Few generals enjoy the reputation of Erwin
Rommel – the Desert Fox. Despite his service for the Third Reich, he is sometimes described
as courageous, dashing and dynamic, even by his enemies. His arrival in North Africa in
1941 signalled a major shift in the theater. His victories and panzers would make him a
legend - and Hitler's favorite. However, Rommel’s North African adventure ended in total defeat.
So, just how did the Allies kick the Desert Fox out of Africa? In January 1941, British victory in North
Africa seemed almost complete. The British-led Western Desert Force consistently pushed back
Italian forces, captured Tobruk and now threatened the major Italian port of Tripoli.
With Mussolini’s North African empire in tatters, he approached Adolf Hitler for assistance.
Hitler considered North Africa a campaign of secondary importance, but a total Italian
collapse could spell disaster for the Axis alliance. Hitler agreed and on January 11
issued Directive Number 22, to hold the region of Tripolitania.
He sent Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel to fulfil this request. Rommel was a rising star in
the Wehrmacht, having led the 7th Panzer Division during the invasion of France. His audacious
approach, including seemingly materialising unexpectedly behind the enemy, had earned
his division the nickname Gespenster Division – the Ghost Division.
However, he was not supposed to go on the offensive in North Africa. His Afrikakorps
was formally under Italian command and only to act as a Sperrverband – a blocking detachment
– whose goal was preventing further British penetration. Rommel’s superiors in the Oberkommando
der Wehrmacht forbade any advance other than reconnaissance patrols. Rommel sensed a loophole,
and he advanced against Commonwealth troops in March.
The British hadn’t expected an attack until May and were exhausted after fighting the
Italians. Despite far inferior forces, Rommel outflanked the British-led Eighth Army’s
static defences and spread panic. The British tried but failed to reform the line, and they
withdrew from Cyrenaica in disorder. Only Tobruk, defended by Australian infantry, held
out. British attempts to relieve it in May and June came to little and, now at the end
of his supply lines, Rommel besieged the port. In any case, his superior, General Franz Halder,
stopped him from going any further. Although Rommel’s insubordination frustrated
his commanders, Hitler was jubilant. He promoted Rommel to General of the newly formed Panzergruppe
Afrika, giving him command of both the German Afrikakorps and Italian XX Corpo d'armata.
This also strengthened the direct relationship between Rommel and the Führer - Rommel was
quickly becoming Hitler’s favorite. But soon the limelight shifted away from North
Africa. On June 22, 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Hitler decreed the Libyan
war would continue after Operation Barbarossa. On the British side, new Western Desert Force
commander General Sir Claude Auchinleck had other ideas. The hard-pressed Tobruk garrison
needed relief and on November 18, 1941, Auchinleck launched Operation Crusader. After seaborne
commando raids, the Eighth Army surged ahead taking Rommel by surprise.
Heavy armoured clashes broke out throughout the desert, especially the Sidi Rezegh airfield.
Despite initial setbacks, German troops slowly gained the upper hand. Rommel now sensed the
battle’s decisive moment had arrived. On November 24, he personally took control of
the 21st Panzer Division and raced after the retreating British 7th Armoured Division – and
towards the Egyptian border. He hoped to repeat the successes of early 1941 and trigger a
chaotic rout. His gamble, later called the dash-to-the-wire,
was a bold one – but it failed. Despite Rommel advancing up to 60 kilometres, the
Eighth Army did not collapse. Auchinleck reasoned Rommel must be reaching his supply limit.
And he was right. Rommel lacked the fuel to complete his dash and had to divert to Bardia
to resupply. Meanwhile, New Zealand troops took advantage of the 21st Panzer’s absence
to force their attack and link up with the troops in Tobruk. The dash to the wire may
have cost Rommel a narrow victory. Over the next few weeks, the 8th Army brought in fresh
reserves like the 2nd South African Division. Rommel tried to counter-attack but realized
he couldn’t keep up against the mounting pressure and ordered a retreat. At the end
of the year he was back in El Agheila where he started 9 months earlier. Undeterred, Rommel planned his next assaults.
Now closer to Tripoli, he improved his logistics and developed a strong defensive position
known as the Cauldron. The British were slow to capitalise on their success and so once
again Rommel went on the offensive. On May 26, 1942, Axis forces moved towards
Bir Hacheim and captured it on June 10. Rommel turned his attention north, surrounding and
hitting allied forces from multiple sides, which forced their withdrawal. The British
abandoned their offensive plans and poured reserves into holding the line. On June 21,
Axis forces arrived at Tobruk to find the original defences mostly disbanded. Panzers
broke through, capturing 35,000 mostly South African defenders. A fortress that had previously
held out nine months, now fell in two days. Hitler was jubilant and Rommel was promoted
to Generalfeldmarschall. He recalled: “For every one of my “Africans”, that
21st of June, was the high point of the African war.” (Barr) The battered Eighth Army, with barely 70 tanks
left, limped back to the coastal town of El Alamein. Axis forces continued to attack,
but their tanks came up against better-prepared Allied positions. R. I. Cunningham, an anti-tank
gunner with the Royal Horse Artillery, recalled a duel with a panzer on July 3: “The enemy... withdrew leaving five tanks
on the field. The northernmost of these, a [Panzer] IV, was stopped but not destroyed
and was firing steadily with HE at my gun... The Battery Commander... came up and told
me to cease firing as ammunition was extremely low... I expostulated but the Battery Commander
was firm; he turned and had walked some 18 meters… when an HE shell from the same tank
went over our heads and exploded beside him, wounding him seriously in the throat. I fear
I then disobeyed orders and wrecked the tank with just two more rounds.” (Cunningham,
Turning Point) Winston Churchill urged Auchinleck to counterattack,
but Auchinleck informed him the Eighth Army was exhausted. Churchill fired him for his
hesitation, and eventually replaced him with Bernard Law Montgomery. Montgomery, though,
realised Auchinleck was right. Eighth Army needed rest and retraining, and the El Alamein
position was a strong one. With the sea to the north and the impassable Qattara depression
to the south, the front narrowed to only 40 kilometers, which robbed Rommel of his ability
to manoeuvre. Meanwhile, British signal intelligence revealed the German plan. Montgomery decided
to allow Rommel to attack in the south and force Rommel’s panzers towards Alam Halfa
– a strongpoint bristling with dug-in tanks and artillery.
When the Axis attack opened on August 30, Rommel fell into the trap. Losses were high
on both sides, but the German assault failed. With his health worsening, Rommel returned
to Germany to recuperate. He was not the only one reaching the end of his endurance. Desert
conditions, poor rations, and overexertion resulted in widespread illness among German
troops. Although some of these conditions could have been treated early, many soldiers
waited until they were at breaking point before seeking help. A lance corporal with the 15th
Panzer Division wrote home: “Lads come here and after a couple of weeks
they keel over. Most of them get sent back to Germany. Still, they don’t grumble about
this being: “All for a Greater Germany.” (Kitchen 313)
As the Axis forces began to buckle under pressure, the British seized the initiative.
Montgomery’s Second Battle of El Alamein opened on October 23. Now on the offensive,
the main obstacle for the British would be getting through extensive German and Italian
minefields. British-led units made progress, but the attack
was not flawless. Units advanced at different speeds and mine clearing took time. German
anti-tank guns inflicted a heavy toll on advancing British armour. But the Germans also suffered
losses and on October 24th, Rommel’s temporary replacement, Panzer General Georg Stumme,
died of a heart attack. Rommel was rapidly recalled to deal with the crisis.
On November 2, Montgomery ordered Operation Supercharge to break through German positions
around Kidney Ridge. The limited frontage now hindered Montgomery’s mobility, so,
as he told his commanders, it would be a frontal attack:
“It’s got to be done. If necessary, I’m prepared to accept one hundred per cent casualties
in both personnel and tanks.” (Kitchen 338) British efforts paid off. After a grinding
battle of attrition which took its toll on both sides, the Axis forces withdrew on November
4. Hitler ordered Rommel to stand and fight – to
the death if necessarily. But Rommel defied this order and instead withdrew to the Tunisian
border. Shortly after a new factor entered the theatre. On November 8 Anglo-American
troops landed in Morocco on as part of Operation Torch. Rommel was now fighting a two-front
battle. In Tunisia, Axis commanders became pessimistic,
since the mountainous terrain denied Rommel’s methods of manoeuvre. His German and Italian
superiors took increased control, and ordered him to hold the Mareth Line, an outdated position.
Wehrmacht Commander-in-Chief South Albert Kesselring remained confident a counterattack
could be carried out, but Rommel lacked forces. By January 1943, German high command was preparing
to replace him. The Allies continued their relentless advance,
with Tripoli falling to allied troops on January 23. The German army in Africa’s strategic
fate had been sealed. On March 9, Rommel flew to Germany, but his army would not be given
the same luxury. On May 12, many of the remaining German troops surrendered. Hans Klein of the
Hermann Göring Division was one of them: “The bombardment the Americans threatened
for the next morning never happened. We then broke our small arms over a tree. My company
was singing as we threw the stocks and bolts of our weapons in all directions... We hadn’t
had anything to eat for a couple of days since there was nothing coming through. The water
supply was good, but there was no ammunition to continue the fight.” (Klein, Center for
Oral and Public History) The North African campaign is often viewed
differently from other theatres in the Second World War. The Afrikakorps themselves recognised
this dynamic, and their battle cry of “Heia Safari” conjured up images of a great African
adventure. Rommel – the Desert Fox – and the Afrikakorps Panzers completed this distinct
mythos. The tank largely defined warfare in Libya
and Egypt. The sheer scale of the area of operations meant mechanised movement was the
only reliable means of transporting troops and equipment. For Rommel especially, the
wide desert expanses provided a canvas for ambitious manoeuvre, and he saw his tanks
as akin to ships at sea. British tanks dominated before the arrival
of the Afrikakorps. The Matilda II, with its 78mm armour, was impervious to Italian anti-tank
guns. Though it was slow, making just 11 kmh cross-country. This limited mobility and increased
the time the crew spent in hot, uncomfortable conditions. Crew fatigue remained a significant
issue. Mobile cruiser tanks like the Vickers Cruiser
Mk 1 could exploit openings. Both of these tanks had a relatively weak 2-pounder gun,
although this was enough against early Italian tanks.
The Matilda and Vickers would meet their match once German tanks arrived on the scene. Initially,
the Afrikakorps fielded mostly Panzer IIs and IIIs, with a smaller number of Panzer
IVs. Most were equipped with their short-barrelled guns – ideal for attacking infantry but
less effective against armour. For this role, the Germans brought in specialised versions
like the Panzer III J, with a long 50mm gun, and the Panzer IV G, with an effective long
75mm gun. British-led forces increasingly relied on
American tanks to counter this German advantage - first the M3 Grant and later the M4 Sherman.
Both were armed with a 75mm gun, and were more effective against armour and they could
fire different types of ammunition – something lacking in early British tanks. Britain also
introduced new models, including the 6-pounder armed Churchill and an up-gunned Mark IV Crusader.
Ultimately, Rommel also received a small number of Tiger tanks. Protected by up to 120mm of
armour, the Tiger had a respectable cross-country speed, despite its weight. Its 88mm gun gave
it impressive long-range killing ability - one Tiger even recorded a Sherman kill from 2,700
metres. They were also good for German morale, as Major Luder of the 501 Panzer Section noted:
“We must do all we can to put purebred Tiger units into action.” (Kitchen 436)
However, the Tiger only had a minor impact in North Africa. By the time it took the field,
fighting had mostly moved into the Tunisian mountains, where ranges were shorter and terrain
more difficult. Tigers particularly struggled in the rainy season mud. They also did little
to help Rommel’s supply problems, since a single Tiger could guzzle up to 10 litres
of fuel per kilometre, with even more in desert conditions.
Some historians suggest German technical superiority was in fact only marginal. It was the way
the tanks were used that really mattered. British Major-General Donald Bateman, Middle
East Training Centre commander, noted the Germans had more confidence in their equipment
than the Italians: “The Italians last year lost confidence
in their weapons (one Italian prisoner kicked a C.V. 3 Tank and said “No good – like
everything Italian”)... The Germans are not likely to do the same.” (Roy 36)
While British tanks in North Africa largely operated as separate units, taking on enemy
tanks, Rommel used combined arms “boxes”. Within each box was a panzer battalion, artillery,
engineers and other supporting units. When attacked, the box halted, and the tanks moved
out to the sides. Anti-tank weapons stopped the enemy armour, while panzers manoeuvred
round to the sides and rear. Whereas British tanks often made frontal charges, relying
on their protection, the panzers prioritised fire and mobility. To counter this approach,
the British recommended a 3-to-1 numerical advantage.
The British later adapted and by El Alamein they had developed better cohesion between
infantry and armour. They also shifted their anti-tank priority to artillery. New 6-pounder
guns were more potent and easier to camouflage and even the 25-pounder howitzer could be
used in an anti-tank role. The Germans also relied on anti-gun guns for direct tank-killing.
The Flak 88, for example, was very effective in long-range desert conditions, but its height
made it difficult to camouflage. By 1943, the British had a distinct advantage in artillery,
being able to fire 30 shells for every 1 German, a fact not lost on one German NCO:
“The English have artillery that really should not be allowed. Full stop.” (Kitchen
326) Despite later Allied superiority, earlier
in the campaign German forces had superior equipment, tactics and morale – so why did
the Allies ultimately defeat them? Rommel himself later blamed a lack of supplies, incessant
air attack, poor performance by the Italians and the Eighth Army’s overwhelming superiority
in arms. How much of this is accurate? Supply certainly was a critical concern. Rommel’s
army was the only significant Axis force which needed to be supplied over water, and British-controlled
Malta made this even harder. The desert’s scale and lack of ports also meant local success
simply created longer supply lines, more fuel being consumed for transport, and less potential
for further advance. The opposite was true for the enemy pushed back to their main ports.
According to some estimates, Rommel only received 40 percent of the supplies he needed between
January and August 1942, and he complained about it:
“The bravest of men cannot fight without a gun, the best guns are worthless without
ammunition, and in mobile warfare guns and ammunition are virtually worthless if they
cannot be moved around in vehicles with enough petrol.” (Kitchen 350)
Rommel consistently advocated for more supplies and even began to believe professional jealousy
prevented them being sent from Europe. Hitler often made big promises but resupplying a
division in Africa required approximately ten times the transport of resupplying one
on the Eastern Front. Meanwhile, the British had a well-developed
port at Alexandria and a constant supply flow via the Cape of Good Hope and Suez Canal.
Other research suggests, however, that Rommel exaggerated his supply issues. Historians
Vincent O’Hara and Enrico Cernushi claim 2.24 of the 2.67 million tons shipped to Rommel
arrived, and that for over half of the 17-month campaign, Rommel received 90 percent of his
supplies. Although it's worth noting Rommel considered his supply allowance a minimum,
so even receiving 90 percent of your minimum isn’t enough. Also, supplies arriving in
North Africa did not necessarily mean they arrived at the front, since there was a serious
lack of trucks. According to Giuseppe Mancinelli, the Afrikakorps
and Italian command liaison officer, Rommel habitually blamed the Italians for his woes.
Rommel argued poor Italian combat performance placed more pressure on his German troops,
which increased fatigue, and he accused Italians of lacklustre logistical efforts.
However, Italian units - including colonial divisions raised in Libya - formed a significant
portion of Rommel’s force, so any success is also attributable partially to them. Others
suggest it was only through Italian efforts that Rommel’s great 1941 victories were
possible, since they had already weakened the Eighth Army. Italian signal intelligence
was also of vital assistance to convoys running the Mediterranean gauntlet. Later Rommel expressed
some sympathy for his Italian troops, who were often poorly equipped. After losing the
Ariete Division, he lamented: “In the Ariete we lost our oldest Italian
comrades, from whom we had probably always demanded more than they, with their poor armament,
had been capable of performing.” (Kitchen 348)
On the other hand, British-led forces had similar issues. Their force was also multinational,
including Brits, Australians, New Zealanders, Indians, South Africans, Greeks, French and
local Senussi soldiers. Early British command experienced tension between officers of different
backgrounds and personalities. So, multinational command issues were not unique to Rommel.
Airpower was another concern for Rommel. In his early campaigns he counted on reliable
Luftwaffe support against the small British Desert Air Force. But as the campaign went
on, more and more Luftwaffe resources were needed elsewhere – such as bombing Malta.
Meanwhile, the Desert Air Force concentrated only on supporting the Eighth Army. By August
1942, the RAF had decisively wrestled air superiority from the Luftwaffe, allowing heavier
bombing and targeting of Axis supply convoys. Then there was Rommel himself. His victories
and command style clearly earned him praise, including from the British themselves. Once
Auchinleck took over the British-led forces, he told his commanders:
“There exists a danger that our friend Rommel is becoming a kind of magician or bogey-man
to our troops, who are talking far too much about him. He is by no means a superman, although
he is undoubtedly very energetic and able... I wish for you to dispel by all possible means
the idea that Rommel represents something more than an ordinary German General.” (Lewin
245) Rommel’s preference for leading from the
front, improvisation, and dashing manoeuvres scored early victories, especially against
an exhausted and unprepared enemy. However, these methods earned diminishing returns.
Rommel was adept at exploiting his enemy’s mistakes, but as the British became more confident,
they made fewer mistakes. Montgomery was especially cautious, and by 1942 he had access to accurate
ULTRA intelligence from broken German codes – making surprise almost impossible for
Rommel. Furthermore, Rommel’s methods worked best
in short campaigns where decisive strategic objectives were within range, which was not
the case in North Africa. Only Alexandria was a truly strategically decisive target,
and its capture was unlikely. As the campaign turned into a war of attrition, supply and
command issues became more critical. Even some other German officers criticized Rommel
for continuing to lead an army like a divisional commander. When taking personal control of
units, he left the headquarters and abandoned a broader strategic view. For example, during
the ‘dash-to-the-wire', he was out of communication with other units for several days. So, Rommel’s defeat can be attributed to
many factors – a lack of supplies, geography, tension within his command, a two-front campaign,
and arguably his own command methods. But there was also one critical difference between
the Axis and Allied effort in North Africa – the theatre’s relative importance. For Hitler, North Africa was always a sideshow.
Rommel’s initial orders were purely defensive, and Hitler’s focus was firmly on the Eastern
Front. Rommel had to compete and haggle for resources and attention. Although Hitler sometimes
made promises, the rest of the high command usually didn’t support them. Kesselring,
Halder and others consistently restrained Rommel, and his supporters suggest they hobbled
a talented commander out of jealousy. Others claim Rommel’s commanders were much better
placed to understand Rommel’s position within the war effort and the theater’s full significance.
Some German planners did attempt to retroactively give the theatre more strategic value through
the so-called Plan Orient – the invasion of the Caucasus via the Middle East. This
ambitious plan envisioned linking up with Imperial Japanese forces and severing vital
overland supply and reinforcement routes to the USSR, as well as capturing vital oil fields.
German commanders did develop plans for Egypt’s long-term occupation, including Einsatzgruppen
units to carry out executions of Jews, political opponents, and others. Such activities had
already taken place elsewhere in North Africa: for example, Italian citizens and German troops
carried out pogroms against Benghazi Jews, and the Axis authorities set up a concentration
camp in Tripolitania – though the largest single pogrom took place in 1945 when the
region was under British administration. Italian authorities expelled the Tunisian Jewish population,
especially after German troops’ arrival. These actions contradict the common belief
that the North African campaign was a supposed “war without hate”.
However, these grand strategy plans were always tentative. Few German commanders considered
Plan Orient to be realistic, and Egyptian occupation plans were haphazard. Although
the Einsatzgruppen expected to cooperate with the Afrikakorps, it's unclear if their commander
ever met with Rommel. Overall, Rommel’s superiors consistently struggled to work the
North African campaign into a wider strategic plan. It was also unclear what German victory
looked like in North Africa. Was it simply preventing an Italian collapse, capturing
Tobruk, or the conquest of Egypt? Meanwhile, ever more resources, troops and attention
were needed on the faltering Eastern Front, in comparison to which North Africa’s significance
and scale was tiny. General Jodl contemptuously referred to the whole theater as “Rommel’s
little shooting expedition.” (Barr) Meanwhile, for the British, North Africa was
the significant focus for much of 1941-43. Humiliating defeats in France, Singapore,
and Greece meant they sorely needed a victory somewhere. Churchill likely considered victory
in North Africa as essential to his political survival – and he went so far as to put
it this way in August 1942: “Rommel! Rommel! What else matters but beating
him?” (Watson 1) As a result, Allied forces received the attention,
supplies and intelligence they needed to succeed.
The North African campaign also had wider strategic and political importance for the
Allies. Operation Torch signalled serious US entry into the war against Germany and
a wider commitment to the European theatre. Success in Africa also exposed what many hoped
would be the soft underbelly of the Axis. The invasions of Sicily and Italy, and with
them the opening of a second front in Europe, came soon after in 1943.
For the allies, defeating Rommel in Libya and Tunisia marked the start of a clear road
to victory. Though this road would still be long and costly.
From the landings in Italy, Normandy and Southern France to Operation Bagration and the Soviet
advance to the Oder, it would take until early 1945 until the Allies set their eyes on the
Rhine in Western Germany and the Red Army was gearing up for their Berlin Operation.
The Battle of the Rhineland would be the last set-piece battle in the west, and the Battle
of Berlin the last one in the East. Millions of Allied soldiers stood at the ready to bring
the Third Reich to its knees and the last German reserves would have to defend. If you
are curious about these two battles, we produced two World War 2 documentary series that together
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the Reichswald at the border until the Allied crossing of the Rhine that involved the biggest
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entire two week Battle of Berlin day by day. Both documentary series were filmed on original
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subscriptions and supporting us at Real Time History directly. We want to thank the Tank Museum for granting
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131. This is the last operational Tiger Tank in the world! If you want to see the tank
running live, we highly recommend you get a ticket for their Tiger Day event that’s
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