"What China Will Be Like As A Great Power" : Martin Jacques Keynote (32nd Annual Camden Conference)

[Music] [Applause] China what's it going to be like as a global power well 10 years ago we probably wouldn't have asked this question with a sense of imminence we could see China rising dramatically but we didn't see it at that stage as a great power ten years later the situation is very different first there's the decline of the United States following or accentuated by the Western financial crisis and secondly there's the rise of China again following the Western financial crisis and the the doubling in size of China the Chinese economy in the subsequent 10 years compared with the American economy growing by about 10 percent in that period and it was results of these changes under Xi Jinping there's been a shift in Chinese foreign policy which I think we're all aware of which is moving from the dong shoppings idea of moving carefully quietly hiding or capability hiding your leadership to something which is much more outgoing and expensive moving to the idea that China was not just a recipient of globalization a player in globalization but was also a maker and shaper of globalization we're in a new situation one of the difficulties I think that we've had in the West is we we've always been on the back foot we've always been a bit on the defensive we've always been a bit behind the game when it came to China we didn't really we didn't really believe in it beyond the point we didn't believe it was sustainable and now I think we have to face the fact that this is a remarkable change that's taking place and we somehow have to be able to make sense of it to understand it but the Achilles heel in the West has been that really we are we don't understand China in some profound way we don't understand China and the reason for this is that the Western that our paradigm is that we are universal that everyone should be one day will be is required to be like us that there's only one modernity in the world it's a modernity now frankly this is no longer a sustainable position it hasn't been a sustainable vision for a while but it's absolutely not sustainable any longer in the world because we see not only the transformation of China but so many developing countries which do not come from the same historical political cultural roots as the West and we have to now try and understand in this context the difference that is China China has never been like the West it isn't like the West and it never will be like the West I don't mean that there are connections similarities and so on but there are some fundamental differences which are enduring differences now I want to make three points in this context the first is that China we think of countries being essentially nation-states the China is not in any simple way a nation-state China this was the beginning of China's rather crude map so I got here but two thousand years ago over 2,000 years ago the beginning of China as a polity the hand is the still over two thousand years ago you can already see is occupying a large part of the eastern part of China it was only at the end of the 19th century when China got into being big trouble and what became very divided and occupied in parts that China finally conceded that it should be a nation-state in other words it adapted to the European then European norms of the international system and it began to call itself a nation-state so you know that's what 120 hundred and thirty years ago something like that that's a sliver of time when you consider a 2000 odd year history of China so to understand China we've got to understand it in my view primarily not as a nation-state primarily as a civilization state that it's inheritance is a civilizational inheritance that ideas about the relationship with the state and society Confucian values there all of the individual within Chinese society traditions like gwenci a certain type of relationship networks in China or even Chinese food for that matter Chinese language ah civilizational her ancestors of China which way predate the period of it being a nation-state so China is a civilization state and a nation-state and this marks it out I think in all sorts of ways if we tease the different aspects of China properly tease out the differences that that are China is about and there's another example of this and you know if those cracked China of course is huge those four provinces of China are bigger have a bigger population between them than that of the United States but the point I want to make here is that China we think of China we think of China as as a as often you know a very centralized country run from Beijing and so on which isn't that isn't true actually it would be impossible to run a country the size of China 1.4 billion people nearly from Beijing China has many as many different customs many different cultures or primary languages Mandarin many different languages spoken and so on and so trying to learn Tovar a long historical period pre-communist pierre I meant talking about the Imperial period that the only way that China could really operate and could hang together was if it was on the basis of a certain sort of respect for difference if you like or to put it another way one civilization many systems and so for example this lives on today if you look at the handover of Hong Kong in 1997 dong shoppings idea was one country two systems' very different way of thinking to that of a nation-state drawn from the tradition of Chinese civilization a nation-state would never think like that I mean German unification it was one nation one system that's a tradition in the West that's where it comes from our history likewise the tradition of one country two systems' comes from a different civilization tradition so this is very fundamental or take another crucial difference about China which is the relationship between state and society now we and I understand this and you know been through this myself we think of governance in countries as essentially about universal suffrage multi-party system and China doesn't have that and for that reason we've long believed in the West that the Chinese system as we know it today is unsustainable is illegitimate but it's not I don't think if you look at the work that's been done on Chinese governance if you look at the Pew Global Attitudes surveys and so on about the set that levels of satisfaction amounts of Chinese with Chinese governance that's a really sustainable position it's clear that the Chinese governing system different though it hugely different though it is from our own in the West enjoys a great deal of support and legitimacy but what is the nature of this legitimacy it can't be the same as ours because we see it in terms of that Democratic position that I've just described now in China the difference is I think crucially based on three factors first of all the state is seen as the Guardian and the embodiment of society this is inconceivable that this will be the case in the United States but in China it is the case and it goes back a long time we're not just talking now about versus 1949 we're going back yeah 2000 years for this tradition secondly the idea of governance in China is drawn powerfully from the notion of the family I mean confuses his idea of the role of the Emperor was that the mob Emperor should modelled himself on a good father was a patriarchal tradition of course then and and so it was a family unit that acted as the microcosm if you like of China as a country well thirdly the the tradition of meritocracy the importance of meritocracy which could lease back to the tank the 1516 hundred years ago so these are things which together the Chinese see governance in a different way to the way we see it and it can be as we've seen extremely effective and the third and the final difference which brings me to the subject of my talk tonight is China's place in the world China's role in the world now you know it's strange to say but europe and the united europe and china shared a very important thing in their in their in their prime period they both in a sense regarded themselves to be universal that they were superior forms are being if you like to those that existed elsewhere but this this the the way in which they interpreted this proposition was very different europe interpreted this proposition essentially as an evangelizing mission to transform the world to take the message of civilization to those who were not civilized through the colonial mission through christianity through language through the culture and so on and I suppose the prime X most extreme expression of this was the height of European colonialism prior to 1914 now China's interpretation of universes and was entirely different China did not see it in terms of externalizing itself because the Chinese idea of their universalism was we are the Middle Kingdom we are the land under heaven we are the highest form of civilization so why leave China what's the point of leaving China when is it were we are all that could be so the Chinese interpretation of its universalism was essentially a stay-at-home universalism whereas the European version was to go to go overseas to to go around the world that's why the United States is the United States because it was a product of that evangelizing mission of European civilization and European colonialism now these differences are very important to understanding today the difference between I think the Chinese way of seeing the world and China's role in the world and that of the West the United States in particular of course as by far the most important Western country now the characteristic forms of of all countries that expand is are firstly economic that you cannot become a great power unless you have a powerful economy and that is therefore the major players globally historically in the modern period Britain then the United States and China have all shared this characteristic in varying degrees so that is a important commonality but beyond that I think you'd I would say looking back at the history of the West on the one hand and China on the other here we have a marked difference a marked disparity because military power and political power and political control have been extremely important in the Western tradition I mean that may be the highest form of this as I said before was colonialism but it's it's been extremely important in the way in which the Western tradition has related to the rest of the world now China is rather different China China didn't I mean do you know in the 500 years between from the mid 14th century to the mid 19th century China only fought one major war with another country which was Vietnam which they got a bloody nose and eventually were defeated and had to retreat there are only two major wars actually in that whole family repeat the period between major nations countries in Asia compared with say a hundred and forty-two wars just between Britain and France I Satan I said it's true in that same 500 year period so for the Chinese actually you know the Chinese had this system called it's become called the at least in Western terms the tribute system and the tribute system lasted for probably about three thousand years the longest existing international system or partial international system in the world and the and this was essentially it was not a military system the Chinese did not apart from that Vietnamese example invade other countries it did not by and large interfere in the politics of other countries so there isn't a strong tradition or in any real tradition beyond the point in China of exercising military or political power what mattered to the Chinese was cultural power if you are going to be attribute state of China then you had to recognize the role of the Empire the superiority the Empire the land and the heaven the Middle Kingdom and Confucian values you were required to do that as long as you did that you could more or less do anything absorbing but that was essentially the Chinese system so we have here a very interesting point of departure in comparing the Western tradition historically and the Chinese tradition strongly strong emphasis on military and political power in the Western tradition stronger versus on cultural power in the Chinese tradition the economic power is shared but it's also I think got to be said that in the future Chinese economic power because of demography is likely to be much greater than anything we've historically seen much greater relatively speaking it's been compared with the United States even in its prime in the the end of the 40s and 1950s okay so this is this brings me slipping through history to the present what are going to be I can't cover this ground obviously because there's a lot of things to say but let's say if I got time the seven key characteristics or elements of China as a global power of course they are well partly they're rooted in reality we can already say partly I'm speculating and and and who knows whether I'll be right or not my first point is indeed about China's economic power and I think that what we have to recognize I think we do recognize that China's economic transformation has been remarkable even now but well as of 2015 it's already represented fifteen percent of global GDP and I think the figure now is something by 16 or 16 or 17 percent of global GDP which is remarkable given in 1980 China represented about one percent of global GDP and the the prospects well who knows whether this will become true but these are some figures from Huan Gong Cheng hua University and this is based on GDP measured in terms of primary purchasing power not the exchange rates it would be different if it's exchange rates but in 2030 or 2035 lets you know these projections are always speculative China would account for a third of global GDP which by the way is what China accounted for in 1820 so there is a tradition if you go back far enough of this followed by India then and of course second here is India at 90% but the Chinese economy bigger than the American and the economies together and twice the size of the American economy now you know many a slip twixt cup and lip these kind of projections I think broadly speaking will come true but maybe much maybe significantly so I mean there's lots of things that can happen in the meantime that could change that situation but I think that we would be given recent history we would be mistaken in not taking these kind of possibilities very very seriously and I think the immediate Lee emerges here that actually China's economic power is going to be as I mentioned disproportionate disproportionate compared with anything we've ever witnessed in modern times previously disproportionate even compared with with that of the United States and certainly with Britain I mean did you know that Britain never accounted even at its highest point it accounted for about eight and a half percent of global GDP and never larger than that but was able to have an empire which was controlled v of the world and a fifth of the world's population but it never had that strong an economy so my second point about China China as a as a global power is is about its relationship with the developing world now I would there is no doubt at all that the most important bilateral relationship to China is that with the United States and it's also regards its relationship or in a rather different way with the European Union to be very important but strategically speaking I don't think that is an accurate way of seeing how China views its relationship and its priorities in terms of the world I think that China's most important strategic priority and it's thinking is its relationship with the developing world now I think that a key part of the explanation for this is where China's come from China of course in 1978 when dong shoppings reforms started was extremely poor and was poor than a lot of African countries in terms of per capita income and so therefore it's it's seen itself as having a certain affinity and with the developing world that it understands the problems the developing world furthermore of course there were other attractions of its relationship with developing world for example China like other East Asian countries Japan Korea is very poor in Natural Resources and China to fuel its industrial transformation needed large amounts of raw materials so the relationship with Africa which actually dates back a long time to the 1950s was very important to to China but I think above all it feels also that it understands developing countries it understands what the problems are developing countries and I think this is a fair proposition and it China is obviously much closer to that situation that experience and that need than the United States or European countries which are much richer and so the mind of the population in our countries in the rich world is very different is in a different place to that of those in the developing world and in China so China I think sees its future very much in terms of its relationship with the developing world this is it explains why for example it's developed such a quote such a strong relationship with African countries now there's been a lot of criticisms of China's relationship with the country's but I think that if you look at public opinion for example in Africa according to Pew and so on China the majority attitude 60 65 percent of Africans have over quite well have what's called a favorable attitude towards China and one of the things done is by becoming a serious source of demand for for African raw materials from those countries that produce a lot has boosted the prices and one of the reasons why I think African growth rates of the last 10 years probably the biggest single reason why African growth rates are now very strong in some countries is because of this relationship with China also I mean China unlike the west of the Europe America wasn't really involved in this but European countries has been generous in terms of and recognized the importance of providing infrastructure and so it's made mistakes it's criticized and so on but I think that you can see from this you know the role that China has been playing unfortunately the American relationship with Chuck with Africa the trade has been falling but you can see that China has been a very important player and I think this is unlikely to continue and just bear in mind here a very important point do you know that in the mid 1970s two-thirds of global GDP was accounted for by the Western world which is roughly fifteen percent is been declining well let's say 15 16 percent of the global population and only one-third by the globe by the developing world where eighty five percent of the world's population lives today the figures are this year are 59 percent is now accounted for by the developing world and I'll get my fingers right here 39 percent by the developed world and the projection for 2030 is that the developing world called South here will account for 67 percent of global GDP and only 33 percent by the rich world so China's relationship is a very populous developing country itself but now upper middle income country you can see the thinking of the future how important this is going to be to China as a as a great power third point belton Road now of course this is not in a way you know in a way I think China sort of learnt a lot about about dealing with the developing world cut its teeth with Africa in the period of the last 20 years or so and Belton Road is as you I'm sure are all aware is a hugely ambitious project to transform transform the Eurasian landmass where there are many many very poor countries although there are also rich countries up at the end of the Eurasian landmass is somewhere coior 'ip which is certainly not paul and but the idea i think is this the chinese thinking in relationship to delta road is look we how do we transform our country we transformed our country by economic growth based on very large scale very usually state large scale investment usually state investment and especially directed infrastructure I mean you know China does have for it a developing country and it's strong reinforced structure of expressways of Railways and they're not a larger high-speed rail network than the rest the world put together China have really made you on infrastructure in a big way and I think this has been so important to development in China because it's created a connect connectivity across China which has drawn the country together and allowed the market to develop in the kind of way that it has and I think the Chinese thinking in relationship to belton wrote is if it worked for us why can't it work for the many countries of Central Asia the Middle East Southeast Asia and so on well that that I think is essentially the Chinese thinking in relations to both wrote and you know bear in mind that about 65 percent of the world's population lives in this in this in this land mass now how is it gone well you know they came out of the traps running hard and they've a lot of money a great deal of infant money has already been invested and there's been a lot of enthusiasm his or to from not all the countries in the Eurasian landmass but I think there's 71 countries are lying along the route of Italy sorry helps us doesn't it so it's good to have a map I find and okay you can see the green the green lines are the land routes well the green the green lines and the red lines are the land routes and the blue is the maritime route so a belt and road I know it's a crazy language but believe it or not I always get confused well is the belt is the land route and the road is the maritime route can you imagine that so I don't know why they just didn't stick to the name Silk Roads because we all kind of know what that means so a lot of enthusiasm from many countries for for the project because they conceived the possibilities of how their circumstances could be transformed the two key countries that have not signed up for it and Japan and India and they were not represented at the big summit two years ago in Beijing but many many countries were at very high levels use it often at the highest level of all you Western Europe has been it was represented most governments but not at the highest level usually and I think that that gives you a sort of rough picture of what the support or what the attitude was now the United States attitude as it was on the Asian infrastructure investment bank was should not get involved not not join in and so on and has recently been to develop an alternative approach personally I think this is a mistake I think the United States should get involved because if it's not involved then then it's not a player in terms of the rules the regulations the the projects and so on and personally I think the alternative program will just be too weak in terms of its funding I mean China's throwing a lot of money at it and I don't think America is in a position to do that at the moment or in the force for the foreseeable future now it is also true and must be emphasized that China's run into some serious problems in different countries with belton Road notably Myanmar Sri Lanka motives Malaysia some criticisms in Pakistan so what is the problem here well the proctor but the biggest criticism of China in this context is the most recent criticism anyway is that in extending loans to these countries usually very very very good interest rates around about 2% do these countries have taken on debt burdens which will see them in big trouble and I think that China has China has a problem in this context why well you know this is a vast program so some some Chinese companies some state-owned companies and so on they rush into it they want to do a deal the Chinese banks of backing a China Development Bank and so on and they take on commitments which are excessive under the circumstances where they need to go slowly rather than very quickly I think a lack of political awareness political nouse I mean Malaysia classy example Malaysia historically has been quite close to China Matthew I know who I do know is very Pro China but he's been very critical of China in this context why because the previous government of Najib undertook these big commitments voting got lots of loans in China and and put themselves and put the country in a lot of debt and no no no ji was particularly corrupt finger and and now Matt is cancelled or not yet canceled but suspended some of the key projects like the east rail route so I think that there's a certain degree of sometimes greed sometimes corruption sometimes just you know rushing into things lack of it lack of knowledge about the political circumstances of different countries lack of awareness of the importance of civil society and civil society organizations and so on so I I think that is very important what's going to happen well I think what's going to happen is the Chinese will read ago she ate all these agreements where they under a lot of pressure there and this will I don't think it'll bring belt and wrote down I don't think the Chinese will let that happen I don't think they can let it happen but it is a warning to them but in the longer run what do I think I think that belt and road basically is going to be successful and what scale I don't know remember we're talking about a very long term project I mean I don't think we do at 10 years or 20 years we've talked about 50 years or more than that this is a most extraordinary miss objective and but what I think is going to happen is in you can see this this map here is my Danny quoi it was LSE learn at school of economics and he tries to understand trying to work out for very complex econometrics where the center of the global economy is is and he estimated that in 1980 it was a yellow spots just off the African coast and he's and he's seen it moving and now he thinks it's just above the Arabian Peninsula there is it now the center of the global economy and it he he predicts it'll be by 2050 on the sino-indian border so and the transformation of the Eurasian landmass as a result of belt alone can only accelerate accelerate an underline that kind of development that's one point I would make the second point I would make is that don't underestimate the kind of transformation in governance that is likely to come from Belton Road many countries were at the moment there aren't really regional strong regional organizations to across large parts of the landmass and I think what we're going to see is a transformation in the idea of the nation-state new regional entities being created in other words a revolution in governance across the region in ways that at the moment I I don't can't predict what exactly what there'll be but I think there would be inevitable consequence of this process and the other thing I think is in almost inevitable especially if Europe and the United States are not particularly involved in it and that is the increasing importance of the Chinese renminbi as a currency in these areas increasing importance of Chinese ideas about how these kind of projects should be organized their legal basis and so on two courts are being established one in Xi'an and we're in change and to hear commercial disputes in in belt and road projects which is an illustration of this point so that is belt and rope and a very important project now this brings me to just a couple of points that I want to make which is very quickly I don't think I think when with in terms of us-china relations we shouldn't exaggerate the importance of Chinese military expenditure China is not Russia the Soviet Union was believed in military competition and the arms race and you can see even today when the country is much weaker a much poorer it still places a disproportionate emphasis on military expenditure I don't think China is like that takes me back to the earlier point about history and China not essentially regarding military power within the same with the same priority as is true in the West and certainly in the case of Russia and the other point I want to make before just finally making some points about us-china relations and that is China is also not going to be a political meddler why because China thinks it's different its unique it's not it's not it's not a model for others and it has an agnostic attitude actually a relatively agnostic attitude towards political systems wherever they are this brings me to my final points about the United States and China we are now as we all can see very clearly in new waters in new territory as far as the relationship between the United States and China is concerned the era that started with Nixon Mao in 1972 has come to an end why is it come to an end because the United States has shifted its position not just Trump I think that more widely across American society why is it shifted its position because I think for a long time America saw China not as a rival to beyond a point to the United States it were it was a very very unequal relationship but we can all see that that balance has changed and now there's a feeling in America that China in some ways is a threat or it's certainly a challenge to the United States I would say first that it is impossible for the United States to stop the rise of China unless we're talking about a nuclear war but then we're all dead anyway Mirai zuv China is one of these great quite unusual historical moments of a fundamental transformation taking place in the world I mean the rise of Europe and the decline of China in the 17th and 18th century was also one of these great change historical trends historical periods the United States cannot stop the rise of China this is this is impossible and so it has to try and find a way of relating it to China in this new context second point I want to make the problem of the relationship between the competitive relationship between China and the United States is not fundamentally about trade it's fundamentally about innovation now there has been a very strong view in the West that China was not capable of serious innovation that China was good at copying good at imitating but when it came to creative change radical change China would not be able to succeed now I think this was a profound misconception you see ever since 1978 it's true that in the early decades China was by and large taking existing technologies and applying them to the new circumstances in China but even that kind of approach is not simply copying it involves a process of incremental innovation not Parrott not radical innovation but it's nonetheless innovation and I think across Chinese society when it was growing at 10% a year or now 7% a year this led to an enormous buildup of innovative capacity of innovative thinking across Chinese society this was not just you know this has been going on for a long time and now China has reached the point where it is capable of competing in areas which you and I certainly didn't expect China to emerge as a serious player in the world I mean you know the United States has had a monopoly basically of lots of technologies mostly those coming from Silicon Valley and yet within a very short space of time maybe 10 years less than 10 years firms like $0.10 and Alibaba have emerged as you know on a par with the top American technology firms and Huawei has to be included in this category so China is China China's rise economic rise is going to the formidable challenge and to the United States and the only way that I think America I think it's a mistake for America to react in a protectionist way to this I mean I'm not don't do any protection whatsoever under any circumstances but in general the danger of protectionism is that you withdraw it's a defensive response when in fact basically for example it's very very important that American firms are competing in China because China is becoming such a competitive ruthlessly competitive and dynamic economy so you have to be part of it to learn from it because learning is going to be very important in relationship to how we in the West respond to the rise of China my last point and I'll finish with this is the key question I think for us in the West is and particularly for the United States is to find a way of relating to China based on a different assumption the assumption can no longer be we are number one in the world and we will just defend what we have achieved because the situation has changed China is a serious competitor in many fields now to the United States so we have to do what my country has not been good at my country being Britain which is learning to live in a world which is not the same as we've lived in for a long time and we've found it very different in my country brexit debate is a fantastically good illustration of this we found it very difficult to move on and I think the great challenge for the United States will be how to live in a world where China is appear a peer competitor what are the forms of cooperation and what are the forms of rivalry this is the question raised in Sioux City's trap by Graham Allison you know how does the United States deal with this challenge other than putting up the barriers and threat in becoming you know becoming more military from zombies response this isn't going to work this cannot be in the future so this is the great challenge that faces the West but to to the United States in response to the rise of China as a great part thank you very much all right Martin thank you very much for that very thought-provoking opening setting of the table with your thoughts I want to start out by interrogating one premise of your argument and that's not the part where you say that China is on the rise that's fine I think most people would agree with you that China is indeed on the rise and has been for more than 20 years now but I would like to interrogate the part where you presume that the West is in decline life is still pretty good for many people throughout Europe and for a large proportion of the population in the US and life is still quite in fact very difficult I would say as a reporter we get to see these things for most people in China and notwithstanding the many many many millions of people who've been risen out of who've been lifted out of poverty in China the Communist Party continues to tighten the screws and a lot of that bureaucracy and other things in dangers China's economic rise and China has actually I think some would say surprisingly proved to be quite vulnerable to u.s. pressure on trade whatever one might think of President Trump and his rhetoric and methods and him as the messenger so how do you how do you actually back up that argument that the West is an inexorable decline compared to China well it's not it depends on how you define decline obviously I define decline as not absolute decline which is quite unusual it does happen to countries but it's very unusual but decline as relative decline that is for example what proportion of global GDP does the United States account for purchasing power parity of course though as you could be either in the PPP PPP but it's true of exchange rates it's just the exchange rates is slower then but it if you do the graph they're more or less parallel to each other so now in terms of relative decline I mean the United States for example its high its highest-ever proportion was not surprisingly during the Second World War but even in the 1950s American proportion of global GDP was just under 29 percent something like that and now it's well below 20 percent but now that is that is a very significant decline now it doesn't it doesn't mean that American living standards are falling because by and large for most people but not all people as we found from the politics of the last few years but basically you know American life has got better meanwhile China's relative obviously as I explained relative proportion of global GDP has been rising very quickly so that's what I mean if you take Europe it's exactly the same position in relation to Europe in fact European decline has been more accentuated than American it's like and you know there are there are other problems to worry about for the West I mean growth rates are very low I mean you asked me this question ten years after the global financial crisis you know and the impact on the West was MUC with you know it was very bad I mean even so far as to have hit Beijing as well growth rates in China are also considerably lower than they were 20 years ago 15 years ago when you and I were both living in China so give us the flip side of some of what you've explained to us in the keynote what do you see as some of the major barriers and obstacles that China is likely to face in its rise well multitudinous I mean you know if I'm giving this talk in China especially five or six years ago and that the Chinese reaction was you know we've got your eggs you know you're exaggerating where we've got to you're under estimating the problem so there and it is true that if you live in a developing country then and Chinese it's still a developing country then you've got many different problems you know the economy is imbalance it's it's it has serious funding problems all sorts of difficulties economy has what do I think the biggest problems are I think the debt problem is a serious problem this is this is internal debt it doesn't have external debts but it has internal debts and the internal debts are - well - banks basically excessive lending on the part of for the particularly state-owned companies not individuals it's and also by local governments and provincial governments especially local municipal governments that's one area secondly I think that the growth of inequality in China is an underestimated problem in my view and the divide between rural and urban the wrong coastal well yeah I mean this is part of the problem of a developing country because what the way Dunc shopping strategy was a sort of spatial strategy in a way which was let me develop the South the coastal regions which is you know Guangdong near Hong Kong Guangdong Province Fujian Province and then up the eastern coast Shanghai and so on so their living standards are much and their growth rates but they're not no longer the graters but their living standards are much higher than for example central China although central China being for example Sichuan province Georgian and so on and much greater than Western Western Europe now probably the consequences of that kind of equality providing it doesn't persist indefinitely because then it would affect the unity of the country my views are not so serious when it because people don't people someone living in Chongqing or Chengdu don't know you know they don't measure themselves against someone living in Shanghai because it's like so far away but when that inequality becomes for example inequality in Shanghai or Beijing then and if you look here you can see it it's very vivid then that can become a serious problem and add to the mix the migrant workers who be extremely important for China's transformation I mean they've done let's face it in labor terms a lot of the heavy lifting of it and they still are not they still can't you know if they're living in Shanghai they still can't get access to Shanghai education hospitals and so on so they then you know they're but they have because they're they're sitting there their household rights are from where hometown and so on and there have been they've been talking about as you know reforming the hukou system missile registration system but they haven't got very far with it so I think though those kind of I mean you know you could you could add to one of the good things about the Chinese is that when they face a serious problem they do do something about it so corruption for example corruption was a really serious problem in China and they did and I think that they've had they made a singular dent on this problem inequality I don't think they've really done very much at all of it well I'm looking forward to tomorrow our first speaker is an expert on the Chinese bureaucracy and I'm sure we're gonna press her on how much of the corruption push is corruption versus elite Chinese bureaucratic politics because we could have a whole conversation about that also the economists who are going to be joining us throughout the we can can tell us about the Gini coefficient and all the relative inequality so we'll hear a lot more about it alright let's start out with some of our questions here in the audience I saw this gentleman here raised his hand someone's going to be bringing a microphone right to you sir Jim Matlin Rockport you gave a spectacular overview thank you but given the long civilization tradition as you described it with the dominance of a paternal model Confucian model how would you describe the role and status of women in this modernizing China do they have or can they ever reach parity thank you for that question Martin Mao who said women holding up half the sky yeah well that's very true they think we're actually I think that of course if you look at many professions and so on in China they're very unequal very gender gender gender equality is is very powerful but if you look but I think there is a I mean and there are there's going to be I think a lot of conflict gender conflict in China in relationship relation which has already begun to express itself over the last five years in various developments but I also I mean I think it depends on the pressures I mean if you go now in journalism for example it's a I the very large number of women journalists and in fact I mean I don't know the statistics for it but this is based on my own you know my own bit circumstantial evidence there's been a big change and if you look at the composition of students for example I mean teacher China Xinhua food on universities and so on and I don't know what the exact gender breakdown is but there's a you know there's a formidable proportion of women amongst them so I think that there is change but if you go to the party if you look at the you know if you look at a picture of at the Congress you know it's almost male only yes and if you would like to know more about that I would recommend you to read a new book that's just come out by later Hong fincher who's a journalist turned academic who has her degree from Tsinghua University it's called betraying Big Brother and it's about feminism in China today the book just came out a couple months ago and it's all about these last say three to five years of this rise of a feminist movement in China so we get a lot of information from that we have another question right here thank you you far you don't forget to identify your cell right Tom Remington from Cambridge Massachusetts you've argued that we shouldn't regard China through Western eyes that Western models of development don't apply very well if you accept the premise that Marxism and Marxism Leninism are a Western import what do you think is the future of communism meteorology the Communist Party especially given that Xi Jinping is intensifying China's commitment to communist ideology oh great we got a double with a political science question there the unacknowledged Western import but you're right clearly clearly Mao and the Chinese Communist Party you know was founded on the basis of the Marxist tradition at the same time as most communist parties were founded think the Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921 but I think that one of the great successes of Mao was his ability to indigenous Marxism in a way that the Russian the Soviet Communist Party failed to do and I mean I'm one of them one of the consequences this was growing friction which we should not forget between the Chinese Communist Party and Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party later on as well leading to the breach at the end of the 1950s between them so for example the traditional Marxist position was that the working class is the leader of the socialist revolution is the vanguard class and all that kind of stuff now Maris position was the opposite to that MERIS position was that the peasantry in China would be the mainstay of the revolution and of course that is exactly what happened which is the opposite of what happened in the Soviet Union and one of the reasons why the Soviet Russian Communist Party from from Amelia Arthur Revolution was in big trouble was because it represented such a minority of the population so it was very dependent on authoritarianism now the Chinese Communist Party I'm not saying it wasn't no authoritarian but because it had a mass basis in the countryside it enjoyed much greater support than happened in Russia and I think one of the real you know if you're how does it you know is a party whatever the party is whether it's communist or you know your parties or whatever is it able to change is it able to move with the times this is the great question I think facing political parties and the Chinese Communist Party that we're going to be your objective about this has clearly changed enormously hugely it's abandoned a lot of its old ideological positions but no everything so I I think that the success of Mao was was you know originally was this ability to give it to give the Chinese Communist Party Chinese roots well socialism with Chinese characteristics was the phrase of course but if we're gonna have a conversation about the peasantry we'll then we might have to bring up the whole Cultural Revolution Great Leap Forward that could take us down a whole other path that's another for you questions I got a signal that we have a question from one of our remote locations the question is from George West and Newbury New Hampshire who says will the who attends Dartmouth it looks like will the success of China force a change in our democratic system and what are the chances of this happening well I think this is a very important question nice and brief but a big question which is to what extent is what's happening in the West now a consequence of the rise of China it's not a stupid question you see you know what we've got the financial crisis we've had the impact that that had economically which was dire the worst hit since the 1930s and then we've had the political consequences of those economic consequences and the political consequences have been a very big challenge to the governing class is right across the West including here and a serious decline in support certainly in Europe for all the major parties Social Democrat and right-wing conservative parties and a loss a growing loss of faith of people or a shaking of faith of people in the democratic system y-you know now I I do think that it it's not the example of China because China isn't I don't think people in the West see China as an example and I don't think that they learn certain things from China but we're never going to go down that path because our traditions are completely different but the impact of the decart relative decline the relative decline of the West you know it's you know you can feel this the angst in the countries I mean the decline for example you take European leaders you know or leaders in my own country are diminished figures now take seriously diminished fingers people do not respect them in the way that they used it why not because they don't have command of the societies or thermogenesis services that they use that but when you use the word command and authority I hope you're not suggesting that authoritarianism is a preferential I'm just saying look we question is to understand what the consequences might be so in that sense we need to be good analysts and observance we don't we don't just you know fatal politics is just to you know only notice the things you like and ignore the things you don't like then you're in big trouble and we'd have to put some big blinders on all over the world for the last several years I think we have time for one last question up here in the balcony go ahead could you stand up please sir if I try to stand off probably fall down Sarge Cheever Wellesley Massachusetts sir could you comment on China's treatment of its minorities which seems to range from historical toleration to enforce conformity are you specifically referring to the weavers we're about independet ention camps in the West and Tibetan I think this is a very good question I mean they I think it's it's a very complicated question actually the reason it's complicated one sense I think for me it's simple and one sense is very complicated the complicated part of the question is look China is an extremely diverse country extremely diverse many many different ethnic and racial minorities but the most extraordinary feature of China is the way in which over a very very long historical period the great majority well over 90% of the population by general agreement have come to regard themselves as Han so the Heinie's you know of course ultimately race as his news about there's a cultural question not a physical question but the now that and they embrace many many different different people so many minorities would now regard themselves to be hat and that's not through oppression that is to through the process of you know cinah cessation if you like over a very very long historical period and I think Confucian that you know the Confucian tradition was what had two sides to it one was very open to the difference and minorities where and that was when essentially the they were confident and at other times very defensive and exclusionary which was when they were on the back foot so I think this so I in many ways I think China is I'd say has ethnically be a very successful country but I think since 1949 they're been to the in my view the biggest failure of the Chinese government has been in relationship to shinjang and Tibet where the this old defensive mentality they're all Confucian defensive mentality has been had the upper hand and therefore a lack of proper recognition of cultural rights of religious rights of the practice of those has been very clear in Tibet and in Xin Jiang now we should distinguish between the two I think as well I mean Tibet I can't you know beyond a point I can't understand why the Chinese don't don't pursue a different policy because Tibet is not a threat to China it's not Xin Jiang is more difficult problem because shinjang is is you know bordering on the other of the other Central Asian Republics there there is a serious terrorist problem I know I was in a room Qi about four years ago now which is the capital of Xinjiang province and he did remind me of my visits to Belfast and Londonderry during the Troubles because there were you know there were sort of semi armed patrols and vehicles and so on all overseas and so it was clear that there was a serious terrorist problem although one wonders whether that feeling is also caused by the repression the figure that you used of ninety percent of people feeling happy to be sign off' i'd i'm not sure where that figure comes from I can certainly say travelling in Xinjiang and in Tibet and in minority areas in southern China in Yunnan Province for example those minorities don't feel Han and they feel sad that their culture is being suppressed and I'm thinking of I mean as a reporter so I'm curious where the 90 percent I don't think it's a province like you know and so on it's repressed I mean you know no not reported asked you know what what happens what happens with industrialization and modernization is customs do get lost you know it's not a question of political repression it's a question of the way in which commercialization for example of people's lives and so on leads to the loss of certain forms of customs and identities and that is being tuned that's not just true of China that's happened rapidly across the West you know now you know we might we may lots of languages and so we may much regret this but it's not such an easy thing to do to deal with what I'm talking about and I think the question is is director this is what about you know clear political and social repression of people okay and that that is a different that is a different question and and I'm I'm I think this is a big one I don't go along with all the proper all the stuff that's been said about what's happening GJ I think I don't think that that is necessary exactly what's happened but I do think the Chinese over a quite a long beard of God the treatment of the we go and the treatment of the Tibetans wrong mm-hmm and is there a solution to that is there something do you see a way because I think the question was sort of asking the question who seemed to be asking why are they doing this is there a way that China can be convinced that these are not threats to them these large minority populations and I don't know if inner loop she was that because I haven't been to a room she in the last four years I don't know if that feeling of Londonderry Belfast which I didn't know during the Troubles I was never there was that because those people were politically repressed or you know what was the chicken and what was the egg serious in in Shin in orem she what was it was not so yeah I mean what happened in Northern Ireland was that the Catholic minority population basically was had inferior circumstances to the majority Protestant population it wasn't just about religion that shorthand will use the religious terms and they and and there was a long journey unsurprisingly for unification right with you know with Irish Republic and and and hence the IRA and the terrace acts and so on and eventually of course the solution was found to this well there were it's not yet properly found but there were there will be in my view a United Island that would be oh I doubt we're gonna have a Senator Mitchell doing a good Friday accord for Shin Jung but but but all right I don't know if we have time for one last question no I'm being told we do not all right well then let me thank everyone for being with us tonight and remind you that the Opera House doors here are going to open tomorrow morning at 7:45 in the morning seating will be available at 8:15 the conference will begin promptly at 8:45 and just a a nice note is if you don't know this the two hour parking rule in town does not apply on Saturdays or Sundays so Park to your heart's delight please join me in thanking Martin for sharing all of his time with us and we look forward to seeing you tomorrow

Channel: Martin Jacques

Views: 890,207

Rating: 4.6729689 out of 5

Keywords: China, U.S., Camden Conference, Martin Jacques

Id: uBjvklYLShM

Length: 76min 30sec (4590 seconds)

Published: Tue Mar 26 2019

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[u/geopolitics_banbot]

Rules / Submission Statement Guide / Wiki Resources

[u/Prankmore]

Submission statement: Martin Jacques gives a talk on what China will be like in the coming years as it takes its place as a great power. In particular he addresses the key differences in how China sees itself and how it views the role of a great power. He talks about China's long history as a regional power and how its belt and road will effect global geopolitics and china's role and influence in it.

Martin does make quite a few assumptions but on a whole I think it's an interesting look into what the future of global politics and power might look like.

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[u/[deleted]]

I will be consistent here in saying I know Martin is at least a socialist, if not outright communist. Not in any derogatory meaning, just that the bias is there. I will not accept his version of events either, though not for the above reason, more so that I believe a person/country is shaped by circumstances rather than any predetermined factors.

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One example I like to use is freedom of speech. Whenever a issue like guns is brought up, Conservatives don't want that conversation. In fact the NRA has actively suppressed research on the subject over the years.

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Whenever illegal immigration is brought up, a liberal doesn't want to have that conversation.

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Looking at that, it's possible(though obviously with some exaggeration) to claim that no one likes freedom of speech in America. Which is obviously not true.

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Regardless of one's predisposition to that freedom, circumstances shape their handling of each situation. That is what I believe to be the main driver in behavior. Obviously there are many factors at play here than just the one.

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Just some take away from this talk.

-China is very expansionist. To say it isn't is like saying Rome isn't. What was Zhou Dynasty China was very small. Even Chinese heart land like Xi'an of Qin, present day Shanghai of Chu were not initially part of the dynasty. Much less my home, the former home of the Manchus. It only seems that way because Rome fractured and never existed again. China didn't. At certain points Rome's expansion also stopped, because it was not sustainable to go any further.

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-Belt and Road will be more ambitious than the Marshall plan. I agree with that. However, the Marshall plan rebuilt war torn "DEVELOPED" countries of the West and Japan. China is trying to build in places that are pretty much at the bottom of the economic barrel. I won't pass judgement on this project yet, but the ambition of a project is hardly related to the success of it. In fact most times quite the opposite.

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-China's military spending is not small. For what it is, one overseas base, no military engagement, low pay/pension relatively. It's in fact not small at all. 2 most likely 3 carriers, 1 most likely 2 LHD and 10+ destroyers at various stages of construction/trials is not a cheap nor small investment.

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Having said all of that. I don't think China will be better or worse than any other superpower. The inference that a Authoritarian China will bring more authoritarianism, to me, is the same as a democratic America would bring more democracy and freedom to the world.

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That has definitively not proven to be true, unless you count democracy in name only and about as effective as a 3 legged dog, as democratic and free.

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I think he started out with a fundamental misunderstanding of China. He claims that Chinese history is 2,000 years old. Chinese people consider their history to be 6,000 plus years, based on the fact that they can still read 6,000 year old texts and identify with the culture of people living in those times.