Baptism of Fire: Germany's Lost Victory in 1914

it's a long way to tiary it's a long way to go it's a long way to temperary so the sweetest girl I know goodbye pck A Farewell let us s it's a long long way to but my heart right there it's a long way to Temporary it's a long way [Music] [Applause] to nice to get applauded before You' said anything is it I must be a very popular chap because this is the third Conference of mine you've all come to so thank you very much welcome everybody uh thank you for giving up the World Cup Silverstone Wimbledon and the henryy rata so obviously all nons sporting types uh but we've got a a very full program of uh very distinguished academics today um and I'm sure we're going to have a a really stimulating morning and afternoon uh I would just ask as we got such a tight schedule if the speakers would kindly I'm sure they will stick as close as they can to the timing uh Colin Wagstaff will begin to jump about and make sort of noise noises or uh signs like that if we're overrunning but um Don't Panic everybody will get a chance to uh ask questions we'll have two ring mics today so uh there'll be plenty of opportunity to make yourself heard uh I think one of the nicest things about today is that we're looking at both sides of the Hill uh as is right and proper and uh we've got uh to use a transatlantic term a great leadoff hitter today in Bob froley one of the foremost experts on the German Army in the first war his book German strategy and the path to veran won the Gladstone price from the Royal Historical Society in 2005 is also uh edited a book of bonin's writings and uh somewhere in no man's land I gather at the moment is a new book by Bob on the the German Army in the first world war which we all eagerly await I'm sure so uh with f without further Ado Bob [Applause] PR uh good morning and uh thank you all very much uh for uh coming out today uh it's always a pleasure to be sort of one of the early speakers you can usually guarantee that the audience is is uh is is pretty awake and pretty Lively um and that's always always a nice thing I I I'm always sort of usually stuck kind of just after lunch which is one of the worst times to to to be giving a giving a talk uh and thank you all for coming out this morning as well again uh I don't know very much about kind of the sports so I'm not really missing anything but I I take it there's some big ones that are going on uh at the moment uh so I appreciate you coming out and and and listening to us to us here um I'm going to be talking today about sort of the German Army in 19 1914 uh particularly on the Western Front because Peter's going to be uh looking at the at the Eastern Front um I asked was asked to sort of talk a little bit about about with the bef and I I will try to do that uh but it it's worth noting that the bef didn't feature that prominently in German thinking in 19914 um and didn't really feature very prominently in German thinking until much much later in in the war so there are some obviously some key elements and key moments when the bef came into sort of German um sort of um aspects of the of the war but for the Germans their main enemy on the Western Front was the French uh and this was a a key kind of element to to to German German thinking about uh about how to prosecute the campaign and then obviously the campaign in 19914 um there's been a lot of writing recently about the sort of lack of enthusiasm or at least the IG ambiguity of enthusiasm within Germany at the outbreak of the first world war in some respects challenging the the sort of previous assumptions about the uh War enthusiasm but there's one group that was incredibly enthusiastic for War uh and that was the the German Army leadership uh Recent research by people like anuka Mower and hogar alabach have demonstrated the extent to which which um helmet fun Mol the younger and uh Eric V Falconhead were actively pushing the government into war um you may have seen some some of the 37 days with its caricature of of of both mka and Falcon Hine um but they get that element to a certain extent right these were two people um who were at the head of the German German Army um or German armies who were pushing very hard for for war to break out in in 19 1914 um the quotation here is from Eric V Falen hein's diary uh from the uh 1 of August 1914 uh I I it always sort of strikes me when I when I when I look at this this uh this this quotation um for a range of reasons one it's it's looking at where the mobilization order was signed the symbolism of signing this on a on a table constructed from wood from uh from from HMS Victory um and then of course it's the the emotion that the two men felt uh of going to war this was something that had been long planned had been long thought about and long hoped for by by many within the within the German Army in particular they were looking for a settling of scores once and for all with their uh their their Archen enemy the French um so this was an opportunity for both mka and for the the uh the rest of the German German military establishment and indeed they were proud of the meticulous preparation that they had put into uh to War uh there's some statistics up here about the sort of different periods German Army went through a mobilization period where the units were brought up to strength bringing in reservists and this reservist is an important element and I'll keep coming back to that as we go along uh through this through this through this talk um 21,000 trains uh two 2 million almost 2 milon 2.1 million men 118,000 horses were moved in the mobilization period alone uh then the German Army went into its deployment period so once the units were brought up to strength these units were then moved to their assembly areas to be ready to to uh to start the invasion of of of France again this required about 11,000 trains moving 3.1 million men and almost um uh uh 850,000 horses this is a a massive undertaking um for for for any army now obviously the French are going through this the Russians are going through this at the same time but by way of some some comparison in 1870 when the German Army mobilized for its its uh its earlier war against France they had 1300 um mobilization trains moving Army of uh of 550,000 with 157,000 horses so you get a sense of the scale and how things have changed and moved on by 1914 and this scale and this change would create a whole host of problems for the German Army and not just the German Army in in 1914 how do you command an army of almost three million men spread out over over hundreds of kilometers this is this would create challenges that that that most armies would struggle with in the early days in 19 1914 now the mobilization went pretty pretty uh pretty smoothly uh I put the slide up here about Le because Le was a key element to uh to the to the German deployment plan this isn't about their about their War plan this is about how they move their armies and get them into position to move into into northern northern France Le offered a uh a key Rail Link uh and if they didn't capture Li this would create all sorts of problems for the German deployment plan indeed the German deployment plan had in it as as a as a secret orders that if the if the uh attack on Le had failed that they would violate Dutch neutrality as well uh in order to move their armies um across across these borders so Le is a key element uh six brigades were held at at at high Readiness um uh and moved across the the uh the Belgian Frontier on the night of the 5th of August in order to take to take this Citadel by audom that obviously didn't didn't happen completely they had mixed success some of these brigades made it through um uh and indeed bits of the Fortress surrendered very very quickly however the outer ring of forts didn't uh and they needed to bring up these sa secret weapons these super he heavy howitzers including the 42 CM howitzers um in order to to break the back of these forts as well it took until the 16th of August for these forts to finally uh uh finally surrender uh with some pretty spectacular destruction along along the way demonstrating the the strength and the uh uh um the power of these uh heavy heavy uh super heavy howitzers as well so although there was a delay in capturing leage it didn't really sort of impact German deployment plans uh uh particularly badly I I'll come back to that too uh there propaganda postcard um mailed on the uh the 3rd of August so before actually uh the the invasion of Belgium took place uh it always strikes me as as an interesting interesting sort of view of of how Germans were seeing this at the time uh it says uh onto onto Brussels Belgium must be ours uh and you see the Jack boot sort of crushing Li as it as it sort of comes across the the the uh the river there um so from very early on you get this this this sense of of Germans had a deep understanding of what they were wanting to accomplish um from this and indeed the importance of Li even though this is uh ostensibly a state secret uh at this stage as well um the German Army deployed uh deployed seven armies in its western western Army uh about 78 divisions or so uh and about 1.3 million men um one Army uh in the in the uh in the East that that Peter's going to talk about in in a little bit I won't go into much much depth in that here but the East plays an important role in what happens in the west as well and I'm going to touch on that uh as we go along too this is a uh very complicated map a complex map of the of the French and German deployments in uh in uh in August 1914 there's no need to really sort of understand the detail of it but but I think what you can pull away from this is the complexity of this uh and indeed the the depth and breadth of the of the German German deployment and um you can see how the how how far north the German first and second armies are um and these are the sort of key armies of the of the German right wing they're going to slash through into into northern northern France and these key armies have got to squeeze through a narrow Corridor uh uh between the sort of the the German border and the uh and the Belgian border uh around around uh Li uh so they they've got to get in there and Li is absolutely crucial for rail Communications it's going to keep these two armies supplied with the the material that they need and indeed for communications back as well and I'll come back to that in a in a little bit too now where is the German High command in this the Oba has lighten well from the 2nd to the 18th of August they they were uh in uh uh in in in Berlin um coordinating things the 18th of August is when the German uh deployment or the deployment of the German uh uh Western armies was complete it's when the Great Army maneuver as uh Gard happen the chief of operations called it could be could begin on the 18th of August the OHL moved uh to to k um in order to have some some greater control of of of what was what was going on in the uh on the Western Front though as we find this was a real challenge uh the OHL was was going to going to rely upon um uh telephone Telegraph and radio communications with its armies in order to in order to coordinate their their activities um blend proved too far back it had some real strengths and it was based obviously within German territory it had sort of German Communications um that were that were there uh but as the armies Advanced deeper into France communication became more and more challenging with the with the uh the the OHL um on the 30th of August they moved to to to Luxembourg in order to be closer to the front and in order to to communicate a little bit better um but that was about as close as they could as they could get mulka was tied in part by the Kaiser uh the Kaiser accompanied the the headquarters into the field and um it was perceived that he couldn't get too close to the front for fear of of an attack and and the risk to the Kaiser's life as well so we can see some of the ways in which some of the constraints were placed on the the the OHL early on and how um how molka didn't didn't want to uh to challenge this at this stage and in some respects he didn't feel the need to when you look at the sort of view from the the OHL things looked like they were going really well uh these are extracts from some of the reports that the OHL and and some of the Diaries of officers within the OHL uh during this during the early stages of the campaign in in in the west um on the 12th of August the French army had been quote routed um at mulhausen by this by the sixth Army um uh on the 23rd of August the fourth Army has won a great Victory you see constantly these these terms sort of popping up of these these these wonderful victories and and how um the AR the enemy armies had been routed defeated beaten annihilated um these were all charged terms for for for for German observers at the at the time and indeed on the 25th of August Hans vlen the head of the German German headquarters um wrote in his diary that a quote modern-day sadan was developing on the on the Western Front again this is a charged term this is something this is this is a a German sort of U shorthand for an annihilating Victory um that that that was being conducted on the on on the Western Front so the OHL is perceiving things in in very Rosy terms these are the reports that they're getting back from the armies in particular the second Army uh and I I'll come back to that as we as we go go along um and indeed uh the normally quite uh um um levelheaded vilhelm Groner even sort of Records this in his in his uh his diary on the on the 3rd of September I won't read you the the entire quote but you can see this up here about how enthusiastic he is about what's going on and how he believes that this is all going to plan uh and that German Victory is is is just within uh within grasp um so the OHL thinks things are going really really well on the on the at the front um of course there are some people who are questioning okay where are all the guns where are all the standards where are all the prisoners um but in the heady enthusiasm of this this this period um people were were were quite um uh were quite optimistic about about their own chance again reflected in the propaganda of the day uh here are the Germans having beaten the the uh the the French and and the Russians uh now laying into to their British allies as well um the only real fly in the ointment uh in the days before the the September was what was going on in the Eastern front and again I won't go into that in in any in any real depth um but the initial sort of reports were that the eth Army was withdrawing uh against orders um from a a uh uh the Russian enemy and again sort of dire entry from from Hans Von plen here sort of captures the the the fear that that was that was in the um uh in the minds of many in the OHL about what this represented in the problems that this that this this would quote that this would this would create um ghard toen again the the uh the operations officer in in the OHL wrote of this uh this period later um quote the overwhelmingly favorable reports that arrive daily in conjection in conjunction with the great victory of the sixth and seventh armies in lra from the 20th to the 23rd of August caused the high command to believe that the great decisive battle in the west had been fought and had gone our way under the influence of the quote decisive Victory unquote the chief of the general staff decided that the moment had come when considerable forces could be transported to the east in order to seek a decision there as well unquote so on the 25th of August uh the OHL ordered two Army Corps and some other units to be sent to the Eastern front in order to to uh to to stabilize the the elements there and to uh and to to to bring about the decisive Victory against the against the Russians as well things looked slightly different from the front line um the armies as they were going forward faced all sorts of issues and all sorts of problems there's consensus that the cavalry failed in one of its primary missions of strategic reconnaissance it didn't know where the enemy was um the first Army for example had no idea where the bef was uh were they uh on the continent at all some intelligence suggested that they hadn't even landed um other intelligence suggested that they were at Leo some that they were at antp um nobody had any real idea of where the bef might be found or indeed much of the French army where where was this um this caused the the first Army for example to heavily Echelon it its forces to the to the right as it was advancing through uh uh through Belgium into northern France so when the first Army met the the bef at moms it its Echelon forces had to come a much greater distance in order to come in to get into the battle as well so um the first Army wasn't in a good position to to uh decisively defeat the bef or or indeed that entire wing of the French army because it didn't really know where these elements were so this uncertainty on the the battlefield was a was a key element in which in which the armies the armies operated um another kind of key thing was the state of the army itself particularly as the as the campaign developed and as it as it went went went forward um the quotation here is from the deployment directives of that the OHL uh uh issued U at the out outbreak of the war that stressed the need and the importance of of uh protecting these reservists um most of the German Army was made up of reservists these were people who were called back to the colors and who fleshed out these units on on mobilization um the youngest people were were obviously um reasonably fit but many of them had been out of the army for for a considerable period of time and were no longer at the peak of their their physical physical fitness so ostensively there was great care to be to be given to these reservists that the marches weren't to be too exhausting particularly in the early stages of the of the campaign while these these men took their time to uh uh to to get back into into shape and while indeed the units sort of came together and and and and fleshed fleshed out the reservists were the backbone of this German Army um and this is in active Army units as well as the reserve units about half of the of the active units were made up of the younger um uh reservists and then obviously there Reserve units that were about a quarter um uh active duty personnel and uh the rest made up of various classes of reservists of various ages as as well um however this wasn't always the case um German propaganda would sort of sort of have us see these uh these fit young men marching off to war surrounded by the the ghosts of their ancestors uh surrounded by the ghost of milka the mka the Elder um bler uh uh Frederick the great um the reality of course was was was very much different the third Reserve Corps for example had lost over a thousand Men by the 14th of August this is before operations had really really begun these are men who are falling out because they they couldn't keep up with the with the the physical regime the seventh Reserve Corps um was termed by it its uh it commanding officer Hans vvel uh as quote not suitable for Modern War unquote uh this is a a a a well sort of uh experienced officer who was looking at his reservist saying look these guys just aren't up to this these modern-day campaigns and the demands these these modern day campaigns um the seventh Reserve Corps was asked to March 150 km in uh in in 5 days uh from the 20th to the 20 25th of August um a considerable um sort of area I was looking on the map on the on the train on the on the way up or I was looking at a a news story about the tour def France and there's a leg that goes from Cambridge to to to to London that's 155 kilometers um so can you imagine walking that in in in in 5 days fighting along the way as well it gives you some sense of of what these guys were were um were were up against here um again a a uh slightly complex map one you you probably won't be able to won't be able to see very well um but I put this up here to highlight the movements of this is the map of the the movements of the first Army um from the 20th of August um uh up to uh the uh the the 5th of September um it gives a sense of of how far these these men are are are Marching and in particular the core and the units that marched the furthest in the the Western campaign in 1914 were the reservists it was the uh seventh Reserve division which was part of the the fourth uh Reserve Corp which was on the outer outermost wing of the uh of the the German German rightwing between the 17th of August and the 5th of of of September it marched 471 km so an incredible sort of amount of of of of of space face that these reservists these sort of part-time soldiers were being were being asked to asked to do but it wasn't just the reserve units that were we're suffering uh on the 27th of August the um uh the 19th Army Corps an AC of Duty Army Corps uh reported his Commanding General reported quote um he could not guarantee that they would be fit for combat um in a in a future battle because of the exertions of the marching that they they were going through and obviously fighting along the way as they as they as they went so the German Army was was was having to go this great distance on foot um quite obviously um and uh made up of people who were not always suitable for for Modern War in in the in the view of its own of its own generals there were other problems as well too um there are a range of tactical issues that they faced um some research some recent research would have us believe that the the German Army in 1914 was a paragon of tactical vert you uh it wasn't uh there were good units and bad units as with with every Army but consistently there was a problem uh and that's it its units uh its infantry attacked without waiting for for artillery support in in early 1914 there was a consistent problem that was seen by the OHL and by observers at the at the front that that these units would would uh would go forward cost what it may uh to use the term from the the German um uh regulations for for the Infantry for 19 1914 uh I'm going to give one example it's a it's a rather extreme example but I I I think sort of captures this uh this this problem in essence this is the uh Infantry Regiment 116th Infantry Regiment again an active duty duty regiment a regiment that that that should have known sort of better and and and should have been at the peak of its of its of its powers um it had its baptism of fire on the 27th of August uh against a French enemy in placed in the uh in the woods around a village called uh anlo um there were the regiment had 70 officers and uh 2,921 men um in it and who attacked on on on this this day um by the time the day was over uh 50% of the officers 36 officers would be casualties and 35% of the men uh 101 were were were were casualties uh this was the bloodiest day that this regiment faced in the entire War uh the second bloodiest was at verone uh when they suffered 25 % casualties uh in in in terms of officers and 25% in in in men so it gives you a sense of sort of the High s scale of casualties that were going on now the problem for the 116th uh Infantry Regiment is that it attacked without waiting for any type of support at all attacked without waiting for for uh artillery support or even uh to deploy its machine guns to provide support in this attack as well the Infantry um just just launched into attack against the French or who were dug in in in in woods they couldn't see the French they didn't know the strength of the of the of the the French enemy um and they got they got stuck into a uh a a a a dirty Close Quarters battle that sort of accounts talk about of being with the bayet and entrenching tools uh without any particular support whatsoever um so this accounts for these these high casualties of this day as well and this was replicated if not in such an extreme fashion across the front uh were attacking without waiting for any artillery preparation without coordinating any artillery support um which meant uh that they that it was a a an infantry on Infantry battle or an infantry uh against an enemy supported by artillery and and machine guns as as well uh so the German infantry suffered horrendously um by uh in these types of attacks now this is reflected in casualty figures um the the Western Army um lost a total of 136,137 men uh uh by in August alone uh this is this is before we get into into September uh the Western Army had lost uh 265,000 or so um by the 6th of September so it gives you a sense of the scale of the of the losses that that are going on the average Army strength on the in the western uh of the western armies was 155,000 so again it gives you a sense of the of the scale of German losses um this is even before uh the the battle battle of the M now what can we see as some of the problems and challenges that emerg from this well some of the issues are are are are around command um there was a real disconnect between the the the uh High command and what went on uh at the front uh the distance grew uh and the complexity of communications grew as the the uh the German armies Advanced deeper and deeper into into France and so the OHL had had expected to rely upon sort of modern Communications expected to rely on on Telegraph telephone and um uh and radio to sort of keep keep up with what was going on with these with these armies that didn't that didn't really work on the eve of the marn in early September the OHL only had good Communications with the third fourth and fifth armies on the Western Front so there three armies that that it had only limited communic Communications with the first and second armies the the quote unquote decisive armies they only had radio communications and with that quite Patchy the first Army only had one transmitter that was capable of of of reaching the OHL um and it often took 24 hours for messages to pack pass back and forth between the OHL and the the first and second armies this was such a problem that by by the battle of the marn messages were arriving too late the first and second armies had Advanced too far um and and had were were doing things on their own and outside what the OHL was requiring of them um uh as time went on as well it's also created challenges how do you communicate between your armies uh cof F delman zingan the chief of staff of the SE the sixth Army uh complained in his diary of the problems created by these modern Communications and I'll read this to you a quote one can only give the barest of details over radio because everything has to be encoded this is a drudgery a true exchange of opinions uh such that can be seen in the files of the campaigns from mult the elders time is barely possible unquote so this element of being able to communicate and exchange information about what was going on in the front with the with the high command uh simply wasn't wasn't possible so the OHL relied heavily on liaison officers moving forward into to to to the to the front uh in order to sort of gain a sense of what was going on but also to bring its orders forward now obviously the most famous of those was rard Hench um that that went forward during the battle of the mar and ultimately resulted in the withdrawal of the of the the first and and second armies but this was happening throughout the campaign uh in in the East um and uh these relatively Junior officers are are moving forward trying to sort of make sense of what's going on without themselves having a real good understanding of what's happening in the front eye so communication is is a serious problem understanding is a serious problem as as as time goes on um I I put up this this diagram here this is a diagram of of uh the uh the doctrine for uh Communications in uh in 1914 that was existent in in 19 1914 now what we can see in this is is a couple issues that that that emerged during the campaign as well um note that there's no lateral communication between the armies the armies were expected to communicate with each other via the OHL and Via um via sort of um Germany itself so um there's very little sort of attempt to to create a Communications net between armies so the first and second Army as they're advancing in the third and fourth as as they're advancing into into northern France um wasn't able to communicate directly with each other uh so again they relied heavily on leaon officers going back and forward between these these uh these commands as well again relatively Junior officers often who are are trying to carry messages and trying to find each other um in in the uh in the chaos of these the these Battlefield the other problem that they had was a lack of communications troops um the uh head of the field um uh Communications troops was in the second Echelon of the OHL um which was further back in in Germany as well so he wasn't even brought forward he didn't know some of the problems that were going on of the communications with the OHL in the front and Communications between between armies as well so you get a problem of of not just sort of doctrine of how you're going to do things but also the the uh uh limited number of troops and their ability to actually affect Communications between units as as well so they've got real problems of communication um that are going on between armies and between the armies and the and the Uhl sometimes even within armies so units are moving forward and the troops aren't aren't actually sort of keeping Pace the communication troops aren't keeping Pace with the advance because they're having to lay cable um and uh and try to keep up with with with the advance German Army only also had 35 radio transmitters in in 1914 so not enough to to to go around either another problem of course you get is how do you actually sort of command over this vast scale again I alluded to sort of the the the differences between 1870 and 19 1914 in 1870 there are three German armies 550,000 men um in uh in 1914 of course there are seven armies uh in of of well over over a million men spread out over an immense distance with Communications as as a challenge as well this is an area before sort of developments in command such as Army groups so each Army in effect is fighting its own battle uh as the German Army is advancing into into into northern France the OHL was meant to play a coordinating role but with limited Communications and limited understanding of what was going on in the front can only really sort of um exercise that command with the third fourth and fifth armies the armies closest to it and the armies that quite Frank are not the most crucial crucial armies um so it's sending messages it's sending liaison officers to the to the first and second armies on the right wing and the sixth Army in particular on the on the uh on the left wing um Without Really sort of getting a sense of what what's going on and when you read the Diaries of these uh these commands um from the the the first second and and sixth armies they're often exacerbated by what the OHL is asking them to do um they don't get a sense that the OHL understands what what what what what conditions are like at the front as well the other issue you get you get of course is challenges of of command of course each of these armies is equal each of these Army commanders is equal and each thinks that they have the the the the secret to Victory again you particularly get this uh on the uh uh the the the rightwing the first and second armies uh uh clook and buo didn't get along buo in particular had had a very sort of um um a very well-defined view of of what battle should look like and and how battle should be conducted his view of battle is is very much a closed order event um so when gaps sort of developed between the second Army and the third Army and and the first Army this this threw buo into into a tizzy um and again you look at the Diaries of the time and as liaison officers are moving to the to the to the armies to the right and and left of him saying look close up we've got to we've got to close these gaps the first Army commanded by clo couldn't care less you they didn't care about about these gaps they were happy operating kind of on their own the third Army was a little bit a little bit more cognizant of it uh and fell under the the the second Army sort of sway a little bit a little bit more but you get these various sort of ideas about how battle should be conducted and who should be sort of winning this quote unquote decisive decisive Victory um indeed where was it to come from is it the first Army that's to deliver this plow is it the second Army uh uh clook and and buo both both belied that it was their army that was that was that was there to do it this even extended within the armies as well second Army is again a good example um budha had a terrible relationship with at least two of his core commanders um he wasn't even on speaking terms with with two of these men um from issues that came up some of which pre-war some of which from early days of the war as well so he didn't trust them they didn't trust the second second Army so you get these problems even within the sort of the the German German German armies of problems of of of uh of command there's also the issue of personnel um some of this is reflected in the health issues that that began to emerge as the campaign developed uh and indeed I I don't think this is simply a German Army issue I mean you see this obviously in the bef too with with senior officers either dropping dead of heart attacks or or uh or or or essentially being being too stressed to to carry out their their roles similar things were happening in in in the German Army too and I I think we don't really sort of appreciate the impact the the the mental impact this had on these commanders this kind of uh the the pressures of time and space that they simply weren't able to deal with effectively um we know for example that that budo certainly St suffered at least a minor stroke during the uh during this this campaign they put him out of action for for for a day or two his chief of staff um aov Lowenstein was also quite ill um during during his campaign and wasn't able to to exercise his duties effectively so real sort of operational sort of decisions were being made by relatively junior members of the uh of the the second Army staff on top of that Lowenstein was the German Army's Uh Russian army expert he'd spent the majority of his career in Russia studying the Russian army which begs the question why wasn't he Chief of Staff of the eighth Army um why was it valer um who didn't have any real innate understanding of the of the of the um of the Russian army similarly you look at the the first Army uh K was the German Army's French Army Expert yet it's the first Army is likely to to to meet the the British expeditionary Force so there are some pretty interesting questions about decisions that are made about about command and about suitability of people for for command within the German Army as well of course is not just these men who who are who are problem facing problems with their health um Howen the third Army Commander was retired on on health grounds um soon after the battle of the M mka himself um there many indications that that he had problems with the with the stresses and and the problems of the campaign indeed even before uh the campaign had had had begun so we see this sort range of problems that that that emerge um uh sort of on the eve of the battle of the mar the German Army by time it reached the mar is stretched in in many different different senses it's stretched in terms of it of its physical ability to keep keep fighting um his reservists are are are suffering indeed even his active duty units are are suffering from the exertions of these of these uh modern-day campaigns uh and indeed its command structure is suffering too uh it's suffering from the issues of communication and lack of knowledge about what's going on and good knowledge about what's going on in the front whether that's in front of an army or or particular unit or whether it's higher up at the at the the OHL communication between the units and the different various levels of command was also beginning to sort of suffer by the time of the uh of the battle battle of the marn um you get issues of of health and uh and indeed suitability for for for this uh High Press um uh high high paste campaign in in in France as well uh are these the right men can they actually do this um by the time they reach the Battle of mar they serious tensions within the western western Army um of course the OHL thinks that Victory is is is almost there the armies are are are less um are less sanguin about this um and indeed are reaching the stage where they're they're they're they're desperately in the need of a pause and arrest in order to in order to refit and to uh and to to recharge uh as well um so by the time the German Army reaches the mar it has these these inherent sort of problems and difficulties that are that are that are within it uh and and it's struggling to overcome these um the issue in terms of of of the mar itself again you see these emergence these problems emerge in response to the battle uh boo is uh uh over the over the moon or or he's he's he senses the the great difficulty great challenge that the Gap that's been created between the first and second armies into which the bef amongst other units um Advance um the first Army doesn't really care about this they're worried about the sixth French sixth Army emerging from Paris and importantly German Cavalry units that are that are operating in its rear echelons as well that are creating problems for its Supply um and and creating problems for for its for its operations as well so you get these two armies that are concerned with very different things um by the time the battle of the MN breaks out when the OHL representative reaches these armies uh it's got he has to try to make sense of what's going on um and he's got to try to evaluate the sort of where these armies are their strengths their weaknesses Etc um and uh and indeed he is the one that that that that decides that that to to order this with drawal now of course the evidence of the time really suggests that this is meant to be a tactical withdraw to buy the German Army a bit of time in order to in order to to regroup and to attack again um uh but we all know that doesn't that doesn't happen for a variety variety of of reasons um and of course the German Army is is struggling even with this bit of time that that the withdrawal buys to uh to to reform itself and it's falling back into the chaos of its of its uh rear area too uh that create additional problems Etc I think I will end this this this this there and I'm happy to sort of take some questions including after the mar and if people are interested in that as well okay thank you very much a long way to it's a long way to go it's a long way to tary to the sweetest girl I know goodbye P A Farewell Square it's a long long way to but my heart right there it's a long way to Temporary it's a long way to go it's a long way [Music] [Applause] [Music] Towell L Square it's a long long to the but my [Music] heart

Channel: The Western Front Association

Views: 118,585

Keywords: ww1, great war, 1914-18, first world war, western front association, WFA, 1914, German Army, British Expeditionary Force, BEF, War (Collection Category), Western Front (Military Conflict), World War 1 (Military Conflict), World War 1 (Event), Educational, History, War (Quotation Subject)

Id: -mudhjZe8X8

Length: 43min 12sec (2592 seconds)

Published: Sun Apr 12 2015