On the morning of June 24, 1812, the greatest
army Europe has seen until now stands on the banks of the Neman river, at the western edge of
the Russian Empire. La Grande Armee, the army of 20 nations, begins to cross the bridges: rank upon
rank of Frenchmen, Italians, Germans, Poles and many more, cross amidst the sounds of fluttering
standards, horses straining in their traces, and the creak of wagon wheels. But the Russian
Imperial army they expect to find awaiting them is nowhere to be seen. Napoleon’s Downfall has begun.
For the French, the crossing of the Neman is the beginning of the Russian Campaign;
for the Russians, it’s the start of the Patriotic War. For four days, the men, horses,
cannon, regimental standards, and supply trains of the Grande Armee stream eastwards across the river
under the watchful eyes of Russian Cossack scouts. June 1812 marks the beginning of one of the
most dramatic campaigns in military history – in just under 6 months, the balance of power in
Europe will be upended, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians will lose their lives
in battle, to sickness, exposure, or starvation, and Europe will come closer to total war than ever
before. But as the bands play the Grande Armee across the NEman and Russia holds its breath,
few of the troops can imagine the suffering and carnage that is to come – or even how
it all came to war in the first place. Colonel Jean Boulart of the artillery of the Guard
recalls the moment: “Despite the uncertain future, there was enthusiasm, a great deal of it. The
army’s confidence in the genius of the Emperor was such that nobody even dreamed that the
campaign could turn out badly.” (Zamoyski) The clash between France and its client states
and Russia in 1812 arose from years of war and a very tense peace. Back in November 1806, Napoleon
decided to respond to a British blockade of Europe with a continent-wide blockade of trade with
Britain. He called it the Continental System and hoped it would damage the British war
effort, but it also put pressure on French satellite states and allies in northern Europe
who had strong trade links with Britain. In 1807, France and its allies defeated the Fourth
Coalition, which included Prussia, Sweden, Saxony, Russia and Britain, with a resounding victory
over the Russians at Friedland. Tsar Alexander I asked for an armistice, and the Treaty of
Tilsit brought peace – for the time being. The treaty did not force the Tsar to give up
any territory, but it did compel Russia to join the Continental System, ally with France,
and declare war on the United Kingdom. The Tsar also agreed to recognize French satellite states
and renounce Russian interests in the Balkans. In the years after Tilsit, the blockade of Great
Britain reduced trade in Russia’s Baltic ports by a third, the ruble lost 50% of its
value, and annual deficits soared. Political interests also drove France and Russia
further apart before 1812. The most explosive problem was the status of a Polish state. In
1807 Napoleon created the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, a client state that greatly
worried Russian ruling circles. Russia had gained much of its western territory
in the 18th century partitions of Poland, and its leaders feared that the Grand Duchy was a step
towards re-creating a full Polish Kingdom that would want those lands back. The Polish question
was a politically useful one for Napoleon: he referred to the 1805-07 war as “The First
Polish War” and in his proclamation to the Grande Armee in 1812, he announced the invasion of Russia
as the “Second Polish War” – but he never promised a Polish kingdom. The Tsar hoped that he could
win over the Poles by offering them a kingdom, but insisted that he be crowned king, so
in 1812 the Polish question was still open. Russian and French interests also
clashed in the Baltic and the Balkans. In 1808-1809 Russia defeated Sweden and
took control of Finland, which became a Russian satellite. In 1810 Sweden elected French
Marshal Jean Bernadotte as regent, so Russia now worried about French influence on its northern
border. To the south Russia and the Ottoman Empire also fought a war from 1806 to 1812, over
influence in the Balkans and the Dardanelles. One of the political flashpoints was a personal
one for the Tsar. When Napoleon redrew the borders of the German lands by creating the Confederation
of the Rhine and expanding the French empire, he dispossessed the Duke of the tiny Duchy of
Oldenburg. Duke George however, happened to be married to the Tsar’s sister Catherine, and the
couple exiled themselves to Russia. The Tsar took this as a grave insult to his honor and viewed
it as a severe breach of the aristocratic code. Napoleon may have been Emperor of the French and
King of Italy, but he had little respect for the old order and Christian religion that Alexander
held so dear. These ideological and personal differences also contributed to the reason
the Grande Armee crossed the Neman. Napoleon saw himself as a man destined for European
imperial hegemony. He felt his mission was to spread a rational French-revolution-inspired
system across all Europe, with one currency, one system of weights and measures, and one rational
philosophy of administration. As he put it, he wanted to make Paris the capital of the world.
For good measure, the French emperor also spoke of freeing the Polish nation. Tsar Alexander
saw himself as a protector of the traditional divinely-ordained order, with a mission from God
to resist a Napoleon that he admired and feared, but also viewed as bent on conquest. The two
men held talks together at Tilsit in 1807 and again at Erfurt in 1808, but came no closer
to understanding each other or resolving their differences in power politics – though they did
praise each other in official communication. The peace brought by the Treaty of Tilsit in
1807 was straining under economic, geopolitical and ideological tensions between France
and Russia. Napoleon wanted to somehow keep Russia as an ally in the main struggle
against Britain, but the Tsar had other plans. On New Year’s Eve, 1810, the Tsar declared
that Russia was leaving the Continental System in violation of the Tilsit treaty. By 1811
at the latest both sides viewed a coming war as inevitable. The Tsar was
determined to not be the aggressor but Napoleon had no such hesitations. In early
1812 diplomatic preparations reached a fever pitch. France signed agreements with former
enemies Prussia and Austria which forced their reluctant monarchs to provide a total of
some 70,000 troops to support the Grande Armee. The Russians ended their war with Ottomans
and signed an agreement with Sweden. After unsuccessful diplomatic advances, the French
went so far as to occupy Swedish Pomerania in January 1812 to enforce the blockade. Russia even
made a secret agreement with Count Metternich that Austrian troops would not be used aggressively
even if the French forced them to invade. The espionage war intensified, with the
French uncovering a Russian spy ring in Paris, and sending their own agent to the Grand
Duchy of Warsaw to gather intelligence. French presses even printed fake Russian
rubles for the army to buy local supplies, while in Russia, the Tsar’s authorities cracked
down on prominent Francophiles, spread anti-French propaganda, and censored the post. The nobility
began to worry that if the French did come, they might liberate the serfs or inspire
them to rise up against their masters. Russian officer PA DavYdov decided to re-enlist,
and wrote of the growing tension to a friend: “According to what is being said and what
is being prepared, war with the French is imminent. As for who will command the army, we
know nothing, they only say the Tsar himself will soon inspect it […] there is no other
news, the war is on everyone’s mind.” (Rey 62) Both sides also began full-scale
military preparations from 1811. They conscripted significantly more men to fill
out the ranks, and made logistical arrangements to supply the growing armies. French authorities
began to fill their supply depots, and in early 1812 units began the long cold march from their
barracks in France, Spain, the Italian peninsula, or the German lands to East Prussia and the Grand
Duchy of Warsaw. At first, none knew exactly where or whom they would fight – rumors hinted
that they might march against Prussia, Sweden, Russia, the Ottomans, or even British India.
Even as the armies confidently marched east, some Frenchmen feared their Emperor was making
a mistake. Some regions of the country were experiencing a wheat shortage and had little
stomach for another war after decades of fighting. Even some of Napoleon’s advisors tried to warn
him, like former Minister of Police Joseph Fouché: “No matter what success you achieve, the Russians
will fight for every foot those difficult lands where you will find nothing to feed the war
[…] half of your army will be employed in covering weak lines of communication, interrupted,
threatened, or cut by swarms of Cossacks. Sire, I implore you, in the name of France, in the name
of glory, in the name of your security and ours, sheathe your sword.” (Rey 45)
In Russia, army engineers fast-tracked a fort-building program to shore up defenses. Forts
in Kiev, Riga, BabrUisk, Dunaburg and a fortified camp at DrIssa were either renovated or built
from scratch. 50,000 extra muskets were bought from Britain, and 100,000 men began to move from
Finland and Bessarabia towards the western border. Last-minute diplomacy is little more
than a charade. The Tsar sends word to Napoleon that peace can be maintained if
French-led troops withdrew beyond the Rhine, but there is little chance of that, and Napoleon
does not answer. He eventually sends a reply, but he has committed to war and the messenger
is sent mostly to gather intelligence. After months of preparation and buildup, the
war begins with the crossing of the Neman. Both the French and Russian High Commands can now put their war plans into action – and
these are as different as could be. The 650,000 men, 150,000 horses, and 1393 cannon
of the Grande Armee are divided into 5 groups: a northern wing under Marshal Macdonald,
the main force under Napoleon himself, two others under Napoleon’s stepson Eugene
de Beauharnais and Napoleon’s brother Jerome, King of Westphalia. Austrian forces under
Prince Schwarzenberg are on the southern flank, and two corps stayed in Prussia as a reserve.
The 200,000 men and 1100-1600 cannon of the Russian army are divided in three: the
1st Western Army under Barclay de Tolly, the 2nd Western Army under Prince Piotr BagratYOn,
and General TormAsov’s 3rd Observation Army troops protecting Ukraine. There are more Russian
troops in other parts of the empire, but they are needed to guard its vast borders.
Napoleon said he never wanted a war with Russia and only invades to force Russia back
into an alliance against Great Britain, and his military plans are ambivalent: he talks of
marching on Moscow, or St Petersburg; of beating the Russians quickly in a decisive battle or
of campaigning until 1814. In any case, he promises to make war in a way never seen before.
Russian high command also went back and forth on whether to adopt an offensive or defensive
strategy. Ultimately they choose a risky strategic retreat to draw the Grande Armee
away from its bases before making a stand. Most of the men, however, like Lieutenant
RadozhItsky, have no inkling of the plan: “We thought that we would immediately go out
to meet the French, fight them on the border, and chase them back.” (Zamoyski)
As Napoleon’s army of 20 nations streams across the Neman in June 1812, the Tsar gathers
with his commanders at his headquarters in Vilna. Discussions are tense, and there’s confusion as
to what exactly should be done and when, with the most powerful army in the world just a few days’
march away. On June 25, the Russian army receives its orders: retreat to the east. Meanwhile
French Captain Fantin des Odoards has just crossed the river and makes an entry in his diary:
“Vive l’Empereur! The Rubicon has been crossed. The shining sword which has been drawn from its
scabbard will not be put away in it before some fine pages are added to the glorious
annals of the great nation.” (Zamoyski) The next day, des Odoards and his French, German, Polish and Italian comrades can see smoke
rising from Vilna – but still no enemy in sight. Napoleon’s Grande Armee crosses the Neman river
in June 1812, but in the following days it does not find its Russian enemy. On June 28 French-led
troops enter the regional capital of Vilna after a brief cavalry skirmish on the outskirts.
French officers like General Berthezène are surprised: “In all directions we found
the Russian army in full retreat […] we advanced without any obstacle, and to our
great surprise, since we couldn’t imagine that the Russians would abandon the capital of
Lithuania without firing a shot.” (Boudon 112) But the Tsar, the Russian high command and the
troops were gone. Before they left, the Russians destroyed the flour mills, warehouses, supplies
and town bridge. Many pro-Russian residents have also fled, but some Polish and Lithuanian notables
hope that Napoleon will grant them an independent state. The Countess of Tisenhaus was moved:
“Prince Radziwill’s regiment passed in our street, Polish Uhlans with a charming uniform and banners
in the Polish colors. I was on the hotel balcony and they saluted me and laughed. It was the
first time in my life I saw Pol[ish troops]! I shed tears of joy and enthusiasm, I felt
Polish. It was a moment to savor.” (Rey 95-96) Napoleon does set up a local administration on
July 3, and recruits up to 40,000 local troops, but he doesn’t want to create a full Polish
Kingdom for fear it will claim lands that his ally Austria took in the 18th century partitions
of Poland. On June 30th an envoy from the Tsar arrives and tells the French Emperor Alexander
will talk peace if the Grande Armee leaves Russia. Napoleon refuses the offer, and decides
to stay in Vilna while his army advances. Meanwhile, Russian General Barclay’s
1st Western Army of 136,000 men is marching hard towards the fortified camp
at Drissa. The goal is to meet up with Prince Bagration’s 2nd Western Army and its 60,000
troops to make a stand along the DvinA river. Barclay’s retreat is going relatively well –
despite the strain on morale and discipline, only about 10,000 Russians desert and the cavalry
is mostly able to provide a protective rearguard. The main difficulty is the chain of command
and the lack of operational plans for the strategic withdrawal. The Tsar told Barclay that
Barclay was in overall command, but Alexander keeps interfering with orders of his own and
Bagration resists accepting Barclay’s authority. Prince Bagration considers
the retreat dishonorable: “We were brought to the frontier, scattered along
it like pawns, then, after they had all sat there, mouths wide open, shitting along the whole length
of the border, off they fled. It all disgusts me so much it’s driving me crazy.” (Zamoyski)
He wants to strike north into the flank of Napoleon’s army group, or west towards
Warsaw. But either of these options would be far too risky given the superior
enemy, so after a few days’ delay, Bagration also begins moving east to join up with Barclay.
Napoleon wants to prevent the two Russian armies from joining up, so he hatches a plan. Marshal
Davout turns towards Minsk, to get between the two Russian armies. If Davout can cut off
Bagration’s route to Drissa, Jerome’s army group can then smash the trapped Russian army to pieces.
Things start well when Davout’s maneuver cuts off General PlAtov’s Cossack corps from Barclay’s
army and forces them to join up with Bagration. But Jerome’s corps are having trouble. His
army group leaves GrOdno on the 30th and is immediately hampered by lack of food, poor roads,
and alternating extremes of cold and hot weather. He also hesitates to attack Bagration since he
has no intelligence about enemy forces. Napoleon is livid, and orders Jerome to
pick up the pace. On July 4, Bagration realizes that Davout is
cutting off his path to Barclay, so the Georgian Prince disobeys his orders and
swerves to the southeast to avoid encirclement. Bagration has escaped the French trap for
now, but the superior French-led forces are still hot on his heels. But just who was
marching in the so-called Army of Twenty Nations? The Grande Armee of 1812 was massive – over
650,000 men, about 150,000 horses, and 1393 guns: 355,000 French Empire (includes parts of the
Italian peninsula, parts of the Rhineland, and the Low Countries)
80,000 Grand Duchy of Warsaw 36,000 Prussia
30,000 Austria 29,000 Westphalia
27,000 Saxony 20,000 Kingdom of Italy
16,500 Würtemberg 15,000 Bavaria
9,800 Denmark 8000 Kingdom of Naples
6800 Hessen 6600 Switzerland
3700 Spain 2900 Illyrian Provinces
2800 Croatia and Dalmatia 2200 Portugal
15,000 from smaller German duchies and principalities
Note that these are the paper strengths, and actual boots on the ground are fewer.
For the Russian campaign, Napoleon divides his forces into three main army groups, called
Grandes masses: one under Napoleon himself, including the Guard and the corps of Marshals
Davout, Oudinot, and Ney plus a massed cavalry force under Marshal Murat, the King of Naples;
another under his stepson Eugene de Beauharnais, including Marshal Saint-Cyr's and Grouchy’s
corps; and the third under his brother Jerome, King of Westphalia, with Marshal Reynier’s
and the Polish Prince PoniatOwski’s corps. Marshal Macdonald commands the northern
flanking corps, while Austrian forces under Prince von Schwarzenberg cover the south. In
all there are 11 army corps and 6 of cavalry. Of this total force, about 330,000 infantry,
70,000 cavalry, and 30,000 artillerymen actually cross into Russia in June 1812 (Rey).
Some men in the Grande Armee volunteered, but the majority are conscripts from
the popular classes who can’t pay for a replacement. Many are experienced veterans,
while others are among the 160,000 new recruits from the expanded French Empire. French
infantry includes the Regiments de ligne, light infantry like voltigeurs and chasseurs a
pied, and the elite 50,000 strong Imperial Guard. The artillery consists of foot and horse
batteries, plus bridge layers, wagoners, and armorers. The horses and drivers of artillery
trains are specialized in moving the guns and ammunition when not in combat, while the gunners
handled the 6, 8, and 12 pound guns in battle. The cavalry is considered the best in the world,
and includes heavy cuirassiers, dragoons, hussars, lanciers, carabiniers, chasseurs a cheval.
It is still the most prestigious branch, but according to General Paul Thiébault, cavalry
wouldn’t play the main role in a pitched battle: “With few exceptions, [the cavalry]
serves to complete or decide victory, but not to obtain it. The artillery
must weaken enemy [formations], the infantry must overrun them and break through,
the cavalry must disperse them and take prisoners. [Cavalry] charges must be infrequent, but
when they happen must be all-out; since it can only fight in close quarters, cavalry must
appear only when it will strike. et comme elle ne peut combattre que corps à corps, elle
ne doit paraître que pour frapper.” (Brun) Nearly half the Grande Armee is
from outside the French Empire, from hesitant allies Prussia and Austria or
satellite states like the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, the Confederation of the Rhine, or the Italian
kingdoms. Units from different states were often placed in the same larger formations – notably, 3
Polish regiments were attached to the Young Guard. Some historians argue that non-French units
were less motivated to fight, while others point to widespread respect, admiration and even
adulation towards Napoleon as a motivating factor for non-Frenchmen. There were certainly challenges
with communication given the number of languages spoken, and occasional French arrogance. Eugene,
himself Viceroy of Italy, responded this way when General Pino complained about the lack of food:
“Gentlemen, what you ask for is not possible, and if you are not happy go back to
Italy. I have nothing to do with you or the others. Know that I fear neither
your sabres nor your daggers.” (Del negro 5) The quality of the troops also varies, including
those of the army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The Polish cavalry was capable, but many
of the Polish troops are in a poor state when the campaign begins. They spent much of the
previous two years building fortresses in Bohemia, Prussia and the Duchy; they’d been poorly fed;
many are suffering from scurvy and dysentery, and they often aren’t paid by the cash-strapped
Duchy. 8 out of 10 men have never seen combat. There’s also an issue with leadership, as Prince
Poniatowski is unfamiliar with modern logistics, movement, and camp practices (Nieuwazny 89-90).
For all their differences, Napoleon’s troops did have some things in
common according to French officer Elzéar Blaze: “The Grande Armée fought hard, seldom
cheered, and always bitched.” (Elting vii) The Grande Armée might be the most powerful
army in Europe, but it’s already getting weaker by the day. French logistics and supply
plans are failing, and on the 30th, a snap cold rainstorm kills tens of thousands of draft and
cavalry horses. Forcing a decisive battle before sickness and hunger take too much of a toll is
becoming more and more urgent. The Russians have escaped for now, but Marshal Davout writes to his
wife that the Emperor’s genius will soon triumph: “The Emperor’s manoeuvres will prevent this
from being a particularly bloody campaign. We have taken Wilna without a battle and forced
the Russians to evacuate the whole of Poland: such a beginning to the campaign is
equivalent to a great victory.” (Zamoyski) But not every victory will be without battle,
and next week brings a baptism of fire. By July 9, 1812, Prince Bagration’s 2nd
Western Army has retreated 250km in 10 days without a rest. He orders a stop at NEsvizh, and
sends General PlAtov’s cavalry to hold up the advancing French-led army of King Jérome. Jerome’s
vanguard of Polish Uhlan cavalry clash with the Cossacks at Mir in the first battle of the Russian
campaign. Around 1300 Poles attack the village, and the Russian horsemen retreat. Some of the
Poles gallop after them, but they run straight into an ambush – it’s the Cossacks’ VEnter
tactic. 3000 Russian horsemen are waiting for them and force the Poles back across a stream. When
Polish reinforcements arrive that evening, the Russians pull back to the village of SimakOvo.
On the 10th, Platov also gets more reinforcements, and outnumbers the Poles 6000 to 3000. The
Poles don’t know this, so they advance. Platov attacks the Uhlans with everything he’s
got, including artillery and some regular cavalry. After 6 hours of desperate fighting, more
Russian units arrive and the Poles withdraw. The two-day skirmish costs the Russians
175 killed and wounded, while the Poles suffer 400 killed and wounded and 500 prisoners.
It’s a small Russian victory, but an important one for General Ivan PaskEvich: “This action
had great consequences for morale. In the cavalry, you either beat the enemy or
you are beaten. Все зависит от первого успеха. Everything depends on the first
success. Platov had to defeat the enemy at Mir to stop the boasting and
arrogance of the Poles.” (1812 год, 83) The Russians win a tactical victory at Mir,
which buys a little time for Bagration’s tired footsoldiers on their strategic retreat, but
the French are still breathing down their necks. Operations
Napoleon is trying to isolate and destroy Prince Bagration’s 2nd Western Army before it can join
up with the larger 1st Western Army. Bagration, however, has changed course to avoid being trapped
between Marshal Davout and King Jerome. After a brief rest helped by the Cossack defense of
Mir, Bagration’s troops resume the march towards MogilYOv. Davout’s corps reaches Minsk on July 8,
only to learn that Bagration has escaped the trap. Jerome’s army is simply too slow. Despite their
utter exhaustion and hunger, Davout’s troops race to cut off the Russians at Mogilev. There’s still
time to catch them, but Davout has already lost a third of his men to sickness, exhaustion, and
desertion. Captain Gardier recalls the conditions: “Beaten by the wind and the rain, after being
weakened by the excessive heat […] the horses as well as the men can barely stand.” (Rey 101)
Napoleon’s first attempt to force a decisive battle at Minsk has failed because of logistical
problems, Jerome’s indecisiveness, and perhaps the Emperor’s own lack of energy. While Davout and
Jerome chase Bagration, the Emperor now turns his attention to Barclay de Tolly. Here, Marshal
Murat’s cavalry corps are to keep the Russians busy at Drissa, while the main French-led force
is supposed to continue east, then turn north to cut off Russian communications with St.
Petersburg. If Barclay retreats, the two Russian armies will be even farther apart. If he stands
and fights, he’ll be surrounded and outnumbered. But the Russian high command has new plans of
its own as its armies continue their brutal forced marches to keep ahead of the Grande
Armee. On July 8, Tsar Alexander arrives at the fortified camp at Drissa, which is to be the
lynchpin of the Russian defense along the Dvina. He visits the fortifications with Prussian
Major Carl von Clausewitz, who joined Russian forces since he opposed his country’s alliance
with Napoleon. Clausewitz delivers his report: the defenses are very strong in some places, but
the geographical location is a liability since the French can cut off the camp from behind, just
as Napoleon is planning. Other Russian generals also doubt the position. Even if Barclay’s army
can hold out, if it stays put at Drissa the French will have a free hand to catch up with the 2nd
Western Army. Bagration has escaped one trap, but might not escape another. The bulk of the
1st Western Army reaches Drissa on July 11. Abandoning the position is politically complicated
for Alexander, since he’s simultaneously under pressure to turn and fight and to stop
meddling in the chain of command. Nonetheless, the very next day, the high command issues its
orders: the army is to leave Drissa in a few days and continue east. They will not let Napoleon
surround them, and they will not yet fight. The Russian army is now retreating
farther than planned – so what kind of army is it that has so far outrun Napoleon? In June 1812, the Russian Empire boasts an army of
some 622,000 men. But only about 200,000 of these can be spared to face the French-led
invasion, with another 113,000 in reserve. The men in the three Russian
armies reflect the country’s social system – the vast majority
of other ranks are unfree serfs. Saint Petersburg sets annual conscription quotas
according to which young Orthodox Christian men are recruited to serve for 25 years – which
meant that for many they would never see their homes again and serve until death. Families
often observed the conscription of a son as they would a funeral. Pamfil Nazarov’s
mother is distraught when he is called up: “[My brother] left in the evening
and arrived [our parents’] at dawn. He tethered the horse at the gate and went
into the house. He burst into tears as he told them that I had been conscripted as
a soldier and I send them my regards. My mother took the news very badly – she even lost
consciousness for a few minutes.” (Назаров 532) The peasants resented this system,
as did land and serf-owning nobles who did not want to lose farm workers. It
also struggled to provide enough manpower, since Russia’s inefficient agriculture meant large
numbers of serfs were needed in the fields. The manpower shortage in 1812 forces the government
to call on the Народное ополчение, a poorly trained militia. In theory every able-bodied man
could serve, but in practice they’re ineffective, and threaten the established order of docile serfs
– only 230,000 militiamen are called to the colors and they play a limited role in combat.
More than 80% of the officers are noblemen, but most of these are poor in spite of their
noble titles, and depend on their meagre army salary. Only 15% of Russia’s officers in 1812
have received any formal military training. Many of those who have are from ethnic
minorities like the Baltic Germans, or foreigners from the German states, Britain,
and anti-revolutionary aristocrats from France. The many Prussian officers serving
on the general staff causes tensions, as some Russian officers do not take kindly
to foreign influence – especially when the “dishonorable” strategic retreat plan of 1812
was drawn up by Prussian officer von Phull. St. Petersburg diarist VarvAra BakUnina considers
the officer corps motivated but ill-disciplined: “All the army letters are filled with the desire
to get the war started […] they say the soldiers are impatient to get to grips with the enemy
and avenge past defeats. […] young officers spend their time drinking and playing…there
are orgies every day.” (Rey 63) The Russian army of 1812 is also the
product of the French-inspired reforms introduced after its defeat by France in
1807. The army’s structure was formalized and unified – corps and divisions were made permanent,
and the number of cavalry and infantry regiments, and artillery brigades in each division
was fixed. In 1812, there are 33 divisions, each of which has 4 infantry and 2 cavalry
regiments, and one artillery brigade. All told, a division has 18-20,000 men. Army staffs were
also re-organized and formalized from 1811, which -- on paper at least -- improves command
and control. Combat training also improved, especially musketry and a softer approach to
discipline introduced by Barclay de Tolly: “The Russian soldier has all
the highest military virtues: he is brave, zealous, obedient, devoted, and not
wayward; consequently there are certainly ways, without employing cruelty, to train him
and to maintain discipline.” (Lieven 108) Though the re-training program
wasn’t complete by 1812, the Russian army of 1812 is far better than the
one Napoleon defeated at Austerlitz, and Friedland in 1805 and 1807. In fact the artillery is
among the best in Europe, and its 6 and 12 pounders and licorne or edinarOg howitzer are
generally heavier than their French counterparts. Cavalry is also formed into corps, and includes
light Uhlans, Hussars, heavy cuirassiers and dragoons. Most of the irregular troops are light
cavalry, and the Cossacks were the most numerous and important. Most Cossacks came from the Don,
UrAl, and OrenbUrg Hosts, and they excelled at reconnaissance, hit-and-run tactics, and harassing
slower French units. Other irregular cavalry came in the form of BashkIrs, KalmYks, or Tatars. The
Bashkirs were meant to serve as border guards and still used traditional clothing and weapons
like the bow and arrow. Imperial authorities did not trust them with firearms after their
numerous rebellions in the 18th century. The much-improved Russian army has won
the first skirmish of the campaign, and avoided a pitched battle with the powerful
Grande Armee. Even though Napoleon’s massive army is suffering from exhaustion and hunger, he’s in
no mood for political compromises. On July 14, he refuses a Warsaw delegation’s request for a
Polish Kingdom. According to French ambassador Abbé de Pradt in Warsaw, this is a grave mistake:
“[Les délégués polonais] étaient partis de
feu; ils revinrent de glace. [The Polish delegates] left
full of fire [but] they returned with ice in their souls. The chill
communicated itself to the whole of Poland, and it was not possible to warm
her after that.” (Zamoyski) Both sides are still confident: the French
that they will force a decisive confrontation and end the war; and the Russians that they will
escape the trap. Both will soon be disappointed. The Russian 1st Western Army continues its
retreat in the face of the advancing Grande Armee: it has left the fortified camp at
Drissa and reaches POlotsk on July 18, with Napoleon’s main army group close behind.
Barclay hopes he can make a stand at Vitebsk to stiffen morale and give a chance for Prince
Bagration’s 2nd Western Army to pass through Mogilev and join him, but Davout’s corps is
rushing to cut off the Prince’s escape route. Bagration gets a little help from French
infighting. Napoleon is furious that his brother Jerome didn’t catch up with Bagration near Minsk,
so he puts his brother under Davout’s command. King Jerome finds out from Davout rather than
the Emperor himself on July 16. Jerome views the demotion as an insult to his honor, so he abruptly
leaves the army and returns to Westphalia. In the north, Marshal Macdonald’s X Corps is on
the move towards Riga, a naval base and port of entry for British supplies to Russia. On July 16,
a Royal Navy squadron under Admiral Byam Martin arrives off the coast to support the Russians, but
can do little more than send encouraging words. The 30,000 French-led forces include Bavarians,
Westphalians, Poles, and the Preussische Hilfskorps, the Prussian Auxiliary Corps
Napoleon had forced the Prussian King to send. Many of its officers and men are
not keen on helping the French they had fought just a few years before, and
some emphasize these feelings in later memoirs: “We Prussians did not follow
the loud calls of Napoleon, we followed far more the irresistible will
of our hard-pressed King.” (Holzhausen 63) The 18,000-strong Russian garrison of Riga also
includes Prussian officers who have chosen to fight against Napoleon – but its fortifications
are outdated and less than half of its 585 guns can even fire. The first clash occurs at Eckau
on July 19. The Russians send 3500 men to block the Prussian advance, but Prussians defeat
the Russians, who retreat to Dahlenkirchen. On the 22nd, Riga’s Commander General I.N. Essen,
orders the burning of several suburbs of the city to deny their use to the enemy, and two days
later the Prussians and French lay siege. The siege of Riga is an unusual chapter of the 1812
campaign. Macdonald doesn’t have enough men to cover his assigned 120km front along the Dvina
river and close the siege ring around Riga, so the Russians are able to bring reinforcements
from Finland after they sign a peace treaty with Sweden on July 17. Russian Army General
Friedrich von Löwis leads two sallies in August, and they’re able to push back the Prussians to
the point where the French siege engines are in danger of being captured, but the Prussians
eventually force them back into the city. When British ships appear off Dantzig, the French
are forced to further weaken their forces at Riga. Eventually the Prussians and Russians also come
to an informal agreement to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, and to treat prisoners well. After
another failed Russian sortie in September, the siege devolves into an impasse
for the rest of the campaign, and the Prussians spend much of their time
in camp playing cards and singing songs. As the Prussians and French settle down to a
somewhat comfortable siege at Riga in July, the rest of the Grande Armee’s men
and horses are hungry and desperate. The Achilles’ heel of Napoleon’s army is logistics
and supply. The sheer number of men and horses, and the lack of roads, infrastructure, long
supply lines, and lack of local food production in the western Russian empire make the campaign a
quartermaster’s nightmare even before it begins. As the army was gathered in the Grand Duchy
of Warsaw, food was already so scarce soldiers simply took it from local peasants, as
Wuertemberg soldier Jakob Walter recalls: “Day by day, the privations and hunger increased. Despite its orders, the regiment was
obliged to carry out requisitions and slaughter livestock so the men could have a
bit of meat to improve their rations of potatoes seasoned with sand […] bread was rare and
there was none to be bought.” (rey 60) The men even harvest unripe rye, and feed their
horses the thatched rooves of local Polish homes. About 60,000 soldiers are sick when the army
finally crosses into Russia, and by early July there are already about 30,000 deserters roaming
the countryside (Rey 85 and Zamoyski) Napoleon orders deserters shot, and a Polish cavalry
lieutenant reports other draconian punishments: “The guilty man would be completely stripped and
tied by his hands and feet in a square or street, whereupon two troopers were ordered out of
the ranks to lash and cut him with whips until the skin peeled off him and he looked like a skeleton […] but even this did not
help [to stop desertions].” (Zamoyski) The army’s European horses are not used
to the muddy roads, lack of fodder, and summer cold snaps. By some estimates,
up to 40,000 cavalry and draft horses perish in the June 30 storm alone (Zamoyski),
which makes the supply situation worse, which leads to even more looting. Polish
peasants wryly joke about their “liberators”: “The Frenchman came to remove our fetters
but he took our boots too.” (Zamoyski) The Russian scorched earth policy also deprives
the Grande Armee. Just like at Vilna and Riga, in the garrison town of BorIsov Colonel
Gresser puts the torch to anything of value as Davout approaches on July 13. He orders
the destruction of 1960 quarters of flour, 183 quarters of groats, 2345 quarters straw,
and 19,500 poods of hay. The troops also toss 100 pounds of gunpowder in the BerezinA river,
destroy 16 cannons and wreck the bridge over the BerezinA – an act that will have dramatic
consequences later in the campaign. (Mikaberidze) The scorched earth policy is just one sign
that this war will be more violent and total than those that came before – for the
Tsar has called for the entire nation to fight. On the Russian side, one issue troubling
leaders is morale. Barclay told the troops they would finally fight at Drissa, and
the renewed retreat causes tongues to wag. Artillery Lieutenant RadozhItsky overhears
the concerns of his gunners: “Obviously the villain [Napoleon] must be very strong; just
look at how much we are giving him for free, almost the whole of Poland.” (Lieven 154)
Russian civilians are also worried, especially nobles who own serfs and fear
the French might support an uprising. Anna KonovnItsyna writes to her husband
Piotr, a general with the 1st Western Army: “Our serfs are all downcast, they’re all afraid of
the French. Today quite a few came to see me and asked if I had news of you; I tried to reassure
them as much as I could and told them you’d never let the French through. […] I am not afraid
for myself, God will not abandon us. If only you come out of this alive. May Christ be with you.
да пребудет с тобой господь.” GaspOd (Rey 105) The Tsar is under pressure from his
advisors and his sister Catherine to deal with the political crisis and
leave the warfighting to his generals. Alexander finally agrees, leaves the army,
and turns his attention to the war effort. He has printing presses set up to print
leaflets to encourage the Grande Armee’s German and Italian-speaking troops to desert
before preparing two manifestos that will change the very nature of the war his
empire is fighting. In the first manifesto, the Tsar calls on Russians of all classes and
creeds to fight the enemy by any means necessary: “Today we call on our loyal subjects, of all
orders and all religious and civil statuses, and call on them to oppose the designs and
attacks of the enemy in a unanimous and general uprising. […] Nobles! You have always
been the saviors of the fatherland. Holy Synod and clergy! With your ardent prayers you have
always called God’s grace upon the head of Russia. Russian people! Brave descendants of brave Slavs!
You have broken the teeth of lions and tigers who have attacked you more than once. Unite! With the
cross in your hearts and weapons in your hands, no human power can defeat you.” (Rey 107)
In the second manifesto, the Tsar announces he will come to Moscow to collect funds for the
war and to raise the national militia. The nation in arms, the scorched earth policy, and partisan
warfare with peasant help are some of the reasons why the 1812 campaign in Russia is an important
step in the totalizing process of modern war. Not all peasants patriotically heed the
Tsar’s call though, as there are dozens of local uprisings across the empire in 1812.
The war will be used as foundational event in the creation of modern Russian nationalism, and
the reason it’s known as the otEchestvennaya voinA the Patriotic War. The Second World War will
later be called the Great Patriotic War. Just a few weeks after the campaign has begun,
it is quickly turning into an all-out war: the men of the Grande Armee are ruthless in
their desperation and hunger, and the Tsar has called on the Russian nation to rise up, and
his army is torching what it can as it retreats. All eyes are now on the provincial town of Mogilev
as both Davout and Bagration force march their exhausted men towards it – whoever gets their
first might tip the balance of the Patriotic War. In late July 1812, the two main Russian armies
are retreating in good order as Napoleon’s Grande Armee continues its advance into Russia.
Prince Bagration’s 2nd Western Army, however, is still in mortal danger of being cut off before
it can join Barclay’s 1st Western Army near Vitebsk. After Marshal Davout blocked Bagration’s
path at Minsk on July 8, the Georgian hopes to reach Barclay via the town of Mogilev. But once
again, Davout strikes first. His troops enter the city on July 20, and even though he doesn’t
know exactly how many troops Bagration has, he prepares to attack. Mogilev is surrounded by
deep ravines which strengthen the French position, and the Russians also don’t know how many men
Davout has, but they attack anyway July 23. General Nikolai RaEvsky leads 17,000 men
and 84 guns, against Davout’s 21,500 men and 55 guns. Raevsky leads the 26th Division in a
frontal assault near the village of SaltAnovka, while the Russian 12th Division hits the French in
the flank. The 12th manages to take the village of FAtovo, but Davout sends in his reserves
and stops it. The frontal assault fails, but it gives rise to a Russian patriotic myth.
General Raevsky is said to have brought his two sons into battle with him, a story that
inspires patriotic paintings showing the scene and becomes a favorite of Stalin’s. But the story
isn’t true – as Raevsky himself will later write: “It’s true I led the attack. When the men
drew back I encouraged them along with the other officers. On the left side, everyone was
killed or wounded, and grapeshot struck near me. But my children were not there at that
moment. […] That's it, the whole story was made up in St. Petersburg [by] engravers,
journalists, [and] writers. […] And that is how history is written! Et voila
comment on écrit I’histoire!” (Есипов) The Battle of Mogilev, which the
French call the Battle of SaltAnovka, costs the Russians 2500 men and the French 1500. Davout once again prevents Bagration from taking
the shortest route to join Barclay, so Bagration sends his forces across the river south of
Mogilev to continue his retreat by a longer route. Barclay de Tolly’s 1st Western Army reaches
the town of Vitebsk the same day Davout turns Bagration away at Mogilev. Since he
doesn’t know about Bagration’s defeat, Barclay thinks that if he can delay
the Grande Armee in front of Vitebsk, Bagration can join him and together
they can finally face the enemy. Barclay orders a spoiling action to slow
down the French-led advance on July 25, which leads to three battles in three days
collectively known as the Battle of Vitebsk. General Alexander OstermAnn-TolstOy’s IV Corps
of 8000 infantry and 2000 cavalry await the enemy near the village of OstrovnO, in positions
on either side of the VItebsk road. Marshal Murat’s vanguard of 8000 cavalry and 1000 infantry
attack immediately, but without enough infantry and artillery, French-led forces struggle to
break the Russian lines protected by forests and swamps. French cavalry charges again and again,
and eventually forces back the Russian left. The fighting is intense, and Russian officer Alexander
MikhAilovsky-DanilEvsky records a dramatic scene: “During the battle of VItebsk, an
adjutant came to tell Ostermann-Tolstoy that the left wing was under
pressure, and asked for orders. The count replied: stand and die. граф
отвечал ‘Стоять и умирать.’”(Ивченко 505) After action reports criticize Ostermann-Tolstoy
for being careless and reckless, but also unquestionably courageous.
He orders a massed bayonet charge, a tactic the Russians are trying to phase out,
and a near-suicidal charge by the IngErmanlAnd Dragoons. The Russians manage to hold the line,
but in the evening French reinforcements arrive, and Ostermann-Tolstoy decides to withdraw. French
doctor Raymond Faure surveys the battlefield: “The [field] was ploughed up and strewn with
men lying in every position and mutilated in various ways. Some, all blackened, had been
scorched by the explosion of a caisson; others, who appeared to be
dead, were still breathing; as one came up to them one could hear their
moans; […] they were in a sort of apathy, a kind of sleep of pain, […] paying no attention
to the people walking around them; they asked nothing of them, probably because they knew
that there was nothing to hope for.” (Zamoyski)I Despite the carnage, the Grande Armee hasn’t been
slowed down at all, so the Russians try another stand on July 26. The 3rd Russian Division its
8000 infantry and 3000 cavalry come face to face with a French-led force of 8000 infantry and 7000
cavalry. The Russians take up a position on a hill flanked by the Western DvinA river and a swamp.
After fierce resistance for most of the day, the Russian right wing gives under the pressure,
and they retreat to the line of the LuchEsa river. Only now does Barclay learn of Bagration’s defeat
at Mogilev – the 1st Western Army has been waiting in vain. July 27 brings still more fighting
as Russian cavalry and light infantry Jäger hold out for as long as they
can against Murat’s cavalry, but French-led horsemen outflank the Russians
position and the Russians once again fall back. Each side has lost about 4000 men over three
days – to make up for Russian officer losses, 5 non-noble NCOs are promoted, a
rare occurrence until this war. Napoleon now expects that the next day will
bring the decisive battle he has been looking for since June, so his forces break off
the chase and make camp for the night. With the two main Russian armies still
in full retreat, the Russian High Command decides to strike with its southern army
to relieve some pressure on Bagration. The Tsar orders General Tormasov’s 3rd Observation
Army to advance against the right flank of the Grande Armee, which is covered by the Austrian
Auxiliary Corps and General Reynier’s VII Corps. Tormasov’s advance is dangerously close to
the Duchy of Warsaw, a key French satellite state. French command doesn’t realise that
Tormasov has 45,000 men, far more than Reynier. The two forces clash at the small town of Kobryn,
which is defended by 3000 Saxons under Major General von Klengel. The Saxons barricade the
roads, and prepare positions in the monastery and half ruined 18th century fortifications.
Early on July 27, Cossack, Tatar, and Bashkir cavalry push the Saxons out of their forward
positions and back into the town itself. At 9am, Russian infantry storms Kobryn and a brutal
house-to-house fight begins, and the town burns to the ground. Saxon officer Carl Becker later
recalls the confusion in the midst of battle: “During this extremely intense fighting, we
suddenly got news that the Sahr Brigade had arrived to reinforce us. There was a loud
cry of celebration – long live the King! Long live the Sahr Brigade! […] Unfortunately
we learned soon after that this news was wrong […] it was a Russian light infantry unit
with uniforms nearly the same as ours.” (Becker) The Battle of Kobryn costs the Saxons about
1000 dead and wounded and 2000 prisoners, including Klengel himself. The Russians lose
only 200 dead and wounded, and they capture 4 Saxon regimental standards.
Following the Russian victory, Reynier force marches his remaining troops north
to join with the Austrians, who will now stay in Volhynia to keep Tormasov in check instead
of supporting the main offensive as planned. As all three Russian armies fight to stave off
disaster, Tsar Alexander meets with churchmen and wealthy merchants in SmolEnsk and Moscow. They
pledge 10 million rubles to the cause, and most serfs accept forced service in the new militia,
even though some are armed only with pikes. Still, Alexander orders the imperial family in St
Petersburg to prepare to flee to Kazan if need be. And his armies will continue to retreat. On the
27, General Aleksei ErmOlov convinces Barclay it is too dangerous to fight Napoleon at Vitebsk,
so the Russians abandon the city. Female Russian cavalry officer NadEzhda DUrova remains confident,
according to her later patriotic memoirs: “We are moving by quick marches into the heart of
Russia, with an enemy at our heels who believes in all simplicity that we are running to escape
him! Fortune blinds. […] The artillery lieutenant, whose unprecedented luck has cost him both
wits and common sense, will soon be remarked through the emperor’s robes.” (Durova 131)
On the morning of the 28, Napoleon’s officers are shocked that Vitebsk is undefended. The decisive
battle has eluded the Emperor once again, and some historians think he made a serious
mistake by not attacking with everything he had the day before. Many of his troops are reaching
breaking point marching in the 30 degree heat. Piedmontese soldier Giuseppe Venturini
keeps a diary of his suffering: “Bivouacked in the mud [July 20-23], thanks
to our two cretinous generals. […] [The 24] I was on sentry duty at General Verdier’s. I was
lucky that day; I ate a good soup. On the 26th six men died of hunger in our regiment.” (Zamoyski)
For Venturini and the rest of the Grande Armee, every step deeper into Russia brings more
dangers – and their Emperor knows it. After the Battles of Vitebsk and Mogilev at the
end of July, Napoleon and the Grande Armee enter the city of Vitebsk. Given the hardships of the
campaign so far, the Emperor decides to pause and rest his troops – even at the risk that
the two Russian armies he has been pursuing could finally unite. The Grande Armee has
suffered terribly from logistics problems, and has lost about one third of its men mostly
to sickness, exhaustion, and desertion – as well as half of its draft and cavalry horses.
Napoleon uses the time to try to reorganize his army’s supply: he orders hospitals to be set up
in Vitebsk, Kaunas to become a logistics hub, and for Minsk to provide the army with flour.
On August 2, the two Russian armies finally met near Smolensk. The Russian high command
now debates whether to continue the retreat or finally stand and fight. 1st Western Army Chief
of Staff Aleksei Yermolov worries that his troops are tired and losing morale, and Barclay
fears that the enemy is still too strong. He’s also lost contact with the French vanguard
so he doesn’t know where their forces are. But there is not just enormous pressure from
Prince Bagration. The Tsar himself urges Barclay to launch an offensive in a letter. Finally, he
agrees to a limited offensive towards Vitebsk on August 7, but almost immediately cancels it based
on rumors of strong French forces on his flanks. Grande Armee command is also planning
its next steps. Napoleon and his marshals debate stopping the campaign until 1813, but
the Emperor decides to push on. He decides to strike before the Russians can organize a proper
defense, so he plans to outflank them at Smolensk. On August 11, the Grande Armee begins to move
and crosses the Dneper river on the 14th, and the clash of arms is not long in coming.
As the French advanced towards Smolensk, Marshal Murat’s cavalry run into Russian General Dmitry
NeverOvsky’s 27th Division at Krasny. The French far outnumber the 7000 Russian infantrymen, but
the Russians close ranks and form an infantry square to cover their retreat. The French cavalry
charge the square repeatedly, but they cannot break it. 15 year old Russian soldier Dmitrii
DushEnkovich experiences his baptism of fire: “Everything seemed incomprehensible to
me. I felt that I was [still] alive, saw everything that was going on around me,
but simply could not comprehend how this awful, indescribable chaos was going to end. To this
day I can still vividly recall Neverovsky riding around the square every time the cavalry
approached with his sword drawn and repeating in a voice which seemed to exude confidence […]:
‘Lads! Remember what you were taught in Moscow. Follow your orders and no cavalry
will defeat you.’” (Lieven 163) The Russians lost around 1500 men,
but their infantry square manages to pull back in good order. The French
cavalry has the numbers to stop them, but with French artillery held up by a
broken bridge they cannot defeat the square. The French have missed anopportunity
to weaken the Russians at Krasny, but will get another chance at the largest battle
of the campaign so far – the Battle of Smolensk. The town of Smolensk has a population of about
13,000 in 1812. It’s only really symbolically important since it houses a sacred Orthodox icon
of the Virgin Mary, and features a citadel from the 17th century wars against the Polish Kingdom.
Napoleon has failed to surround the Russians, but now he thinks they will fight, so he doesn’t
try to outflank them further down the river. The evening of August 16, Marshal Ney and Murat
launch an attack on the city outskirts but General Raevsky’s corps beats them off. By the next
morning, the Russians have 30,000 men defending the town under General Dmitrii DokhturOv, and the
Grande Armee has lined up about 50,000 troops for a frontal attack. First, the French-led forces
attack the outskirts and push the Russians back. By the early afternoon, it’s clear to Napoleon
that Barclay is not going to come out and face him, so he orders his troops to storm the
walls. French cavalry on the right flank defeat Russian dragoons, and all along the
line fierce hand-to-hand fighting begins. When the French-led troops reach the 10-meter
high fortress walls, they find they can’t scale them without specialized equipment. Instead, they
try to climb them as best they can under Russian fire. French cavalryman Auguste Thirion of
the 2nd Cuirassiers witnesses the scene: “I cannot conceive how a single man or a single
horse could escape that mass of cannonballs coming from [both sides]. We [saw our] infantry
laboriously descending into the ditches, or rather the ravines which made up the moat of
the fortress. It was a Polish division which was trying to storm those rocks with a courage,
a desperation worthy of greater success; these brave men tried to scale them by
climbing on each other’s shoulders.” (Zamoyski) French artillery soon sets the town
on fire, and civilians begin to flee. Russian troops still hold the town, but
in the early morning hours of August 18, Barclay decides to give up Smolensk
and retreat towards Moscow. Prince Bagration is furious and calls Barclay
a “German sausage-maker” while Cavalry Corps commander Prince Constantine gives his opinion
to his staff officers in no uncertain terms: “It isn’t Russian blood that flows in
those who command us.” (Lieven 165) The Russian army begins a dangerous retreat in the
presence of stronger French forces on August 18, and the Grande Armee enters Smolensk. The
battle has cost the French-led forces about 7000 killed and wounded, and the Russians about
11,000. Smolensk is ruined, and nearly all of its residents have been killed or fled. French
doctor Raymond Faure takes in the destruction: “[Russian] soldiers [trying] to flee had
fallen in the streets, asphyxiated by the fire, and had been burned there. Many no
longer resembled human beings; they were formless masses of grilled and carbonised
matter, which the metal of a musket, a sabre, or some shreds of accoutrement lying beside
them made recognisable as corpses.” (Zamoyski) As Smolensk burns and the Russian armies move
east, fighting also breaks out in the south, where Napoleon’s reluctant Austrian
allies go over to the attack. Austria would have preferred to stay neutral
in 1812 after Napoleon had defeated it in 1809. But the Emperor of the French expected Austrian
support against Russia so Austria provides 30,000 men in exchange for the Illyrian Provinces
and confirmation of its control of Galicia. The Austrian corps is under direct Austrian
command of Karl von Schwarzenberg, unlike the Prussian corps. Although Napoleon
is married to an Austrian princess, he still has some concerns about potential
disloyalty – and indeed, the Austrians have agreed with the Russians that they will try to
avoid aggressive operations as much as possible. The Austrian corps was meant to advance towards
Minsk, but after the Russian victory over the French-led VII Saxon corps at Kobryn, it’s
joined by the remaining Saxons and moves south. Russian General Tormasov’s 3rd Observation Army
takes up defensive positions around the village of GorodEchno, which the Austrians and Saxons
attack on August 12. The Russians make skillful use of the terrain, occupying the higher ground
behind a swamp. The Saxons try to outflank the Russian positions, but the battle lasts all day
and includes heavy fire from Austrian artillery. Later, Saxon Colonel von Bose blames a lack
of Austrian support for allied difficulties: “Die Österreicher wollen nicht recht beißen. The Austrians just don’t want to sink
their teeth into it.” (Holzhausen, S. 75) Russian troops manage to hold their
positions for most of the day, but their left wing is in such danger of being
overwhelmed that Tormasov decides to withdraw behind the safety of the river Styr. The Battle
of Gorodechno, aka the Battle of PodObna costs the Saxons about 1000 killed and wounded and the
Russians 3000. The southern flank of the Grande Armee has been stabilized, but the fresh Russian
Army of the Danube is on its way from Bessarabia. The Grande Armee is now in possession
of the charred ruins of Smolensk, and has won another tactical victory – but some
question whether attacking at Smolensk made sense. Prussian officer Carl von Clausewitz considers
Napoleon’s failure to outflank the Russians east of Smolensk to be the gravest error of the entire
campaign. But such judgments are far from the men’s minds as the Russians struggle to maintain
cohesion on the retreat. The Grande Armee still has the upper hand – and the very next day the
Russians will face their worst crisis of the war. After the Battle of Smolensk on August 17, the
two Russian armies facing Naopleon’s Grande Armee need to retreat along the Moscow road.
Extracting Russian forces from around Smolensk makes strategic sense, but it
exposes them to extreme risks. The Moscow road runs right along the Dnepr river,
within sight and range of French guns across the river. If the Russians use that route,
their strung-out columns will be decimated. So after a day of rest on August 18, Barclay
divides his forces and sends them on a night-time detour along smaller roads running
through nearby forests, in the hopes they can get back on the Moscow road farther east.
This is a dangerous maneuver. The Russian troops are marching in the dark, and do not
know the territory they are passing through. Some units are delayed, while others get lost in
the forest and take the roads meant for others, causing confusion. If the Russians don’t move
fast enough, the more numerous French-led forces might seize the critical road
junction near the village of Lubino. The Russians would then be trapped
while their units are still separated. The 2nd Western Army army is supposed to guard the
road junction and wait for the 1st Western Army to join it, but due to miscommunication most of it
marches east and leaves only a rearguard behind. Meanwhile the French-led corps overcome their
surprise at the disappearance of the enemy from Smolensk, and make their move. Marshal Ney
begins a pursuit, while Junot’s Westphalian corps moves on the Moscow road from the south.
French troops launch a series of attacks, which the outnumbered Russians desperately resist to
allow the 1st Western Army can get to safety. When General Pavel Tuchkov’s 3000 men exit the forest
and reach the Moscow road, he realises the bulk of the 2nd Western Army is not there to protect
it. So he disobeys his orders to move east and takes up a defensive position with Count Vasily
Orlov-Denisov’s cavalry protecting his flank. Still, French-led pressure on the Russians
forces them back to the last position protecting the junction between the forest roads
and the Moscow road. General Yermolov is able to send some reinforcements to support Tuchkov,
but the situation is hanging by a thread and the Russians only have 30,000 men facing 50,000 from
the Grande Armee. Inexplicably, most of Junot’s Westphalian corps does not attack the vulnerable
Russian flank, even though it has orders to do so and could have turned the battle. Hessian
Lieutenant Colonel von Conrady is furious: “If we had attacked, the Russians would have
been routed, so all of us, soldiers and officers, were eagerly awaiting the order to attack.
[…] whole battalions [were] shouting that they wanted to advance, but Junot would not listen, and
threatened those who were shouting with the firing squad […] Several officers and soldiers in my
battalion wept with despair and shame.” (Zamoyski) Ney is able to force the Russians to give up their
positions once fresh French divisions arrive, but by then their two armies were safely on the
road to Moscow. Losses at the battle of Valutino GorA are about 9000 killed and wounded on each
side. Russian commanders are stunned that they’ve escaped total destruction. At one point in the
fighting, Barclay exclaims “everything is lost,” and he later says the chances of escaping
were 1 in 100. Yermolov says “we should have perished” (Lieven 170) and Russian army
staff officer Woldemar von Loewenstern admits “The fate of the campaign and of the army
should have been sealed that day.” (Zamoyski) As the Russian armies barely escape disaster
at Lubino and retreat towards Moscow, other battles are taking place to the
north, on the road to Saint Petersburg. On the northern front, the Russians have the
momentum. General Wittgenstein’s Russian 1st Corps has broken off from the 1st Western Army
to protect the approaches to the imperial capital at Saint Petersburg, but Wittgenstein has no
intentions of a passive defense. From July 30 to August 1, Russian troops launch a surprise attack
and defeat Marshal Oudinot’s forces at KlIAstitsy. Oudinot is forced to retreat to the town of
Polotsk, where he is joined by Gouvion St-Cyr’s Bavarian Corps. Wittgenstein decides to press
his advantage and despite having only 19,000 men to the French and Bavarian 35,000, he attacks on
August 17. The French occupy the high ground near the junction of the Dvina and PolotA rivers, so
the Russians concentrate on the Bavarian positions at the village of Spass. The Bavarians are able
to hold off the Russians with great difficulty, while Russian artillery manages to stop a French
advance. That evening, Marshal Oudinot is badly wounded in the shoulder and Gouvion St Cyr
takes command of the Franco-Bavarian troops. Russian reinforcements have arrived, but they’re
still outnumbered. Wittgenstein does not expect a French attack, but St Cyr is more aggressive than
Oudinot. He fakes a retreat and instead sends the 8th French Division across the river Polota, but
even before it arrives the Bavarians advance. The Russian rearguard of cavalry and light infantry
are under extreme pressure and give way. The French also push the Russians back in the center.
Desperate to stem the tide, Russian dragoons charge the French cavalry, and a confused mass of
horsemen from both sides moves back towards French lines. The Russian advance is only stopped when
a Swiss regiment holds its ground and neighboring units pour in flanking fire. Swiss officer Salomon
Hirzel later gives the credit to his countrymen: “The Russian dragoons arrived at the
same time as the fleeing [Frenchmen], and they cut down the gunners at their
guns. This success spurred on the enemy, and regiments threw themselves against each
other and friend and foe joined in one mass. This meant our batteries on the walls of Polotsk
couldn’t fire. The entire corps seemed close to collapse […] but the 1st and 2nd Swiss regiments
stood fast like a wall, with bayonets lowered, threatened friend and foe alike with death
should they come too close.” (Maag 125) Hirzel exaggerates the danger and the role of
the Swiss, but the Russian charge is an intense moment in the fight: General St Cyr narrowly
escapes capture by jumping into a ditch, though he is wounded for
the second time in two days. The First Battle of Polotsk costs the
Franco-Bavarians 6300 killed, wounded and prisoner, and the Russians 7500. Wittgenstein is
forced to retreat and the Grande Armee’s northern flank is secure for the time being, although
the French now shelve plans of offensive action. Napoleon makes Gouvion St Cyr a Marshal of France,
but the carnage on the battlefield is gruesome. Days after the battle, wounded men still lie
unattended, as Swiss Captain Landolts records: “With horror, we saw [a Russian dragoon] who had
his right leg torn off at the hip by a cannonball. Despite the massive loss of blood and four days
without food, he managed to firmly ask to be sent to hospital. This I promised to do […] and the
dragoon lived for several days more.” (Maag 129) Napoleon’s commanders have once again been
unable to win a decisive victory, even though Valutino-Gora was their best chance so far. French
leadership again discusses its options: pursue the Russians to Moscow in the hopes of a final battle,
or stop at Smolensk and prepare for a new campaign in 1813. If they stop, they might be able to
re-establish their logistics, recover deserters, and deal with the threat to their southern flank
posed by the Russian Army of the Danube. They could also rally Polish and Lithuanian support
in their newly-won territories, which might also have long-term benefits for France. On the other
hand, staying in Russia for another year might increase the risk of a coup back in Paris, and
his war against Britain and Spain is going badly. There’s also a food shortage in French-occupied
provinces. An advance to Moscow however, would put the Grande Armee in fertile territory at
harvest time. In the end, Napoleon decides he must deal with Russia now, and that the Russians
will certainly fight for their old capital. The Russian government is also making
decisions. Its soldiers are exhausted from the interminable retreat, and many officers – not
only Bagration – have lost confidence in Barclay, not only because of his non-Russian
origins, but because he refuses to face the Grande Armee. Some now refer to
Barclay de Tolly as boltai da i tolko, all talk and no action. On August 17, the Tsar
meets with his advisors to choose a new commander, and announce their decision three days later: the
Russian armies will now answer to Mikhail KutUzov. As the Grande Armee pushes deeper into
the Russian Empire in late August 1812, it leaves lands mostly populated by Poles,
Lithuanians and Belarussians, and enters territory mostly inhabited by ethnic Russians.
The Tsar announced a national war back in July, and now the people’s war against
the extended supply lines of the French-led invasion force begins in earnest.
Russian tactics in their unconventional national war against Napoleon are based on partisan
resistance, Cossack raids, and scorched earth. Peasant resistance begins to grow in response
to the violence and looting of the Grande Armee. Around the conquered city of Smolensk, any chance
of the local population seeing Napoleon as a liberator are disappeared with the destruction
of the city. According to Russian officer G.P. Meshticha: some villagers are
prepared to fight the invader: “Along the way residents had
abandoned their villages and towns and taken with them their food and
belongings. What they couldn’t take with them, they destroyed. […] Some had left the towns,
others hid in the forests with their families. They were armed with pikes and guns to defend
themselves in case of attack.” (Rey 139) At the same time, some Russian commanders
start sending small and agile Cossack units to operate behind enemy lines. Prince Bagration
and his aide-de-camp Lieutenant Colonel Davydov agree to detach some irregular cavalry
units to harass the enemy with hit-and-run raids. Bagration spells
out his orders in a letter: “I order you to harass the enemy and to try to
strike his supplies not only from the flanks, but in the middle and rear. You are to
disrupt supply columns and vehicle parks, and to destroy ferries. […] Nobody should know
[about] your movements, and you are to maintain absolute secrecy. You yourself are responsible
for your own supply of food.”(Mika Lion) Other Russian commanders also
begin to send out raiding parties, and gradually more and more Cossacks are
stalking isolated enemy units or groups of foragers looking for food and fodder – with the
help of local peasants. Grande Armee soldiers begin to forage in larger, organized
groups in case of attack by Cossacks or armed resistance by peasants. Even though the
Cossack raiders are not a serious military threat, they do take several hundred prisoners a day
and case widespread fear in French-led ranks. Hessian Captain Röder observes
one such incident at Vitebsk: “Everything was suddenly thrown into ridiculous
uproar because a few Cossacks had been sighted, who were said to have carried off a forager. The
entire garrison sprang to arms, and when they had ridden out it was discovered that we were
really surrounded by only a few dozen Cossacks who were dodging about hither and thither.
In this way they will be able to bring the whole garrison to hospital in about fourteen
days without losing a single man.” (Chandler) Many Russians accept the scorched earth policy,
because of their suffering at the hands of the Grande Armee. This planned destruction
of supplies, infrastructure, and shelter worsens the already catastrophic French supply
problems and military losses. In late August, Marshal Oudinot’s wife Eugenie de Coucy
describes the journey to visit him in hospital: “The roads were destroyed, choked with
debris of wheels and horse skeletons. Ruined villages consisted of little more than a
few walls, around which moved the inhabitants, clothed in rags. […] but what saddened me the
most were the unmistakeable little mounds, on the top of many of which stood
a small cross.” (Boudon 154) The problem is also troubling Marshal
Murat , as he writes to General Berthier: “We are very badly off. […] You cannot imagine how
the Russians leave the country when they withdraw. They leave nothing, absolutely nothing. Ils ne
laissent rien, absolument rien.” (Boudon 151) Peasant resistance, Cossack raids, and scorched
earth are now part of the reality of the war in Russia, but both sides are still focused
mostly on how to win the conventional war. Napoleon is committed to an advance on Moscow
and he expects Russian leadership will fight for the old capital. On August 24, the Grande
Armee begins to move east from Smolensk, 400km from Moscow. It enters the city of
Vyazma without a fight on the 28th. Vyazma’s 15,000 residents have nearly all left, and French
troops are able to put out the fires left by the retreating Russians and salvage badly-needed food.
While his army marches ahead, Napoleon also needs to secure his rear and his vulnerable supply
lines. He leaves garrisons at Smolensk, Vitebsk, and Minsk, and orders a Polish division to cover
the line from Minsk to Mogilev. He also knows that he needs reinforcements, so the two reserve
corps from East Prussia begin to move east. General Mathieu Dumas has put in charge of medical
and supply logistics, but he and his team are overwhelmed by the task at hand. There is simply
no way to properly supply the army in the field, even though the French threaten to shoot local
Russian officials who don’t give them the food they demand. There is not enough flour, and even
if there were there are not enough ovens to bake it in. Horses continue to starve, and even the
herds of cattle the army have brought along from East Prussia are dying off. In the summer
heat, there is also a serious shortage of water, so troops drink whatever they can find, which
causes many to get sick. The crisis weakens combat effectiveness of all units – for example, the
VI Bavarian Corps regularly has a quarter of its strength out looking for fodder for the horses.
The shortages also torture the men, as Sous-lieutenant Jean-Marie-Pierre-Guillaume
Aubry de Vildé writes to his father: “Mon cher papa, I am writing to tell you of
the misery we are suffering. We have no bread and live only on meat, like wild animals. […] We
continue to run after these damned Russians who run away from us as quickly as we chase them.
We haven’t fought yet, but I constantly hope that happy moment will come.” Boudon 148
Meanwhile the two Russian armies continue their retreat in good order, in spite of
difficult conditions and flagging morale. The heat is so oppressive officers grant special
permission for the men to unbutton their tunics. One of the keys to the withdrawal is a disciplined
marching order to protect the columns from attack. The vulnerable horse-drawn artillery moves
in echelon. When crossing open ground, cavalry protects the columns, while light infantry
provides the cover over more difficult terrain. Further afield, Cossack cavalry keeps watch
and reports any sign of enemy flanking attacks. Cavalry officer Nadezhda Durova later writes
that her faith in the long retreat never wavers: “When I imagine the dreadful end of our retreat,
involuntarily I sigh and become pensive. The French are a foe worthy of us, noble and
courageous, but evil fate in the guise of Napoleon is leading them into Russia. Here they
will lay down their heads, and their bones will be scattered and their bodies rot.” (Durova 131)
The rest of the army does get a morale boost when General Mikhail Kutuzov arrives to take overall
command on August 29. Kutuzov will be made into a symbol of the Russian spirit in Leo Tolstoy’s
epic novel War and Peace, and still later will be portrayed as a military genius by Stalinist
historiography, but in 1812 he is actually a flawed commander. The Tsar doesn’t like him and
he is known for his loose morals, but Kutuzov is popular, skilled at relationship-building, and
fresh off a convincing victory over the Ottomans. Lieutenant Radozhitsky sums up the feelings in
his unit when they learned of Kutuzov’s arrival: “The moment of joy was indescribable: this
commander’s name produced a universal rebirth of morale among the soldiers […] a man
with a Russian name, mind and heart, from a well-known aristocratic family,
and famous for may exploits.” (Lieven 188) Kutuzov’s appointment creates a complicated
command structure since the two Russian armies remain under Barclay and Bagration,
but both accept their new superior and his plan. Kutuzov intends to draw the Grande
Armee further into Russia, and fight a series of well-chosen defensive battles along the way
while building up Russia’s weak reserves. This task gets a little easier on August 27, when Tsar Alexander meets with Swedish regent
Jean Bernadotte and the British ambassador. The Swedes release Russia from its promise
of 40,000 men to help them conquer Norway. The Grande Armee is still the most powerful
army on earth, but hunger, disease, and the Russian People’s War are wearing it down.
A reorganized Russian army under united command is slowly growing in strength and recovering its
morale – and every last Russian soldier will be needed soon, since the largest and bloodiest
battle of the campaign is just days away. As the Russian army retreats east
in the early days of September 1812, its new commanders decide to finally stop and give
battle to the Grande Armee. As the Russians fight daily rearguard actions against the advancing
French-led forces along the Smolensk-Moscow road, General Kutuzov sends his officers
to select a defensible position. Which, in this part of the empire, is
not easy. Russian army officer Carl von Clausewitz sums up the difficult terrain:
“[…] the forests are thinner [and] the ground is level – without any decided mountain ridges
– without any deep hollows; the fields are without enclosures, therefore everywhere
easy to be passed; the villages of wood, and ill adapted for defense. […] If a commander
then, wishes to fight without loss of time, as was Kutuzov’s case, it is evident that he
must put up with what he can get.” Lieven 192 Russian army officers Bennigsen and Toll
select a position near the village of Borodino, near the confluence of the rivers KolOcha
and Moskva, about 120km west of Moscow. In the first days of September, the Russian army
begins to prepare defensive works and organize itself along a line running from northeast of
the village of GOrki towards the southwest. The weak link in the Russian defences is the
southern flank, since the Grande Armee might push along the Old Smolensk road and threaten
to advance into the rear of the Russian forces. Anchoring the southwestern corner is a hill
near the village of Shevardino. A small group of pioneers begin to build a redoubt in a hurry,
and soon there’s a pentagonal shaped fortification with a 1.5m high wall and shallow ditch around.
The redoubt is in an awkward position out in front of the Russian line – there’s
even an undefended hill just 200m away the French could use for their artillery. Kutuzov
decides it won’t be the southern anchor after all, and plans to protect his left wing further
back at the village of Utitsa. Regardless, General NeverOvsky’s division is ordered to
defend the redoubt. Historians debate about what the Russians actually have planned for the
redoubt: was it to threaten the French flank when they arrive, delay their advance, disrupt their
deployment, or simply as an observation point. On September 5, Marshal Murat’s cavalry
scouts catch sight of the entire Russian army spread out below them – the long-awaited battle
will finally happen. Napoleon surveys the situation and decides the Shevardino Redoubt must
be taken before the main battle can be fought. 30,000 French-led infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and
186 guns make ready to attack in the afternoon. The Russians only have 8000 infantry, 4000
cavalry, and 36 guns in and around the redoubt. A combined force drawn from the corps
of Davout, Poniatowski and Murat mount an attack on the area around the redoubt
starting in the late afternoon. Russian Jaegers put up stiff resistance, but French
General Compans’ division cannot be stopped. French officer Gourgaud witnesses a clever
tactic to inflict maximum damage on the enemy: “[General Compans] made [a battalion]
advance, covering four guns charged with grape[shot] that moved behind it. […]
At 50 toises [100m] from the Russians, he unmasked his battery, which caused
a dreadful destruction of the enemy. Compans profiting by the disorder which
he observed in their ranks, and charged with his battalion at the point of the
bayonet.” [Mikaberdize, Battle of Boro] There is vicious hand-to-hand fighting as the
French storm the redoubt, which changes hands several times. The French 61st Line Regiment
take the hill, but a counterattack by the Sibirskii and MalorossIski Grenadiers drive them
off again. After dark, the French try to maneuver between the redoubt and Shevardino village, but
they confuse Russian heavy cavalry with allied Saxon cavalry and are cut down. The Red Lancers
of Hamburg don’t know they’re facing the heavily armored Russian cuirassiers, so they charge into
a superior force only to beat a hasty retreat. The Russians feed three divisions into the fight,
but the Grande Armee threatens to outflank them, so the Russians finally abandon
the Shevardino redoubt at 11:00pm. They leave behind a virtual charnel house on
and around the hill: there about 7000 dead and wounded Russians, and 5000 killed and wounded
soldiers of the Grande Armee. The French troops who occupy the position spend the night surrounded
by heaps of bodies and the cries of the wounded. The stubborn defence of the Shevardino
Redoubt allows the Russian militiamen to work on other field fortifications that will
play a critical role at the Battle of Borodino in two days’ time, and the Russians now suspect that
Napoleon will focus his main attack in the south. Kutuzov reports a glorious if
modest victory to the Tsar. The corpse-covered Shevardino Redoubt is now
in French hands, and both armies now prepare for the colossal clash of arms that
will come on September 7, 1812. Along the main Moscow road,
the first days of September see several clashes between the French vanguard and
the Russian rearguard. The Grande Armee reaches the fatefully-named village of Borodino
on the 6th, but the retreating Russians are applying their policy of scorched earth
effectively. A French officer notes the effects: “Coming out of the woods, which were full of
Cossacks who were routed by the Italian cavalry, we passed through several villages devastated
by the Russians. The devastation, which these barbarians left in their wake, showed us
the way.” (mikaberidze, battle of boro) The scorched earth only worsens the
misery of the men of the Grande Armee. Food is scarce, they are exhausted
from the endless marches, and they’re parched. Captain Girod
de l’Ain is among those suffering: “The heat was excessive: I had never experienced
worse in Spain […] This heat and dust made us extremely thirsty […] [but] water was scarce.
Will you believe me when I say that I saw men lying on their bellies to drink horses’ urine
in the gutter!” (Mikaberidze, Battle of Boro) While his men are starving and desperate to still
their thirst, Napoleon gets a welcome piece of personal news from France. The Prefect of Paris
arrives and brings a gift from Napoleon’s wife, Marie-Louise of Austria. It’s a painting of
their 1-year-old son, who already has the title King of Rome. The Emperor is so pleased
he displays the painting outside his tent, and writes Marie-Louise to thank
her for “the portrait of the king.” On the Russian side, the troops destroy the
inconveniently located village of SemYOnovskoe to deny cover to the enemy. Inexperienced
Moscow militiamen are frantically working on more field fortifications on the
high ground. Generals Bennigsen and Toll argue about how best to construct the
central redoubt and so-called fleches fieldworks in the south – and none of the
work is being overseen by military engineers. The militiamen struggle with a lack of tools
and hard ground which is also dangerous for artillery ricochets. They’re not finished
with their work by the end of September 6. Kutuzov also has leaflets printed in
French to encourage the enemy to desert: “Soldats francais, […] don’t believe the
perfidious words that you are fighting for peace […] you are fighting for the insatiable
ambition of a master who does not want peace, or he would have had it long
ago, and who is playing a game with the blood of the brave. Go home
while there is still time […]” Rey 155 On the eve of the great battle, General
Kutuzov orders the icon of the Virgin Mary, removed from Smolensk before the
battle there a few weeks ago, to be carried before the troops. Napoleon
and some French officers mock the religious procession, but Russian officer Fedor Glinka
believes his countrymen are at one with God: “Never have Russians prayed with
such fervor as today…. At this hour, the hearts and souls of the Russians were in a
secret conversation with the divine.” Rey 155 French officer Raymond de Fezensac is
also keenly aware of what is at stake: “Both sides realised they had to win or perish:
for us, a defeat meant total destruction, for them, it meant the loss of Moscow
and the destruction of their main army, the only hope of Russia.” (Zamoyski)
The next day, September 7, 1812 will determine whether French hopes are
realized, or Russian prayers are answered. On the morning of September 7, 1812, the Grande
Armee faces the combined forces of two Russian armies near the village of Borodino – the biggest
battle of Napoleon’s campaign in Russia so far. The Emperor wakes up at around 2:00AM,
and dictates a message to his troops. He reminds them that they are defending
his crown, promises them glory, and perhaps more importantly for
the men, an end to their misery: “Soldats, voilà la bataille
que vous avez tant desirée. Soldiers, here is the battle you have so long
desired. From now on, victory depends on you: it is a necessity. Victory will give us
abundant supplies, good winter quarters, and a prompt return to la patrie.” (Boudon 215)
Some soldiers are stirred by Napoleon’s words, but others don’t hear it, or only get a
brief translation from their officers. Meanwhile, the Russian armies have held
their religious ceremonies yesterday, and this morning brace for the coming storm. The Russian defences stretch from north of
the Kolocha river near Gorki, and extend westwards in a rough semi-circle ending along
the Old Smolensk-Moscow road near the village of Utitsa and a large wood. The fortifications
around Gorki are strongest, and Kutuzov suspects the French might attack there, against Barclay.
Bagration’s sector on the Russian left flank, however, is open and vulnerable, so they’ve
reinforced it with two major defensive works: a large redoubt, known by the French as the Grande
Redoute and the Russians as Raevsky’s Redoubt; and three arrow-shaped field fortifications known
as fleches. Each one includes sharpened logs, mutually supporting gun positions, is surrounded
by ditches, and is protected by a double palisade at the rear. Small streams and ravines in front
of the Russian line add a natural obstacle. This southern sector is precisely the part
of the line where Napoleon wants to strike the decisive blow. Eugene’s troops will fix
the Russian right, while Ney and Davout will concentrate on the Grande Redoute and the Fleches.
Prince Poniatowski’s Polish V Corps will try to overwhelm the extreme Russian left and push into
the Russian rear along the Old Smolensk road. The Russians hope to bog down the
Grande Armee in a battle of attrition, so they pack most of their troops between
Raevsky’s Redoubt and the Fleches. There are between 9 and 16 Russian soldiers per metre of
front, which means they will take heavy casualties but Napoleon will have very little room to
outmaneuver them as he has so often in the past. The Russians are also counting on the superior
firepower of their more numerous artillery to turn the tide. To discourage unauthorized
retreat, the Moscow militia is positioned just behind the southern end of the line to
turn any fleeing men back to the front lines. All told, about 135,000 French-led
soldiers and 587 cannon are facing about 114,000 Russian troops, 8000 Cossack
irregular cavalry, and 30,000 militiamen. At 6:00AM, a battery of the French Imperial
Guard fired the signal for the battle of Borodino, or la bataille de la Moskova, to begin.
French-led units launch attack after attack against the Russian defenders, and the two massive
armies crash amidst the thunder of hundreds of guns and the whinnying of tens of thousands of
horses. In the midst of the chaos and the killing, the sun begins to shine. Napoleon takes heart
and tells his staff that it’s the same sun that shone at his victory at Austerlitz in 1805.
But the Russians at Borodino are not the Russians of Austerlitz, and they continue to hold their
positions under enormous pressure. The fighting is of an intensity rarely seen in the Napoleonic
Wars, a fact not lost on Lieutenant N.I. AndrEev: “The artillery roared to such an extent
that from dawn until the middle of the day we couldn’t even hear the musket fire;
the cannonade was constant. One might think the sky was on fire. But we could hardly see
the sky through the thick smoke.” (Rey 157) The French take first the southern Fleche,
then the others, but the Russians counterattack and take them back. Marshal Davout is
knocked unconscious when his horse is hit and he falls to the ground, and Russian
artillery general Kutaisov is killed – no one is in command of the Russian artillery
for the rest of the battle. By mid-morning, the constant bombardment from Eugene’s artillery and relentless pressure of the Grande Armee
begins to take its toll on the defenders. The huge number of men and immense firepower in
a small space make the fighting far more chaotic than a typical Napoleonic battle, as Russian
army officer Friedrich von Schubert recalls: “He who has not seen it with his own eyes
cannot imagine the disorder. One couldn’t speak of command. Each regiment, as soon as
it had half reformed after a clarion call, attacked +immediately. […] In the middle
of the melee were our infantry divisions, which the officers were trying to reorganize;
[General] PaskEvich was desperately tearing at his hair and cursing.” (Rey 161)
Around 10:00AM, although historians still debate the exact timeline of the battle, Bagration’s
Fleches are taken yet again – Bagration counterattacks, but the lines has been breached.
Andreev later recall the apocalyptic scene: “Our division was annihilated. I couldn’t
go by the road, so I went through the fields were wounded and mutilated men and horses
were everywhere, in a most horrible state. Describing these horrors is beyond my strength. Even today I cannot think about
that horrible spectacle.” (Rey 159) By noon, Ney is able to consolidate
possession of the Fleches, helped by the fact that a shell seriously wounds Bagration
– who will die of gangrene in a few weeks. Kutuzov appoints Alexander von Wuertemberg
as commander of the 2nd Western Army, but in practice Aleksei Yermolov takes over.
Meanwhile in the north, the Grande Armee takes the village of Borodino despite the fierce fight
put up by the Russian Chasseurs de la Garde light cavalry. Eugene sets up more French guns in
the village to pour fire into the Russian center. Grouchy’s cavalry and three divisions of infantry
cross the Kolocha and move on the Russian center. Just as Napoleon had planned, Kutuzov has been
forced to weaken his center to support the south. Raevsky’s Redoubt, anchoring the Russian
line, still resists. The Grande Redoute is all the more imposing for the attackers because
it is protected by a swampy stream to the front, with only limited access from the rear. But
now its Russians defenders are under attack from all sides. About 2:00PM, Marshal Murat’s
cavalry begins a series of charges to open a breach in the Russian lines to allow the French
infantry to assault the redoubt. At 15:00, French cuirassiers heavy cavalry smash into the Russian
lines one final time, and the infantry is able to capture the redoubt at heavy cost on both sides.
Sous-lieutenant Ducque is shocked by what he sees: “Most of the [dead] were infantrymen
who lay under dead horses and cavalrymen who had charged over them. This mix of
men, weapons, and horses, breastplates, iron and brass cavalry helmets formed an
indescribable scene. […] The horror of this incredible sight was increased by the moans of
the dying who lay among the dead.” (Rey 161) French-led troops can now move south
on the plateau to support the Poles, and threaten Russian troops in the ruins of
the SemYOnovskoe. The Russians have now lost their most important defensive positions and
begin to fall back. Napoleon must now decide whether to throw in the Imperial Guard to finish
off the Russians. But French command believes that the battle will continue the next day, and
the Emperor decides not to risk the Guard. The Grande Armee has taken all Russian
positions, and Russian troops have pulled back more than 1km from their original line.
The artillery rumbles until about 6:00PM but both armies begin to pitch camp for the night at a
safe distance. The soldiers who survive the day’s butchery are forever marked by it, as Russian
soldier Yuri BartEnev writes to his parents: “Pieces of bodies were everywhere, and the dying
groaned. I saw one man without a head, another one without hands or legs. I saw a lightly wounded
soldier who couldn’t speak because his mouth was full of the brains of the man who
had been killed beside him.” (Rey 162) There is no second day of battle at Borodino.
In the night of September 7-8, Kutuzov gives the order to retreat towards Moscow, and the next
day, the Grande Armee, once again, has no enemy before it – but it is too exhausted to pursue
the Russians, and stops to rest. The Battle of Borodino is one of the largest and bloodiest
of the Napoleonic Wars. This is partly because it is not decided by maneuver; but waged with
brute force and firepower in a head-on struggle. In just one day, French guns fire 60,000
cannonballs, and the Russians 50,000; French-led infantry fires some 140,000
cartridges and the Russians 120,000. An average of three cannons are fired
every second of the battle. All this iron, lead and fire takes a terrible human toll. The
Grande Armee loses 28,000 killed and wounded, and 15,000 of its already decimated complement
of horses. The Russians suffer 45,000 killed and wounded and 1000 prisoners. Borodino
did not spare the generals either. 10 French generals are dead and 39 wounded; the
Russians lose 6 dead generals, including both Tuchkov brothers, and 23 wounded. The Russian
2nd Western Army has nearly been destroyed. Napoleon, who is sick the day of the
battle, has been heavily criticized for his performance at Borodino. Some historians
call it one of the worst moments of his career, and insist that if he had sent in the Guard he
could have carried the day and won the campaign. In the end, both sides claim victory: the
French since they are the masters of the field; and the Russians since have badly weakened their
enemy and still have an army. The Russian command also made mistakes including confused orders
and placing too many troops on their right wing. French-allied King Wilhelm von Wuerttemberg,
whose brother fought on the Russian side that day, is relatively reserved about the outcome: “In reality, Kutuzov didn’t have any more
reason to have Alexander order a Te Deum in St. Petersburg than did Napoleon to send victorious
communiques to Marie Louise.” (Fileaux 115) The Battle of Borodino goes on to become THE
symbolic battle of the Napoleonic Wars in Russian history. It will be used by poets, novelists,
composers and filmmakers over the course of two centuries, to build a powerful mythology
and national memory that is still influential today. But all the history books and national
celebrations are far from the minds of the armies at the end of the day on September 7. Despite
the scale, intensity, and lethality of Borodino, the war is far from over, and
Moscow is only a few marches away. After the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon’s
Grande Armee forces the Russian army to retreat eastwards, towards Moscow. Russian leadership
now faces a torturous choice: they can risk another battle with their badly weakened army, or
they can abandon the historic former capital city to the very French-led army they have
publicly said they’ve beaten just days before. Kutuzov, whom the Tsar makes a Field Marshal on
September 11, thinks about fighting more delaying battles west of Moscow. But his generals remind
him that the army no longer has enough men to face Napoleon, and it’s also struggling with morale
and supply. Most Muscovites flee the city, even as thousands of wounded from Borodino stream in for
treatment. On September 13, the Russian generals meet. Barclay and Yermolov want to retreat, while
Bennigsen, DokhturOv and Moscow Governor Fyodor Rostopshin want to fight. Kutuzov decides that
Moscow cannot be defended, and must be evacuated: “Napoleon is like a torrent which we are
still too weak to stem. ‘Moscow is the sponge which will suck him in […] I will see to
it that French, like the Turks last year, will eat horse meat!” (Zamoyski and Rey, 169)
Moscow is thrown into chaos at the news. Residents panic, pack their things, and soon choke
the streets as refugees following their army as it leaves the city. Russian soldiers are demotivated
and discipline begins to break down as units plunder on their way out. For many, losing Moscow
is unthinkable and akin to the end of the world as they knew it. Lieutenant Alexander
Chicherin of the Semenovskii Regiment: “As we passed through the city, it seemed
I had entered an unreal world. I wanted to believe that all I saw – the sadness, the fear,
the panic of the inhabitants – was just a dream and I was surrounded by ghosts. The ancient
spires of the Kremlin, the tombs of my ancestors, the cathedral where our Sovereign was blessed,
everything cried for vengeance. There are things that cannot be explained.” (Rey 19)
As the Russian army withdraws, the Grande Armee arrives. In hasty talks, General
Raevsky and Marshal Murat agree to a ceasefire after the Russian threatens to set fire to
the city. Strange scenes ensue as French-led units run into and sometimes even mingle with
Russian units, with both armies looting freely. For the Grande Armee, Moscow seems to hold out
the promise of relief after more than two months of unbearable suffering. Sergeant Bourgogne
of the Imperial Guard recalls his hopes: “At that moment, all the suffering, the
dangers, the hardships, the privations, everything was forgotten and swept from our minds
by thoughts of the pleasure of entering Moscow, of taking up comfortable winter quarters in
it and of making conquests of another kind, for that is the character of the French soldier: from the fight to lovemaking, and
from lovemaking to battle.” (Zamoyski) Napoleon enters Moscow on September 15 and sets up
in the Kremlin, expecting that now Tsar Alexander will make peace. But soon, the streets of
the old capital begin to fill with smoke. The great city into which the Grande Armee marches
on September 14 is nearly empty – of 262,000 residents, only about 10,000 remain. Among
those who have left are 2100 firefighters and their 96 water pumps, ordered out of
the city by Governor Rostopshin. Small fires break out on the evening of the 14th, but French
officers assume they have broken out accidentally as a result of careless soldiers, Russian and
European alike. But later that night, larger and more ominous blazes break out in the Kitai Gorod
quarter. French-led troops rush to try to put them out and discover torch-bearing arsonists – it’s
now clear the fire is no accident. Before he left, the Governor had ordered the chief of police
to set the city on fire as part of Russia’s scorched earth policy. With a rising wind, no
firefighters and no more fire pumps, it is a matter of time before the conflagration gets out
of control in a city made mostly of wood – even though the French arrest and execute 400 Russians
suspected of spreading the flames. On the 15th, Arbat is burning, and Moscow University library
turns to ashes. The 16th, the fire reaches the stables next to the Kremlin, and Napoleon
leaves Moscow for nearby Petrovsky Palace. Grande Armee units also partially evacuate the
city until fresh rain finally puts out the fire on the 20th. When they return, much of the city
is smoking charcoal: 29% of homes are destroyed, along with 73% of churches and countless cultural
treasures. and their attitude has changed. Far from an oasis, Moscow is now a ruined city
filled with anger and fear. French-led troops now loot and kill with renewed ferocity.
They shoot hundreds of civilians and wounded, and rape an unknown number of women. French
soldier R. Bourgeois witnesses the atrocities: “When we became certain the Russians
had decided to sacrifice their city, an inhibition spread among the troops.
Civilians […] chased out of their homes by the flames […] were stopped by soldiers lacking
all humanity, who mistreated them and only left them after robbing them of their precious things
[…] Any women who appeared were seized at once and delivered up to the brutality of
those who preyed upon them.” (Rey 181) One captain of the Guard
steals silver church ornaments, melted them down and sold them.
Bavarian war artist Albrecht Adam accepts the invitation of a French
officer to acquire some Italian art. Russian civilians also loot whatever they can
in the absence of any order or police. One type of item the Grande Armee looters do not focus on
for the most part is warm winter clothing. When some Polish units begin smithing winter horse
shoes, French officers simply laugh at them. While the Grande Armee plunders conquered
Moscow, Napoleon busies himself with attempts to reach out to the Tsar for a peace deal. The
result is not at all what the Corsican expects. The Emperor of the French feels
that now that he has, in his eyes, defeated the Russian army at Borodino
and occupied Moscow, the Tsar ought to be ready to make peace. And Russian leadership
is feeling the pressure after Moscow has fallen. There is panic in St. Petersburg, and the army is
in crisis. Count Rostopshin complains bitterly: “The soldiers are no longer an army, but a horde
of bandits, looting under the very eyes of their commanders. One cannot shoot them: how can one
punish several thousand people a day?” (Zamoyski) On September 18, Napoleon meets with Russian
General Ivan Tutolmin, who agrees to act as an intermediary and writes to Maria Fyodorovna,
the Tsar’s mother. She does not respond. On the 22nd, Napoleon convinces an officer close
to Grand Duke Constantine to carry a letter to the Tsar at St. Petersburg. But he does not answer
either – in fact, the officer is accused of treason put in prison. Napoleon then asks the
Marquis de Caulaincourt to go to see the Tsar, but Caulaincourt says there’s no point. The
Emperor, however, is not ready to give up, and he writes his own letter to Kutuzov which
he entrusts to the former French ambassador Jacques Lauriston on October 4. Kutuzov has
orders from the Tsar to continue the war, but he agrees to meet Lauriston in secret in
case he can learn something of French plans and play for time while reinforcements are
on their way. Lauriston bitterly complains about partisan peasants, who are ambushing and
killing Grande Armee troops. Kutuzov is unmoved: “[I] cannot civilize in three months
a nation that considers the enemy worse than a gang of marauding Tatars under Genghis Khan […] I am only responsible for
the behavior of my soldiers.” (Rey 187) While Napoleon tries in vain to treat for peace,
his army spends a relatively comfortable month in Moscow. The Russian army, meanwhile, is able to
pull off an important strategic maneuver after leaving Moscow. Kutuzov’s forces head southeast
towards Ryazan. French cavalry give chase, and the Cossacks seem to be just ahead of them. But
the bulk of the Russian army suddenly turns west, and at first the French don’t notice
it’s only the Cossacks in front of them. The main army reaches Tarutino on October
3 and sets up camp to wait gather strength. It also now controls the vital routes south and
southwest of Moscow, and is close to its supply bases in Kaluga. If the Grande Armee wants to
move west through an area it has not already devastated, it will have to fight to get there.
The Grande Armee has conquered and plundered the ashes of Moscow, the Third Rome and the old
capital of the Russian empire. Napoleon is adamant that he wants peace, but he cannot make
it alone. His army has been gravely weakened and still suffers from desertion and ill-discipline
– and now, the Russian army’s Tarutino Maneuver has placed it in a menacing position. The
Russians have suffered terrible losses, but they can replace them, and the country’s will
to fight is shaken but not broken. Politician Alexander Turgenev is dismayed at the destruction
of Moscow, but confident of ultimate victory: “The ruins [of Moscow] are for us the wages of
our penitence, moral and political; and the fire of Moscow, of Smolensk, will, sooner or later,
light for us the way to Paris. These are not empty words, I am completely certain of it.” (Rey 23)
After his unsuccessful peace feelers, Napoleon is now certain that his army must
leave Moscow. He orders preparations to begin; and a few days later on October 13,
the first snowflakes begin to fall. By mid-October 1812, Napoleon and much of his
Grande Armee have spent nearly a month in Moscow, but the Tsar has refused all offers of peace.
The Emperor has decided to leave the ruined city. Spending the winter in Moscow would keep him far
from politically unstable Paris and staying might put his armies at risk of being further weakened
over the winter while the Russians get stronger. But he’s had a difficult time deciding
what to do once he does leave. He could move west along a southern route through
Ukraine, but this would take him even further from the centers of Russian political power, and the
Russian army is blocking his path. He could also decide to move north towards St Petersburg and
try to force a decision, but the onset of fall, the massive distances involved and the weakened
state of the Grande Armee make this unlikely. Another option is a withdrawal to Smolensk (and
possibly further), either by a route south of the one the Grande Armee had already taken, or by
the same route. This would be an admission of catastrophic defeat, and expose the army
to the risk of starvation if it follows the same devastated route through Belarus.
Napoleon finally chooses the least bad option: he orders a retreat to Smolensk through Yel’n’a,
passing south of the area destroyed in the summer. This means fighting their way through the Russian
army encamped at TarUtino. The Grande Armee army prepares to leave Moscow on October 18.
While Napoleon is wasting valuable time in Moscow, Russian leaders are also making plans. Kutuzov’s
priority is to rebuild his army’s strength, and he does so: he had just 40,000 men when
he arrives on October 3, but two weeks later he has 88,000 regulars and 28,000 cavalry,
including irregular Cossacks and Bashkirs. Meanwhile irregular Cossack cavalry and peasant
partisans raid Grande Armee foraging parties and isolated units, which cause the French 15,000
men during the month they are in Moscow. The strategic retreat is over, the new Russian
military objective is to go on the offensive. Now, the Tsar expects that his armies, which outnumber
the French-led invasion forces for the first time since the campaign began, will strike at
the Grande Armee from multiple directions to surround and destroy it. Wittgenstein’s
northern corps, reinforced with fresh units from Finland, is to push south against the
corps of Oudinot and Wrede. In the south, Admiral Chichagov’s Army of the Danube is to
move against Schwarzenberg’s Austrian corps. Finally, Kutuzov’s main army is to close on
Napoleon’s main force from the east – all with the objective of trapping the Grande Armee and
delivering a crushing blow somewhere in Belarus. While Napoleon agonizes in Moscow
before finally deciding to move west, Kutuzov strikes first at Tarutino. The Russian army’s Tarutino maneuver had
allowed it to escape the Grande Armee and set up camp between Moscow and Kaluga. French
Marshal Murat’s cavalry corps and General Poniatowski’s 5th Polish Corps encamp just
north of the Russians to keep an eye on them. Kutuzov is working on rebuilding his forces,
but as the weeks pass, Generals Bennigsen, Barclay, and British advisor General Wilson
all pressure him to maintain offensive action. So he approves a surprise attack on the French
and Poles for October 18. Murat’s cavalry is a shell of its former self. The entire 3rd Cavalry
Corps, for example, only has 700 sabres out of its original complement of 9700, and the Saxon
brigade has been reduced to a mere 50 horses. Polish Lieutenant Henryk Dembinski complains
that the surviving mounts are in a pitiful state: “It was so bad that, even though we had
folded blankets to the thickness of sixteen, their backs had rotted through completely, so much
so that the rot had eaten through the saddlecloth, with the result that when a trooper dismounted,
you could see the horse’s entrails.” (Zamoyski) This is the depleted force the Russians catch
completely unaware near VInkovo. Ten regiments of Cossacks carefully approach the unsuspecting
French and Poles before charging straight into their camp. At first, the Allied troops
closest to the Russians panic and simply flee, leaving their weapons and supplies behind.
French Captain Bréaut describes the chaos: “We finally got into battle formation.
The guns were firing on us with grapeshot, nothing stopped them. There were too many
Russians. […] we were quickly forced to retreat, but did so in good order. Cannon balls were
falling in our ranks like hail […] Everywhere we looked we saw nothing but Cossacks.” Boudon 248
But just as it seemed the Cossacks might be able to use their momentum and French disorganization
to score a complete rout and perhaps even capture Marshal Murat, they stop. A Russian army corps
also joins the fight, but by now the French and Poles have recovered their wits and they are able
to inflict losses on the Russians – including corps commander General Baggovut, who is killed.
Some observers argue that the Cossacks simply wanted to secure their loot from the French camp,
while others emphasize that Kutuzov is satisfied with the limited victory and orders no pursuit.
The Battle of Tarutino, or the Battle of Vinkovo, is relatively small scale but important: the
Russians are from now on willing to go over to the offensive, and the Grande Armee
is psychologically shaken and beatable. The Russians triumph at Tarutino, but Kutuzov doesn’t press his advantage despite
good intelligence from his superior light cavalry. Instead, the Grande Armee will come
to him as it leaves Moscow behind. The Grande Armee that marches out of a burnt-out
Moscow on October 18 and 19 is a shadow of the one that crossed the Neman river in June. The Tsar has
rejected Napoleon’s peace offers, and in the month the army spent in Moscow, Cossack and partisan
raids kill or wound another 10-15,000 men. There are now only about 95,000 men in Napoleon’s
main strike force. The months of hardship have reduced them to a disorganized and dispirited
crowd intent on surviving rather than conquering. A massive baggage train of up to 50,000 wagons,
carts, and even wheelbarrows, accompanies the troubled army’s columns. Captain Eugene
Labaume is reminded of a scene from antiquity: “He who has not seen the French army leave
Moscow can scarcely imagine the Greek and Roman armies as they abandoned the ruins of
Troy or Carthage. The long lines of carts, in ranks of three or four, extended several
leagues and were loaded with the immense booty the soldiers had torn from the flames.” Boudon 249
Many French residents of Moscow who had lived there before the war also leave, along with some
Russians who cast their lot with the French. Napoleon initially leaves 10,000 men in the
city with orders to blow up the Kremlin, but changes his mind soon after
and orders all his troops to leave. They attempt to destroy the Kremlin but fail.
The French-led occupation of Moscow causes a strong feeling of resentment in Russia and helps
rally the population against the Grande Armee. Russian authorities use the fire for propaganda,
but peasant art and songs also show their hatred of the French and genuine attachment to Russia.
The reality of the re-entry of Russian troops and civilians into Moscow is more
complicated than patriotic sentiments. The city is absolutely ruined, as one pre-war
French resident who decides to stay recalls: “One could barely recognize
where the streets had been; corpses lay everywhere in the streets and in the
courtyards […] dead horses blocked the roads, the carcasses of cows and dogs lay among the bodies
of people; a little farther along [those] who had been hanged – they were arsonists who had been
shot and then strung up. We passed all this by with an inconceivable indifference.” Rey 206
As the French leave, peasants from the devastated villages around the city organize themselves into
large groups and take advantage of the disorder to plunder anything of use still left among the
ruins. An anonymous Russian observes the chaos: “By entire convoys, peasants arrived in Moscow
to steal what the enemy hadn’t had the time or the possibility to take away. They took
mirrors, chandeliers, paintings, books, furniture; in a word, they took everything
they could lay their hands on.” Rey 224 Russian authorities arrest many of
the looters in the following days, but eventually strike a modus vivendi by
having the peasants carry the thousands of bodies lying in the streets outside the
city limits and bury them on their way home. As Napoleon leaves the ruins of Moscow behind
and wants to reach Smolensk or Minsk by a safe route to consider his options
and perhaps set up winter quarters. But a restored Russian army is blocking the way. The much-reduced Grande Armee that left Moscow on
October 18 heads to the southwest, towards Kaluga and the encamped Russian army. He hopes to take a
southerly route westwards, but wants to avoid the Russian army. So his forces veer west and head for
MaloyaroslAvets, a small town at a key junction that would allow the Grande Armee to choose its
preferred route and keep the Russian army at bay. The Russians know French-led forces are near
MaloyaroslAvets, but they don’t know it’s Napoleon’s main army until Russian partisans
get confirmation from captured French officers. Meanwhile 6000 men of Eugene’s vanguard have
occupied the town, and General DOkhturov decides to attack them with his force of 12,000.
The night of October 23, the Russians manage to push the French units out of the town and across
the lone bridge spanning the nearby river. Dokhturov sets up his guns on
the steep slopes behind the town, which gives the Russians a tactical advantage for
the main battle which starts early on the 24th. The fighting rages back and forth throughout the
day, and each side throws in more and more units. In all some 32,000 Russians and 24,000 Grande
Armee troops are involved. Most of the troops fighting on the French side are from the Italian
peninsula, and Maloyaroslavets is the culmination of their role in the campaign. Italian units
hold out in bitter fighting around a monastery, while the town changes hands up to 5 times.
In general, Russian troops are able to attack downhill with powerful artillery support from
the heights above, while Eugene’s men must worry about the vulnerable bridge behind them. The
fighting in the streets is at close quarters, and British General Robert Wilson, who is attached
to the Russian army, recalls the haunting scene: “The crackling flames – the dark shadows of the
combatants flitting amongst them – the hissing ring of the grape as it flew from the licornes –
the rattling of the musketry – the ignited shells traversing and crossing in the atmosphere –
the wild shouts of the combatants, and all the accompaniments of the sanguinary struggle
formed an ensemble seldom witnessed.” (Zamoyski) The Russians decide to abandon the town, which
has burned to the ground during the battle, and withdraw to the ridges while their cannons
continue to fire on the French and Italians. By this time Kutuzov’s and Napoleon’s main
armies have both arrived on the scene, but the Emperor hesitates.
On the 25th, he rides out to assess the situation and But while on the south
bank of the river, a Cossack patrol ambushes the Emperor’s scouting party. The Chasseurs de
Garde barely manage to hold off the attackers, and one Cossack rider manages to get within 20
meters of Napoleon himself. Sergeant Bourgogne of the Imperial Guard is among the troops
rushing to help and witnesses a tragic mistake: “We saw the Emperor almost
in the midst of the Cossacks, surrounded by generals and staff officers. […] At
the instant when the cavalry entered the plain, several officers were forced to draw their sabers
to protect themselves and the Emperor, who was in their midst and might have been taken. One of the
staff officers, however, after killing a Cossack and wounding several more, lost his hat, and then
dropped his saber. Finding himself weaponless, he rushed at a Cossack and snatched away his lance
and began to defend himself with it. At that very moment he was spotted by a Horse Grenadier of the
Guard, who, mistaking him for a Cossack, because of his green cloak and lance, rode him down and
passed his saber through his body.” (Chandler) Napoleon survives the incident, and determines
that he doesn’t want to risk his main force crossing the bridge within range of Russian
guns. The Battle of Maloyaroslavets is over: tactically it’s a draw, and costs both sides
around 7000 killed and wounded. Strategically though, it is an unintentional Russian
success. Kutuzov is cautious and withdraws, but Napoleon never learns his way to Kaluga
is open. The Grande Armee’s easier path west has been blocked, and the hapless French-led
forces must now retrace their steps through the very same region that both armies had plundered
and burned their way through in the summer. The Russians have forced the Grande Armee
to retrace its steps on its retreat, and disaster looms. To make
matters worse for Napoleon, Russian forces go over to the attack far to
his rear – on the northern flank near Polotsk. On the northern front, Russian army general
Wittgenstein now has 40,000 men, although 9000 are militia, to pit against Oudinot and Wrede’s
17,000. There are also 10,000 more Russians under General Fabian von Steinheil marching from Riga.
If Wittgenstein can defeat the Franco-Bavarian force around Polotsk and capture the town’s
bridge across the Dvina, he could threaten French supply centers at Vitebsk, Minsk and Smolensk.
Since Wittgenstein doesn’t have the engineering capabilities in his corps to build a pontoon
bridge east of St Cyr’s corps to outflank them, he decides to attack head-on and use his
numerical superiority to drive the French and Bavarians back. On October 18, the
Second Battle of Polotsk begins as three Russian columns arrive outside the town. In
the morning, cavalry units clash several times as Wittgenstein tries to advance his lead units
and push the French out of a wood. Then, at 11:00, French cavalry smashes into the Russian left,
and Wittgenstein himself is briefly in danger until more Russian horsemen arrive and the
French withdraw. Then Russians sent their reserves into the center of their line, and after
fierce fighting over the field fortifications, the Franco-Bavarians have no choice but
to give way and retreat towards the city. Swiss Lieutenant Zimmerli recalls
the intense Russian artillery fire: “For an hour and a half cannonballs
literally rained down on us, and in our passive position we expected at any moment
to be carried away or torn to pieces by one. We were very happy when news came of a
Russian attack on a field fortification and we were called to defend it. At least
there we could fight back.” Maag 175 Meanwhile, General Prince YashvIl advances on the
opposite bank of the PolotA river. The Russians manage to surround a Croatian regiment and force
the French back, but break off the fight when French artillery in Polotsk opens up.
The day ends without a decision, as the French make good use of field
foritifcations and the awkward battlefield which divided the more numerous Russians
in two. Fighting continues on the 19th, but Saint-Cyr realises that with Stenheil
approaching, he might be surrounded. That night, the 2 and 6 corps make a hasty retreat across the
river and blow the bridges, leaving many of the Bavarians trapped on the northern bank and bound
for captivity. The 2nd Battle of Polotsk costs the Grande Armee about 4000 killed and wounded and
2000 prisoners, and the Russians lose about 8000. The Bavarian corps is so weakened that
it retreats to western Belarus, while Oudinot’s 2 corps joins up with Victor’s corps
to protect a potential retreat for their Emperor. The Emperor’s Russian campaign is
collapsing, and even his barren path of retreat is in danger of being cut off. In
Paris, the latest defeats are still unknown, but bad news from Russia has been trickling in
for weeks and sets off a political shockwave. With the Emperor thousands of km away in Russia
and the army bulletins growing ever more cryptic, opponents of Napoleon’s rule decide to risk
a coup. General Claude Francois de Malet had served in the French army before resigning
when Napoleon crowned himself emperor in 1804. Malet is a fervent republican, and is in a Paris
prison after conspiring against Napoleon in 1808. He has connections to some other disgruntled
groups, including officers in the secret Societe des Philadelphes, and Bourbon royalists in
the secret Association des Chevaliers de la foi. He’s in prison with Catholic dissident the Abbe
Lafont, and together they break out of jail on October 22. Malet immediately puts his plan
into action. In full general officer’s uniform, he presents forged documents declaring Napoleon’s
death to an officer of the French national guard, who believes him. One of the forgeries is an order
from the senate and reveals Malet’s intentions for France: the end of the empire, a popular vote for
a new constitution, peace with foreign enemies, immunity for imperial officials, amnesty for
political prisoners, freedom of the press, and reconciliation with the Pope.
Malet uses the troops under his control to free two other imprisoned republican generals, who
move to take over the police and arrest imperial officials. Early on the morning of October 23,
Malet and his accomplices have control of the Ministry of Police, the local prefecture,
police headquarters, and Paris city hall. The 1st Regiment of the Imperial Guard joins
the coup and prepares to block the city gates. But when Malet confronts the Commander of
the Place de Paris and even shoots at him, Genera Hulin has Malet arrested, and the
conspirators are executed a few days later. The Malet coup attempt fails, but it reveals
the presence of small but motivated networks of Frenchmen opposed to the Emperor on republican,
royalist, and Catholic grounds. It also shows the fragility of Bonaparte’s hopes for a dynasty.
When faced with Napoleon’s apparent death, officials did not immediately call for Napoleon’s
son to be proclaimed Emperor and Marie-Louise regent. Regime change is considered possible even
at the highest levels of government in Paris, a thought that will give Napoleon cause for
concern when he eventually finds out about the coup – for now, he has no idea.
Hortense de Beauharnais writes to her brother Eugene about the Malet
affair and fear of the Emperor’s wrath: “You must know by now about our Paris adventure.
Everyone is worried about how the emperor will take it. We all laugh at the police, but we are
worried about them and we believe that the emperor will not sacrifice people who are devoted to him.
[…] The last [army] bulletin has caused alarm. We, those who have spirit, think that you are
preparing for a rearward movement that is quite wise. But the rumor mill got a lot of people
to think the emperor might be dead.” (Boudon 348) By the third week of October,
Napoleon’s entire campaign in Russia is in shambles. His army is depleted,
he has decided to leave Moscow, and the tide on the battlefield
has turned against him at Polotsk, Tarutino, and Maloyaroslavets. Still, many of his
men like Lieutenant Dembinksi, believe in him: “We could see that we were slowly perishing,
but our faith in the genius of Napoleon, in his many years of triumph, was so
unbounded that these conversations always ended with the conclusion that he must
know what he is doing better than us.” (Zamoyski) For the Russians, their strategic retreat,
scorched earth policy and People’s War have required terrible sacrifices from the army and the
peasants alike, but they are now bearing fruit. They have the enemy where they want him – now
it’s a question of striking before he can escape. On October 26, with cold autumn
rains in full swing during the day and frost covering the earth at night, the
Grande Armee begins its long and uncertain retreat along the exact same route it had
come in July and August. In an ominous sign, the Emperor of the French now carries a
small vial of poison everywhere he goes. As Napoleon begins his retreat from
Maloyaroslavets on October 26, he is three days ahead of Marshal Kutuzov and pushing his men
beyond their limits. Speed is the only option, since his rearguard is struggling with discipline,
and there are not enough horses left in the army to pull supply carts and form a cavalry
screen to protect the column from Cossack raids. Within a few days, the Grande Armee
passes through the battlefield at Borodino, and thousands of wounded left from the great
battle are loaded on carts for transport west. French-led troops also trudge past the thousands
of unburied bodies still littering the field. Russian soldier Fyodor Glinka reaches Borodino
soon after: “Few [of the dead] still had a human look. Well before the frosts had arrived,
maggots and putrefaction had made their mark. […] Packs of wolves had come
from every corner of Smolensk province. Birds of prey had flown from the nearby fields.
[…] The birds picked out the eyes, the wolves cleaned the bones of their flesh.” Lieven 261-262
By November 3rd the core of the Grande Armee is just east of the town of Vyazma, and
Kutuzov’s army is breathing down their neck. Napoleon’s troops are in a vulnerable
position, stretched out in columns 50km long. Russian army general Mikhail MilorAdovich wants to
cut off Marshal Davout’s rearguard and destroy it, so he attacks. The Russians manage to surround
Davout’s corps, but Eugene and Prince Poniatowski rush help Davout, and Kutuzov is once again slow
to bring up his main force. The French-led troops are able to rejoin the main column, but they
lose more men than the Russians: 6000 killed and wounded and 2000 prisoners, against Russian
losses of 1800 killed and wounded. 1000 homes and 4000 shops and warehouses burn to the ground. Even
though Kutuzov is criticized for his timidity, the capture of Vyazma is a boost to Russian
morale, including for Lieutenant Ivan Radozhitsky: “Our superiority was clear: the enemy had almost
no cavalry and in contrast to previous occasions his artillery was weak and ineffective…we rejoiced
in our glorious victory, and in addition saw our superiority over the terrible enemy.” Lieven 265
French morale is headed in the opposite direction, and an angry Napoleon puts Marshal
Ney in charge of the rearguard. As the Russian army re-takes Vyazma in the east,
it also continues its offensive in the north. Russian army general Pyotr Wittgenstein begins
to move south in order to threaten Napoleon’s line of retreat, and his forces clash
with those of Marshals Victor and St-Cyr near the village of ChAshniki on October
31. 30,000 Russian troops with proper winter clothing and supported by 114 guns advance
against 30-35,000 men of the Grande Armee. At first, the French hold off the Russians
thanks to their position on a high riverbank, but when the superior and more numerous Russian
artillery opens up, Victor decides to retreat. Napoleon is furious when he gets word of the
retreat some days later, since his escape route is still under threat. General Berthier
conveys the Emperor’s orders to Victor: “Take the offensive—the safety of the whole
army depends on you; every day’s delay can mean a calamity. The army’s cavalry is on foot
because the cold has killed all the horses. March at once—it is the order of the
Emperor and of sheer necessity.” (Chandler) Victor then launches the Battle
of Smoliani on November 13 and 14. In fierce fighting, the village changes hands
6 times, but the French-led units are unable to outflank the more numerous Russians.
2000 Russians and 3000 Grande Armee troops are killed or wounded, and the French
fail to force Wittgenstein back. The Grande Armee is still in
danger of being surrounded, and Wittgenstein is drawing closer to Napoleon’s
only line of retreat. But even away from the battlefield, there is no rest for weary Grande
Armee soldiers thanks to Russian partisans. Tsar Alexander had called for the nation to
rise up against the invader back in July, but the Russians’ most intense partisan
guerilla war against the Grande Armee starts on Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow.
sIn September, Kutuzov expressed his hope that the constant and unpredictable
harassment of Grande Armee units will complement his strategy of
mostly avoiding major battles: “Since the autumn time is coming, the movements
of a large army are becoming too difficult [...] that’s why I decided, avoiding a general battle,
to wage a small war, because the separation of enemy's forces and his blunders give me more
ways to exterminate him.” (Безотосный, 354) The Russian guerilla campaign that reaches its
peak in the fall of 1812 has two components. The first are special detachments of regular troops,
often joined with Cossacks, commanded by officers. Russian partisan units are to block any roads
other than the main Smolensk road the Grande Armee is on, monitor French movements,
and capture prisoners for interrogation. Sometimes, they cooperate
with advanced Russian troops, like at the Battle of Vyazma. All this
guarantees maximum stress and hardship for the surviving men of the Grande Armee.
According to Russian officer Denis Davydov, these units, called parties,
are built for irregular warfare: “The best position for the ‘party’ is
its incessant movement... Убить да уйти To kill and to flee. [That] is the essence of
the tactical duty of a partisan.” (Троицкий, 370) The very first party created is commanded by
Captain Alexander Figner, who is one of the most famous figures of the war. Since he speaks French,
German, and Polish, Figner can sneak into French camps in disguise to gather intelligence that
he then uses to set traps for French-led units. His 200 men operated along the MozhAisk road
in October, killing several hundred soldiers, destroying several guns, and earning their leader
a reputation. Napoleon even calls him a “real Tatar.” (Троицкий, 371) Figner is also known for
his cruelty, in particular killing prisoners. On November 9, Davydov, Figner and other
guerillas carry out the largest partisan operation of the war against an entire
Grande Armee brigade near Lyakhovo. More than 3000 Russians surround the entire
brigade and force it to surrender – including commanding officer General Jean-Pierre
Augereau and all 2000 of his men. The second element of the guerilla campaign are
armed peasants, but historians know less about them. They mostly defend their villages, carry
out opportunistic attacks, and target French supplies – one notable success occurs earlier in
the campaign when they intercept a herd of 1500 cattle and several flocks of sheep meant to
reach the Grande Armee for food in the fall. Some peasants also avenge their suffering
at the hands of the Grande Armee by robbing, torturing, and killing prisoners. Kutuzov
is sympathetic in spite of the atrocities: “It is difficult to stop a people
embittered by all that they have seen, a people who have not seen wars on
their land for two hundred years, a people ready to sacrifice themselves for
the motherland and who do not distinguish between what is acceptable and what is
not in normal wars.” (Троицкий, 379) The story of the peasant partisans will
later be mythologized in the Soviet Union, in particular, the case of VasilIsa KOzhina, a
woman who led a group responsible for escorting French prisoners – and possibly a combat
unit. She already gains notoriety in 1812 – Moscow Governor Fyodor Rostopshin
describes her as a larger-than-life figure: “Дородная баба! A large woman,
proudly walking with a long saber hung over her shoulder over a
French overcoat.” (Троицкий, 378) Ironically, at the same time that thousands of
Russian peasants are taking up arms against the invaders, thousands of others take up arms against
Russian landlords. During 1812 there are about 60 local peasant uprisings across the Russian
empire, which are suppressed by the Tsar’s troops. Russian military and civilian partisans
are a constant threat for the miserable Grande Armee soldiers – but so are
gnawing hunger and numbing cold. The retreat of the Grande Armee from Moscow is one
of unimaginable suffering. Discipline crumbles, there’s not enough food, and the Russia
winter arrives in full force in November, bringing temperatures as low as -23C. French-led troops are hardly recognizable as
the proud military force that entered Russia back in June – tens of thousands of deserters and
accompanying civilians trail the depleted units, making coordinated maneuver even more
difficult. The Marquis de Caulaincourt thinks it is the worst-organized retreat ever and
Cossack commander Matvei Platov agrees: “The enemy army is fleeing like no other army
has ever retreated in history. It is abandoning its baggage, its sick and its wounded. It leaves
behind horrible sights in its wake: at every step one sees the dying or the dead.” Lieven 261
The severe cold arrives the second week of November, and the men don’t have proper clothing,
shelter, or fuel for the fires. Württemberg officer Colonel von Kerner records the deadly
results the morning after the first cold night: “I have just seen the most appalling sight of
my life. Our men are there, sitting around their campfires just as we left them last night,
but they are all dead and frozen.” Zamoyski In a single night, 2500 Italian troops die of
the cold attempting to cross the Vop river, an experience they call the note
d’orrore, the night of horror. The freezing troops are also starving, and
eat anything they can get their hands on: mostly horse meat from the rapidly
perishing cavalry and draft animals, but also cats, straw, candles, axle
grease, and according to multiple sources, the dead bodies of their fellow soldiers.
Baron Larrey, the chief surgeon of the army writes of the catastrophe to his wife:
“Jamais je n’ai autant souffert. I have never suffered this much. The campaigns
in Spain and Egypt were nothing compared to this, and we are not at the end of
our suffering […] We were often happy to seize a few strips of flesh
from the horses we found on our way. We cooked them on our campfires and
that was all we had to eat.” Rey 242 The collapse of discipline makes hunger problems
worse. Soldiers fight over the little food there is, and when the first troops arrive in
Smolensk they simply plunder the stores, so those who arrive later go hungry.
The Russian soldiers pursuing the Grande Armee are also suffering from the extreme conditions.
Their supply lines are getting longer, and the 850 carts of food they need every day
are harder and harder to deliver to the 120,000 men and 40,000 horses that need them.
By early November they’ve outrun their supplies and begin to go hungry as well – but
their morale is higher than anytime since June. The men of the Grande Armee have only one goal:
to survive. But as they limp west from Smolensk, they are again called upon to fight.
By mid-November, the Grande Armee’s main column only has 36,000 men – about a third
of what it had two months earlier when it left Moscow. There are 10,000 fit soldiers in the
Imperial Guard, 12,000 in Davout’s corps, 5000 in Ney’s, 6000 in Eugene’s. 1000 in Junot’s and just
800 in Poniatowski’s. In total there are only 5000 mounted cavalry remaining. They’re accompanied
by about 40,000 wounded, deserters, and sick, including women and children. (Rey 244)
As the Grande Armee leaves Smolensk behind on November 17, it once again faces grave
danger of being cut off and destroyed. As Napoleon waits near the town of Krasny for
the rest of the army to catch up with him, Russian troops under Miloradovich and Kutuzov are
closing in. Napoleon orders an attack to prevent the Russians from blocking the main road ahead of
him. The Imperial Guard leads the charge as 16,000 frozen and hungry French-led troops crash into
35,000 Russians. The Emperor’s gamble pays off, as his men force the Russians back
and remove the immediate danger of encirclement. Russian partisan officer Denis
Davydov paints a dramatic picture of the action: “The Guard with Napoleon
passed through our Cossacks like a hundred-gun ship through
a fishing fleet.” (Chandler) Historians who take a more pro-French view of
the Battle of Krasny point to the partial French victory as justification for Napoleon preserving
the Guard at Borodino in September, and as proof that even in the face of catastrophic conditions,
the Emperor still held sway over his men when present on the battlefield. The success is however
costly: about half of the Young Guard are lost. Meanwhile, at the eastern end of the
Grande Armee’s column, Miloradovich manages to isolate Ney’s rearguard of 6000 men
and 12,000 civilian stragglers, and this time, the rest of the Grande Armee does not come rushing
to help. Ney is not happy with his Emperor: “That bastard has abandoned us; he sacrificed
us in order to save himself; what can we do? What will become of us? Everything is fucked!
[…] Those who get through this will show they have their balls hung by steel wire!” (Zamoyski)
On the 18th Ney refuses Miloradovich’s offer to surrender, and launches a desperate
frontal assault against the Russians blocking the road west. But the French-led troops
are stopped by a wall of Russian artillery fire. That night, the Marshal and 1000 survivors
manage to cross the Dnepr river and rejoin Napoleon at Orsha. The escape earns Ney
the nickname “the bravest of the brave.” Marshal Ney’s corps is destroyed, but there is only one more natural barrier between the
Grande Armee and safety: the Berezina River. Despite the French predicament, Marshal
Kutuzov wants to continue to let hunger, cold, and partisans weaken the French. On a
geopolitical level he also fears that if Napoleon is captured or killed, Britain might become
too strong. But many other Russian commanders and the Tsar himself want to be more aggressive.
So Kutuzov decides that Admiral Pavel ChichAgov and General Wittgenstein will do the bulk
of the fighting. Once Chichagov takes Minsk and denies its supplies to Napoleon, the only
realistic option for the Grande Armee to cross the Berezina river is at the town of Borisov.
Schwarzenberg’s Austrians and Reynier’s Saxons attempt to move east to distract Chichagov, but
Russian general General Osten-Sacken manages to stop them – in any case Schwarzenberg has orders
from home to not be too aggressive. The Emperor will have to run the gauntlet. On November
22, Chichagov’s vanguard arrives at BorIsov after covering the last 55km in just 24 hours,
then proceeds to force the two Polish divisions guarding the town back across the river.
The Grande Armee arrives within sight of the river on the 23rd, and quickly pushes back Russian
troops – but the Russians are able to destroy the lone bridge at Borisov. Since the weather has
warmed up the river is no longer frozen solid, so it seems there is no escape. But two days
earlier, a Russian peasant informs a lost French cavalry unit of a passable stretch of the
Berezina at Studienka, just 15km north of Borisov. On November 25, Napoleon and the Imperial Guard
enter Borisov. Chichagov has no idea the French have found an alternate crossing, so he issues an
order of the day with a description of Napoleon so he can be identified for capture: the Emperor is
said to be “short, stocky, with a short and thick neck, strong head, and black hair.” (Rey 269)
But the Admiral is overconfident. Marshals Murat and Oudinot move their troops
towards Studienka, and the night of the 25, engineers brave the icy water to throw two bridges
across the Berezina. At the same time, the French pretend to be preparing to cross at Borisov and
another crossing to the south. Chichagov takes the bait and moves troops south, while Napoleon
continues to shift his forces towards Studienka. The Grande Armee begins to cross the river
the afternoon of the 26th. Although Chichagov learns he’s been tricked, his and Wittgenstein’s
units are still too far away, though the Russians do manage to destroy the last French division
to leave Borisov. By the morning of the 27th, most of the Grande Armee has crossed except
for the 9th corps protecting the bridges. The morning of the 28th 30,000 stragglers, wounded,
and civilian followers of the army press towards the bridges at Studienka in a disorganized mass.
But by now the Russians have rebuilt the bridge at Borisov, and reposition their forces: Chichagov’s
27,000 men, Wittgenstein’s 40,000 and Kutuzov’s vanguard are ready to attack the 19,000 troops
of the Grande Armee, of whom 9000 are Poles. On the 28th on the west bank, Russian numbers
put extreme pressure on the French-led troops, but Marshal Ney’s cavalry manages a
counterattack that pushes the Russians back. The fighting is fierce, as Grande Armee
Swiss soldier Jean-Marc Bussy recalls: “We dared not look to the right or left
for fear of no longer seeing our friends, our comrades. We closed ranks, shortened our line
and redoubled our courage […] Horrible carnage! To get to our bridges they would have to go
through us, crush each and every last one of us. We shouted “Vive l’Empreur” and did not feel
the cold. On ne sent pas le froid.” (Rey 273) At the same time on the east bank, Wittgenstein’s
artillery pours fire into the crowd of soldiers, wounded, and civilians surging across the bridges. Württemberg officer Christian von
Faber du Faur observes the panic: “Musket and cannon balls beat down on the compact
mass; the cries of the hapless people drowned out the thunder of the guns and the whistling of
bullets; and they rushed even more furiously towards the bridge. Around the bridges rose mounds
of men and horses trampled to death or killed by enemy fire; to get onto the bridge one had to
fight one’s way over them. The floes of ice on the river carried them away from time to time,
but this just made space for others.” (Rey 274) It’s well after dark when the last of Victor’s
rearguard clear a trench through the piles of bodies and crossed the river to rejoin the
rest of the army. There are still thousands on non-combatants on the east bank, but most
are too exhausted and frozen to move, and die or are made prisoner by the Russians. When French
troops set the bridge on fire early on the 29th, desperate figures try one last rush – many
more drown in the river, including some mothers who commit suicide by throwing themselves
and their children into the icy Berezina. As the Cossacks pillage the abandoned carts, Russian engineering officer
Martosa is shocked by the carnage: “The first thing we saw was a woman
jammed into a hole and crushed by the ice. One of her arms hung half severed, the other one
held an infant with its arms around its mother’s neck. She was still alive, with her eyes fixed
on a man nearby who was already frozen solid. Between them lay another dead child.” (Rey 278) In military terms, the Battle of the Berezina
can be considered a French tactical victory. Napoleon managed to save the core of his
much-reduced army against far superior Russian forces, including his marshals, general staff, all
divisional commanders but one, and 2000 officers. For the Russians, it was a missed opportunity,
and the Tsar pins most of the blame on Chichagov. He removes the Admiral from command and sends him
into exile – a convenient scapegoat for a general Russian failure. The cost was incredibly heavy:
13,000 Grande Armee soldiers are dead or wounded, 5000 non-combatants have been killed and
10,000 taken prisoner. The Russians lose 15,000 dead and wounded. (Rey 277-8)
After failing to fully crush the Grande Armee at the Berezina, Kutuzov devises a new plan
catch and surround Napoleon’s main force, and cut off Macdonald’s 10th corps in the north at Riga.
But with the temperature dropping as low as -37C, the Russians too are suffering from cold, hunger,
and exhaustion. The agony of the remnants of the Grande Armee, once 600,000 strong but now reduced
to 15,000 men and up to 40,000 stragglers, is even worse. The road to Vilnius is choked
with the dead and dying, and the Russians launch several small-scale attacks along the way.
Napoleon departs for Paris on December 5, leaving his men to struggle on through the snow
until the survivors cross the Neman on December 14. Napoleon’s gruelling Russian campaign is
over. Shortly before he leaves, Napoleon issues a final army bulletin in which he admits defeat
but indicates his “health has never been better.” The same cannot be said for hundreds of thousands
on both sides of the campaign. Historians estimate about 300,000 Grande Armee soldiers – half the
number who entered Russia – died in battle, of wounds, hunger, disease or exposure. Russian
losses are estimated between 200 and 300,000 dead, along with tens of thousands of civilians.
In that same bulletin, Napoleon blames the harsh Russian winter for his defeat, sparking a
myth that will last for more than two centuries. “General Winter” certainly contributes to the
French disaster, but inadequate logistics, command mistakes, and fierce Russian resistance
ensure the defeat of the Grande Armee even before the first snow falls. Russian myths also grow
from 1812. Intellectuals like Lev Tolstoy and leaders like Joseph Stalin - even today’s Vladimir
Putin - turn to the struggle against Napoleon for inspiration in forming national identity,
and to motivate Russians to fight their wars. In December 1812, the destruction of the most
powerful army in the world shakes the European order. The Grande Armee maintained Napoleon’s rule
and imposed the continent’s alliance system – and now it is gone. The prospect of an independent
Polish kingdom, and the loyalty of unwilling French allies Prussia and Austria, are now
uncertain. When the Comte de Mailly-Nesle arrives in allied Prussian Koenigsberg,
he finds hints of the troubles to come: “[Königsberg] displayed an insolent und
ungenerous hatred towards the French. Many inns refused to take us, saying ‘Go away,
we’ve had enough of you French!” (Rey 299) The Russian army is intact, the
German-speaking lands are restless, and Britain is still fighting – 1813 promises
a new chapter in Napoleon’s Downfall.