How Did EVERYONE Miss THIS!? | Malaysian Airlines Flight 134

this airbus a330 has just taken off and the pilots are facing a huge problem none of their airspeed indicators are working properly and now they're gonna have to try to figure out how to fly this giant aircraft and land it without them what has led up to this situation is an absolutely incredible story so stay tuned a huge thank you to manscaped for sponsoring this video in the world of aviation everyone who works there have a specific safety role everyone from the ramp handlers to the gate agents to the cabin crew to the pilots to the engineers everyone knows that they have specific responsibilities in order to make sure that the industry keeps being as safe as it possibly can but what happens when those responsibilities are either ignored or misunderstood in today's video i'm going to show you a really good example of how dr reese's swiss cheese model actually works in real life and you'll be able to see how the threat is coming and how each and every one of the safety barriers that are there and supposed to stop this threat from becoming an incident are being transgressed whole by whole the threat in this story is a little insect called a mod wasp mud wasp is actually a group name of several types of wasps but they all have in common that they like to build their nest in little cavities often man-made cavities the mud wasps can be found pretty much all over australia but they're most prevalent in tropical areas so along the eastern seaboard close to brisbane which is where this incident is going to take place has had a lot of them during the last few years the problem really comes when these mod wasps start infesting the local airport because it turns out that aircraft has a lot of little holes in them that these modbus things are perfect to build little nests in especially the pitot tubes on the aircraft seems to have the perfect diameter of a hole for a mod wasps to call it a home of course the problem is that these pitot probes they have a little hole in front of them for a very specific reason these probes they measure the dynamic pressure as in the wind and then they subtract the static pressure and the difference between the static pressure and dynamic pressure is the aircraft air speed which is something that we the pilots need in order to fly an aircraft safely this is why we tend to have at least three different pitot probes on every commercial aircraft so that we have three independent sources of airspeed if we would need to there were some studies made about how quickly a mod boss would start to infest a pita probe if they were around and it was available and they found that it could take as little as 20 minutes from when an aircraft stopped at the gate before one of these mod was would be there and start to look at furniture to move in and because of that between the years of 2015 and 2018 which is when this incident happened the authorities in brisbane airport realized that they couldn't get rid of the mod was the infestation was too far along so instead they started sending out these warning letters to operators that was operating into the airport telling them that if they were planning to have a long turnaround on the ground or an overnight stay that they needed to start putting these pitot probe covers on top of their pita probes now peter probe cover is a like a little mitten that you just put over it and fasten it to the back it tends to have a long streamer hanging below it so that it's very conspicuous it's easy to see and obviously the whole reason of putting them on is to make sure that none of these mod wasps could get access to the pita probe and start building nests inside malaysian airlines had previously been flying to brisbane airport but over these years when the mud wasp infestation started they had actually been on a commercial break from flying there but just before the incident flight happened they had decided that they were going to start flights there again and they started flying there with their airbus a330 aircraft prior to the start of the operation they had been notified about this infestation and they had agreed that probably this would be a good idea to fit the pita probe covers onto their aircraft during the turnaround however for a different reason this had not really been communicated to the pilot and to the line maintenance engineers this brings us to the incident date which was the 18th of july 2018. at 2020 local time the airbus a330 pulled up on stand in brisbane airport they were met by ground crew who shocked on the aircraft and extended the jet waste started disembarking the passengers and everything was completely normal there was a crew change scheduled so the inbound pilots and cabin crew they left the aircraft once all the passengers had disembarked and the aircraft was going to stay at the gate for about three hours until 23 20 when the next group of pilots and cabin crew would fly the aircraft back to kuala lumpur inside the terminal building a line assist engineer from malaysian airlines was eagerly awaiting the arrival of the aircraft he had been dispatched from his home base in kuala lumpur to do two turnaround checks for the airline and this was going to be his last one so he was gonna travel back on the same aircraft this evening at time 2030 he was giving access to the aircraft and he made his way up into the cockpit where he started looking through the aircraft technical log to see what kind of jobs he needed to do the problem though was that since he wasn't based in brisbane he didn't have access to any tooling or oils or anything that he really needed so he needed help of a assistant engineer that was locally based and at time 2045 this assistant engineer arrived to the aircraft from the apron side and he was carrying with him three pitot probe covers that was recommended by the airport he found himself some mobile steps he moved up to the nose of the aircraft and he fitted these peter probe covers onto all three pitot probes after this he removed the steps and he made his way up into the cockpit where he introduced himself to the line assist engineer and they both started talking about what types of jobs that they needed to do during the turnaround at this point the assistant engineer also told the line assist engineer that he had fitted the probe covers but he didn't get a response back and the line assist engineer was holding the tech log also didn't note down that these um probe covers had been fitted this probably indicates that the line assist engineer either didn't hear or didn't understand the comment that the assistant engineer did about the pitoprom covers because he definitely wasn't expecting to hear that the two engineers then walked out of the cockpit and made their way down onto the apron where the line assist engineer said that he was going to start the transit walk-around check but in order for him to be able to do that he would need some extra engine oil and some hydraulic oil that they needed to replenish and the assistant engineer walked away to get that oil for him at 2054 the line engineer started his walk around and he was actually captured on cctv footage when he was looking with his flashlight up directly at the peter probe covers later in interviews the engineer said that he did notice the peter pro covers but he was a little bit confused as to why they were there because he hadn't asked for them and he had no idea of the mod was problem at brisbane airport so he made a mental note to himself to tell the assistant engineer to remove them and then he continued with his walk around the problem though was that when the assistant engineer came back they started to replenish the oils that they had discussed before and also the fueling started and the line assist engineer was in charge of handling the fueling so he completely forgot about these peter probe covers and i guess we've all been there you know when you see something and you make a mental note about yeah i'm gonna fix that later and it just completely disappears this is very common it happens all the time and that's why it's so important to have little reminders or write something down if there's something that you really need to remember but in this case it did not happen as the fueling was going on the crew arrived to the aircraft and started preparing it for departure the flight crew consisted of two very experienced pilots the captain had more than 14 400 hours of total time but he had most of that time done on boeing 737 and boeing 747 so he had recently converted over to the airbus a330 and only had about a 555 hours on that aircraft the captain's training record showed that he was of average to good abilities and there was only some small notes about his hand flying capabilities together with him was a very experienced first officer he had 6500 hours and the majority of those hours was spent on the airbus a330 so he was actually more experienced on the type than the captain was they decided that the first officer was going to be pilot flying for the flight and that meant that the captain was going to be pilot monitoring and he was the one that needed to do the pre-flight walk around at time 2234 the fueling was completed and the line assist engineer took the fuel receipt and brought it up to the cockpit where he met with the flight crew and started discussing what had been done to the aircraft the assistant engineer was also present here and he asked the line assist engineer if he needed help with anything else the line assist engineer said no that's all everything is good so the assistant engineer left the aircraft and went to attend another aircraft that needed his help he intended to come back later on to see if there was anything else he could do but because there was more work than expected in the other aircraft that never happened the line assist engineer finished up talking with the pilots and then when he was done he went back into the cabin sat down on his assigned seat and awaited departure he assumed that it was going to be the assistant engineer that was going to handle the push back of the aircraft so he was going to be the one that was in charge of the final walk around of the aircraft that didn't happen and you know what they say happens when you assume things you make an ass out of you and me the captain now left the cockpit to go out and do his pre-flight walk around and at time 2254 the same cctv footage shows how he goes out and starts looking up onto the left hand side of the nose he then quickly moves around he skips the right hand side of the nose and continues behind the aircraft all in all this walk around took very short time and it's obvious that he even though he was looking at the peter probes did not see that the peter pro covers was still installed even though the streamers were hanging from them so how is that possible well it's possible due to a phenomenon called inattentional blindness it's when you look at something but you're thinking about something else you're not paying attention to what it is that you're looking at this means that you are watching something but you're not actually seeing it this is particularly common when you're faced with things that are out of sequence something that is not the way that you are anticipating to see it so in this case for example these pilots would not have expected to see a pitot probe cover fitted it was just a turnaround check so he didn't see it at all anyway this just goes to show how important it is especially in the business of aviation but in any job that you do that you pay attention to the task that you're performing because if you don't if your mind is off somewhere else something like this can happen after the captain had finished his walk around he went back up into the flight deck sat down and they proceeded to complete the pre-flight preparation in this case they needed to do the performance calculation and they calculated that they needed a v1 speed of 153 knots and a rotation speed of 160 knots they then start the before start checklist and as they're reading through that checklist it includes the item gear pins and covers the first officer responds removed to that item now why would it do that well it turns out that in the cockpit of the airbus a320 at malaysian airlines they're supposed to be both gear pins those are the pins that are installed into the landing gears and the nose gear so that the aircraft can be towed safely and probe covers all right those probe covers are supposed to be in the cockpit so that you can take them out and you can verify that if you have three of them you know that no probe covers are fitted outside but unfortunately it had become a habit in malaysian airlines to not have those probe cars installed they were so rarely used that they had been removed from most cockpits so the pilots had gotten accustomed to not seeing them in the cockpit so the fact that they weren't there on this flight didn't mean anything to the pilots they started just rhyming that part of the checklist which is another point i want to emphasize never find yourself rhyming a checklist if something doesn't make sense or it doesn't conform to the checklist it needs to be investigated in this case though the probe covers had been installed by the airport so it is possible that these crew might have had probe covers in the cockpit but that that didn't indicate that they were actually removed from the outside now we're starting to get close to one of the last barriers of defense to keep something like this from happening and that is the pushback procedure at time 2311 the boarding had been completed and all of the paperwork was done the jet way was removed from the aircraft and the tow bar was fitted so they were now ready to start the pushback procedure the way this is done in brisbane airport is they have a person called the leading hand the leading hand is basically the lead dispatcher of the aircraft this person will be responsible for any part of the turnaround that is not maintenance related so for example the boarding of passengers the loading of the aircraft and also the very last walk around before the pushback continues and the pushback procedure in this particular case malaysian airlines had recently changed handling provider and the leading hand that was supposed to do this push back he was not completely sure that he had received the training needed in order to do this part of the pushback procedure because you actually need to be trained for that so he contacted a leading hand that was dealing with another aircraft and ask that person to come over and help him the original leading hand assumed that new person that was coming in was going to do the final walk around of the aircraft where you check that all doors and hatches are closed and all probe covers are removed and the new person that came in assumed that the previous person had done it so no one actually did this last crucial walk around of the aircraft instead the first officer got into contact with this new person asked confirm all doors and hatches are closed and all external checks are complete and the new leading hand responded a firm all external checks are complete ready for pushback and the aircraft started pushing back now the personnel that was sitting inside of the pushback truck could not see the probe covers hanging the leading hand that was walking next to the aircraft as it was getting pushed back could probably have seen it but he would be more focused on making sure that there was no obstacles that they were pushing back and that the engines were starting normally so no one was looking up at the probe covers that was still hanging off all three pita probes at time 23 24 the pushback is completed both engines are started and the pilot say goodbye to the leading hand who now removes his headset and together with the pushback truck starts moving away from the aircraft at this point four different people have in four different walk arounds missed the fact that these pitot probe covers are still installed on the aircraft the aircraft starts taxing out for a full-length departure runway 01 in brisbane and this is going to be a close shave i'm talking about closed shaves my sponsor for this episode is manscaped manscaped is a really high quality provider of grooming products for men and they've just released their latest trimmer the lawnmower 4.0 now the lawnmower is a really high precision grooming device i use it for example when i trim my beard but because it has some really sharp ceramic blades and skin safe technology you can also use it to trim other places the lawnmower is waterproof which means you can use it in the shower or you can just rinse it in water and it has this really cool led light which lights up the area that you're trimming and i find that really helpful if you go for the performance 4.0 package you'll also get the weed whacker nose and ear trimmer and some ball toner and ball deodorant for those special places if you think that sounds awesome or i should get that for my partner well then use the link here in the description below and the code mentor for a whopping 20 off the original price your balls will thank you when the airbus a330 lines up on the runway the wind is very very light it's only three knots from variable direction and the wind doesn't change almost anything during the first couple of thousand feet of climb this is important to know because this means that the indicated airspeed is very similar to the indicated ground speed that they're getting from the gps's the first officer starts the takeoff maneuver by calling takeoff captain responds with check and the first of them moves the trust lever into the flex detail position which is the d-rated take-off trust setting that they have calculated before the aircraft starts accelerating down the runway and when it passes 30 knots which is normally where the indicated airspeed indicator starts becoming alive nothing happens the aircraft continues its take-off roll and when it passes 50 knots a red speed flag appears on both primary flight displays this is because the aircraft has done an internal comparison between the ground speed and the indicated airspeed and realize that something is off here something is not right so it shows these flags to the pilots it's clear that the captain notices that something is wrong here because only seconds after these flags appear he call out ah speed speed and you can also hear on the corpus voice recorder that the intensity of his breathing increases unfortunately as this is happening a completely unrelated atc calls comes in between a tug driver and the atc tower and it's possible that this distracts the pilots because only a few seconds later this is 10 seconds after the captain first calls out speed he also calls out 100 knots from the ground speed indication now 100 knots is important because that indicates the difference between the low speed regime and the high speed regime in airbus aircraft in the low speed regime the pilots are taught to reject the takeoff for pretty much any type of warning that's because the speed is still not very high and there's plenty of runway left but off the 100 knots you're into the high speed regime and this is where the pilots are trained to keep going to be go minded and only really stop for things like engine failure engine fire predictive windshield warning or if the aircraft is deemed unsafe to fly this 100 knot call from the captain clearly confuses the first officer a bit because he would have heard that something is up for the airspeed and now suddenly he gets a speed call out so he continues recalling then abort both no and then continues a couple of calls between the pilots which just shows that there's quite a bit of confusion going on here as this is happening the aircraft accelerates pause 118 knots and continues to accelerate the next thing that happens is that the first of the calls out go to adr 3 which indicates that he wants the captain to switch over to the air data reference unit number 3 which provides a secondary source for the airspeed indication this shows really good technical knowledge on behalf of the first officer but it's not the time to be doing this this forms part of a non-normal checklist that you do when you have time to do so but definitely not during the take-off role when you still is below b1 and you have the possibility to reject the take-off the captain responds with check and only three seconds later the aircraft has accelerated pause the v1 decision speed and also the rotation speed the first officer notices this he looks down on the ground speed indicator and he initiates the rotation of the aircraft as the rotation begins the captain calls out you you rotate it on ground speed and the rotation continues so what could possibly be the reason that these pilots are now bringing this aircraft airborne without any working airspeed indication the answer to that probably lies in how we pilots and people deal with stress because pilots are continuously trained to take the decision to either reject or continue the takeoff we do this every six months when we do our recurrent training but airspeed indications are rarely the reason that we train to reject the takeoff and the reason for that is because airspeed indications and the problems with those are really insidious and they're very different every time that you have a problem with airspeed it manifests itself with different ways either you might have airspeed indication working on one side and not the other sometimes both doesn't work or all three doesn't work and it's not associated with any oral warning and if you fall into the trap of trying to figure out what is going on rather than just realizing that something is going on and rejecting the takeoff well then your mental processes are going to be severely limited by the now increasing time pressure as the speed is increasing and the stress that comes with that as soon as the aircraft gets airborne a master caution warning can be heard and an ecam message saying out of flight auto trust off is seen the first officer calls this out and the captain responds with a positive rate first off response gear up and the captain retracts the landing gear the aircraft is now climbing without any valid airspeed indication not on the captain's side not on the first officers and not on the standby the flags are momentarily changed into indicated airspeed but the airspeed never goes higher than about 50 knots and the reason that the flags disappear and you do get some airspeed is likely because the heating of the pitot probes are now burning through the peter probe covers so a little bit of air is escaping into the pit of probes but it's never close to the kind of airspeed that it should be they do have some speed information from the irs calculated ground speed indicators but since the air data computers have been told to disregard the position of the alpha veins as in the angle of attack veins when the air speed is less than 60 knots that's now what the air data computers are telling them so this means that the aircraft now goes from normal law where there are plenty of protections for the flight envelope of the aircraft into what's called alternate law which is a degraded mode that doesn't offer as much protections to the flight crew initially the first officer is pitching for about 13 degrees nose up and he keeps the thrust in the flex detent it should be mentioned here that at this point he should be doing the airspeed unreliable memory items which includes pitching to 15 degrees and adding full trust but this doesn't happen instead at 300 feet the first officer asked the captain did you did you put it to adr tree the captain mother something in response but it can be seen on the flight data recorder that the air data source is being changed over to adr tree at this point obviously that doesn't solve anything because all three pita probes are covered with pita covers so the aircraft just continues to climb at about 700 feet the first officer reduces the thrust back to max continuous trust he lowers the nose to seven degrees pitch up and as they pass one thousand feet the first officer asks the captain to start actioning the e-cam actions for the out-of-flight auto-thrust off message that they got earlier the captain immediately starts doing this as they pass 1500 feet they get the next master caution warning this time they get an ecam message saying that they're in alternate law like i explained before the alternate law actually kicked in immediately as they got airborne but the warning has been inhibited until 1500 feet now the tower calls up the aircraft and tells them to switch over to the departure frequency the captain responds and asks them to repeat what the frequency is and as he's responding this the first officer mentions to the captain that maybe we should call a pan-pan call pam pancall is a urgency call right it's a step below a mayday call and it shows that the aircraft is in need of assistance and help but that there's not any immediate danger to the lives of the passengers and crew on board this sounds like a good idea to the captain and at this point the first officer also takes over the radio which is standard operating procedures to do when there's a non-normal procedure because that leaves the pilot monitoring to deal with the non-normal checklist and the e-cam items and the pilot flying providing that he has the capacity to do so can continue to fly the aircraft and speak to air traffic control so the first officer now calls the tower again and says malaysian 134 we have unreliable airspeed and requests to climb straight ahead six thousand feet unfortunately the tower who thinks that he has already given the departure frequency to the aircraft doesn't hear this call a few seconds later the departure controller calls up the tower controller and asked them what happens with the malaysian i haven't gotten on my frequency yet and the tower controller says that i sent them over hangs up the phone and now calls the malaysian aircraft up again to tell them to contact departure frequency and instead of repeating the pam-pan call the first officer receives it and just switches over to the departure frequency once it's on the departure frequency he repeats the pan-pan call which is now received and now the aircraft finally start receiving the kind of support and help that they need they get a clearance to climb to 10 000 feet which they read back and as they pass 5 800 feet the first officer now called the captain to start issuing the non-normal checklist for unreliable airspeed they haven't done the memory items at this point but at least they're starting with a checklist now the captain asked the first officer if he is able to engage the autopilot to which the first officer responds no the crew now receives a climb clearance of 15 000 feet and as they're continuing to climb the captain works through the qh non-normal checklist for aspirin unreliable and here you can really see that even though there's been a lot of mistakes that have brought them into this situation now they're starting to work together as a team and they're starting to use all of their training to try to solve this situation as good as they possibly can they're starting to project how this problem is going to affect them as they go forward they talk about things like how high they can climb with the current configuration for example what kind of trust settings and attitudes they need to keep the aircraft safe where they are at the moment and at one point the first officer even stops the captain and says stop the checklist i need to concentrate now on just flying the aircraft the captain stops and this is exactly how we're supposed to deal with no normal checklist if there's ever a doubt about the safe continuation of the flight you have to hold the checklist make sure the aircraft flies and then continue with the checklist this is exactly what they do they level up at about 11 000 feet once they are level off they ask a traffic control if they can get continuous vectors towards the east of brisbane airport while they troubleshoot the issue they complete the checklist and they realize that it looks like all three air data reference units seems to be inoperative this is very very unusual so they go through the checklist again just to make sure that they've come to the right conclusion but yeah that seems to be the case it needs to be said at this point that it is perfectly possible to fly an aircraft like this without any working airspeed indicator it is a lot of work and it requires a lot of crew coordination but the way that we would do it is that we go to the in-flight performance chapter of our qh we look up flight with unreliable airspeed and in there you will have diagrams that will show us exactly what kind of attitude trust setting that we need to keep at any given configuration and given weight and then you need to project that into the future so as a pilot monitoring you need to tell the pilot flying that right next up you need to set this trust this pitch and then you need to wait for the aircraft to establish its new speed until you continue so it is really hard work but it turns out that the airbus a330 has another trick up its sleeve which we'll come to in a second because once the crew had decided that yeah we don't have any working adrs the checklist tells them to switch all of the adrs off now this is an irreversible action once you've done that in the air you will not be able to switch them on again until you're down on the ground since the crew has already confirmed that all three adrs are not working at time 23 43 they switch all adrs off this gives them access to something called the backup speed scale the boss and this is a really nifty little system what it does is that it replaces the speed tape on the left hand side of the primary flight display with a display that shows a workable performance envelope it basically shows that with the current trust and pitch weight you should be able to be safe in this envelope and it shows the crew exactly how to fly that so it basically gives the crew the same information they would get from their performance charge but in a visual way now switching off all three adrs comes with some problems as well for example they won't be able to use the speed brakes because if they do so the spoilers will come up on the wings and this backup speed scale does not account for the change in pitch that is required with speed brakes operating also they will have to manually handle the pressurization of the aircraft and they won't be able to extend the landing gear normally they will have to use the gravity extension for that and after landing they will not be able to use the nose wheel steering so they will have to stay on the runway all of this is discussed among the crew and they start to think how this is going to affect them going forward they're also communicating with our traffic control so everyone is kept in the loop and the tail air traffic control for example that they are going to need a longer final than normal that they are going to need a tug after they have landed on the runway to pull them back into stand because they won't be able to maneuver themselves and so on all of this is showing really good situational awareness by this crew at this point the pilots are now discussing how to proceed with this and they decide that the best course of action is to return in the land on runway one in brisbane the same runway they took off from this is going to mean that they're going to land slightly overweight so they make sure that they have the landing performance to do so and at time 2344 they call up the cabin crew and inform them that they are going to be returning back to brisbane and that is going to be a normal landing the next thing the crew has to decide is who is going to be landing the aircraft because the malaysian airlines operations manual clearly states that in case of a non-normal situation the captain should be doing the landing but after discussing this they realized that the first officer has actually got more experience on this particular aircraft type and he's been flying the aircraft beautifully up until this point i just love seeing these kind of discussions because it shows me that these pilots are able to adapt the normal procedures to their situation and use common sense and situational awareness as they're doing results at time 2358 the aircraft initiates its descent from 11 000 feet and starts receiving vectors in towards the ils approach the captain keeps reading out what kind of pitch and trust that the first officer should be using in order to reduce the speed as they're getting closer towards the localizer and they're obviously using this together with the information they get from the backup speed scale they intercept the ils localizer at the 20 miles final and once they start following the glide slope down the captain keeps pre-reading what kind of trust and pitch that the first officer needs to keep for each configuration change which is exactly how you should be dealing with a situation like this meanwhile air traffic control keeps updating them with ground speed information from their radar display they switch from the approach controller to the tower controller who keeps giving the same type of information at time 33 minutes past midnight the aircraft safely touches down on the touchdown zone markings at a speed of about 152 knots the first officer starts decelerating the aircraft and brings it to a safe stop about 1600 meters short of the runway end the only damage that was recorded on the aircraft from this incident was some light scrape marks on the landing gear doors and that happened because they had to use the gravity extension mechanism and with that the landing gear doors that would normally retract for the landing was hanging out and because the aircraft was slightly overweight the doors came briefly into contact with the runway as they touched down but apart from that everyone on board was safe and when the aircraft came to a complete stop the pilots called in the line assist engineer into the cockpit and explained to him what had happened and he immediately remembered the pitot covers that he'd seen during his walk around the investigation into the serious incident showed how easy it is for several stakeholders to make the same kind of mistakes when they're assuming or relying on other people to do the job that they're supposed to do it also showed that the risk assessment analysis that malaysian airlines had done prior to flying into brisbane had some faults in it and the technique they used also had some fault in it and the recommendations that came out of it included the fact that you needed to enter into the tech log any time that p2 covers was installed on the aircraft there also needed to be better guidance to pilots as to when to reject a take-off because of unreliable airspeed and also that airbus should include some more audible warnings in the cockpit in case the aircraft felt that it was dealing with unreliable airspeed now if you want to see another really interesting video then check this out also i hope you noticed that i have another channel called mentor now check it out and subscribe to it up here if you want to support the work that i do then get yourself a t-shirt or become part of my lovely patreon crew have an absolutely fantastic day and i'll see you next time bye [Music]

Channel: Mentour Pilot

Views: 1,302,059

Keywords: captain, mentour pilot, mentor pilot, crash investigation, full epsiodes, aviation, pilot, crash, air crash investigation, final report, boeing, airbus, piper, cessna, disaster, fatal crash, air incident, air disasters 2022, malaysia, malaysian, airlines, pitot tube, gear pin, static, push truck, airspeed, BUSS, backup speed scale

Id: f80WwpNuaxg

Length: 34min 44sec (2084 seconds)

Published: Sat Apr 30 2022

Reddit Comments

[u/TackleMySpackle]

Excellent video! I've encountered the dirt dauber/mud dauber problem in the American Southeast before. Had 5 aircraft perform either rejected takeoffs or air turnbacks from this problem (in one day) prior to making it mandatory to install the covers at all layovers. We found bug guts in 3 of the 5, a solid mud hut in 1 of them, and a charred, fully intact dauber in the fifth.

The BUSS was a surprise to me. Didn't know the A330's had those. I bet most mechanics wouldn't either. It's such an odd scenario!

[u/alexalex99000]

Video made by Mentour Pilot