TN: Hi. I'm Tim Naftali. I'm director of the
Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in Yorba Linda, California. I have
the honor and privilege today to be interviewing William Timmons for the
Nixon Oral History Program. We're in Washington, DC and it's March
27th 2009. Mr. Timmons, thank you for joining us today. WT: Thank you for having me.
TN: Let's start by-- Let me ask you, when did you meet Richard Nixon? WT: I met Richard
Nixon in the Senate. I was a staff assistant to Senator Alexander Wiley
when he was a Vice President and he had an office on our floor, actually, in the
old Senate office building, and I met him a number of times during that period. He
wouldn't remember it but, of course, I do. TN: Tell us a little about Alexander Wiley.
WT: He was a senator from Wisconsin. Republican. A senior member, when I was
there. He was on the Foreign Relations Committee and Finance Committee and
quite a character, actually. And so, I after Korea, when I came back from the
Air Force, I found a job on his staff and he was very good to me for six years I
had worked there. TN: What were the key issues that you worked
on when you were with Senator Wiley? WT: Well, I didn't do much legislative work. I did
mostly newsletter and answer mail and that sort of thing as sort of
entry-level position. TN: Let's move forward a little bit. When did you get involved
in Vice President Nixon's presidential campaign? WT: I was not involved, really, in his first
presidential campaign, and it was much later that I got involved with him
leading up to the, um, to his campaign for presidency later. It was probably about '66. Along in there somewhere.
TN: Do you recall what you did. WT: Well, my boss at that time was Congressman, later Senator,
Bill Brock and we both thought that he had the best prospects for being elected
President, having been Vice President, and doing lots of work for Republicans. So
Congressman Brock and I tagged on to him pretty early there and we made
recommendations on members or challengers, Republican challengers, that
needed some help and helped him devise his schedule to go out and help
Republicans. TN: That was a very successful effort on his part in 1966. WT: I think so. I think
he did a good job and, of course, he built up some IOUs in that process
that he cashed in later. TN: What do you recall if you, if Congressman Brock
was one of them, who were the other key congressional supporters of President
Nixon, Vice President Nixon's in '66 who helped guide his schedule that year?
WT: Well, there was actually a rather formal group called the Mundt-Arends Group.
Karl Mundt and Les Arends, the House, Mundt in the Senate, and they had six or
eight people that would meet regularly with Richard Nixon
to give him advice on members to support and issues to develop and so forth. So, it
was called the Mundt-Arends Group and Brock was a part of that. TN: 1968. What, what
do you do in '68 for the campaign? WT: Well, I was still on
Congressman Brock's staff but in those days, members could do other things and
it wasn't quite as restrictive as it is now. So, um, I was involved with him on, first,
on scheduling him into member's districts. And then, we had, uh, the '68 convention to be
concerned with and he named me the convention manager in Miami for the '68
convention, and that took a lot of time and effort. And after the convention, I
was in charge of congressional relations for the campaign located here in
Washington. He, of course, was in New York and the main campaign headquarters was
in New York. TN: Tell us about some of the challenges you faced in putting together the Miami campaign, uh, convention of 1968. WT: Well, a lot of people today
will not remember that Nelson Rockefeller and Ronald Reagan also were candidates for the presidency. So, it was a three-way fight. Uh. Some of the difficulties were that a
number of the governors ran as favorite sons and therefore, they withheld their
delegates from any of the other candidates, trying to trade them off,
perhaps, for something of value, um, but I, frankly, never felt that Richard Nixon
was in any jeopardy getting the nomination but there was some collusion,
strangely enough, between Rockefeller and Reagan in Miami, Miami Beach, at that time.
And so, we had to work pretty hard on the delegates. TN: Were you one of those who
worked on Strom Thurmond? WT: I didn't personally, no, but he was a supporter and
a very important supporter because the Reagan team was after him. TN: So, the-- Was
there some kind of horse trading involved to keep him on onboard? WT: I don't know. I
think he felt that, uh, that Richard Nixon had the best chance to win.
Whereas, Reagan was not that well-known nationally. He was governor but he
wasn't well-known nationally and, of course, Rockefeller would have been an
anathema to Strom Thurmond. So, maybe by elimination, he was a supporter of
Richard Nixon but they got along well. TN: In retrospect, what were the moments of
optimism and pessimism in the '68 campaign? WT: Well, optimism is-- I also covered the Chicago
convention for, for the campaign. The one that Hubert Humphrey was in and the
demonstrations and everything else. That was interesting because it pushed Richard
Nixon well ahead because of the troubles the Democrats had. Now, soon Humphrey came
back later, of course, and made it a horse race but, at the time, we felt pretty
comfortable that Richard Nixon had a great opportunity to, to win that, and Lyndon
Johnson, the President, was, of course, he was a Democrat and he supported Humphrey
but he was not opposed to Richard Nixon either and I think Nixon cultivated that
quite a bit. TN: What, uh, we're talking about how it became a horse race, what
role did the bombing halt play? WT: Well, it was significant. It was quite, several days
before the election and it was something that, obviously, the President could not
oppose-- I meant, President - that Richard Nixon couldn't oppose because it was a
strategy. A lot of concern whether it was politically motivated or not and that
tightened up the race quickly, I think, the bombing halt. And so, it was a
significant factor and caused a great deal of concern among those of us supporting Richard Nixon. TN: Were, were you surprised when the election turned out to be as close as it
was? WT: I actually was because we'd been ahead so much and
that Humphrey couldn't seem to get it all together. He was handicapped by
having to defend Johnson and the policies of Johnson, particularly regarding Vietnam.
On the other hand, he was trying to separate himself because so many of his
followers were not enamored with Lyndon Johnson. So, he was in a real box. TN: President Richard Nixon is elected President. He's president-elect.
Please tell us about what you recall of the transition and the role you played. WT: Well, um. Bryce Harlow, who was close to President Nixon and, of course, Dwight Eisenhower
before, called me from the Pierre Hotel and asked said that the president-elect
wanted me to join the staff and he hopes that I could do it and I told him
I would check and see. It was a great honor and I'm working for Congressman Bill
Brock at that time and we checked that, checked my wife, what she thought about it,
and I think we all agreed it was a great opportunity, uh, to join a new administration.
In particular, since we had worked for Richard Nixon during the campaign. So, um, so I was happy to go up to the Pierre
Hotel and work during that early transition period, and after the first of
the year, I came down here and we worked in out of the, um, Federal Office Building 7,
it was called then, and did a whole host of things to prepare for his entry
into the city and his swearing-in. TN: Tell us about how Mr. Harlow built his
congressional relations staff. WT: Well, he's a real master at the legislative process.
He worked for Eisenhower and he was with Proctor and Gamble and he stayed close to members of Congress and to the Washington establishment. He was smart, uh, articulate, uh, just a great mentor to me. And, um, so, I was
very pleased to have an opportunity to work with him. He was the Assistant to
the President and I was one of two deputies. My responsibilities in the
first year was for the House of Representatives and an old friend of
Bryce Harlow's, fellow named Ken BeLieu, was recruited to run the Senate operation,
and, uh, we had a small staff, uh, but very aggressive and it was a great
opportunity to learn under the great Bryce Harlow. TN: Could you, because, of course,
the audience will not know what the legislative landscape looked like in
1969, but could you, could you just tell us about the majority and the minority
and how strong those majorities were? WT: The, um. President Nixon came into office the
first president in 120 years not to have control of either body
of the Congress. I think a lot of journalists and historians have overlooked that fact.
120 years a long time and the difficulties it presented us, just
immense. Also, President Nixon was not highly regarded by the liberal wing of
the Democratic Party. He had defeated Jerry Voorhis for the House in
California and, later, Helen Gahagan Douglas for the Senate seat. They were
both darlings of the Democratic Left and he was very active in the House Un-American
Activities Committee in the House. Again, a, what is seen as kind of a far-right
group. So, he was not all that popular with a large segment of the Democratic Party.
So, the handicap of having a majority in the hands of the opposition was not very
comforting to any of us and that, they controlled the House and Senate for the
whole period that Richard Nixon was President, and the
numbers were significant. It wasn't one or two votes difference, it was substantial. That
meant for us, of course, that we had to, if we were going to get anything passed,
anything accomplished, you had to appeal to a segment of the Democratic Party which
turned out to be the more conservative side of the Democratic Party. [coughs] TN: To what extent was there a legislative-- When you came into office, to what extend did you have a legislative agenda that you were planning to realize? WT: Actually, President
Nixon did not have strong commitments during the campaign that we were
obligated to fulfill, a laundry list of issues. Clearly, Vietnam was very big and
central and he was determined to do something about that. The taxes were an
issue but he didn't propose an awful lot of innovative issues during the campaign
that we were obligated to fulfill. So, we had pretty free hand to try to fashion
together a legislative agenda for him. [coughs] TN: Could you, from your perspective, because
we've interviewed other participants in this, can you tell us the, the strongest
hands in that first year in shaping the Nixon administration's legislative agenda?
WT: Well, clearly, Bryce Harlow was a key factor in it. John Ehrlichman, who was
counsel but later became domestic czar was important. Henry Kissinger, clearly,
was a key player in those early days. Also, because of the stature of Nixon's
Cabinet, there were a lot of key people in the Cabinet who played a role in the
legislative policy arena. Pat Moynihan in the White House was a Democrat but, but
somebody that the President had a lot of confidence in in his area of expertise. A lot of health and - HEW - Health, Education and Welfare issues that came up with Bob Finch who
was an old friend, obviously, of the President. So, all of these people had a
role to play in fashioning some sort of legislative agenda for the President.
First year, as you know, is one of kind of solidifying your support and getting
ducks in a row. You normally don't submit a budget the first year.
If you jump forward to the second year, 1970, which was his first real budget, he
proposed more money for, um, Social Security and Medicare and food stamps and welfare
than Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, which is something wouldn't, wouldn't
think he would do with his background in the Republican Party and so forth but he
was a man of many facets. And so, he was off and running and Family Assistance
Plan was up and all sorts of other issues that were he felt strongly about. TN: Did you find, do you recall finding
Republicans surprised by the extension of the Great Society that they
were witnessing? WT: I think so. I think a number of Republicans were surprised
about it and some of the Democrats were. Um. We had a debate within our legislative
shop on kind of the strategy to pursue. One concept was a floating coalition
whereby regardless of the issue, you had different votes and you appealed to
conservatives or to liberals or to moderates or to leaning this way or that
way on each issue. The other concept was to take your base that would be with you
forever and satisfy that base on issues. Um, and my personal view was to take the
base and build from your base, try to stretch out a bit rather than the
floating coalition concept. Seemed to me that was just too hard to manage and, and
also you could never really depend on some members for more than one vote.
The Family Assistance Plan we mentioned it was the floating coalition concept and
while it passed the House, it the Senate committee wouldn't report it out.
So it died but the President got some credit, nevertheless, for proposing it, I
think, among some groups. TN: Didn't the President's interest in the Family
Assistance Plan also wane? WT: I think so. There was a lot of controversy over it. One, it was very complicated. The guaranteed income. A job, work-fare, they worked for
this and what do they get? And what was the amount? Was at $1,600 a year? Was it $2,500 a year? Extremely complicated and expensive and
I think he did, I think after the House voted, I think
there was some backing away from it. I think he would liked to have had it but he wasn't willing to spend the legislative chips necessary. TN: Another main focus in that
early period was the environment. WT: Mm-hmm. TN: Please tell us what you recall of, of getting the
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts passed. WT: Well, they were very big issues early on. There were some environmentalists in the
Congress who were pushing various proposals. Senator Muskie was one.
He was the chairman, I think, of the Public Works Subcommittee in the Senate
and, therefore, kind of responsible for environmental issues and, um, the Clean Air
Act came out. It was called the Muskie Bill by Democrats, anyway, and we made a, I
think, we made a terrible mistake in the signing ceremony for that bill.
The President wanted to sign it and we had recommended the requisite number of
members, the leaders and chairmen of various committees, and Senator Muskie, obviously,
was one but he was taken off the list, and I appealed that, not because I felt
that Muskie was deserving of anything extraordinary but that it was a breach
of Senate protocol not to have the sponsor of the bill at a signing
ceremony and it would hurt us with other rank-and-file members but the President held
forth and I think part of the problem was that they saw Muskie as a contender
for the presidency and he felt awkward there praising Muskie and handing him a
signing pen at a ceremony. So he didn't come and it did hurt us some, I think,
with not so much with him, necessarily, as other members who thought it was really
petty not to have him there. TN: Let me ask you about a foreign policy legislative challenge - the ABM Treaty. WT: Well, that was a biggie. The President very much wanted the Anti-Ballistic Missile program adopted. It was a system to protect our
homeland, at least, our retaliatory capabilities missiles and it was-- He took a
very personal interest in that and it was a very close vote that passed the
House and the Senate. It was a tie vote. The motion was to strike it, to defeat it,
and that failed 50-50. It didn't get a majority and he asked the Vice
President, Agnew, to go up and vote on it even though it wasn't necessary. It was to
give it the 51 votes. The Vice President could vote on a tie, of course, and it's kind of
interesting. I think, that a case can be made that the ABM program led to SALT 1,
a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, and which led to SALT 2, which Nixon
negotiated. SALT 1 was, was ratified by the Senate and SALT 2 after he left
office, and you have the subsequent Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan, who
enjoyed some sort of detente with the Soviet Union because of, of ABM, SALT 1
SALT 2, and that eventually led to the downfall of the Soviet Union. There's a
bit of a stretch to tie that all back to the ABM but I think it played a part,
along with a lot of other things, in the breakup of the Soviet Union. TN: Can you recall some of the horse
trading involved in getting it to 50-50? WT: No [laughs], I can't but I'm sure there was a lot.
TN: Well, we interviewed Secretary Laird and he, he played a role in that. WT: Oh yeah.
TN: Can you recall any legislative struggles over the Office of Economic Opportunity?
Don Rumsfeld's operation? WT: Eh, not many struggles. The conservatives and Republicans, by
and large, did not like OEO. The Democrats and liberal did. And I don't recall the
creation of OEO but I think we were all uncomfortable with, uh, with it. Um. And so, you
get not only the authorization but then the appropriation for the various
programs under OEO and I don't recall the specifics of the creation of the agency. TN: Well, it's created before-- WT: Beforehand. TN: under Johnson but candidate Nixon had talked about
doing away with it-- WT: Uh-huh. TN: and then assigned it to Don Rumsfeld, who energetically kept
it going. WT: [Laughs] Yeah. TN: Um. WT: And he was promoted to handle the Cost of Living Council then because
of his good work [laughs]. TN: Environmental Protection Agency. WT: Mm-hmm. TN: What do you recall of its establishment? WT: Well, you know, there were so many organizations created during the Nixon terms that I think historians don't fully appreciate - really, historians may, students don't - and EPA was one. And it was a monumental achievement, I think, to move forward on
the environmental areas because before the Nixon years, the environment didn't
play a very big role in national policy discussions that I can recall,
but during his time, it really came to the forefront and he established the
Council on Environmental Quality in the White House and helped create the EPA
and named a number of key people to run the EPA in that time, and while some of the
business interests were concerned about it, I think the President thought it was
a good move. TN: In '69, the administration has a tough
national security challenge, which is whether or not to accept nuclear weapons for Israel, um,
and it's not one that you had to worry about but it did have a congressional
side to it, which is whether or not Israel would get F6 planes. And I was
wondering if you could recall, because we will talk about this when the Yom Kippur
War occurs when we talk about that, but if you can recall some of the politics of
the congressional politics in the Middle East-- WT: Mm-hmm. TN: in those first few years before we
get to the war of '73. WT: I have no recollection of the,
of the military aid program to Israel during that period. It was clearly an
issue that Henry Kissinger and, and the President were consumed with, um, but the jet
aircraft I just don't, can't reach back 40 years
and remember. TN: I understand. Let's talk about let's talk about Cambodia, um, and
what do you know about-- What, what, if any, briefings were given the Senate, the
congressional leadership, before we started bombing Cambodia? WT: Uh, none that I recall, which caused some problems. Um. The irony of this is that President
Nixon, during the campaign, talked about how he wanted to end the war with honor in
Vietnam and, indeed, in '69, his first year, he cut back the ground troops, I think,
30%, and the second year he cut back the remain troops 50%. The third year, he, by
August, they were all out of there except maybe a few advisers. So he did, in fact,
reduce the, cut back on U.S. ground forces. Cambodia, because the North Vietnamese
continued to use Laos and Cambodia as trail ways to bring in troops and supplies, even though peace talks were ongoing, he
did order the bombing of Cambodia and there was no, that I can recall, consultations
with the Congress and, of course, they got very upset over it, and you had a number of
end the war amendments and bills and resolutions, uh, for all of Indochina, which
went beyond Vietnam, and tried to cut off bombing in Cambodia. He was trying to
stop the interdiction, of course, of Communists into South Vietnam. I think
there were probably eighty roll call votes over his time on Vietnam and
Indochina. It seem to always be a Mansfield Amendment or a Cooper-Church Amendment
or something bouncing around to restrict his ability to end the war in the way he
wanted to end it and, um, Cambodia really lit the fire again
because we were pulling out and here all of a sudden but, you see, he felt that the
North Vietnamese were not honoring their agreements in Paris to, uh, to have a
peaceful solution to South Vietnam. TN: Again, for the students that-- [to off-camera voice] Thank you.
Why don't we change tapes then, please?
