Being & Time The Worldhood of the World I

hello this is phenomenology and my name is Mark Doris B in this video we're going to take a look at Heidegger's book being in time and in particular we're gonna be looking at section three of division one the world hood of the world so welcome back everyone I hope you're doing well of course remember that these videos are built-in so if you missed the previous video make sure to watch it or begin at the beginning because heidegger one of the things he's doing in this Texas as we continue through his discussion he's continually refining his his language and ultimately refining his consist conception of the being for whom being is an issue that is Dawson so with ultimately the question of the science Frogger or the question of what being is in general sort of somewhere out on the horizon of his concern so welcome back one of the things we've looked at in the first and second sections of being in time is namely the idea that for Heidegger design consists altum Utley in the fact that is a being that's in the world and involved in the world and we're gonna see in today's video Hydra is really going to flesh that out even further and he's also going to controvery there's a really a couple of really important things that's going to talk about in this section Heidegger on the one hand is going to introduce his conception of the ready at hand you'll probably recall from section two as well as section 1 heading the language of the present at hand to talk about when things are when we treat something and we try to consider it as it is in itself as an object that's present before us an objective entity we're gonna see that Heidegger doesn't think that this is really the thing that this isn't very this is not a very good characterization of the way in which da sign is actually involved in the world of course da sign does recognize and interrogate and investigate things in the president hand for instance consider mathematics but he thinks this is not mainly what we're doing we're actually living in the world where we're using things as we go and we're treating objects according to our concerned rather than according to what they are in themselves and so he's going to introduce the ready at hand this will become pivotal as he discusses the world hood of the world ultimately the world of the world consists in that very feature of Dawsons being in terms of the radiant hand and then he's going to talk about the spaciality ultimately of the world for da sign and then as well as there's a criticism in between there of de cartes conception of the world as a form of extension in space so we've got a lot to cover I'll be honestly there's took me a very long time to sort of prepare and read through to get ready for you so we're gonna jump into I'm gonna try to keep this video as succinct as we possibly can because it's gonna be long at least that's what I anticipated so welcome back everyone let's jump in excuse me paragraph 14 that starts out section 3 it's called the idea of the world hood of the world in general and of course here Heidegger starts with a sort of question about what is the world itself what exactly is the world remember when we talk about being in the world Heidegger has been approaching this by looking at being in as such the world as terms of the world hood the world in its world hood and then finally being in the world so he's building up a concept of Dawsons existential character and we're starting here at the world and what is the world in general what is it itself well as a phenomena the world is what shows itself in the entities that are within the world notice that no one has a perception or an experience of the world the world is not an entity as such but the world is rather the place were or the thing we're in the entities exist so as a phenomena the world shows itself in the ant ities that are within the world now if we were to do a pre phenomenological description here we would say is that well although there's sort of two steps on the one hand we could enumerate the things that are in the world like houses trees people mountains etc I don't know it starts this I think that supposed to be something else so we could enumerate things that are in the world in step two would be to depict the way that those things look and they give an account of the occurrences in them and they occur with them so this would be sort of a pre phenomenological analysis of what the world is in general and you can see that this is in many ways constitutive of certain forms of anthropology about the world of course as a phenomenologist Heidegger of course is not going to be doing that right here's a quote for you to give a phenomenological description of the world will mean to exhibit the being of those entities which are president hand within the world and to fix it and concepts which are categorical so this is ultimately sort of kind of the real goal here is can we fix a phenomenological conception of what the world is okay so that's sort of what we're up to here and you're gonna see what that means as we go through so let's jump here to our next slide one of the problems here is what we would call the problem of substantiality and that is ultimately hold on a moment my apologies for some reason my printer just turned on randomly and it assumed it was making some noise so anyway I like to turn that off so let's get back to it and the promise is substantiality well first up the world is ultimately taken to be made up of things right and our concern here is what is the being of the things of nature right is when we talk about the the world is made of things all of those things are natural and those things are treated as natural insofar as we consider them to not be their own substances and we can talk about substantiality here so the question though is what exactly is the ontological significance of a concept of substance of a concept of substantiality right Heidegger writes on Tues on page 64 neither the article depiction of entities within the world nor the ontological interpretation of their being is such as to reach the phenomena of the world so you can see here we have a bit of a difficulty on our hands and the problem looks like this well how do we reach the world when all of the quote objective renderings of the objects that are in the world always presuppose the world right so for instance what we can do is in a sort of ordinary philosophical sense what we could do is we look at the objects in the world we can evaluate them but one of the things we're going to see is we look at what those objects are in their essences in terms of the president hand here we get objective renderings as it were but all of these objective renderings presuppose the world itself right because all of these are entities within the world so how do we reach the world when this is what all we have is right in the president hand so perhaps you might consider well maybe the world is a characteristic of Dawsons being right for instance does every dockside have approximately its own world right and in a certain way we do in fact talk like that I mean not in significantly because of how yours influence here but we do talk as if that we each have our sort of own world right but strictly speaking the world's not an entity it's rather the place where and the entities are and it looks like maybe it's a characteristic of Dawsons activity but you can see if don't sign if every toss I approximately has its own world then does the world become subjective that that is does the world become ultimately one subjectivity which of course creates a whole range of problems especially when the approach has been to analyze entities in the present at hand what they are in themselves so how is the world the case then and how is there a common world how is that the case I'm sorry because even if it's true that dumb that the world is a characteristic of Dawsons pain then if it's not subjective well in what sense is it common and so these are two different problems though they certainly could be related and a third question here is your ask is well how can we access the world hood of the world as such instead of a subjective or a common rendering of the world now we're Colyer in the in paying in time heidecker's ultimately he thinks that we have to articulate what the world hood of the world is so that we can understand what it means to say that da side is a being in the world what does it mean to be in a world what's that if you will the essential characteristic of the world as such this is what we're asking when or there's what Heidegger is asking when he asking about the world hood so we've got a number of problems on the table and you'll see in the beginning of this section it's really just a series of questions now a Honeycrisp strategy is trying to move us and refine us into a place where at least we were clear on what sort of answers pertained to these questions so let's ask this what exactly is world hood well on the one hand whoops on the one hand the world hood refers to an ontological concept right because the world is reflects what must be a primary state for the things that are in the world for beings as such so world it must be an ontological concept a world order also has to be a constitutive element in the structure of being in the world of course I've already mentioned that and that's where after and he is to find this existentially right such the world hood here is an existential now rule that of course also is something that's characteristic of da sign and this is really that we'll see this is really important and as he begins to unfurl his analysis of worldment here you'll see that art are parallel concept of da side right what we understand about da site will also be continually refined here now when there's sort of four key points that are worth mentioning when we talk about world hood the first is an optical concept and that's the idea that the world signifies the totality of those entities which can be present at hand within the world so if we remember Heidegger is laying out this this language between the on tech and the ontological and this is related we'll see to what's known as the ontological difference I'll get there in a minute but in this first sense the world signifies basically all of the ends these that are that we can we can Intuit in the president hand within the whole world so it's a totality the second is to think of on the world hood the world as an ontological term right remember ontology signifies the question of being as such for Heidegger so when an ontological term in this sense would mean is that it signifies the being of the entities in the world not just the accumulation of the entities right there also there's the ontological facticity here and when we talk about facticity remember this is heidegger's caught of his conception for the idea that we're beings in the world in a sense that it has happened already right as it were so what we consider is that the ontological facticity of world hood is that refers to that we're in a fact achill design lives so there's world were also in this sense not just a totality not just the being of the entities of the world but the fact that docile lives in the world and then fourthly what we might call what hottinger cause but ontological existential concept of a world hood and this refers to the structural modes for the worlds that design inhabits this refers to the structural form of existence that design has with the world so you can see when we talk about the world we're actually can mean the world or in a variety of ways so the world hood come to be parsed out in these four ways well you could says that things which are worldly are not really given as present at hand right and this becomes sort of a launching off point for Heidegger here because when we talk about something being worldly especially in this third signification the aunt a lot of ontological facticity we're talking about the way in which Dawson lives in the world and worldliness there isn't something that's given as something that's president at hand it's not just an objective determination of something something's worldly for in terms of da science facticity and so far as da sine is living in the world and of course da sign is living the world that includes a whole bunch of things philosophers typically ignore that includes for instance the fact that we have to drink things or the fact that we we move something out of the way to turn a light switch on the fact that we're driving our car we flip our signal and turn left and all of these little minutia that actually take up the majority of my life right these are things that philosophers typically ignore and they concern the ontological facticity of design and we're gonna see that this is the Avenue the Heidegger wants us to follow when we assess the world hood and the future and ask the question of what exactly does it mean for us to be beings in the world one of the things is that he realizes that we have a tendency to pass over the world hood of the world right dasu doesn't we Oh tip Dawson doesn't typically get wrapped up in the idea that there is a world it's it's living it right da sign is for the mainly approximately for the most part just living in that world right we're not usually stopping and turning our attention to the world of the characteristic of what it means to be in a world because the world is sort of the grounding context for all of our involvement and our activities right and this is a really important part of our interpretation of the world at of Dawson the fact that Dawson generally skips over the world right so what does this mean well it's not that we skip over in the sense that the world of the everyday da sign which is closest to it is the environment now the term for environment that he uses here is the term invent right in German and this literally means the around world and that that is the term for world and who means really releasing this signification it means the around us of the world and particularly Heidegger mentions that what he's gonna be talking about when we're talking about the environment is to talk about spaciality and around us so you can see here is that again we're going to be focusing up and following up on the world of the world in terms of its being an ontological facticity and the first thing we'll recognize is that the world is something that's around us it's a given I'm always already present around us and before us and both in space but also in terms of our phenomenological involvement we're gonna see what that means today now Heidegger breaks up this section to three sort of alpha alpha numeric concepts and it first is the analysis of the environment ality and world in general so what's typical of higher is Easter starts with the general and it works his way through so what exactly we talk about we talk about the environment in the world of Gerald and this leads us to paragraph 15 the being of the entities that are encountered in the environment now it is important here to recognize that we talk about the world we're not talking that's the world is not the same thing as the environment for Heidegger um but in order to understand what the world is we have to start with the environment and the environment here is a term that I think needs to be understood in terms of its facticity the fact that I'm living in the world there's something that's around me right and consider while you're sitting here watching this video or while you're think of you're on the subway and you're going somewhere or you're on a train the world is more than what's just around you right but what is around you is the environment okay so the beings of those entities which we encounter as closest to us can be exhibited phenomenologically so things that are near not I don't have a phenomena of the world but the things that are around close to me I do have a phenomenal experience of now this phenomenal experience comes in the form and comes in the form of dealings right I'm dealing with things on it daily on a daily in a daily manner right DAW sign as Dawson lives in the world DAW sign is moving things around think of your relationship to the keyboard for instance the mouse of the printer the computer screen all of these are entities beings in the world and they populate your environment and your mode of activity is one in which they are part that you're dealing with them as it were and manifold of concerns okay so and how am i concerning myself with these things well primarily in terms of use and using these objects right so notice for instance that I have a highlighter pen here right this highlighter when I'm using it I you know I'm sorry in my daily life the facticity of my average everyday life I I see the highlighter and I used the highlighter in its existence is only a part of my world insofar as it's something I'm using right I don't consider what the pen is in and of itself no you usually think of the pen is present at hand I usually approach it as something to be used which is very different than the present hand and so what this means is that the environment is populated with entities that are available for DAW signs use okay and this will become the pro not preliminary phenomenological theme of Heidegger investigation of DA signs being in the world where at the end of the day is going to be it's going to take its point of departure based upon the idea that we that we are encountering things in terms of their use now Heidegger does make it a remark of method in this paragraph he says quote this is the way in which every day DAW site always is when I open the door for instance I used the latch the achieving of phenomenological access to entities which we encounter consists rather than thrusting aside our interpretive tendencies which keep thrusting themselves upon us and running along with us and which concealed not only the phenomena of such concern but even more those entities themselves as encountered of their own accord Inc in our concern with them now these entangling errors become playing if in the course of our investigation we now ask which entities shall be taken as our limit as our preliminary theme and established as our pre phenomenal basis for our study now that's a that's a sort of lot to say there and I encourage you to pause the video and just read this passage slower if you need to write but what he's sort of saying here is that when we use our everyday is that when we think of how Dawson is all the time it's everyday manner it's using these objects in the world and there's a tendency philosophically for us to sort of stop our description of the average everyday life of the person and throw in a whole in whole set of interpretations or interpretive apparatus I all them and he's saying that we get all entangled ultimately in our interpretations and our concerns for things in our average everyday involvement with things and we've got to do is we've got to parse this all out so that we can build and articulate a sort of pre phenomenological basis for the study itself no there's wrong the right way for us to go methodologically Heidegger indicates what's the wrong way well we're inclined to then turn our attention to the things and to work out their theoretical objectivity this is the wrong path that is we're inclined sort of saying okay well in my world I've got pins I've got lamps I've got keyboards etc etc let's do a philosophical evaluation what each of these things are in their own particular essence and then let's see how those things function and relate to Dawson and he says this is the wrong way to go in fact that this sort of we might call it the philosophical temptation here or the maybe we better term would be the theoretical temptation to theorize the objectivity of the things we encounter in the world this is the wrong path one because this is not how we actually use things right right we have to be attuned to looking out da sign actually exists and da sign exists in terms of the use of things per look primarily so that means that we have to understand what it means to use things and we can't do that by just isolating the objectivity z' of these things now he says what's the right path well and he sort of does he takes his Greek which is fond of doing in any sort of does a conceptual rework the original Greek term Prague Mota of course he gives the actual Greek determination there I've just given you them transliteration but the Greeks had this concept of that things could be understood as Prague matzo that is of things that you use and Heidegger says locate this is interesting let's recast the language of the Prague Vata in terms of equipment now we can see here that das eine uses things and what that means is that das eine is is organizing its intentional compartment towards things and it's treating the world in terms of the world being sets and multiplicities of equipment some ones are available for use and so much or not right but it's treating the world as a world of equipment right or as he says we shall quote quality call these entities which we encounter in concern equipment so this is important equipment deena denotes the fact that das eine is a creature this primordial II concerned in terms of its involvement with the world's right and this is a part of Dawsons ontological facticity right going all the way back what we looked at earlier now it's important to realize that equipment is not its own kind of being right equipment is essentially something in order to right i'mso equipment is not an entity si just not a being a such equipment is really if you will a way in which da sign treats things and understands things and it's understand is at its core the idea of something in order to write and here we might say the higher gear probably consciously does not use this language we might say that equipment is something that's cast in terms of instrumentality right we're objects exist for me and this into the average everyday sense in terms of how I can use them to do things right I use this in order to do this I use this in order to to do this I need the pen in order to highlight I need the computer in order to record the lecture to write my notes etc etc right so equipment designates actually a phenomenological structure not an entity or being but a phenomenological intentional comportment towards things and here it's really quite helpful to keep in mind all of the stuff we looked at with regard to who Cyril right now you can see we're doing something radically different than who Cyril but you can see here that equipment what you can at least use who Cyril to better understand what Heidegger means when he says that equipment is a phenomenological structure right it's a it's a structure in consciousness regarding the way in which I treat and understand other beings and entities right it's a reference of something to something so with equipment you will always have a referential sort of relationship where I have the pen I'm sorry the highlighter references the text that I highlight right the keyboard references the webpage I'm typing in and searching for right so we have a reference of always something conjoined with something else and this is a part of if you will the logic of equipment so equipment does not show things as they are for themselves or in themselves right that's really important equipment is rather a designated term of da science concern and involvement of the world or if you will our concern and involvement with the world on an average everyday in an average everyday sense right so here's an example think about sitting in a room writing and leaning on the desk right so I tried to find a picture of someone doing this right and what are some of the characteristics you're gonna see that some things are treated according to the I'm sorry that things are treated according to a manifold of concern right I'm concerned based upon how I'm organizing what I'm concerned with in terms of my activity right so for instance if I'm writing an essay as you no doubt will be writing an essay right or or have written an essay if you're not going to write one when you're writing an essay right and I'm sleeping on the desk I'm understanding the beans that are populating the beans with the lowercase B there in my test according to this manifold is matrix of concern and involvement that I have going right things are not treated theoretically right so I'm not looking at the keyboard saying hmm that's the keyboard etc etc right I'm treating them is something that just comes and goes as it were and things are treated in terms of their dealings right now this is what Hyder introduces his really most important concept for this entire section of the world hood of the world that is the idea of the readiness to hand what the readiness to hand he says that we've been talking here about the idea of things in terms of the present at hand to the present to hand in terms of when something is taken as a conscious theoretical object to a right when I want to understand being in a theoretical sense that's the present to hand but there's this other motive compartment the ready to hand and ready to hand concerns when my my when I'm describing my fact achill mode of existence in which I'm treating using things as I go now excuse me I apologize now the German term against here is the zoo huntin height so this is the term you should use you can say the ready to him but the zoo huntin is ultimately was talking about now the president Han is the for London and the ready tan is the zoo wanton okay and he wants to say that when we talk about the way in which we're sitting at the desk when we're involved in terms of use we're talking in terms of a really different mode of comportment a different form of intentionality if you will of course the most famous example to how to Kirk is is that of the hammer he's very fond of talking about hammers but think in fact just recently I might we have flooded my house and so I had to I don't rehab' Marin all to face boards that are on the lower floor of the building I was using a hammer and when I use a hammer I just grabbed it and I nail things and I use it I never consider the hammer as a theoretical object right and sort of interesting because I noticed that as I was working I would frequently lose my hammer because I'm obviously not a construction worker I've heard up that's obvious but I'm not I'm not very good with construction and so I sort of lose it and part of the resent losses because when it was no longer useful to me I would just set it to wherever was available to me right I would lose track of the hammer and that's an indication of the motive compartment in which I treat the hammer as something to use I don't treat it as a theoretical object it's literally ready to hand in the sort of literal sentence now we talk about the difference between the present two hand on the one hand and the ready to hand on the other sorry for all the references to hands I know it's it's a little bit overwhelming and confusing the present two hand could is this notion of looking without circumspection okay now circumspection is an important sort of term that frankly I'm not sure where Heidegger thus far and being in time before this point has really been able to articulate and define what he means by circumspection but you're gonna see it's really really important and so what do you think circumspection means right circumspection is the idea that I can move around something and I can see it from different angles and different perspectives and that doesn't necessarily have to be a description of something physical right I can understand something and treat it in terms of use in a variety of different ways right when I treat when I want it when we look to something in terms of the present to hand there's no circumspection because I'm trying to understand as a theoretical objectivity as it is in itself right consider for instance here what mathematicians are doing when they're asking the question what a prime number is right they're trying to understand what a parameter is at its essence regardless of circumspection right they don't want to know what what it's like for you to use a prime number or what it's like for you to use a printer they want to know what a prime number is without circumspection now by contrast the ready to hand is as form of consciousness of conscious involvement and being activity that is fundamentally one of circumspection where i am looking at it from these different angles in these different ways right on 69 hi it's the peculiarity of what is proximately ready to hint is that in its readiness to hand it must as it were withdraw in order to be ready to hand quite authentically right that is there's this weird part that when I treat things in the r18 I have this circumspection of things but there's a way in which there things which are ready to hand sort of withdraw and disappear back into my world right so like just recently I just a moment ago I just used the example of a pen and I just set the pen down and I kept talking and clicking through the slideshow here and you can see at that moment the pen in terms of my circumspection and in terms of my involvement with it sort of withdrew and sort of became if you will camouflaged and into all the other entities that are populating my desk well why because this withdraw is related to the idea that I think I was no longer concerned with it right I was no longer how did dealing with it as such right so the zoo on he's trying to get in try our ticket at the zoo on in here right so what are some of the considerations about the zoo Hannam do we should recognize well we talked about the zoo on it we're saying that things that are produced are made for the ready to hand right so when you make for instance I've been drinking this Cup as I've been talking and I apologize have sort of reticulum my throat today that but this cup was manufactured for someone why well it was manufactured in order for it to be ready to hand right so that people could drink out of it okay right it wasn't created as a you know whoever made this probably someone in China might even say when we made this Cup do not make the cup for it to be an object of philosophical examination ironically we're doing that right now kind of um they may need to be ready to hand something to use so production is organized towards the ready to hand right that's interesting number two year not all the things that are ready to Hannah it necessarily produce them right so for instance he gives the example of animals in a sort of kind of non environmental ethicist way right he talks about they did it animals are born and created in the world but animals don't they're not created to be treated at the ready to hand right but we do treat them to the red eating and when we eat them right when we kill them and eat them they become objects to use right now it's interesting Heidegger doesn't tell us but it's interesting too maybe on the sidelines here think about constant systems regarding the treatment of persons here and what it would mean to treat someone in a person in the zoo London which of course is something we do in fact do right persons considered the way the physician treats the person the patient who's lying on the ground bleeding right they'll treat the person as something to be used and not used in the sense that they're trying to do one thing for another but they treat their body they're trying to they treat them as a task to deal with right and that could be in the zoo home it interesting I know so and by the way it's important to recognize that the zoo Han and the boron do not have an ethical implications here for Heidegger I just think there's some interesting questions we might want to be thinking about now as the environment is discovered nature is thus encountered so so this sort of interesting here so I have this environment this around where this felt that's around me and I'm concerned and I'm dealing with it and as I'm discovering my environment nature is gets encountered right and remember this term nature for Heidegger always gonna sprit Iman signature and right so nature gets encountered I begin to recognize that there's certain sorts of things in the world which are the way they are outside of me and I must concern my involvements in accordance with how they are right and so nature gets encountered and of course from there it's just a short hop and skip away from a theorization about nature and what nature means in a sort of scientific sense you can you can see here and by the way notice that the scientist treats nature in the present to hand that's important now when da side works not only does it encounter things as ready and but it also discovers entities that are like docile so that's another really really big important part is and we'll see this week um playing a large role at the end of division one for Heidegger which is namely that da sign recognizes that there's other beans that are also acting in a concern for manner towards the world and they're treating the world as it were in the zoo honden right now readiness to Han is the way in which entities is that I'm sorry remember this readiness to hand is the way in which entities as they are in themselves are defined on to logic Oh categorically right so this is part of one of the things that hider is constantly doing is he's sort of plugging in here a specific terminological distinction for what you means here right so of course so it's the ontological categorical ization of things that they're ready to hand treats them it's not sort of important here and I put a clock up here as an example right now one of the questions that's worth interest that's worth asking here is number one is the Borana or the zoo London logically Park which one is more fundamental and the order of hydras treatise he began by with the present and but now he's introduced the ready to hand in the distinction so which one of these is more fundamental which one's logically prior certainly for DAW signs facticity Heydrich is gonna argue that the zoo Hanten is right and I realized that a misspelled German word here so for all my Germans watching my apologies and for everyone else too now one of course is the relationship between the two becomes an important question and this leads us to section 16 which i think is a little bit obscure section actually but paragraph 16 is how the worldly character of the environment announces itself in the entities within the world right the world's not an entity in the world so in what way is there a world this is an important question because entities exist in the world the world is not itself a being in the world right because the world is where the B bizarre so what does it mean to talk about a world well every day MIT pardon me the everydayness of da sides being in the world is the first thing to see here right is that is that da sign in its everyday sense has different modes of concerns right has different modes of concerns so some of those are zoo honored and some of them are more haunted actually right so this is how we encounter the worldly character of things right now considering a couple different things here right for example some something ready to him becomes unready to him for instance consider a broken computer now he says for instance that it looks like what can happen is you're like when I he of course doesn't give the example of a computer but you'll be fine with the example I'm using the computer and suddenly the computer stops working and then it's no longer available to me in order in terms of the order of the concern I have right I can't type my paper I'm upset and frustrated so there's something wrong with the computer and so then the question becomes at that moment because it's no longer something that's usable the computer can potentially become present to hand to me I start to consider what's wrong with this computer what is this computer exactly how can I figure it out how can I understand what it is essentially that is how can I reframe it as a theoretical objectivity so that ultimately I can give back to using it right we've all in Prague brought some of you watching this today in fact I've had to deal with a computer that stops working and you suddenly have to sort of move out of the zoo on and into the vorilhon it right so pure present at hand announces itself in such equipment but only to withdraw to the rayna's hand of something else so we get sort of these sporadic moments of the present to him but as it were everything always seems to go back to the readiness to hand sew the unusable 'ti of objects and the ready to hand in terms I'm sorry the unusable objects are ready to hand in terms of obtrusive news it became present to him and no more right so you're talking about obtrusive nests in the section Heidegger talks about sort of three different ways that this can happen or three different attributes of the sort of ways of our involvement and that is in terms of the conspicuousness of things the obtrusiveness of things in the obstinacy of things okay so ultimately on 74 we read that the structure of the being of what is ready to hand his equipment is determined by references or assignments right so here's important how I know how to use things depends on upon number one how I'm referring something something else but it also depends upon how I assign things and I understand something right this is very very important because this means that we ultimately have to understand what it means to have a sign and what it means to have a referent and we're gonna see he comes to this in a little bit now because when equipment breaks you get a disturbance started another misspelled word and the Asturian sort of announces itself the environment announces itself anew and so we get a sort of disclosure so it's quite interesting here because Heidegger seems to be giving us this example of that when things go wrong we actually become we can use our observation as a means for better understanding what it is things really are in our average everyday life they're given a zoo Hanten right so in such private expressions as inconspicuous 'no son obtrusive 'no sin non obstinacy well we haven't view is a positive phenomenal character as the being of that which is approximately ready at hand and then he also writes in the next page that which can be lit up most that which can be lit up and lit up means for him sort of when things may become apparent to me when I sort of see something it's lit up right so that's what you can be lit up must already be disclosed it's already in my environment and disclosed to me so the world is therefore something we're in da sign as an entity already was and if in any manner it explicitly comes away from anything it can never do more than come back to the world right Dawson is always propelled back into the world with something right and so that's really sort of an interesting partner and you can see here that is slowly crafting a more rigorous conception of what world it is now we talked about references and I mentioned just previously the idea that this means that we have to ultimately uncover a better do a better job of understanding what a reference what references and signs are okay so we come across equipment in terms of science so I recognize something as an equipment because there's certain signs and these are given phenomenally to me but I recognize certain signs regarding what those things are what those beat what the being of those entities consistent insofar as i can use it for my concern my dealings etc so the sign structure actually provides an ontological clue whoa for characterizing any entity whatsoever right so this idea that we have signs is really important right because signs show and they indicate right now referring or referencing is a way of relating things together and there's an asymmetry here because not every referring is a sign but every sign doesn't referring right so that's an important point here or here it is I have a room every reference is a relation but not every relation is a reference so those they asymmetry again now among the signs or symptoms right so to recognize a sign is to recognize what it points towards right but the before I recognize the sign I recognize symptoms that are related to the sign traces residues documents testimonies etc and when he says residues yeah I can't help but consider here the the way in which Edmund Husserl utilizes the language of the residual um or a phenomenological residual so when I see something I can use and I recognize I recognize side there's also residues of mean there may be are sort of on the outskirts and related to Heidegger actually gives the example of a turn signal in a car and of course I this is not a car from when Heidegger was alive but he gives the example it's it's funny too because all of our cars up turn signals not but he says some cars now have turn signals right so what does it turn signal doing right well the sign is an item of equipment which is ready to hand for the driver it is concerned with driving right so it's good it's so for instance as I'm driving the car I use the turn signal and it's a part of equipment that's ready to hand for me as the driver but guess what it's also something that's ready to hand as a sign for the people behind me so they can see where I'm going right and so these are this indicates some of the symptoms that sign some of the signs and symptoms as it were right now here's a couple quotes I've gotten and by the way I should mention it as I was putting together his presentation if you can't sort of overwhelming and I wasn't into a good job of always including the pagination so I'm just following I should know I'm just following Heidegger systematically and pretty much everything I have in this presentation comes from a directly if not directly a parent i paraphrased it so but where I couldn't where remembered I included a citation so my apologies you'll do better hopefully when you write your papers no here's some quotes here so this indicating which the sign performs can be taken as a kind of referring right but here we must notice that this referring as indicating is not the ontological structure of the sign is equipment right so when we talk about the way in which the sign refers that's not an ontological description here okay instead referring as indicated is grounded in the being structure of equipment in terms of serviceability for right so if we're gonna talk about the ontology of equipment and we can say is that referring is a part of the structure the ontological structure for equipment remember we said equipment was a phenomenological determination and so that means that equipment has a beading structure and that beam structure takes its place in terms of the serviceability of things right so things are serviceable in terms of how they refer right etc etc so indicating as a reference is a way in which the towards which of the serviceability becomes on tically concrete right so we so this is sort of where you can sort of link up here at the refering and the non ontological sense with the ontological sense that is the ontological sense becomes concrete as a kind of referring within the equipment right so signs what does that mean about signs signs address the circumspection of our concern for dealings two signs let the ready to hand be encountered and secure our orientation and concern foot ceilings right because remember signs are helping me organize how I'm going to work with things so I have this keyboard here and notice that I have these little squiggly letters on top of the keys right those are signs they indicate and refer certain functions for the machine right andthey and so those signs organize and orient me in terms of my concern full feelings right so what I'm trying to write something that that's hot that is the description of my fact achill involvement with the keyboard right one important type of activity of course is the establishment of signs and interestingly enough this is what Heidegger's really doing right in the whole text Heidegger is laying out systematically a whole new set of philosophical terms what are these terms their signs and what are these signs they're referring where I what are they referring well namely the involvement of da signs activity in the world as a being in the world right but the establishment of a sign does not necessitate the production of equipment so just because you established a sign it doesn't mean you have to make things that are ready to hand right so the wider the extent of a sign the narrower the eligibility and the usefulness will be right so that's quite interesting sort of dichotomy to think about here again the wider in the extent to the side the more that a sign signifies the narrower and the and the narrower the usefulness of that sign will be now think here for instance of a sign for something that's quite quite large in its extender quite wide and you'll see there's not a the wider something a sign refers to something then the less useful it really can become for me so it's quite interesting sort of dichotomy no high degree indicates that there is a threefold relationship between signs and references now I should mention that philosophically there's a very long and a huge literature about signs and references and I'm not going to go into any of that now but you should be aware that there's a lot of other fall Spurs especially I'm thinking of Freya for instance and Vic and Stein who are concerned with these same issues of course from a very different point of departure than Heidegger okay so what are the threefold relations between these well one there's an indication indicating is founded upon the equipment structure as such right so it depends upon this structure of the equipment in terms of what gets indicated and how to the indicating which the sign does is an equip mental character of something that's ready to hand right okay that makes sense number three the sign is not only ready to hand with other equipment but in its readiness to hand the environment because in each case explicitly accessible for circumspection so you can see heidegger's bringing back into his analysis here he's folding it in the way of Baker folds in flour and butter right he's folding back in his recognition of the way in which the environment plays a fundamental role in terms of it they're the new belts concerned the current concern for dealings I have in the room belts right so he's bringing down here so what we say here is that on 82 a sign is something that's on tickly ready to hand which functions both has this definite equipment and as something indicative of the ontological structure of readiness to hint of referential totality and of world hood right so the world part of the world is given according to these indicating signs of my concern for involvement regarding what the zoo hauntin so what I want you to remember as we've been going through at this is the one we talk about the world hood of the world this is where we're talking about the zoo hundun okay and in the zoo honden is to talk about our involvement with the world and this is what signs are doing when they indicate things to me right here's what I do before I continue this because I this video is I'm almost an hour in I'm gonna stop this video I'm going to start up on part two with this the involvement and significance the world hood of the world so and then in part two we'll conclude part three the world hood of the world okay so that's what we've got going on thanks guys for watching I know there's been a long video I hope it's helpful and interesting we'll see you guys online bye

Channel: Mark Thorsby

Views: 7,358

Keywords: Heidegger, Being and Time, Sein und Zeit, The Worldhood of the world, Dasein, existentialism, phenomenology, ready-to-hand, zuhandenheit, present-to-hand, vorhandenheit

Id: d-X_XQ5ecOE

Length: 52min 8sec (3128 seconds)

Published: Sun Apr 03 2016