(dramatic orchestral music) - [Narrator] The German
regular army was, in 1939, the most efficient national
fighting force in the world. This was not necessarily because of its often-quoted
superiority of equipment which was partly a
propaganda myth that worked. It was due more to the tradition of militarism in the German nation. A tradition that ensured,
even in peace time, an excellent and
forward-looking general staff and an army and population whose patriotism, and hence
their military morale, could be easily stirred. (soldiers chanting) The basis of the military
can be traced back to traditions of conscription and militarism well before
even the First World War, when the German general
staff never really thought of the army as having been defeated. This attitude, together with
the resentment engendered by the Versailles Treaty, there among other things
severally restricted weapons and armed forces, gave
a boost to militarism that was showing results even before Hitler came to power in 1933. The Versailles restrictions
on armament in particular did much to pressure
Germany into developing technically advanced
equipment and tactics, so that when the time came, an efficient army could be
produced at short notice. In consequence, through the
late 1920s and early 1930s, all arms basic equipment
was being developed in civilian guises without the handicap of having to preserve existing materiel. Commercial car and lorry chassis turned suspiciously easily into
military cross-country vehicles, while more potent weapons
were actually tested and developed fairly openly
in neighboring countries. (marching band music) Thus, when Hitler came to power and declared the creation
of a revived army services, or the Wehrmacht, comprising the Heer, the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine, the basic preparations
had been carried out. (marching band music) The development of battle
tanks had been slowed, as had the development of
artillery and aircraft, which were big things to
hide in the finished form. But other equipment was
almost ready for production. Organization and planning
was not seriously inhibited by postwar restrictions, and
was pushed ahead urgently all through the interwar period. Untouched by the Allied concept of preparing for another war, the German general staff
seized on the new ideas of the British captain Liddell Hart, who advocated the idea of
an armored striking force as the spearhead of the army. German generals were deeply
impressed by these ideas, and developed them further by
adding ground-attack aircraft as part of the coordinated spearhead. This new style of warfare
was known as Blitzkrieg. (dramatic music) The original concept of the
army was based on Wehrkreise, or home-base areas, of
which there were 18 in 1939, divided between six army groups, two of which were in Austria
and of recent origin. Each Wehrkreis was home
to a number of divisions, and more importantly, to
their component regiments, each of which had a regimental base. The war mobilization plan
was based on the Ersatz, or replacement, system. In this plan, each peacetime
unit had two parts, the active unit, already
up to war strength, and a permanent replacement
cadre at its base. This could, at short
notice, call up reservists, organize recruiting, carry out training and dispatch of replacement drafts, and organize the reception and processing of wounded or convalescent personnel. The scheme was that if
war appeared imminent, second battalions could
be raised and equipped from active reservists without showing much external sign of mobilization, and additional reserve
battalions could be provided fairly quickly thereafter. In practice, the system
was extremely flexible, and at the outbreak of
war produced four waves of infantry divisions. Successively, the active
units, fresh reservists, territorial, and short-trained men. On the Panzer side, the original five divisions
were quickly doubled in number, mainly by converting the
existing light divisions. (tanks rumbling) This system remained almost
unaltered until 1942. Although, after the
first Russian campaign, a number of field replacement units were situated near the
appropriate theater of war instead of in their home districts. In addition, entirely
new units were formed when and where required, rather than with territorial associations. By late 1942, the army had
become so large and complicated, that the Ersatz duties were split. The old divisional headquarters became simply mobilization organizations, while new training units were organized as regiments and battalions. In 1943, some of these latter
units on the Russian front were even organized as divisions, fully armed and equipped
to carry out local garrison and anti-partisan duties. (gunshots firing) The responsibility for
them was then transferred from Ersatz organization to
the field or fighting army. (gunshots firing) (tense music) All German armed forces were controlled by the Fuhrer's headquarters, through the Oberkommando
der Wehrmacht, or OKW, of which Hitler, as head of state, was the supreme commander. The field army was controlled by the Ober Kommando des Heeres, or OKH, which had 12 departments, each
having overall responsibility for one aspect of the army. The system was flexible, and
it was possible to re-form and change the number and
type of fighting formations at all levels. Army and Korps were either Panzer or army. For the army there were
four basic patterns. Panzer, infantry, mountain, and parachute. For the Korps, there were six types: panzer, infantry, mountain, parachute, Korps command, and reserve. In practice, any of these could
contain elements of another if the situation warranted it, Or, if it suddenly had to
take over additional reserves. Attached troops at army and Korps level were fighting and specialist units. OKH allocated such units
semi-permanently to army groups, who exercised overall planning control. Armies were then allocated
a proportion of these units, depending on their campaign requirements, and they in turn doled them out to Korps on a temporary basis. The units included heavy armor, artillery, and engineer
brigades or battalions, together with other specialist units. The main fighting units were, as in all contemporary
armies, the divisions. As the war progressed
and it became necessary to administer and garrison
occupied territories, further types such as the security and the coast defense
divisions were formed, and pressures on manpower
led also to the formation of some improved unites,
such as the Sturm, or assault division,
which had fewer troops, but an increase in automatic firepower. (gunshots firing) Also, there was the
Volksgrenadier divisions, composed mainly of men taken
out from civilian employment, and equipped on a lower scale
than regular formations. In theory, the chain of command was clear, but as the war progressed, it was not only interfered
with by other organizations, but Hitler himself short-circuited it more and more frequently, often giving direct orders
to frontline commanders over the heads of their superiors. After 1943, OKH controlled the Eastern fronts only, the others being directly under OKW. (tense music) The organization of German army supply and administration services was generally conceded
to be very efficient. The secret lay in simple administration with few and clearly defined
spheres of responsibility. A basic structure that
could be rapidly expanded or contracted as the
military situation dictated, and an ability to utilize
local resources to the maximum. In particular, the two functions
of transport and handling were clearly separated. Transport down to divisional level was the responsibility of the
senior supply officer at army, who had at his disposal a
number of standardized units known as columns. Transport within divisional units was divided into unit supply, which was provided by the light columns, and unit battle transport which carried the ready use supplies and equipment. Handling formations down to regiment level had special units which provided the labor for handling, unloading and
reloading consumable supplies, and were controlled by special
administration platoons. All major units had first-line
repair and maintenance sub-units to cope with running repairs, and divisions had workshop
companies for harder tasks. If a repair job was too big for these, it was passed back direct to the army, that maintained
fully-equipped field workshops capable of complete rebuilds. (tense music) The division was, in all
armies of the Second World War, the biggest cohesive unit, with a balanced allocation of all arms, and capable of acting
as an independent whole. Korps troops were
normally specialized units used only to add weight
to a particular arm for a specific operation. Army troops were heavy units, but did not have the capacity
to operate on their own. A division could at least
theoretically support itself. It included a reconnaissance unit, special engineer units often equipped for light bridging operations, an infantry component of at least four, and often up to nine battalions, an artillery regiment, and various supply, support
and disciplinary services to keep it running in the field. Additionally it might include one or more armored units to provide
strength in attack if that was required. The biggest self-sufficient
unit in a divisions was the regiment, roughly the equivalent
of a British brigade, which was divided into Abteilungen. Units of battalion size or above were normally classed as Abteilungen, and the term brigade was reserved for groups of two or more regiments. In the German army, the
major fighting divisions were of sharply contrasting types, owing to the Blitzkrieg philosophy. This called for a limited
number of very well-equipped, highly mobile hitting divisions, backed by less strong,
but fully-mechanized, infantry formations to
provide swift follow-up in the attack. The major snag was that
given the known capacity of the German production industry, this meant that concentration
on the elite divisions left very little spare
capacity to supply transport and mobile weapons for the remainder. The OKH did not consider the
line infantry so important. They were expected only
to consolidate gains and occupy enemy territory, or to hold fairly static
portions of the front line. Thus they were intended to be
transported largely by rail, an excellent military railways department being a useful legacy of the previous war. For tactical purposes, and short-range supply from the railhead, the infantry could be equipped mainly with horse-drawn transport, which theoretically could
be supplemented locally with materiel requisitioned
in occupied territory. Their weapons too, were
more defensive in pattern than those of the Panzer
or armored divisions, and did not require such expensive and sophisticated mobile carriages. Given that the original
Blitzkrieg premise was sound, the idea of a railway-transported unit using modern horse-drawn
transport was perfectly viable. But the incredible wastages
following the opening-up of the Russian front, and
then again in Normandy, meant line infantry
divisions had to be used in a more mobile situation
than first envisaged. Then, once air superiority was lost, rail transport became very vulnerable. (bombs exploding, planes droning) The philosophy of the OKH
required a balanced allocation of arms right through the
division, down to platoon, so that any of its combatant
units could operate as a self-contained
force on its own level, and could be quickly combined
with other scratch units without upsetting the balance of arms. (bombs exploding) Under this system,
ordinary German soldiers appeared willing and able to fight under the direction of any officer, rather than clinging
to the sort of loyalty a British soldier showed to his unit. The principle also had
a major disadvantage, in that heavy weapons were dispersed throughout the division. Hence, though each unit always
had some localized support, it was almost impossible for
all the divisional artillery to be easily concentrated in
the same devastating manner as the British artillery
officer could with his guns. Another general feature of the German divisional organization, was that not only the
nominal rifle regiments were effective combat infantry, but that the recce battalion, unlike the British and
American armored car units, included a strong infantry component, mounted, in the case of mobile divisions, on fast cars, motorcycles,
or armored troop carriers, and in infantry divisions
provided at least with bicycles or horses. Thus they could form a mobile reserve and were backed up by the engineers. These were also fully combatant and organized as a strong
infantry battalion, with its full complement of heavy weapons. They were often the toughest
troops in the division, and specialized in assault work. The Panzer division was the hitting power of the German army. The army divisions initially comprised two full tank regiments with
a small infantry component and supporting services. These tanks, however, were
mainly the light Panzer I and II, virtually armored machine
gun or light cannon carriers, with an admixture of Czech machines and a few heavier vehicles. The French campaign in 1940, when the Panzers far outran their following infantry divisions, showed the manifold dangers
of such an organization, and late in 1940 they were reorganized on a much better balanced basis, with one tank regiment, two
motorized infantry regiments, and stronger supporting units. In particular, self-propelled
anti-tank guns and artillery were introduced progressively to increase the offensive power, and in the case of SS
divisions especially, the infantry component was
often further strengthened. In the 1941-42 organization, this consisted of three battalions, each of two companies
of Type II battle tanks, and a company of short-gun Type IVs for the close support work. (tank rumbling) It also had a reconnaissance
troop of Type IIs attached to battalion headquarters. Later, the allocation was
changed to two battalions of four companies. One of 96 Type IV, and of 96 Panthers, often with a ninth company of
Tiger tanks, or assault guns. In practice, while great efforts were made to keep the Type IV
battalions up to strength, there were never enough
Panthers to go round, and various captured vehicles
and other ersatz machines were used as substitutes. (tense music) Every army had its basic tactics, policies and plans for
triumphing on the battlefield, and every army constantly
modified them in detail, or on a large scale as
circumstances changed. From the war's outset, German general staff policy taught that only an offensive
approach achieved success, and the defensive should be employed only as a holding operation, or to provide a more secure base for future offensive operations. This principle was embodied
in the tactical doctrine of the Blitzkrieg, or lightning war. This was clearly demonstrated
during the first years of World War II, and dominated
German military thinking and action up to about 1943. The basic field tactics
within this framework divided into three main parts. The first being reconnaissant tactics. This task is common to all
armies until they meet in battle. The Germans divided it roughly into operational reconnaissance,
which they considered as general long-range
observation, mainly by air; tactical reconnaissance,
which was carried out 15 to 20 miles in advance
of an attacking force by motorized or armored units, specially-organized for the task; and battle reconnaissance, which was close-range reconnaissance, as a division or similar force moved in to engage an enemy. (bombs exploding) The latter pattern was the most important, and according to the principle whereby armored units
made the first thrust, was entrusted, wherever possible, to the armored reconnaissance battalions of the armored divisions. The standard patrol consisted
of three armored cars operating on a narrow front and providing mutual
observation and covering fire. The lead vehicle was
often used as a decoy, being driven close to
suspected enemy positions, and then withdrawing rapidly
once it had exposed these by drawing their fire. Once contact was established, it was normal practice to try to build up a local superiority in numbers, calling on the reserve armored
infantry of the battalion to enable scouting to be pushed forward, and enemy outposts to be driven in. (bombs exploding) Infantry as such were
not normally expected to undertake offensive reconnaissance, since the infantry divisions were intended only to consolidate and to mop up. But in specialist cases, they were used. In such cases, fighting
patrols of up to 15 to 20 men, but more often seven to eight, were sent out in World War I fashion. They were armed mainly with automatic and semi-automatic weapons, and were not expected to engage in serious and prolonged fighting. Their duty was to take prisoners
if possible, and to report. (tense music) The basic concept of the
offensive for the German army was to encircle and destroy the enemy, using local superiority
in armor, firepower, and surprise. (guns firing) The Germans quite rightly distrusted the classical mass frontal attack, considering it expensive
in both men and materiel, and also the most difficult
way to achieve success. (guns firing) Where possible, they preferred
to strike at a flank, and then encircle the enemy. The breakthrough at Sedan proved the effectiveness of this tactic. - The world was staggered by the speed with which the German
armored columns moved. What was the secret that enabled armies to move so far so rapidly? The secret lay in the organization of the striking spearhead. Armored forces came first, closely followed by motorized divisions, which peeled off, forming solid walls. And through the corridor thus formed, raced the supply trucks to feed
the ever-lengthening column. It was obvious that if
the Allied situation was to be restored, the German column would have to be cut. On May 17th, General De Gaulle
attacked the German flank, and captured a few prisoners, but his light mechanized forces were like a pin pricking
the side of a rhinoceros. A subsequent attack met
with even less success. The means for a really
successful counter-attack against the German corridor
simply did not exist. Where numbers of divisions were required, only handfuls of companies
and battalions were available. A valued attempt to
cut the German corridor was made by a group of
slow-moving British tanks, just south of Arras. But lack of sustained striking power doomed this valiant unit to destruction. On May 21st, the German spearhead reached the channel port of Abbeville. Protecting their flank along the Somme, the Germans fanned out
to the north and east. This was to be the perfect
battle of annihilation. On May 28th, the Belgian army, compressed into a small
space, and weary of battle, lay down its arms. That left the desperate
French and British defenders with their backs to the sea, at the small channel port of Dunkirk. - [Narrator] An attack was
normally on a divisional basis at least, and theoretically
comprised a unified force of tanks, armored and motorized infantry, and self-propelled assault guns. Originally massed artillery
barrages were envisaged, but in practice the
Germans were rarely able to concentrate their guns
as well as the Allies could, and improvements in camouflage in any case meant that enemy positions
could often not be identified until close combat was joined. Thus, even the divisional
artillery regiments were often decentralized, a substitute being provided to some extent by multi-barreled mortars and
close-support assault weapons. (guns firing) The basic scheme was
the tanks would attack initially in two, or
more often three, waves, with armored infantry
in half-track carriers sandwiched between them, and with SP anti-tank and
assault guns on the flanks. (guns firing) The first wave took the
brunt of the fighting, thrusting through to the enemy anti-tank and infantry positions, while the second wave, and infantry, gave covering fire and then dealt with any remaining opposition. The third wave, with
supporting motorized infantry, then came in to establish the breakthrough and guard the attack's flanks, while the remains of the first two waves thrust straight for the
enemy's artillery positions and struck at his rear. (dramatic music) Enemy tanks were supposed specifically to be engaged by the
accompanying mobile assault guns and specialized tank destroyers known as Panzerjägers, and Jagdpanzers. (dramatic music, guns firing) The massed infantry attack
was by no means so common, although when used it
was on the same basis. (guns firing, bombs exploding) In detail, where possible,
penetration was to be achieved by infiltration tactics
linked with the use of special assault squads to
overcome key strong points. (bombs exploding) (guns firing) (bombs exploding, guns firing) Much greater emphasis
was placed on artillery and mortar support, and in principle assault
Howitzers were to be used in large numbers, engaging
enemy support weapons over open sights if required. Special assault gun brigades
were formed for this purpose, although as the war went on, their massed use became
less and less common. (guns firing) The Germans were extremely
adept at infiltration, which was often very successful, as much because of the confusion it caused as for any other reason. But once they reverted to
mass frontal infantry attacks, as they did for instance at Anzio, their effectiveness was greatly decreased. (tense music) Defensive operations
were originally envisaged as holding situations pending
resumption of the offensive, and laying great stress on immediate and violent counterattacks. (guns firing) The principle was to catch a presumably rather disorganized enemy
before he could re-form after his attack. After 1943, however, it became obvious that a more general
defensive posture was needed, and the principle of defense
in depth was redeveloped, using experience gained
especially on the Russian front. The principle was to have
three main defense areas. First came a series of advanced positions some five to seven thousand yards ahead of the main defense zone. These were within range
of the medium artillery, and were manned by light mobile units, whose main tasks was to make
the enemy deploy too early, and if possible in the wrong sector. (guns firing) They were not supposed
to hold out at all costs, but were to slip away
when their job was done, leading the enemy on to
the next line of defense. The second, an outpost position, was in a zone usually around 2,000 yards ahead of the main defenses, and was covered by the
light field artillery. It consisted of individual
prepared positions, sited so far as possible to
give each other mutual support, and manned by infantry
units, support weapons, and anti-tank gun teams. Infantry weapons were normally
the longer-range ones, machine guns and rifles. And if possible, alternative positions were prepared in advance, so that quick moves could
be made from one to another to confuse the enemy. The Germans were particularly adept at rapid and efficient
transfer of mortars, thus avoiding easy location
by enemy observers. As far as possible, all
outpost positions were selected to facilitate unobserved
withdrawal by their occupants, and were often registered
by the German artillery, so that their occupation
could be denied to the enemy. (bombs exploding) Finally, there was the main battle zone, with a stabilized line of
connected strong points. These, sited on reverse
slopes if possible, had an all-round field of fire, were protected, at least in principle, by thick belts of wire and mines, and were manned by riflemen
and machine gunners backed by mortars and heavy weapons. (dramatic music) The Germans did not like
building such points in woods, because of the greater
expenditure of effort. But on rivers, they preferred to have defensive positions on the enemy side, thus making the river an integral part of
their anti-tank defense. Perhaps more than in other armies, the art of field camouflage and the improvement of natural obstacles to an enemy's advance were brought to a high
ptich of perfection. (bombs exploding) (tree creaking and falling) These often made quite
lightly-defended positions appear formidable, which considerably held up Allied attacks. German forces were also adept at the timely and unobtrusive withdrawal, so that Allied bombs
and artillery barrages often fell harmlessly on empty trenches. (bombs falling) Their army organization
and the high degree of tactical initiative instilled into the regular officer and NCO cadres, also meant that ad hoc formations could be quickly improvised
from any odd units available to plug gaps in an emergency. These battle groups, or Kampfgruppen, were a regular feature
of German field tactics, and could range from
company-sized groups of infantry right up to divisional-sized combinations. (guns firing) But from 1944 onwards, small tactical tricks
could not save the day. Lack of mobility meant
that a line had to hold until it was broken. Since it was difficult to
provide a controlled withdrawal, an inner reserve line
had to be constructed at a considerable distance to ensure time for its completion. (tense music) The exaggerated accounts
of the opening campaign against Poland in 1939 hid the fact that the successful
Blitzkrieg had been achieved with quite ordinary
equipment for the period. During the fall of
France, French equipment, especially in armor, was
in many ways superior to equivalent German machines, but the army organization was ineffective against the superb staff work and unexpected tactics of the Germans. (dramatic music) Time invalidated the
theory of the Blitzkrieg, for while winning major battles, it did not in Russia
provide the short, sharp war it was intended to do. In the field initially,
the Blitzkrieg worked. With crushing air superiority
and the unexpected tactics of the lightning war, first the Poles in autumn 1939, and then the French and
British eight months later, were caught unprepared, and decisively defeated on land. The German army found itself
master of Western Europe, with a reputation for high fighting power and advanced equipment. The paucity of such
equipment was not noticed, and the success in some
parts seems to have hidden its lack, even from
the German political leaders. During the ensuing year, such improved equipment,
both light and heavy, was in fact coming into service. The main battle tanks, Types III and IV, new infantry weapons, and tactics based upon the lessons learnt, were ready for the major
turning point of the war, the opening of the Russian
front in June 1941. (tanks rumbling) Although it exposed Germany to that constant general staff nightmare, a war on two major fronts, at first this appeared
a feasible operation. The Panzer tactics and the sweeping outflanking movements worked. The opposition was driven back
in great leaps and bounds. (guns firing) But it also very soon revealed the two basic weaknesses that
defeated the German army. Firstly, it became quickly evident that production capacity
was not sufficient to equip properly the rapid
expansion made necessary by the vast distances of Russia. A situation made worse by
operations in the Balkans and in Africa that drained
off further resources. (wind blowing) The Blitzkrieg, for
the first time, failed. And in doing so, sealed
the final military defeat. Secondly, the strict military
control of operations ended when, on the 19th of December 1941, Hitler took command of the army, and increasingly interfered
in its activities, and had a terrible effect on
both efficiency and morale. His obsession about not giving up ground proved disastrous. Germany had only a very limited
potential in a long war, and the defeats at Stalingrad and Tunis, where whole armies complete
with equipment were lost, were irredeemable, so far as
army strength was concerned. Field commanders on the eastern front also had to accept the
rise of private armies, formed by various factions
of the Nazi regime, such as the Waffen SS, the armed branch of the
Nazi Party's own force. The best equipment, the best fighting men, the most regular supplies, were directed towards this army. Their field commanders had a
direct line of communications to the OKW, and would not easily assimilate
with regular army units. Their loyalty was to
Himmler and to Hitler, which led to a continuous struggle for control in the field. The same problem occurred
for the field divisions formed from redundant Luftwaffe
and Kriegsmarine personnel. These divisions received
sub-standard equipment and training, whilst
still retaining old links with their former masters
who were unwilling to give up control. Political pressure led
to a rationalizing effect on development and production. From 1942, new, and for its
period, very advanced equipment, began to reach the field army, though never in sufficient quantity. Despite teething troubles, the new equipment was superior in design to equivalent Allied equipment, and it was only this
superiority in design, coupled to the still-efficient
military machine, and the resilience of the
average German soldier, that enabled the army
to fight on for so long. From the time of the
successful Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944, the original defects of the army ensured its eventual destruction. Firstly, the basic lack of resources was emphasized by an ever-increasing Allied superiority in the air and an apparently
inexhaustible Allied source of equipment and manpower. Then too, Allied air
superiority invalidated the German strategic defense pattern that had been forced on them by the split between mobile and largely
immobile divisions. On the western front, with
rail traffic disrupted by airstrikes, they could
no longer easily move the horse-drawn infantry divisions, and had to rely on a crust defense, backed by barely-adequate mobile reserves. (guns firing) Yet Allied air power
also seriously hampered the mobility of these reserves. Petrol stores dropped rapidly, and even heavy armor could
not move safely in daylight. (planes droning) (guns firing) Thus, even the Panzer and motorized units, bled of much equipment
for the Russian front, where drawn into a cross defense which was a stable defensive line. It was a very hard defense to crack, as the Allies found at
Cannes and at Monte Cassino. But once it broke,
there was little to hold advancing troops, and more importantly, much equipment had to be abandoned through lack of transport. On the Russian front, air superiority was never such a problem. But the extremes of climate
and the vast distances handicapped the German
army in much the same way. There was never enough mobile transport, or battle equipment, and
what there was wore out. In the circumstances,
the German withdrawal was a good piece of tactical fighting, since until the Russians used
Blitzkrieg tactics themselves in overwhelming strength in 1945, some sort of a front line
was always maintained. Perhaps the most amazing
fact about the German army was that despite political interference, its losses, and the impossibility
of ever meeting its needs, it remained a cohesive organization up to the end of the war. This was partly helped by
the increasingly strict combing-out of civilian workers to supply manpower needs, and by the staggering
capacity of German industry to maintain high production totals, even under the Allied bombing. (bombs exploding) It was a considerable feat to be able to raise a
mobile counterattack force of the size and quality
that tried to burst through the Ardennes in December 1944. The attack came at the weakest
point of the Allied line, with the German forces
outnumbering the opposing Americans by nearly three to one. As usual, the heavy tank
units of the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies spearheaded the attack using Tiger Is and King Tigers. At first, it looked as if
the plan might succeed. In the foggy weather conditions, the Allies were unable
to call in airstrikes, and during the first 24 hours, the Fifth Panzer Army advanced 20 miles through the American lines. But on the 23rd of December,
the weather cleared, and the Allied air forces
were deployed en masse. (bombs exploding) On the ground, the German tanks met increasingly stiff resistance, especially at Bastogne. If the town, with its many roads leading off in all directions, had been captured during
the first few days of the offensive, German forces would
have been free to attack the St Vith defenders from the rear, and to reach the Meuse
virtually unopposed. As it was, the Second Panzer Division skirting Bastogne to the
north, came close to the Meuse. But it lacked the support of units which had been diverted
to capture the town, and to deal with Patton's counterattack, which raised the siege
on the 26th of December. (guns firing) Like a rock in the center
of a raging stream, Bastogne reduced the momentum
of the German assault. If it had fallen, the
initial German thrust would have been deeper, and the Allied recovery
made far more difficult. (guns firing) As the Germans began to lose momentum, the Americans counterattacked. By the end of January,
the battle was over, and the Allies had
reached the German border. That the gamble failed does
not conceal the basic feat. The army was defeated with
the German capitulation on the 8th of May 1945. The Allied Control Council passed a law formally dissolving the Wehrmacht on the 20th of August 1946, the official death of the German army. (dramatic music)
