After more than a year of fighting on the
Eastern Front, German High Command had good reasons to think that the Soviet Forces had
been brought close to the breaking point. Losses of the Red Army in men and material
were tremendous. Millions had been killed in action, wounded,
or marched off to captivity, the tank corps had been shattered, and much of the artillery
lost. Only a massive undertaking of rebuilding and
reorganizing saved the Red Army from collapse. I'm Indy Neidell, and this is a World War
Two special episode- about the reconstruction of the Soviet Army. The most immediate problem was the shortage
of manpower. On paper the Soviet Union possessed a much
larger manpower pool than the Germans, with 46 million men between the age of 15 and 50,
yet the losses of the opening months of the Axis invasion really were severe. Industry and economy were dealt a devastating
blow, as the Wehrmacht occupied much of the industrialized western regions, bringing up
to 66 million Soviet people under their control. Those who fled or retreated with the Red Army,
were now needed everywhere. Not just in the armed forces, but in the factories
and the farms as well. Women, invalids, and children were called
upon to take their posts, but this would take time. Shell, gun, and tank factories had either
been lost, destroyed, or had been dismantled and transported far to the east. Everything had to be rebuilt and reorganized,
all while the enemy continued his advance. To solve the immediate manpower shortage and
to stabilize the Red Army at the front, Soviet High Command put its mobilization plans to
the test. Millions of reserves from 14 classes were
immediately called up for service. The recruitment and replacement system drafted
and trained men by district, setting quotas according to the male population. 18 districts were active in 1941, with most
soldiers being drafted from the regions of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov,
and Orel. However with many of those population heavy
districts falling to the enemy, recruitment drives on the Volga, in Siberia, the Caucasus,
and Central Asia had to be intensified. The youngest class first drafted was that
of 1922. Then in the winter, they drafted the class
of 1923, and in May 1942 that of 1924. The overall goal was to field an army of at
least 6 million men at all times. Of course, stabilizing the front in the face
of the German onslaught presented an administrative nightmare within the districts, as men were
rushed from reception to medical centers, and then on to their designated units. Uniforms, weapons, and equipment had to be
constantly and quickly distributed to hundreds of thousands of men. In the overall chaos of the first months of
the invasion, it was not uncommon that whole divisions lacked adequate signal- or engineering
equipment, sometimes even basic necessities, because of supply bottlenecks. The difference of "authorized strength" and
what was called a "workable level" at the front would remain a problem for frontline
field commanders. The first waves of replacements often varied
largely in quality. Many commanders complained to High Command
that the new soldiers were undertrained and unfamiliar with heavier weapons. Even in the first months, it also wasn't uncommon
to throw in soldiers younger than 18 or over 40, just to have replacements. Sometimes they went as far as withdrawing
combat fit personnel from hospital and service units, or even releasing prisoners from captivity
to reinforce the rifle divisions. This was not a workable solution for the long
run, as inadequate training in weapons and tactics only led to poor performance on the
battlefield and high losses. Instead, a cost-efficient standard of training
had to be implemented, to restore stability and combat effectiveness to the frontline
troops. (SEGUE 1)
In general, the duration and character of military training within the Red Army in wartime
was bound to the task and the situation expected at the front. Infantry training would take something between
2 and 4 months, while tank crews would train for up to 12 months. During times of crisis however, training could
be much shorter. Emphasis was put on obedience and discipline,
as well as close combat skills and endurance. Further focus was put on camouflage and deception,
field fortifications, and anti-tank techniques, as well as fighting in forests and marshes. After basic, the replacements received any
additional training at the front, like sniping, reconnaissance, and unit tactics, especially
at the company and platoon level. One of the most persistent problems was the
shortage of officers. Less than 12% of the Red Army soldiers had
the equivalent of a high school education, and Stalin's purges had robbed the Red Army
of many experienced senior officers. By October 1941, each field army was ordered
to offer a 3-month course for junior officer candidates. Men with a secondary school education were
preferred, but it became common in the Red Army to promote men for heroism and competence
in the field. Like in no other army, it would be possible
for men with barely any academics at all to rise to the rank of divisional commanders
or even chief of staff. (SEGUE 2)
To not only replace the losses at the front, but to also create a reserve, the Soviets
created the Reserve Armies Administration (GUF). Already by mid-July 1941, they had formed
6 new armies and 31 fresh divisions. By December and in time for the winter counteroffensive,
the GUF had gathered up to a total of 492 divisions into the Reserve Front. 227 of them were fresh or reformed rifle divisions. Although many divisions were understrength
with only limited equipment, the sheer numbers alone demonstrated how well the Soviet recruitment
system worked. The heavy losses during the winter, however
showed that simply replacing soldiers was not going to win the war. They needed to focus on optimizing the integrity
of veteran rifle divisions as well. Service at the Front usually followed a pattern
of a few days of extremely intense combat, with a longer period of movement and exploitation
with lower levels of danger, until a stalemate set in. Of course, such continuous periods of heavy
fighting put a lot of stress on the frontline soldiers, especially in the face of repeated
German breakthroughs and victories. This led to an extremely high turnover rate
within the rifle companies, both from death and wounds inflicted by enemy action, or from
sickness and desertion. It was not unusual that entire battalions
or regiments had to be rotated out of the line and to the rear, because of a decline
of combat power. At first the Red Army simply reinforced units
directly at the frontline, by funneling in replacements. This often did more harm than good, though,
as it compromised the integrity of the unit. So with the orders of March 16 and May 1,
1942, Josef Stalin forbade that practice and ordered that units were only to be reinforced
in the rear. There they could train and assimilate to form
cohesive combat groups. Despite the chaos at the front, the Soviet
mobilization system worked remarkably well in creating new units, as well as refitting
and reconstructing worn out divisions. In fact it worked so well, that in just 6
months, the Red Army could switch from desperate defense, to reinvigorated offense, but as
I said, to beat the Germans, manpower alone was not going to cut it. When the Wehrmacht attacked in June 1941,15,000
tanks had been stationed in the Western military districts, roughly three times what the Germans
had, and not a single German tank fought in the same weight class as the medium T-34 or
the heavy KV-tanks. Yet by just mid July, less than a month after
the invasion began, the Soviet tank losses were appalling and under a couple thousand
were left. This happened because the Soviet tank force
was caught during a phase of expansion and transition. See, when Barbarossa hit, only 27% of the
Soviet tank force was fully operational. And the vast majority of it was light tanks,
many of them old and obsolete, with armor too thin and guns too weak to effectively
counterattack. Both the superiorly armed and armored T-34s
and KV's were either too few in numbers, led by inexperienced commanders, or left without
support and supply. Soviet tank crews also did not at all have
the same level of training as their German counterparts, maintenance standards were low,
and repair facilities few and far between. Many tank units were also incomplete, lacking
basic instruments such as radios, so a large part of the force was lost or abandoned because
of mechanical problems, lack of fuel, or lack of supplies, and not necessarily to German
attacks. In the face of such losses, the Soviets disbanded
what was left of their mechanized corps by the end of 1941 and reorganized their tank
and motorized units into smaller divisions. Like with the infantry, the focus was put
on replacing losses as quickly and cost-efficiently as possible. To increase output, the Soviet tank industry
was now to produce only these tank types: the medium T-34, the heavy KVs, and the new
light T-60 and T-70s. Those chassis would serve as the basis of
the entire Soviet tank force, and High Command prohibited any unnecessary improvements or
variations. Improving the gun, armor, or engine, or even
giving the crews a better level of comfort was certainly possible, but it would increase
costs and impede speed of manufacture. As long as the tanks worked and operated with
enough armor, speed, and firepower, it was acceptable. This simplicity in the manufacturing process
also had the positive byproduct that operating and maintaining the tanks was rather simple
as well. So over 1941 the focus lay on replacing light
tanks to support the infantry, but by 1942, production began to shift to establish the
T-34 as the main workhorse. Its early models had been plagued with faulty
transmissions, shoddy optics, and short track life, yet those flaws were now ironed out. The Red Army did not abandon the heavy KV
tanks, but Soviet tank designers were already looking for a new tank, one with less weight
but more engine power. Although production was still interrupted,
by the summer of 1942, Soviet facilities were able to reliably produce more than 1000 tanks
a month. By May 1942, more than 120 independent tank
brigades had been formed. Additional lend-lease deliveries of Valentines
and Stuarts also helped to plug the gaps, but Soviet High Command was impatient. Only with large tank armies, they thought,
would they be able to effectively deal with the enemy. Yet the pre-emptive strike against Kharkov
ended in disaster, when the Pushkin Tank Force was destroyed, so rushing things was certainly
not the way to go. Another thing the Red Army found itself in
short supply of was artillery. Soviet doctrine had always placed emphasis
on overwhelming artillery in both offensive and defensive operations. In June 1941 the Red Army held a flexible
arsenal of over 91,000 big guns and mortars, but the Wehrmacht's rapid advance had robbed
them of a big chunk of that, with estimates going as high as 70% lost. Most of the 50 shell-producing factories were
located in the western districts, 17 in Leningrad alone, and it would take time to rebuild stock,
but the rebuilding process was a chance to modernize the artillery and anti-tank guns. Much focus was put on the 45mm and the new
ZIS-3 76mm divisional guns, of which they were able to produce over 2000 a month by
mid 1942. Soon they were able to form new independent
anti-tank and tank-destroyer brigades. Since the 76mm outranged the German 50mm,
plans were made to put the 76 on a tank chassis and use it as a mobile tank destroyer. The new SU-76 was a solid concept, yet the
prototypes showed insufficient tank destroying capabilities. Instead, it was used as mechanized artillery,
providing direct artillery fire against enemy strongpoints. Such mechanization projects were in fact necessary
if they were to beat the Germans in the field one day. Once the recruitment and replacement was done,
it would be time to reform the Red Army according to strategic demands. But this was still future talk. From June 1941 to the end of summer 1942,
the Red Army had three phases of mobilization and reorganization, very much increasing its
potential. First after the losses of Barbarossa, second
in early 1942 after the winter counteroffensive, and a third time after the initial losses
during Fall Blau and the advance on the Caucasus and Stalingrad. Despite the challenges, the Soviet system
prevailed each time, not just in recovering from the losses, but in creating a strategic
reserve as well, in order to achieve local superiority. By mid 1942, they were outproducing their
losses at a time when the German supply was beginning to dwindle. The longer the war on the Eastern Front continued,
the stronger the Red Army would become. If the Germans believed they were thinning
out their enemy, they were certainly in for a rude awakening. Last year, we did a special episode on the
state of the Red Army during Operation Typhoon, and you can and should check it out right
here. And you can and should join the TimeGhost
Army at timeghost.tv or patreon.com so we can make ever more such specials to flesh
out our coverage of the war. Won't that be great? It sure will. See you next time!
