We Agree Now! | Rationality Rules & Cosmic Skeptic | Is Morality Objective?
Video Statistics and Information
Channel: CosmicSkeptic
Views: 203,189
Rating: 4.8837852 out of 5
Keywords: Alex O'Connor, cosmic, skeptic, cosmicskeptic, atheism, rationality rules, podcast, morality, objective, religion, language, philosophy, Hume, Is ought, subjective, debate, discussion
Id: yrYLvaXCokg
Channel Id: undefined
Length: 104min 30sec (6270 seconds)
Published: Thu May 09 2019
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Their understanding of Kant's categorical imperative is aggressively wrong. Kant believes that you can derive essentially rule ethics. Kant's works purport to show how to properly derive an ethical framework.
I also object semantically to the use of pleasure to describe the goal of utilitarianism. Pleasure does not capture the breadth of competing consequentialist philosophy
Two atheist Youtubers talking about ethics and metaethics. Sam Harris name dropped and RR makes a Harris-style argument early on
Having watched one of their exchanges before, I think it's good that they read up on some things and are discussing the topic a bit closer to how it's usually discussed instead of making up own vocabulary and trying to come up with ad-hoc theories.
A couple of things, quotes roughly from memory.
is-ought and induction:
There isn't really an analogy between the is-ought gap in deductive arguments and induction the way they both characterized it, in two ways. First, by the very definition of what deduction and induction mean. Deduction is supposed to necessarily preserve truth, induction isn't. If an argument doesn't necessarily preserve truth it fails deductively but not inductively. Inductive strength is about making the conclusion unlikely to be false given that premises are true. Second, the is-ought gap is not a problem of deduction in the same sense as to how the problem of induction actually is a problem of induction. One can accept the is-ought gap and find plenty of deductive arguments which do preserve truth. The problem of induction is about induction as such, and all inductive arguments.
Claim: "If you ask people why why why questions about morality, you always break them down to well-being."
This is, as he says, something borrowed from Harris. A trivial answer to that would be that this is an assertion about what kind of answers people actually give but only a brief look at people writing about this topic shows that this is not only not the answer people give, many outright reject it. There are more than enough people who maintain that there are values which 'compete' with well-being and can't be reduced to it. For instance justice. There are many problems where one solution seems to maximize overall well-being while the other is juster. Maybe you want to claim that these people are confused and that's actually not what they mean. But I wish people (Sam too) would stop asserting that this actually *is* the only thing that people answer, when it clearly isn't.
Furthermore, the problem with the attempt to use well-being as an umbrella-term for every potential value ("well, that's included in well-being, that's also well-being, yeah I mean that with well-being as well") is that you're simply not saying anything distinct at some point. If you play that game forever, it ultimately just collapses into "everything that's good is good, and what isn't is bad, morality means to do good and not do bad".
"If you want X, do Y. That's from Kant, that's Kant's hypothetical imperative."
The name, or more precisely the German original, comes from Kant. But that's precisely the view Kant strongly rejects, of course.
Now, I'm at 30 minutes and it seems like they're already reiterating some things for the third time. Not sure if I want to continue.
Hey /u/FuturePreparation this is for you.
I don't think that "If you want X, you ought to do Y", with Y being the thing that is most efficient to maximize X, is a true statement. I think a more correct statement would be "If you want X, you are more likely to do whatever you believe is Y". And I don't think that this gives us any framework for morality - yes, people have desires and yes, people try to fulfill their desires. You can't get a prescriptive system out of it, and defining "ought" as a descriptive statement when it's clearly a prescriptive one is very dishonest. It doesn't give us a framework for what is good and what is bad. If, for instance, I desire happiness, how is it good if I have it? It does raise my happiness, but it's not good, there's just a fact that I have it. I desire a thing, my desire has been fulfilled. It's neither good nor bad. Neither does desiring happiness makes it good or bad. Or, for instance. If I desire happiness, how is it good if I act in a way that increases my happiness? It's not good, it's just an action that increases my happiness.
All of that utilitarian system where you have a goal, and then you say you ought to act in accordance with the goal and there are good and bad things in accordance with it, its bullshit. It's just one big equivocation - you use words like "goal", "ought and should", "good and bad", "virtue and vice", but you don't really mean them in the way they are conventionally used. As I understand their view without those words, it's just:
People desire things.
One of the major desires is well-being.
There are certain actions that are more and less likely to increase our well being.
It just doesn't mean anything. Yes, we desire well-being. Yes, we are more likely to act in accordance with what fulfills our desires. There are actions that are more and less likely to cause an increase in well-being. There's no ought there, there's nothing good and bad, just simple and obvious facts stated in a weird manner. It still doesn't justify any single action.
For instance, why not say "If you want X, you ought to do Y", where Y is the opposite of what you want? For instance, if you want to increase human well-being, you ought to eat babies. Does it logically follow? No. Neither does "saving babies". How is it logical to act in accordance with your desires rather than to the opposite of them, how is it rational and why ought we do it? Those questions are still unanswered.
This isn't a bad discussion, but I stopped listening about halfway through because it struck me as mid-level uni dorm room discussion (which is fine!). They do a really good job of describing that 1) the subjective aspect of morality is the goal (basically) but 2) the objective aspect is in the tactics.
My dorm room comment aside, this tidbit is a succinct point that I'd agreed with for the longest time, but hadn't found the words for (of course, CS alluded to this concept when they had their original exchange, so this was kind of diminishing returns for me).
Anyway, I disagree that ethics is all about well-being as a lot of backwards ethical systems advocate certain principles that don't fit in that paradigm. Perhaps if you want to be reductionist you could say they care about harm/well-being, but they really don't. For instance, Christians believe you should accept Christ as savior not because it will save you from hell, but because it is the right thing to do. And there are others.
I'm a big fan of virtue ethics fwiw