Aircraft CRASHES into Taxi and Bridge, WHAT happened?! | TransAsia Airways 235

[Music] imagine that you're sitting in a taxi the driver has just put on some soft music in the front and you're looking out to the window onto the grey clouds outside thinking about other things suddenly the left wing of an aircraft slices through your taxi before it hits the pavements next to you the aircraft tumbles into the river below what just happened stay tuned a huge thank you to curiositystream for sponsoring this video in this video i will tell you the story of trans asia airways flight 235. the flight in itself is very short it's only about three and a half minutes but in those three and a half minutes years of personal capacity issues organizational problems and technical malfunctions was brought together in the most tragic way possible this video will include the story of loss of life so sensitive viewers beware the circumstances who led up to this accident actually started several years earlier back in 2009 the captain of the aircraft we're going to call him captain a had just finished his duty in the taiwanese air force and he started to look for employment in the civilian sector he applied to become a airbus 330 first officer with a local taiwanese airline he was accepted in to start the court and he started going through his typewriting court but very quickly the instructors on this airline started noticing that this pilot had some problems the training reports indicate that he was falling behind the aircraft that he had problems learning procedures that his overall situational awareness as in knowing what's going on around him was was not at the level that was supposed to be and also he had problems prioritizing tasks and handling well on the stress he was given some extra training during the typewriting course but eventually the airline decided that he was not going to be successful in this so they stopped his training course this happened in march 2010 and a few months later in august 2010 he applied for another airline this time trans-asia airways and he was successful in his interview and he started his training on the atr 72 500 model this time he was successful in his training and he started working as a first officer he flew successfully as a first officer for about four years and in april 2014 it was time for him to go for his command upgrade train to become a captain during his command upgrade training there were further issues identified first of all the airline in itself didn't follow the correct command upgrade procedure as they had written that it was supposed to be done in their operations manual but also once the candidate got into the simulator there were obvious deficiencies being noticed he eventually failed his command upgrade simulator check and the reasons stated for him failing the check was incomplete knowledge of procedures and execution incomplete knowledge of qra checklists not applying full trust during a single engine go around incomplete knowledge of handling of an engine fire procedure and cockpit management and flight planning needs improvement so these are some fairly serious deficiencies right here and his case was brought up in front of a review board the review board in the airline decided that he should get a second chance so they put him through some extra training and after this extra training he managed to get through his final command check and he was released onto line training on the line during the line training further points about his capacity was also raised by other instructor pilot but eventually through some extra sectors of flying he managed to obtain his command and started working as a captain on the atr 72 500 fleet around this time transaction airwaves had also included a new type of atr into their fleet the atr 72600 which is a slightly more advanced model this meant that captain a now needs to do something called difference training which is where you go through a ground school course and eventually some simulated training to show how all of the new systems works in this new aircraft on the very last day of this conversion training the instructor was doing the training with captain a wrote in his training file that he may need extra training and also he added quite ominously now czech efatto endian failure of the takeoff procedures but eventually his commercial training was approved and he started flying on the line on the atr 72 600 which is the aircraft that is going to be involved in this accident now let's talk a little bit about these aircraft so both the atr 72 500 and 600 are considered quite modern turboprop aircraft they're equipped with two prattan whitney turboprop engines and these engines are equipped with a system called automatic take of power control system atpcs now what atpcs does when it's armed is that it monitors the power output of these two engines and if it senses that one of the engines are failing during the takeoff phase and it senses this by a reduction in torque output then it will automatically out of feather that failing engine using out of feather unit and afu outer feathering basically means that as the engine is failing the propellers will go from the position they were in to try to deliver trust into a position where they are just flailing in the airstream to give as little drag as possible the other thing that the atpcs system will do is that it will up trim the remaining still working engine this means it will increase the power output with between nine to ten percent so if it was given about ninety percent of power during the normal takeoff it will now give around a hundred percent and both these two actions the up trimming of the working engine and the outer feathering of the failed engine will increase the take-off performance of the aircraft during the takeoff phase both the 500 and the 600 had the atpcs system installed but there were some differences in how it was handled because it was supposed to be armed before takeoff and if it couldn't be armed that was an early sign that there might be a problem with the atpscs system the years prior to this accident there had been a number of uncommanded feathering events where the atpcs system had been deemed to be part of the issue so if the pilots tried to arm it and it wouldn't arm on the 500 model the pilots were allowed to take off anyway providing that they had checked prior to their departure that they had sufficient performance margin but on the 600 it was deemed that this was not prudent to do so they needed to reject the takeoff the problem was that trans asia airways had not properly communicated this difference to their pilots and since the majority of their pilots were used to fly in the 500 where they were okay to take off most of them were not aware that they had to reject the takeoff in case this happened on the 600 and this is going to become very important very soon on the 4th of february 2015 captain a was scheduled to fly four sectors it was supposed to start in seongshan where he was based then fly over to kin men and then back to seongshan and then do the same rotation once more he was scared to fly together with another captain captain b and this happens sometimes it's not a big deal it's when there's not enough first officers available for whatever reason two captains are perfectly okay to fly together also in the cockpit was a first officer who was doing his transition training from the atr 70 to 500 to the 600 and part of that training included that it needed to do a certain number of observation flights the first two flights of the day went out without any type of problem and on the third flight there was 53 passengers on board two cabin crew and three pilots making the total of 58 people on board at time 10 45 local time transacia flight 235 requested pushback and clearance from their stand in seongshan airport they were cleared the mucha to quebec departure which would take them through a right-hand turn and climbed into an altitude of 5000 feet on this departure there was also something called an endian out standard instrument departure and that's a specific departure route that you have to fly in case you have an engine failure because the sid the standard instrument departure that you were cleared might have higher obstacles on it that it's not um doable with single engine performance but there's no indication on the cockpit voice recorder that they ever discussed this nor any other part of an emergency before they took off the weather at the airport was quite nice it was covering cloud layer at 2800 feet good visibility and the wind was straight down runway 1-0 so that was going to be the departure runway captain b was going to be pilot monitoring for this flight he was sitting in the right-hand seat and captain a was the designated piloting command for all of these four flights and he was sitting in the left he was going to be published flying for the flight and they completed their pre-flight procedures as per standard operating procedures they started up both engines and they started taxiing out for departure now during the taxi out the cockpit voice recorder took up a lot of discussions between captain b and the first officer that was sitting on the jump seat it looks like captain b was actually instructing the first officers about the differences in the atr 72600 model but the problem here is that during the taxi out it's considered a sterile phase of light it's a part of the flight where we only are supposed to talk about really operational things and him instructing the first officer here could potentially disrupt a little bit the crm in between the two flying pilots as in captain a in this case was left outside of the communication he was just concentrating on taxing out while these two other pilots were talking to each other now before we get into the accident sequence i just want to share a short message from one of my sponsors who makes it possible for me and my team to create these type of videos now i know that you guys are watching my videos because you love learning new things and finding out the nitty-gritty nerdy details behind each story and if that's true you should seriously check out the sponsor of this episode which is curiosity stream curiosity stream is a high quality subscription streaming service with thousands of great non-fictional stories and documentaries from some of the best filmmakers in the world i am watching a series right now called what went wrong about the challenger shuttle disaster which is terrible but also really really interesting if you think peter that sounds really interesting well then consider supporting me by supporting my sponsor go down into the description click on the link which is curiositystream.com slash mentor pilot and the coupon code mentor pilot that will give you a whopping 25 off the annual subscription fee which is wait for it only 14.99 per year which is insane value for money now back to the video at time 10 51 and 39 seconds the aircraft begins its take off roll only four seconds later the pilot monitoring exclaims no atpcs armed the pilot flying exclaims really and the monitoring response but yeah takeoff inhibits and that's then repeated by the pilot flying remember we talked about earlier that if the atpcs system did not arm it could be an indication of some further problems well what's actually happened here is that deep inside of the outer feather unit on the number two engine engine on the right side a connector has started to have some problems the soldering on one of the connector pieces has started to develop micro cracks and because of those micro cracks the connector is not sending consistent signals to the atpcs and this is why it's not arming but this is where captain a takes his first of many mysterious decisions during this flight because even though both of the pilots have said take off inhibit indicating that they are aware that on the 600 they shouldn't continue to take off with this problem he now turns over and said okay continue the take off and the takeoff has continued the pilot monitoring seems to agree with that and it's impossible to know exactly why they thought this way but there is a possibility that because both pilots had flown their majority of their experience on the atr 72500 where they were allowed to continue to take off if their performance was sufficient it's possible that that's what kind of overrode in this situation a few seconds later pilot monitoring looks over and he realizes that the atpcs system has now armed and he calls this out he also calls out 70 knots which is the difference between the low speed regime and the high speed regime on the atr and the aircraft accelerates normally it reaches v1 rotate rotates normally brings its gear up after the gear is retracted there is a short conversation between the pilots of whether or not the atpcs didn't arm because the truss lever angle wasn't in the correct position but then they continue to climb about 40 seconds into the flight the tower controller calls up the aircraft and tells them to switch frequency over towards taipei departure control instead pilot monitoring reads this back and as it's reading it back there is a short noise in the cockpit indicating that one of the bleed air valves is now closing and this is the first indication that something is about to go wrong this is then immediately followed by the sound of the master warning going off in the cockpit and as this is happening the aircraft is in a right-hand turn climbing through 1200 feet what is actually happening is that that faulty connector inside of the outer feather units on the number two engine is now starting to send signals to the atpcs system that the engine needs to out the feather the system then reacts to this as in this engine has failed and it starts to auto feather the propeller the system also closes the bleed air valve on enemy number one and up trims it remember increases the power on that engine in order to maximize the available performance as this is happening the ewd the engine warning display inside of the cockpit shows correctly engine 2 flameout at takeoff and it also displays the checklist items that the pilot needs to go through but now a couple of things happens very quickly first of all captain a calls out i have control and it disconnects the autopilot the autopilot on the atr 72600 is a very capable autopilot it can handle an engine failure on takeoff because it can both outer trim the rudder and it has a powerful your damper that can counteract the asymmetric thrusts that comes from the engine failure but because captain a has now disconnected it it means that he now needs to hand fly the aircraft and that increases the workload both on him but the entire crew the second thing that happens is that captain a calls out i will pull back engine number one throttle this makes no sense because everything in the cockpit is indicating that it's the number two ending that is the faulty one even the ewd is saying so so pilot monitor responds with wait uh cross check but then he is immediately interrupted by captain a who calls him to engage heading mode because remember they're now following an sid that they cannot follow they have to turn over to the left to follow the engine out sid so captain b is momentarily distracted by this he enters the heading mode and gives a heading of 092 degrees to captain a and then captain b continues in to try to deal with the failure at hand but he hasn't noticed that captain a has already reduced the power lever back on engine number one the aircraft is now initiating a left-hand turn from 131 degrees to approximately 0.92 degrees heading it has an altitude of 1485 feet and the speed is about 106 knots reducing we're a little bit more than a minute into this emergency the pilot monitoring captain b is now running through the engine failure checklist he reads out engine flame out check and then up trim check and then out of feather check and to this pile of flying responds okay a few seconds later pilot monitoring looks up and it calls out check speed because the airspeed has now crept down to 101 knots which is only a few knots above the stall speed inexplicably the pilot flying responds to this with pullback number one and it pulls back the live engine even further unfortunately the pilot monitoring did not notice that apollo flying was doing this because he is still reading the checklist and he comes to a point where he says okay number two flame out is now confirmed and the flying responds with okay but he still does not add any power on the engine number one power lever at time 10 53 and 9 seconds the aircraft reaches its highest recorded altitude of 1630 feet at this point it doesn't have enough trust to continue to climb so the pitch mode changes over from iis which is a mode that provides a continuous climb to altitude hold only a few seconds after that the first stall warning sounds in the cockpit the pilot flying captain a recalls out terrain ahead and the pilot monitoring responds with okay check lower probably referring to the pitch for him to lower the pitch in order to get out of the stall now the first officer on the observer seat also chimes into the conversation and he says you're low and that's immediately followed by another stall warning and stick shaker the pilot monitoring looks over and he said okay push push back which sounds a little bit strange is probably referring to push push forward to get the nose down but remember this is a translation into english and the translation that might not be perfect but he also adds wait a second throttle throttle probably referring to the fact that the throttle is not coming up as part of the approach to stall recovery procedure now the pilot flying responds by increasing the power lever on engine number two and further reducing it on engine number one once again making the situation even worse the aircraft is now in a 20 degree left bank it has turned through the intended heading of zero nine of five degrees and it's now heading zero five zero degrees the altitude is descending they're at 1526 feet and the speed is back at 101 knots and now the pile of flying captain a is about to make his biggest mistake yet because five seconds later captain a calls out number one feather shut off indicating that he's about to actually shut down engine number one remember this is not his area of responsibility this is something that the pilot monitor should be doing with the use of the checklist and by cross-checking with his colleague the pilot monitoring responds with a number feather showing some possible confusion here but what you have to understand is that at this exact moment the aircraft is experiencing several stall warnings stick shaker and even stick pusher events at time 10 53 and 35 seconds the aircraft has stopped its left-hand turn and has now initiated a right-hand turn instead to try to crack back onto its track of 095 degrees this is where the pilot monitoring finally calls out a mayday mayday call to air traffic control and they're still on the tower frequency they haven't changed over yet but at the same time as the pilot monitoring is calling this may day call another call is heard in the tower which keeps the air traffic controller from properly hearing what transaction flight 235 is actually saying they just assume that they've gone back onto the frequency so instead of acknowledging the may they call air traffic control now calls them again to change frequency to the departure frequency instead in the cockpit the confusion is now getting worse and worse the first officer sitting on the jump seat calls out how come that it becomes like this and the pilot monitoring captain b says we've lost both we've lost both sides finally recognizing the severity of the problem when the pilot flying hears this he says uh restart the engine and he then repeats that exact same phrase seven times during the few seconds that are left of this flight because the aircraft has now descended through a thousand feet and is reaching about 500 feet when the pallet monitoring reaches over and puts the condition level of engine number one back up again and this initiates the engine restart procedure but it's just way too late at time 10 54 and 27 seconds the pilot flying captain a says his last few words on the cockpit voice recorder and those are wow pull back the wrong side throttle indicating that he now understood what has caused the problem all along as he's saying this the aircraft enters a left turn bank and when it does so it also enters an aerodynamic stall from which it will not be able to recover the bank increases from 10 degrees to 80 degrees as the aircraft is getting closer to a highway overpass of the key long river it impacts a taxi that is driving along the road and that exact moment is caught on a dash cam from a car behind the taxi the left wing then impacts the road and the railing on the side of the road before the aircraft continues down towards the kilon river and it's continuing to increase a bank which means that it impacts the river in an inverted position as the aircraft impacted river it broke into several pieces and 39 out of the 58 people on board were instantly lost that included all three pilots and one of the flight attendants after the crash some of the survivors managed to get out to a hole in the body and climb up on the wing to wait to rescue workers who were on site very very quickly another few survivors were actually trapped in a pocket of air in the back of the aircraft and the rescue workers managed to open the emergency exits from outside and the people could escape and now the investigation really started and luckily both the flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder were undamaged in the crash and can be examined quickly and from a very thorough investigation of both engines they could hone in on the faulty connector inside of the outer feather unit and therefore understand why the out of feathering event had started but then the investigators dug a little bit deeper and they started asking themselves why didn't the crew reject and very quickly they realized that this was probably due to organizational issues inside of trans-asia airways because by interviewing several of the pilots they found out that there weren't much agreement whether or not it was a mandatory reject if the atpcs system didn't arm on takeoff so this caused the investigation team to dig even further into the organizational issues inside of the airline and they realized that the command upgrade procedure that the airline had built and had approved by the authorities was not properly followed in the case of captain a it was also very clear that captain a had shown significant deficiencies during several training events before this happened not only in this airline but in previous airlines as well but this had not been properly captured and had not been seen as the threat that it obviously was to flight safety because dealing with an engine failure of the takeoff is something that we airline pilots are trained for every six months throughout our entire career there were several recommendations that came out of this accident a few of them were aimed at the engine manufacturers to make sure that this faulty connector was fixed and so that it couldn't happen again but most of the emphasis was actually put on the airline itself and this brings me to a really important point that i want you guys to take with you and that's the use of the term pilot error pilot error is a kind of slush term that is thrown in when people don't want to go any further when people don't want to dig into what the actual root causes behind an accident is yes in this case i know a lot of people will be saying in the comment section that this guy should never have been allowed near an aircraft and so on but that's not really the point the point here is that there weren't any sufficiently good selection processes and there weren't any sufficiently good training processes in place in this airline to help this guy and to stop him from progressing into command and this was exactly what the investigation eventually showed after this crash this airline was effectively grounded until they could show to the authorities that all of their pilots had the sufficient knowledge needed and competency needed in order to safely fly their aircraft this was the second crash within a few years with deadly outcome from this airline and it eventually led to the airline going bankrupt so it's not there anymore but whenever you hear the word pilot error you should be asking yourself but why why was it pilot error because unless the pilots have voluntarily made mistakes have broken rules and they know that they were doing something wrong there is something else at stake there's something else that we can learn from it in order to make sure that the airline industry becomes as safe as it's humanly possible now if you want to see a video where the pilot actually did break the rules voluntarily and ended up almost crashing into the sea twice in one day then check out the video up here and if you want to support me in the work that me and my team does for the channel consider becoming a part of my patreon crew or buy yourself a couple of merch t-shirts have an absolutely fantastic day bye

Channel: Mentour Pilot

Views: 873,949

Keywords: captain, mentour pilot, mentor pilot, crash investigation, full epsiodes, aviation, pilot, crash, air crash investigation, final report, boeing, airbus, piper, cessna, disaster, fatal crash, air incident, air disasters 2022, transasia airways flight 235, transAsia, taiwan, dashcam, cam footage, footage, 235, engine out deperature, sid, standard instrument, ATR, ATR72 600, ATR72 500, river, highway, turboprop

Id: xU0E-w-43Fc

Length: 26min 28sec (1588 seconds)

Published: Sat Feb 12 2022