When Pilots STOP TRUSTING the Aircraft! | Royal Air Maroc 780S

a boeing 737-800 is lining up for their final approach when suddenly the autopilot starts turning the aircraft in the wrong direction how many technical faults does it take before pilots start distrusting their aircraft and what happens when they do a huge thank you to brilliant for sponsoring this video in the morning of the 30th of december 2016 a crew from royal air morocco was getting ready to fly their boeing 737-800 from rabat sal international airport in morocco up towards paris orly airport in france the flight crew consisted of a very experienced 47 year old captain and he was flying together with a 30 year old senior first officer both of them quite experienced on this aircraft type together with them was four cabin crew members and the pilots were looking very carefully onto their pre-flight briefing material because they could see that the weather at the destination paris orly was not going to be very good it was forecasted to be fog even freezing fog with very poor visibility the way this works is that if you're departing on an ifr flight plan which commercial flights always are you need to make sure that the weather at your destination is good enough for you to start an approach with the available minimum protrades so in the case of paris orly that's something called a category 3 ils approach that means that the pilots can go down to as low visibility as 200 meters and they need to be able to see the runway at about 50 feet height just as they pass the threshold of the runway but you also need to be able to go to your alternate and your alternate airport actually needs better weather than that so if the alternate airport is also equipped to allow category 3 ils approaches well then you need to have weather good enough to do a category one eyeless approach at your alternate so instead of 200 meters visibility you now need normally around 550 meters visibility if there's no cat tree available at your alternate well then you're going to need non-precision approach minima the rules have been made in this way so that if something would happen to the aircraft with your instrumentation for example when you're flying into your destination you'll still be able to divert and do a successful approach into your alternate because the weather is supposed to be better there you can also depart towards your destination if the weather is worse than your best available approach there but in that case you need to carry enough fuel to be able to bring you to two good alternate where weather weather is better than the second best approach aids but on this morning the crew saw that the weather was going to be good enough to fly a category 3 ils approach in paris early and that the weather in lyon was a bit marginal but it was still better than category 1 which means that they legally had the weather needed in order to go towards paris but because the weather was a little bit marginal the captain decided to uplift one ton more than a minimum required fuel this would enable him to go in and sit and wait in a holding for example in case there were queues coming into orly or if they encountered some other problems they would just have a little bit more time the pilots then continued through their briefing pack and they looked at their no thumbs no tums is a list of items that might not be working properly on route for example navigational aids or at the airport of arrival or at the alternate so you have to go through that list fairly carefully because there might be things in there that precludes you from flying for example a cat tree ils but they couldn't find anything of interest so they proceeded to brief the cabin crew and then they walked out to the aircraft while they were walking out to the aircraft they decided that the captain was going to be pilot flying for this first flight and when they got into the cockpit the captain took up the aircraft technical logbook checking the technical logbook is really really important as well because there might be things in there that precludes you from flying certain procedures for example a category three eyelash because it needs the aircraft to have certain systems functioning the captain looked through the whole item list which is where all of the current defects of the aircraft is listed but there was nothing there according to the tech look the aircraft was perfectly fine now what the captain didn't know was that this particular aircraft actually had had quite a lot of problems during the six months before this flight specifically it had problems with the left side air data inertial reference unit it's adiru now the 737 800 has two adirus okay and what they do is they basically gather all of the information from all of the different probes outside of the aircraft like the static tube the static probe temperature probes alpha veins things like that but also it combines this information together with information from its irs units its inertial reference system the inertia reference system is basically a set of three laser gyros and three accelerometers that continuously update information about the position of the aircraft it gives information like heading track ground speeds attitudes things like this and it feeds this into the adiru and the adru takes this information combines it with all of the other information and then brings that into the flight control computer on that side so there are two adirus they're two flight control computers and they are connected to each of the screens normally together with the flight directors and the autopilots so this information is really important and if there's something wrong with the information that's coming from the adiru well then that information might be erroneously fed to the flight control computers that then controls the autopilot and the flight directors which are showing the pilot how they're supposed to be flying the aircraft the left adru the one on the captain's side had actually been replaced twice during the last six months because it had been sending faulty information and the pilots had been receiving fault messages during flight but after each time this happened the problems couldn't be reproduced on the ground when the maintenance organization dealt with it so they were intermittent the maintenance crew had received the aircraft with these problems reported by the pilots they had in some cases exchanged the adiru on other occasions they couldn't reproduce the faults so they would just check through what the fault this was try to isolate it since it couldn't be isolated it would be cleared the system would have tested it would have worked fine and then the aircraft was released again there was also another problem that this aircraft had had and that was an intermittent issue with the connection between the right radio altimeter and the flight control computer and again this was an intermittent fault so it had been reported on one flight and then it would work perfectly for five flights and then it would come back again and the maintenance organization had again replaced part of this system but never really been able to identify where the problem was and since there was no current fault on any of these systems the maintenance organization had left the aircraft out and according to them it was clear of faults so there was nothing written in the tech log and there was no way really up for the captain to know that this aircraft had this history unless he would have gone very very far back to look at all of the faults that happened during the last six months which you can't really expect him to do and even if he would have done that since all of the problems would have been rectified by maintenance there was no reason for them to believe that any of this persisted so the pilots completed their pre-flight preparation they boarded their 149 passengers they pushed back and started taxing out for takeoff at time zero seven four six royal emma rock flight 780 sierra took off from runway 03 in about the captain brought the landing gear up and engaged command a just per normal and then continued a normal climb up towards paris orly about one hour into the flight the first sign of a problem appeared to the crew and this came in the form of a control display unit message saying ires left drift the crew didn't really recognize this message they hadn't seen it before and they started taking up their manuals looking for what this message actually meant but they couldn't find any kind of reference to the message later on it turned out that the reason they didn't have any information about this was because royal amarok had received a service bulletin from boeing saying that they needed to update their software for their fmcs and they had done so they had updated to the newest software but they had failed to tell boeing that they had complied with this service bulletin and because of that boeing hadn't sent the new information about all of the updated messaging back towards royal amarok so the crew was looking for this message they couldn't find it but you know they kind of had an idea what it was so they went into a separate sub-menu inside of the flight management computer and they looked at the position and the speed of each irs and they found out that the left irs was in a significantly different position than the right irs and the speed was also different so this made them believe that okay we have potentially an issue with the the left irs but they also noticed that it looked like the irs position and speed started converging with the right irs so this led them to believe that the system was actually correcting itself so they left it behind they couldn't find any more information anyway and they started concentrating on getting weather for paris orly because they were now getting closer to the destination as expected the weather in paris early was not good the visibility was varying between 400 to 450 meters with light wind from a variable direction and a temperature of -2 degrees so the captain started setting up and preparing for a category 3 ils approach just that they had planned with on their briefing stage now when we fly a category 3 eyeless approach the procedures are a little bit different than a normal approach and that's because a category 3 isles approach is flown like an outer land which means the aircraft is going to land by itself in order for the aircraft to be able to do so we need to engage both autopilots in command and we can only do so after we have been cleared for approach and we've armed the approach mode on the autopilot so the captain briefed this they set their minimus independently on each side 50 feet radio and after the briefing was completed they requested the center they started descending in towards paris during the descent the crew got a second warning on their fmc cdu this time it said verify position irs irs at this warning they did have some guidance for but since they were in the descent and they had already looked at the irs issue since before they assume that this problem is the same as before we already checked it it was sorting itself out so they didn't pay any more attention to it instead the crew continues to descend they change frequency to the approach controller for paris only approach and at time 109 royal emma rock flight 780 was cleared to descend to 5000 feet and turn slightly left to intercept the localizer runway 06 for a category 3 iles approach when the aircraft intercepted the localizer it started turning slightly left and right on the localizer the approach controller saw this happening and he queried the crew as to are you sure that you are established on the localizer but he didn't get any response back from the crew and it's possible that that was because the crew at this point was trying to engage the second outer pilot in command but they hadn't yet been cleared for approach which means the approach mode wasn't armed so they couldn't do this every time that they switch on command b that disengaged command a and they did this a couple of times at time 10 13 and 38 seconds the approach controller again called the crew and asked them to confirm that they were established on the localizer the crew responded this time and said that they were and the approach controller handed them over to the tower but he didn't clear them for approach so the pilots called up the tower controller told him that they were established on the localizer and asked if they were clear for approach the tower controller said negative you're not call me back when i'm five miles final which is a little bit weird because in order for the crew to call him at five miles final they obviously needed to follow the ils approach so the crew responded to this by asking if they could descend further to four thousand feet and that prompted the tower controller to then finally clear them for approach and when the crew got cleared for approach the captain engaged approach mode and this time when he engaged command b it worked so now both autopilots were armed for the outer land but remember how this aircraft had had issues with the connection between the radio altimeter and the flight control computer on the right side now that same problem came back again and because the flight control computer on the right hand side couldn't verify that the information that he was getting from its radio altimeter was correct it now disengaged command b so as soon as the captain had engaged command b it disconnected again the captain then tries to engage autopilot b a second time once again it doesn't work but the switchover actually causes autopilot a to disconnect so now captain has to re-engage autopilot a again and they realize that something is wrong with the autopilot system they cannot get the second autopilot to engage which means that they cannot fly the category 3 ils now there's no indication of any problem on the first of the side there is no radio altimeter flag or anything like this but they have to discontinue the approach this happens at 3250 feet but the missed approach altitude in paris early is only 2 000 feet so this means that they're now above their missed approach altitude when the crew tells the tower controller that they are unable to continue the category 3 is approach the tower controller only tells them to level off at 2000 feet follow the missed approach procedure and then to state their intentions when the crew does this they clean up the aircraft they immediately realize that the weather is too poor to do another approach into paris early instead they have to divert but luckily like we discussed earlier they know that the weather all but being a little bit marginal is still better in lyon so they will be able to fly a category one ils approach there so at this point the workload for the pilots is really starting to pick up they've had a minor issue with the irs system on the left-hand side but then they couldn't engage the autopilot on the right hand side which doesn't seem to have anything to do with that malfunction then they had to do a non-standard missed approach and now they're in the middle of a diversion which always comes with more workload where the pilot needs to talk to the cabin crew prepare them they need to liaise with the company to see what to potentially do with the passengers after the diversion and they also have to start to have a really close look at their fuel state but things are about to get much much worse for these pilots and i'll tell you all about that after this short message from my sponsor who makes it possible for me to make these kind of videos reading text or watching video can be a really great way to learn the basics of a subject but if you're like me then i guess that you are in order to really learn something you need some hands-on practice you need to really use the knowledge in order for it to get in here and this is where the sponsor of today's video brilliant is such a brilliant tool because brilliant is an online interactive stem learning platform that helps you to get a much deeper understanding of the concepts in maths science and computer science by taking you through the subjects piece by piece in a really hands-on way and as an educator myself i really love how brilliant is doing this and i really enjoy using it if this sounds good to you well then go down click on the link below which is brilliant.org mentor pilot it will give you a free seven-day trial where you can check it out and if you like it it will give you a further whopping 20 off the premium deal so go down click the link and start learning today during their diversion towards leon the aircraft is now climbing up to the most economic flight level for the diversion and as they're doing so the captain is trying to tune a vor navaid for lyon this is a ground-based navaid that they can use to see what direction the airport is at and the distance but as he's tuning in the frequency he doesn't seem to be able to get it identified so instead he takes the identifier for the vor which is lima sierra echo and he puts that into fmc and when he does so the fmc tells him that that navaid is more than 3 000 nautical miles away and the captain cannot understand why that is and this is now starting to really saw some doubts in his mind about the navigational status of his aircraft the reason that this is actually happening is because the lima syrian vur was actually no termed to be inoperative and was replaced by a temporary navit with a different code but this notam was not in the normal section for the destination and alternate it was in the unroot section so neither the captain nor the first officer had picked that up anyway as they're now getting closer towards their alternate lyon the captain is starting to set up for the category one ils approach into runway three five right and a part of the setup is to calculate the landing distance and also set the outer brake they want for the landing captain selects the outer brake setting but when he does so he gets an auto brake disarm light showing that the outer brakes does not seem to work they take up the qra non-number checklist they go through it he tries to reset it again it doesn't work so he sets it to off they need to use manual braking which is not a big deal but you can start to see here now that there are many different systems that seems to not be connected to each other that are failing in fact the outer brake system is using information from the left adiru and because it's not getting correct information it is now not arming but the captain has not made that connection yet at time 10 44 and 43 seconds the crew is handed over to the lyon approach controller this controller tells them to start to descend initially to flight level 9-0 and then to descend to three thousand feet for radar vectors in for the eyelash approach for runway three five right in lyon two minutes later he tells the crew to turn left onto heading of zero two zero degrees and on this heading they are cleared for the full eyeless approach runway35 right as the aircraft is now turning left the captain reaches over and he engages the warlock mode on the autopilot in this mode the autopilot will capture the localizer signal first of all the captain then intends to arm the full approach mode so that it can capture the glide slope and start descending down towards the runway they also start to extend flaps 1 flaps 5 and slow the aircraft down as the aircraft is getting closer to the localizer the approach controller hands the aircraft over to the lyon tower controller but before the pilots have a chance to call the tower controller the localizer is captured and the pilots are expecting the aircraft to make a left-hand turn to align itself to runway 3-5 right but here something else happens remember the small fault that has been creeping into the left irs system now that fault is starting to affect the adiou on the left-hand side which sends signals to the flight control computer that's controlling the autopilot and instead of the aircraft turning left to intercept the localizer it now starts banking 30 degrees to the right instead and starts turning onto a heading of zero seven zero degrees which is almost perpendicular to the intended course initially the pilots don't do anything they're just monitoring the system and the captain thinks that they have captured the wrong localizer which further makes him doubt the information that he's seen in front of him on his navigation display the autopilot then starts realizing its mistakes and start turning towards the left but soon it becomes apparent to the flight control computer on the left-hand side that is being fed erroneous information and it disconnects the autopilot leaving the captain to hand fly the aircraft once again but the aircraft is now 1.6 nautical miles away from the center line paralleling the centerline down the first officer now contacts the lyon tower controller but as they're doing so they're on nine miles final they're 1.6 miles to the east of the center line and the captain realizes that he will not be able to stabilize this approach so once again the crew tells the controller that they need to go around tower controller reads this back and tells the crew that from his perspective it doesn't seem that they are even close to the localizer signal and this just reinforces the crew's perception that something is very wrong with their navigational system they initiate the go-around and they're supposed to climb to 5000 feet and the captain is still hand flying and he flies through the 5 000 feet missed approach altitude and continues up to 5600km feet where he engages the command b and that initiates a slightly sand back to 5000 feet the crew is told to go back on to the lyon approach controller frequency and the approach controller gives the crew a vector down towards the south to start preparing for another approach but now things are about to get really hairy because as the aircraft finalizes its turn a limit value is exceeded inside of the left adiru this causes an irs fault warning to appear on the irs panel it also causes a master caution warning for the pilots and it disconnects the autopilot removes the flight directors on the left hand side and the pitch roll and heading information for the captain the captain continues to hand fly the aircraft and there is an irs fault non-normal checklist to be done but now the workload has gotten so high for this crew that the captain instead of calling for that checklist just does one of the items that he remembers from memory which is he puts the irs transfer switch from normal to both on right that action forms a part of the checklist however there are many other important things inside of the checklist as well for example it tells the crew to not use the autopilot for the approach but the captain feels that now they have done a diversion and another go around they're running low on fuel he needs to hurry things up he needs to get this aircraft down on the ground and he does not understand why the all of these systems are malfunctioning for him as this is happening the captain is still hand flying the aircraft but with very limited instrumentation until he switches over the irs has to bought on right and this is doing this by memory he's not paying much attention to the limited instrumentation that he has which means he has missed that he's climbed the aircraft from 5000 feet up to 6500 feet when he realizes this he reaches over and engages the command b he also engages the outer throttle and the aircraft once again descends back to 5 000 feet the pilots are now starting to discuss how to proceed with this flight if they are going to go for a second approach into lyon or if they're going to divert further down to marseille they took some weather for marseille during their flight in towards paris but that was a long time ago now and they are not sure that the weather is still good in marseille they go into their a car system which stands for aircraft communication address and reporting system but they only get a message of acres no com which means that a cars is not receiving any information so based on the fact that they don't know what weather is like in marseille they take the decision to do another approach into lyon but they have this perceived time pressure they haven't actually looked too closely on how much fuel they actually have available and if they would have done so they would have recognized that that extra ton that they carried from rabbat is actually helping them quite a lot here it will enable them to hold for almost 20 minutes before they can do that next approach into leon and they would still land with more than their final reserve fuel and those 20 minutes they could have used to systematically go through the non-normal checklist of the irs fault for example which would have given them better guidance and a better foundation to stand on for the next approach but that doesn't happen instead the crew is now preparing to do a fast second approach in towards lyon and from the communications that is happening from now on there's a clear sound in their voices that they're starting to be really really stressed about the situation and i kind of understand that as well because not only are these guys dealing with the time pressure and that the fact that they've done two go-arounds in marginal weather they're also doubting their systems they're doubting whether or not what they see in front of them is actually accurate and they don't really understand why all of these failures keep happening so the workload must have been tremendous at this point and it's going to start to affect the crew resource management from this point onwards the fact that the captain switched the irs mode selector over to both on right has restored the instrumentation on both primary flight displays but the captain still takes the decision that it's probably better for the first officer to be pilot flying since the instrumentation seems to be working better on his side so he hands over the controls to the first officer and he takes on the radio he now also calls up the lyon approach controller and tells him that they're having issues with their position this is the first time that any of the controllers have been told the kind of technical problems that the crew is facing the approach controller acknowledges this and gives him a right turn vector on the heading of 355 degrees to intercept the localizer again from a tree five right as the aircraft is turning onto this heading suddenly the yaw damper stops working now that would also probably have felt like a really random fault for this crew i mean it doesn't seem to be connected to any of the other technical malfunctions they're experiencing but in fact this is a feature of the boeing 737 if they are flying with the autopilot engaged with an irs fault the your damper is designed to trip off 30 seconds after the autopilot is engaged to make sure that any faulty signals that are being sent from the irs's doesn't cause also the jaw damper to start turning the aircraft the wrong way but of course this is very very deep technical knowledge and it's very unlikely that the crew being under such extreme workload as they are at that point would be able to remember something like that the crew does not carry out the accurate checklist associated with the your damper failure because they're now intercepting the localizer when the aircraft intercepts the glide slope once again the faulty connection between the radial altimeter on the right hand side and the flight control computer disrupts the signals to the autopilot b in this case it disconnects the autopilot b and it also removes the flight directors from both pilots this means that from this point onwards the crew is going to have to hand fly a raw data ils approach and i just want to make this clear that we do practice hand flying raw data approaches in the simulator it's actually a really really good crew resource management exercise because the workload would increase tremendously on the pilot flying the pilot flying now needs to anticipate trust level movement because every time that you add trust the aircraft's gonna pitch up a little bit when you take it off it's going to pitch down the same goes for when you're changing configuration and you are required to increase your instrument scan speed enormously because if you are focusing too much on for example maintaining the localizer then you're likely going to lose the glide slope and if you don't focus too much on the glideslope you might lose the speed when you have the flight director the flight director take care of most of this you don't need to scan that quickly but this also means that you have the time for example when you do your landing checklist to make sure that the flying is not correcting while you're starting the checklist so that he or she cannot follow and check the checklist properly but of course in this case the crew is already under a tremendous amount of workload and they haven't pre-briefed this and they haven't mentally prepared for it so as this is happening and the first officer is pilot flying he just hands over the controls to the captain remember this happens just as the aircraft intercepts the glide slope so the aircraft are going to need to push down immediately in order to follow the glide slope down the captain does this but he overdoes it a little bit he increases the vertical speed too much and he starts to go below the glide slope at time 11 08 and 38 seconds the captain calls up the approach controller and tells him that he's continuing the approach manually this doesn't make any sense to the approach controller so he calls him up and asks to confirm that you have the runway in sight to which the captain responds negative so the captain is now both handling the radio and hand flying the aircraft and it's likely that he's doing so because this all happened so quickly that he didn't have time to formally hand over the radio to the first officer from this point onwards the next calls that's coming from the captain to our traffic control are done in french which is the captain's native tongue this is another sign of potential overlord of the captain because up until this point he's been doing everything in english but now he's reverting back to french the captain asks the approach controller to please confirm that they're on the correct localizer once again indicating that he doesn't really trust the instrumentation that he have in front of him the approach control responds that he cannot confirm to them that they have the correct glide and localize the capture but it looks good from his point of view the approach controller now tells the crew to switch over to the lyon tower frequency and at this point the first officer takes over the radio and switches over they select gear down and as they pass 950 feet they are two dots low on the glide slope and a gpws glide slope warning is issued this coincides with a minimum safe altitude warning at the approach controller station but of course he has handed the crew over to the tower controller so he cannot warn them the first officer now gets into contact with the tower and the approach is continuing well outside of the stabilized approach criteria they are still more than one and a half dot low and they're now starting to deviate left of the center line as well the tower controller can see this and he asked the crew if they are visual with the runway and they respond negative the ground proximity warning system continues to issue glide slope glide slope warning and it also gives out a secret warning when the rate goes over 2250 feet per minute at 560 feet above ground the aircraft is at 162 knots and the speed is increasing they are 1.4 dots below the glide slope and the first officer now calls up the tower and says we are we are we are go around air morocc as is calling this the aircraft comes out below the clouds and the pilots can start seeing the runway they realize that they are in between runway three five right and three five left and that they are very very low the captain decides to continue the approach and sidestep to the right in order to align himself with the localizer for onward 1.35 right at 400 feet they're still not in landing configuration and they have a speed of 178 knots as they continue the approach the first officer now contacts the tower again and tells them that actually we are going to continue the approach at 240 feet they receive a too low terrain warning from the egpws the tower calls them up and asks them confirmed that you have the runway inside to which the crew responds affirmative they continue the approach and as they descend through 180 feet they're still one kilometer short of runway three five right they get more too low terrain warnings but they continue in towards the landing anyway the crew is now clear to land and as they pass 80 feet they select flaps 40 for the landing 10 seconds later the aircraft touches down on round 3 5 right they touch down about 150 meters beyond the landing touchdown zone and at a speed of 159 knots they decelerate normally and vacate the runway without any further incidents once they pull up on stand they disembark the passengers and the captain gets into contact with the company he tells them about all of the different technical malfunctions that they have had he also put it into the tech log but it doesn't tell them anything about the non-stabilized approach and the numerous gpws warnings they received because of this they did not pull the cockpit voice recorder circuit breaker which means that the voice recordings were not saved for the subsequent investigation all of the things that you've heard here comes from the investigation which is based on the interviews that they did with the flight crew the air traffic controllers and the flight data recorder which they did have access to so how come this happened in the first place then and how come that the captain decided to continue a clearly non-stabilized approach well the air incident investigation team went through all of the data they had and they found out that there were some poor practices when it came to reporting technical defects into the technical logbook in royal amarok this in turn led to the maintenance department not being able to follow the correct fault isolation techniques that they needed to do and that allowed these two separate malfunctions to be carried on to the incident flight those two male functions then interfered with the autopilot system the flight director system the your damper the auto brake system in a way that created a lot of mistrust between the crew and the aircraft this then together with the perceived time pressure degraded the crew resource management inside of the flight deck to a point where the captain just wanted to get the aircraft down on the ground and that's what he said to the investigators that once he saw the runway he heard that the first officer was calling for a go-around but he said i don't want to continue to fly this aircraft for these failures anymore i can see the runway over there i'm just gonna put it down on the ground and get it to an engineer the really incredible thing here is that after this that happened royal amarok called in a line maintenance engineer that went out to to try to deal with the aircraft but once again he couldn't reproduce the fault once the aircraft was started up and checked on the ground so it ended up with the same pilot flying the same aircraft on the same day back to paris orly again where they picked up the passengers and then they flew the aircraft down to marrakesh and on approach into marrakesh with the first officer was piled flying once again the autopilot disconnected there were several recommendations that came out of this investigation a few of them were aimed at boeing for letting an irs fault like this um affect the flight control computers in a way that the aircraft could start turning away from the intended flight path but there was also feedback to royal air morocco on the way that the captains wrote down issues in the technical logbook needed to be more exact and to cover all of the different faults that they had experienced there was also some feedback on how the crew had handled the technical malfunction management and the use of curate checklist and the two pilots were issued with some ground school training and also two four-hour simulator sessions which was focused on issues with the irs systems and how to fly raw data approaches manually now if you want to continue binge watching air accidents and incidents then check out this video up here i hope that you have seen and subscribed to my new channel mentor now where i do more technical content about aviation if you want to support the channel consider becoming part of my patreon crew it's hugely appreciated have an absolutely fantastic day and i'll see you next time bye

Channel: Mentour Pilot

Views: 1,038,958

Keywords: captain, mentour pilot, mentor pilot, crash investigation, full epsiodes, aviation, pilot, crash, air crash investigation, final report, boeing, airbus, disaster, fatal crash, air incident, air disasters 2022, royal air maroc 780, morocco, paris orly, lyon exupery airport, marseille, pfd, adiru, flight management computer, fmc, go around, air maroc, fear of flying help, mentour now, mentour Pilot crash, RAM, Royal Air Maroc, seconds from disaster air crash investigation, fear of flying

Id: 31j_A2BC8kA

Length: 36min 52sec (2212 seconds)

Published: Sat Mar 12 2022