In the early morning of 13 September 1944, several commanders from the U.S. Third Army’s Twelfth Corps gathered on the western side of the Moselle River north of the city of Nancy to discuss how to cross the river and engage the German forces on the other side. In the previous days, German counterattacks had drastically reduced the American bridgehead and U.S. forces were unable to continue their efforts to pursue the enemy. During the deliberations, the commander of Combat Command A (or CCA), Colonel Bruce C. Clark, asked the commander of the Thirty-seventh Armor Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Creighton W. Abrams, for his opinion. Pointing at the bridge, Abrams replied, “That is the shortest way home.” With the approval of the Twelfth Corps commander, Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy, Colonel Clark ordered Abrams to cross the bridge. The encirclement at Nancy had begun. Army Doctrine Publication 3-90 defines encirclement operations as “operations where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground lines of communications and reinforcement.” “Typically, [offensive] encirclements [are the product of] penetrations and envelopments, or extensions of exploitation and pursuit operations. They usually result from the linkup of two encircling arms conducting a double envelopment. The main area of operations for the encirclement was the “Charmes Trough” ”—the swath of relatively unrestricted terrain straddled by Toul in the north and Epinal in the south. The Third Army referred to this area as the “Nancy Gap.” With both road and rail routes, the area possessed ample lines of communication and was ideal for its advance into Germany. Two main highways traverse Lorraine from east to west. In the north, near Metz, the highway joins Nancy with Saarbrucken and Mannheim. In the south, the highway joins Nancy with Strasbourg. Over the previous sixty days, the Third Army had enjoyed a tremendous amount of space to maneuver. However, the terrain in the region was about to change all of that. “The Lorraine plateau narrows as it approaches its eastern terminus; hemmed in as it is by the middle and lower Vosges and the western German mountains, there is not enough room to accommodate a modern army in advance on a wide front. …Any advance east of the Moselle will tend to move diagonally toward the northeast on a constantly narrowing front.” The entire Lorraine region was a formidable area to attack through, and the restrictive terrain separated and compartmentalized maneuver forces, severely limiting their ability to support one another other. This topography limited Third Army’s options during its offensive. Based on this, Third Army planned the operation in two phases. Twelfth Corps and Twentieth Corps were directed to seize crossings over the Moselle River as a part of phase one. The second phase had the two corps advance abreast and seize crossings over the Rhine River. Simultaneously, the newly arrived Fifteenth Corps would cover the southern flank of the Army. Despite these planning considerations, Third Army G-2 neglected to account for German forces in the area. On 3 September, Adolf Hitler recalled Field Marshall Gerd von Rundsted from his forced retirement to command Oberbefehlshaber West or OB West. The current acting commander, Field Marshall Walther Model, assumed command of Army Group B. Their joint task was to establish a defense-in-depth as far forward of the Westwall, also known as the Siegfried Line, as operationally feasible to create the time and space necessary to conduct a counterattack planned for late November 1944. By 5 September, the Lorraine region formed the southern flank of the German defense. Responsibility for this region fell to Army Group G, a subordinate unit of OB West. Commanded by Colonel General Johannes Blaskowitz, Army Group G was divided into two smaller commands: the First Army, under command of General of Panzer Troops Otto von Knobelsdorff; and the Nineteenth Army, under command of General of Infantry Friedrich Wiese. The tenuous boundary between these two German armies would become the axis of advance for the U.S. Third Army. In defense of Nancy, the Third Panzer Grenadier Division, plus one regiment from the Fifteenth Panzer Grenadier Division, defended the area to the north, while the Five Fifty Third Volksgrenadier Division defended the city. The area south of the city was occupied by the remaining regiments of the Fifteenth Panzer Grenadier Division and a conglomeration of replacement and school troops belonging to the First Parachute Army. To reinforce their defenses, Adolf Hitler granted the forces in the Western Theater priority of replacements for armored vehicles. Rather than refit existing Panzer units, the decision was made to form new, independent panzer brigades. These units were being assembled between St. Die-des-Vosges, the closest railhead to the front, and Molsheim the headquarters of German Army Group G. These units were in position to defend the area around the city. In early September 1944, the Eightieth Infantry Division and Thirty-Fifth Infantry Division established bridgeheads across the Moselle River. As the commanders planned the next offensive, the scouts of the Second Mechanized Cavalry Group patrolled the Nancy area up to the Moselle River. In this capacity, the Second Mechanized Cavalry Group performed a screening operation for Third Army’s main body. A screen is one of four types of security operations. According to Army Doctrine Publication 3-90, security operations provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, and provide commanders with the time and maneuver space to develop the situation and react to the enemy. Security operations differ from reconnaissance operations in that security operations focus on the protected force or location while reconnaissance operations focus on the enemy and terrain. The four types of security operations are: area security, screen, guard, and cover. “Screens provide less protection than guards or covers. Screens are defensive in nature and are accomplished by establishing a series of observation posts and patrols to ensure observation of the assigned sector. The screen force gains and maintains enemy contact…and destroys or repels enemy reconnaissance units by conducting counter-reconnaissance.” Effective screens require depth. “Depth provides friendly forces the ability to…delay, impede, and harass the enemy with indirect fires causing them to deploy early while preventing enemy forces from identifying, penetrating, and exploiting the screen.” As long as they remain within supporting range of indirect fire assets, “a unit may conduct a screen in all directions for a stationary protected force. Units perform a screen to the flanks or rear, but not in front of a moving force.” With the Second Mechanized Cavalry Group’s screen providing time, space, and protection, both Twentieth Corps and Twelfth Corps were able to transition back to the offensive. Meanwhile, with the hard-won bridgeheads over the Moselle River finally open, the Fourth Armored Division’s commander, Major General John S. Wood, directed his Combat Commands to pass through the bridgeheads, encircle the city of Nancy, and seize subsequent bridgeheads for the drive to Germany. In 1944, a U.S. armored division, such as the Fourth Armored Division, was relatively small compared to other Allied or Axis formations. It consisted of eleven thousand soldiers and two hundred and sixty-three tanks, organized in three tank battalions, three battalions of armored infantry, and three battalions of self-propelled artillery. Three task force headquarters, designated as Combat Commands A, B, and R (for reserve), controlled a mix of fighting elements organized for specific tasks. An armored division also possessed an organic cavalry squadron, combat engineers, an air defense battalion, and an anti-tank battalion. The key weapon system in the 1944 armored division was the M4 Sherman tank equipped with a 75 mm main gun. Wood’s initial intent was for the two Combat Commands, CCA and CCB, to pass through the two bridgeheads and maneuver toward the town of Chateau-Salins. There, the bulk of his combat power would link-up in an encirclement of Nancy. Trapping the better part of three German divisions. On 12 September, Colonel Clark, the commander of CCA, dispatched Troop D of the Twenty-fifth Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, or CRS, to the Eightieth Infantry Division’s bridgehead as a liaison to facilitate CCA’s movement through the bridgehead the next day. The Troop commander, Captain Charles Trover, and his unit conducted their movement and arrived in the early morning hours of 13 September. Coordinating with the liaison officer, he was told his troop would not be allowed to pass until all of the supporting artillery units were informed of the planned movement of friendly vehicles through the bridgehead. Finally, at zero four hundred, the main body of CCA began its movement toward the bridgehead from its assembly area, located roughly eight kilometers northwest of the Meuse River. The liaison at the bridgehead, and the accompanying constraints, are integral parts of a passage of lines. An enabling operation, a passage of lines involves transferring the responsibility for an area of operations between two commanders, and a forward passage of lines “occur[s] when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while moving toward the enemy.” “Commanders reduce risk and ensure synchronization through detailed planning and decentralized execution. With forces intermingling during the passage, the need for positive control increases. Control measures for a passage of lines are generally restrictive and include “assembly areas, attack positions, the battle handover line, contact points, passage points, passage lanes, routes, gaps, phase lines, and recognition signals.” “A passage point is a specifically designated place where the passing units [move] through the stationary unit. A passage lane is a lane through an enemy or friendly obstacle that [allows the passing unit to rapidly move through the stationary unit’s area]. A gap is an area free of armed mines or obstacles whose width and direction allow a friendly force to [move] through the area while dispersed in a tactical formation.” “The [operation] may also use start points, release points, and fire support coordination measures, such as coordinated fire lines.” “A coordinated fire line is a line beyond which conventional and indirect fire support means may fire at any time …without additional coordination.” Either the higher headquarters or the stationary unit establishes these control measures as they control the terrain and know the location and effects of obstacles in the area. However, to ensure a common operational picture, the passing unit often co-locates one of its command posts with the stationary unit’s command post. As units prepare to conduct a forward passage of lines, “the passing unit conducts reconnaissance from its current location to its designated assembly areas, which are generally located to the rear of the stationary unit.” From these assembly areas, the passing force will either move through the attack positions and utilize a gap to pass through the stationary force, or, in a restrictive terrain, it will utilize passage lanes to move through the stationary unit’s positions. Although it’s preferable that the passing unit move through a gap in the stationary unit’s positions, if no gap is available, commanders and staff should allocate at least two passage lanes for each battalion task force. The width and depth of a gap allows the passing force to travel in a tactical formation; whereas lanes generally restrict the passing force to column or line formation. Detailed air defense and fire support planning is necessary as the passing unit may move slowly and in column formation when utilizing passage lanes. “Once a passage of lines begins, it occurs quickly. When possible, the operation takes place when the enemy has the least capability to detect it, such as at night or during periods of reduced visibility.” “The stationary force controls and secures the area of operations far enough to its front that the [passing] force can [move] through the stationary force and reform into a combat formation before [making] contact with enemy forces.” In a forward passage of lines, this generally occurs between the forward line of own troops, or FLOT, and the Battle Handover Line. The Battle Handover Line “is a designated phase line where responsibility transitions from the stationary force to the [passing force].” The area between the battle handover line and the FLOT belongs to the stationary force commander who may employ security forces, obstacles, and fires in the area. The stationary unit supports the passing unit before and during the passage of lines. “The stationary unit clears any obstacles from the designated gaps, lanes, or routes, and guides elements of the passing unit from the contact points through the passage points.” The stationary unit provides direct and indirect fire support to the passing unit. Direct fire support ends after the passing unit has crossed the FLOT and deployed into a tactical formation. Once the passing unit “commander assumes responsibility for the area of operations, that commander coordinates all fire support,” and “also assumes control of fires forward of the battle handover line.” The coordinated fire line may shift forward at this time “to conform to the movement of forward security forces.” There are two techniques for moving the passing force through the stationary force. Ideally, the passing force deploys from its assembly areas through its attack positions without stopping, and then crosses the FLOT in a combat formation through a gap in the stationary force’s battle positions. The passing force stops at its attack positions only if necessary to conduct last minute coordination; it stays there for the shortest amount of time possible to avoid offering the enemy a target. This technique is appropriate if there is adequate maneuver space for the passing force to deploy effectively without disrupting the stationary force’s defensive operations. This technique allows the passing force to rapidly attack once it crosses the FLOT. The other technique involves the passing force moving from its assembly areas to pre-determined contact points with the stationary force. Guides then lead the passing force through the stationary force’s battle positions along passage lanes. The passing force then deploys into combat formation after crossing the FLOT but before crossing the battle handover line. This technique may be required in more restrictive terrain. If this technique is used, the FLOT should be outside direct fire range of the enemy to allow the moving force to deploy into attack formation without being fired upon. “A passing unit’s order of march is generally reconnaissance and security elements first.” These elements “operate forward of the release points and establish a screen in front of the passing unit.” “The ground combat force moves next, followed by functional and multifunctional support and sustainment units.” “The passing unit’s command post passes through the lines as soon as possible after the lead elements complete their passage and locates where it can best control operations.” “The transfer of authority [from the stationary force to the passing force] usually occurs when roughly two-thirds of the passing force has moved through the passage point.” Despite these controls and liaison, CCA’s passage of lines with the 80th Infantry Division at Dielouard was no simple affair. Just as CCA’s liaison element was finalizing the passage plan, the Germans counterattacked along the perimeter of the bridgehead, using a weakened Kampfgruppe from the Third Panzer Grenadier Division. The Germans penetrated the 80th Infantry Division’s defenses along the northern side of the bridgehead, so that by 0615 they were close enough to engage the Americans with direct fire weapons. Finally, the crossing area commander released Troop D to pass through the bridgehead in an attempt to blunt the German attack. The 25th CRS was organic to the 4th Armored Division. The squadron consisted of four reconnaissance troops, a light tank company, an assault gun company, and a headquarters troop. The reconnaissance troops were made up of three platoons of three M8 Greyhound armored cars and six quarter-ton jeeps each. The Greyhound had six wheels and was armed with a thirty-seven mm cannon and a fifty-caliber machine gun. Its armor was very light and the open-topped turret turned out to be extremely unpopular with many soldiers, particularly in bad weather or when receiving indirect fire. The light tank company consisted of seventeen M5 Stuarts equipped with thirty-seven mm cannons. The M5 was the premier light tank of the U.S. Army when the Second World War began. But by 1944, it had proven to be outmatched by German armor. The assault gun company had two platoons organized with six M8 Scott Howitzer Motor Carriages. The M8 Scott was a 75 mm howitzer placed on an M5 chassis. The howitzer gave it some firepower, though the rounds’ low velocity made the M8 a poor anti-armor weapon. Once across the bridge, Troop D supported the 80th Infantry Division and repulsed the German counterattack. Troop D then continued to the village of Loisy. After eliminating German resistance there, it attempted to seize the village of St. Genevieve by a hasty attack. However, German assault guns in strong defensive positions around the village forced Captain Trover to deploy his cavalry troopers in defilade and wait for the arrival of the rest of CCA. This movement initiated the encirclement of Nancy and the German defenders within the city. Offensive encirclement operations usually consist of two phases—“the actual encirclement and the [subsequent] actions taken against the isolated enemy…The commander executing an encirclement operation organizes encircling forces into a direct pressure force and one or more encircling arms. Armor, mechanized infantry, aviation, air assault, and airborne units are especially well suited for use as an encircling arm since they have the tactical mobility to reach positions that cut enemy lines of communications; [thereby preventing relief, reinforcement, or escape.] “The commander assigns the outer encircling arm a security mission; an offensive mission to drive away an enemy relief force; or a defensive mission to prevent the enemy relief force from making contact with the encircled enemy force.” The inner encircling arms remain oriented on the enemy and apply pressure while advancing parallel to the enemy’s direction of travel. They “attempt to reach defiles, bridges, and other critical points before the main enemy force reaches them. If the encircling force cannot outdistance the enemy, it engages the enemy force’s flanks to force the enemy to fight under the most unfavorable conditions possible, ultimately in two or more directions simultaneously… As the inner encircling arms maneuver towards their contact point, the commander may establish a series of battle positions around the encircled enemy. The first phase of the encirclement is complete once enemy lines of communication are severed; generally after “the two arms of a double envelopment complete their linkup.” Offensive encirclement operations present unique command and control challenges and generally require careful control measures to prevent fratricide. To ensure unity of command, a single commander should direct the overall encirclement operation; however, each subordinate encircling arm requires its own headquarters. “The encircling force headquarters may name one of its subordinate units as the headquarters for an encircling arm. Alternatively, it may create or designate a temporary command post, such as its tactical command post, to control one or more arms of the encirclement.” Offensive encirclement control measures consist of boundaries between the outer and inner encircling arms. Commanders also establish contact points where the converging arms of the encircling force are required to make contact to complete the encirclement. Finally, they establish a restrictive fire line between the encircling forces and may establish a free-fire area over the encircled enemy. “A restrictive fire line is a specific boundary established between converging friendly, surface forces that prohibits fires or their effects from crossing.” “A free-fire area is a specific region into which any weapon system may fire without additional coordination with the establishing headquarters.” Once enemy forces are encircled, phase one of encirclement is complete. For the operation Colonel Clarke organized CCA into two task forces. Task Force “Abe” consisted of the 37th Armor Battalion, minus one company of tanks, but reinforced with an infantry company from the 53rd Armored Infantry Battalion, and with direct support fires from the 66th Field Artillery Battalion. The second, Task Force “Jaques,” consisted of the 53rd Armored Infantry Battalion, with the addition of a company of tanks from the 37th Armor Battalion. The plan for the encirclement directed that Troop D of the 25th continue to screen to the north, while Task Force “Abe” attacked the German forces attempting to contain the bridgehead. By 0800, they had driven the German assault gun unit from St. Genevieve. By 1615 the lead element of the sixteen-kilometer long column had reached the town of Nomeny. Here, elements of the 553rd Volksgrenadier Division were guarding a motor-pool, which included self-propelled guns. CCA destroyed nearly half the German vehicles before the remainder of the unit escaped to the south. The Germans employed roadblocks, small tank detachments, and anti-aircraft emplacements to impede the CCA’s movement, which were quickly destroyed by the lead tanks of the column. Additionally, the soldiers of CCA used their organic indirect fire assets to kill or neutralize enemy fighting positions deemed too strong for the tankers to eliminate using direct fire. After completing the final phase of the first day’s operations, CCA began to wheel to the southeast, setting itself in a mobile, circular formation, known at the time as a coil. A coil is a formation used generally by small formations moving through hostile territory. When they conduct a short halt, what the units will do, is they will have each vehicle face out in 360 degrees in order to provide security from all directions. By nightfall, U.S. forces were less than five kilometers from Chateau-Salins, their first objective. By the end of the day, CCA’s casualties were twelve dead and sixteen wounded. CCA had exacted a considerably higher toll on the enemy. German losses included twelve tanks destroyed, eighty-five other vehicles, and five large caliber guns either destroyed or captured. Additionally, U.S. soldiers had captured three hundred fifty-four enemy combatants. While the main body moved down the road, two lighter forces were at work on both flanks. After CCA cleared towns along the route, Captain Trover maneuvered Troop D to the north. Moving adjacent to CCA, Troop D quickly destroyed or reduced roadblocks. That evening, Troop D conducted a stationary screen of the route. South of CCA, D company of the 37th Armored Battalion conducted a similar screening mission. Equipped with M5 light tanks, it was ill-suited for direct engagement with German armor, so it was task-organized with the battalion’s assault gun platoon. The company moved parallel to CCA’s route of advance. Upon reaching the Seille River, it discovered that the Germans had destroyed the three bridges. Additionally, the ground on the near side of the river was too marshy for armored vehicles. It then returned to its route of advance and seized a bridge over the river, east of Nomeny, and held it, until relieved by a platoon from Troop D the next day. In the early afternoon of 14 September, the task force received a Fragmentary Order from 4th Armored Division headquarters. CCA was ordered to bypass Chateau-Salins and seize the high ground in the vicinity of Arracourt, to prevent German reinforcements from relieving the troops encircled at Nancy. CCA was then to make contact with CCB. CCA followed the trails and access roads to reach the paved road at the village of Moyenvic. This move, deep in the enemy’s rear, engaged columns of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division moving to new positions south of Nancy. By the evening of 14 September, CCA had eliminated another 136 vehicles, including ten 88mm guns and had captured an additional 409 German Soldiers. CCA’s losses for the day were 10 soldiers killed, 23 wounded, and 2 Sherman tanks destroyed. Later that evening CCA established a hasty perimeter defense, oriented east and astride N-74, the main road to Nancy. German troops in the area were caught by surprise by its presence. CCA captured scores of German soldiers without the use of force. Colonel Clark and his staff determined that the German defense lacked the depth they had previously encountered. The relative ease with which CCA had penetrated the German forces trying to destroy the bridgehead, coupled with the lack of a coordinated effort to contain their encirclement, led Colonel Clark and his staff to conclude that there was an opportunity to advance even deeper than anticipated. The 4th Armored Division commander, Major General Wood, agreed with them. Lieutenant General Eddy, the 12th Corps commander, however, refused the proposal on the grounds that the continuation would take them outside of the corps’ zone of responsibility. Major General Wood had clashed with Lieutenant General Eddy before as they seldom agreed on the preferred course of action. Lieutenant General Patton tended to favor Wood’s ideas, over Eddy’s, further exacerbating the problem. While defending the bridgehead, the 80th Infantry Division was hit with numerous, large counterattacks. The German army had learned many hard lessons on the Eastern Front. One, in particular, was the need to destroy enemy bridgeheads as soon as possible. Given the High Command’s reluctance to allow for a readjusting of lines or a displacement of any kind, the German tactical commanders made the destruction of the bridgehead the number one priority. To increase their chances of success, the Germans used a combination of fog rising from the Moselle River and darkness of night, to conceal the movement of their platoon-sized storming detachments into positions along the river. These detachments blinded American positions with flares, fixed them with automatic weapons fire, and then swept over the position, either destroying them outright, or forcing them to conduct a hasty retrograde. The Germans followed this success with exploitation groups led by tanks or assault guns, reinforced by company-sized, or stronger German infantry. While these detachments moved along the roads and trails to eliminate bridgeheads, German artillery shelled the American positions in preparation for a direct assault. By 15 September, the situation inside the Dieulouard bridgehead deteriorated to the point that Lieutenant General Eddy ordered CCA to release the attached 1st Battalion of 318th Infantry, to return to the 80th to reinforce the bridgehead. Colonel Clark also dispatched a tank platoon as an escort. The battalion returned just in time to prevent the Germans from overrunning the American lodgment on the eastern side of the river. The remainder of CCA stayed in the vicinity of Arracourt, harassing German forces in the area. Because the terrain south of Nancy did not favor the defender, CCB and the 35th Infantry Division advanced on the morning of the 14th across the Moselle leading to further successes near Luneville. The U.S. forces’ tempo prevented the Germans from digging in and they were unable to repulse the advancing Americans. By evening of 15 September, the soldiers of CCB were set in a coil with their southern flank astride the Marne-Rhine Canal, observing the main road leading to Luneville. In the town, remnants of the German 553rd Volksgrenadier and the 15th Panzer Grenadier Divisions were in position behind a thin armor and infantry screen. Later that same evening, a patrol from CCB made contact with a patrol from CCA —completing the encirclement of Nancy. “The second phase of an encirclement operation involves actions taken against an isolated enemy. The commander’s decision to fix, contain, or destroy isolated enemy forces affects the task organization of subordinate units, as do enemy attempts to break out from the encirclement or linkup with the encircled force… There are four techniques for reducing or destroying an encircled enemy force: the squeeze technique, the hammer and anvil technique, the wedge technique, and the escape route technique. “The squeeze technique uses simultaneous, coordinated blows on the enemy from various directions… The commander uses fire and movement together in a controlled contraction of the encirclement. As the enemy’s perimeter contracts, the commander removes units from the inner perimeter and adds them to the reserve… This technique is effective against battalion or smaller enemy forces.” The squeeze technique is likely to confuse the enemy and force the enemy commander to disperse combat power around the perimeter; thereby preventing the enemy from using their reserves in a decisive manner. “The hammer and anvil technique employs a stationary blocking force as an anvil on one or more sides of the inner perimeter, while other elements of the encircling force” act as the hammer by conducting offensive operations “to force the encircled enemy against the [stationary] blocking force. Either the anvil or the hammer can destroy the enemy. [However,] usually the hammer, as the attacking element, accomplishes this task. This technique is most effective when the blocking force is located on or to the rear of a natural terrain obstacle.” “The wedge technique uses a unit to divide enemy forces in the pocket while the rest of the encircling force remains in place. This technique allows the commander to concentrate against a small portion of the encircled enemy. However, the encircling force maintains pressure on the other encircled enemy forces to prevent them from reinforcing or supporting the threatened [force]. The unit dividing the pocket conducts sudden and swift attacks immediately after the end of supporting preparatory fires.” “The escape route technique involves leaving one or more gaps in the inner encircling arm to entice the enemy to attempt a breakout. Once the enemy starts moving, and is no longer sheltered in defensive positions, that moving enemy force is more vulnerable to acquisition, attack, and destruction.” With American combat power now behind Nancy, the city was occupied by elements of the 12th Corps on 15 September. While large numbers of German troops were either killed or captured, many German troops slipped away, enabling them to continue the fight because the encirclement was not completed with a larger force. This adds weight to the argument made by both Clarke and Wood that had the 12th Corps been able to push more of its combat power through the bridgehead, it would have prevented the better part of three German divisions from escaping. Although on the defensive, the German Army on the western front remained committed to regaining the initiative by launching an offensive at the first opportunity. Its main goals in the Lorraine region were the elimination of the U.S. bridgeheads and the restoration of the Moselle River line. The 5th Panzer Army was tasked with this mission. Commanded by General of Panzer Troops Hasso von Manteuffel, the army consisted of the weakened 21st and 11th Panzer Divisions, the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, as well as three new Panzer brigades: the 1-11th, 1-12th, and 1-13th. Each Panzer brigade was composed of three battalions—one battalion of 49 Mark Four tanks, and one battalion of 49 Mark Five Panther tanks. The number of tanks made these brigades formidable, however, they lacked the supporting units typically found in a Panzer Division. Namely, they lacked organic reconnaissance units, artillery, and air defense assets. This proved to be particularly troublesome during the offensive. Compounding the problems posed by the equipment shortages, the hasty reorganization of these Panzer brigades caused them to be filled with soldiers newly graduated from basic training, with no experience working together as a cohesive unit. Even worse, component units and commanders often did not meet face to face until detraining at the staging area of a planned attack. These factors proved especially damning for Panzer Brigade 1-12 when it was defeated by French troops at Epinal, leaving Manteuffel with only two brigades for his counterattack. Early on the morning of 18 September, the lead elements of Panzer Brigade 1-11, attacked the 42nd CRS. Initial reports from the cavalry squadron seemed to indicate that the attack consisted of two companies of infantry, supported by six Panther tanks. The 42nd CRS engaged the tanks, but, its low velocity 75mm guns were unable to penetrate the armor of the German Panthers. The Germans returned fire, destroying three of the M8 Scotts, or half of the troop. The 42nd then conducted a delaying action, finding a greater level of success against the German infantry. By 1100, reinforcements from the 4th Armored Division had arrived, stabilizing the situation and forcing the Germans to break off their attack. The 42nd Calvary squadron's actions at Luneville stand as a perfect example of a guard mission in an offensive operation. The 4th Armored Division was attacking north to encircle the town of Nancy. The 2nd Calvary Group, the 42nd Calvary squadron's parent organization was tasked with guarding the flank of the 4th Armored Division. The Germans had amassed a large counterattack force in order to assault into the flank of the 4th Armored Division and stop their attack. Although the attack had not inflicted a great amount of damage to the main body, the 42nd CRS, had taken serious casualties. The loss of the organic anti-tank capabilities was also very serious, since it would be difficult to replace. In fact, it would be another three months before the 42nd received replacements. As both American and German forces maneuvered around Luneville, neither recognized the other’s disposition or objectives. With Panzer Brigade 1-11 stopped on the evening of 18 September, what the Third Army considered a skirmish was a major offensive for the Germans. While the Fourth Armored Division continued to prepare for operations north of Luneville, the lack of Germans reconnaissance kept them unaware of the location and strength of the Fourth Armored Division’s assets. The Germans’ failure caused them to alter their plans for the next day’s operations. They would now attempt to clear the Arracourt area using the hammer and anvil technique. Panzer Brigade 1-11 would move from the south, while Panzer Brigade 1-13 would advance from the east. The eastern brigade would be the anvil and the northern brigade would act as the hammer. Fear of Allied close air support caused the German forces to move at night through the Parroy woods toward their planned assembly areas north of the Rhine-Marne Canal. Panzer Brigade 1-11's inexperience caused it to become lost in the thick woods, it asked a local national for directions. The patriotic Frenchmen sent the brigade in the opposite direction. This delayed its arrival in the assembly area well into the afternoon. Because of this, Panzer Brigade 1-13 attacked alone. However, it believed that fog and poor weather would conceal its movements. Shortly before midnight, CCA’s observation post near Lezey detected the sounds of tracked vehicles moving in front of them. It called for in-direct fire and the noises stopped. At 0730 on the morning of 19 September, the assistant S-3, Captain William A. Dwight, was traveling by jeep when he came upon a battalion of Panther tanks belonging to Panzer Brigade 1-13. Slipping away undetected, Captain Dwight was able to radio his battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Abrams, and inform him as to the size and composition of the enemy force moving in his direction. At approximately the same time, the light tank platoon from the 37th Armored Battalion had a brief encounter with some German tanks near Moncourt. Upon returning to the battalion command post, and reiterating what he had seen, Captain Dwight was given a platoon from C Company, 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and sent to regain contact with the German armored column. Traveling back to the area of the previous encounter, the platoon engaged the column. . Outnumbered three to one, it took up a position in a depression to fight the Germans. Having been discovered, the German attack was unable to concentrate its combat power, leaving it susceptible to defeat in detail by the 4th Armored Division. By the end of the engagement three of four American vehicles were temporarily disabled, but eight German tanks were destroyed in the process. For the remainder of September, the Germans attempted to re-start the offensive. But they were only able to mount small tactical engagements and were incapable of stopping U.S. momentum. After the fall of Nancy and Arracourt, the German goal of eliminating the bridgeheads was now well out of reach. During the encirclement of Nancy, and subsequent battles around Arracourt, American forces overcame significant obstacles on their path to victory. The weather wrought havoc on the use of Allied airpower, preventing, in many cases, the Allies from using one of their strongest weapons during the encirclement and the subsequent German counterattack. The terrain hindered the war of movement that characterized the Allied advance over the previous two months. Despite the terrain, weather, and the continued short comings of American armor relative to the German enemies, the U.S. had prevailed. The division and corps cavalry organizations made key contributions to the Allied victory. They provided invaluable information on enemy size and disposition, and when called upon, they were able to strike back at the enemy. Throughout the encirclement and battles around Nancy, Third Army showcased bold, creative maneuver at all echelons. Colonel Clarke, Major General Wood, and the troops they led, outperformed the German Army in Lorraine. In the early Fall of 1944, the soldiers of the 4th Armored Division showcased what armored doctrine could be.
