Surrender of the Philippines, 1942 (OFFICIAL FILM)

[Music] nearly a year later when brigadier general clifford blumel and i were sitting in rags in a prison camp near tarlock we discussed the conditions under which our divisions formed what i'm saying is this our units were doomed before they started to fight they never had a chance to win that they lasted as long as they did is a stirring and touching tribute to their gallantry and fortitude lieutenant general jonathan m wainwright as part of their plan to seize resource-rich territories held by europe and the united states imperial japanese forces under the command of general masaharu homa invaded the philippines on 8 december 1941. cut off from supplies and reinforcements by the attack on pearl harbor general douglas macarthur organized the united states army forces far east or yusafi to defend the philippines strategically important harbor at manila as japanese troops steadily advance towards the city from both the north and south to delay the japanese general macarthur organized his forces into five core sized elements the north luzon force under the command of major general jonathan m wainwright the south luzon force under the command of regular general george m parker jr and three others the reserve force the bisayan mindanao force and the harbor defense force however as the japanese gained air superiority and the u.s asiatic fleet withdrew to australia macarthur's soldiers under staggering pressure from a well-coordinated joint attack by the imperial japanese army and navy were forced to withdraw to the bataan peninsula with warplane orange in effect macarthur shifted focus from destroying japanese forces attempting to invade luzon to delaying their advance long enough to allow him to withdraw his forces to the baton peninsula from there usafe was to hold until supplies and reinforcements could arrive holding baton also supported the goal of defending manila bay and denying its use to the japanese it was an operationally sound decision drawing his forces to the peninsula would negate the japanese numerical advantage and allow macarthur to concentrate his defense along a narrow front to accomplish this macarthur ordered the relocation of yusafi headquarters to corregidor after which he declared manila an open city general macarthur the matter of the united states armed forces in the far east announcement to further capital from the ravages of war i have today declared manila as an open city to avoid every possible danger the office of the american high commissioner the commonwealth government and army headquarters and immediately evacuate the city of manila and a special district surrounded while usafe forces delayed the japanese supplies had to be moved to bataan and corregidor admiral hart commander of the asiatic fleet left the philippines on 25 december to join his naval forces to the south he left admiral rockwell in command of a regiment of marines three gun boats three mine sweepers and six motor torpedo boats he also gave orders for the evacuation of kibiti's naval facilities the destruction of oil and gasoline stores in manila and the removal of any remaining supplies to either corregidor or maribolis on the bataan peninsula general brereton commander of the far eastern air force left as well to join his bombers at batchelor field in northern australia leaving only a small number of fighters and their pilots with support crews under the command of colonel harold h george these airmen would eventually become infantry soldiers when no replacement aircraft arrived in the meantime general wainwright's north luzon forces prepared to implement the withdrawal plan outlined in warplane orange as directed by general macarthur under this plan wainwright's forces were to keep the junction open where route 7 the road into baton intersected with route 3. this was to be accomplished through successive withdrawals along five defensive lines curving south towards bataan each position was to be held only long enough to allow the enemy to prepare an organized attack and then abandon for the next defensive position further south army doctrine explains that a delay is one of the most demanding ground combat operations a delay wears down the enemy so that friendly forces can regain the initiative through offensive action buy time to establish an effective defense or determine enemy intentions as part of a security operation normally in a delay inflicting casualties is secondary to gaining time except when directed to prevent enemy penetration of a phase line for a specific duration a force conducting a delay avoids becoming decisively engaged delays typically require areas of operation with significant depth to enable forces to trade space for time like other operations commanders organize their forces into a security force a main body and a reserve the security force conducts reconnaissance operations to determine the enemy's scheme of maneuver the main body is assigned an area of operations that includes the enemy's most likely avenue of approach the main body then begins engagement area development while also preparing primary supplementary and subsequent battle positions primary positions are positions that cover the enemy's most likely avenue of approach into the area of operations supplementary positions are defensive positions that provide the best sectors of fire in defensive terrain along an avenue of approach that is not the primary avenue where the enemy is expected to attack subsequent positions are positions that a unit expects to move to during the course of a battle in addition to battle positions phase lines and engagement areas delays have several unique control measures used to coordinate maneuver and fires to delay within the time requirements established by the commander these include delay lines trigger lines and disengagement lines a delay line is a phase line where the date and time before which the enemy is not allowed to cross the phase line is depicted as part of the graphic control measure a trigger line is a phase line located on identifiable terrain that crosses the engagement area and is used to initiate mass fires into the engagement area commanders may also establish engagement criteria to be used in conjunction with a trigger line for example engagement criteria may consist of a specified number of enemy troops or vehicles entering the engagement area or crossing the trigger line before friendly forces are permitted to engage a disengagement line is a phase line located on identifiable terrain that when crossed by the enemy signals to defending elements that it is time to displace to their next position commanders also established disengagement criteria such as a number of enemy vehicles by type entering the engagement area friendly losses or enemy movement to flanking locations disengagement criteria and disengagement lines are used to prevent friendly forces from becoming decisively engaged the delay begins with friendly forces occupying their battle positions once enemy forces cross the trigger line friendly forces mass fires into the engagement areas until the enemy crosses the disengagement line when the enemy crosses the disengagement line friendly forces begin moving to their subsequent battle positions this movement is typically staggered by units and battle positions to maintain contact with the enemy they employ indirect fire electronic warfare and obscuration fires to cover and screen their movement the reserve force may also be used to help the main body disengage similar to when a force bounds forward a delaying force breaking contact with the enemy withdraws to either successive or alternate battle positions more flexible than successive positions alternate positions are arrayed along different phase lines and are used in areas of operation with significant depth however alternate positions require numerous rearward passage of lines that can complicate operations conversely successive battle positions are arrayed along the same phase line and are used when an area of operations is wider than it is deep successive positions enabled the commander to mass fires from all combat elements on the enemy whether withdrawing to successive or alternate positions forces continued to delay in this manner until either the conditions established by the commander have been met or the force is no longer capable of mounting an effective defense the delay succeeds by forcing the enemy to repeatedly concentrate forces to fight through a series of well-prepared defenses thereby buying time and exhausting the attacking force a delaying action would allow the south luzon force now under command of major general albert m jones to withdraw west and north along their own successive defensive lines leading around manila they would then cross the papuanga river by way of the two bridges at column pit move to san fernando and then turn south moving into bataan while the north luzon force delayed the bataan defense force comprised of those soldiers already in place with the philippine 31st and 41st infantry divisions would prepare the peninsula's line of defense under general parker macarthur hoped the protracted withdrawal of the north luzon force during the day would slow the japanese by causing them to deploy their forces before each line then at night he will withdraw his soldiers under cover of darkness leaving a small force of infantry and artillery to defend their withdrawal before dawn these forces would withdraw to avoid being targeted by enemy aircraft the delay was designed to buy time for the south luzon force to make it safely to baton by the cutoff date of 8 january [Music] the delaying positions number d1 through d5 have been recognized before the war by us forces and selected to maximize the use of terrain features as strong points to anchor them to the high ground according to army doctrine publication 3-90 a strong point is a heavily fortified battle position tied to a natural or reinforcing obstacle to create an anchor for the defense or to deny the enemy decisive or key terrain each line was approximately one night's march away from each other line d5 was the only phase line designated for a protracted defense since it was the area through which both south and north luzon forces would move through to baton although unit histories refer to d1 through d5 as lines they were in actuality too large an area to be covered by available forces and were only delaying positions designed to be held for one day before defending forces retrograded to the next line further south in support of these delaying actions general weaver's provisional tank group was to cover the withdrawal by counter-attacking along enemy avenues of approach and halting the enemy's tanks by deploying on opposite sides of the road at curves and bins they hope to leverage their main gun's ability to traverse and employ overlapping fields of fire this tactic would also enable them to maintain an escape route engineers primarily from the 91st philippine division would also play a significant part in these delaying actions since they were responsible for maintaining roads and bridges ahead of the forces falling back as well as destroying those same roads and bridges to halt the enemy's advance overall the withdrawal plan had been well prepared ahead of time unfortunately the baton defense force still faced two major obstacles first japanese airpower continued to harass and attack them second was the tension caused between supplying the forces fighting the delay and the simultaneous storing of supplies on bataan for the embittered siege that was to follow on the afternoon of 24 december the north luzon force was positioned roughly along phase line d-1 facing the lingayen gulf this line extended west from erdonita on route 3 to san carlos and ended at aguilar on route 13. all units were under orders to hold until 1900 hours before falling back to the agno river to the east the 26 cavalry philippine scouts had already withdrawn across the agno river at tyuk to anchor the north luzon force at the start of the withdrawal to phase line d2 to the west of tajuk the 11th philippine division and 192nd tank battalion defended along the center of the line from urdunita to san carlos they were awaiting further armor reinforcements from the 194th which had departed from manila that morning further west the 21st division held from san carlos to the zambales mountains these soldiers had not yet engaged the enemy at 1900 defenders along the line began to retrograde blowing bridges across the egno river to line d2 shortly after noon on 25 december an advanced element of the japanese 48th reconnaissance regiment engaged patrols of the 26th cavalry near tajuk by zero 400 on 26 december taiyug was in japanese hands the japanese crossed the agno around 1800 near villasis on the 26th late on that afternoon wainwright ordered the 11th division to fall back to route 3 then continue south to the d3 line despite occasional alarms there was no action on the d3 line on 27 december that night the north luzon force made ready to fall back to the d4 line the philippine 91st division began withdrawing at about 1730 and by zero 430 28 december had reached the south bank of the papanga river below cabana tuwan concerned that a quick withdrawal from the d4 line would threaten the north luzon forces ability to hold the road long enough for the south luzon force to complete its rearward passage of lines into bataan wainwright ordered his forces to hold longer than planned at the d4 line in order to buy more time by 29 december the japanese 48th division had reached the d4 line it had advanced in two columns the west column consisting of the first formosa regiment supported by a battalion of artillery advanced on cabana tuwan the east column consisted of the second formosa regiment the 47th infantry regiment and the 48th reconnaissance regiment it advanced towards tarlac where it linked up with the ninth infantry regiment stout resistance by the u.s and filipino forces enabled them to cling to the d4 line throughout 30 december by dawn on 31 december wainwright's north luzon forest was on the d5 line holding the road open to bataan wainwright's forces finally met with the south luzon force outside the town of san fernando the road through the town leading onto the peninsula became a bottleneck which the japanese failed to target with their aircraft however japanese tanks from the seventh tank regiment advanced to baliwag where they threatened to cut the path across the column pit bridges they met company c 192nd tank battalion in the town and suffered a defeat at the hands of the superior american stuart tanks by new year's day all of the south luzon force had moved into bataan wainwright's rearguard forces then pulled back towards leak and at single bridge across the coutu river there the 26 cavalry elements of the philippine 11th and 21st divisions and a handful of tanks delayed the japanese while the rest of the north luzon force crossed into the peninsula on 7 january at 0-700 the 26th cavalry crossed over the river and into baton [Music] before the japanese attacked bataan macarthur's forces experienced a bit of luck houma's most experienced division the 48th was reassigned to support the dutch east indies campaign inexperienced reservists from the 65th brigade took their place the brief halt in hostilities as houma reorganized part of his force allowed the soldiers on bataan time to prepare their defensive positions mcarthur's plan for the defense of baton was based on an advanced defensive line separated in the middle by what was considered the impassable terrain of mount native however mount native's dense vegetation and elevation precluded its use as a strong point as forces occupying the mountain were unable to use the position to mass fires on the enemy having consolidated on baton macarthur now reorganized his remaining forces into two cores each tasked with defending a portion of the main defensive line the western sector of the line was held by general wainwright's first philippine corps made up of the philippine first 31st and 91st infantry divisions a battery each of field artillery and self-propelled 75-millimeter guns and the resilient philippine scouts of the 26th cavalry its main defensive positions crossed east from the village of maubon to the base of mount natip covering the eastern sector second corps commanded by major general parker included the philippine army's 11th 21st 41st and 51st divisions and the 57th infantry regiment philippine scouts with the u.s philippine division held in reserve second corps main defensive positions stretched from the base of mount native east to mabatang and manila bay yusafi supply officers forecasted that the bataan defense forces required enough supplies for 43 000 soldiers to last 180 days however the actual number of troops that had withdrawn to baton was approximately 80 000 with an additional 26 000 civilians that had fled to the peninsula as well compounding this problem was macarthur's initial attempt to defeat the japanese without withdrawing to baton in compliance with this plan many supplies were moved to forward bases once macarthur ordered the execution of warplane orange these supplies now needed to be moved back to bataan a considerable amount went by ship from manila and some supplies came by truck and train from other locations but much had to be destroyed or left behind making food as valuable as ammunition and mounting an affected defense of the peninsula this left macarthur no choice but to order that his troops be placed on half rations wainwright recorded the horses of the 26 cavalry had to be shot by the men they had served so gallantly and eaten by all of us the horses had eaten all the rice straw stacks remaining in the tip of bataan since the last harvest there was no forage for them and the tough meat became eagerly sought slivers in our ice on 9 january 1942 japanese initiated an artillery barrage against second corps whose wider and flatter area of operations was less defensible than the narrow hilly region first core occupied following the barrage two regiments of japanese infantry attacked supported by artillery and tanks for seven days second corps defended against the japanese who eventually penetrated its left flank and forced it to withdraw east and then south along the coast road fighting also occurred between first corps and the japanese when they penetrated the defender's front and eastern flank along mount native showing that the mountain's jungle was not as impenetrable as the americans had estimated recognizing that both cores were outflanked along the divide between their forces general macarthur ordered their withdrawal to a new position on the night of 22 january this new position was more defensible running uninterrupted between the towns of bagak on the west and oreon on the east for two nights both cores withdrew under the cover of 75 millimeter guns and general weaver's tank group in an effort to re-establish their new line of defense and make a final attempt to save baton macarthur wired general marshall to report his situation and losses he reported that he had lost 35 percent of his entire force with some divisions only operating at 40 percent strength he explained that the japanese were now able to reinforce at will and that the defense of bataan had become a battle of attrition attempting to turn both cores from their primary defensive positions the japanese conducted a series of amphibious landings south of the orion bagak line between 23 january and 1 february these attempts came to be called the battle of the points the defenders consisted primarily of grounded pilots members of the philippine constabulary division and headquarters and service troops nonetheless they successfully held off the attackers the battle of the points is a textbook attempt at a turning movement field manual 3-90-1 explains that a turning movement is a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy's principal defensive positions by seizing objectives behind the enemy's current positions thereby causing the enemy force to move out of their current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat at the same time the battle of the pockets began when japanese forces attacked along the oreon bagak line creating two pockets and a salient in first course area of operations in wainwright's first core area japanese attacks were initially repulsed but then colonel yorimasa yoshioka's 20th infantry regiment found an opening on the philippine first regular division's west flank and was able to penetrate into the division's rear yoshioka's force had difficulties navigating the dense jungle and soon split into two groups the groups were eventually surrounded and attacked by units of the 11th and 51st infantry divisions on 27 january lieutenant general akira naras reinforced 65th brigade attempted to penetrate second course defensive positions along a small path known as trail number two elements of the philippine 41st and 51st infantry regiments successfully defended against the japanese advance and on 2 february second course commander major general parker ordered a counter-attack that forced nara to withdraw his troops on 8 february lieutenant general houma after considering his increasing number of casualties ordered a withdrawal of the 14th army from their forward positions he then called on imperial japanese headquarters to send reinforcements and conducted an operational pause until they arrived this decision upset the japanese timetable for operations in the south pacific encouraged by their successful defense of the peninsula soldiers in the field requested permission to pursue the enemy but their requests were denied macarthur knew that his troops were isolated with limited resources whereas the japanese would receive aerial and naval resupply and reinforcements originally destined for french indochina instead for the rest of february macarthur reconstituted his forces and strengthened their fortifications in preparation for the coming attacks [Music] by the beginning of march lieutenant general houma added the fourth division to his 14th army and received enough replacements to reconstitute his 16th division for the soldiers and civilians on bataan march saw the reduction of rations to 1000 calories per day the lack of food and the harsh jungle conditions increased the prevalence of disease crippled by the lack of sufficient medical supplies for combating malaria many troops fell ill at the end of the month as the japanese began their next assault on bataan major general parker estimated that his overall readiness had fallen by 20 percent general wainwright reported that only 25 percent of his soldiers were fit for duty wainwright later wrote in his memoirs if we had had something in our bellies some hope that we could expect help from the united states things might have been a little more endurable but our perpetual hunger steaming heat by day and night the terrible malaria for which we did not have enough quinine and the moans of the wounded were terribly hard on the men especially when all this was piled on top of the knowledge the japanese were coming at us again and there was little room for retreat recognizing the precarious position of the forces defending the baton peninsula president roosevelt ordered general macarthur to move to australia on 10 march macarthur briefed general wainwright that he was leaving mcarthur would retain command of the philippine forces by establishing a liaison through his g4 colonel lewis c bibi he placed wainwright in command of the newly formed luzon force with four subordinate commands reporting to him macarthur also left the harbor defenses that were still intact under the command of major general george f moore on 12 march general macarthur left corregidor with his yusafi staff his final orders to wainwright included the need to defend in depth and to fight as long as there remained the ability to resist on 19 march general marshall chief of staff of the u.s army ordered wainwright to assume command of all forces in the philippines on 21 march wainwright moved his command to corregidor which left the luzon force in need of a commander major general edward p king jr an artilleryman was subsequently appointed and assumed command with major general albert m jones taking command of first corps and major general george m parker retaining command of second court before wainwright left for corregidor he gave strict orders to major general king not to surrender over the next two weeks his soldiers attempt to obey that order would ultimately end in tragedy on 3 april the japanese launched a major operation against second core with a sustained aerial and artillery bombardment that pummeled the core's western flank infantry from the japanese fourth division and 65th brigade then began their attack after four months of little sleep increasing sickness and less and less food the soldiers who defended the oreom bagak line were operating at less than 50 percent as a result the japanese were able to break through the second core's line of defense out flanked major general king ordered first corps to reinforce second core for a counter-attack with the help of what tanks remained in the provisional tank group and the remaining soldiers of both jones philippine scouts of the 45th infantry with the american 31st infantry regiment general parker's second corps attempted a counter-attack on 6 april when the philippine 31st infantry division moved out of its bivouac area at lamao for the attack it left behind approximately one-third of its soldiers who were in need of medical attention still many of those same soldiers rose from their sick beds to mount a defense wainwright later commented baton was a hopeless hell where everything was bad except the will to live the memories of home as torturous as they sometimes could be and the ever dimming hope that the great country we represented would somehow find a way to help us unfortunately the japanese had also planned an attack for the same day when the various actions were over the japanese had driven a wedge between the two cores occupied mount samat the dominant height on bataan and were poised to attack second quarter's exposed western flank for a push towards manila bay though both cars attempted to reform their defensive line over 7 and 8 april the japanese were too strong and too well supplied forcing the defenders to withdraw to the docks of marebalis with the intention of falling back to corregidor with the hospital having already been the target of japanese air attacks general king was concerned that if his forces continued to resist the wounded and their attendant medical staff would face capture or be killed piecemeal without notifying general wainwright he decided to surrender his remaining forces on 9 april he met with japanese major general kamichiro nagano and arranged terms of surrender for his soldiers on luzon with luzon under their control the japanese looked to attack corregidor next but before they could begin operations against wainwright's last stronghold they needed to move approximately 72 000 prisoners from bataan unwilling to use limited assets to transport them to camp o'donnell an army post converted to a prisoner of war camp they force-marched the weakened soldiers 105 kilometers through the peninsula plagued by malnutrition disease and the added random cruelty of their captors it is estimated that some 600 americans and between five to six thousand filipinos died on the infamous baton death march as the prisoners marched north the japanese began planning their attack on the island of corregidor located at the mouth of manila bay kregedore was well stocked possessed numerous gun emplacements and was fortified with a tunnel system capable of protecting its defenders from even the heaviest of bombardments however with the destruction of its barracks water tanks and power plant by aerial bombardment and overwhelmed by the influx of soldiers who were able to make it off baton its resources were pushed to capacity overcrowding dwindling food supplies and disease took their toll throughout the month of april beginning on 1 may the japanese preceded their invasion of the island with a heavy artillery barrage that lasted until the night of 5 may that night two battalions from the japanese 61st infantry regiment landed on the northeastern end of the island and established a beachhead soon tanks and artillery were being brought ashore in response all available yusafi personnel including sailors artillery men and airmen joined with the fourth marine regiment to defend the island unable to withstand the overwhelming enemy force they fell back to a strong point on melinda hill near the center of the island realizing his command of 11 000 soldiers and staff were unable to effectively defend the island any longer and having been authorized by president roosevelt to determine when and if the philippines should be surrendered general wainwright made the decision to lay down arms on 6 may in his final message to president roosevelt and general macarthur wayne wright wrote with broken heart and head bowed in sadness but not in shame a report that today must arrange terms for the surrender of the fortified islands of manila bay there is a limit of human endurance and that limit has long since been passed without prospect of relief i feel is my duty to my country and to my gallant troops to end this useless effusion of blood and human sacrifice we have done our full duty for you and for our country when he met with lieutenant general houma lieutenant general wainwright tried to limit surrender terms to his forces on corregidor however using threats against those who had already surrendered the japanese general insisted on the complete surrender of all yusafi forces in the philippines including those in the bisayan islands and on mindanao not willing to endanger any more of his soldiers lives wainwright agreed to houma's demands on 7 may he broadcast surrender instructions from a radio station in manila for all forces in the philippines subject surrender it became apparent that the gas and remote pressures would be eventually destroyed by aerial and artillery bombardment and by inventory supported by tanks which have overwhelmed regulators after leaving general hormone with no agreement between us undecided to accept in the name of humanity his proposal you therefore be guided accordingly and will i think we'll surrender all troops from the earth to land to the proper japanese [Applause] just a second on my part it was realized were forced to find me by means entirely beyond my control [Applause] the next morning 8 may he sent written orders to his commanders to surrender by 9 june the majority of wainwright's forces had complied nevertheless a number of soldiers continued to lead filipino gorillas against the japanese for the remainder of the war even the earliest war plans for the philippines recognized the difficulty in defending such a remote military outpost years later macarthur gave his opinion that after the crippling of the u.s pacific fleet at pearl harbor the philippines chances for sustained defense were drastically reduced if not made impossible when half of the far east air force was destroyed on 8 december an admiral rockwell's naval forces departed for australia the ability to mount a joint defense of the island chain also became highly unlikely though macarthur's defense of the islands was bold and well planned it suffered from a lack of well-trained forces outdated equipment and too few supplies it was also challenged by the lack of infrastructure and the restricted terrain across much of luzon which made repositioning forces laboriously slow despite these severe disadvantages u.s and filipino troops effectively delayed japanese forces for five months forcing them to expend significant blood and treasure to take the island chain it was the biggest day of general hama's life and 50 000 fanatic soldiers bought it for him with their lives [Music] as far as the general was concerned it would have been cheap at twice the price quote japan is prepared to lose 10 million lives in her war with america how many is america prepared to lose have this not been the case and had the philippines fallen quickly in accordance with japan's strategy they may have been able to extend their planned conquest of southeast asia further this made the resolute defense mounted by general wainwright's combined forces one of the few symbols of hope for america during the uncertain months following the attack on pearl harbor and joe don't for one day one hour one minute ever forget that last message sent by a gi who saw his starved comrades americans and filipinos dying around him at corregidor what you are about to hear now is a transcript of the radio messages that came out of port mills corregidor on may 5th they are not near yet we are waiting for god only knows what the white flag is up everyone is falling like a baby [Music] they're piling dead wounded soldiers in our tunnel corregidor used to be a nice place it's haunted now get this to my mother my love to pop joe sue mac carry joy and fall tell joe wherever he is give him hell for us just one word more this isn't just another movie take it from me

Channel: Army University Press

Views: 357,148

Keywords: World War II, WWII, MacArthur, US Army, Philippines, Homma, Wainwright, Bataan, Pacific Theater, Manila, Pearl Harbor, delay, defense, Corregidor, War Plan Orange, retrograde, Philippine Scouts, Philippine Army, North Luzon Force, Roosevelt, USAFFE, National Guard, 26th Cavalry, corregidor, bataan death march, surrender, turning movement, battle of the points, phase lines, engagement areas, successive positons, alternate positons, strong point, lingayen gulf, camp o'donnell, guerrilla

Id: YetDRYOj9uk

Length: 40min 9sec (2409 seconds)

Published: Mon Jan 04 2021

Reddit Comments

[u/TankedAndTracked]

They do a really good job with these. Surprisingly good production values, and incorporating the modern interpretation of doctrine to explain what's going on.

[u/pinoysnooper22001]

The Battle of Bataan (7 January – 9 April 1942) was a battle fought by the United States and the Philippine Commonwealth against Imperial Japan during World War II. In December 1941, Imperial Japanese forces attacked the Philippines. The commander-in-chief of all U.S. and Filipino forces in the islands, General Douglas MacArthur, consolidated all of his Luzon-based units on the Bataan Peninsula to fight against the Japanese army.

This film covers the execution of War Plan Orange, defense of Bataan, evacuation to Corregidor, and eventual surrender of U.S. forces.