In 1942, after three years of war, German
control in Europe reaches its greatest extent: from the Arctic circle to Africa and from
the English Channel to the Volga. But all that has changed in 1943, a year sometimes
called “das vergessene Kriegsjahr” or the forgotten year of war. As the new year
begins, the Red Army tightens its grip on surrounded German forces in Stalingrad, who
surrender in February. This marks the first time an entire German field army has laid
down its arms, and it won’t be the last. Stalingrad is a major turning point in the
war, but 1943 has just begun, and the rest of the year will see more dramatic setbacks
for the Axis in the European theatre. In fact, the very next major Allied blow against Germany
will draw some direct comparisons to Stalingrad – Tunisgrad. By late 1942, Axis forces in North Africa
are on the backfoot. After Rommel’s decisive defeat at the Battle of El Alamein in November,
British General Bernard Montgomery’s Eighth Army chases the newly renamed German-Italian
Panzer Army back across the Libyan desert. Shortly afterwards, Anglo-American troops
under General Dwight D. Eisenhower land in Morocco and Algeria as part of Operation Torch.
The goal for both the Axis and Allied armies is Tunisia – home to the last major Axis
ports of Bizerte and Tunis. For Rommel, the shorter supply lines in Tunisia
offer a chance to replenish his army and perhaps bring it closer to being an effective force.
But 2,500 kilometres of non-stop retreat has unsettled the German high command. In Berlin,
the general staff make arrangements for his replacement, and continually ask Rommel to
make much needed sick leave. He refuses for the time being. The Allies are also making plans. In January
Roosevelt and Churchill – Stalin refuses their invitation – meet at Casablanca to
discuss political and military strategy. There are disagreements though. Some of the Americans
push for an invasion of Western Europe as soon as possible, while the British are more
cautious and want to strike on the supposedly softer Mediterranean front. The debates are
bitter, and the US generals are divided since some fear the US doesn’t yet have enough
strength to sustain a full-on invasion. By the end of the conference, the Western
Allies agree on their plan for 1943 and beyond: they would attack Sicily as soon as possible
and delay the invasion of France until 1944; they would intensify and coordinate the bombing
campaign against Germany; and they would double the proportion of Allied forces in the Pacific.
The Brits and Americans are frustrated with the compromises, but Stalin is angry, since
he wanted an invasion of France within months. Roosevelt, perhaps out of frustration, announces
the Allies will accept nothing less than unconditional surrender from Germany, Italy, and Japan.
This statement will become controversial, and debates still rage as to whether it stiffens
Axis resistance, or whether Roosevelt hopes to delay peace talks until the US is in a
stronger position. In any case, before any of the Allied plans
can happen, there is an immediate need to finish off the Axis presence in North Africa. Luckily for Rommel, Montgomery’s pursuit
is slow. By prioritising fuel deliveries for the best German units, most panzer divisions
are able to limp across the Tunisian border. Italian troops lacking vehicles are not so
lucky, and the British take many prisoner. On January 23, 1943 the British capture Tripoli,
while to the west, the British 1st Army, including the US II Corps and French XIX Corps approach
from the Tunisian-Algerian border. Meanwhile, the Italian navy and the Luftwaffe move reinforcement
into Tunisia, some via the massive Messerschmidt 323 transport planes. There they join German
General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim’s 5. Panzerarmee. Together with Rommel’s panzerarmee, the
Axis have 104,000 German and 74,000 Italian troops in or around Tunisia by late January
1943. However, both panzer armies are underequipped and Rommel’s force has lost two-t hirds
of its tanks and halftracks and nearly all of its artillery in its retreat. However,
around 800 Luftwaffe aircraft can provide local air superiority.
Tunisia promises a different kind of North African combat than the open deserts of Libya.
Here there are mountain ridges, narrow passes and vast salt marshes, making manoeuvre and
rapid advance difficult. Although cornered, the Axis troops still pose a threat to the
spread-out allies and prevent the rapid capture of the ports in late 1942.
So, allied troops set up positions along the East Dorsale Mountains. Eisenhower requests
permission to drive a wedge between von Arnim and Rommel, but his British colleagues think
the plan is too ambitious and want to wait for Montgomery’s arrival.
British officers also have reservations about the inexperienced Americans. Many US officers
have never seen combat, and major manoeuvres in 1941 showed deficiencies in senior leadership,
tactics and infantry training. Although re-training corrected some issues, Eisenhower himself
notes that some of his officers are complacent. Rommel has already dismissed US troop as "Britain's
Italians". The Axis wants to strike the Allies in the
West before Montgomery’s estimated arrival in the east in early March. Von Arnim’s
forces already had some success against US and French troops and he is confident he can
deliver a serious blow in southern Tunisia. Once Rommel arrive, the Germans adopt a two-part
plan. Operation Frühlingswind (Spring Breeze) will see Arnim’s 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions
strike against vulnerable US positions around Sidi Bou Zid – a major supply base and headquarters
of the US 1st Armored Combat Command A. Once von Arnim has pinned US forces there, Rommel’s
Panzerarmee will launch Operation Morgenluft (Morning Air), a rapid strike from Gabès
to Gafsa and through US positions around Kasserine. But things are tense at German headquarters.
Rommel and von Arnim don’t like each other, and their animosity grows as they work together
– which means overall commander Albert Kesselring has to intervene to smooth things over. The
dual operations also have no definitive end, instead German commanders will quickly draw
up extended plans based on results. On February 14, Von Arnim launches Frühlingswind,
with two armoured columns breaking out of Faïd. Supported by artillery and Stuka dive
bombers, the panzers take green US troops around Sidi Bou Zid by surprise. Isolated
on two hill tops, the US infantry is unable to move or support each other. With communications
unreliable, Colonel Thomas Drake of the 168th Infantry Regiment sends a desperate report
written on toilet paper: “Enemy surrounds 2nd Battalion (located
on Mt. Lessouda)… Shelled, dive bombed and tank attack... Germans have absolute superiority,
ground and air... Am attempting to hold my CP position. Unless help from air and armor
comes immediately, infantry will lose immeasurably.” (Kelly 194)
But US forces are scattered around the region, and his commander Lt Gen Lloyd Fredendall
is over 100 kilometers away in Tébessa. On February 15, Shermans and Stuarts of the
1st Armoured Combat Command A attempt to counterattack the experienced German panzers, but the result
is a slaughter. Airburst artillery forces the US tank commanders into their turrets,
reducing their visibility and speed. Lt Kurt Wolff recalls the results:
“...scarcely had the first shells left our guns than the first three enemy tanks were
on fire... [Soon] there were at least 15 burning tanks ahead of us [and] the remaining enemy
tanks had retreated... [The battalion commander] laughing like a boy, went from company to
company asking us and himself too: ‘Did you ever see anything like [that]?’” (Kelly
206) The panicked withdrawal turns into a rout,
with US troops fleeing their positions. Meanwhile, Rommel’s troops launch Operation
Morgenluft but find their main target of Gafsa already abandoned. But instead of ruthlessly
pursuing the fleeing Americans, the Axis units advance cautiously, giving US troops time
to take up new positions on the Western Dorsales. Rommel, who was still overseeing the final
elements of the Libyan evacuation, quickly relocates to take command of the next stage. The success of Frühlingswind and Morgenluft
reinvigorates Rommel. He now develops an ambitious plan to surround allied forces in western
Tunisia. Rommel thinks if he gets command of all of
von Arnim’s armour, including heavy Tiger tanks, he can punch through Kasserine Pass
and capture the US supply depot and headquarters at Tébessa. Once resupplied with captured
fuel, he could then strike 225 kilometers to Bône on the Algerian coast, encircling
the entire allied force. He eagerly sends the plan to Kesselring and the Italian Commando
Supremo. But von Arnim is against the idea. Instead,
he wants to keep his panzers for a conservative operation towards the British depot at Le
Kef. Although unlikely to completely defeat the allies in the west, this will cripple
them for the foreseeable future, allowing a stronger defence against Montgomery when
he arrives. The result is a compromise. Rommel gets von
Arnim’s panzers but must use them to strike towards Le Kef. Rommel’s Operation Sturmflut
is set for February 19. Two main columns would strike towards mountain passes at Kasserine
and the Sbiba Gap, and Rommel would reinforce which ever thrust produced the most results.
But Rommel wasn’t happy with this compromise, as he later revealed in his memoirs:
“At other times, our higher authorities were so wildly overoptimistic that they hardly
knew what to demand of us next; now, however, when a little boldness really was required,
they lacked the guts to give a wholehearted decision.” (Kelly 229)
Guarding Kasserine is a weak US force under Colonel Alexander Stark. His cryptic orders
from Fredendall reference a stubborn and costly last stand from the US Civil War:
“Go to Kasserine right away and pull a Stonewall Jackson.” (Citino 94)-
But Stark’s men are mostly construction troops and who have never seen action. They
struggle to build a hasty defensive line – they do plant 3000 mines, but simply lay many of
these on the road. The Americans do have help from a horse-drawn French battery of 75mm
guns, but powerful Allied armour reserves stay at the rear to avoid a repeat of the
Sidi Bou Zid disaster. At first, Rommel tries to force the pass with
a decisive strike through the valley. But French artillery and US machine guns push
back the attackers. German commanders order Panzergrenadiers to scale the heights either
side of the pass and clear out US infantry. Both attacks start with some success, but
a lack of air support and artillery means the Germans soon retire.
Still, although the defence largely holds, Axis troops are slowly advancing. Fredendall
even prepares to abandon his HQ at Tébessa. Meanwhile, the German strike against Sbiba
is doing poorly. British and US anti-tank guns repel the attack and Rommel decides to
focus on Kasserine, including the newly arrived Nebelwerfer rocket artillery. Late on February
20, US troops abandon their positions, leaving their armour unsupported. The French artillerymen,
having fired all their ammunition, spike their guns and fall back. There is now nothing to
stop Rommel’s panzers, which breach the pass and destroy a small British armoured
force sent to block them. Now flushed with victory, Rommel splits his
force in three and attacks towards Tébessa, Thala and Sbiba simultaneously. But the Axis
offensive is losing steam while fresh allied troops, with armour and artillery, rush to
the front. By splitting up his forces, Rommel has weakened
their offensive punch. Although the Germans briefly reach Thala, Allied material superiority
is turning the tide. By February 23, with clear skies bringing allied air attacks, it's
clear Le Kef is unreachable and Rommel calls off the attack.
The Battle of Kasserine Pass can be seen as both a US and German defeat. Although German
troops force the pass, the overall German plan failed quickly.
US commanders are disappointed at their performance. Some accuse Fredendall of hunkering down in
his bunker instead of issuing clear and decisive orders. Following Kasserine, he is replaced
by General George Patton. Historian Robert Citino concludes:
“Although ‘blaming the general’ is the most simplistic form of military history,
it is occasionally hard to avoid. The evidence against [Fredendall] is overwhelming.” (Citino
97) Others have been more forgiving, suggesting
Fredendall’s failure is indicative of wider issues concerning rapidly turning a small
peacetime army into a larger warfighting force, such as untested officers and tactics. Furthermore,
considering their lack of experience, US troops performed relatively well against German veterans,
even according to Rommel: “Die Amerikaner hatten sich vorzüglich
geschlagen.” - “The Americans performed excellently.” (Citino 97)
Rommel has also been criticised, especially his decision to split his force following
Kasserine and expect rapid drives in mountainous terrain. Some historians suggest it is surprising,
given his experience in the Alps in WWI, that Rommel did not clear the heights before his
armoured push. But Rommel likely felt he did not have the luxury of time, given Montgomery’s
Eighth Army was closing in. Rommel’s relationship with von Arnim impacted
the operation too. Rommel was outraged to find out von Arnim only sent half of the 10th
Panzer Division, and kept all the Tigers for himself. Von Arnim instead uses them in his
owned failed offensive on February 26, losing 15 of his 19 Tigers. These are losses the
Germans cannot afford – by March, they only receive 29,000 tons of the required 140,000
tons of supplies. Meanwhile, the US alone bring in 400,000 tons. What is left of the Axis army in Africa will
now be needed to face off against Montgomery in the east, and Rommel rapidly relocates
to the Mareth Line to face his old opponent. Rommel doesn’t like the new position, which
consists of a series of pre-war French forts. But his superiors demand that he stops Eighth
Army outside of Tunisia. Hitler promises he’ll send new weapons and reinforcements, but by
now, Rommel only has 160 tanks, mostly Italian, against 800 tanks in Eighth Army. Meanwhile,
losses and fuel shortages mean the Luftwaffe has almost disappeared from the Tunisian sky.
Rommel knows Montgomery is getting stronger, so he orders a spoiling attack to disrupt
British preparations for March 6. However, his subordinates attack in the south after
disagreeing with his recommendations to attack along the coast. In any case, Montgomery’s
dug in tanks and anti-tanks guns, including powerful 17-pounders, are waiting for them:
“The silly buggers came right at us, didn’t they? Some of us who were in the early desert
fighting expected a Rommel flank attack, something clever. It never happened. They kept coming
straight across the plain.” (Watson 109) Montgomery put it more succinctly:
“The Marshal has made a balls of it.” (Citino 100)
Although only 94 Axis troops are killed, Rommel loses up to 56 tanks in what is his last action
as a commander in North Africa. On March 9, the Desert Fox finally agrees to take sick
leave in Germany. Montgomery now launches his attack on March
16. It will be frontal charge supported by a wider flank, largely made up of New Zealand,
Indian and French Senegalese soldiers. The frontal assault initially has some success,
establishing a bridgehead across the Wadi Zigaou – but Allied troops soon lose the
position with heavy casualties. Frustrated, Montgomery prioritises the flanking
manoeuvre. Indian troops use their mountain experience to move through rough terrain and
attack from behind the Mareth Line, while the New Zealand Corps rush further to the
Axis rear, breaking through Axis defences on March 26. Rommel’s replacement, General
Giovanni Messe, falls back to the narrow Wadi Akarit position, but Allied forces overrun
his lines by combined artillery bombardment, frontal charges, and mountain infiltration. The situation is now dire for the Axis troops.
Hitler hopes Tunis and Bizerte can become meatgrinders to deplete allied forces and
delay a European invasion, but morale and equipment is lacking. By April, von Arnim’s Fifth Panzerarmee
has 150,000 men and 150 tanks against 210,000 Allied troops and 1,200 tanks. Patton also
regains US positions at Gafsa and Sened Station, eventually linking up with the Eighth Army
on April 7. Now Eighth Army clashes against the new Axis
positions at Enfidaville. Again the first assaults fail, but mountain troops, including
Gurkhas, backed up by accurate concentrated artillery fire break the position open. For
every Axis artillery shell fired, the British fire up to 30.
The US II Corps, now redeployed in the north under General Omar Bradley, also batter their
way towards Bizerte with renewed confidence. Von Arnim sends Major Hans von Luck to Berlin
to plead for an evacuation, but Hitler refuses to see him.
When Hitler finally allows an evacuation in late April, it is of little use since the
Axis lack aircover and shipping. On May 7, 1943, the Allies capture Bizerte
and Tunis. On May 13, Axis forces surrender along with tens of thousands of their troops.
Many are Italian non-combat and colonial troops, but many are also German veteran units like
the German veteran 15th and 21st Panzer and 90th Light Divisions which surrender to a
man. A contingent of the elite Hermann Göring division that fought in Tunisia is also captured,
though a few escape to Sicily. Almost immediately, Allied troops refer to
the Tunisia campaign as Tunisgrad – a reference to the recent Soviet victory at Stalingrad.
This is due not only to the tough nature of the fighting, but also the seemingly decisive
nature of the victory and the number of prisoners taken. Tunisia was not an easy victory for the allies,
and the disasters at Sidi Bou Zid and Kasserine Pass tainted British perceptions of the Americans
for some time. In total, the allies suffered 70,000 casualties in Tunisia, with the US
losing 2,715 dead, 9,000 wounded and 6,500 missing or captured in its first major theater.
Of course, these numbers are not close to Soviet losses at Stalingrad, but they are
a large portion of the roughly 240,000 allied casualties for the whole North African theatre
since 1941. Axis losses in Tunisia are up to 62,200 with 12,200 killed – also far
less than Stalingrad. Similar to Stalingrad though, the capture of Tunisia trapped and
destroyed a large Axis force of over 250,000 thousand men.
Army Group Africa may not have been as central to Axis war plans as Sixth Army at Stalingrad,
but it was still a significant Axis investment in manpower and resources. Its defeat also
eliminated tens of thousands of experienced troops as well material that Germany desperately
needed elsewhere. In fact, the Germans redirected transport
planes earmarked for Stalingrad to Tunisia, meaning they couldn’t supply either location
properly. The Luftwaffe struggled to recover from the losses it suffered over Tunisia and
the Mediterranean theatre, which amounted to 41% of the entire air force.
The victory was also total, since the Axis would never be able to return to Africa or
even plan to. They would instead from now on move into a defensive posture concerned
with the defence of their key territories. Meanwhile, allied – especially British – confidence
grew after the disasters of 1939-41. Despite the Kasserine defeat, Allied forces were starting
to perfect an operational doctrine that combined high levels of mechanisation with sophisticated
logistics and thorough battle plans. This allowed them to effectively translate their
advantage in industrial capacity onto the battlefield.
Meanwhile, the victory showed the German way of war was faltering. German principles of
Auftragstaktik, or mission command, which emphasised autonomy and flexibility at lower
levels of command, were coming unstuck against Allied material superiority and firepower.
Such methods worked well in the early war against inexperienced and unprepared enemies,
but the Allied method left little room for mistakes the Axis could exploit. As historian
Paddy Griffith concluded: “German tactical analysts might growl resentfully
that US tactics were ‘inflexible, plodding and all about material superiority’ (exactly
like Montgomery’s, in effect); but the fact remained that the Germans could not win such
a battle.” (Griffith 55) The rest of the fateful year of 1943 would
only make this trend even clearer. But the Allied method still has weaknesses.
Much of the material needs to be brought across the Atlantic, and although Germany is retreating
on land, they’re still on the attack at sea – which the Allies need to stop if they
hope to invade Europe anytime soon. From 1939, German U-boats threaten Allied
shipping. Although German surface raiders do play a role, Admiral Karl Dönitz hopes
his submarines can wage a so-called ‘tonnage war’ against British merchant vessels. This
means sinking enough merchant shipping to either massively degrade British military
capabilities, or better yet – force London to surrender.
At first, the Germans have some success. Dönitz calls summer 1940, “the happy time”, in
which U-boats easily target mostly isolated merchantmen, sinking 471. When the US joins
the war in 1942, this increases to 1,160. The U-boat crews' term this the “second
happy time” or even “American Shooting Season”.
For British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the Atlantic is the critical theatre on which
all others depend, and by late 1942 it is one of the few areas in which Germany remains
decisively on the offensive. In November 1942, U-boats alone sink 768,000
gross tons of Allied shipping, their peak for the entire war. As a result, Churchill
asks his allies for more assistance. He also lays down new guidelines for referring to
the German submarine threat: “Enemy submarines are to be called U-boats.
The term “submarine” is to be reserved for Allied underwater vessels. U-boats are
those dastardly villains who sink our ships, while submarines are those gallant and noble
craft which sink theirs.” (Gannon) At the Allied Casablanca conference in January
1943, US leaders agree to prioritise the Atlantic and delay the invasion of France and Germany
until 1944. Although some commanders accept reluctantly, others understand it is impossible
to use the United Kingdom as a base for invasion with a lingering U-boat threat. But even with promises of more US support,
issues remain. Across the allied effort there is significant demand and internal competition
for scant resources. Meanwhile, Dönitz has more U-boats than ever. In 1939, Dönitz had just 39 subs, but by
early 1943 he has around 300 and more are being build. Then, when Grand Admiral Erich
Raeder’s resigns as Navy Commander-in-Chief in January 1943, Hitler promotes Dönitz to
the top naval position. Hitler tells Dönitz to maintain the pressure in the Atlantic,
although the admiral remains realistic about the challenge in a radio broadcast:
“The harsh realities of the submarine war [means that] even more difficult times lie
ahead of us.” (Van der Vat 289) With a submariner in command of the entire
German navy, the Allies also expect the U-boat menace to grow. One area of concern is the
Mid-Atlantic Air Gap, a favoured U-boat hunting ground known to allied seamen as “Torpedo
Junction”. By 1943, partly thanks the massive expansion of the Royal Canadian Navy, Allied
warships can provide end-to-end escort, but they’re still too few and remain vulnerable
without air support. Airbases in the UK, Iceland, US and Canada have been improving coverage,
but there’s still a gap of up to 1,000-km gap off the Cape of Farewell. Allied commanders
try to close it with escort carriers – including retrofitted civilian vessels – or Very Long-Range
bombers like the B-24 Liberator, but until January 1943, British Coastal Command only
has 6 VLR Liberators. The majority go to the bomber offensive against Germany or the Pacific.
Meanwhile, in December 1941, the German navy’s Beobachtungsdienst intelligence service cracked
the British Naval Cipher No. 3. By intercepting British communications, they organise group
attacks on convoys. U-boats locate about 70% of convoys thanks to codebreaking.
Allied resources are also drained by the 1942 Operation Torch landings in North Africa,
and the Battle for Tunisia in early 1943. The Royal Navy diverts 125 destroyers and
other escort ships to Torch, while fuel demands for African operations mean North Atlantic
convoys have less fuel to out-manoeuvre U-boats. The result is an increase in sinkings in early
1943. In March alone, German U-boats and surface ships sink 120 Allied ships globally, totalling
704,000 tons – 484,000 of which sinks in the Atlantic. This rapid increase in tonnage
sunk – 74% over the previous month – is often seen as a major crisis. A March 1943
British memorandum claimed: “...[T]here is insufficient shipping to
allow us to develop the offensives against the enemy, which have been decided on. Every
ship sunk makes the situation worse... We can no longer rely on evading the U-boat packs
and, hence, we shall have to fight the convoys through them.” (Haslop 210)
A December 1943 Allied report even goes so far to suggest victory in the Atlantic – and
therefore the entire war - was threatened. More recent research though, has questioned
the crisis idea. The supposed March crisis mostly focuses on two convoys, which suffer
disproportionate losses – 22 of 90 merchant vessels sunk. Overall, however, only 31% of
March convoys are attacked, much lower than the 52% attacked in November 1942. In fact,
in the first quarter of 1943, sinkings are lower than any 1942 quarter. The allies are
also building more ships than they are losing, with a net gain of 2 million gross tons by
March 1943. Perhaps most significantly, there is nothing
in German sources which portrays March as a moment of imminent victory. In fact, within
two months, the U-boats withdraw from the Atlantic in defeat. Just as the March convoy battles are raging,
the Allies meet in the Atlantic Convoy Conference to better pool resources and standardise procedures.
The top priority is closing the mid-Atlantic Air Gap and taking the fight to the U-boats.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Western Approaches is optimistic:
“I really have hopes now that we can turn from the defensive to another and better role
– killing them.” (Redford 74) Early 1943 also sees several tactical, technological
and military developments all coming to fruition around the same time. Ultra intelligence,
from the cracked German Enigma is the most well-known tool available to the Allies, but
it was by no means the only one – or even the most important.
Ultra can provide a general location of most U-boats, which are tracked by the men and
women in London’s Submarine Tracking Room. Convoys reroute around them – an effective
tactic. But Ultra intelligence is slow, and sometimes it takes up to 72 hours to de-crypt
German communications. There are also periodic blackouts when Germans alter their settings
– including almost all of 1942. And, as the number of U-boats at sea increases, the
likelihood of evading them decreases. Ultra is vital as a wider strategic tool but cannot
pinpoint U-boats preparing to attack. That’s where other technology comes in.
By early 1943, more allied escorts are equipped with better sonar and radar equipment. Underwater
ASDIC sonar can listen for submerged U-boats, gauging range and bearing. Not only does this
reveal approaching U-boats, but allows for more accurate use of anti-submarine weapons,
like the Hedgehog and depth charges. Meanwhile, ships and aircraft equipped with the new 10-centimetre
radar can detect U-boats on the surface. None of these tools are perfect, but when combined
with others, they create a near impenetrable network of defences:
“The first indication of a U-boat attack would be from the ASDIC people who would pick
up a contact... you could hear these pings... and the difference between the ping and the
pong is the distance how far the submarine is away. When they think they’re right over
the top of the submarine, the order is ‘Fire’. That means the depth-charges go... A colossal
volume of water would come up... it was almost like lightning going across the water. In
daytime it’s a fantastic thing to see.” (Bailey 67/68)
German submariner Anton Staller aboard U-188 is on the receiving end of a depth charge
attack in March 1943: “Alarm bells shrilled loudly... “Destroyer
on the starboard bow... Range about 5,000 meters!”... A quick glance at the manometer
showed me that we were at 100 meters, at the same instant for the first time I heard ahead
of us the roar of exploding depth charges. Now I discovered how appalling loud these
sounded under water. Though fearful I concentrated on my hydrophone wondering if I would ever
hear anything again in my life... ” (Willman 49)
Another important Allied development is High Frequency/Direction Finding, known as HF/DF
or “Huff Duff”. This can detect German U-boat radio communications out to 25 kilometres,
close enough to pursue and attack. It greatly outranges surface radar and helps allow escorts
to be more proactive. The technology existed since 1942, but in 1943 it’s much more available,
with at least 2 HF/DF equipped ships per convoy. With this comes more powerful anti-submarine
weapons and better organisation. Previously 6 escorts were considered adequate to protect
24 merchantmen, but civilian experts led by Professor P. M. S. Blackett, find that eight
escorts can protect 48 merchant ships just as effectively. This combines smaller convoys
into larger ones and frees up escorts which can become mobile support groups assisting
specific convoys under attack. The convoys and their escorts also adopt new
tactics based on the in-depth analysis of previous convoys. From February 1942, Britain’s
Western Approaches Tactical Unit conduct wargames based on recent attacks to estimate and predict
U-boat group tactics. Much of this analysis is carried out by staff of the Women’s Royal
Naval Service, better known as the Wrens, who work as plotters, mathematicians and players
in the war games. The result is new evasion, search and convoy patterns which are taught
to officers in special training courses. By 1945, 5,000 Royal Navy officers have received
Tactical Unit training. And finally, there are more Very Long-Range
bombers and escort carriers. By May, Coastal Command has 49 VLR bombers, up from 17 in
February. Although dwarfed by the hundreds of bombers attacking German industry, this
number is enough to close the air gap. Aircraft like B-24 Liberators, Whitley bombers and
Sunderland and Catalina Flying boats, become vital submarine killers, quickly accounting
for around half of U-boat losses. The combination of new tools and tactics is
devasting to the U-boat fleet. In April, the battle balances out, as the Allies lose 39
merchantmen but sink 15 U-boats. May 1943 is the decisive month, especially
the voyage of convoy SC-130. Heading to Liverpool from Halifax, Nova Scotia, the convoy has
37 merchantmen and 8 escorts, several equipped with High Frequency Direction Finding and
new 10-cm radar. German naval intelligence identifies the convoy and gathers up to 25
U-boats in three wolfpacks to attack to attack. Donau 1 and 2 approach from the south-east,
while Wolfpack Iller is already in the area. The plan is to attack the convoy in the airgap,
but British Ultra intelligence is aware of this. However, a system failure means the
information is not passed to the escort commander. Even so, when the attack opens on May 18,
the escorts proactive sweep for the U-boats and spoil their attacks, while the convoy
also makes evasive turns. Soon the battle moves within the range of approaching Allied
aircraft which hound the U-Boats and force them to submerge. By May 21st, U-boat command
abandons the attack. The Allies sink three U-boats and damage another
with no losses. On board one of the sunken U-boats - U-954 – is Admiral Dönitz youngest
son, Paul, who dies with the rest of his crew. The SC-130 battle is the pinnacle of a terrible
month for the Kriegsmarine, in which they lose a total of 41 U-boats – almost 25%
those operational. Kapitänleutnant Peter-Erich Cremer at U-Boat Staff Headquarters later
recalled: “This May situation was quite out of hand:
as I was soon to learn, the number of boats that failed to return from patrol reached...
more than one a day, and there was talk of “Black May”.” (Gannon)
On May 24, Dönitz orders his U-boats to withdraw from the Atlantic until better equipment and
countermeasures are available. So why did things go so wrong, so fast for
the U-boats? Allied developments are one factor, but there were also German weaknesses. Firstly,
the Germans had poor intelligence on Allied capabilities, especially High Frequency Direction
Finding, radar, and Enigma decryption. As a result, submariners didn’t know how to
avoid or compensate for them. Secondly, Dönitz’s top-down approach required constant radio
reports, especially before an attack. This gave British Ultra and HF/DF detection more
chances of locating them. During the SC-130 battle, there were 104 HF/DF reports, allowing
the Allies to pinpoint the U-boats. Thirdly, the Kriegsmarine lacked reliable air cover.
Dönitz demanded more from Hermann Göring’s Luftwaffe, but Göring resisted diverting
resources away from his own interests. The increase in U-boat numbers also didn’t
mean a proportionate increase in sinkings, although the sheer number of active U-boats
still worried the Allies: “By April 1943 the average kill per U-boat
at sea had sunk to 2,000 tons. This might be interesting as a sort of sporting score,
but the number of U-boats operating had so greatly increased that it was of little significance
in solving the problem. When Daniel Boone, who shot fifty bears a year, was replaced
by fifty hunters who averaged one each, the bears saw no occasion to celebrate the decline
in human marksmanship.” (Van der Vat 316) But individual U-boat performance and crew
experience, were dropping quickly. In 1940, U-boat commanders had on average two years'
experience. In 1943 this was only 8 months. Most U-boat captains killed in May 1943 had
only one or two patrols to their name. In 1940, 2% of U-boat captains were responsible
for 30% of sinkings. All these so-called “aces” had entered the Kriegsmarine before 1935,
but by 1943, the veterans of the early war were gone. Roughly 850 U-boats – about 75%
of the total built and crewed during the war – would never damage an Allied merchantman.
In November 1940, the average tonnage sunk per U-Boat per day was 430 tonnes. In January
1943, it was 65. From 1939 to early ‘43, the Atlantic is
the only theatre in which Germany successfully maintained the offensive. But now even there,
they are in retreat. Dönitz’s withdrawal is not meant to be permanent though. He fast-tracks
new U-boat developments and shifts back to a smaller group tactics, but the U-boat wolfpacks
never make a meaningful return. Instead, the Atlantic becomes the logistical highway for
the Allied invasion of Europe. But as Allied leaders had decided at Casablanca,
Northern Europe would have to wait. The next push would be in the “soft underbelly of
Europe”, although it will prove to be harder than anticipated. In early 1943, Anglo-American troops decisively
defeat Italo-German forces in Tunisa and take 250,000 prisoners. In spring, and after much
debate, the Combined Chiefs of Staff confirm Sicily as the next steppingstone towards the
invasion of Italy and so-called “soft underbelly of Europe”.
They hope taking Sicily will provide freedom of movement for Allied forces across the Mediterranean
and allow bomber fleets to reach further into occupied Europe. It may also appease Stalin
by opening up an additional front in Europe just as German forces launch their summer
offensive at Kursk. Sicily’s invasion could even force Italy to withdraw from the war
– although this is more of a hope than an expectation.
Allied intelligence successfully casts doubt among the Axis where the invasion will take
place: During Operation Mincemeat, Allied operatives plant fake invasion plans for Greece
on the corpse of a supposed Royal Marines officer, which is then dropped off the Spanish
coast. Through the false information, the Germans move several divisions to Greece.
Allied air raids also target Sardinia to further muddy the waters about the actual invasion
target. British Field Marshal Harold Alexander oversees
the invasion, named Operation Husky, using the specifically created 15th Army Group,
which included the British Eighth and US Seventh Army. The initial invasion forces consists
of around 160,000 men, 600 tanks and 1,800 guns. They`re supported by around 4,000 allied
aircraft of Mediterranean Air Command operating from North Africa and Malta. The Allied airmen’s
goal is to seize air superiority, interdict the island and provide close air support.
This force will face off against General Alfredo Guzzoni’s Sixth Italian Army. He has 10
divisions, although six of these are mostly static coastal defence divisions. Overall,
he has around 200,000 combat troops and 260 tanks and armoured cars. They are supported
by up to 30,000 German troops and personnel of the 15th Panzergrenadier Division and Panzer-Division
Hermann Göring. Considered elite, these German divisions are underequipped and filled out
with replacement soldiers after costly battles on the Eastern Front. But they can still field
around 100 Panzer IIIs and IVs and 17 Tiger tanks. In the air, the Axis have up to 1,600
available aircraft from multiple bases on Sicily, Sardinia, and Italy.
But the Italians struggle with poor equipment. The Livorno and Napoli Divisions are arguably
the best in the Italian army but are largely equipped with obsolete early war tanks, or
captured French vehicles. Available Axis vehicles are grouped into mobile
units, the most powerful of which is Battlegroup Schmalz. Its job will be to counter invading
forces near Syracuse, Augusta and Catania. Officially, German troops are under Italian
command, but in practice, German commanders are largely independent.
Both allied ground commanders, Bernard Montgomery and George Patton, have been highly critical
of the invasion plan during its conception. They request to u¬¬¬se their veteran troops
from North Africa, but Alexander encourages them to use fresh troops so these can gain
experience. Enemy air power is also a major concern for the landing force, so Air Chief
Marshal Arthur Tedder suggests capturing and using the well built-up enemy airfields in
the southeast of Sicily. This will allow fighter units to take off directly from Sicily instead
of Malta. Patton and Montgomery also request more close air support during the landing,
but Tedder argues gaining air superiority through bombing enemy airfields is a better
use of Allied air power. From early June Allied planners prepare for
the invasion. On June 11, the allied navy and air force bombard the nearby fortress
islands of Pantelleria and Lampedusa into submission. Then on July 2 – D-Day minus
7 – Sicily and targets in Southern Italy come under heavy aerial and naval bombardment
to disrupt and destroy supply lines, airfields and defences. As a result, the Axis relocate
the vast majority of their aircraft to mainland Italy, leaving only around 125 in Sicily.
By this time the Mediterranean Air Command has achieved air superiority over the region,
although German Luftflotte 2 still has bomber and fighter reserves available to potentially
disrupt the landing in Sicily. Meanwhile, British and American paratroopers
are getting ready for their drops. British and American planners developed the
airborne component of Husky at short notice, and some commanders are concerned about the
drop planned for the night of July 9. US 82nd Airborne commander, Major General Matthew
Ridgway is worried about friendly fire and a lack of night-flying experience among American
pilots. All-in-all 5300 airborne troops are supposed
to land in Sicily. US troops will mostly jump from C-47s, while British paratroopers will
arrive on gliders. But there is a lack of trained glider pilots and US C-47 pilots have
little experience in towing gliders. Once on the ground, the paratroopers will
secure important crossroads and bridges to slow or stop axis counterattacks against the
landing beaches. The 82nd Airborne will seize high ground around the junction at Piano Lupo,
while the British 1st Airlanding Brigade will capture the important Ponte Grande Bridge
near Syracuse. As the first Allied planes head for Sicily
things quickly go wrong. The planes towing gliders rapidly fall out of formation and
lose their bearings. Things get even worse when they come under anti-aircraft fire. The
tug pilots dip and weave, and some prematurely release their gliders. Of the 144 gliders
dispatched, only 54 land in Sicily, and only 6 on target. Up to 69 may have crashed into
the sea, likely drowning around 300 paratroopers. This meant only around 100 men are immediately
available to attack their targets. The US drop fares little better. Pilots again
lose their way in the dark, while strong winds batter the landing zones. Most paratroopers
land in small groups, and less than 200 are immediately available to capture the Piano
Lupo junction. In many cases, troopers simply land and make their way towards the noise
of battle. But despite the low numbers, Anglo-American
troops attack many of their first objectives. A single glider team captures the Ponte Grande
Bridge, and US paratroopers battle against defenders at Piano Lupo. US paratrooper Bob
Fielder recalls approaching the nearby Biazza Ridge:
“Suddenly there was an unmistakable loud, ripping burst from a rapid-fire German machine
gun... Never having heard the sound of 1200 rounds per minute I wondered what in the world
is that?” (Fielder 31) At Ponte Grande, Italian troops with mortars
and armoured cars attack the British paratroopers, whittling their numbers down to 70. The paratroopers
now await relief by seaborne forces. Despite the high casualties, the mis-drops
do have one benefit. The widely dispersed landings make the invasion seem larger than
it is, and Axis forces are occupied dealing with guerilla-style attacks. Although Guzzoni
announces an invasion, Axis command makes no serious effort to counter it on the beaches. Coinciding with the nighttime airdrops are
coastal commando raids by No. 3 Commando and SAS teams. Their job was to clear coastal
guns and obstacles. At around 3am on July 10, the first seaborne
units land. At the Pachino Peninsula, the Royal Marines, 1st Canadian and 51st Highland
Divisions come ashore in the darkness to find most Italian positions abandoned. In many
cases the coastal defenders have simply fled their posts. The British 50th and 5th Divisions
land south of Syracuse to equally light resistance. By 5am, the Brits and Canadians have secured
the beaches and heavier landing craft deliver tanks and trucks. Allied troops take Pachino
airfield, which they then ready for Allied aircraft. The British 50th Division runs into
British paratroopers who’ve just retreated from Ponte Grande and together, they rapidly
retake the bridge. The US landings also largely go to plan, despite
rough seas. Major General Lucian Truscott’s 3rd Division lands first, and sweeps towards
Licata to cover the landing beaches’ left flank. As they advance, they knock out coastal
defences and railway guns to clear the way for other divisions. In the east, the 45th
Division capture the Comiso airfield and secure the landing beaches’ right flank. The 1st
Infantry Division lands at Gela including a contingent of French Moroccan troops, and
although resistance is stiffer, they take the town by 8am.
By now the first serious axis counterattacks arrive, as Guzzoni orders the Livorno and
Hermann Göring Divisions against the US beaches. However, bombing and paratrooper activity
has cut communications, meaning these first counterattacks are poorly coordinated. To
the east, Italian blackshirt militia attack the Canadians, who easily push them back.
British troops now approach Syracuse, a major port and key to continuous naval supply for
the British landing forces. Guzzoni hopes its formidable defences will protect it, however
allied troops enter in the afternoon to a reportedly “riotous” welcome by the locals.
Italian units do counterattack towards the city, including with captured French R-35
tanks. But by now, British troops have brought up anti-tank guns and other defences. Italian
tank commander Adamo Profico recalls the attack: “We left, my tank in the lead… After a
few hundred meters, my driver turned to me and shouted “mines!” […] The tracks
of our tank had already gone over the first mines, which duly went off… The second tank
arrived at full speed, and as it took the curve a gun hit its right tracks; this disabled
its steering, and it careened off, rolling down the escarpment. Right on its heels, the
third tank arrived, also going at full speed. As soon as it had made the curve, its front
was hit.” (Anfora 167) By the end of D-Day, allied commanders likely
feel things are going well. Their troops are ashore, beachheads are expanding, several
captured airfields are already in use by Allied fighters, and Syracuse has fallen. But there
are mounting issues. Of the 5,300 airborne troops dispatched, only 2,000 are fit for
duty the next day. Army commanders on the ground also complain about a lack of air cover.
With allied aircraft occupied with fighter and fleet escort missions, no close air support
is available on D-Day and D+1. This lack of continuous air cover allows a German Luftwaffe
attack against the Gela transport area to get through and sink the ammunition ship SS
Robert Rowan. The Axis forces are also recovering from the
initial shock. Now that they’ve identified the landing beaches and allied forces, Guzzoni
orders more organised counterattacks. Battlegroup Schmalz blocks Allied progress towards Augusta,
while the Livorno and Hermann Göring Divisions make a stronger move against the Gela beachhead.
On July 11, three Italo-German columns attempt to break through to Gela. In the west and
centre, the Americans repel the Livorno Division with heavy losses, however the Hermann Göring
Division’s panzers make better progress against the light anti-tank weapons of US
screening forces. German tanks break open the line and head for Gela and the beaches.
With allied tactical support aircraft busy elsewhere, the 1st Division rushes anti-tank
guns and armour ashore. Eventually, a handful of vulnerable catapult launched navy spotter
planes are able to direct naval gunfire and stop the German attack.
Axis commanders realise the offshore armada would destroy any further attempts to reach
the shore, so their forces withdraw and take up blocking positions around Caltagirone.
But despite the failure of Italo-German counterattack, they do slow the progress of the American
1st and 45th Divisions. The Luftwaffe is less successful and are only able to offer sporadic
resistance from the remaining Sicilian airfields. Johannes Steinhoff from Jagdgeschwader 77
later recounts the desperation in his memoirs: “With what we could scrape together of the
remnants of the group, we would fly along the north coast over Etna’s crater towards
the Straits of Messina where we would fling ourselves at the [B-17] Flying Fortresses
in a series of uncoordinated attacks. Our numbers were so few that we would do little
damage, and even that little depended upon our breaking through to the bombers.”
To reinforce the US troops, further paratrooper drops are planned for late July 11, but the
drop is another disaster. Recent German bomber attacks have the allied anti-aircraft units
on high alert. When the navy and army gunners spot the friendly C-47s are spotted, they
mistake them for Axis craft and open fire on them. 23 of the 144 transport planes are
lost to friendly fire, with an estimated 90 aircrew and 229 paratrooper casualties. A
report by the 82nd Airborne Division blamed a lack of communication and preparation among
the ground forces. Meanwhile, fleet commander Admiral Andrew Cunningham blamed the pilots
for flying outside of agreed air corridors. As the US advance bogs down, the British Eighth
Army makes better progress along the coast. The Brits take Augusta on captured on July
12, but resistance from dug-in enemy units is stiffening. Montgomery now develops a plan
to open new routes of advance for British troops. While continuing to push towards Catania
along the coast, he orders the XXX Corps to swing around Mount Etna from the west, with
the aim of cutting the island in two. However, this requires British troops to take over
US objectives around Caltagirone and give them exclusive use of Highway 124.
Patton is outraged that his force is now relegated to supporting the British manoeuvre. So, in
response, Alexander allows the US 3rd Division to advance towards Agrigento. As Montgomery takes increasing control of
the offensive, German commanders are also taking control of the defence. General der
Panzertruppe Hans-Valentin Hube of the XIV Corps takes over de facto command of the island,
while incoming German formations are preparing to reinforce him. The elite 1. Fallschirmjäger-Division
is on the way, as is the freshly reformed 29th Panzergrenadier Division.
BLOCK 5: PRIMOSOLE BRIDGE On July 13, Montgomery opens his major push
towards Catania. First, nighttime airborne and seaborne commandos raids will capture
two bridges, the Ponte dei Malati and Ponte dei Primosole. The 50th Division will then
breakthrough axis defences around 30 kilometers to the south, link up with the commandos and
strike for Catania. Once again, the air drops go poorly. Both
friendly and enemy anti-aircraft fire forces nearly 30 percent of the gliders to return
to base, and only 200 men and 3 anti-tanks guns drop near to their target. To make matters
worse, they’ve dropped directly on top of the newly arrived 1. Fallschirmjäger-Division.
The British do capture Primosole Bridge, but come under immediate German attack. The Brits
use captured anti-tank guns and mines to repel the assaults, but casualties are mounting
and ammunition is running out. Eventually, they decide to relocate to a hill to the south
of the bridge, and cover it from there until 50th Division arrives.
However, the 50th Division expected to fight against Italian units, not hardened German
paratroopers and their progress is slow. Fighting is particularly tough in dense vineyards and
orange groves. A soldier of the 5th East Yorkshire Regiment recalls:
“[…]it wasn’t possible to see more than 20 yards [in the orange groves]... Some [unidentified]
troops were moving alongside a small wall, […] As we were debating who they might be,
the question was solved by the rapid burr of a Spandau [machinegun] not very far away.”
(Clay, 186) On July 14, the 50th Division reaches the
bridge, but finds the northern bank under solid German control. British troops wade
across on July 15, but German machineguns and artillery soon pin them down. Only a small
Allied bridgehead is formed. On July 17, after tough fighting around the
bridgehead, the Brits make another attempt towards Catania under a heavy creeping barrage.
Sergeant Georg Schmitz of the 1. Fallschirmjäger-Division is on the receiving end:
“We survived the 1 ½ hour barrage well under the cover of the tank trench. […] We
had orders not to open fire until Oberstleutnant Walther... gave the order... Thus, without
a shot being fired from our side, the attacking enemy came unhindered into the range of fire
of our infantry weapons. But then he was met by our furious defensive fire. The attacker
had very heavy losses and the attack was beaten off.” (Klein 29)
The British attack again on July 18, but they’re unable to breakthrough to Catania, or the
nearby aerodrome. The next day, Montgomery abandons the plan
and shifts the focus to his planned swing around Mount Etna. But what was envisioned
as a speedy thrust is also an arduous slog. On July 17th, the Canadians push along Highway
124 but are stopped short of Enna by tenacious resistance. The Axis forces have already shifted their
positions to counter the move. Hube decides to abandon the west of Sicily and fall back
to a series of defensive lines around Etna. His plan is now to defend Sicily as long as
possible before withdrawing forces across the Messina Straits into Italy. However, the
withdrawal is not a retreat. German and Italian rearguard units continue to contest town after
town. Demolitions and booby traps further slow the allied advance.
With Montgomery bogged down, Patton senses an opportunity. He demands US forces be given
a more significant objective, arguing there is a political necessity for the American
public to see their troops at work. Alexander concedes and allows Patton to capture
Palermo, a major port and the largest city on the island. US forces, especially the 2nd
Armored Division, now race forward against isolated pockets of mostly Italian troops
- who often surrender after token resistance. Colonel James Gavin of the 82nd Airborne recalls:
“It was unlike anything else I had encountered during the war. Suddenly a machine gun or
anti-tank weapon would open up, and then the white flags would appear. A shot had been
fired for ‘honour,’ but it was just as likely to cause casualties as a shot fired
in anger.” (Ford) The US troops have another advantage in their
drive across Sicily. Large number of the American troops are Italian-Americans, some with Sicilian
heritage. They occasionally receive a warm reception from locals and can use their connections
to gain important intelligence. US intelligence also makes use of criminal
connections among New York mafia families with ties to Sicily. Local Sicilian mafia
opposed to Mussolini helps gather intelligence and guide allied troops through mountain passes.
Meanwhile, German troops report a hostile attitude towards their continued presence.
German paratrooper Joseph Klein recalls the response to his unit's demolitions work:
"In Trecastagni, […] some [civilians] emerged as spokesmen, waving old hunting rifles around
and assuming a threatening posture... The kerfuffle did not end until our platoon sergeant
had a machine gun group with an MG 42 set up on the market square...” (Klein 29)
On at least one occasion, tensions spill over into murder. The Hermann Göring Division
shoots 16 Italian men in Castiglione di Sicilia, likely as retaliation for supposed thefts.
By July 22, the Americans have taken Palermo, and the Allies have practically cut the island
in two at Termini Imerese. US troops take 50,000 Italian prisoners with only 272 casualties.
Patton now directs his troops along northern Sicily to participate in the attack towards
Messina. Indeed, for him it has now become a race about whether the American or British
will get there first. Meanwhile, in Rome, the war takes an unexpected
and dramatic turn. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini is voted out of the Fascist Grand
Council and arrested – his time as Il Duce now over. King Victor Emmanuel assumes full
constitutional powers. Mussolini had faced a growing conspiracy from within his own general
staff, and the Sicilian invasion paired with Allied bombing of mainland Italy act as a
final nail in the coffin. But with Hitler watching closely, Italy vows to continue the
war – for the time being. Mussolini’s removal also ends any pretence
of Italian command in Sicily. General Hube now oversees the entire withdrawal and evacuation.
His troops continue to fight rearguard actions towards the Etna Line based around the formidable
Centuripe position. Meanwhile, US troops advance towards Troina, another prepared defensive
point. Carefully positioned German anti-tank guns, machine guns and tanks take their toll.
In many cases, small groups of axis troops delay entire Allied divisions in the narrow
mountain roads. Progress is also hampered by a lack of close
air support coordination by the Allies. The process of requesting air strikes is slow
and convoluted, and in any case, fragile radio equipment breaks down or cannot get through
the mountainous terrain. Confused boundaries between US and British units add to the problem.
As the British XXX Corps assault Centuripe, fighter-bombers of the US XII Air Support
command attack them by mistake. XXX Corps commander General Oliver Leese phones General
Omar Bradley to complain: “What have we done that your chaps would
want to bomb us? [They’ve hit]… right on top of my headquarters! They have really
plastered the town.” (Ford) Exhausted and inexperienced allied units are
now near breaking point. Major Derek de Stacpoole, of the 7th Royal Marines – an entirely green
formation – recalls an attack on Dittaino: “My God! When I think of the things that
went wrong – the unpreparedness and the rush and hurry of the whole blasted amateurish
mess up!... Poor old 7th R.M. Never have so many been buggered about by so few.” (Ford)
Only the release of experienced units from North Africa breaks the deadlock. Aided by
the arrival of the British 78th Battle Axe Division, the British and Canadians capture
Centuripe and its dominating heights on August 1.
On August 6, the US 1st Division finally captures Troina, but only after the Axis counterattack
no less than 24 times. With these two positions lost, Hube knows the battle is now over. He
speeds up preparations for evacuation but continues his punishing rear guard actions.
The British 3rd Division advancing along the coast is especially held up at Monte Fratello.
To assist it, Patton orders amphibious landings behind the enemy lines on August 8, 11 and
16. Although risky, these so-called “end runs” do ease the advance. The British also
conduct their own landing on August 16 to cut off retreating elements of the Hermann
Göring Division but are unable to catch them. Both Allied forces now converge on Messina,
and during the night of August 16, the vanguard of the US 3rd Division enters the outskirts.
Hube’s well-organised evacuation comes to an end. The narrow straits, coastal guns and
large anti-aircraft forces means the evacuation Allied forces mostly don’t disrupt it, and
on August 17, Hube’s command is one of the last units to leave Sicily. Of the eventual 460,000 Allied troops in Sicily,
around 5,000 are killed and up to 16,000 wounded in Operation Husky. An additional 3,500 are
missing. Of those killed, 1,400 are paratroopers. German losses are 4,500 killed, 13,500 wounded
and around 10,000 missing or captured. Italian losses are especially high. 4,650 Italian
troops are killed, 5,000 wounded and up to 152,000 missing or captured. The loss of Sicily
also decimates axis air units. In July 1943 alone 711 German aircraft were lost in the
Mediterranean theatre, and the Italian Regia Aeronautica is in the process of dissolution
after Husky – a high cost for the limited damage they were able to inflict.
But despite these results, there are Allied complaints with the first major joint operation.
There was poor coordination, especially between different branches as well as animosity and
a lack of communication between commanders. Although tactical air superiority improved
as the invasion went on, army commanders consistently claimed they rarely saw friendly air cover.
Air commanders replied they were attacking targets further to the rear, a more important
contribution. Better communication regarding objectives
and methods may have smoothed over these tensions. Alexander is also accused of giving Montgomery
too much control and undervaluing US troops’ potential, while Patton too is criticised
by both superiors and subordinates. General Omar Bradley, who served under Patton,
accuses him of recklessness with the lives of his men, especially in his race to beat
Montgomery to Messina – a race some historians suggest Montgomery was not even aware of.
News emerges of two incidents in which Patton slapped enlisted men and at Biscari on July
14, US troops massacre 73 Axis prisoners. The perpetrators claim Patton ordered for
no prisoners to be taken, something Patton denied.
There were also missed Allied opportunities, as Hube’s phased withdrawal preserved his
fighting strength. In the first 17 days of August, the Axis evacuate 100,000 troops,
10,000 vehicles, 200 artillery guns and 47 tanks to Italy where they would continue the
struggle. However, the Allies also learn lessons from
their mistakes. For example, almost all aircraft will display clear invasion stripes to prevent
friendly fire during the Normandy invasions, while airborne operations will enjoy longer
planning periods and wider use of pathfinder units to guide in paratroopers. They also
make tactical improvements, including improved rugged radios and clearer channels for requesting
air support. Arguably the biggest outcome of Husky is also
a mostly unintended one. The removal of Mussolini opens the question of Italy’s role in the
war. But while the Allied demand of unconditional surrender remains, Italy seems reluctant to
surrender, and the battle for Italy will continue. In fact, many of the units – on both sides
– who had fought in Sicily will soon meet again on new battlefields. The next step for the Allies is the invasion
of the Italian peninsula, which begins on September 3, an event that causes the collapse
of Mussolini’s regime and a new Italian government to join the Allies. It’s a political
success for the Allies, but militarily things quickly bog down into grinding positional
warfare. American, British and Canadian forces are able to gain a foothold, but the Germans
quickly disarm the Italian army, take control of the country, and rush troops to the landing
zones. Allied troubles in command and coordination, plus Italy’s mountainous terrain, and skillful
German defence all mean that by the end of the year, larger Allied forces are stuck up
against the German position south of Rome known as the Gustav Line – with its strongpoint
at Monte Cassino. In fact, the truly decisive breakthrough was
going on at the same time as Operation Husky, but far to the East. There, the Wehrmacht
and the Red Army wage the biggest battle of all time at Kursk – and although the Germans
inflict more losses than they suffer, the Red Army emerges victorious. In spring 1943, Nazi Germany’s leaders are
facing a strategic dilemma: the Soviets stopped their 1942 offensive at Stalingrad, Allied
bombers are pounding German cities, Axis forces in North Africa surrendered to the British
and Americans, and Allied ships are winning the war against the U-Boats.
But Adolf Hitler and his generals know they cannot defeat the Soviet Union while fighting
a two multi-front war, so he is cautious: “This year we cannot undertake any large
operation [in the East]. We must avoid all risks. I think we can only make limited strikes.”
(Töppel 21) Hitler believes that once the Anglo-Americans
try and fail to open a second front in France, he’ll be able to strike a decisive blow
against the USSR. The immediate priority for him is to draw the Red Army into a battle
of attrition to weaken it so badly that the Soviets won’t be able to launch a major
offensive of their own in 1943. This is especially important since in spring 1943, the Red Army
outnumbers the Wehrmacht in the east 2.1 to 1 in men, 4.6 to 1 in tanks, and 3.1 to 1
in guns. And despite the catastrophic losses in men
and equipment suffered by the Soviet Union in 1941 and 42, Red Army commanders are indeed
planning sweeping offensives: they plan to smash the Germans around Oryol which would
open the way to Bryansk, Minsk, Poland, and East Prussia, while a simultaneous offensive
through Kharkiv would let them recapture of Poltava and Kyiv, and threaten the German
rear to the north or its Allies Hungary and Romania. If the Soviet plan works, the war
might be over by 1944. So the Germans have a conservative plan for
the Eastern Front in summer 1943, while the Soviets have high hopes for major breakthroughs.
And both are focusing on the area around the town of Kursk. The Soviet General Staff, or Stavka, expects
the Germans to attack the Red Army in exposed Kursk salient, so they deploy two army groups
in the area – the Central Front under Konstantin Rokossovsky, and the Voronezh Front under
Nikolai Vatutin, they also create a reserve army group for a counterattack – the Steppe
Military District under Ivan Konev. Red Army engineers also turn the salient into
a fortress, to bleed out the attacking Germans. But some Soviet leaders begin to doubt the
defensive plan given the long delays in building fortifications. Joseph Stalin and Vatutin
both argue the Red Army should hit the Germans first, to spoil the expected enemy attack.
Eventually, Marshals Vasilevsky and Zhukov convince Stalin to start on the defensive
to weaken German armored formations before going over to the counterattack – especially
because of the new Germany heavy Tiger tanks. The Red Army had captured a Tiger in January
1943, and the test results showed its armor is extremely strong. Regular soldiers are
worried about the Tiger too: “But the Germans have gotten ahead of us
with their tanks again. […] The worst is that our guns and tanks aren’t equal to
the Tiger.” (Popjel 157) Learning how to fight against Tigers is a
key part of Soviet preparations – Red Army anti-tank crews learn to target vision ports
or commanders’ hatches, which have a tendency to shear off after a hit.
The Soviets build six defensive belts to protect the salient and prevent a German breakthrough.
Together, the belts include 9200km of trenches, sometimes 4 lines deep, along with 1 million
mines. Most of the 300,000 civilian workers who work on the fortifications are women.
The two first belts are the strongest, to allow the destruction of German tanks, and
it’s here that the Soviets create anti-tank strongpoints. A typical strongpoint has a
company of anti-tank riflemen, a squad of engineers with explosives, 4-10 anti-tank
guns, and 2 or 3 tanks or self-propelled guns. Soviet troops also dig in their vehicles so
that only the turrets are visible to the enemy. But German aircraft detect the Soviet strongpoints,
and so the Wehrmacht command issues instructions on how to engage them:
“The numerous anti-tank strongpoints visible in aerial photographs […] must be engaged
as follows: a) Stuka [dive bomber] attack [immediately] followed by Grenadiers attacking
with fire support from Tigers. b) […] strongpoints are to be suppressed by artillery fire and
Tiger gunfire. [Then] the infantry attack. [followed by] a supporting attack by tanks.”
(Stadler 27) Aside from fortifications, the backbone of
the Soviet defense is artillery – and they have lots of it, up to 70 guns per kilometer
of front in some sectors. Soviet partisans behind German lines also contribute to the
defense, and in June alone they launch 1100 attacks against German logistics and infrastructure,
damaging 400 locomotives and 54 railway bridges. The Soviets are also planning for counteroffensives
they will launch if they can stop the German attacks. In Operation Kutuzov, the West, Bryansk,
and Central Fronts would attack the German-controlled Oryol salient and continue west. Meanwhile
the Voronezh, Steppe and Southwest Fronts would strike towards Kharkiv in Operation
Commander Rumiantsev. So the Red Army is preparing for a German
attack around Kursk and preparing a massive counteroffensive. And it is these preparations
that help make up Hitler’s mind about where to strike. Hitler originally wants to attack in the Donbass
region to secure control of its critical natural resources. It is his generals who convince
the Führer to attack at Kursk, to cripple Soviet offensive potential. And he is not
the author of the attack plan, unlike what German generals will later say after the war.
But the attack is delayed, and Hitler and his generals debate what to do. In April,
9th Army Commander General Walter Model tells Hitler that he thinks he can win at Kursk,
but his army isn’t strong enough yet, so Hitler decides to wait until reinforcements
arrive. Then in May, Axis forces in North African surrender, and Hitler fears Italy
might soon leave the alliance, or the Allies might land in Italy or Greece. He decides
to wait until the situation in the Mediterranean is clear before committing in the East. But
in the second half of May, heavy rains turn the roads in the Soviet Union to mud and render
any attack impossible. In June, everything is ready, but Hitler is
still hesitant. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein and General Kurt Zeitzler have been telling
him that the Red Army around Kursk is getting stronger, and the longer the Germans wait,
the worse their chances. So Hitler decides he’ll wait for the Soviets to attack first
instead. Then in late June, Army Group Centre Commander Günther von Kluge convinces Hitler
he must attack as soon as possible. The offensive, Operation Citadel is set to begin on July
5, 1943. The German plan is to encircle the Soviets
and crush them. Model’s 9th Army is to break through the strongest Soviet positions in
just two days, and complete the northern half of the encirclement. The southern pincer consists
of General Hermann Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army, and Army Detachment Kemp. Hoth’s tanks will
lead the assault until they meet up with the 9th Army and trap the Red Army’s best forces
in a pocket. Including their reserves, the Germans have about 900,000 men, 3900 tanks
and self-propelled guns, 1800 planes, and 8300 artillery pieces and mortars (Töppel
80). These figures though include the 2nd Army that would not participate in the attack.
But the German plan has a fatal flaw – they badly underestimate Soviet strength. Including
reserves, the Red Army has 2.6 million men, 8900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 5900 planes
and 47,400 artillery pieces and mortars that it can throw into the battle. They’ve also
introduced new heavy weapons systems, like the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns. So the Germans have finally decided to attack
at Kursk, just what the Soviets have been preparing for. But when the battle starts,
the Red Army is in for a surprise. In the night of July 4-5, several German soldiers
cross the lines to surrender, and tell the Soviets the attack is imminent. Soviet aircraft
and artillery spring into action to catch the Germans in their jumping off positions.
General Rokossovsky later records his assessment: “[Our artillery] fire plastered the enemy
troops preparing to attack, caused heavy losses, especially in artillery, and disrupted command
systems. Our strike surprised the fascists and made them think that we were about to
attack. Their plans were disrupted and confusion spread amongst [German] soldiers. It took
two hours […] before the enemy artillery started preparatory fire [which] was disorganized
and weak.” (Rokossovsky 262) For decades, this is the picture accepted
by Soviet and Western historians – but it’s not true. In reality, Soviet artillery strikes
too soon and does little damage, and German fighters shoot down 300 Soviet planes on the
first day alone. When the ground attack begins on July 5, the
Germans break through the first defensive belt in the north and south. The next day,
they pierce the second belt, shocking Soviet commanders who expected their months of preparation
would provide better results. The Central and Voronezh Fronts both rush in their reserves,
but a major counterattack in the north fails to drive the Germans back. Rokossovsky now
orders that Soviet tanks should not be sent against German armour, as he writes later:
“Given the superiority of the enemy, especially in heavy tanks […] [our] tanks should only
counterattack against infantry or light vehicles; and even then only when our fire had already
disorganized enemy dispositions. This order was necessary given the situation. There were
cases when our tankers rushed to attack Tigers, only to be pushed back behind the infantry
with heavy losses.” (Rokossovksy 266) In the south, the Soviet counterattack turns
into a giant tank battle, as Soviet units try to encircle the German armoured spearhead.
As in the north, German tanks dominate the battlefield here too. On July 8 alone, they
knocked out 343 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns, against just 20 German. The Soviets
have spent some of their reserves with no result, and the Germans in the south push
farther. In the north, Model’s 9th Army struggles
once it reaches the third Soviet defence belt. Soviet mines, including anti-tank mines upgraded
with artillery shells, take out many German vehicles, and heavy Red Army artillery fire
holds up German infantry. The Germans notice that Red Army tactics against their heavy
tanks are taking a toll as well: “Particularly noticeable was that the commanders
hatch was often pierced or badly damaged […] Russian regulations for engaging Tigers were prepared
surprisingly quickly and the enemy stubbornly followed them with all weapons.” (Töppel
65) Field Marshal von Kluge blames 9th Army’s
failure squarely on Soviet firepower, but hopes to continue the offensive after regrouping.
Another issue is coordination between German tanks and infantry, as in the case of the
33rd Panzergrenadier Regiment’s assault on a hill:
“The tanks [of the 35th Panzer Regiment] should have, as discussed and agreed, immediately
pushed to the top of the hill. […] Our attack ran into strong enemy fire, some of it flanking
fire, but we advanced better than expected. On the crest however, there was extraordinarily
hard hand to hand fighting. The Russians had literally to be dragged from every foxhole.
Unfortunately, [our] tanks stayed at the foot of the hill and didn’t move. While the top
of the hill was being cleared, the Russians counterattacked with their tanks. The last
of our rifle companies […] saw that our own tanks weren’t supporting us, and could
not resist the counterattack.” (Töppel, größte Schlacht, 145)
In the south, 4th Panzer Army has more success, and penetrates the third Soviet defensive
belt on July 11. Manstein admits on July 13 that his forces are too weak to surround the
Soviets on their own, but he also wants the offensive to continue. Hitler wants to avoid
further discussion with the headstrong general, so he tells Manstein that the general’s
Army Group South would have to give up some of its forces to help counter the Allied landings
in Sicily. But this is just an excuse and Hitler doesn’t send any units from the eastern
front to Sicily for the next ten days. But Hitler’s ruse works and Manstein reluctantly
accepts that Citadel has failed. Still, Hitler’s lie that he needed to send reinforcements
to Sicily becomes one of the most persistent myths about the battle of Kursk, and still
has many defenders today. The German offensive has failed thanks to
a lack of forces and stiff Soviet resistance – and because the Soviet counteroffensive
has begun. On July 12, the Red Army launches Operation
Kutuzov. The Soviets break through the German positions facing Oryol, forcing the 9th German
Army to send reinforcements to help plug the gaps, which seals Citadel’s fate beyond
a doubt. Red Army soldier Evgeny Bessonov later describes how the Luftwaffe tries to
slow the Soviet advance: “That was my first experience of such a
heavy air raid. It was pure hell; it is hard to find a comparison for it. You are just
lying in your foxhole and waiting for death, bombs are exploding all around, the ground
is shaking and you are shaking. I was frightened to death and wanted to run away from that
hell, but I was a platoon commander and had to stay with my soldiers.” (Bessonov 39)
Further south, the Red Army attacks 4th Panzer Army’s vulnerable spearhead. The 5th Guards
Tank Army, supported by the 5th Guards Army, will lead the charge after having sat in reserve
so far. The Soviet tank army is to destroy German armour near the village of Prokhorovka,
break through the German line, and drive ahead 30km. The Soviets use radio transmissions
and fake troop movements to confuse the Germans to think there are two more Soviet armies
west of the German spearheads, but this is just a ruse. The attack is so critical to
the Soviets that Stalin sends Marshal Vasilevsky himself to Prokhorovka. But when Vasilevsky
realizes the Germans have advanced much farther than expected, he panics and orders a rushed
start to the operation on the morning of July 12. But the Red Army isn’t yet ready, and
when the 5th Guards Tank Army smashes into the II SS Panzerkorps, confusion reigns. German
intelligence fails to anticipate the Soviet attack, so SS soldiers like Erhard Gührs
are completely surprised: “We were all sleeping, then they were on
top of us, with planes, endless tanks with infantry on them. It was hell. They were around
us, above us, and in the midst of us. We fought, man against man. We jumped out of our foxholes,
jumped on our vehicles and took on all comers. It was hell!” (Guehrs)
Despite the shock, the Germans recover and inflict a heavy defeat on the attacking 5th
Guards Tank Army. The SS units not only hold their positions, but also knock out 382 Soviet
tanks and assault guns, of which 227 are destroyed. The Soviets are only able to knock out a dozen
German tanks, and only 4 of those are not recoverable. These figures are in stark contrast
to later Soviet portrayals of the battle as a Red Army success.
For the Germans, Prokhorovka is limited to a local, tactical defensive success. The Soviets
still have the upper hand, but have to delay their main counteroffensive for three weeks
because of the heavy losses they’ve suffered so far. On August 3, they’re finally ready
to launch the final phase of the battle, Operation Commander Rumiantsev. 7 Soviet armies, 2 of
them Tank Armies, storm the German lines in the southern part of the Kursk Salient. Three
more Soviet armies join them in the next few days – a total of 1 million men, 2440 tanks
and self-propelled guns. Trying to stop them are the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment
Kempf, both of which have been weakened by sending units to other parts of the front.
They’ve only got 210,000 men and 640 tanks and assault guns, of which just 270 are combat-ready.
The Red Army immediately smashes the German line north of Kharkiv and advances towards
the southwest. German units have to avoid being surrounded, so they beat a hasty retreat.
On August 5, Soviet forces liberate Belgorod and Oryol – for the first time since the
start of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army has beaten the Wehrmacht in a big summer
battle. In Moscow, Red Army cannons fire a massive 124-gun salute at midnight to commemorate
the double liberation. On the 7th, elements of General Katukov’s
1st Tank Army reach Bogodukhov, just 50km from Kharkiv and nearly behind the German
forces fighting there. The German command rushes Panzer divisions from other parts of
the front, and manages to stop the Soviet tank spearhead. In the following days, both
sides send more and more reinforcements into the fighting, which develops into another
major tank battle. The desperate Germans even weaken their forces defending Kharkiv – which
Hitler wants to hold at all costs – to stop this dangerous Soviet drive. The Soviets are
trying to push farther southwest towards Poltava, the most important communications and logistics
hub for Germany’s Army Group South. On August 11, the Red Army launches another
attack, this time with the fresh 1st Guards Army of the Southwest Front. The goal is to
encircle Kharkiv from the south. Army Detachment Kempf is now surrounded on three sides, and
the defence of Kharkiv is becoming untenable. The Germans are able to stop the Voronezh
Front west of Kharkiv, but the Steppe and Southwest Fronts are getting closer and closer
to the city. By the 18th, Hitler has to admit the situation
in Kharkiv is hopeless for the Wehrmacht, and prolonging the city’s defence risks
another Stalingrad-style disaster. He allows Manstein to give up the city if necessary.
The same day, the Germans complete their retreat from the Oryol sector, bringing Operation
Kutuzov to a close. The Soviet pincers close ever tighter around Kharkiv, and on the night
of August 22-23, the Wehrmacht left the city to the Red Army. The Battle of Kursk, which
has raged for 50 days, is over. The Battle of Kursk is the biggest battle
of the Second World War, and one of the bloodiest in history. Historians still argue about Soviet
losses today, and the exact figures will probably never be known. In all probability, at least
1.2 million Red Army soldiers are killed or wounded, 7000 tanks and assault guns destroyed,
and 3000 aircraft lost. The Germans lose about 203,000 dead, wounded and missing, 1200 tanks
and self-propelled guns, and 650 aircraft. (Töppel 154) Although Soviet losses are far
heavier, and the Red Army fails to achieve its operational goals, Kursk is a serious
defeat for the Germans. They hesitated before deciding to attack and to exploit the initial
successes, they underestimated the enemy, had inaccurate intel -- and all this without
any margin for error given their logistical and numerical disadvantages. They don’t
achieve any of the goals they had when they attacked in July either: they don’t destroy
the Soviet forces in the Kursk salient; they don’t weaken the Red Army enough to prevent
its offensive; they don’t shorten the front to free up reserves; and they don’t capture
hundreds of thousands of Soviet prisoners they wanted to put to work as forced laborers
in Germany. Hitler had hoped that a victory at Kursk would
convince the world that the Wehrmacht was invincible. But the result is the opposite:
for the first time, the Red Army stopped a German summer offensive within a few days,
and despite enormous losses, went over to the offensive all along the Eastern Front.
By the end of summer 1943, German combat power in the east was exhausted, and they could
no longer replace their losses. The defeat at Kursk also has repercussions at home: in
spring 1943 most Germans still believed military victory over the USSR was possible, but after
Kursk morale begins to fall. And the victory at Kursk was the start of
more Axis setbacks in the east. From August to December, the Red Army throws the Germans
back from Kharkiv to the Dnipro river. Soviet forces recapture Kyiv in November, but German
forces fight hard and manage to keep a few bridgeheads on the eastern bank. At German
headquarters, these minor successes and the stabilization of the line in December are
optimistically interpreted as a sign they might have weathered the storm.
Meanwhile another storm is brewing in the skies above the Reich, as the British and
American air forces launch their bombing campaign to strike and German industry and civilian
morale. At the January 1943 Casablanca conference,
Allied commanders call for a Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany. The goal is to
hit key industries and military targets in preparation for an invasion in 1944. Allied
command still prioritizes U-boat facilities at first, but by June 1943 the POINTBLANK
directive shifts the focus to German aircraft and ball-bearing production.
US Army Air Force chief Henry Arnold strongly supports strategic bombing and has expanded
US air power since 1940. He especially believes the targeted daytime bombing of specific key
industries, like oil or ball-bearings, can cripple German war production. British bomber
command chief Arthur Harris, who is sceptical of such ‘bottleneck’ bombing, wants the
US to join the RAF in nighttime area bombing, but Arnold maintains independence. The RAF
and USAAF campaigns will build on each other but are largely separate.
From the US side, the Eighth Bomber Command will carry out most of the new mission for
summer and fall 1943, flying from RAF airbases across East Anglia. By late summer, the US
had almost 400 heavy B-17 bombers in 21 Bombardment Groups ready for operations in the skies over
occupied Europe. The Eighth conducted small-scale raids, especially
in occupied France, in 1942, but a lack of bombers limited operations against Germany.
By 1943 though, new aircraft, personnel and equipment are arriving, allowing for operations
to be ramped up. In summer 1943, the Eighth launch a series of raids to coincide with
the RAF’s bombing of Hamburg. Starting on July 24, 1943, US bombers hit targets across
Norway and Germany over six days in a mini-campaign known as Blitz Week – with mixed results.
A firestorm in Hamburg damages some U-boat production facilities and kills and wounds
thousands of civilians, while the Norway bombing setbacks nitrate production by a few months.
But bomber losses mount and the available fighter escorts are inadequate. Overall, the
USAAF lose about 100 B-17s across Blitz Week, with 90 casualties.
Still, replacements are arriving from the US and commanders plan new, even more ambitious
raids. Operation Double Strike targets the Regensburg aircraft factories and Schweinfurt
ball-bearing plant in a coordinated raid – the deepest yet into Germany. Colonel Curtis LeMay’s
4th Bombardment Wing will attack the Messerschmidt factory at Regensburg before flying onto land
in North Africa. Planners hope these so-called “Shuttle Raids” confuse enemy air controllers
and wrongfoot defending fighters. The 4th Wings unexpected flight to Algeria will hopefully
divert Luftwaffe forces away from the 1st Bombardment Wing’s outward and return flight
to Schweinfurt. This is even more vital as both raids will lack fighter escort for much
of their route. Fuel limitations means many escorts will turn back near the Dutch border,
while long range additional fuel tanks are scarce.
However, the raid on August 17 quickly goes wrong. Poor weather delays the departure of
the Schweinfurt force, meaning it takes off four hours after the Regensburg force, instead
of the planned 10 minutes. As the 146 Regensburg bombers pass into Luftwaffe operational areas,
German fighters scramble and attack along a 260-kilometre-long aerial battlefield:
“We came down on them from the front and slightly above. The huge airplanes were quickly
distinguished as individual targets – we aimed at the fuselage and the right engines.
We fired, then ripped through the entire bunch lightning-quick – a fantastic moment. Some
of the monsters had caught fire. I dodged their huge, shark-like tails with their large
black code letters.” (Caldwell) Over Regensburg, the fighters withdraw and
the bombing is generally effective. One of its biggest impacts is unintended, as it destroys
secret experimental Me 262 jet fighter fuselages. The diversion south also works and confuses
the Germans. However, it's of little use to the delayed Schweinfurt force flying along
a similar route as the Regensburg bombers. German fighters have time to land, rearm,
refuel and attack the second penetration even harder than the first. After a gruelling air
battle, the bombers reach their target, but bombing is less accurate.
The combined raids are costly for the Eighth. 60 B-17s are shot down, and 11 scrapped on
their return, with 600 casualties – around 16 percent of the force. Certain groups, such
as the 100th and 95th Bomber Groups lose almost 50 percent. US bomber aircrews claim to have
shot down 288 enemy aircraft, but the real figure is closer to 47, with only 16 German
pilots killed. Of this number, most were shot down by escorting fighters. The hugely exaggerated claims of shot down
enemy fighters were sometimes viewed sceptically by commanders but accepted in the interest
of morale. This was important as statistically; bomber crews face some of the worst odds for
all combatants. The B-17 Flying Fortress is designed to be
robust and well-defended by a 10-man crew in mutually supporting defensive air formations.
But, although Luftwaffe pilots attack from all directions, US aircrews become especially
concerned about attack against the weaker front of the plane. Machineguns are
later added to the plexiglass nose, but B-17 gunners lack training, and despite Allied
claims, German losses to B-17 guns are low. One Eighth Air Force commander was critical:
“I really felt that the gunners, in some cases, were more a hazard than they were a
protection. I do not think we will ever know how many airplanes we shot down ourselves
by this wild spraying of .50 caliber machine guns...” (Ross 150)
US planners try to improve the B-17, such as the G model with a remote-controlled chin
turret, but enemy fighters and flak are just two of many dangers.
Accidents are a problem - made worse by lack of maintenance time – as are friendly fire,
collisions in formation flying, frostbite and poor weather. Many pilots lack experience
taking off and landing in fog, especially with overladen planes:
“An overloaded B-17 stalling out under a thousand feet met its spectacular end in seconds...
Three tons of bombs, twenty-seven hundred gallons of high-octane fuel, about six thousand
rounds of fifty-caliber ammunition along with oxygen tanks, hydraulic and lubricating oil,
all hitting the ground at over two hundred miles an hour, left nothing but a steaming
black smear.” (Ross 146/147) A whole crew bailing out is possible, but
dangerous. Crew have to grab their parachutes in time, fight against the forces of a tumbling
plane and avoid other planes or debris in the sky. Pilots often remain onboard to keep
the plane flying level. The men also fear being shot while parachuting, and German civilians
occasionally attack downed bomber crews. Stoked by Nazi propaganda regarding Anglo-American
Luftgangsters, conservative estimates suggest lynch mobs kill around 350 downed airmen,
especially from 1944 – although the actual figure may be higher. German troops generally
do take prisoners though. Sergeant Ray Manley recalls his reception after bailing out:
“Four German soldiers approached me and asked if I was armed. I said, “No,” and
then one of them replied in perfect English, “For you, the war is over!” Then they
walked me to a nearby village where a crowd of people had gathered... A little blonde
girl, aged about five or six, stood and looked me over. She smiled at me, the only friendly
face there...” (Hawkins Munster 131) Successive missions with high casualties also
result in psychological breakdowns. The USAAF reassigns sufferers to non-combat roles, but
crews see psychological wounds with a social stigma attached. The men also know that the
bombing kills more German civilians than soldiers, which adds additional stress for airmen like
Colonel LeMay: “[Y]ou drop a load of bombs, and, if you’re
cursed with any imagination at all, you have at least one quick horrid glimpse of a child
lying in bed with a whole ton of masonry tumbling down on top of him; or a three-year-old girl
wailing for Mutter... Mutter... Then you have to turn away from the picture if you intend
to retain your sanity.” (Hansen 167) For Eighth Bomber Command crews, the stats
are grim. A 1943 study finds only 26% complete their 25 missions. 57% are killed, missing,
or captured and 17% are wounded, killed in accidents, or discharged due to mental conditions. But numbers paint an incomplete picture. Casualty
rates among bombers vary greatly between different parts of the formation. Some may escape unscathed,
while others might be almost wiped out. The 100th Bomber Group gains a grisly reputation
for high losses, earning it the nickname the “Bloody Hundredth’. At Regensburg, the 100th loses nine of 21
attacking bombers– the highest of any group. 100th Bomber crewmen begin to suspect Luftwaffe
fighters are deliberately targeting them, perhaps as revenge. A story spreads among
US crewmen that on an earlier raid a damaged B-17 from the 100th dropped its landing gear
to signal surrender to a German fighter. When the fighter flew closer to escort it to the
ground, the B-17 gunners opened fire, shooting the fighter down. The story though is probably
false. The reality is likely more mundane. At Regensburg,
many 100th Group bombers flew in the most vulnerable positions of the wing – the high
and low squadrons of the low combat box in the formation. These exposed positions lack
the supporting fire of the central ones and were often targeted first, earning the nickname
“Purple Heart” or “Coffin Corner”. But the rumour sticks and in October, a new
raid seems to confirm the Bloody Hundredth ‘curse’.
On October 10, 1943, US planners target the city of Münster. 274 B-17s will attack the
city center in the first explicit US raid to bomb civilian housing. The goal is to kill
or render homeless workers of Münster’s factories and transport facilities, reducing
both manpower and morale. The aiming point is the Münster cathedral on a Sunday afternoon.
The 100th is exhausted after another week of intense bombing, but the Americans expect
the Münster raid to be relatively easy due to its proximity to the Dutch border and fighter
escort. However, it soon turns into a disaster. Fog prevents some escorts joining the bombers
and up to 350 Luftwaffe fighters scramble to intercept the raid, especially the 100th
Bomb Group in “Coffin Corner”. Captain Frank Murphy aboard a 100th Group B-17 nicknamed
‘Aw-R-Go' recalls: “The German aircraft came after the 100th
in seemingly endless waves. As one element of fighters broke away, another was turning
for a head-on attack far ahead of us... Fighter after fighter flew directly into our formation
passing so close that we could distinctly see the German pilots in their cockpits...
More than once I turned away from the attacking fighters fully expecting a certain head-on
collision.” (Hawkins Munster 113) Within moments, German Me 109s and Fw 190s
shoot down three of the 100ths lead squadron. Damaged bombers, falling out of formation,
found themselves especially vulnerable to heavy twin-engine German aircraft, like the
Me 110, 410 and Ju-88. The bombers’ gunners attempted to drive off attacks, but weapons
jam, crewmen are wounded, and ammunition runs out. The B-17s waist guns and turrets are
often the most dangerous position to man. Within stricken B-17s, chaotic scenes play
out: “...I heard loud yelling behind me. I turned
and saw Sergeant Auger squatting beside the Navigator with blood streaming down his face.
The Navigator, obviously in a state of complete shock, was screaming at him, ‘Get back on
your guns or I’ll kill you!’ He started searching through his gear for his pistol.”
(Hawkins Munster 147) The US loses 30 B-17s. Of the 100th group’s
13 bombers on the raid, 12 are shot down, with 32 killed and 88 captured. The lone surviving
bomber, the Royal Flush, limps home on two engines, a non-functioning oxygen system,
and wounded crew. Its pilot, Robert Rosenthal, will go on to complete 52 missions – double
the standard tour. Despite the losses, the lead bombers hit Münster, killing 700 civilians. For the bombers, the lesson of October’s
so-called ‘Black Week’ is the need for better long-range fighter escort. New fighters
like the P-51 Mustang and improved fuel drop tanks are coming, but Allied plans to cripple
the German war industry mean bomber missions often outrange fighter escort. Four days after
Münster, the 100th Bomb Group joins another ambitious mission deep into Germany. The target is once again Schweinfurt. Bomber
command believes a raid on the ball-bearing plant can set back German fighter production
by months. It will be the biggest US raid yet: 383 B-17s in two forces will penetrate
into Germany without fighter escort. Within 100 kilometres of their route, around 1,100
Luftwaffe fighters are based. US veterans of the first Schweinfurt raid two months prior
are concerned: “When the briefing officer said, “Gentlemen,
your target for today is Schweinfurt,” everyone groaned. The ball bearing plants would be
heavily defended. We knew our third mission would be one hell of a fight.” (Bowman 16)
Again, the raid starts poorly. Delays and weather confuse fighter escort rendezvous.
By the time escorting P-47s near the German border, some have only 15 minutes of fuel
for combat. Mechanical problems mean only 291 bombers continue onto the target.
When the Allied fighter escort turns back around Aachen, the Luftwaffe attack with everything
they have, including a new weapon: “...the tail gunner, shouted that a Me 110
behind us out of range was firing something at us and it was leaving a black stream of
smoke. We didn't know that it was at the time, but we discovered later that it was a rocket...
The missile exploded right under our plane. It felt as if we were on an elevator; it lifted
us up and did all kinds of damage.” (Bowman 57)
The American bombers arrange themselves into mutually supporting masses up to 100 strong,
but Luftwaffe planes launch coordinated attacks. While twin-engine Zerstörer aircraft, like
the Me 110, volley rockets into B-17 formations to cause disruption, single-engine fighters
accelerate in front to open up with a grouped head on attack. Once out of formation or damaged,
isolated bombers can be picked off from all directions.
As the Americans approach Schweinfurt, flak guns, some crewed by teenagers, take over
the defence: “Our fire control equipment registered the
formation immediately... Every three seconds the alarm bell range. That means: “volley
fire from all guns!”... The enemy aircraft were densely surrounded by the air-bursts
of anti-aircraft shells... Large dark, in some places blood-red, clouds of smoke and
dust hung over the city. Often only afterwards were we stricken with fear. We 16-year-olds
had to overcome it each in his own way.” (Bowman 44)
228 B-17s reach Schweinfurt to bomb it, with generally good accuracy. The Luftwaffe pursues
them on the return flight. Only when the bombers reach the safety of escort fighters near the
Channel do the equally exhausted Germans retire. Some Luftwaffe pilots have flown three individual
sorties during the raid. US losses are 60 B-17s shot down, and 121 damaged, 17 beyond
repair. 600 men are dead or missing. 13-year-old Ernst Reichert finds a crashed bomber:
“With other boys I ran straight to the suspected emergency landing site. [...] On the left
in the burned-out cockpit was the completely charred and shrunken pilot. His hands still
gripped the steering wheel tightly. The Flying Fortress had already burned down and was still
smoking. Behind the pilot there was another crewman, also charred, tilted sideways.”
(Historischer Verein Markt Werneck) Bomber crews claim they’ve shot down 186
Germans, but the actual figure is around 40. Allied commanders claim the attack destroys
three ball-bearing factories and shuts down the entire works. Privately, though Eighth
Bomber Command is concerned about the high losses. The second Schweinfurt raid ends USAAF
deep, unescorted penetrations, while poor weather stops major bombing until February
1944. When commanders assess the year’s progress, they’re still not sure how much
damage they’ve done. Assessing the damage is difficult due to inaccuracies
in bomber surveys and debates about the German war economy. Post-war RAF and USAAF surveys
tend to exaggerate the impact both economically and psychologically. In the USAAF’s case
this was partly to encourage its reform as a separate, independent branch of the military.
But even some analysts at the time accepted the results were disappointing. Firstly, allied
intelligence worked under the assumption Germany was fully mobilised from the start of the
war, limiting German war production growth. However, Germany consistently found surplus
industrial capacity – although historians debate whether this was due to lack of early-war
mobilisation or fixing economic inefficiencies. In any case, general arms production continued
to increase until peaking in 1944. Fighter and ball-bearing production was also
not hugely disrupted by bombing in 1943. Until the final months of the war, the Germans built
more aircraft and fighters and compensated for ball-bearing production damage with porcelain
substitutes, rigid controls, imports from Sweden and unused stockpiles. Some historians,
such as Alan Levine, suggest bombing may have reduced German armaments growth by as little
as 5%. Others argue the 1943 Combined Bomber Offensive
should be viewed as a German defensive victory. Although no bomber force was totally destroyed
or forced to turn back, Allied bombers failed to cripple German war production. Armaments
Minister Albert Speer later claimed follow-up raids on bombed facilities could have caused
significant damage, but such raids often came too late, by which time equipment was salvaged
and buildings repaired. But this potential German defensive victory
is highly conditional. The 1943 campaign did wear down the Luftwaffe. In all theatres,
the Luftwaffe lost 30-40% of its entire force every month. For a while new production replaced
aircraft losses, but the Luftwaffe lacked experienced pilots. New pilots received less
training, and advanced skills like instrument flying and night flying became rare. Although
there were advances like jet fighters, the Luftwaffe also adopted more desperate measures,
like mobilising their own bombers in the fight against Allied bombing. The Luftwaffe converted
surplus bombers like the Dornier Do 17 into heavy fighters and even theorised concepts
of air-to-air bombing – dropping time-fused bombs onto enemy formations.
A huge amount of resources and manpower were also being locked down in German air defence.
By the end of 1943, 9,000 88mm guns, 25,000 other anti-aircraft weapons and half the electronics
industry was diverted to air defence. This means fewer weapons on the frontline and more
equipment in passive roles. On average 16,000 shells were fired per bomber shot down.
Bombing in 1943 also set up the German war industry for future failures. German authorities
brought more forced labourers into war production, impacting output and quality. Meanwhile, factories
dispersed or moved underground were less efficient. Dispersal may have reduced fighter production
by 25% compared to concentrated factories. Such isolated factories were also more vulnerable
to transportation bombing, which becomes a major allied target in 1944.
Luftwaffe successes in 1943 may also have more to do with Allied limitations than German
strategy. Weather, inexperience, and a lack of fighter escorts arguably played a bigger
role. By the end of 1943, the Allies are working on solutions to these problems – like better
radar and radio equipment, longer range fighters, and improved training. As soon as the weather
clears in February 1944, the bomber offensive continues on an even bigger scale. The bombing campaign of 1943 kills tens of
thousands of German civilians, and turns the heart of the Reich into a major front. Meanwhile,
far from the front lines and momentous battles, the Nazi regime’s plan to murder Europe’s
Jews, Roma, and other groups in the Holocaust continues. Berlin also targets remaining German
Jews, including the arrest of thousands who were married to Christian German women. This
leads to a rare example of open German opposition to government policy in February 1943. Hundreds
of wives and relatives gather in Berlin’s Rosenstrasse to demand the release of their
loved ones being held their by the Gestapo. The police release some, but send others to
their death in concentration camps. This protest though, is a small exception in the midst
of the ongoing genocide. Aktion Reinhard is the name the Germans give
to their operation to kill the more than 2 million Jews living in ghettos in Eastern
Europe. In 1942, the SS experiment with methods for mass killings and settle on gas chambers,
which they build at three main killing centers, or death camps: Bełżec, Sobibór, and Treblinka.
The plan is to deport most of the Jews from the larger ghettos: Warsaw, Łódź, Bialystok,
Vilnius, Minsk, Riga, and Kaunas – along with thousands of Roma people. Once the deportees
arrive, German guards trick them into thinking they’re being sent to showers – but instead,
they are gassed. Jewish worker Shimon Goldberg, describes the gassing of the Roma at Treblinka:
“While I was there, they killed about 2,000 Gypsies. The Gypsies went wild, screamed awfully
and wanted to break down the chambers. They climbed up the walls toward the apertures
at the top and even tried to break the barred window. The Germans climbed onto the roof,
fired inside, sealed off the apertures and asphyxiated everyone.” (Arald, p. 152-153;
Crowe p. 246) In this way, by September 1943 the Germans
have killed 250,000 Jews at Sobibor, 600,000 at Belzec, and 874,000 (and several thousand
Roma) at Treblinka. Most of the Polish, Baltic, and Belarussian Jewish population is now dead. But the killing in 1943 doesn’t stop with
Operation Reinhard. In November, the Germans kill more than 40,000 at the Majdanek, Trawniki,
and Poniatowa camps in what they call Operation Harvest Festival. And in other parts of Europe, German and collaborationist
authorities continue deporting and murdering other Jewish communities. Starting in February,
SS officials deport nearly all of the historic, 50,000-strong Jewish community in Salonica
to Auschwitz, where the camp authorities immediately gas 2/3 of them. In Bulgarian-controlled Macedonia
and Thrace, Bulgarian authorities deport 11,000 Jews whom the Germans then kill. Sofia then
goes back on its agreement with Germany and refuses to deport the Jewish population living
inside the pre-war Bulgarian borders. After Italy surrenders in September, German
troops occupy the country and the Nazi government tries to kill the Italian Jews, which up until
now the Mussolini regime refused to deport. In October, the SS and Italian police begin
to round up Italy’s Jewish population for transport and murder in Auschwitz. In the
end, they kill about 15% of Italian Jews. In occupied Denmark, Germany declares martial
law after a series of strikes, and plans to deport and kill the 7500 Jews in the country.
The Danish government contacts the Swedes, who agree to accept Jewish refugees escaping
by boat, the majority of whom do. Most of the Jewish victims of Aktion Reinhard
and the other mass murders had no chance to defend themselves, but in 1943, thousands
of Jews rose in revolt against the Nazis. In August, at the Treblinka killing center,
Jewish prisoners fight back against the SS guards and 200 escape, most of whom the Germans
catch and killed. In October at Sobibor, Jewish Red Army prisoners of war lead an uprising
that kills 13 SS men and other guards, including the center’s deputy commander. 300 prisoners
escape, of whom 50 survive the war in hiding. Two of these are Chaim Engel and Selma Wijnberg,
who later marry. Selma, suffering from typhus, later recalls the terrifying escape from the
camp as the guards machine-gunned the crowd: “Chaim took my hand and he said, 'Come,
its no use we stay there.' And then everybody starts running […] to this gate, everybody
was falling around next to us. You hear mines going and people dropping dead […] You just
run. I remember I had a necklace full with Jewish emblems […] So that was the first
thing what i took off and threw away [outside the camp]. […] I was very nervous of course
when you had to run, I get diarrhoea and I had to stop all the time. We heard shooting
behind us and we heard screaming and we were running and running […]” (Interview)
The biggest uprising of all takes place in the Warsaw Ghetto in April and May. Once Operation
Reinhard begins and the Nazis plan becomes clear to its intended victims, so the Jewish
underground resistance in the Warsaw ghetto prepared to resist. They form defence organizations,
and receive weapons from the Polish Home Army, which was resisting Nazi rule throughout Poland.
Many ghetto residents are former Polish army soldiers, and when the Germans start deportations
in January 1943, these Jews fight back for several days. The Germans deport fewer Jews
than planned, but begin a second deportation wave on April 19, when the main uprising begins.
For 23 days, about 750 armed Jews hold off around 2000 German troops. They know they
cannot win and most will die, but resistance commanders like Mordecai Anielewicz are determined
to fight: “Something has happened which is beyond
our wildest dreams. The Germans have fled twice from the Ghetto.[...] I cannot describe
the conditions under which the Jews are living. Very few will hold out. Sooner or later the
rest will perish. The die is cast. In all the bunkers where our comrades are hiding,
it is impossible to light a candle at night for lack of air […] The main thing is—the
dream of my life has come true. I have lived to see a Jewish defence force in the Ghetto
in all its greatness and glory.” (State of Israel 1:91; Crowe 268)
The Germans do reestablish control over the ghetto, claiming to kill about 7000 Jews and
deport more than 40,000 others in the process – the vast majority of whom they kill soon
afterwards along with survivors in the ghetto. And so the so-called forgotten year of 1943
sees the Allies push the Germans out of North Africa, Sicily, part of Italy, the Atlantic,
and smash the Wehrmacht backwards from the Volga in Russia to the Dnipro in Ukraine.
But even though the Germans are losing, they are making the Allies pay dearly and cling
to their conquests: the Allied campaign in Italy is bogged down, the bombing campaign
suffers heavy losses in men and planes, and the Red Army loses hundreds of thousands of
men without achieving its ambitious strategic goals.
The Germans are losing the war, and the odds are stacked against them, but they have stabilized
the lines in the east and in Italy, for now. As historian Robert Citino writes: “...the
math couldn’t have been worse. But was it just possible that there were some in the
German military – not just Hitler, but men among the staff and field commanders – who
looked around at the end of this horrible year, took a deep breath, and began to hope
that with a tweak here and there, a little more willpower, and perhaps a bit of luck,
they might actually survive their ordeal?” (Citino 278)
These thoughts are a departure from the rational approach to war the German officer corps long
prided itself upon. Germany is out of options for holding on to its supposed 1000-year Reich,
and yet still underestimates the willpower of its more powerful enemies. The Allies have
definitively gained the upper hand, and 1944 will make that abundantly clear. Since you are watching this two plus hour
documentary about the pivotal year 1943, I am guessing you might be keen to learn more
about the Second World War and other overlooked campaigns that don’t often get the time
they deserve in history documentaries. Well, we made two other epic World War 2 documentaries:
the first one is 16 Days in Berlin; the most detailed documentary about the Battle of Berlin
ever produced. A 4 ½ hour day-by-day breakdown of one of the biggest battles of the entire
war when the Red Army advanced from the Oder River into the heart of Nazi Germany’s capital.
Filmed on original location, featuring detailed maps and animation, expert interviews and
much more. The second documentary is Rhineland 45 about the last set-piece battle on the
Western Front in which the Allies under Bernhard Montgomery attacked from the Dutch Border
and ultimately crossed the mighty Rhine river. This 3 ½ hour documentary was also filmed
on original location, features detailed maps and animation, expert and veteran interviews
and more. But you can’t watch 16 Days in Berlin and Rhineland 45 on YouTube because
of our uncompromising portrayal of the war using authentic combat footage.
So, where can you watch these two massive documentaries with a combined runtime of over
8 hours? On Nebula, a streaming service we’re building together with other creators; where
we don’t have to worry about YouTube’s advertising guidelines and the mighty algorithm.
If you sign up at nebula.tv/realtimehistory you can watch all our content in 4K, ad-free
and earlier than on YouTube. And not just in your browser, Nebula is also available
on your Smartphone and devices like Apple TV or Roku. And all that for just $30 a year.
And it’s not just our documentaries you can watch on Nebula, there are a lot of other
creators on there who also produced original content they couldn’t upload on YouTube.
If you want even more Second World War content, check out the Battle of Britain series by
Real Engineering or if you need a break from military history, check out Jet Lag by Wendover,
a fun game show where contestants race around the world. Again, that’s nebula.tv/realtimehistory
for just $30 a year and supporting our channel and future history content directly. As usual you can find all the sources for
this video in the video description below. If you are watching this video on Nebula or
Patreon, thank you so much for the support. I’m Jesse Alexander and this is a production
of Real Time History, the only history channel that won’t forget 1943.
