Deep Battle: The Soviet Answer to the Blitzkrieg

the widespread narrative about World War II especially the early years usually evokes how German generals made brilliant use of so-called Blitzkrieg tactics an Innovative concept founded on the concentrated use of tank units on speed as well as maneuverability pity though that Blitzkrieg was propaganda term coined to describe the effects of early German campaigns and not actually a tactical approach while the video marked put into practice was their take on combined arms Warfare a military Doctrine which they referred to as the war of movement or in German's Creek baby and it wasn't such an Innovative concept nor was it exclusive to Germany since the Napoleonic Wars and once again after World War One military theorists all across Europe develop doctrines and strategies based on a the coordinated use of different arms and B breakthrough of enemy front lines followed by a deep thrust towards their command centers so in today's episode we're actually going to take a look at the Russian and later the Soviet Doctrine one could be summarized as the conduct of combined armed efforts to achieve a simultaneous attack against the enemy's combat order not just against their front lines but throughout the entire depth of their positions or as a Soviet put it globoki boy or deep battle foreign military theorists did not operate in a vacuum but they leaned heavily on the military traditions of saris Russia especially in the 19th century sahari's military Doctrine swung between two extreme Visions one was the one exemplified by General Prince mikar kutisov the man who defeated Napoleon's invasion Prince kudosov actually makes several appearances in War and Peace by Tolstoy in which he states that the wars were won Through Time and Patience kudazov was a proponent of a defensive strategic approach in which Russian troops would make good use of their vast territory in large numbers to stretch out the Invaders supply lines and eventually wear them out just before we continue with 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leader of a vast offensive campaign against the central empires in 1916. brutalov was successful in Breaking the German and austro-hungarian lines but failed to consolidate his gains due to his troops lack of mobility and coordination during the russia-polish war of 1919-1920 Soviet General Mikhail takachevski ran into similar problems his initial advances at the Battle of Warsaw did not reach operational depth due to the lack of reserves which would have helped to protect the initial gains the war ended with the Polish Victory which led Soviet military theorists in the 1920s to opt for the kutisov school of thought this faction was led by General Alexander fierchavin who proposed to make good use of the Soviet Mass Superman pad conduct long defensive Wars of attrition at a 1986 military Congress speertram's ideas were opposed by tukachevsky who argued that the nation's industrial capacity would not allow for such protracted efforts the Red Army would have been better off by being on the offensive quickly defeating its enemies through mobile operations at the end of the Congress takachevsky's theories had the upper hand Red Army commanders realized that offensive was the way to go and that large numbers of tanks were key in achieving Victory although they're not quite yet figured out how to organize armored units or how exactly to use them and now enter the picture another influential strategic thinker General giorgioceson his 1936 Treatise the evolution of operational art greatly influenced tukachevsky in distilling the tenets of this deep battle Doctrine Isuzu theorized that a field commander should expect the opponent's formation to be structured as a layered system of defensive lines supply routes command centers and staging areas for reserves as the offensive progresses the field come will be met with an ever-increasing set of challenges with quote the greatest tension and crisis at the final stage of an operation in other words commanders should not celebrate Victory once they had broken the initial front line as they should keep attacking therefore a successful offensive operation should be conceived as again to quote an operation in depth it must be planned for the entire depth and it must be prepared to overcome the entire depth according to isison a defensive order of battle should always be assumed to be arranged along several deep echelons of resistance these should be met with quote equally deep offensive echelonment in a poetic stroke isison described how a successful offensive should quote resemble a series of waves striking her Coastline with growing intensity trying to ruin it and wash it away with continuous blows from the depths now this approach was eventually codified by tukachepsky and the red Army's P youth 36 regulation manual so let's now take a look at this fascinating although boringly named manual and learn how deep battle globoki boy actually works [Music] Doctrine commanders facing the enemy Frontline would organize their forces in four echelons the first Echelon consisting of aircraft bombers and fighter bombers would establish air control and bonky enemy positions the second Echelon would be composed of armor infantry and artillery by launching combined offensives they would identify the weak spots in the enemy line and punch through it the actions of the second Echelon would be divided into two phases in Phase One the Infantry would attack alongside the immediate infantry support tank group saw NPP in the Russian acronym NPP groups consisted of light tanks and armored cars and their task was to offer protection to infantry by neutralizing Machine Gun nests nbbs were intended to advance up to 1.5 kilometers or 0.93 miles from the forward line the starting line of attack in phase two long-range support tank groups rushed into action known as DPP these groups were designed to engage enemy resistance located 1.6 2.5 kilometers from the forward line thus about one to one and a half miles American friends dbb groups would consist of heavier Vehicles compared to mpps such as the t-35 and T28 tanks next the Third Echelon of armored unit supported by self-propelled artillery motorized and mechanized infantry would exploit the breach or breaches pouring through the punctured line and driving deep through enemy held territory these units would be allowed to carry out independent operations bypassing pockets of resistance targeting vital Commander control centers artillery batteries reserves and supply lines the tank groups at the heart of this Echelon would be the long-range action ones or DD due to the nature of their mission DD groups required the use of light fast tanks in the late 1930s the BT series tanks fit the bill but later these were replaced by medium tanks such as the legendary t-34 once the DD groups exhausted their run they would be followed by a fourth Echelon of reserves which would consolidate gains and mop up any residual resistance to summarize we can say the globoki boy was based on the correct assumption that enemy units are not deployed across a single line but are arranged across several layers of Frontline troops reserves and supply lines in order to effectively break VAR style attack friendly forces should rely on large independent armor and mechanized formations followed by sufficient reserves to drive deep into enemy formations or to quote directly from the Red Army regulation manual pu-36 quote the enemy is to be paralyzed in the entire depth of his deployment surrounded and destroyed which was all well and good but how would it actually turn out when this was put into practice while the Red Army carried out several Maneuvers and exercises to test the Pokey boy a particularly large one took place in him Minsk modern-day Belarus in September 1936. foreign military observers remarked positively on the size of the Soviet armored units as per quality well a British Observer noted how these forces were handled with little skill leading to tank formations bumping into one another clearly it was too early for tukachevsky's theories to have filtered down to subtleton officers and ncos on the ground and a few weeks later sober tank units would have the opportunity to finally test laboki boy in a real situation the Spanish Civil War in this conflict the Red Army sided with the Republican government in its popular Army against Francisco Franco's nationalist forces supported by Italy and Germany the first shipment of 50 t-26 speed tanks landed on Spain's southern coast on October 15 1936 under the supervision of Colonel krivisheen a training officer at the Soviet tank School more than 300 further tanks would be delivered by the end of the year and krivisheen was joined by General Pavlov in command of all Soviet armored forces in Spain on February 13 1937 Pavlov and his first armored Brigade had the chance to prove their medal against a nationalist attack on Madrid Franco's forces moved towards the capital from the southeast and were met by Pavlov at the Battle of harama Pavlov's tanks successfully halted the Nationalist advance but they lacked infantry support and thus failed to disrupt in depth the enemy formation and exploit the initial success on March the 8th 1937 Soviet and Republican Spanish forces success possibly fought back an Italian attack at the Battle of Guadalajara this time Pavlov ensured good coordination between armor and air support but did not pursue a counter-offensive in depth allowing the Italians to withdraw in good order on July the 5th 1937 a combined Soviet Spanish force of 130 tanks and 125 000 men may have had the opportunity to finally show the world how to globacy boy an enemy Army out of existence this was the Battle of brunette one in which Franco could field only fifty thousand troops and 50 tanks the Republicans did indeed score an initial impressive success penetrating up to 24 kilometers or 15 miles and nationalist lines but the initial attack echelons failed to destroy Franco support routes allowing him to reap it regroup and consolidate his defenses from the entire Spanish experience of General Pavlov the high command of the Red Army Drew their own conclusions large independent armored units were useless and tanks should be used in an infantry support function or NPP according to their previous classification now these setbacks had occurred really early on only shortly after tukachevsky's theories had been published in that manual therefore tank troops still lacked extensive training I mean it was only going to be a matter of time before everyone was trained properly right right [Music] that would have been the case sad not the Soviet Union been led by one Joseph Stalin a paranoid despot with a knack for shooting himself and his nation in the foot from August 1936 to March 1938 Stalin Unleashed his secret police the nkvd on a Great Purge designed to eliminate perceived political Rivals and consolidate his power The Purge extended to senior officers of the Armed Forces accused of trotskiest sympathies Espionage or even consorting with the Germans the nkbd arrested or executed 11 out of 13 army commanders 57 out of 85 Corps commanders and 110 out of 195 division commanders the Army leadership had been thoroughly decapitated losing invaluable experience and talent in the span of just a few months amongst the victims of the purges was Marshall to kochevsky shot in the back of the head by an mkvd officer on June 12 1937. the Marshall's military theories could have survived their creator but not in such a climate of fear lawyer those officers who survived the purges avoided any association with tukachevsky and his Works thus confining blabaki boy to almost complete disgrace and Oblivion the Red Army adopted a concept aligned to General Pavlov's conclusion larger armored and mechanized units from Brigade upward or would be disbanded their vehicles would be spread thin Distributing them across rifle divisions and confined to just a mere support role luckily though a brilliant General would prevent the Deep battle flame from going completely extinct Georgie zhukov from the 20th to the 31st of August 1939 Soviet and Mongol troops clashed with Japanese forces at kalkan goal on the border between Mongolia and manchukwo general zhukov split most of the 500 tanks under his command among infantry units except for those in the sixth Brigade he kept them as a cohesive unit which he used to pierce through envelop and Destroy two entire Japanese divisions this successful if partial application of deep battle principles unfortunately received little attention two weeks after the Red Army invaded Poland in this operation two mechanized cores the 15th and the 25th performed poorly due to the poor Logistics once more the Supreme military Council Drew their own conclusions on November 21 1939 the council ordered the mechanized Corps to be disbanded their tanks were divided into smaller regiments and assigned to Rifle divisions in a supporting role and this is how armored units were deployed in the winter War I.E the invasion of Finland from November 1939 to march 1940. steinied by the Ferocious Finnish defense tied down by an outdated Doctrine the Red Army failed to punch in depth across Enemy Lines advances were slow territorial gains disproportionately low and casualties were extremely high but you can check out our video all about the winter Warfare more on that following the Perry victory in Finland General Pavel Rodney Straub commander of the armored forces advocated for reforms to quote tanks must be employed in masses the best situation for a tank commander is to be in command of large groups a brigade a Corps an army these are Splendid instruments in an offensive a concentration of a thousand tanks this is the dream of every tank commander Romney's job's dream was fulfilled by his boss Minister of Defense martial to machinco in the second half of 1940 he organized the creation of nine mechanized cores each comprising of 1031 tanks 268 armored cars and 36 000 troops 20 more such calls were created in the first half of 1941. now paper these cores appeared as awesome fighting units but since the purges and the demise of tukachevsky's Doctrine no senior commanders were trained or experienced enough to lead such unwielding monsters and this became apparent after June 22nd 1941 the beginning of operation Barbarossa again you can watch out dedicate video on that for all of the details but in short the invasion of the Soviet Union was met with spectacular success initially despite the axis Fielding only 3 000 tanks against the red Army's 24 000. due to their poor leadership most of the Soviet mechanized core were encircled and destroyed in the early stages of the invasion the axis Onslaught was halted only with the counter-offensive in Defender Moscow from December 1941 to May 1942. the Red Army was successful on this occasion but it made no use of independent tank brigades nor deep battle principles resulting in a slow and methodical advance foreign in May of 92 former Minister now simply martial timoshenko appeared to give another shot at globoki boy he constituted two independent tank cores to launch an offensive around Kharkov modern day Ukraine but lack of coordination across echelons led to another failure and the destruction of one of the Thousand tanks this debate may have spelled utter Doom for deep battle but Marshal of armored troops Yakov federenko used it instead as a learning opportunity in June of 1942 he issued an order about the formation and use of armored cause which might as well have been penned by tukachevsky himself quote in an offensive operation an armored Corps has the mission of massing its forces for a deep thrust enveloping the enemy's main forces encircling them and destroying them in cooperation with the Air Force and with other ground units an armored Corps may drive ahead of the other friendly forces and penetrate the enemy sector to a depth of 40 to 50 kilometers provided that a second wave is sent through the Gap the Stalingrad counter-offensive part of operation Uranus in November 1942 is a great example of how to correctly use an independent tank formation the fifth tank Army as part of globuki boy the attack on the German line started at 7 20 in the morning on November the 19th with a barrage by more than 3 500 artillery pieces this was the first Echelon then the second Echelon kicked off with two rifle divisions supported by NPP tank units this created a large breach in the axis defenses then to tank caused the Third Echelon rushed through the Gap neutralizing reserves and command nodes in little more than three days the fifth tank Army was able to advance more than 130 kilometers or 81 miles following the Stalingrad defeat the Germans sought to retake the initiative by launching an offensive in July and August of 1943. this resulted in the Battle of Kursk the largest tank battle in history and I'll refer you to our dedicated video about that battle for more details on that it seems like we've really covered it all but from the perspective of the application of gubaki boy it's worth mentioning that the Red Army successfully repelled the initial German attack on the 5th of July by deploying a system of defenses in depth the Soviet kids then went on the counter-offensive with two operations coup dissolve and remyancer on the 12th of July and the 3rd of August respectively the first action broke Enemy Lines at Oriole north of Kursk and pushed deep into german-held territory eventually covering 540 kilometers or 335 miles and liberating Smolensk operation romance have instead attacked the German south of Kursk resulting in the liberation of bulgarad and Kharkov modern-day Ukraine Soviet armor Doctrine would continue evolving and yield even larger successes most notably operation progression and The Manchurian campaign of August 1945. the objective of bagration was to liberate by a Russia or modern-day Belarus and drive the Germans back to East Prussia operations began on June 22 1944 the third anniversary of Barbarossa the Soviets deployed four fronts formations roughly equivalent to Army groups and other militaries equipped with 5200 tanks and self-propelled guns following very closely the Deep battle instructions from the p-36 manual an initial infantry assault was if effectively backed by brigades of t-34 tanks and Su self-propelled howitzers the echelon broke the German lines in six sectors allowing for more mobile groups to rush in the fifth guard tank Army under General Rod misrov was particularly successful advancing up to 40 kilometers 25 miles a day the fifth guards cut off enemy supply routes captured a vital Communication Center seized the Minsk Moscow Motorway and reached Riga modern-day Latvia at the end of August all the while they had been followed by a fourth Echelon of infantry which secured their gains and took tens of thousands of prisoners the assault against the Japanese kwantang Army in Manchuria I was even more impressive here the red army fielded three fronts with 3 700 tanks and 1850 self-propelled guns which all went on the attack on the 9th of August 1945. now masters of Mobility the Soviet tank armies Advanced 450 kilometers or 280 miles in just four days that was over mountainous terrain the run into Manchuria was spearheaded by the sixth guards tank Army of General Andre krabchenko which had successfully enveloped the Japanese Defenders by the 13th of August a week later the campaign concluded with a decisive Soviet Victory impressively krabchenko's tax had Advanced an average of 80 kilometers or 50 miles per day following the end of World War II the practice of globoki boy fell into disuse it was intrinsic to its nature that the doctrine would be applicable only in the context of symmetric Warfare carried out by means of conventional weapon systems and the decades following World War II were all but conventional the Soviet Union and its allies found themselves locked in a cold war with the West in which long-range nuclear deterrent was more important than echelons of combined armored and mechanized formations and when the cold war did indeed get heated Soviet forces would find themselves waging asymmetric Wars against Guerrilla formations as was the case in Afghanistan and then does the Russian Federation which has been involved once again in a conventional war with its recent invasion of Ukraine the performance of its military and tank units in particular has been generally poor again we've got several videos dedicated to that if you want more details one of the reasons for such poor performance is the lack of a key ingredient to globoki boy coordination amongst different arms and services according to defense post author Jeffrey H Fisher Modern Warfare requires skillful combination of domains land air and C but also space the electromagnetic spectrum cyber information and others by applying a two rigid vertical command structure Russia's military cannot successfully coordinate multi-domain operations a contemporary version of globacy boy so that concludes our exploration of the deep battle Doctrine I hope you found the approach interesting and do let us know if you like this military Theory stuff whether you like videos like this in the future is a bit experimental let me know what you think and thanks for watching foreign

Channel: Warographics

Views: 55,751

Keywords: soviet deep battle doctrine, soviet deep battle, blitzkrieg, deep battle, battle of kursk, soviet union, blitzofthereich, military, war

Id: 3ybF6qGyjUk

Length: 22min 14sec (1334 seconds)

Published: Thu Jun 29 2023