If Pearl Harbor was the spark that brought the United States into the Second World War, then D-Day was the culmination of American mobilization, ingenuity, and sheer will. Following years of planning, Allied forces crossed the English Channel under the cover of darkness with the intention of ending the war in Europe. To accomplish this, the Allies initiated Operation Overlord, a mission designed to open a beachhead in France that would force Nazi Germany to fight a multi-front war. Thousands of Americans lost their lives on the first day of the invasion, but the effort put 155,000 Allied troops onto the beaches and into the French countryside. One month later, a million soldiers had come ashore. A year later, the war in Europe was over. Headquartered at Fort Sam Houston, the Third Army was notified that it would deploy to the European theater on New Year’s Day 1944. After stops in New York and Scotland, the Third Army arrived in England and began preparing for combat operations. Once the Third Army landed on the continent, its two phase mission was to clear Brittany of Axis forces and then maneuver east towards Germany. Prior to entering combat, Third Army’s strength was approximately 260,000 soldiers. Not involved in the initial assault on fortress Europe, Third Army maintained radio silence and observed strict Operational Security measures to conceal its presence after arriving on French soil. On 25 July, 12th Army Group, under the command of Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, commenced with Operation Cobra, a mission designed to defeat Nazi forces in France. Under the leadership of Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr, Third Army launched breakouts in several directions. The 4th and 6th Armored Divisions spearheaded this offensive. Irate that his forces were unable to stop the Allied advance, Adolf Hitler ordered the Seventh Army to launch a counterattack near Mortain, France in early August. The main body of the counterattack was comprised of four Panzer Divisions. Seventy German tanks broke through the U.S. lines, but were halted with support from artillery and fighter-bombers. The Nazi counterattack ultimately failed, and U.S. forces, including the Third Army, maneuvered to trap the German Seventh Army at Falaise. Hitler’s gamble cost him tens of thousands of troops and failed to end the Allied push east. As German forces in Normandy floundered, Third Army’s advance increased in tempo, momentum, and lethality. The Third Army’s push out of Normandy and race toward the German border was nothing short of extraordinary. According to After Action Reviews from the month of August, the Third inflicted nearly 150,000 enemy casualties while incurring less than 16,000 losses. These forces eliminated hundreds of Mark III, Mark IV, and Mark VI tanks, thousands of enemy vehicles, and over a thousand artillery pieces. While German defenders struggled to halt the rapid advance, the Americans liberated French town after French town moving ever closer to the German border. Unfortunately, the lengthening of supply lines, difficult terrain, and a reinforced enemy meant 3rd Army would not see the same geographic success as it had enjoyed in August. The Third Army had reached a culminating point. “The culminating point is the point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. Culmination represents a crucial shift in relative combat power. While conducting offensive operations, the culminating point occurs when the force cannot continue the attack and must assume a defensive posture or execute an operational pause.” Following the liberation of Paris in August, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, called for his commanders to press the attack. “We, in the West, must seize this opportunity by acting swiftly and relentlessly and by accepting risks in our determination to close with the German wherever met …It is my intention to complete the destruction of the enemy forces in the West, and then --- to strike directly into the heart of the enemy homeland.” While Allied Armies marched toward the deepwater port at Antwerp, Patton’s Third Army prepared to move on the operationally important French cities of Metz and Nancy. Capturing these cities would open a southern axis of advance into Germany. One strategic target was the Ruhr region, the industrial heart of the Nazi war-machine. If the Center of Gravity was the German Armed Forces, then capturing the Ruhr was a critical requirement to the war effort. The Third Army’s move toward Metz and Nancy provided operational flexibility to General Eisenhower. If the Allied attack culminated before Antwerp, Patton’s Third Army would still have the ability to maneuver and could become the primary force to threaten the Ruhr Valley from the south. As such, Third Army’s attack on Metz and Nancy was a branch plan. Army Doctrine Publication Five dash Zero articulates that, “Plans and orders often require adjustment beyond the initial stages of the operation. A branch is the contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction…of a force… Commanders build flexibility into their plans and orders by developing branches to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions.” Third Army was ordered to secure Metz and Nancy before maneuvering across the German border to Mannheim. After it became apparent that counterattacks were incapable of containing the Allied advance, the German high command attempted to create a defensive perimeter before the Allies reached the Siegfried Line and the German border. This new line was designed to break the Allied advance in France and provide a starting point for the massive counter-attack Adolf Hitler envisioned. Hitler's counter-attack had originally been planned to strike west through Dijon, but due to the rapidly changing battlefield Nancy became the new target. The utter success of Operation Cobra had surprised everyone, including the Americans. The distance and speed at which the Army Groups had advanced put them two hundred days ahead of what planners had predicted. These unanticipated gains soon caused problems for the supply lines that were transporting a majority of their cargo from the crowded Normandy beaches. Unfortunately for the Allies, rail lines had been knocked out by pre-invasion bombing, pipelines could not keep up with the pace of the breakout, and air supply was not practical for such a massive operation. This logistical nightmare was addressed by an armada of trucks known as the Red Ball Express. Driving around the clock, the Red Ball Express quickly pushed its drivers to the brink of exhaustion. Facing shortages across the front, General Eisenhower made the decision to push available resources to the Allied advance north. By August, Third Army’s daily march toward the Lorraine region of France was consuming 5,500 tons of supplies per day, including 450,000 gallons of gasoline and 10,000 gallons of diesel. On 28 August, General Bradley visited General Patton to discuss how the unfavorable logistical situation would impact his command. Third Army would begin experiencing a gasoline shortage the following day. During this critical shortage, Patton had no option but to pause his offensive. Supporting units, such as field artillery, became completely immobilized. Third Army’s mobility was crippled as the gasoline allocation fell to a low of 25,000 gallons on 2 Sept. However, Patton’s soldiers were able to rebound once fuel supplies returned to normal later that week. At the beginning of the Lorraine Campaign, Patton commanded three corps – the VIII, the XII, and the XX Corps. XII Corps had started the campaign under Major General Gilbert Cook, but due to deteriorating health, he was replaced by Major General Manton S. Eddy on 19 August. The bulk of XII Corps was composed of the 35th Infantry Division led by Major General Paul Baade, the 80th Infantry Division headed by Major General Horace McBride, and the 4th Armored Division commanded by Major General John Wood. Additionally, Third Army was supported by the XIX Tactical Air Command. XII Corps made unprecedented gains in August 1944. During a sixteen-day span, the soldiers of XII Corps advanced 400 kilometers. On the cusp of the gasoline shortage, Patton ordered his corps commanders to cross the Meuse River before their mechanized units became immobilized. Facing little enemy resistance, his soldiers successfully crossed the eastern side of the Meuse before running out of fuel Once the operational pause was over, Patton directed his core commanders to first create a bridgehead over the Moselle River, and then generate a bridgehead over the Rhine en route to Mannheim. A bridgehead is “an area on the enemy side of a linear obstacle that is large enough to accommodate the majority of the crossing force, has adequate terrain to permit defense of the crossing sites, provides security of crossing forces from enemy direct fire, and provides a base for continuing the attack.” The responsibility for establishing XII Corps’ bridgehead fell to the 80th Infantry Division and the 4th Armored Division. Unlike the 35th Infantry Division which had deployed in July, the 80th Infantry Division had not arrived in France until 3 August, D+58. Known as the “Blue Ridge Division,” the 80th reflected the average composition of an American Infantry Division in terms of infantry and artillery battalions. The artillery had three battalions with 105 mm Howitzers and one battalion of 155 mm Howitzers. The 1117th Engineers were attached because of the diverse terrain encountered in the French countryside. Elements of the 4th Armored Division had entered combat days after arriving on the Continent in July. Its organic units included tank battalions armored infantry battalions, cavalry, armored engineers, armored field artillery, and support units. General Eddy’s initial plan for creating a bridgehead across the Moselle involved the 4th Armor Division conducting a hasty gap crossing followed by infantry units from the 80th Infantry Division. Citing unease over the depth of the Moselle, the lack of reconnaissance, and concern over risking armor in an unknown terrain, neither General Wood nor General McBride agreed with using the 4th Armor Division to establish the bridgehead. Instead, the 317th Regimental Combat Team, one of three infantry regiments in the 80th Infantry Division, would cross the Moselle near the town of Pont-a-Mousson to generate a bridgehead. Once established, the 318th from the 80th Infantry Division and Combat Command A, 4th Armored Division, known as CCA, would maneuver behind Nancy and seize the city from the east. Meanwhile, the 319th of the 80th Infantry Division would fix the enemy by crossing the Moselle and attack east from the town of Toul. Due to the successes experienced in August, the Americans were not anticipating what lay ahead. In defiance of the slog expected by pre-D-Day planners, XII Corps’ August offensive was the epitome of mobile success. Although considered a peer-level threat, German units had been forced to withdraw at a pace that had not allowed for an organized and deliberate defense. The American operational pause triggered by logistical and planning considerations provided a short window of time for German commanders to regroup and prepare. General Johannes Blaskowitz commanded Army Group G, which included the First Army, the Nineteenth Army, and the Fifth Panzer Army. Third Army’s operational pause during the fuel shortage was just the reprieve the German Army needed to dig in. Using the Moselle as a natural obstacle, German forces reinforced behind the river and prepared to halt the advance. The 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division defended near Pont-a-Mousson. While some of the German units in the Nancy sector were untested, the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division was an experienced and motivated unit. The division had been rushed from the Italian front so quickly that its soldiers were still wearing tropical uniforms and its organic tank battalion had not yet arrived in theater. Other German units near the Moselle included the 92nd Luftwaffe Field Regiment and the 553rd Volksgrenadier Division. Although a division of Volksgrenadier consisted of 10,000 soldiers on paper, these units were generally quickly assembled and poorly trained. From observation posts stationed on the hills east of the Moselle, the entrenched German forces watched as the 80th Infantry Division arrived and prepared to conduct wet gap crossings. Published only weeks after D-Day, the United States Army released new doctrine on river crossings in FM 100-5 Operations. Similar to the doctrine from 1941, the new field manual divided river crossings into three distinct phases; Preparing the crossing site, Crossing the river, and Exploiting the crossing. The first phase, preparing the crossing, mandated that soldiers perform reconnaissance operations, deception operations, and planning with engineers and air assets. Phase two required obscuration or pre-dawn movements, maximizing artillery capabilities, and the use of assault boats and ferries before the installation of bridging. The manual from 1944 also stressed holding a reserve force for the third and final phase, exploitation. Today, Army doctrine on wet gap crossings resembles the practices of earlier field manuals, but its tenets have been modernized and, instead of three phases, current doctrine identifies five phases. Due to its complexity, a deliberate wet-gap crossing is “a centrally planned and controlled offensive mission requir[ing] the allocation of specialized crossing resources and a force dedicated to the security of the bridgehead.” “A division is normally the smallest organization that can conduct a deliberate wet-gap crossing.” Planning and executing this complex operation requires the careful delineation of command and control responsibilities among the various command posts, headquarters, and supporting units. During a deliberate wet gap crossing, METT-TC will dictate force allocation and the mission’s success will depend on maintaining momentum throughout the operation. Doctrine for a division gap crossing recommends utilizing four to six routes and maintaining strict traffic management to avoid confusion and enhance combat power in the bridgehead. To maintain momentum and limit its exposure while crossing the gap, the division should be augmented with specific enablers. “The division requires an appropriate engineer task force or brigade headquarters for command and control that includes bridging augmentation in the form of Multi-role Bridging Companies known as MRBCs. In addition, the division may require augmentation from other combat engineers, mobility augmentation companies, and dive teams. Military police should augment the division to assist in regulating traffic and conducting route security in the crossing area.” Corps and divisions should allocate additional artillery units to provide obscuration. “Finally, the corps will provide air and missile defense support to protect the bridgehead from air interdiction.” Commanders must choose between hasty, deliberate, or covert crossings. A hasty crossing, “is a crossing of an inland water obstacle or other gap using the crossing means on hand or those readily available, and made without pausing for elaborate preparations.” Hasty gap crossings are most often used when enemy resistance is weak and the gap is not a severe obstacle. Hasty gap crossings also feature decentralized control at the Brigade Combat Team level, using organic assets, or expedient crossing means at multiple sites along a broad front. The strength of a hasty crossing is the avoidance of an intentional pause, thereby promoting speed, facilitating surprise, and providing continuation of maneuver momentum. A deliberate crossing is “the crossing of an inland water obstacle or other gap that requires extensive planning and detailed preparations.” Deliberate crossings often occur after a hasty crossing has failed or was not feasible. Deliberate crossings require, “reconnaissance, detailed planning, coordination of fire plans, extensive preparations and rehearsals, and significant engineer assets.” Greater time is required to plan, prepare, and execute a deliberate crossing. Hasty and Deliberate “gap crossings in support of maneuver are similar to breaching operations in that the force is vulnerable while moving through a lane or across a gap. Maneuver units are forced to break movement formations, concentrate within lanes or at crossing points, and reform on the far side before continuing to maneuver.” As such, both operations are guided by the acronym, SOSRA, which stands for Suppress, Obscure, Secure, Reduce, and Assault. “S” Suppress. Soldiers must implement fire control measures. So support forces can provide effective direct and indirect suppressive fires. The purpose of suppression during gap crossing is to protect and enable the assault and bridgehead forces tasked with seizing the far side objectives. The mission of the support force is to suppress the enemy overwatching the gap. “O” Obscure. Effective obscuration requires decisions on the placement, density, and timing of obscuration fires. Wind conditions need to be factored into the obscuration between the enemy and the crossing area. Commanders must consider that obscuration smoke may do more to identify friendly locations than to mask their activities, and, in fact, obscurations can support deception operations. “S” Secure. Forces conducting a gap crossing, secure the bridgehead to prevent the enemy from interfering with the passage of forces through the crossing area. The division must secure a series of objectives including the near side, far side, exit-bank, intermediate, and bridgehead objectives. “R” Reduce. “Reduce is a mobility task to create and mark lanes through, over, or around an obstacle to allow the attacking force to accomplish its mission.” The number and width of gap crossing lanes must be determined based on the scheme of movement and maneuver with a lane marking system in place. The minimum number of crossing points for a brigade combat team is two and a division is four, as this allows for combat losses and the need for two-way traffic for follow on forces. “A” Assault. Once the bridgehead line is secure, the division continues the attack with breakout forces. Cutting through multiple European countries, the Moselle River has been an important waterway since the days of the Roman Empire. In 1944, the river posed a serious obstacle to Third Army’s advance. The Army Engineers who participated in the September crossings described the Moselle as, “Average width 150 feet; variable depth 6 to 8 feet; Rate of Current 5 miles per hour; Bottom firm, but muddy; Low banks but bulldozing necessary; Available fords for foot elements, but perilous for tracked vehicles because of mud. Two characteristics especially affected operations: the quick flow and the tendency of the water level to change overnight.” American intelligence sources proved unreliable at Nancy. Agents working for the French Forces of the Interior could not keep up with the speed of the Allied advance, so their reporting became less reliable over time. U.S. cavalry patrols operating west of the river had not been able to identify the threat across the Moselle, and the 80th Infantry Division had not arrived in time to conduct its own reconnaissance prior to its initial assault. Over a two day period, XII Corps attempted to cross an assault force at several points to establish a bridgehead across the Moselle. Rather than conduct this crossing under the cover of darkness on the evening of 4 September, General McBride decided to launch a morning attack. His decision had the assault boats south of Pont-a-Mousson deploy at 0930 on a clear day. To further complicate matters, Close Air Support from the XIX Tactical Air Command was unavailable on the day of the attack. During the initial assault, artillery fire was not requested, except to place smoke on two hills on the east side of the Moselle. Later, artillery batteries engaged German targets along the river. The 317th Infantry regiment, one of the division’s assault forces, struggled against the prepared and experienced 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division. After successfully crossing a canal on a damaged footbridge, 1st Battalion’s crossing of the much-larger Moselle failed after multiple advances were broken and the rubber assault boats were destroyed before reaching the river. Attempting to cross near Vandieres, 2nd Battalion was repelled by machinegun fire, mortars, and artillery. 3rd Battalion was ordered forward, but the unit withdrew after being unable to find a crossing point. By 1605, one platoon of “G” Company of the 317th had successfully crossed the Moselle, but it was soon forced to withdraw because of hostile fire. After regrouping, the 317th initiated a series of wet gap crossings at night. Returning to the fight, 1st Battalion maneuvered south of Pont-a-Mousson near Blenod. The disciplined German defenders allowed 1st Battalion to cross a canal and enter a flat area with little natural cover before firing. Suffering high causalities, 1st battalion withdrew into a factory. Operating in silence, 2nd Battalion attempted another crossing around midnight near Vandieres using procured civilian barges. When a German voice broke the calm, the battalion hit the ground just before machinegun fire sprayed overhead. The enemy did not allow the battalion to advance or withdraw, so most of 2nd Battalion was unable to retrograde until the following afternoon. As the casualties mounted, the wounded were treated by the 305th Medical Battalion, one of the 80th’s organic units. When the fight for the Moselle started, Third Army’s hospitals were operating under canvas tents in the field, but with a growing number of casualties and more river crossings to come, the order was given to move all hospitals into buildings. Ferried in rubber assault boats by the 305th Combat Engineer Battalion, the 3rd Battalion of the 317th was able to put “Item” and “Love” Companies across the Moselle by 0425 on 6 September. The darkness aided the infantry crossing, and these companies were able to dig in 90 meters from the bank. Desperate to prevent the establishment of a bridgehead, the German defenders left their positions and attacked the Americans with bayonets and grenades. By 1100, the bridgehead had been eliminated by the German attack and 160 Americans were missing. Neglecting the extensive preparations necessary for such a complex operation, and lacking accurate intelligence, the 80th Division was unable to cross any of its infantry assault forces to the far side of the Moselle. After deliberation over the possible deployment of 4th Armored Division’s Combat Command A to assist the embattled 80th Division, XII Corps Commander, Major General Eddy temporarily cancelled all further wet gap operations. According to current Army doctrine, successful gap crossings require: surprise, extensive preparation, flexible planning, traffic management, organization, and speed. Although each of the gap crossing fundamentals are critical to a successful operation, forces must be clearly task organized when conducting a deliberate wet-gap crossing. “Commanders conducting a deliberate gap crossing organize their units into assault, assured mobility, bridgehead, and breakout forces.” “Assault forces seize the far side objective to eliminate direct fire on the crossing site.” A task force consisting of dismounted infantry and engineers may be organized as the assault force. “Assured mobility forces provide crossing means, traffic control, and obscuration. These supporting units are task-organized to perform specific tasks and are controlled using specified procedures that are clear, simple, and rehearsed by all elements to ensure responsive support of the plan and unity of command and effort.” Assured mobility forces include Combat Engineer Companies mobility augmentation companies, multi-role bridge companies, and Military Police. “A bridgehead force is a force that assaults across the gap to secure the enemy side, the bridgehead, to allow the buildup and passage of a breakout force.” One or more of the division BCT’s normally serve as the bridgehead force during a deliberate wet gap crossing. “The breakout force attacks to seize objectives beyond the bridgehead as a continuation of the offense.” The division's reserve BCT may become the breakout force once the bridgehead is secured. Organized in this manner, forces are ready to conduct a deliberate wet-gap crossing. Army Techniques Publication 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility, describes a wet-gap crossing as a five phase operation. These phases include: Advance to the Gap. Assault across the Gap. Advance from the Far Side. Secure the Bridgehead Line. Continue the Attack. Phase One, Advance to the Gap, “is the attack to seize objectives that secure the near side terrain, which offers favorable crossing sites and road networks and provides enough area to stage crossing forces while preventing congestion and an undesirable massing of assets.” “The seizing of this terrain sets the conditions for the assault across the gap. Normally, the division advances with two BCTs abreast and one trailing. The division tactical command post controls the effort of the lead BCTs.” “The division main command post controls aviation, artillery, and other assets in-depth to isolate the crossing area and far side objectives. It also sustains the division advance to the gap by ensuring that key classes of supplies are positioned forward. Supply and maintenance priorities are adjusted to include crossing means, bridging units and equipment, and the assured mobility forces supporting the crossing.” “Each lead BCT main command post functions as the BCT’s crossing area headquarters, and is typically supported by an engineer battalion headquarters to help develop the crossing plan and control the crossing means within the BCT’s crossing area… Once the lead BCTs have secured the near side, military police and engineers mark routes from the staging area to the crossing sites; lay out staging, holding, and call forward areas; and set up Engineer Regulating Points and Traffic Control Points.” Phase two, “assault across the gap,” involves units seizing the far side objectives. “The intent of this phase is to rapidly place sufficient combat power on the far side to eliminate enemy direct fire onto the crossing sites and secure terrain for defensive positions and then attack positions.” The division tactical command post supported by an engineer brigade headquarters coordinates the actions of the BCTs conducting the assault across the gap. The crossing sites are chosen based on available concealment, accessibility, and sufficient space for staging areas on the near side. These sites also have defensible terrain on the far side of the gap to provide a secure base for continuing the mission.” “Each BCT tactical command post controls its own respective assault crossing elements, which normally consist of dismounted infantry.” Dismounted elements of the assault force crossed the gap using assault boats operated by engineer units via air assault or other methods to secure terrain for the reinforcing armored vehicles.” “BCTs normally establish limits of advance and coordinated fire lines for the dismounted forces conducting the assault." This far side limit of advance will be graphically depicted as a phase line and will likely become a release line. During a gap crossing, “a release line is used to delineate the crossing area. Release lines are located on the far side and near side and indicate a change in the headquarters that is controlling movement. Release lines are normally located within 3 to 4 kilometers of the gap and on easily identifiable terrain features. The release line on the near side is usually out of range of enemy direct-fire weapons. The release line on the far side delineates an area large enough for forces to occupy battalion size attack positions. Collectively, the crossing area is about 6 to 8 kilometers." “The dismounted assault forces are typically supported by tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and other direct-fire systems in support by fire positions. Heavy rafts are prepared to transport tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to the far side for reinforcing dismounted infantry.” “Commanders may consider immediate construction of a bridge during this phase without ever conducting rafting if this is viable. The advantage to this is that it may allow combat power to be massed on the far side at a much faster rate. The risk that the commander takes in making this decision is that a large amount of bridging assets are potentially exposed to enemy fires before the elimination of enemy direct and indirect fires on the crossing area." To mitigate this "each BCT main command post controls obscuration during crossing." "The division main command post continues to control aviation, artillery, and other assets in-depth to isolate the crossing area and far side objectives. The division main shifts fires two subsequent targets as units advance. It coordinates with the core for air and missile defense coverage to protect the crossing area from enemy air interdiction.” The concentration and channeling of friendly forces for the gap crossing "creates lucrative targets at relatively fixed locations that are easily targeted by enemy air. Therefore, approaches; holding, staging, staging, and call forward areas; crossing sites; and other critical nodes along the gap are the highest priority for air and missile defense protection during the crossing. Air and missile defense units occupy positions to engage aircraft with massed fires before the aircraft can reach weapons release points." "This phase is complete once the far side objectives are secured." The third phase, advance from the far side, is the attack to secure the exit bank and intermediate objectives that eliminate direct and observed indirect fires into the crossing area. "Each BCT main command post controls the movement of its follow-on forces from the staging areas across the gap to their attack positions on the far side. They control the upgrade of crossing sites from assault boats too heavy rafts or bridging in conjunction with the division operation order.” "The division tactical command post continues to control actions to secure the far side until the BCTs that make up the bridgehead force are set in attack positions.” “It then controls the coordinated attack of the lead BCTs from the far side attack positions through the exit bank objectives to the intermediate objectives. The division tactical command post may displace forward across the gap during this phase. "Each BCT tactical command post, in coordination with the division tactical command post, controls the movement of its bridgehead forces out of their attack positions to the exit bank and intermediate objectives. Exit bank objectives are those positions that, when seized, eliminate enemy direct fire into the crossing sites. Intermediate objectives are those positions from which the enemy can provide observation for indirect fires. This enables the expansion of air and missile defense coverage, allowing more depth to engage aircraft in air avenues of approach on the far side of the gap." "The division main command post controls aviation and artillery fires in-depth to block enemy counter-attacks into the bridgehead." During this phase, “bridge companies run heavy raft sites and begin to construct ribbon bridges.” “Limited two-way traffic begins to allow for the return of disabled equipment and casualties by ground transportation.” Military police and engineers provide traffic control on both the near and the far side of the gap to facilitate rapid transit within the crossing area. This phase ends once the intermediate objectives are secure. Phase four, “secure the bridgehead line,” consists of the tasks necessary to secure the final bridgehead objectives while providing the time and space for the build-up of breakout forces. “The lead BCTs of the bridgehead force attack to secure the final objectives within the bridgehead to prevent the enemy from successfully counterattacking by rapidly building enough combat power to establish a hasty defense. The hasty defense is temporary and the priority remains crossing the gap, as quickly as possible, to reduce the risk to forces occupying assembly areas and continue the attack on the enemy. The lead BCTs maintain continuous far side security to prevent bypassed enemy elements from infiltrating back to the gap and disrupting activities at the crossing sites. They control avenues of approach into the bridgehead and must have sufficient combat power to defeat enemy counterattacks. The bridgehead must be defendable and large enough to accommodate both the breakout force in the lead BCTs that seize it, normally 19 to 30 kilometers in depth." "The division tactical command post controls the lead BCTs as they secure the bridgehead objectives and preparation is made to move the reserve BCT or other breakout forces into attack positions within the bridgehead." "Once the bridgehead line is secured the division main command post directs the movement of the breakout forces through the crossing area to attack positions within the bridgehead." "The division main continues to control aviation and artillery fires in depth to screen the flanks and interdict enemy formations as they move to counter attack." "The BCT main command posts continue to monitor and improve the crossing sites and control the movement of forces through the crossing area... During this phase, specific bridges and rafts are designated for full-time return traffic. This ensures that ground resupply in the evacuation of casualties, detainees, and disabled equipment can occur.” Once the breakout force has occupied its attack positions, the division is ready to continue the attack. The fifth phase is the attack out of the bridgehead to defeat the enemy at a final objective. This phase begins with a forward passage of lines as the breakout force passes through the hasty defense established by the bridgehead force. “The lead BCTs of the bridgehead force must reorganize and prepare to follow the breakout force as the division or corps reserve. Security forces from the core must come forward to relieve the lead BCTs from their bridgehead security mission. The division technical command post moves forward or rejoins the division main command post and focuses on the attack out of the bridgehead and subsequent missions." Without reliable and accurate intelligence, Close Air Support, or the element of surprise, the 80th Infantry Division's initial attempts at conducting a wet gap crossing failed. The commander's decision to forgo fires for tactical surprise did not work as planned. The problems were further compounded by difficult terrain and a ready enemy defense force fighting from prepared positions. XII Corps Commander Major General Eddy and his staff would address these shortcomings before the next attack. XII Corps’ effort to cross the Moselle was aided by a changing battlefield. Seventh Army’s advance from the South forced German units in the Nancy Area of Operations to maneuver east to avoid encirclement. This allowed XII Corps to redeploy the 35th Infantry Division, which had been responsible for protecting the southern flank of the Army. The process was expedited by the 79th Infantry Division's arrival from 15th Corps to assume 35th’s mission. Thinking beyond the problem of the wet gap crossing, General Eddy unveiled a new plan on 7 September. The mission called for the 35th Infantry Division to create a bridgehead for the 4th Armored Division in the weakened German defenses south of Nancy. The armored division would then attack north to envelope Nancy from the east. The plan was not well received by General Eddy’s subordinate commanders who were concerned that the 4th armored would be trapped in difficult, unknown terrain. The decision was made to have the 35th create a bridgehead then attacked Nancy from the south, while the breakout force of CCB 4th armored divisions swept deeper into enemy territory before turning north. Once this action turned the German defenders south, the 80th Infantry Division would renew wet gap crossing operations north of the city and maneuver toward Nancy. CCA, 4th Armored Division, would be held in reserve to exploit opportunities. As the soldiers prepared for the next round of wet gap crossings, they had to contend with supply shortages ranging from fuel to ammunition to food. Artillery shells were also in short supply across Third Army, with 105 millimeter stocks reaching critical levels. Looking to conserve ammunition, artillery teams were ordered to halt unobserved fire. To alleviate Class I shortages, 2.6 million pounds of frozen beef and 500,000 pounds of canned beef that had been captured from the German Army were promptly sent to the front. Using all means necessary to supply Third Army and other units. U.S. XII Army Group sustainers found innovative ways to maintain operational tempo. When the fuel supply slowed, once again, the US Strategic Air Force repurposed several B-24 Liberators to deliver thousands of gallons of gasoline to the front. Instead of bombs, these B-24s delivered fuels so Third Army could resume the offensive. One of the eight principles of sustainment, “Improvisation is the ability to adapt sustainment operations to unexpected situations or circumstances affecting a mission.” On 11 September 1944, XII Corps prepared to execute a Corps wet gap crossing south of Nancy with the 35th Infantry Division as the bridgehead force and 4th armored division as the breakout force. The operation was set to begin at 0500. The plan called for the 134th and 137th Infantry regiments, the assault force, to advance to the Moselle supported by the 1135th Engineer Combat Group. However, while maneuvering into position for the next day’s operation, The 134th discovered an accessible intact bridge that was wired with explosives. After getting permission to cross before the pre-planned time, 2nd Battalion of the 134th began crossing at 1900 and by 2230, had occupied their far side objectives on the east bank of the Moselle. Tank destroyers were supposed to join the effort, but because of a communication breakdown, they never arrived. To eliminate the bridgehead, German ground units counterattacked at 0030 while the Luftwaffe tried to destroy the bridge from the air. the German Air Force failed, but artillery fire knocked out the bridge leaving the 2nd Battalion stranded. Supported by armor, a determined German assault decimated 2nd Battalion’s position forcing its survivors to swim back across the river to safety. The American casualty rate was high, partially because the defenders lacked the strength of combined arms. Although the infantry suffered the majority of losses, the role of a combat engineer in a wet gap crossing was also perilous. PFC Frank Albertson, who was involved in the Moselle crossings, recalled “In an assault crossing, two engineers are assigned to each boat, which takes six to eight infantry men, fully equipped…. One engineer sits in the bow and strokes the boat, while the other sits in the stern; all of them paddle. There are no seats, and everyone kneels. You feel pretty naked out in one of those boats.” Despite the setbacks experienced by the 134th Infantry Regiment, the 137th fared much better and benefited from a robust deception plan. The 137th’s attack at Crevechamps was preceded by an artillery barrage fired eight kilometers north of their intended crossing site. This action was followed by a thirty-minute bombardment at the actual crossing site by the entire 35th Division artillery with support from XII Corps largest howitzers. The combined arms plan allowed the 2nd and 3rd battalions to seize all of their bridgehead objectives before being slowed by enemy small arms and artillery fire. The successful crossing also allowed 1st Battalion to cross the Moselle and maneuver to attack a surprised enemy. Doctrine states that gap crossings are “typically a race between the crossing force and the enemy to mass combat power on the far side” of a gap. On the evening of 11-12 September, the engineers completed the construction of a 51 meter bridge across the Moselle near Bayon. The bridge allowed infantry and armor to pour into the bridgehead. German commanders ordered a counter-attack, but it was quickly defeated. The Americans had won the race to mass combat power. By that afternoon, the 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was in full retreat and under duress from P-47s and P-51s of the XIX Tactical Air Command. The successful wet gap crossing had opened the southern route to Nancy. As planned, the 35th Infantry Division's successful river crossing south of Nancy triggered the 80th Infantry Division’s operations north of the city. Rather than attack at Pont-a-Mousson again, the 80th would attempt to cross six kilometers to the south at Dieulouard. The terrain was less than ideal. The Moselle River splits east of Dieulouard creating an island several hundred meters wide that lacked cover. Compounding the problem, the area was observable by elevated positions including Mousson Hill….. Hill 382 and Falaise Hill. The reconnaissance in force originally attempted by the 80th at Pont-a-Mousson had only limited combined arms no close air support and lacked actionable intelligence. The planning for the deliberate crossing would mitigate these problems. Operating in terrain that favored the defense, XII Corps started shaping the battlefield days before the attack. Unlike the previous crossing, scouts were sent across the Moselle to gather intelligence, and a daily artillery barrage was fired to confuse the enemy as to the time and location of the operation. These actions remain the corps’ responsibility and current doctrine describes how, “The corps will plan, resource, and control all of the requirements to execute a believable deception so that the enemy does not know exactly where or when the division will cross the wet gap.” On 10 September, fifty-eight U.S. medium bombers attempted to isolate Dieulouard by destroying bridges that the Germans could use for reinforcements. The next day American pilots targeted Pont-a-Mousson in yet another attempt to conceal the actual crossing site. The 80th Infantry Division’s wet gap crossing commenced at midnight on 11 September. With 1st Battalion in reserve, the operation opened with the 317th’s 2nd and 3rd Battalions seizing the divisions near side objectives. During Phase II, Assault Across the Gap, the infantry was supported by eight battalions of artillery, which opened up with 15 minutes of preparatory fire around 0430. This included fire from 105 and 155 mm Howitzers. To paint the route for the assault, thirty rounds of white phosphorus were fired at Bezaumont, lighting up the night and the French town. Twenty .50 caliber, and thirty .30 caliber machine guns were manned by engineers who laid down suppressive fire for the assault force. Facing enemy small arms, mortars, and artillery fire, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions crossed the Moselle and, by morning, secured their exit bank and intermediate objectives. 1st Battalion maneuvered between the 2nd and 3rd expanding the bridgehead to over 3 kilometers. Around noon, the 318th Infantry crossed, and by nightfall, five battalions prepared to defend the bridgehead. Without the assured mobility provided by the 305th Engineer Combat Battalion and the 1117th Engineer Combat Group, the 80th Infantry Division would have faced greater risk in its crossing. The 305th was responsible for crossing the entire dismounted assault force, while the 1117th crossed the mounted bridgehead force. During the crossing engineers led 15 soldier teams in plywood assault boats across the water. The rainfall, which had been advantageous for obscuring movement, was not helpful to the engineers, as it changed the current of the Moselle and created muddy conditions along the banks of the river. After the assault teams were across, the 1117th conducted mine clearing operations and marked lanes to enable the 80th Infantry Division’s continued mobility. The 557th Heavy Pontoon Battalion of the 1117th Engineer Group was supposed to start assembly of Treadway bridges once the area was deemed safe from enemy artillery. Assuming a higher degree of risk in order to increase operational momentum, General McBride ordered the 557th to begin construction even though enemy forces had not yet been cleared. Operating under enemy fire, the engineers initiated construction at 1000, completing several bridges by 1950 with the assistance of armored bulldozers. As one Major put it, “The engineers had to contend with mines below and shells from above.” In all, five heavy pontoon bridges were deployed in the Dieulouard area of operation. Before daybreak on 13 September, German commanders ordered the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division and the 553rd Volksgrenadier Division to eliminate the bridgehead. The brunt of the attack came from Foret de Facq. Well-equipped and manned with veteran soldiers, the Germans counterattacked with two battalions and fifteen tanks, overrunning the 318th Command Post and killing over 120 soldiers. Chaos ensued from a breakdown in traffic management as US forces were entering the bridgehead while units from the front were retrograding back. The US position became so desperate that three Engineer Combat Battalions were defending the bridges with small arms. The surging counter-attack made it within 90 meters of the bridges. When it appeared that the easternmost bridge might be lost, the crossing site commander authorized the insertion of CCA elements to secure the bridgehead. CCA’s lead element, Troop D/25th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, attacked across the bridges. Simultaneously, the XII Corps, 4th Armored Division, and 80th Infantry Division commanders met and opted to use the 37th Tank Battalion task force, an element assigned to the breakout force, to clear remaining enemy from the bridgehead before attacking further east. In this case, units intended for Phase V: Continue the Attack, had to be employed early to secure a bridgehead in danger of collapsing. This effort stopped the surging German counter-attack and forced defeated enemy units to retreat to the north. Current doctrine warns that “Wet gap crossings are among the most critical, complex, and risky combined arms operations.” After several attempts XII Corps successfully crossed two assault forces across the Moselle River on 12 September. With a plan that closely followed US river crossing doctrine, XII Corps executed a wet gap crossing south of the town of Nancy with the 35th Infantry Division as the bridgehead force and 4th armored division as the breakout force. As planned, the successful wet gap crossing opened the southern route to Nancy and allowed the 80th Infantry Division to initiate a similar crossing north of the city. The establishment of multiple bridge heads enabled Patton's Third Army to return to what had made it successful during its advance across France, mobility. Now, Third Army could pursue general Eisenhower's directive to strike directly into the heart of the enemy homeland.
