s right here. Satellite images
we found suggest that it tried to pick up the
cars at other ports in Asia. But the handoff happens
weeks later in South Korea. So where did the
containers go? Vladivostok, Russia. And here is why
we think that: First, the ship’s last
reported destination before the transponder
was turned off was a coal port
next to Vladivostok. We think the cars were
offloaded in this area. Second, the owner of
the Russian ghost ship is based in Vladivostok. His name is
Danil Kazachuk. And he confirmed that he
bought and sold the Mercedes in a phone call to
a Times reporter, but offered no further details. Four months after
the cars disappeared, South Korean officials seized two of Kazachuk’s ships,
including the ghost ship, for alleged illicit trade
of coal and oil with North Korea. Third, we tracked these
North Korean transport planes, which made a rare visit to
Vladivostok on Oct. 7 — perfectly timed with the
arrival of the containers. They are the very planes
that normally carry Kim’s luxury vehicles and a possible
direct transportation link to North Korea. Our final clue:
In January 2019, the same exact model
of armored Mercedes was spotted on the
streets of Pyongyang by the website
North Korea News. [cheering] The route to Asia. The ghost ship in Busan. The North Korean planes. It’s not possible to say if
every part of this journey was illicit. But since 2016,
sanctions experts say that North Korea has
used similar techniques to bring in vital fuel sources
and technology for its weapons program. Which raises the question:
How effective are sanctions as a tool to pressure
Kim Jong-un to end his nuclear ambitions?
