House Holds Hearing On Capitol Riot | NBC News

care may mute participants microphones when they are not under recognition for purposes of eliminating inadvertent background noise uh second members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves if i notice when you recognize that you have not unmuted yourself i will ask you if you'd like the staff to unmute you if you indicate approval by nodding staff will unmute your microphone third i want to remind all members and witnesses that the five-minute clock still applies you will notice a clock on your screen that will show how much time is remaining and if there's a technology issue we will move to the next member until the issue is resolved and you will retain the balance of your time fourth in terms of the speaking order we will be beginning with the chair and ranking member then members present at the time the hearing is called to order will be recognized in order of seniority finally the house rules require me to remind you that we have set up an email address to which members can send anything they wish to submit in writing at any of our hearings that email address has been provided in advance to your staff good morning to our panel i'm pleased to welcome acting chief of the capitol police yogananda pittman an acting house sergeant at arms tim blodgett today is our third of three hearings reviewing the aftermath of the breaching of the capital capital by an insurrectionist mob on january 6th the purpose of this hearing is to dig deeper into the failures that occurred on january six i and the members of this subcommittee will be asking some very uncomfortable questions as we conduct a thorough review of what went wrong i want to emphasize at the outset that the hearing is not a gotcha exercise none of us at this hearing can forget the events of january 6th but how we respond will determine how we collectively learn from the trials of that day not as democrats and republicans but as americans charged with the responsibility of being caretakers of our republic as we move forward we do not want to fall into the trap of preparing to fight the last war we must be prepared to ensure the next one never happens and if we ignore the mistakes of the past the capital campus will continue to be vulnerable to unknown and unexpected threats so i am going to start with the meeting i had on january 5th i was briefed by then house sergeant-at-arms paul irving and u.s capitol police chief sund during the briefing both chi sun and mr irving provided assurances that the capital complex had comprehensive security and there was no active intelligence that groups would become violent at the capitol during the certification of the electoral votes i was later told by chief sund that his department did not have intelligence that there would be an armed insurrection although we now know that there was in fact an intelligence report from his own department released on the third which states quote unlike previous post-election protests the targets of the pro-trump supporters are not necessarily the counter protesters as they were previously but rather congress itself is the target on the sixth as outlined above there has been a worrisome call for protesters to come to these events armed and there is the possibility that protesters may be inclined to become violent this combined with stop the steel's propensity to attract white supremacists militia members and others who actively promote violence may lead to a significantly dangerous situation for law enforcement and the general public alike end quote but even putting the capitol police intelligence assessment aside how could the security planning policies and procedures apparently be so lacking and prepared this event was widely promoted on social media weeks in advance and your own report specifically shows the department was monitoring these posts there were numerous groups with a history of violence known to be planning to attend and these groups were actively discussing their plans on social media i for one am at a loss to understand how your intelligence report and then later as the mob walked 16 blocks growing in size an aggressive demeanor failed to impact the capitol police force security posture i also would like the panel to address the failures regarding command and control and communication i have spoken to many officers who felt that on that day of the attack they were left alone and unsure how to respond how did command and control break down so quickly what needs to be changed it has been widely reported that senior leadership was not reachable nor providing direction to the officers is that true we have also been told that there was not a clear understanding of the rules of engagement and the level of force that officers were expected to use as the attack unfolded how could that have happened once the capital was breached was there a strategic plan to secure the building now i look forward i hope you can provide updates to the committee as to how the capitol police and sergeant-at-arms are currently protecting the campus and its workforce and to talk about the next steps to ensure the future physical safety of our campus we need to know what you think are the major institutional and cultural reforms and or overhauls needed to maintain as safe and as open a campus as possible so that the visitors from across the country and around the world can witness representative democracy in action i look forward to your answers to these questions and more i want you to know that we are very thankful for your service and that of the staff of your organizations who work so hard to make this house run at this point i would like to yield to my friend and colleague the ranking member jamie herrera butler for an opening statement that you would like to know thank you mr chairman and thank you acting chief pittman and acting sergeant-at-arms budget for being here today uh january 6th the whole world watched in disbelief as the center of american democracy was assaulted the very ideals of democracy that make us the envy of the world were attacked it was the constitution in action it was the counting of the electoral votes it was the transfer of power that takes place every four years and it was literally under uh insurrection the very ideals were coming under fire and that day an angry mob with the intention to destroy not just the symbols of our freedom but the people who took an oath to serve and protect the constitution the assault on the capital will forever be a painful reminder that democracy and the rule of law are not guaranteed to us we must continuously fight to uphold them with that in mind we have to take very seriously that it's our job as both the american people and as members of congress to make sure this never happens again this starts with a clear and candid assessment of what went wrong here's the truth top officials either failed to take seriously the intelligence received or the intelligence failed to reach the right people this meant that the capitol police force was woefully unprepared for the attack to be clear the united states capitol police force is not meant to be an army expecting sixteen hundred officers to hold back an unruly mob of eight to ten thousand people many of whom were armed and had their own homemade uh explosive devices or had came with or weaponized everyday items it's not a position we should ever have to be in but understand uh what fit but we must understand what failed on that day whether it was a broken lines of communication whether it was inadequate training and not enough for the correct equipment decision-making processes or everything in between look security is essential and we all have a fundamental need to feel safe on the capitol grounds it's up to the capitol police and the sergeant-at-arms to provide that assurance so that we may work on behalf of the american people without obstruction or fear of violence while we absolutely must do better to keep this place secure i have to say it's also important that we try to keep this institution as accessible to the public as possible we are the people's house sacrificing the openness of this institution is not the only way to keep the capital secure i don't like that there's a fence around the capital complex that makes the seat of democracy look like a military base and i don't like that it costs almost two million dollars a week i hope we're able to find ways to secure this place without such measures a balance i believe must be and can be struck i look forward to working with the legislative branch with chairman ryan and with the different agencies involved to figure out what that balance is and to execute it as quickly and efficiently as possible with that i yield back mr chairman thanks mr butler appreciate your leadership on all this and i appreciate how you've conducted this in a bipartisan manner uh it's been a joy to work with you next we will ask the chair of the full appropriations committee congresswoman rosa delora for any opening statements that she would like to make thank you very much thank you mr chairman and thank you ranking member herrera butler and welcome to our witnesses uh i am so grateful to join with you uh as we dig deeper the security failures that occurred on january 6th on that day our nation held its collective breath watching in disbelief as violent insurrectionists rioted in our capital we listened in horror as insurrectionists were spurred on as the mob stormed the capitol building aiming to disrupt congress and yes they came for the congress members of the u.s capitol police and the house sergeant unarmed valiantly leapt into the fray but they were overwhelmed these courageous women and men risked their lives to defend our democracy it's a testament to their bravery and their dedication that no members or staff were physically harmed but it breaks all of our hearts that so many capital police officers were injured in the attack many quite severely we pray for the officers and their families as they have dealt with the unfolding tragedy of that day especially the family of officer brian sicknick and our hearts are heavy for the loss of capital police officer howard liebengood who died by suicide in january as we honor these sacrifices we must take the hard look at just what exactly happened on that dark day and what we need to do to ensure such an alarming breach such an alarming failure of our capital security this should never happen again the attack exposed weaknesses in our capital security systems that are far greater than any of us would have ever anticipated and it has made it abundantly clear that the capitol police and the sergeant of arms require major institutional and cultural reforms what went wrong on january 6th as the committee that funds the security of the capital today we hope we can gain a better understanding of the problems that the capitol police and the sergeant-at-arms must address what resources they need to reform themselves to keep members congressional staff employees and their own officers safe what are the solutions what should the role of the capitol police board be i say a thank you to our witnesses for joining us today acting chief of police yogananda pittman briefed members of the appropriations committee last month and i hope we can continue to drill down on the issues that we discussed then and acting house sergeant-at-arms tim blodgett brings an important perspective from this from his office on january 6 2021 our nation gazed into the abyss our democracy indeed is fragile but the security of our seat of government should never be and that is why it is so immensely important that we have an open and honest discussion to ensure the events like those do not take place that took place on january 6 can ever happen again and i yield back and thank the gentleman thank you chairwoman doloro next is ranking member of the full appropriations committee k granger for any opening statements you'd like to make k i'd like to thank chairman ryan and uh ranking member jamie herrera butler for holding this important hearing today the january sixth attack on the capitol was something i never thought i would witness in the face of great danger u.s capitol police bravely fought to defend the complex and ensure our members and staff were safe in addition to making sure that the capitol police have the support and resources they need to process and heal from the traumatic events of that day we must ensure that they have the resources necessary to defend the capital against similar attacks it was clear from our briefing last month that the failure to protect the capital was not due to a lack of intelligence but rather a failure to properly act on the intelligence there was also a clear lack of command and control because so many agencies were involved yet their actions were not coordinated this is unacceptable and left our law enforcement men and women on the ground unprepared for the very real threat they face at the center of this controversy is the capitol police board which includes the sergeant-at-arms architect of the capitol and capitol police serious questions remain about their failure to approve the request from the capitol police chief to call in the national guard and properly notify members and staff on the status of the threat through the emergency notification system as we speak miles of fencing still surrounds the capital and the center of american government is now tarnished by razor wire and limited access while we must take we must take the necessary steps to make the capital complex safe and secure we must have the ultimate goal of safely reopening the capitol and its ground to the public the capitol and its buildings belong to the american people not us they need to be able to visit their elected representatives and know they will be safe while doing so i want the witnesses to discuss what changes have been made and will need to continue to be made to ensure the capitol complex is protected i thank you mr chairman i yield back thank you ranking member granger we're now going to move to our witnesses uh without objection your written testimonies will be made part of the record we ask you to please summarize your statement and highlight your efforts to the committee chief pittman please begin and after your statement we'll turn to uh sergeant-at-arms blodget for his statement once the statements are complete we will move to the question and answer session so please begin chief pittman thank you for the opportunity to testify before the committee on january 6 our strength determination and commitment to the mission of protecting the democratic process was tested fortunately the uscp succeeded in its mission with the assistance of law enforcement partners like mpd the united states capitol police protected the congressional leadership members and the democratic process on january 6 i was the assistant chief of police of the department's protective and intelligence operations leading up to january 6 the department gathered information about the anticipated events of the day and released assessments that analyzed the raw information received from multiple sources the department issued four assessments about the january 6 event the final assessment indicated amongst other things that militia groups white supremacists and other extremist groups would be participating in the january 6 event these groups plan to be armed the target of the demonstration would be congress and the demonstrators saw this as a last opportunity to overturn the results of the presidential election and they were desperate the assessment was widely shared throughout the department and in response to the assessment the department made significant changes to its security posture we increased the size of protection details deployed counter surveillance agents across dc increased our cdu platoons including deploying hard platoons we deployed swat teams enlarged the security perimeter and increased exterior and interior patrols to include the subways since the six it has been suggested that the department was either ignorant of or ignored critical intelligence that indicated that an attack of the magnitude that we experienced on january 6 would occur the department was not ignorant of intelligence indicating an attack of the size and scale we encountered on the six there was no such intelligence although we knew the likelihood for violence by extremists no credible threat indicated that tens of thousands would attack the u.s capitol nor did the intelligence received from the fbi or any other law enforcement partner indicate such a threat indeed the secret service brought the vice president to the capitol that day as they were also unaware of any credible threat of that magnitude the department also didn't not ignore intelligence that we had which indicated an elevated risk of violence from extremist groups to the contrary we heighten our security posture there is evidence that some of those who stormed the capitol were organized but there is also evidence that a large number were everyday americans who took on a mob mentality because they were angry and desperate it is the conduct of this latter group that the department was not prepared for the department did face some operational challenges that we are addressing for example the capital lockdown was not properly executed some of the officers were unsure of when to use lethal force our radio communications to officers were not as robust and we are ensuring that our incident command system protocols are adhered to going forward and re-implementing training in those respective areas we are addressing those operational challenges but i want to make clear that these measures alone would not have stopped the threat we faced to stop a mob of tens of thousands requires more than a police force it requires physical infrastructure or a regiment of soldiers since the six we have hardened the complex and we know that some of those temporary enhancements are not popular but these are necessary in the short term the department is beefing up its flow of information and now holds daily calls with its intelligence partners i would like to thank the committee for their continued support and ensuring the department has what it needs i'd also like to thank the chairman for helping the department to ensure that our officers have the mental wellness resources that they and their families need as to the uscp officers that proudly serve the congressional community they fought bravely on january 6 they are heroes i am ready to answer your questions thank you chairwoman deloro ranking member granger chairman ryan ranking member herrera butler and the members of the appropriations subcommittee on ledge branch thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the security failures of january 6. before i begin i want to acknowledge the debt of gratitude we owe to the officers of the united states capitol police metropolitan police and the law enforcement partners who came to the aid of the institution and risked their lives so that our constitution and democracy could endure i cannot thank them enough i want to thank congress for helping provide a fitting tribute to officer siknik we mourn as a community for the loss of his life but the recognition rightfully bestowed upon him hopefully served as a moment of healing for the capitol police and for all law enforcement who make sacrifices on a daily basis to provide for our safety and i want to acknowledge the sacrifices of officer liebengood and smith and their families their sacrifices will never be forgotten and i finally want to thank the national guard who have come from near and far to keep our city on the hill safe they have left their families amidst a pandemic to work in uncertain environment and their presence makes us safer as i stated in my previous briefing to the appropriations committee the intelligence surrounding january 6 was problematic intelligence requires finding needles in a haystack on january 6 there was a failure to either gather synthesize or disseminate intelligence and there were indications that the intelligence was muddled or contradictory for example the january 3rd intelligence assessment from the capitol police has been touted to include information that makes it clear that january 6 will become violent however the document also states that the protesters rallies are expected to be similar to the previous million meg of march rallies in november and december of 2020 which drew tens of thousands of individuals as we know now the events of january 6 were not like the previous marches or any other rallies that we've had on capitol grounds the intelligence provided to the capitol police and other law enforcement did not anticipated a coordinated attack warning should not be qualified or hidden bad information conflicting information or missing information leads to poor decisions in fact when the capitol police presented this assessment to the sergeant-at-arms they simultaneous simultaneously briefed on the plan of action for january 6th and you and one would think that the plan was developed taking into account the intelligence that they were seeing at the time one would also expect the warnings to be reflected in all subsequent intelligence reports the office of the sergeant-at-arms received daily intelligence reports from the capitol police following the initial assessments referenced on the third on january 4th 5th and 6th the capitol police listed demonstrations and categorize the probability of civil disobedience or arrests as remote highly improbable or improbable for each of those days and for every single demonstration the characterization of the threat posed by these protests only reinforced the notion in thinking that they were similar to the two previous demonstrations and that not and not the violent insurrection that we experience the office of the sergeant-at-arms is a consumer of intelligence products we do not independently acquire or analyze intelligence we are dependent on the capital police and the intelligence communities provide timely accurate succinct intelligence to help guide our decisions and it pains me to say but the intelligence missteps cascaded into inadequate preparation which placed the health and lives of frontline officers at risk while frontline officers did everything they could that day the capitol police was prepared for a first amendment event but not adequately prepared for the events of january 6. for example former chief son noted in his letter to congressional leadership that he had expedited the delivery of approximately 104 helmets to officers it was a good decision to expedite the delivery of the helmets but it also raises question as to why the officers did not have the helmets on hand i support any efforts we can to acquire all gear for our officers for our officers to keep them safe and to be able to keep the gear on hand and express the support to the capitol police board proper planning before an event will provide the needed support to the officers on the line and help ensure that the event does not turn into a crisis we must also prepare for contingencies the failure to prepare for contingencies can result in greater difficulty and execution security examinations are currently underway to make sure that we are prepared for the next january 6. lieutenant general honore and his task force have been working to not only examine the security postures on the hill but also the security of members traveling as well as in their districts my office has worked in coordination with general honore and his team to support this critical tasking this could prove to be valuable input in how we better align the office of the sergeant-at-arms to provide security services to members in the aftermath of january 6th i know the office of the sergeant-at-arms must provide more to members and staff to keep them safe these better services will come with an accompanying cost i am committed to carefully stewarding the funds that the subcommittee provides funding is an important aspect but just as important if not more so is the right organizational structure a new look in perspective will help inform my own proposals the subcommittee will see i also support necessary infrastructure improvements support the changes that the capitol police will propose to its fte structures equipment upgrades and more importantly the investment in its officers the capitol police and the office of the sergeant-at-arms will evolve to better secure congress thank you for the opportunity to testify and i welcome your questions um chief pittman let me start with you um first first let me say thank you to you for um the the lines of communication have improved dramatically over the over the past uh weeks and i want to just say thank you to you and your team chief pittman for making sure you're staying in contact with the committee uh in the congress um i've got a couple questions so you were talking about increasing the size of the dignitary protection posting dignitary protection agents extending coverage of uh the investigations division so i when you said you increased the size of dignitary protection how many how many people were uh increased there how many law enforcement people were increased yes sir uh thank you so we went from four-man uh protection details and increased that to six-man protection details okay so that's i mean that's not a significant increase at all when you're talking about you know what what we went through um how about some of the other things you mentioned uh so you embedded an analyst deploying counter surveillance agents so how many counter surveillance agents did you uh deploy in the morning of the sixth so we deployed all of our counter surveillance agents that we have available to us we also increased our uh open source operations if you will to go from uh a 16-hour day to we separated our manpower to ensure that we had open source uh operations around the clock so all of our psb operators if you will which includes dignitary protection the investigations division as well as intelligence were operating on a 24 7 platform i understand that and my my main point is that this was not in any way a significant increase in the amount of law enforcement that were out there moving in detail from four to six uh even if you did that multiple times is not any significant increase and i guess the question i have is that if if you felt like and everybody felt like this was adequate why was chief son trying to press the sergeant-at-arms for more help so let me just uh be clear as it relates to dignitary protection that is just a small portion of u.s capitol police so there's a limited number of dignitary protection agents that are specially trained in that area so increasing from a four-person team to a six-person team essentially is all of the dignitary protection agents that u.s capitol police has available to them so there was so going from from that four-person team to six is every person that we have as it relates to the operational side of the house that's where the the uh bulk of the agency is employed by the uniformed services bureau so that's where the increase uh came primarily from as it relates to forming up those civil disturbance units so prior to that january third assessment uh the operational plan required for four platoons to be activated on for the january 6 event uniform operations increase that platoon size to maximize its strength to seven platoons that is essentially every available officer that we have to form up our cdu units that's 276 officers approximately with 40 person uh platoons each four of those platoons excuse me three of those platoons comprise of hard platoons those are the officers that you see and the hard turtle gear and they have extra if you will uh less than lethal options available to them as well as tactical gear sir okay i appreciate that but my point is that clearly chief son didn't think that was enough because he was going to the sergeant-at-arms mr irving and saying hey we need more help uh and so he knew did you did you feel that same way yes sir so i have an accurate account of the request that chief son made to lean forward as it relates to the national guard and i think that's what you're referring to my team since january 6 uh actively pulled all of the cell phone records from chief sun and they show the following on january 6 chief son first reached out for national guard support to the house sergeant at arms at 12 58 pm he then spoke to the senate sergeant at arms to make the same request for the national guard at 105 pm and he repeated his request to the house sergeant at arms at 1 28 p.m speaking again with them at 134 139 and 1 45. chief sun spoke to both sergeant at arms to request national guard support now chief i i don't mean to interrupt but we're limited on time here a little bit yes sir i'm talking about prior to january 6th my main point here is that we we appreciate that you increase dignitary protection and the platoons and all the rest that's still a limited number i think it's important that the committee and the congress knows that that's a limit a very limited number compared to what the threat was and what we think the threat assessment is and my question to you is chief son clearly was worried and he called mr irving prior to the sixth yes and said hey we need more help mr irving said no go ask the national guard to lean in and quite frankly i don't even know what lean in means if that's some kind of term that i i don't know but what does lean in mean it means you know shut up and and don't ask me for any more help is how i take that and my question is and we've got a lot of questions here but my question is were you in agreement with because you're now the acting chief and part of this enterprise here that we're into is about moving forward at that time were you in agreement with chief sun that you needed more support from primarily from the national guard yes sir okay thank you my time is up uh miss herrera and i just want the committee to know uh like yesterday um we're going to take a little bit of liberties with the time to make sure that these questions get answered uh we have a smaller committee that allows us to maybe do some of that so um with that i'm going to yield to ms herrera butler uh our sergeant acting sergeant-at-arms uh blodgett if we could and then maybe scale back um you know when i when i talk about communications failures um i'm not necessarily talking about like the tweets and the texts that came to members while this was happening what you and i discussed on the phone and what i think is really important is i was standing next to officers both sergeant-of-arms and capital police officers as the insurrection was happening on the house floor getting to the house floor um it was very clear that their head pieces like the the communications pieces they were getting no actual real communication they were getting no leadership they were getting no direction they had there there was no coordination and you could see the fear in their eyes like they literally they're the brave men and women who were just kind of left out on their own to defend did the best they could with what they had um you know there's a there's a video on youtube where the the woman who was was shot there's a time you know with different uh armed forces and different forces coming in at from different angles and it was very clear that the person who who shot didn't know that there was a tactical team coming up the stairs and they all have earpieces in so clearly when so when i talk about communications failures i'm literally talking about the leadership no one owning the frequency and giving direction and that's the thing i want to know i want to know if you're fixing that i mean i i'm i it's great that you guys send out text messages when there's like you know closures and things and that's helpful but the big communications failure on my in my from my vantage point and what i want to talk to other members is i've talked to uh representative mark wayne woolen who was on the floor helping barricade the door with those officers who had their firearms drawn and he said he could hear the shouting and the chaos in the earpieces of the officers who were trying to do the defense so they were on their own are you fixing that and please be brief because i have a couple more questions acting sergeant of arms are you there apologize i was telling you i have to remember to unmute um yes that's something we need to fix and we need to fix it immediately i believe the chief acknowledged in her statement and i don't want to speak for the acting chief but that communication needs to be uh enhanced it drives either out of the command center or the incident command post uh where wherever that is set up um in terms of that um in terms of the communication with my staff okay um sergeant arms we don't control the capitol police uh radios while we we have the radios and can hear uh what is or is not going on uh we do not interject during during a crisis um we communicate with our staff via the cell phone text message um and we were in close contact this situation where you discussed where uh officer byrd was at the door uh when miss babbitt was shot it was it was our uh sergeant-at-arms employee who rendered the aid uh to her at that site can i jump in there sure you guys are in charge though of the security on the house floor are you just there to make sure that we take our coats off when we're on camera uh we we are there to enforce the rules of the house to work in conjunction with the capitol police to to make sure that it's safe we had staff on the floor and in the galleries as well so can i ask um so talking about what happened on the floor when the senate was evacuated and maybe this will be a a a chief pittman question um when the senate was evacuated it was several minutes and i don't have the timeline in front of me before the house was evacuated why why why did why were we locked in and left on the house floor um when there were known assailants in the building and the senate was being evacuated did we not have a plan for evacuation [Music] oh i'm sorry uh yes we had the officer sarge arms put together a plan for evacuating the house floor um the tactical decision to evacuate will be left to the capitol police because at the command center they can see what's going on uh throughout the campus we don't have eyes on that okay let me switch over into chief pittman chief pittman um can you speak to the lack of communication to your officers on their radios and can you also speak to the reason that there was a a decent time delay between when um the senate was evacuated and the house was evacuated yes ma'am so as it relates to communications uh u.s capitol police has practiced um routine drills if you will for the incident command system since uh the september 11th incident on january 6 our incident command protocols were not adhered to as they should have basically yeah listen yes ma'am within an incident command structure you have operational uh operational order if you will and it designates who is in charge of what uh from your incident person incident command structure on the ground as well as a lot of your leadership folks to include myself and several other the other deputy chiefs are posted within the command center so you actually have a thousand foot view if you will and then a boots on the ground view those boots on the ground view uh the person's in charge of our civil disturbance unit as well as those operational commanders that are in charge of the capital are responsible for that implement implementation of that incident command system so when there's a breakdown you you look for those commanders with boots on the ground to provide that instruction uh that did not happen primarily because those uh operational commanders at the time were so overwhelmed they started to participate and assist the officers with boots on the ground versus providing that uh guidance and direction if you will can i ask so were are you talking about the officers who were when you say boots on the ground the guys who are in gals who are literally defending us against the attackers are you saying they were responsible for the communications breakdown amongst themselves no ma'am so i want to know why yourself and the other leaders did not maintain or regain control of the comm system because you had a bird's eye view advantage yes so the expectation is not that those officers would be in charge of the communication those commanders would be in charge that were directly responsible that those officers reported to because they have the tactical advantage and strategic lens if you will on with those officers you're saying those commanders then somehow and this is an honest question so the commanders failed to regain control of the com systems and direct the officers who were on the front lines i think it's a multi-tiered uh failure if you will can i can i really quickly just read this is something i think is really important the capitol police union issued an overwhelming no-confidence vote for the forces top leaders including acting chief yogananda pittman yourself and half a dozen other agency leaders pittman drew a 92 percent no competence vote with 657 of the 1050 union members participating in the vote the vote is symbolic obviously it's not actionable but of note roughly half of the u.s capitol police sworn officers belong to the union so i i am frustrated that what i'm not hearing is uh you know hey i was sitting there watching this with a bird's eye view and i tried to like some i'm not here i'm hearing a lot of process and a lot of like almost explaining why there's a problem versus hearing how you're going to make sure that there is a command center who speaks into the earpieces of the officers and provides direction and leadership the part of the problem there was chaos was because each and every each and every one of these officers boots on the ground commander or not had to make a decision with no information like there was no incoming help as far as they knew they had no idea what you guys were doing i mean i my hat is off to these brave men and women they saved our lives and i'm frustrated that i'm not hearing this is how we're fixing that right now this is what we're doing and that's what i expect and i know mr chairman my time is is up oh i'll wait for a next round so you'll back yeah thank you thank you mr butler uh just quickly as a as a quick follow-up before we go to miss deloro um in in line with what mr rare butler was just saying um can you give us an explanation like about the preparation for january 6th and was there any any special training for the officers to have them prepared for this yes sir so a couple points of uh clarification uh explaining the incident command structure uh was just re uh basically to detail what the system was supposed to do uh the executive team here has taken a number of proactive steps to ensure that incident command protocols are adhered to in the future as it relates to the command staff that are giving directions in the command center that was forthcoming i myself directed the capital lockdown on the day in question with that said there are many more uh improvements to be made as it relates to the vote of no confidence uh the numbers there are not uh totally accurate uh 36 percent of our sworn population less than half of the available officers that could have voted said that they vote no confidence for the capitol police leadership with that being said i think that one vote is one vote too many february 11 on the day of that vote mark one month and three days since i was sworn in as the acting chief i since then my team and i have been working around the clock and the entire department has been working around the clock and i think that we've made some very important changes as well as improvements we're working on the communications to improve that we've streamlined a number of items to include the joint emergency notification messaging system we've streamlined communications between us capitol police and our law enforcement partners we've also streamlined communications between the upper management and how that information is delivered to the rank and file in addition to that we've increased uh our wellness resources and and the delivery of vaccines to all of our employees obviously with that vote we acknowledge that there's more work to be done i know that because i talked to the officers i've been here for 20 years and i've grown up in this agency many of those officers are not just my colleagues those are my friends and their personal well-being is personal to me as it relates to cdu training all of our officers that are coming out of the training academy receive 40 hours of training as it relates to cdu in addition to that our officers that have specialized training what we refer to as the hard gear or turtle gear receive an additional uh 27 hours of training or 24 hours of training for them to be trained on special equipment so to answer your question mr chairman there absolutely is additional training for those hard platoon uh cdu officers well i'm i don't want to take up too much time but we're going to come back to that but there wasn't any special training specifically about january 6th uh to to have them prepared for that you're talking about the standard training that they get not in particular for this this moment in time with all of the intelligence and everything else that we had there was no that specialized training carries over with those officers those officers train on a routine basis as it relates to hard gear uh platoons that they are prepared for civil disturbance right so those officers are trained especially for those types of events yes sir mr laura thank you very much mr chairman i i'd like to direct my attention here if you will to the um the role the function um the relevance of the capital place board um can you either both uh both of you what does the capital police or do what is its mission what is its authority [Music] thank you thank you ma'am uh somebody yeah yes thank you thank you ma'am uh the capitol police board acts is a uh a policy uh kind of board of directors over the capitol police uh there's some statutory authorities that they do have uh with vehicle and traffic and the capitol police enforce those on the day-to-day basis um there's obviously the emergency in request for executive branch assistance uh protection of leadership overseas and and deployments or just some of the some of the uh direct statutory inputs that the capitol police board does have i i see the role of the capitol police board is to provide the policy guidance to the chief support the chief and the needs that she she has to both your com your committees um and then obviously on the senate as well um and then to take your concerns uh with the police and work with the capitol police to correct those concerns that you have as well as personally providing a house perspective to um to the policing of the grounds uh and chief what is your of the role of the capitol police board i'm sorry ma'am you were breaking up could you repeat your question oh sure your your your view of the role of the capitol police board yes so the capitol police board in my view provides direct oversight to the united states capitol police when there are huge or special events that are occurring on the campus the united states capitol police develops an operational plan and they share those plans with the capitol police board as it relates to uh an intelligence perspective on any types of events the capitol police board is kept apprised of any of those things as well but they the capitol police board works in close uh collaboration with if you will with the members of congress so that they can make their security needs known and then that information is kind of like a two-way communication the capital uh police board would then share those requirements with the capitol police as it relates to security with with regard to january 6 what was the capital police board functioning did it function what operational plans were being reviewed is it not the fact that when the request for national guard uh when there was a request for national guard the capitol police uh the board uh said that um uh the optics wouldn't be good or we don't need this or the request denied uh you there it doesn't appear to be what what is its what is its real role is it have a a role in oversight of the of of the capitol police um i know it does a lot of ceremonial things and i appreciate that everybody has to be taken care of but this board and it's um where was the board and how did it function prior to january 6 and on january 6. so ma'am if i could answer that question as it relates to capitol police prior to january 6. i think it's important to note that by statute in order for u.s capitol police to have the national guards on its grounds and a law enforcement capacity the capitol police board must first declare an emergency so in order for us i think your capital police your responsibility was to declare an emergency before the capitol police board could respond no okay no ma'am so by statue in order for the u.s capitol police to have the national guard on our grounds the capitol police board must declare yes ma'am was there any emergency declared of either prior to with intelligence information that determined that um uh we they were coming for the congress um and in in and quite frankly in the midst what where were they where was this board prior to and during this insurrection yes ma'am so it is my understanding that chief son did make the request to the capitol police board to declare an emergency so that when when prior to january 6 prior to january 6th yes and the response from the capitol police board was that his request was denied right and the other the issue was and i don't have of all of my quotes in front of me here but that it was the optics of the national guard being on the the concern when made trump into january 6 that we have national guard on the premise and that request was denied by this board and and it would appear that this board has i i i i can't get a delineation and we'll find it of where its authority begins where it derives from what it is and it doesn't [Music] rule by i fiat they make a decision and it and it and it occurs mr blodgett ma'am i believe you're on the board yes i'm currently on the board yes i was not on the board on january 6. however my understanding um is it was brought up uh at the december board meeting i would have to go back and check that chief son brought up the national guard to mr irving on the fourth mr irving i believe testified uh the other day that he did not take that to be an ask for an emergency declaration um talked to mr stanger um they uh i do not believe that the chief ever spoke to the architect of the of the capital uh prior to that i believe that's what mr blanton uh testified to yesterday um who is also on the board so the ass would have to come from from all three um the uh capitol police board issued a verbal declaration of emergency to give authority to national guard employment uh 210 on the sixth we're getting to the point here so uh whether it's tim or uh it sounds that there was an official denial meeting for the emergency order no no no i i apologize the the the uh the demonstrations were discussed there was no request at that time for an order there was no yesterday and there was never a boat board and i think this is what's really important about getting to the bottom of this so it sounds like mr irving was taking all of the authority by the fortune and was basically denying cheats request without even bringing it to the board so that brings about two questions that this i think a lot of us know is that who in the hell gave mr irving the authority to not bring requests by the chief of the capitol police who wants more more help mr irving makes a decision a unanimous decision uh all by himself to deny that request and then to go say go tell the national guard to lean in that's problem number one and problem number two is why didn't chief son push back in demand i think this is a question for all of us in demand that he brings that to the board for a vote so now you bring in the architect of the capitol you maybe build an ally to help make this happen so it sounds like uh laura that the sergeant-at-arms took the police of making this decision without bringing it on board sir if i if i may i i don't think that mr i can't speak for mr irving but he did testify that he did not take that january 4th conversation uh with chief son is an ask for an emergency declaration um but you've hit on a historical uh tension on the board uh there was a report 2002 of gao and a subsequent report to congress by the board at that time in 2003 which talks about um you know emergencies and the board and how the structures need to be tightened and they need to be forward thinking and i'm happy to provide that report to the committee um as well um but it sums up the tension and it talks about some of the issues that you that you raised chair chairwoman delor do you have any further questions another it's critical whether it is needs to be revamped what kind of authority does it have at the moment i view it as a vestigial uh uh uh it's just there it doesn't appear to do a hell of a lot nor did it do a hell of a lot to deal with this situation on january six it's like your appendix it's just there it doesn't have any real function so the question is um uh the photos of footage of capital police posing for photos with insurrectionists their ongoing investigations is what my understanding is how many officers are under investigation what's the rationale when will the investigation be concluded when can we get a report yes ma'am so right now we have 35 officers that are under investigation and we do have six uh police officers that have been suspended with their police powers being revoked so those of investigations are ongoing at this time what what was the rationale what's the rationale for the investigation i mean on what premise are you investigating them yes ma'am if there is an allegation of misconduct capital police has what's called a rules of conduct and it's basically a code of conduct that governs behavior as police officers if there's a violation of that rules of conduct uh based on those violations we make decisions to investigate those officers and uh proceed accordingly the discipline is warranted when when is the investigation going to be concluded when can we get a report investigation is going to be concluded when the investigations are concluded based on typically a 60 to 90 day scale okay yeah okay so yes ma'am and as soon as we have that information we will report it out okay okay thank you mr chairman thank you for indulging the time i practiced of course stranger thank you um what i'm what i'm seeing is uh what i was hoping to hear are important changes and lessons learned and where we go from here what i'm hearing is the same old stuff and pointing fingers and it looks like protecting jobs and having faced something as serious as we faced and know that this could happen again this is very very disappointing at least and frightening at the most um and it seems as if particularly in the communication in the days leading up to the sixth or whatever then we have a system that failed at every level and even at the time when we were seeing very very serious dangerous things happening and we were watching or participating in the case of members of congress um i think that that this has to be looked at and go back and have proof of the communication and then why in the world could actually not be taken at that time when there was time to do something i i would also like having set through the another um meeting where we listened testimony i would like the the testimony at the other proceedings of the acting chief and the testimony today and a comparison of how the explanations have changed i think we've got a lot of work to do on this committee but i think we have to start with looking at the system and saying what should happen and who should have the authority to say yes we must have uh extra help right now immediately or no can say no you can't have that because that happened all up and down and i think we really need to understand that before we meet again thank you no more questions no ma'am i agree that there needs to be a more robust communication um both leading up to an event uh as well as during an event um as as we as we move in the communication realm uh we tend to to send out very uh short concise non-transparent messaging for fear of sending out incorrect messaging um that was something that was obviously apparent on the six and that needs to change um and i've talked i talked about that at the uh appropriations briefing and i've asked my staff uh to work on that because in a big event like that we have to give you more information not less um the canned messaging may be good if there is a barrier that doesn't go down and you need to to go in through another entrance but not when it's a not when it's a considerable life safety event you need to have the information available to be able to to make the best decision to protect yourself and i agree and i agree with you that that needs to be looked at and correct in some situations the uh i know in my situation i was hill house and i was quarantined and so we were of course under threat of a bomb so we ran out in the street and then what happens on the street i had a situation where a police officer recognized me and said where can you go to be safe and i couldn't go back to where i lived so he helped me get to where my my office was we got inside the building but the security person said no she's not allowed to go in her own office and be locked in an office to stay safe so there is there is a communication problem from the lowest level to the top level of what is important what is immediate and who has the uh the authority yes ma'am i agree um capitol police is acknowledging that there are numerous lessons to be learned from the top down we are leaning forward we're actively working with the task force that the speaker has um at the request of lieutenant general russell honore so we're leaning forward with those recommendations really conducting several assessments from the office of the inspector general our own internal assessments but really acknowledging what can we do in the short term to acknowledge those failures and make sure that those things don't happen again and then leaning forward to say what are those long-term projections that we can implement over time as it relates to training policies and procedures equipment and things of that nature we put a number of requests in the fy 22 budget so that we can ensure that our officers have the proper tools and resources needed so that something like january 6 never happens again we are leaning forward to improve our communications not only with internally with our officers and leadership we've also leaned forward and i think that mr blodgett and i recognize the failures of the previous uh capitol police board as it relates to communications and we have a robust communications tim and i talk daily multiple times a day so we acknowledge that there are a lot of things that should have been done differently but this is an opportunity for us to make change and we're making that happen thanks ms granger i mean that that's the question uh chief pittman that i was getting to about about the the the training in particular training now you have here you have uh the ranking member of the uh you know appropriations committee and the officers weren't properly trained to be able to even know where to take her in that situation and we we find that unacceptable miss clark thank you mr chairman and thanks to both of our witnesses and in particular to acting chief pittman i want to thank your department uh and you for the valiant efforts to protect us the capital and our democracy during the january 6 insurrection and also for the work you do every single day and on a personal note i want to thank you and your department for the recent efforts to bring to justice an individual who threatened me and my staff but if we are going to ensure the safety of the capital and our democracy going forward we must get to the truth and a complete understanding of what took place my goal is to honor those officers who gave their lives to honor everyone who was injured terrorized and traumatized and i cannot get past a glaring discrepancy between intelligence received and preparation so i want to start with the special assessment uh of january 3rd you testify in writing that the u.s capitol police were aware that there were militia members white supremacists and other extremist groups who were coming to dc on january 6 that they were armed that they were targeting congress and the joint session certification process and that they were motivated by seeing this as the last opportunity to quote overturn the election that is some who what when why uh listing and you testified that this special assessment was widely distributed through the u.s capitol police and to the sergeant-at-arms including that there was responsibility of sergeants and lieutenants to ensure that the rank and file got this vital information is that correct yes that is correct you also testified that this special assessment was discussed at the january 4th multi-agency meeting is that correct yes that is correct and again it was brought up on january 5th is that correct yes that is correct mr blodgett testifies that on january 4th january 5th january 6 the u.s capitol police listed the probability of civil disobedience as quote remote highly improbable or improbable my your own testimony today says that that january 3rd assessment quote foretold of a significant likelihood for violence on the capitol grounds how do you rectify these two polar opposite analysis of the likelihood of violence yes so those documents uh that you're reading from that state that some groups were going to be improbable or less likely to incite violence is a not even an assessment it's a document that's provided by one analyst so for example there are several there are hundreds of documents that are combed through by our task force agents we receive uh information through open source and and from a number of sources that we have analysts that comb through that information to put together the assessment so if if i could explain it as being tiered the special assessment is uh the highest tier of assessment rating but that is the document that you're going that we are going to use as a department to make operational plans for any type of demonstration so let me follow up on that so your testimony is that to make operational plans you were going with this assessment that you had that there were armed militia members coming targeting congress and that was a significant likelihood of violence that was your position okay on february 5th uh the norfolk and fbi sends intelligence that says in part uh comments picked up online that congress needs to hear glass breaking doors being kicked in blood from their blm and antifa soldiers being spilled that there were maps being shared of the capital tunnels and facilities and rallying points for groups traveling to d.c it is disputed who saw this report but you do not dispute that it was received by the u.s capitol police is that correct yes ma'am and if i could just follow up with some additional on that norfolk document that document was sent the evening of january 5th we know that it was received by task force agents with u.s capitol police but i think that to put it in its proper context that fbi document also stated that this is an information report not finally evaluated intelligence it was being shared for informational purposes but has not been fully evaluated integrated with other information interpreted or analyzed receiving agencies are requested not to take action based on this raw reporting so i think that i would consider that a additional document that would feed into the assessment that was consistent but capitol police already knew we knew that the white supremist groups and militia groups were coming and we did anticipate those groups being violent in fact you said there was a significant likelihood and you had already looped that into the fact that this was going to be different and targeted at congress and interrupting the electoral college process so now we have some disagreement about whether chief's son actually asks for a declaration of a state of emergency mr blodgett says his understanding from the former sergeant-at-arms irving uh that he says this never happened but boy does this look like we have a violent situation brewing and you sent counter-intelligent officers uh to the rally that day you must have seen the crowds that were gathering you must have been gathering that intelligence back that's in your testimony yet still we come down to this failure to be ready that there is you know 140 helmets that are ordered maybe 126 national guard might be able to come help when we are at a significant likelihood of attacks and however we tier that fbi report it fed right into what you knew already so my question is in the end of this and i see that i am out of time we had white supremacy that's fueling the violence white supremacy that fueled the big lie about our elections do you believe that institutional racism the a culture of white supremacy and i'm not saying any specific person or one action do you believe that played a role in the discrepancy between the intelligence received the assessment of the likelihood of violence and the preparation that left our officers really at the mercy of the mob so as the first black and female chief of this department i take any allegation of inequitable policing extremely seriously i can assure you that under my command the uscp will continue to police equitably with that said i have no evidence whatsoever that suggests that there was any discrepancy based on our security posture and as it relates to making enhancements or not based upon race do you believe that um part of us moving forward on this um there are many things we have to do technical and otherwise but how are you going to plan in this new position with the morale being so low and especially for um those people of color in you know our capital community on your force who see all of this through a very different lens and life experience how are you going to address this and get to addressing institutional racism that exists in every institution we have here at the capitol police to ensure that this does not play a role in the decisions that we make absolutely as the granddaughter of civil rights activists a proud graduate of an hbcu university and the mother of two african-american sons i know all too well about the differences as it relates to policing and institutional racism after the black lives matter movement during the summer i spare headed town hall meetings for the first time at u.s capitol police where i provided a platform for officers to express their concerns with law enforcement as it relates to race we brought in speakers chiefs from all over the country and we provided an opportunity for officers to speak freely so that we could address some of those morale issues that occurred after the black lives matter movement i am proud to say that from those town halls we were able to identify themes working with our training services division as well as the employee employment assistance program to ensure that our officers have the tools and resources that they need to address things like institutional racism we will be leaning forward with the executive team to continue to ensure that our officers remain trained up on things such as unconscious bias implicit bias but we will also be providing new platforms to address those things that were identified in october of 2020 last year as it relates to policing and institutional racism thank you chief clement thank you miss clark uh mr mr hey mr chairman thanks i want to start with uh with tim blodgett tim you there yeah i'm here sir hey look listen first things first before we move into where we're going from here because there's plenty of people paying attention to to the six and i get that and i appreciate that but in the background of your shot you have a buffalo bills helmet and and i'm just telling not giving you political advice i'm just saying quite frankly the committee chairman is from the state of ohio and i don't think they play there if you need something try this book that the chairman wrote it's not a page turner but the chairman did write it so as we go forward just a thought now let's go to the topic at hand huh um hey i i wanna i wanna concentrate on on on where we're heading as a result of lessons learned from this and and the first thing i'd like to do is i hope that as we're looking about security examinations and going forward that we're taking a holistic look and so i want your response to this which is listen i know equipment's part of it i know procedures are part of it chief this applies to your folks too i know training's part of it i know communication's part of it i know standard operating procedures in the future are part of it i want your response to as we decide what role barriers play and in case anybody's missing it it's it's temporary prison fences with razor wire that we can mold all this stuff together and say in a holistic way okay so barriers play a part of it but we don't want the maximum barrier you know like we're not doing other stuff it's like let's take a look at what our posture is in terms of how we operate how we train how we talk with the national guard how we whatever and so i i would like if it's possible to have you put something on the record that as we talk about what the holistic way to go is that we evaluate all these tools at our disposal in a lessons learned sense and don't just go back to we want to do the maximum everything and the first thing is it's kind of like working in working in a minimum security prison right now and i'm not trying to be judgmental on anybody i'm just saying quite frankly fences and razor wire are and by the way the architect of the capital should be involved but i mean in terms of placements and and effectiveness as opposed to to stark visual sadness so holistic approach what do you think mr sergeant i i agree there has to be a holistic approach uh sir um the general honoree study as well as studies that uh security services bureau is doing um and any that the architect may do at some point um will take into account uh the security uh hardening that has to come around the campus uh look to a future uh state and by future state i don't mean looking at necessarily barriers but what new technology can we implement um to keep the openness of the capital um the chief has a plan for uh for attempting to draw down to guard the the wire and the fencing it won't be as fast as some people want and it will be longer than other people want uh but we'll be working with the committee and leadership on that as well as any structural uh items that have to be done uh especially the big ticket structural items your committee is going to be uh fully engaged in your staff so you know we're gonna be looking to you too and i appreciate that so expect that to be a continuing um uh line of questioning in terms of transitioning away from the penal institution look for the nation's capital campus and like i'm not i'm not putting that at anybody's doorstep i'm just saying as we get farther away we should be able to transition to something that once again is is non-penal um chief a couple of things for you first of all i'm going to ask you this question i don't expect you to have the answer right off the top so you can just return to to us and and other members of the committee um but but i was listening to your testimony and you said tens of thousands and i'm looking at the documents available to me and i know that there were approximately 30 000 at the rally and that doj has estimated approximately 800 people entered the building i i just like to know what what the what the source for the data of unless i misunderstood you say the statement that there were tens of thousands of people and obviously i'm talking about the capital and and so maybe i'm wrong but i was unaware of the fact when you say tens of thousands of people that means 20 000 or more to me that were basically outside the capital north south east or west and so i'd just like you to get back with us and give us the authority the authority for that statement along those same lines when you said you had all of your surveillance people deployed i i want to know what that number was and so that's fine for online for purposes of my limited time today there are some pedestrian issues that are current and i'll give you an example of the one at uh at i think it's c street and and behind cannon um right there by the uh the madison building where the fencing has been deployed in a way that for pedestrian pedestrian people that are that are entering that after being screened they basically put the fence all over the sidewalk so you either have to trace through a flower bed or kind of see how you can shimmy through on that so i would appreciate it if there's someone our office could contact for purposes of fencing placement and just walk the perimeter so that if it's something where it can be relocated so sidewalks are actually conducive to pedestrian traffic for those who are cleared to enter the campus that that can actually take place sir i believe uh we have opened up some pedestrian accesses as of this morning uh based on some feedback we heard yesterday so if it hasn't been open please let us know and we'll look into that well don't misunderstand me it's open you just have to be able to walk through a flower bed to use the access point and by the way that's the metro access which has always been open it is unacceptable that you have people queuing up to get through a gate for pedestrian access that the fence has rendered pedestrian access difficult to be generous we'll take a look at that sir thank you okay and then finally i would like to know that's not you that's the chief or and you but finally i would i would like to um to get a briefing a little later on what the coordination is between both of your offices and the aoc in terms of fence design uh evaluating the proper places for whatever those barriers are as we go forward and listen i'm not suggesting an answer i just want to know that issue is being worked as opposed to yeah yeah that's we'll get that later on and the final one that i want offline is this who has operational control over the national guard troops on the capitol campus right now for example if there's an incident at that area where i told you that the gate where the sidewalk is uh it's like so something happens there and we've got an incident and stuff's going who's in charge um how do they handle that at least in the first 30 minutes i'm hoping that the communication issues that we've been hearing about are not communications issues in terms of using those resources in quite frankly a coordinated chain of command if something pops up and i'll take all those offline later on i'm mindful of your time mr chairman thank you and i yield back thank you mr ahmed i'd like to just kind of follow up and ask chief pittman if she could answer the question about the tens of thousands of uh insurrectionists um what that exact number was of people on the capitol complex that were pushing through to get to the capitol if you could get us that do you have that number handy chief yes i do so we based that number off the numbers that were screened down at the ellipse from the secret service we know that they screened over fifteen thousand i believe that number was closer to 20 000 and there were 15 000 approximately that were outside of the ellipse that were on screen we know that those groups left there from our camera footage and came to capitol hill so that's where those numbers are primarily based off of we know what they were able to screen down at the ellipse and then as it relates a couple of follow-up if i may sir uh first and foremost there was a question previously as it relates to evacuation routes so i am uh willing to provide that i know that some of that information is sensitive if not classified if you will so i'd like to provide a follow-up answer as it relates to why we evacuated uh some of the chambers in the manner that we did uh as it relates to infrastructure uh we are actively working as i said with the task force and i know that i speak for everyone here in the leadership when it comes to the fencing that's surrounding the campus as well as the national guard we have no intention of keeping the national guard soldiers or that fencing any longer than what is actually needed we're actively working with a scaled down approach so that we can make sure that we address three primary variables one is the known threat to the environment two is the infrastructure vulnerabilities and then that third burial variable being the limitations that you us capitol police known knows that it has as it relates to human capital and technology resources so we are actively addressing those uh if i may just add one more point with that said we know that the insurrectionists that attacked the capital weren't only interested in attack and attacking members of congress and officers they wanted to send a symbolic message to the nation as of who was in charge of that legislative process we know that members of the militia groups that were present on january 6 have stated their desires that they want to blow up the capital and kill as many members as possible with a direct nexus to the state of the union which we know that date has not been identified so based on that information we think that it's prudent that capitol police maintain its enhanced and robust security posture until we address those vulnerabilities going forward uh sir as it relates to the fencing and the problems with the pedestrian access i will reach out to your office today and make sure that i will lean forward by taking action working with the house sergeant at arms to ensure that pedestrian and staff that need to traverse the grounds are able to do so in a safe and efficient manner and one more side note for the chairman you said that you were from the great state of ohio and we gave mr blodgett a hard time about his bills i can tell you that my husband is from the great state of alabama and we are avid roll tide crimson tide national champions and fans so i just had to put that plug in there for my road type fans on the call thank you sir man thanks thanks pete that that will that will get you nowhere with me i'll tell you right out of the gate uh uh as an ohio state buckeye uh if you could chief um again i'm sorry mr case is next just let me slide this in because i think what mr amadeus questions were important what what was the number outside the capital we know that it was 15 000 maybe plus at the ellipse how many made their way down to the capital with the bike fencing uh right after that or we don't have an exact number like we didn't implement screening that day like service but based on the estimates that we saw from our tv camera we could tell approximately who was coming uh from the ellipse to the capitol ground so we know that there were uh excess of 10 000 uh demonstrators that traverse the campus on january 6. so you think it was 10 000 that came to the capitol left the ellipse walked down to the capitol and then forced their way in i think that we were well in excess of 10 000 that traversed the grounds but as far as the numbers that actually came into the building we estimate that that was approximately 800 demonstrators okay well that that brings about a lot of questions around use of force and and other things uh mr case thank you mr chair uh mr blight chief pittman i want to go back to a line of questioning that i pursued yesterday with the architect of the capitol and the gist of that is how do we best figure out what happened why it happened and how to move forward the observation that i have is that um we need some independent objective outside review and advice um i think even the best of us in circumstances such as this uh are are hard pressed to evaluate ourselves uh to to uh evaluate where we ourselves made mistakes chief pittman you were there at the time uh so you're not objective uh in that sense uh and you may have done everything exactly right but but the issue is that you you are part of it and so therefore um the question is how can we get to the to the right overall answers um and so in that uh in that spirit what i'd like to ask is first of all just for clarification of exactly what investigations of any kind do you know are underway right now and aside from obviously the oversight function of congress itself including this subcommittee my understanding is that we basically have at least three that i know of the first of course is the general honorary study which is focused on the physical security of the capital complex uh the second is um the architect of the capital which is similarly focused on physical security um in which he at least has some outside uh input through the u.s army corps of engineers and their air expertise i also believe uh chief pittman that you've referred to an internal u.s capital police uh review um and so i'll i'll just go with you chief first of all um is that correct do you have your own review underway and and are either of you aware of any other um more formal active reviews yes sir so capitol police does house what we call the security services bureau it's primarily responsible for uh securing national security documents as well as our physical security uh implementation of equipment and or procedures so security services bureau is conducting an internal assessment the office of the inspector general is also conducting an assessment that would be considered external to capitol police uh you already mentioned the uh task force that's being led by general honore they're conducting an assessment primarily as it relates to infrastructure as well as some of our policies and procedures and then lastly uh the gao is also conducting an assessment of the january 6 event okay so let me just go to those so when you refer to the office of the inspector general just for my own clarification what are you referring to there that's not the gao it is it is who yes so the office of inspector gender inspector general is independent of capitol police uh they provide oversight typically to the capitol police board and some of our appropriators as to the um operations if you will to capitol police uh they not only do this for incidents like the january 6 event this is an ongoing independent review uh that's routinely uh analyzing capitol police's policies and procedures and then once they make those analyzations they then turn that information over to the board and make recommendations that capitol police must adhere to to ensure that we are adhering to the best practices uh for a federal agency and i would just turn it over to mr blodgett in case he has any additional as it relates to the oig uh thank you chief uh the inspector general is going through and investigating various uh points along along the uh you know the january sixth uh time frame in the different units and we'll be coming out with a series of reports on that other than the one other than the reviews that the chief is spoken of i'm unaware of any other independent review other than the criminal cases that are going on well there there is certainly the the the overall uh review by the fbi which is which we haven't uh really made reference to but obviously that is that is underway um so so going back to the the the um question of adequate independent objective um review and advice you know i it strikes me that the the physical infrastructure side of this that's a very difficult question with a lot of difficult uh you know decisions to be made at the end of the day but um it it is more about a a physical structure uh to to protect the capital and uh its inhabitants um what we're really at in these hearings i think far more is is the um the organizational structure of of the capital um whether that structure um worked which i think we all have concluded it didn't um whether the the failures were failures of of people under difficult circumstances or failures of systems or exactly where those failures occurred and how can we correct for those to ensure that they don't get repeated and so chief pittman and and i would also observe the architect of the capital yesterday observed the possibility of engaging other parts of our federal government who have dealt with similar similar crisis management situations and have come up with their own best practices for example the architect mentioned of the department of defense also the secret service chief pittman i've got to ask you pretty straight because um i am concerned about your your objectivity and not you personally chief but somebody in your situation who who again was um you know there has a responsibility uh and and obligation and as you said uh friendship uh with many of your of your colleagues um i'm concerned about the ability uh in that context to develop that kind of independent objective review that i think any of us would want i mean it would be comparable to to asking a member of congress to to investigate and conclude the ethics investigations against him or her and you know so that that just doesn't happen right so so what do you think do you think that we have the right processes in place to get to the bottom of this and to make the the the the the corrective judgments that we have to make going forward do you do you see a need for any further review or structure or what do you think about the possibilities of the dod and or the secret service or some other structure i think and i would add to that excuse me i would add to that uh that mr amity's line of questioning uh was resident with me in terms of looking at a more holistic view of this uh meaning across the boardview where we are not thinking in terms of stovepipes my observation here is that there's a lot of stovepiping going on and not a whole bunch of communication across the board and that structure broke down and in that way it's not all that dissimilar to some of the the critical and in tragic mistakes and systems that occurred around 9 11. so how do how do we how do we crack through all of this chief what's your thought on it yes yes so i know that there are the three independent after action reviews if you will in addition to u.s capitol police's internal assessment uh by the groups that i identified it is also my understanding that at the speaker's request there is going to be a 911 style uh commission if you will similar to what occurred after the 9 11 september 11 attacks so i believe that those groups of independent evaluators will come in and advise uh things that we can do in addition to what the external evaluators will provide as well so i think that's going to be key and prudent going forward uh soliciting those from outside of even the organizations that we've named that would come in and provide that independent assessment to state how we would go forward particularly in the long term thank you chair thank you chief thanks uh mr case mr newhouse thank you mr chairman i appreciate both of you being here with us this morning um kind of along the same lines as mr case's questions uh both of you are members of the club of the capitol police board where uh you weren't at the time of january 6 but as the structure is your positions are and you receive information from different agencies about threats to the capital et cetera we've we've heard that process we learned earlier this week from testimony given in the senate that the capitol police board did not receive an fbi threat report warning that there were people traveling to washington to commit acts of violence ms pittman you on january 6 were the assistant chief of police of the department of protective and intelligence operations i hope i have that title correct and this morning i believe i heard you say that the capitol police did in fact um receive this said report on january 5th so like i guess kind of like i said along the lines of mr case's questioning tell me what what should have happened or what you did to make sure the police board uh got that very important information or they say they didn't and so why didn't they and what happened what broke down to where a critical piece of intelligence was not shared with the decision makers that may maybe could have allowed a better a better appropriation prior to january 6th yes sir so that fbi document that was shared on the evening of the fifth it was shared with task force agents that are embedded from capitol police with the fbi uh they in turn sent their email vet email that they received to a lieutenant within the protective and intelligence operations side of the house that information was not then forwarded any further up the chain so that is a lesson learned for u.s capitol police and i've put in corrective measures to ensure that going forward information is shared in a timely fashion and it's shared appropriately going up the chain of command with that said we do not believe that based on the information in that document we would have changed our posture per se information that was shared was very similar to what u.s capitol police already had in terms of the militia groups the white supremacist groups as well as the extremists that were going to participate in acts of violence and potentially be harmed on armed i should say on the campus so moving forward we put in corrective internal controls to ensure that information is shared in a timely fashion because we understand that that was a breakdown in communication we owned that and we've taken protective uh corrective measures to uh change that going forward but you just said if i understood you that even if it had moved up the chain you wouldn't have done anything differently that is correct sir we do not believe that that document in and of itself would have changed our posture we believe it was consistent with the information and intelligence that we already had that those groups were going to be violent and they were expected to participate uh in unlawful activity on the campus uh the one thing that we were already leaning forward and asking for was additional resources as it relates to the request for the national guard that request at that time had already been denied and we made that request repeatedly after january 5th to include several more denials before the national guard were actually on campus so uh that would be the request that we did make after the fact well i appreciate that mr chairman would it be proper to ask for the committee to be able to see firsthand copies of some of these reports that are being referred to that would give us you know better information in context as to what they were seeing yeah absolutely okay um one more question i know my time is running short but i appreciate your indulgence mr chairman while i was on the floor of the house as the building was being broken into my staff was in the cannon in my office in the cannon building and at that time there was a pipe bomb that had been discovered near the cannon building so we received but let me just try to recount that day as accurately as i can my staff received an emergency notification from the capitol police about an evacuation of the madison building i believe that was at 1 10 p.m the next communication that they received from the capitol police were officers running down the hallway banging on doors and yelling to people to evacuate immediately not identifying themselves so it was there was a little bit of vagueness of who was actually telling people to come out of their offices and then it wasn't until nearly 15 minutes later after they had evacuated that they received official notification about the evacuation of the cannon build that was at 123. so i guess as an appropriations committee my question has to do with despite substantial resources that we have appropriated to your department at the request obviously of your predecessors the emergency notification system uh seems to continue to have issues and so um madame pittman i asked would just like to ask the question under your management now what kind of changes are you looking at to rectify the notification system sorry i was having a little trouble with the mute button um yes sir so we've made a number of changes going forward as it relates to our communications one primarily being those canned messages that we the department refers to in our joint emergency mass notification system i believe that mr blodgett referred to it earlier as well we understand that those pre prepared messages if you will do not give the congressional community in times of critical incidents enough information to proceed accordingly on the campus so we are working with our command center staff to make sure that they are not just pushing out those pre-prepared messages but actually providing more accurate timely information to the community we're also leaning forward working with our law enforcement partners as well as community partners like dch sema to make sure that our community notifications and improvements are coming from the u.s capitol police's command center we've also implemented several daily calls as it relates to intelligence and the information that we're able to share in a timely fashion by embedding not only our agents and some of the um known law enforcement leaders as it relates to intelligence for example the fbi but we also have the law enforcement intelligence leaders embedded now here at capitol police we believe that that will help to streamline uh the relaying of that uh information and also to piggyback just on one of your other questions as it relates to that fbi document and it ties right into how we're streamlining communications the fbi already has a joint terrorism task force executive committee if you will that is responsible for sharing all important communications with law enforcement leaders we believe that that intelligence document if it had been priority and as i stated before it states on the document itself it wasn't for action we do understand that that executive committee would have uh streamlined the communication with law enforcement leaders if you will not just sharing it at the lowest level thank you let me just observe about the notifications the substance of the message that wasn't the issue my my conjecture is that if there's a 15-minute delay in emergency notifications then really there's not an emergency notification and by the way those other notifications you're talking about are helpful but they're kind of like the boy that cried wolf if we get six or eight notifications for one incident in a in a building on campus pretty soon you stopped looking at them just just to throw that out there and mr chairman i know i've over my time but do i would you allow me one more question just as i love you go ahead make it quick let's let's uh have a quick answer too from the truth okay make it really quick this is to mr blodgett and i know you've heard this question before but i didn't hear it this morning so i wanted to bring it up and you said at our briefing the other day that it's your res your decision here but i just wanted to ask about the magnet magnetometers entering the chamber of the house uh tell me what a security rationale there is for placing those there you know as members we don't have to pass through these devices to enter any other location on campus so i'm just curious as to what causes the threat to be imminent right there on the house floor and then to your knowledge is there any exceptions to members who uh whether or not they have to pass through there and this is this is not meant to be a political dig but this was an observation on the fourth of this month the speaker pelosi was observed uh entering the house chamber without going through the metal detectors that she herself i believe has have ordered to be in place so could you could you reflect on those questions for me thank you sir um after the briefing my attorney slapped me in the head and uh reminded me that the house voted um hres 73 and directed um fines for complete screening security at the entrances of the chamber so the screening um at this point is is within the house rule um and we're there to enforce enforce the rule in terms of putting up the magnetometers um we had members stating that they were carrying on the house floor 40 usc 5104 states that firearms aren't allowed in the capital with uh however the capital police board uh can have regulations to uh to deal with that uh there's a 1967 capital police board regulation that states that that uh that firearms are not allowed on the house floor um so i have to protect all the members i have to protect them anywhere congress is particularly suited to change that if they don't want me to enforce the statutes that they enact and in terms of enforcement i rely on the capitol police who are the experts in the screening to tell me if a member has not adequately gone through security screening and once i received uh the report from the capitol police that is when i uh imposed the fine and not because someone said hey they didn't do it they're not the expert the capitol police are the experts are there are there exceptions to the uh usage for the requirement to go through no exceptions they may there may be someone with a medical exception card um which would be consistent with the capital police screening there's methods that the capitol police have to deal with that so if there's a medical exception uh that would be different but that would be consistent with the capital police policies all right thank you thank you thank you mr chairman thank you chief pittman i just want to follow up on something because uh that that mr newhouse brought up and this has been kind of a theme throughout the the hearing here you're saying the fbi document wouldn't change anything and you know the average person sitting in ohio right now is saying wait a minute you you've got this information through the capitol police the fbi was saying the same thing it's a whole other issue that that didn't make its way up to you or to chief son that's a whole other issue uh about communication and all the rest but when we're sitting here uh having this conversation the average person is saying you're getting all this information of threats you know these groups are going to be down there what is your definition of a credible threat and it's not that you would necessarily have to have to do something super like proactive and go after anybody but knowing all that knowing the tone and the tenor in the country knowing the rally was happening why wouldn't we have been prepared for the worst case scenario that's what the average american is sitting home thinking about so in a pointed way can you tell us very clearly what is your definition of a credible threat thank you mr chairman absolutely so a credible threat is a a threat that can be acted upon what is the intention is there an opportunity for the individuals to actively uh engage in this threat do they have access to the means of making that happen as it relates to uh u.s capitol police changing its posture because of that fbi document i believe that the clarification should be that we were already leaning forward based on that january 3rd assessment so we were already leaning forward to increase those cdu platoons we changed the security perimeter plan and all of those things that i mentioned as it relates to how we beefed up what we had with that said i agree with you chairman hindsight is 2020. there are numerous lessons to be learned if we were planning for uh level six i believe that chief son if he could get that day back would have planned for a level uh 10 uh security posture we would have had assets and resources on the ground prior to we would have changed uh from bike rack to the global fencing that we have in place now but all of that uh is lessons learned and and we still have a lot more to learn but i think that it should be acknowledged that we were already uh preparing for what we knew was going to be violent acts and civil disobedience for that day of bringing in essentially every employee we had available to us and reaching out to our law enforcement partners to make sure that we had some pre-staged if you will which is why we had the immediate response from the metropolitan police department we're so thankful for them as well as the u.s secret service with that said there were those additional requests for the national guard so there was several security enhancements that were requested but with that said it wasn't enough it was not enough i'm not i don't understand why chief son and yourself weren't pushing for a full vote at the board that that to me if it was such a priority for you then then why would you say i want to force a board boat let's bring in the architect of the capital you know we want to know exactly i mean to me it's it's a you know and you're right hindsight is 20 20. but given everything going on and they're going to be 15 000 people up the street you know to me you adding two more dignitary protection people here or there and a person a couple people that go into the crowd that's fine and that's needed but the reality of it is even if you got to the national guard it was just a few hundred we needed the whole thousand at the dc in maryland and virginia and all of that and so uh to me it's you took the intelligence and and i felt i feel like you didn't didn't put it all together and synthesize it in a way go holy cow i mean something really bad can happen here and and given everything else going on we need to be ready for that and i don't think saying that well the secret service you know didn't see a threat either that to me doesn't cut it either because who cares so they got it wrong too like i mean that that's that's the the underlying issue here and really just trying to understand moving forward i think it's going to be important for us to really understand what is a credible threat in this new reality uh that we're living in miss waxton thank you mr chairman and thank you to the witnesses for appearing today and for everything that you do to keep to keep our communities safe and i want to thank you also for acknowledging the officers who died as a result of the events of january 6th in your in your written testimony and in your testimony here today chief pittman i just want to be absolutely clear for the record do you acknowledge that the the off death of officer brian picnic was a line of duty death yes ma'am i do you acknowledge that officer howie leaving good's death was a line of duty death i can't speak to that at this time ma'am so you're not going to acknowledge that it was a result result of the events on january 6 that hallelujah is no longer with us i cannot speak to that at this time why can't you speak to it at this time because it's still under active investigation well do you acknowledge i know that he's not your officer but would you acknowledge that officer destiny's jeffrey smith his mpd that his death was a line of duty death i'm sorry officer jeffrey smith is not a u.s capitol police officer you're not going to acknowledge that his death was a line of duty death either i'm sorry ma'am he is not our officer u.s capitol police so i'm kind of concerned that i know that the ranking member brought up that that you know that that that there was a vote of no confidence for you in in the union and uh and i'm kind of concerned because you're not standing by your officers i think it's very clear that officer liebengood would still be with us today but for the events of january 6 and the fact that you're not willing to stand by him today is very concerning to me now the capitol police does offer death gratuities for survivors of all officers is that correct yes ma'am as i stated before i've been on this organization for over 20 years now i do stand with my officers and there's a large number of officers uh that have expressed that they stand the question captain the the the the chief chief the question was does the capitol police offer death gratuities for survivors of all officers for any reason that they may have passed away yes ma'am we do and did can you confirm whether this has been at least been processed for the family of officer liebengood i'm sorry could you repeat the question has that death gratuity been processed for the family of officer liebengood that said his survivors will receive that payment yes ma'am it has okay thank you i want to talk a little bit a little bit more about the logistics and the number of officers that were on duty on january 6 and and what you did to prepare now on an average sunday when congress is not in session what would the staffing levels be at the capitol ground with capitol police about how many would be on duty so on an average day our manpower is driven by whether uh congress is in session or out uh during the covet 19 pandemic uh capitol police lean forward with an aggression aggressive ready reserve posture so we i'm sorry the question is what would what would the number of officers be on an average let's say an average sunday and the congress is not in session yes so i would say less than 700. and how about on an average wednesday when congress is in session so those numbers upward uh past a thousand so that's just an average depends on a lot of i'm sorry it depends on a lot of factors but that's kind of average so over a thousand yes okay and how many would be on duty for some sort of special dignitary event like a state of the union how many how many officers would you have on duty for that that would pretty much be our full complement with the exception uh we would adjust shifts even for our midnight officers they would come in early so it's not as cut and dry as we have x number of people it just depends on the timing of the event but that's typically a full hands-on deck if you will for lack of a letter and can you give us some sort of ballpark number of about what what all hands on deck would entail in terms of numbers u.s capitol police's full strength right now is 18 over 1800 officers but with that said there's a compliment of officers that would come and relieve those who had worked let's just say a 16-hour shift because we're 24 7 operation and how many did you have planned to have on duty prior to the january third assessment so so prior to getting that assessment and making the adjustments that you that you outline in your testimony how many do you plan to have on duty so the adjustments were made primarily to our civil disturbance units a civil disturbance unit is comprised of of what we i'm just i'm just asking you for numbers chief pittman i'm just asking you for numbers so yeah how many did you have on duty given at context we went from approximately four platoons to seven okay and what is 40 i'm sorry we went up to 276 officers for cd civil disturbance units okay but the other officers stayed the same no ma'am we also we were prepared for a 24-hour uh session if you will based on the number of challenges that would be allowed to as it relates to the electoral votes being counted we knew that there were a number of hours that each state could contest those electoral votes so we prepared for going over 24 hours with our officers so our officers were strategically uh positioned so that we would have coverage from zero uh 800 hours on the sixth all the way through uh january 7th so over at 24 hour so between a thousand officers on an average day and 1800 officers on a state of the union type day how many officers were you expecting to have present for january we had 1200 officers at approximately 12 p.m on that day and then by 1600 hours we had 1400 officers uh on the campus on january 6. but even before even before you got that intelligence you knew that you were going to have the first second and third officials in line for the presidency all in the same place at the same time correct yes okay so you would think that you would make it more of a more of a security um more more along the lines of a state of the union than than you know an average day and it sounds like even with a threat assessment it was kind of still treated like an average day no matter there was some there was some i'm sorry my time is i i don't want to waste my time um the uh there's been some talk about this january 3rd special assessment from your office which went out on that sunday is that correct sunday january 3rd right i'm sorry as far as there's that special assessment from january 3rd that came out on a sunday and was disseminated to to staff within the capitol police right that was widely distributed within the department yes ma'am okay now in your written testimony you said it was emailed to all officers above the rank of sergeant yes does that mean does that mean sergeant and above or lieutenant and above above the lieutenants and above so isn't it isn't it the sergeants who handle the roll call and do the most have the most contact with the day-to-day officers on the street on the street yes ma'am ms wexton i apologize that's sergeant and above okay so it did include sergeant yes ma'am good and then there was some discussion from representative clark and representative newhouse about these daily intelligence reports that came out in the days following is that right you acknowledge that those exist right yes and that they were disseminated to the sergeant-at-arms the architect of the capital the various folks within the within the capital police as well yes that is correct and you acknowledge that the threat assessments in those were down to remote highly improbable or improbable is that right that's a separate assessment from that uh report that was issued on january 3rd but that is correct right but they were subsequent reports that went out and were disseminated by by the capitol police is that right yes that is correct and you are going to um and you're going to provide those to this committee is that right yes absolutely yes ma'am i will very good um i want to follow up very briefly on a question from the ranking member about the about the command and the communications who made the call for the commanders leave the incident command center and assist officers under assault is that is that a protocol is that a fail safe i mean what do you do when that happens leave the command center we were talking about the communication center and that's why the the officers on the ground were left to fend for themselves when it came to communication no it's uh referred to as the incident command system not the command center itself okay the incident command system who made the decision for for that for that center to be abandoned that's incident command system to be abandoned no no it's not a physical uh place it's a policy and procedure that we have that we uh train to for critical incidents if you will okay so that you will have one line of communication coming from the top down to all the officers on the ground is that what the purpose of it is it doesn't uh align one communication down from the top it's a structured system it's tiered um the person with boots on the ground has certain responsibilities and then it defines each of those persons in the incident command structure what their role and responsibility is so is it safe to say that that structure failed on january 6th yes okay thank you now united states capitol police is notoriously opaque you guys have had zero public press press conferences in your department in the nearly two months since the attack now having this kind of a news vacuum creates a a a community where conspiracy theories theories and misinformation can spread easily that's obviously something that's very concerning to all of us why haven't you had any public press briefings yes ma'am so u.s capitol police has issued a number of press releases but with that said we felt like the primary responsibility after an attack like january 6 was really to focus on our employees their health and well-being as well as providing the necessary information uh to our oversight committee so we have uh streamlined those communications set up regular calls uh with oversight and core leadership so we make sure that we um communicate around two months it's been almost two months will you commit to having public press briefings in the future from this point going forward no ma'am not at this time okay and if you if you look i know that you're acting chief right now if you become the the full-on chief and you're confirmed as chief um would you confirm would you would you agree to have them at that point or are you just it's just not something that you're interested in doing ever my priorities would still be my employees first and foremost and i know that i am to respond appropriately and timely to the oversight committees that govern not only the u.s capitol police but the capitol police board all right so you'll answer our questions but not those of the press is that what i'm getting from you ma'am i'm not saying that i would not answer questions of the press but leaning forward as we go forward my priorities still would remain with the workforce and to the uh committees that provide oversight as well as our appropriators thank you and i just have one final question as a member who who represents a chunk of the national capital metro region um you know looking at all these fences and having these fences around what what really is a beautiful public park on any other day is is disturbing and and not not sustainable in my mind chief pittman and mr blodgett because i don't want you to feel left out mr blodgett can you reassure us that the fencing around the capitol is is not permanent mr blodgett we'll start with you in my mind it's not permanent no okay thank you how about you tooth pitman no the temporary infrastructure is only to address the vulnerabilities after the attack of january 6. our priority is to make sure that the members of congress are safe and that democratic process is protected once we have appropriate infrastructure and human assets in place we will lean forward with the removal of the fencing thank you very much and mr chairman i'm confident that my time has expired i didn't see the timer going off but uh thank you so much for your indulgence and i'll yield back yeah appreciate appreciate it great questions let me just say uh chief i think you know we can do both we appreciate your communications with us and that has improved dramatically but we also think the american people and the press need to hear directly from you so i would just encourage you to take some time uh you know in making sure that that the residents of capitol hill washington dc the people around the country after having watched what happened would benefit from hearing from you directly uh with that our our final member uh mr espaillat um thank you chairman thank you uh right now i'm so like the mariano rivera of this committee a lot of the questions have been asked but uh chief i i want to thank you and and uh sergeant alarm i want to thank you for for uh coming forward today um i want to ask you chief um was there any uh sweep of the capital of the or the premises around the capital order um for explosives uh during the days uh leading up to january 6. i asked that question because um as i came to my office that morning early in the morning i was walking on the sidewalk by rayburn with some of the protesters so obviously there were in the vicinity of the of the capital and around the compounds of perhaps of the of the capital much before the uh actual the insurrection occurred the breaching of the capital occurred so i wanted to know whether you had um ordered the sweep of the office buildings and the capital compound for any potential explosives yes sir so us capitol police does daily sweeps of the congressional uh campus but specifically on large events that are planned for the day we have canine detection dogs as well as additional bomb hds units hazardous device section but those officers go out and conduct sweeps and they do what we call button up the premises uh when we implement what is uh restricted uh to members and staff but to answer the question yes sir yeah but i'm referring for example uh i'm on rayburn and as i was coming uh on up rayburn by the horseshoe area are you familiar with that area uh uh there it is very familiar okay so you know the area and there is uh green areas there uh and of course there's a drive through horseshoe shape uh entrance to to that part of rayburn uh and there is green areas all around uh longworth and of course uh cannon as well and people were just uh part members of this uh insurrectionist group were walking around there very early in the morning was there any sweep whatsoever of those areas for any potential explosives so the the capital itself is what was closed off of course we had the inaugural uh platform that had been closed for a period of time on the west side of the capitol building and then the east front but the areas that you're referring to outside of the longworth and cannon were actually open uh to the public but those sweeps at the capitol building sorry i think my system cut off yeah so so no sweeps occurred around uh cannon longworth or ca or or rayburn where most of the members obviously were before the uh the protest the insurrection came to the capitol building nothing or nothing occurred also the day before in preparation for the uh for the assault on congress yes so u.s capitol place and that's uh probably i just was a little confused as it relates to your question uh specifically for the capitol building and or for the congressional office buildings house or senate side u.s capitol police conducts daily sweeps not just uh for this major event but for the event itself we closed off a portion of the grounds uh over at the capitol but to answer your question that is daily uh that we conduct canine sweeps uh we have specialized um trained dogs if you will that do a uh sweep of the premises and that is on a regular basis so that was done on that day and the prior days how extensive was that given that you were expecting uh some level of of of protests in front of the capital and the surrounding areas how extensive was the sweep effort that you conducted was it as you always do it on a regular basis or did you intensify it we sweep our grounds yes sir like i said on a daily basis so we use a number of uh deployments of k9 capabilities but i think that if we want to go into more granular details we probably should talk more in a classified setting okay uh now you also obviously coordinate with local law enforcement and the fbi and other law enforcement agencies um and the rnc offices and the dnc offices are relatively close to the capital area in fact you know i walked to the dnc offices it's a two block walk from where i am right now and uh there's been reports that pipe bombs were found uh near those offices near the rnc and the dnc offices was there any sweeps for explosives in those areas prior or during january 6. sorry so no sir no sweeps were done at the rnc dnc prior to january 6. those areas are off our uh capitol grounds uh proper it's not in line with our primary jurisdiction if you will so was there any communications with local law enforcement and since you conduct sweets on a regular basis here as you uh testify in longworth canadian and rayburn was there any conversation with law enforcement about potential uh sweeps for explosive in those two sites so no no sir we conduct daily intelligence briefs with our law enforcement partners uh right before the six there was a call with all the law enforcement in the region but as it relates to them doing uh sweeps of the extended jurisdiction there was no conversation uh specific to that i mean this is maybe an extended jurisdiction but this is just a block away basically uh so it's within eye view of the capital of our rayburn and long earth um the reason why i asked this uh chief is because uh a potential next attack may not necessarily be the way it occurred on january 6 and so i'm concerned that your sweeping operations are for explosives may have to be improved and increased dramatically to keep us all safe i think that it's important that you come back to us at another point with more detailed information about your capability to do this and whether or not in fact um how extensive um was it done on january 6 other days before the the seditious insurrection i think it's important that we have that information and you have the capability to do that kind of work um mr chairman i are you back i thank you yes go ahead go ahead sir yes we will evaluate that i know that uh the task force that's been assigned has already leaned forward in making recommendations in that area with that said while there were no sweeps done of the rnc dnc prior to the six we have coordinated uh routine patrols uh posting officers and a marked unit outside of those areas to ensure the safety of the community but as it relates to k-9 specific specifically we will lean forward with those recommendations and look forward to hearing what those assessments uh suggest and you know proceed accordingly thank you for doing that so just a couple quick follow-ups chief my understanding was that that the k-9 units weren't sweeping are you are you clear on that we're not sweeping we were leaning in all hands on deck my understanding uh was that there were a lot of dogs in the canine unit that weren't being used is that true i will follow up on the number of dogs being used but i can tell you right now that we did conduct uh sweeps of the campus on january 6. there's no doubt about that okay but it was like to the number of dogs that were used to participate in the sweeps i'd follow up on the specific number but as far as the sweep of the campus those happen daily yeah no i'm just saying the previous answers that you gave were all hands on deck leaning in all of that and if there were not enough sweeps happening not enough dogs happening because the pipe bombs were were they called in or were they spotted how did you find that information out the rnc owner notified us but as far uh going back to what you said about the sweeps now we are very clear on that as far as uh them sweeping the campus okay yes sir you're you're saying that i'm just i just want to be very clear because your position has has been throughout the last two and a half hours and we thank you for all your time is that it was all hands on deck and i remember yesterday uh it was captain mendoza was saying she was on her way home and had to get called back so what does that mean i mean that doesn't seem like all hands on deck if people are absolutely and thank you chairman ryan for providing us the opportunity to clarify all hands on deck doesn't mean that they're all here at the same time all hands on deck means that we were preparing for an operational period that would exceed 24 hours so we bring in the bulk of the workforce during the heightened periods that we expect demonstrations but we do understand that our workforce is human they can't just continually work exceedingly past 24 hours so there's a contingent of the workforce that comes in to provide relief for those that have been here in excess of 20 hours sir i got you um this is we we've got a lot of information here i want to ask one one final question i will just say and i i want to thank all of the committee members for uh great questions um on both sides of the aisle um the the one you know a lot of disappointments here with the information flow uh not getting to where it needs to be but also the response uh again what's a credible what's a credible threat many of us would think that that information that was being presented was a credible threat uh the the lack of pushing uh from you guys on your side um both chief son and yourself to push the board to have a vote um to push harder and harder because of you know the end result is the rank and file men and women uh ended up you know being put in a situation that that we believe they shouldn't have been in the lack of equipment uh clearly there wasn't a review of the training i mean i was here after the years ago when the governor of kentucky's plane started flying in the airspace coming towards the capitol and the evacuation for from us was run like hell you know we were all just running out so that was i can't remember 10 plus years ago um if not more um so there were all there's all these issues that that we absolutely need to deal with moving forward the one question that i get most when i'm home in northeast ohio uh is the issue around the use of force um because it was it was clear that that the men and women on the front lines weren't sure what to do as far as how to respond to what was happening and again that tells me that there wasn't the the level of training beforehand on or clarity coming from command throughout the incidents which we've heard from multiple occasions from many of the rank and file members so what was the use of force our rules of engagement policy for the the rank and file members on january 6. so the u.s capitol police use of force policy has not changed based on the type of event that we're responding to our officers are required to use the amount of force that's necessary in any given situation however as it relates to lethal force our officers are only permitted to engage in lethal force for the protection of life uh either their own or to protect another person's life as it relates to for the protection of property our officers did use less than lethal force which is what they're permitted to do based on that though i acknowledge that there are additional of resources that this department needs there is additional training that is needed for our officers i too have been posed those same questions as it relates to use of force so at this point i have directed specific commanders those persons in charge of the training services bureau to work along with the cao as well as our general counsel to provide that specific guidance to our officers so we are leaning forward uh with the direction that uh those persons in charge of those areas of responsibility will lead the charge and making sure our officers have the training that they need going forward well i i hope you understand our frustration and uh you weren't in charge but you were one of the leaders uh in in the at the capitol police on that day in the days leading up and it's really frustrating for us who have become friends with so many of these uh rank and file members who take care of us every single day here to watch them be put in a position where they're not told clearly what what they can do to protect themselves and they got kids and they got spouses and and as you said they're your friends too but you know we've got to make sure that the leadership of capitol police is operating and functioning at a very very high level especially in this current environment and i i know you can tell from the committee here and and rank and file members of congress who don't sit on this committee are extremely disappointed extremely concerned that these guys men and women that we love uh were put in this position and you look at the lack of communication you look at the lack of you got you guys didn't even see the fbi threat assessment you know so it's one thing to say look i mean you know we didn't we didn't see it but even if we did uh it wouldn't have changed things well that's fine but you need to see that stuff i mean what what is the what is the information flow over there uh and and how does it not make its way because you said you didn't even see it right did you you weren't you didn't see the fbi uh report and nor did chief son that that is mind-boggling us how given everything going on the fbi issues uh some kind of report that that confirms your your uh intelligence and it it never makes its way to the chief of police or never made its way to you i mean what's going on you know i mean these are these are legitimate questions and i know you're doing daily calls and all of that but i think at some level it's it's about judgment and it it speaks to um being able to run an efficient operation that allows for the kind of information flow in this day and age where we're picking up an enormous amount of intelligence making sure that the right intelligence gets to the right people in a timely manner and then the response is appropriate that's the key there is to get the intelligence and and have the guts uh to tell uh the paul irving or who the sergeant-at-arms like you know i'm not leaning in i'm leaning into you to have a vote with the police board and and look it takes a lot of nerve to be in a leadership position today like the one you're in and we commend you for your service and your leadership and your you know everything you bring to bear um but this is you know minute by minute things can go sideways here and uh we've got to be pushing you and the department to to run at a varying function at a very very high level because mistakes made at your level uh lead to what what happened here on the sixth and um you know we're here to support you that's our job and the appropriations committee is making sure you have the resources that you need but you know you've got to be clear with us you've got to make sure you're executing i mean these issues around equipment it's hard to believe that that men and women of the capitol police don't have the it didn't have the equipment that they need um and so i've made my point we've taken up a lot of your time today you know please uh know that we appreciate your work and we we know how difficult it is um but we've got to expect the best and and and that's what the american people tell us that we have to do and that's our mission here as i said my opening statement to we're just caretakers here you know we come in and we come out and you know your position too people come in and out of we're caretakers and so we've got to make sure that in this moment with everything going on we've gotta we gotta rise to the occasion and um and and the american people deserve that so i wanna thank you uh chief pittman i wanna thank uh tim thank you so much we're gonna continue to be in dialogue again i encourage you chief to make sure you are trying to communicate to the press the best you can i want to thank our staff on the committee uh and all the members of this committee for for good hearing and we'll continue to be in very very close touch uh with that this hearing is adjourned thank you you

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Id: SBjunqa6yOg

Length: 159min 55sec (9595 seconds)

Published: Thu Feb 25 2021