The Tragic Story of UPS Flight 6! When Heroic actions just wasn’t enough.

[Music] very few things will stir more fear into the heart of an airline pilot than an uncontrolled in-flight fire the story that i'm about to tell you today should serve as a very good example as to why that [Music] a is thank you to blinkist for sponsoring this video the story of ups flight 6 really makes the hair stand up on my arms and that's not just because i'm a commercial pilot and understand the horrors of an in-flight fire it's also because i've been an airport firefighter and i've dealt with fires like this and i've been inside of a closed cabin when it's been completely filled with smoke that's why i want you when you watch this video to remember and understand why it's so important that you follow the restrictions that applies to traveling with lithium batteries never check them in to check the luggage always keep them on your person and make sure that the batteries that you do carry are actually allowed to be carried on passenger aircraft ups flight 6 started its travel in hong kong on the 3rd of september 2010. it's flown by a boeing 747 400 af aircraft that's a dedicated freighter and as a dedicated freighter it has several cargo compartments you have the lower compartments in the belly of the aircraft and then you have the main cargo compartment which is the majority of the body and then up in the hump of the 747 you have the cockpit in the front obviously and then you have the rest area for the crew in the back of it now on this day there was a mix of different type of cargo that was loaded onto the aircraft but in the main cargo hold in zone three on positions four five and six there were pallets loaded which had a significant amount of batteries inside of them mainly lithium batteries now these batteries should have been declared as dangerous goods because they are but for some reason the shipper had not done that so the flight crew was unaware of the position of these batteries and that they were on board and they were just loaded into their cargo positions now zone 3 and cargo positions 4 and 5 is located just below the hump of the 747 under the crew rest area and that's going to become important very soon the first light of the day which went from hong kong over to dubai was completely uneventful except for one thing sometime during the cruise the number one pack tripped off now the pack is a machine that utilizes bleed air from the engines and it mixes it up with cooler air from outside and then it provides air conditioning pressurization for the aircraft and the 747 400 has three different packs the number one pack provides it air primarily to the flight deck the cockpit and the upper area of the aircraft and pack number two and three provides the rest of the aircraft so this means that one pack tripping off is not a big deal the pilots just took up their quick reference handbook they read through the checklist and the checklist basically tells them to reduce the strain on that pack wait for a little bit and then push a pack reset switch so if that works the pack will continue to work again and there's no further crew action needed and this is exactly what happened when the crew came down onto the ground in dubai they told their engineering department that this has happened the engineering department had a look at it and they couldn't reproduce the fault but since the system was not working they could just continue with it the flight group that was handling ups flight 6 consisted of a 48 year old captain now he was fairly experienced flying the 747 400 and he was assisted by a 38 year old first officer now this first officer had more than 5 500 hours of total time but he only had a little more than 77 hours on the 747 so this means that he basically just started flying the type they looked at the weather for the second flight of the day which was going to take them from dubai up towards cologne bonn in germany and they saw that the weather on route was good the weather in dubai was beautiful so they decided that the first officer was going to be pilot flying for this second flight which is going to become the accident flight in the turnaround in dubai a couple of containers was removed from the lower cargo compartments but the upper cargo hall then specifically the pallets that was loaded in position four five and six were not touched they were in the same position as they were in hong kong and they were supposed to remain there for the flight over towards cologne the pilots got the aircraft ready for departure and at time 1441 utc that's 1841 local time they started pushing back and taxiing out for departure on runway 3-0 right in dubai the departure that they had been cleared to the run b2 delta would take them straight ahead of the departure and then it would turn them left onto a westerly direction for a little while out of the southern arabian gulf and then a slight right-hand turn would take them towards the north west towards the bahrain fir and since they were taking off during the sunset and they were climbing towards a westerly direction it meant that it was likely that they're going to be following the sunset and when we do this as we're climbing towards the west sometimes you can face sunset that lasts for more than an hour and it also means that you're going to have a lot more light inside of the cockpit the takeoff was initially completely uneventful the first officer hand flew the aircraft to an altitude of about 11 300 feet before he engaged the autopilot and continued to climb up to their planned cruising level of 32 000 feet the flight level 320 but as the crew climbed through about 10 000 feet once again the pack number one tripped off now the crew had already seen this once during the day so the captain just took up the quick reference handbook ran through the checklist said yeah all right so we're going to put trimer on and then try to reset it by added pack reset switch he did so and once again the pack one came back online again so they didn't think much more of it and they continued to climb but unbeknownst to the crew down in the main cargo hold inside one of the pallets one of these lithium-type batteries had now suffered a thermal runway for whatever reason and that terminal runaway meant that a fire started to burn and as the fire started to spread it affected more of the battery packs those also suffered thermal runaways and what you had is a chain reaction where a fire is now quickly building inside of this pallet one thing that you have to understand though is that the 747 freighter doesn't have any thermal cameras or anything that monitors the temperature specifically in the cargo hold what they do have are smoke detectors but the problem with smoke detectors is of course that in order for them to go off you need to have a sufficient amount of smoke for that to happen so this means that this fire has like started to burn and had been spreading inside of the palate for several minutes before there's any type of alarm going off in the cockpit so the pilot they're just continuing to climb up towards their cruising altitude happily unaware of what's going on in the back of the aircraft now before we go into the very rapid accident sequence that happens in this flight i just want to share a short message from my sponsor who makes it possible for me to produce these type of videos i think here in the beginning of the year that we're all trying to improve ourselves i'm trying to lose a few kilos and while doing so i love to find new ideas find inspiration or find new perspectives on things that i thought that i knew that's why i'm so happy to have blinkist as the sponsor of this episode because they are a fantastic resource in doing exactly this what they do is they have more than 5 000 titles in 27 different categories and they take those and they distill them down to their core which they call links this means that a book that will take you hours to read through will only take you maybe 15 to 25 minutes to listen to they do the same for podcasts something they call shortcast and a title that i am blinking through at the moment is the science of storytelling which i'm trying to implement the lessons from in my channel now if this sounds interesting to you then go down and click on the link here below which is blinkist.commentorpilot and that will give you access to a seven day free trial and after that you get 25 of the premium membership in blinkist so go down and start getting inspired today at time 15 12 and 54 seconds this is about 21 minutes into the flight a master fire warning bell goes off inside of the cockpit this together with the red master warning light indicates that there's a fire somewhere in the aircraft the captain looks down and quickly realizes that they're dealing with a fire in the main cargo deck he turns over to the first officer and says okay looks like we have a fire in the main cargo deck forward part i have control of the aircraft this makes the first officer now pilot monitoring and the one who's going to have to deal with a non-normal checklist and he also said i think we should return now this all happens within the space of about eight seconds which means that the decision to return back to the buy comes very quickly and without any real discussion between the crew now part of me understands that because a in-flight fire is among the worst things that can happen to any pilot and especially on a cargo aircraft where the likelihood of this being a spurious warning is much lower would definitely kind of trigger them to take a decision to try to get the aircraft down on the ground from where they were coming from a logical decision to make however in this case it's going to have some immediate consequences because the captain who is now pilot flying he also takes on the role of handling the radio this is something that we generally do when we're dealing with an emergency so that the pilot monitoring can focus on getting the checklist executed the captain is now talking to bahrain atc and he tells them that we have a fire indication and we need to get down quickly bahrain atc comes back into them and says okay we understand you have doha airport at your 10 o'clock position at about 100 miles away would that be close enough and the captain said oh actually we would like to return back to dubai i'd like to declare an emergency at this point dubai is about 180 miles away while dawa is 100 miles away but like i was saying before it is likely that this decision to return is because the airport that they're coming from they know that right they just depart from there they know what the weather is like they know what the runways are like they likely have their shorts you know their pro charts available to them quickly so it would just require less of a setup and less of a preparation to go back in but it's almost twice as far away the captain now initiates a right hand turn to a heading of about 095 degrees that's a reciprocal heading to what they were flying before he also asked to and get cleared to descend initially to flight level 280 28 000 feet he initiates the sand and then he manually disconnects the autopilot for a few seconds he reconnects it and then a few seconds later he disconnects it again lightly just to to feel how the aircraft is feeling which is working fine at that moment the first officer on the same time has taken up the nominal checklist for an in-flight cargo fire and is starting to execute that it's important to understand here that the boeing 747-400 doesn't have any fire extinguishing system inside of its main cargo deck instead it has two things it has a cargo fire liner which surrounds the entire cargo compartment and is made of a material that is supposed to be able to withstand very high temperatures and that supposed to keep any fire inside of the cargo compartment from reaching the cockpit and the crew quarters the second part is something called a fire suppression system which is activated to the use of the non-normal checklist and the non-number checklist tells the pilot that they need to either climb or descend to 25 000 feet first and then you push the suppression button and what that does is it deactivates pack number two and three remember those are the systems that are providing pressurization to the aircraft it also opens the outflow valve which is a valve in the back of the aircraft now that is going to depressurize the aircraft so all smoke and fumes is going to be pushed towards the back of the aircraft and then out since the aircraft is now maintaining 25 000 feet at that altitude the pressure is significantly lower but also the oxygen level is lower and the idea is that because of that it's going to be much harder for any fire to survive or to spread you might have noticed that pack number one is not deactivated by the push of this button and there's a very good reason for that because pack number one remember is providing air and precision to the cockpit and the living waters so this means that if pack number one continues to do that there will be a positive pressure differential which means a higher pressure in the cockpit than in the cargo compartment and the idea is that that will keep any smoke from entering into that compartment the first officer is executing this checklist and as part of the checklist as a redundant feature after you push the suppression switch you turn off pack number two and three manually as well just to make sure that the system is doing what it's supposed to do now because the aircraft is now becoming depressurized it's also part of the checklist to don the oxygen mask and in this case the smoke googles because this aircraft does not have an entire mask covering the face there's two separate units and as the crew is putting the masks on there is some confusion about how to be able to hear themselves or to be able to communicate but that's fairly quickly resolved but as the crew is dealing with the masks something else happens pack number one stops working once again now it's not clear from the flight data recorder if pack number one was actually turned off in error or if once again it tripped off but we do know that pack number one stopped working and that means that it's now no pressure differential between the cargo compartment and the cockpit thick black smoke is now starting to billow into the cockpit you might ask yourself i thought there was a fire liner supposed to stop that from happening even without the pressure differential well it is likely that because this fire is situated where it is which is on the pallets situated in cargo positions four and five which is just below the crew compartment and the fact that it is being driven by a lithium battery fires which produce their own both energy fuel and oxygen that this fire is simply so hot that it burns through that fire liner and then enters into the crew rest compartment anyway the crew are not aware about this they are continuing to talk to bahrain atc and the captain now asks if he can descend immediately to ten thousand feet it's unclear why he asked for this because remember the quick reference handbook no normal checklist is telling them to maintain 25 000 feet for as long as possible to try to stifle the fire but in any case this has been done he is still hand flying the aircraft and the mcp selected altitude the mode control panel on the forward part of the cockpit is now reset to 10 000 feet and they initiate a descent as he's doing this another fire alarm goes off this time from the main aft cargo compartment which is logical because the smoke would have been moving toward the back of the aircraft and there's also a smoke alarm from the crew rest area after descending now the next problem presents itself because the captain who is still hand flying the aircraft starts to recognize that he doesn't have good pitch control of the aircraft the flight data recorder indicates that he is pushing and pulling on the yoke but that there's only minimal movement of the elevators in the back while he's doing that he starts telling his first officer that i don't i don't have any control of the aircraft that you know i i have no control and the first officer responds with what what do you mean you have no control whatsoever and there's a discussion going on about this so why is this happening now well the flight controls on the boeing 747 is controlled from the yoke via cables that are connected to the pilot controls and they then run under the cockpit floor and then towards the back of the crew rest area via a couple of trusses and pulleys they are then moved up into the crown of the aircraft and then they go through the top the crown of the aircraft all the way back towards the elevator rudder and so on well it is likely that the fire was now burned through the cargo liner might have damaged the truss assemblies that are moving these cables up into the crown and if it's done that it's going to have a severe effect on the tension of the cables now the cables need to have a specific tension for the movement of the flight controls to specifically and perfectly match what the elevators are doing so if there is now less tension it means that the effect that the pilots will have as they're moving the yolk is going to become much much less fortunately the autopilot is controlling the elevators rudders and the flight controls by our electronic inputs to the activators towards the back and that is not affected at this point but the pilot does not know this because they're hand flying the aircraft the smoke is now getting worse and worse inside of the cockpit and the cockpit voice recorder transcripts indicates that the pilots are now starting to discuss that are having problems seeing their instrumentation and seeing certain parts of the cockpit the captain asks the first officer to please set up the flight management computer the fmc for return back into runway one two left that's the opposite runway to the one that departed from in dubai and the first officer is saying that he can hardly see the fmc but it is indicated on the flight data recorder that the first officer must have been able to put the approach into the fmc because he subsequently also tunes the two nav data receivers to the ils frequency from the one to left something that is going to be needed for the approach later on at time 15 17 and 39 seconds this is about four to five minutes into the emergency the captain transmits onto bayern adc and tells them that the cockpit is now absolutely full of smoke and that they're trying to turn right onto heading on one three zero and tell them to please tell dubai to have men and equipment standing by upon their arrival the captain also asks the first officer to open the smoke shutter now the smoke shutter is operated from a handle in the overhead panel and if you open that it effectively just opens a small tube to watch a hole in the cockpit and when you open that under normal circumstances where there is smoke in the cockpit and the aircraft is pressurized you're going to get a depressurization from that hole which will then suck any smoke out of the cockpit but in the circumstances that this aircraft is now where they are depressurized it is likely that this could potentially have the opposite effect where the small venturi effect that can be created over that hole could actually be pulling smoke into the cockpit from outside where the fire is burning about one minute later when the aircraft descends through 21 000 feet they're now flying at maximum speed they can in order to get down as quickly as possible towards dubai the captain makes a brief remark about the temperature in the cockpit getting higher only seconds after that he starts complaining about not getting oxygen to his mask he says it over and over i can't breathe i can't get any oxygen give me oxygen he tells to the first officer but the first officer doesn't know how to respond to this and he doesn't know how to help him there is supplementary oxygen masks available inside of the cockpit but in order to reach them the captain would have to go back and get them from the jump seat area when the captain realizes that the first officer doesn't understand what he needs or where the supplementary oxygen can be found he decides that he's going to go and get it himself the corporate voice recorder sounds in the general area indicates that the seat of the captain is being moved back but in order for him to go and get this oxygen he's going to need to remove both his smoke goggles and his oxygen mask so he does that he moves out of his seat only a few seconds later the last words that are ever heard from the captain is i can't see and then there are no more live signs from the captain throughout the rest of this flight when the first officer receives the controls from the captain he almost immediately engages the autopilot and like i mentioned before the autopilot does not suffer from the same issues with the flight control cables as the manual control does so the flight controls problems are now temporarily gone but the first officer is now finding himself in a cockpit completely full with black thick smoke with alarms blaring around him and with a colleague who have now disappeared to somewhere that he doesn't know or can't contact him i i cannot even fathom the amount of stress that this poor pilot would be under during these circumstances and things are not about to get any better because what's happening now is that as the aircraft is descending away from bahrain they're now getting out of radio coverage because vhf radio is limited by line of sight so as they're getting further away due to the curvature of the earth and due to them descending further towards dubai bahrain cannot reach them and by rain adc has tried to get the first officer to change the radio frequency to buy control instead but because of the smoke he cannot see the radio panels so he's unable to set the new frequency and this is going to mean that in order for him to now get vectors to get help to get down on the ground he's going to have to use what we call relay from other aircraft this means that other aircraft that is flying in the area which are higher up or closer to bahrain will be able to hear the radio transmissions from the emergency aircraft so they will have to transmit up to a relay aircraft that relay aircraft then has to transmit down to bahrain and bahrain is going to have to contact dubai via a landline telephone in order to hear where they are because they can't see them on their radar screen and also for dubai to be able to tell them what vectors to get so then dubai has to then tell bahrain through the same landline what the aircraft have to do that has to go back up to the relay aircraft and then back down again so it's a total of six different movements so it has to be done for each and every radio call in a situation like this during the next 10 to 15 minutes there's going to be about 30 different radio calls between the first officer who is flying the aircraft to the relay aircraft and he is becoming more and more frustrated and annoyed with the fact that he's not getting any information because at this point he cannot see his primary flight display which indicates his speed his altitude his heading he basically cannot see anything but the front part of his mode control panel so you can imagine the feeling of not knowing where you are not knowing where you're going and not getting any answers from air traffic control that you're relying on in order to survive while this is happening the first officer is also making remarks that he's running out of oxygen so what's happening to the oxygen system why did it suddenly stop working for the captain well it's been very hard to determine the exact course of this during the investigation but it is most likely because the fire has now started to get close to the oxygen cylinders and the metal piping that runs up to the oxygen masks in the cockpit and if that's the case the pipings might have become so hot that they actually damaged their softer components as they went in and connected towards the masks in any case the oxygen supply does continue to the first officer's mask so he is able to breathe but just barely the aircraft continues to descend at a time 1526.000 you'd see the levels off at 10 000 feet it then continues to descend to 9000 feet and it's still maintaining a speed of 350 knots indicated with flaps up gear up towards the extended centerline of runway one two left the first officer is continuously asking the relay aircraft to give him updates on his altitude his heading where he is his speed because at this point you clearly can't see anything now it might be hard for you guys to understand just how bad the visibility can become when you're in a closed smoke-filled environment but i can tell you as having worked as a firefighter that it is the darkest that you can ever imagine even holding up your hand in front of your face you won't be able to see it through the mask it becomes completely pitch black and on top of that depending on what materials are being burned in the fire they might also start leaving an oily yellowish residue on everything including your mask which will then further decrease the visibility the first officer continues to communicate with their traffic control through the relay aircraft he does also try to use his secondary radio box on the emergency frequency one to one the small five but as he is transmitting on that radio box he doesn't hear any responses coming back even though all of the other aircraft around can hear him we don't know why that is but there is a possibility that the volume is just turned down on his communication box too and because he cannot see the radio tuning panel he cannot see that that's the case either he just thinks that no one can hear it eventually he does manage to get a final vector towards runway one to left in dubai he turns on to having a one one five degrees but he's still maintaining nine thousand feet and over 350 knots with the kind of weight that this aircraft is at this is a way too high energy in order to be able to land safely at time 1536 the aircraft flies through the three degree glide slope for the ils he first does not realize that this is happening but very soon after that he engages approach mode on the mode control panel now if you would have done that a little bit earlier and a little bit lower speed the aircraft would have been able to capture both the localizer and the glide slope and potentially get down and do an outer land without him being able to see but since he's doing this after the aircraft has passed the three degree glide slope it's not going to be successful he does get information from the relaying aircraft about his distance to the runway and he realizes that he's a little bit too high so he resets the mcp altitude to 4000 feet to initiate the descent at time 15 37 and 6 seconds he captures the false glide slope of 6 degrees the aircraft starts pitching down but only seconds after that he disconnects the glideslope feature puts vertical speed in and he puts 2000 feet per minute the centrate into the vertical speed this disconnects the two autopilots that would have been able to do the outer land but since it was on the false glide slope it's unlikely that he would have been able to do that anyway the localizer never captures and that's likely because of his very high speed and altitude just means that the localizer capture criteria for the autopilot is never being met but he's now descending down towards the airport he's getting closer and closer and dubai approach control recognizes that he's just way too high to be able to do this approach they send the messages through the relay aircraft and the relay aircraft asks him if he's able to do a 360. you're way too high can you do a 360. that means making a full turn on final to lower his both speed and altitude but the first offer comes back and just says negative negative and continuous straight ahead immediately following this exchange the first officer selects the gear down he extends the speed break and he selects flaps to 20 and flaps to 30. this probably in an attempt to try to slow the aircraft down and to get it down onto the runway unfortunately the cables that are activating the gear extension runs through the same trusses as the flight controls does and they are now not available so even though he selects the gear down the gear is still retracted this triggers the oral landing configuration alert and it also shows an acas message about gear and configuration the first officer must have understood this because on the cvr you can hear him saying uh i i got no gear and as he's saying this the aircraft levels off at four thousand feet which was the altitude that he selected in the mcp as he levels off the outer throttle changes into the speed select mode and in the speed select mode the other throttle will try to protect any maximum speeds remember how he selected flaps 20 and then flaps 30. well they never got flaps 30 because of the high speed the flaps just would not extend to that position but flaps 20 is still selected and flaps 20 have a maximum speed of 235 knots because of this the trust who has up until this point been set to keep this high speed that the pilot has been asking for is now going back to idle and the aircraft is finally starting to slow down while this is happening the aircraft is overflying runway one two left in dubai the first officer sets 1500 feet in this mcp he initiates the sun and he also asks the relay aircraft about his position once the message has gone through the relay chain the aircraft comes back and tells him that you've overshot runway one two are you able to make a left-hand turn because you have sharia airport at about 10 nautical miles and shady airport has a similar runway to the dubai runway one two the first officer responds that yeah i can do that and give me a vector give me a vector quickly and once again he is very agitated in the way that he's speaking to the uh to the relay aircraft the relay aircraft gives him a heading of zero nine five degrees to turn that's a left hand turn towards sharia but for whatever reason instead of setting heading 095 in the heading select window he sets heading 195 instead very likely that he just cannot see exactly what he's setting this means that instead of the aircraft making a left hand a turn it is now making a right hand turn instead now as the aircraft initiates this turn it does so fairly violently possibly because of the speed and the speed brakes being partially extended it banks over to 37 degrees bank which is triggering a bank angle bank angle warning this warning likely startles and disorients the first officer because after that he adds some trust manually remember they were idle he just puts them up quickly and then he disconnects the autopilot and without autopilot he's now left with almost no flight controls whatsoever the outer throttle once again takes over runs the trust back to idle that gives a downward momentum of the aircraft because the engines are now slowing down so the aircraft starts pitching down to minus 14 degrees attitude and a very rapid descent follows if this descent angle would have been allowed to continue the aircraft would have crashed into an area called silicon oasis which is just towards the east of dubai airport in this area uh thousands of people are living including a lot of the crews that are working for emirates airlines the first officer is now fighting to remain in control of his aircraft and the flight data recorder indicates full control deflections on his yoke he actually manages to deflect the elevator slightly to get the aircraft out of that initial descent and into a slight climb but it only lasts for a few seconds because as the speed is now washing off the aircraft the elevator becomes less and less effective and the descent continues but if the first officer would not have done this it is likely that the disaster would have been far far greater at time 15 40 and 28 seconds the first gpws warnings are starting to appear and then they continue until the very end of the recording at time 15 41 and 34 seconds the boeing 747 crashes into the ground just to the east of silicon oasis it damages several empty buildings the aircraft is completely destroyed and the two pilots are instantly killed in the accident but no one on the ground is hurt this accident rocked the aviation industry and especially the freight part of it after the final report was completed the emphasis became how can we come up with recommendations that make sure that something like this cannot happen again and from that came the development of a system called evas which is emergency visual assurance system it is a system that basically creates a blow-up tunnel that the pilot can put in front of their mask that makes sure that they have unobstructed view from smoke in the cockpit to their primary instrumentation outside the windshield but also towards their charge and anything that is essential to keep the aircraft flying there were also recommendations being made to improve the qra checklist the non-normal checklist to give better guidance to the pilots as to how long they were supposed to stay at 25 000 feet before they started to descend to the closest available airport now i've been in contact with some friends of mine who are flying freight and their guidance is now to keep at 25 000 feet until they're about 50 miles away from the airport and then just dive at maximum speed down and get the aircraft on the ground and evacuate as quickly as possible there were also a lot of recommendations that had to do with the way that a freighter aircraft was designed and the fact that there was a lack of fire both suppression and the extinguishing system inside of the main cargo halls now we're also working on making sure that pallets and freight containers are better in containing fires that there are fire recognition systems inside of the containers to give much earlier recognition of a fire to the pilot and possibly even a way to extinguish a fire from inside of the container itself but before we go i also want to re-emphasize how important it is that you guys the passengers are aware of what kind of batteries you have in your devices and that you never pack any of those batteries into your checked-in luggage also make sure that you follow the guidance of the airlines they will tell you what kind of batteries that you're allowed to take on board and if you would damage a battery if you would drop it between two seats or whatever tell the cabin crew about it now check out this video where these pilots manage to dead stick a boeing 737 after they lose both engines in a hailstorm if you want to support the channel consider becoming a patreon or buy yourself some merch bye [Music]

Channel: Mentour Pilot

Views: 2,314,323

Keywords: mentour pilot, mentor pilot, crash investigation, aviation, pilot, crash, air crash investigation, final report, boeing, airbus, disaster, fatal crash, air incident, air disasters 2022, ups airlines flight 6, cargo aircraft, explosion, aircraft fire, delivery, dubai, DXB, OMDB, silicon oasis dubai, 747, boeing 747, firsts officer, captain, boeing 747 crash, UPS flight 6, UPS 6, mentour pilot crash, plane crash, ups airlines, flight 6, plane crash documentary, plane crash investigation

Id: Y50saxfTqQA

Length: 36min 53sec (2213 seconds)

Published: Sat Jan 29 2022