War and International Politics | John Mearsheimer | NDISC Seminar Series

[Music] the subject I'm going to talk about today is war and international politics and this is actually uh a talk I gave only once before uh and it was the Richard K BET's inaugural lecture at Columbia University this past November um and uh I uh uh want to make it clear as I start that when I talk about war and international Poli ICS I'm really talking about great power War uh and it's important to understand that during the unipolar moment which ran from roughly 1991 when the Soviet Union went down the toilet bowl until about 2017 uh we lived in a world where there was a single great power which was the United States of America that's why it was called the unipolar moment and if you live in a unipolar world you can't have great power politics because there's only one great power so you can't have great power politics itics uh by definition but we now live in a multi-polar world there are three great powers out there the United States China and Russia and we live effectively in a multi-polar world and that means that great power politics is back on the table you can have security competition and you can have War uh among those great powers and I think the subject of war and international politics great power war in international politics is a subject you want to think long and hard about it's a lot like nuclear deterrence when guys like Mike and I were young we knew all about nuclear war we knew about nuclear deterrence we knew a ton about great power politics because we lived in a bipolar world it was dominated by the US Soviet competition the world that most of you grew up in was the unipolar world there was one great power you weren't worried about nuclear war among the great Powers you weren't worried about great power security competition or great power War because it was largely IR relevant uh but uh that world has gone away and we're now in a multipolar world and it's a quite dangerous world as you have surely figured out and it's only going to get worse it's not going to get better uh but that's not my subject today now the perspective I'm going to offer you on war in international politics is a realist perspective as I'm sure everybody here knows I'm a realist and I'm a particular kind of realist Mike and I have fundamental disagreements about how the world works works even though Mike is a realist so you should understand that you're getting a particular realist perspective on the subject uh now my talk is going to have three themes and I'm basically uh addressing three issues I want to talk first about just the essence of international politics I want to talk a lot about the essence of politics two I want to talk about the decision to go to war when great Powers decide to go to war how they think about it and then third I want to talk about escalation in war okay and let me just briefly tell you what the three themes are because I'm a big believer it's very important to have a framework in your mind to begin with that you can then use to keep track of the various detailed arguments that I'm laying out with regard to the essence of international politics my first point uh I'm arguing that war is the dominating feature of international policy itics it really matters enormously uh it in it matters in terms of influencing how leaders think and it influences how States interact with each other whether you're talking about an actual war or the fact that war is sitting there in the background it is the dominating feature and therefore International politics I will argue at some length is an intensely competitive Enterprise at its core intensely competitive Enterprise at its core so that's my first theme my second theme which actually runs against the conventional wisdom uh is and this is all about the decision to go to war is that war is an extension of politics by other means this is Claus vit's famous argument and it's a tool of statecraft and it has little to do with ethics it has little to do with morals has little to do with international law states go to war when they think it's in their National interest this means very importantly there are two kinds of wars that are acceptable and to be expected in international politics preventive war and Wars of opportunity that runs against the conventional wisdom is I'll explain in great detail in the United States of America and in the west more generally today were those two kinds of Wars preventive Wars and Wars of opportunity are ruled out of bounds according to just War Theory and international law right and then the third theme has to do with escalation and War and this is an argument that once you get into a war in the Modern Age there's a very powerful tendency for Wars to escalate to their extreme level to their absolute level to get Total Wars right it's one of the main themes in clitz we don't have time to talk about this uh today but if I gave you a lecture on clitz this is written all over that book he understands that tendency to escalate and what happens when you get in a war with that tendency to escalate is that military considerations end up dominating political considerations remember with regard to my second point I said appropo cosmets war is an extension of politics by other means that means war military factors are subordinated to political considerations but the escalation argument is that once you get into a war once you're in it right the powerful tendency that exists to escalate means that political considerations get subordinated to military considerations and my argument is this is not good under any circumstances but it is certainly not good in the nuclear era when you want the politicians the policy makers in charge to make sure that that war doesn't spin out of control okay so those are the three basic themes uh that I want to develop in my uh talk okay so let's start with the First theme which is that war is at the core of international politics and you want to remember here what we're talking about is the relationship between war and politics and as we go along here you want to just think in your mind what war but more importantly what politics is all about you know I never thought much about politics and what what if you would ask me to Define politics anywhere in my life up to the time I was about 68 years old I wouldn't have known what to tell you what is politics you know how how do you define politics how do you think about politics you want to think about politics what it means you want to think about International politics and then you want to think about how war and international politics are related right these are Big Picture issues right so uh again as you heard me say in my setup remarks uh that four is the most important feature of international politics and it influences how leaders think right it's there all the time it's constantly influencing them uh and it influences how States interact with each other right they're greatly influenced by this phenomenon now my argument is not that we live in a constant state of War obviously we don't live in a constant state of War right my argument is we live again we're talking about great powers in a state of constant security competition great Powers always engage in security comp competition sometimes it's more intense and sometimes it's less intense but they always engage in security competition and sitting in the background is the possibility of war the United States and the Soviet Union competed constantly for security during the Cold War and there was the ever present of danger danger of War sitting in the background furthermore there is no question that war is an absolutely destructive and dangerous Enterprise it's horribleness is in good part what makes it so important so I want to make it clear here I'm not saying that this is a sport this is like playing a football game this is like playing the Super Bowl this is a completely different kind of phenomenon incredibly destructive incredibly horrible and furthermore it's not only the fact that lots of damage lots of Destruction is inflicted on you in a war or can be inflicted on you in a war it's also the fact that the survival of the state is at risk you never want to underestimate the importance of that dimension of the story survival really matters but given how destructive war is and given the fact that it threatens the survival of States unsurprisingly states have gone to Great Lengths over time to do away with war to Outlaw War to figure a way to get rid of it but you know what they failed it every turn they never got rid of it and they're never going to get rid of it it's going to be there forever right so the question is why is this the case you want to think about this why haven't we been able to get rid of war and I'm going to make two arguments the first one it has to do with the nature of politics and the second is it has to do with the architecture of the system this is the anarchic nature of international politics so it's a two-part argument this is why you can't get rid of War why it's an everpresent possibility that sometimes manifests itself in actual fighting there are two reasons the first has to do with the nature of politics and this is what I was imploring you to think about today and think about in the years ahead just what politics is all about Politics as Barack Obama right and Bill Clinton said is a contact sport it's a nasty business politics is all about fundamental disagreements on first principles fundamental differences about questions regarding the good life and these fundamental differences that individuals or Societies or states have are sometimes so profound that people want to kill each other just go back to the religious wars in Europe way back when Catholics and Protestants killing each other in huge numbers right just mattered so much to them the abortion issue an incredibly complicated issue there are lots of people running around in the land who believe or don't believe in abortion who would like to kill some people on the other side it's a contact sport right these differences really matter look at the fights over Supreme Court appointments look at how all these anti-trump people feel about the possibility of him getting reelected my wife was basically a republican you mentioned the possibility of trump winning and she gets mad at me I'm not I said what are you getting mad at me I didn't vote for him last time I'm not going to vote for him this time she's just so infuriated at the thought of this guy getting reelected right and by the way there are lots of people on the other side you get my brothers talking about Hillary Clinton oh boy right I'm just saying what you have to understand the intensity and the enmity that comes with politics is not to be underestimated which is why Clinton and Obama both said it's a contact sport and I have a similar quote from n gigr in there which makes the B basic Point that's why to make politics work you have to have compromises you want to understand that there are no solutions to lots of disagreements about first principles right just there just no Solutions there're always these intense agreements disagreements uh and the question is how do you deal with them inside a state you know inside the United States of America inside Japan inside France you deal with it by creating a state and that state protects people it allows them to disagree but it protects person a from an attack from person B and vice versa right so you have a state but this gets to my point about the architecture in the International System there's no higher authority there's no higher authority to protect these states which sometimes have fundamental disagreements so what this says is you can't take War off the table you understand you can't take War off the table remember I said politics is all about the fact that you have fundamental disagreements between individuals between societies between groups in society between states you have fundamental disagreements and those disagreements are sometimes so profound that a wants to attack B and kill it right you can't take War off the table because there is no higher authority inside the state you could take murder off the table you can take killing off the table in large part certainly in those areas where the higher authority has presence but you can't do that in international politics and when you add to that the destructiveness of War and the fact that your very survival might be threatened right you can see where that leads you right politics right is naturally an unremittingly competitive and intense Enterprise it's unremittingly competitive and intense and that's inside the black box that's inside the state and then you take it out into the International System where there's no high Authority and that competitiveness that intensity is ramped up even more so my this is sort of my basic point to start with that when you talk about um war in international politics you you can see where given the nature of international politics given the nature of Politics as it applies to the International System and the presence of War you can see how those two things go together and again just bring in the survival motive right your survival is threatened as a state furthermore just a destructiveness that's involved right so let me make my argument Crystal Clear by making three additional points first is I'm not saying that cooperation is impossible you could have cooperation you can have two states that are great powers that are competing with each other that cooperate uh during the Cold War my favorite example is on the issue of nuclear proliferation the United States and the Soviet Union both had a vested interest in making sure that there was Zero nuclear proliferation uh and uh we took a while but we eventually created a proliferation regime really starting in the late 60s the npt was 1968 nuclear suppliers group was formed in 1975 five and we basically did a great job United States and the Soviet Union cooperating to shut down nuclear proliferation in good part did we continue to compete at the security level you better believe we did did we continue looking for every opportunity we could find to screw the Soviets coming and going you better believe we did were we glad to Usher them down the toilet bowl in the late 18 1980s early 1990s you better believe we were that's the way great power Poli politics works the United States is a ruthless great power the Soviet Union was a ruthless great power we never stopped engaging in security competition which again is not to say you can't have some cooperation you can have cooperation but that cooperation takes place under the shadow of security competition just a quick word about International economics if you think about International economics and you compare it with International politics certainly as a realist like me understands International politics International economics pays no attention to survival pays no attention to International Anarchy all these terms that we use don't apply there they're interested in cooperation on a large scale that's what globalization is all about and the idea is if globalization Works everybody gets richer Prosperity really matters to them whereas somebody like me focuses laser likee on the concept of survival they focus laser likee on the concept of prosperity right cooperation matters greatly to International economists right because they're not paying attention to survival they're not paying attention to security competition and they could get away with that during the unipolar moment because again great power politics was taken off the table but we're back in a very different world now uh so my argument is that when push comes to shove International politics Trump's International economics when the two are in Conflict uh my third point I want to be very clear I am not making the argument that great power Wars are likely that's not my argument my argument is the great power of War sits in the background most of the time and great power War nevertheless has a profound influence on how States behave and the reason that great power war is not likely Dove tales with another point that I made to you folks and that is that war is so destructive war is so horrible the fact that it is so destructive the fact that it is so horrible makes it very difficult to get states to initiate it right and what drives that its destructiveness is nationalism industrialization and the nuclear Revolution or nuclear weapons right nationalism makes Wars very destructive right because you're able to create Mass armies and you're able to uh motivate those armies to hate the other the other a lot of otherness at the core of nationalism so nationalism U makes Wars highly destructive industrialization all these weapons that are designed to kill people running around out on the modern Battlefield with all these weapons that are highly sophisticated and maximize the chances they're going to kill you w right so uh so a very industrialization and then of course nuclear weapons right nuclear weapons they're called weapons of mass destruction for very good reason so nationalism industrialization and nuclear weapons make make war incredibly destructive and that makes War less likely you understand the point it makes it less likely but nevertheless it makes it as important as ever because it sits in the background it's still a possibility that's the basic argument uh that I am making to you okay let me shift gears now and talk about the decision to go to war okay my second theme you remember when Ukraine uh the Ukraine war started February uh 204th 2022 the Russians clearly invaded Ukraine uh and uh the uh uh basic argument is that uh this War uh was both unjust and unle illegal uh and uh there's just no question that almost everybody thought that the war was wrong the initiation of the war was wrong uh and should be condemned now why is that the case it's because of the domination of a nonos vitan view which said says that international law and just War Theory should dictate when states can go to war and I believe that almost all of you believe this and I believe that almost everybody uh who's reasonably well educated and has thought about this in the west believes that there uh are limited times when you can go to war or limited circumstances when you go to war and those three circumstances and this is an argument based on just War Theory and international law is you can initiate a war if you have good evidence that the other side is about to attack you this is called the preemptive attack right Mike is about to attack me I could see that he has loaded up the shotgun he's coming after me and I just get in the first blow so he's really initiating the war even though I get in the first blow that's a preemptive strike that's okay according to just War Theory that's okay uh according to international law most accounts of just War Theory second is if we get a un Security Council resolution uh I'm unhappy with what Mike is doing I go to the UN Security Council I get a approval from the UN Security Council then I am justified in attacking Mike makes perfect sense fits neatly with international law so the first case is a preemptive strike second case is uh un Security Council resolution and the third is that you're allowed to initiate a war intervene strike into a country if it's engaging in mass murder or genocide right this is the idea if you see what's happening in Rwanda and you decide you're just going to send in the 82 Airborne you can do that right there you're acting according to just War Theory this makes perfect sense to all of you the two cases which I've already mentioned before in my setup remarks where you're not allowed to initiate a war are number one a preventive War this is not preemptive remember I talked about preemptive is where Mike's going to attack me and I beat him uh to the punch that's preemptive that's okay a preventive war is where I see Mike is growing more and more powerful and I want to cut him off at the legs before it becomes too powerful that's a preventive War right the second is a war of opportunity this is a war where you know Mike and I are competitors and uh I'm thinking about attacking that person over there as a way of gaining more power so that I improve my position relative to Mike that's a war of opportunity it's an opportunity to acquire more power right those are verboten preventive war wars of opportunity they're verboten according to just War Theory and according to um international law now let's just go back to Ukraine the conventional wisdom in the body politic in the west is that Putin invaded because he was an imperialist he was interested in gaining uh more power for Russia creating a greater Russia right it was a war of opportunity the vast majority of people in the west believed that it was a war of opportunity right he was trying trying to gain more power for Russia make Russia more powerful make it a greater Russia right that was the argument that's verboten and that's why everybody criticized him I argued on the other hand and now a number of others like Yan stoltenberg uh who is the head of NATO have argued this that it was a preventive War my argument is it was a preventive War he was not going to let Ukraine become part of NATO he was going to Pro prevent that from happening so there's let's call it the John's John Yen stoltenberg argument right and then there's the conventional wisdom both arguments are ruled out of court according to just War Theory and international law right neither neither is acceptable right both are very cvitan arguments right so if you think about what's going on here right uh with this non-ca vitan argument remember citz doesn't talk about whether anything is morally Justified uh or or whether it violates international law it's a tool of statecraft cwood says if John sees an opportunity right to protect himself in the face of this threat from Mike or Mike sees a threat to protect himself in the face of a threat from John Mike and John can do whatever they want war and war is it's a of statecraft let's not get wrapped around the axle about ethics and morals or anything like that that's the clause vzy in View and what you want to understand is that the view that almost all of you I'm sure have accepted right and the vast majority in the body Poli accept have accepted is a non- Claus vitan View and what's going on here is that we are basically trying to subordinate the conduct of international politics to a moral or legal order you want think about what's going on this is very important nobody really puts it in these terms we are subordinating the conduct of international politics to a set of moral and legal precepts right it's really a radical way of thinking about the iation of War right and it's fundamentally non-cl vitan right and the example I like to use to highlight this is the uh case of Michael Michael walser's famous book on just War Theory uh I I think it's a terrific book I've used it for years for teaching purposes even though I I'm a realist and the book is an attack on realism from the get-go uh if my memory correct the first chapter is against realism that's the title of the chapter he hates realism right uh and he would hate what I have said to you over the past 10 minutes and it's a defense of just War Theory and it's in many ways a brilliant book but it has a fundamental flaw in it which uh I believe shows you why my logic trumps his logic why realism trust Trump's Michael Waller's uh just War Theory and that is he towards the end of the book um makes the case that in a supreme emergency when you're on the ropes when it looks like you're going down the tubes you can abandon just War Theory and act like a realist that's the walls or argument right and uh he he he's fully aware that this is a very dangerous argument for him to make and I'll make it clear to you in a second why it's a very dangerous argument for him to make cuz he's leaving a narrow crack in the door open and you cannot leave a narrow crack in the door open with somebody like me cuz I'll go through that I'll go through that door very quickly right so so what what waler is saying you have to be in really dire straights you have to be on the verge of being finished off right and the threat has to be really of the most serious nature and then at the last moment you can turn yourself into a realist and deal with the problem the problem the problem in Waller's argument is who in their right mind would wait till the last minute if you're up against the Mortal foe if you're not up against the Mortal foe you just think you might be up more against the Mortal foe you've all read Sebastian's work on intentions right Sebastian Rosado will tell you intentions are very hard to Divine with a high degree of certainty to use his rhetoric how can I be sure what Mike's intentions will be in 20 or 30 years I I can't know do I want to wait until he turns into Godzilla no do I want to deal with him now when he's not Godzilla and maybe when he's bit weaker than me right so you see the problem that waler has once you say you know once you have a chapter that deals with the subject of supreme emergency and you say that in a supreme emergency you can throw just War Theory down the toilet and you can act like a realist you leave yourself open to the argument that it's better to act like a realist early rather than at the last moment where if you're dealing with a highly efficient adversary that adversary will finish you off right so you see this is why the conduct of international politics um can never be uh subordinated um to uh a moral or legal order it just can't happen uh now I want to be very clear here I'm not saying that there's no room for moral considerations in international politics my comments may be read to lead in that direction action that's not my argument I believe that we are all realists included moral human beings I believe that we all have moral compasses and I believe those moral compasses influence how we think about the world okay I just want to make that clear you understand why I placed all this emphasis on basic realist logic but I believe at the same time we think about the world or at least people like Mike and I think about the world in realist terms we also have each of us a moral compass and the interesting question you want to ask yourself is how does that realist World viiew mesh with that set of moral precepts that guide your thinking about International politics and my argument is there are three possible scenarios the first is what the moral compass says you should do and the realist Compass says you should do line up and you have no problem fighting a war even maybe initiating a war right if the moral compass and the realist Compass line up and they actually do quite often in international politics you can do things for realist reasons that make sense from a moral point of view fighting against Adolf Hitler in World War II I think was the morally correct thing to do trying to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War I think it was the morally correct thing to do I could point to other examples so the arrows sometimes line up there are other cases this is the second scenario where moral precepts excuse me where realists precepts just don't apply during the unipolar moment there's a genocide in Rwanda you can easily deal with that gen gen side from a moral perspective because there are no realist considerations involved it it it has no effect on the balance of power has nothing to do with great power politics so there are quite a few cases in international politics certainly during the unipolar moment but even uh in a bipolar or multipolar world where the balance of power is not affected by the use of military force for moral reasons then we come to the Third possibility which is the trick what happens if moral precepts and realist precepts are at odds with each other what if your moral compass says do this and your realist Compass says do the opposite regrettably you'll do what your realist Compass says every time and the reason you will is because of the nature of international politics and and the fact that we operate in an anarchic system we operate in international Anarchy where you have no choice so my argument is that just War Theory and international law although they are both Noble Enterprises and in certain circumstances they make good sense when it comes to questions of War of peace there's no way that the conduct of international politics can ever be subordinated to them okay let me go to the third part of my talk and uh then I'll stop uh remember I said to you uh according to clausewitz war is an extension of politics by other means and this is just another way of saying war is subordinated to politics right politics is is the main driving force and war is subordinated to it but as I said to you in the setup comments when you actually get into a war in the modern world there's a very powerful tendency for those two things to be flipped and for politics to become subordinated to military considerations and this matters greatly for limited Wars and I'll make clear why that's the case in a minute if you're going to fight a limited War you want to keep it limited it's very important that politics be in the driver's seat that policy makers civilian policy makers be in charge and not military commanders right but the tendency pushes in the other direction when you're fighting limited Wars limited Wars tend to escalate right and this really matters in the nuclear world uh I think if nuclear weapons are ever used they will be used in a limited fashion we can talk more about this in the Q&A if you'd like uh because I can tell you how I think nuclear weapons would be used if the United States had had to use them in the Cold War if the Russians use them in Ukraine they will use them in limited fashion as we would have used them in limited fashion during uh the Cold War had the Soviets or the war sort packed more generally overrun West Germany so you'll start with a limited nuclear war let's hope that never happens but that's where you'll start which is a good thing but once that limited nuclear war starts you do not want it escalating you want to do everything you can to shut it down to be honest but if you don't shut it down you want to keep it limited and then shut it down right and for that to happen politics has to be in the driver's seat in my opinion okay now question is why is John arguing that you have this tendency for politics to become subordinated to military con considerations there are a handful of reasons first has to do with military leaders very important to understand and this is quite well documented military leaders like to win decisive victories this is another way of saying military leaders do not like limited Wars they don't like limited Wars for two reasons they want to go in and win quickly and decisively to minimize the number of their troops who get killed but also because they are in charge of National Security they are in charge of defending the state they are in charge of fighting and dying to protect the state and if there's a threat out there they'd like to finish that threat off once and for all winning a limited victory means that you leave your adversary intact right so military leaders like decisive victories they don't like limited victories furthermore military leaders do not like civilians telling them how to conduct the war military leaders think they are the professionals they know how the profession of arms works these civilians are a bunch of dingling and they're just going to get us in trouble if they're in charge and the best way to avoid this is that once the war starts all responsibility is turned over to US military leaders or we military leaders will execute the war we'll win a decisive Victory and then we'll turn control back over to the policy makers right and I have some quotes in the paper where they're actually generals making this argument so you see military leaders number one like decisive victories that cuts against limited War number two military leaders don't like civilians in the decision making process and it's civilians or policy makers who keep Wars limited right so the military is a big problem here let's put it in a slightly more cautious way there's a real tendency for trouble from the military if you get into a war second force that pushes for escalation which I've touched on already is nationalism uh National ISM huge problem for escalation this is written all over Claus vit's famous track on war just go to book eight of on War what nationalism allows you to do is raise a mass Army and it allows you to Value Infuse that Army in ways where almost everybody hates the other and in fact inside the broader Society at large people are value infused to to hate the other nationalism turns into hyper nationalism I'm sure this is easy for all of you to understand right and the reason that France was so hard to beat it took roughly six balancing coalitions to finish off France the war started in 1792 the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars started in 1792 and they ran to 1815 that's 23 years it took 23 years to finish off the French this is what Napoleon's writing about in book eight of on war he saw Napoleon up CL up close he saw the French army up close it was it was an Army that was built a nationalism it was the nation in arms think about the nation in arms it was a really powerful force and it was bent on dominating all of Europe and this is why ca is very very important for making the argument that War's natural tendency is to escalate to the absolute level and I believe this is why kosit says that war is an extension of politics by other means he wants to make it clear the policy makers should put limits on it because he understood how powerful the tendency was to escalate uh to Absolute War so nationalism is a huge problem and keeping Wars limited um there are other ideologies that matter right first of all you get a case where you have Nazi Germany up against fascist Germany against communist Soviet Union fascist Germany Nazi Germany up against the Communist Soviet Union right that is going to push the war to escalate uh and you have nationalism in that case as well uh then you have other ideologies like the United States right the United States is a liberal state it has a crusader mentality uh if the United States is in a world where there are not many checks on its ability to use military force it'll be running all over the world uh trying to turn countries into democracies right um and then finally you get uh eliminationist ideologies like Nazism it was eliminationist ideology so you can see in addition to nationalism you have this other ideological Dimension and the point that I'm trying to make to you is that what this does is that it pushes States uh to pursue uh total Victory and then finally Inc comes the Dynamics of War dynamics of War uh first of all if you win a limited Victory you're going to launch a limited War you win a limited victory in many cases you're then infected by the victory disease the victory disease says I did pretty well this first time let's escalate and do something else you know we originally when we entered the Korean War our goal was to push the North Koreans back to the 38th parallel but then MacArthur launched This brilliant offensive that resulted in the landing at inchon and we won this stunning Victory and he and the Truman ad Administration decided that we should cross the 38th parallel and head up towards the Yow river right there's the victory disease so the point is talking about the Dynamics of War here that even if you win a limited Victory right you sometimes are tempted to expand uh your success then there's the whole question if you fail if you launch a limited War you fail right then there's a powerful incentive to up the anti so that you can rescue the situation right and then finally there's the phenomenon that Alex DS talks about in His Brilliant book on civilian victimization and War which is that when you get into a protracted War when a country gets into a protracted War it's not on the verge of winning a quick Victory it almost automatically uh goes on a rampage and starts murdering large numbers of civilians uh because because the view is that's a good way to get out of this protracted War that's the solution right to turn to uh killing large numbers of people for those of you who haven't looked at DS's book you should really look at it because Downs by the way concludes that there's no difference between democracies and non-democracies in fact he argues of anything democracies more likely to behave in barbaric fashion than non-democracies but the point is if you're in a war you're in a Modern War and your side is styi and you're looking for a way out what invariably happens is you turn to killing huge numbers of civilians just think about uh the use of the atomic bombs against Japan in World War II Japan was on its knees in early August 1945 it was kaput right and we thought that to get it to finally surrender we might have to invade the Japan Japanese home islands and the thought of invading the Japanese home Islands was so antithetical to American policy makers both in the military and uh in Washington that we dropped two nuclear weapons on Japan the again the war was won by August 1945 Japan was on its deathbed but we couldn't get them to say I quit couldn't get him to say I quit and uh we did not want to join we did not want to invade the Japanese home Islands So to avoid those American casualties this is the Down's point about protracted Wars to avoid those American casualties we dropped two nuclear weapons on Japan and uh but anyway so just my bottom line here is that given the interest of military leaders and how they think about the conduct of war in terms of their views of decisive victories and civilian interference in the head Enterprise given nationalism given other ideologies and given the Dynamics of War it is difficult to keep Wars Limited in the modern age and my argument is that this is of enormous importance when you live in a nuclear world it's of enormous importance when you live in a non-nuclear world but it's of even greater importance when you live in a nuclear world because it's important that we keep that war limited this is why you want to pay a lot of attention moving forward uh to understanding the Dynamics of escalation and you want to think about how War ceases to be right War ceases to be subordinate to politics in these situations and that's not a good thing my conclusion very quickly is that conflict is is endemic to politics conflict is endemic to politics and to put it in slightly different terms war is endemic to International politics this is John's main message conflict is endemic to politics war is endemic to International politics and once war is endemic to International politics fear fear is in the air fear that your survival is threatened remember fear that your survival is threatened there's no Leviathan there's no night Watchmen and once survival is on the table we're at a Clos vitan world don't tell me you can't have preventive Wars don't tell me you can't have wars of opportunity because in a world where survival survival is under threat those two kinds of War however regrettable this is they are on the table bottom line War can never be eliminated from International politics and political considerations will always Trump economic considerations legal considerations and moral considerations when they are in Conflict thank you so uh a wonderful speech uh two questions brief the first on the matter of orig of great power Wars who speak for offensive realism is is your theory of uh um you said calculated aggression in the book The Words of of words of Opp or sasan orell Copans prevented War I think there is some inherent contradiction between the two like offens explanation of the origin of great power war and second I think Peter Cel right wrote the book in 201 2020 are in against the the traditional commissional wisdom that the military leaders or say last like like uh real real like realist than the civilian leaders he made two arguments first the military leaders are often they believe in the core concept of realism more than civilian leaders and second they are often on the driver seat of changing military policy like how do you see this kind of a new challenge don't sit down let me just ask you a question you talked about preventive war and Wars of opportunity and you said there's a contradiction there I mean I wasn't sure what your first point was like who speak for like offens what real theory of Orion of great power Wars well I I would just say to you that the argument I tried to make today and I think most realists would agree with is that those are two distinct kinds of Wars wars of opportunity and preventive Wars I don't think we disagree there and almost any realist could uh or or can or does say that those two kinds of wars exist I think just to take Dale I think Dale focuses much more on preventive War than anyone else uh I think as an offensive realist I focus more on Wars of opportunity than I do on preventive Wars which I think is getting to what your question is that these different people think about these things differently uh but you know there's no reason that you can't think uh in terms of both in the book that Sebastian and I wrote which is very interesting relevant to his question uh Sebastian and I did the World War One case uh this is the July crisis in 1914 and I had long argued don't tell anybody this that it was a war of opportunity that really I thought Germany was going for the whole enchilada but after Sebastian and I spent endless hours going over the case I think I was wrong yeah I think it was a preventive War uh and and and I think Dale is right on that one uh but anyway I just think these are two Logics and one can emphasize one more than the other but they fit deatly in in the realist Cannon although there are realists like Mike who basically believe that neither one make any sense in the modern world uh I'm not picking on him here but I think it just shows you the point that I tried to make early on that there are differences uh among people on this uh and your second question was about the military and their attitude towards War and what was the basic point that you were making there yeah it's basically a Peter Kell Peter Kell's like 2020 book I think Professor advis he sees this yeah so there are two arguments first firstly military leaders often believe in uh The Logical realism more than civilian leaders and secondly they are often on the driver seat of national security policy that's why you see like the US military policy in the C are broadly aligned with like realist principles okay I'm just going to make one quick point just so we get to other people I want to be clear here that my argument is not that military leaders are more interested in fighting Wars than civilians are that there's this widespread belief I believe in the west that militaries love to initiate Wars and thank God we have the civilians which by the way is consistent with my argument The Limited War argument that you want policy makers uh in the driver's seat the argument here right is that policy makers don't want to go to war civilian policy makers and it's these war mongers in uniform actually I think the opposite is the case I I think civilians are really in most cases not all the warmongers and the military is a break gun going in and the key book on this is Dick bts's book Statesman what is it states solders Statesman Cold War yeah soldiers Statesman and Cold War crisis by Richard K bets that was the lecture I gave at Columbia it was Dick's first book it was this Harvard PhD dissertation and Dick's bottom line is that militaries are less reluctant or they're more reluctant to initiate War but once they get into a war they want to go for the whole enchilada they want as I said decisive Victory Rose good John good to see you um likewise so I'm interested in your definition of politics and I like it it sounds very shidian um this idea that it's about fundamental differences that can lead to conflict right it it is very it is very schmidti and as in Carl Schmid Carl Schmidt concept of the political right um but that seems to be intention with clts and the way that you talk about Claws and political decisions is happen to be above military decisions and that's problem with escalation is that military stuff starts to conform to its own logic right the logic of War beyond what makes s for political circumstances but if you have a definition of politics that has conflict baked in and that has politicians who are managers of politics engaging in politics as a contact sport and that if the heart of politics is about being angry enough having enough fundamental differences that people would fight each other and kill each other then how does that Accord with CLS it seems like you know it it seems like it's intention with their idea that and's idea which I agree with um that political managers can pull us back from sort of the absolute Wars that that can happen or the total thank you so the idea is that there's this constant competition uh that can turn deadly and escalate and it might even lead to Absolute war or Total War and what I'm arguing is that uh it's very important for the policy makers to be in the driver's seat so they can set limited goals or in those cases where they set limited goals it's very important that they be in the driver's seat to keep the war limited right that that's my argument and what's the problem that you see just if polans so military leaders are managers of violence right politicians are managers of national interest right they're in a sort of different way right but you've defined Politics as being about conflict you defined Politics as the possibility that you know you have these fundamental differences where people can get angry at each other hate each other they can kill each other what a politician presumably is an expert in politics and that's a very violent view of politics so why would the politician not fall into the same trap as the military be because as a policy maker you just want to keep a war limited because it makes good political sense you're in charge of National Security broadly defined and an unlimited war is something that you don't want I mean just to go to Joe Biden and dealing with Iran uh I mean I do not think or Joe Biden dealing with Ukraine right Joe Biden did not want to get into a war with Russia right he wanted to keep the war in Ukraine limited if he uses military force Joe Biden against the houthis or against Iran let's say you know in the days ahead that he launches a limited set of attacks against Iran he is going to want to keep that limited that makes perfect sense doesn't it and the D one of the dangers that he faces I mean one is the nationalism argument the nationalism argument is these guys killed Americans those are our people right that's the nationalism argument but the other thing is the military they're going to want to take the gloves off in all likelihood right you know military people have been killed right if you're going to go in look look Joe if we go in there we want to hammer these people we want to defeat them we want to eliminate the houie threat right this is the problem that you run into but I I don't see politi I see politicians politicians bad word I see policy makers who represent the political class in a very difficult situation in part because of nationalism part because of nationalism but also in part because of dealing with the military that's my that's my argument thank you Professor M name is k I had a question uh regarding your point about the increased lethal lethality of War decreasing the likelihood of conflict and I wanted to know your opinion on whether or not great powers are increasingly invulnerable and if so uh does that mean that the intrinsic components of the state are have increased in importance I'm inspired by Caitlyn talman's work on coup proofing and how some regimes will look inwards for threat rather than outwards uh if you have any thoughts on that as well but but just start over again what was the basic point because of the lethal increased ality of War okay yes sir and what does that do uh decrease the likelihood of decreases the likelihood okay are you disagreeing with that no I'm just trying to okay but so what is the argument that if it decreases the likelihood of War then it means that great Powers have a greater incentive to look inwards for threats rather than outward might agree with that but the point that this is what the first part Trad it decreases the likelihood okay but the threat is there that that's the point and by the way Rose this is the Schmid Point too right it's the idea that war is sitting there in the background right it's it's that threat that you you can never Take Your Eye Off the Ball that's not a very good way of putting it but you get what I mean right you just you constantly have to pay attention to the possibility right that you will end up in a war so you there's no question that the the intensity of the competition varies from case to case I don't want to get too carried away here but it's the everpresent possibility is there which limits your ability to look inward you wrote a piece M this is Mike Mike Dash wrote a fascinating piece when the Cold War ended uh correct me if wrong but you argued that once the cold war is over with and you're in the unipolar moment there is no external threat and you can look Inward and his argument was that this is going to cause all sorts of problems this is the centrifugal forces right this is the argument that in an immigrant culture like the United States if you think about this but first of all let's just go back to what I said about politics politics is a contact sport different interest you can never get anybody to agree on anything that's an exaggeration but you know what I'm saying so that's point one point two is if you have an immigrant culture right you're going to have additional centrifugal forces because you're bringing all sorts of people into the body politic who have not been socialized and they have to be socialized right and one of the ways in a liberal democracy like the United States with as many people as we have the diversity we have the immigration we have one of the ways of dealing with those centrifugal forces is to have an external enemy right again Schmid back to Rose right an external enemy and Mike's argument was there was no external enemy right and didn't one of the Soviet leaders say you're going to really miss the Soviet Union right because it had this we're going to do the worst thing to you we're going to deprive you of an enemy yes we did did you hear what Mike said we're going to do the wor this one Soviet leader said to us after the Cold War ended we're going to do the worst thing to you we're going to deprive you of an enemy anyway but so that's actually a situation in the early years of the Cold War where I think your logic applied but my argument remember my argument is great power politics is back on the table right and in a world where great power politics is back on the table right I think your argument is moot but I think it applies in that case sir D United States Army retired thank you very much profess for sharing your wisdom it's much appreciated from that period 1939 to 1945 uh what issues what decisions um what policies if any uh would help us today to resolve some of the the issues that 1939 I'm not sure what the answer to that would be uh uh I mean the one thing that strikes me about that period versus the present is that we're in a multipolar world uh and that was a multi-polar world uh and uh I was born and a lot of the older dogs like you Mike uh we were all born in the uh we're born we were born in a bipolar world so all my understanding of great power politics was developed true for you folks too was developed u in U in a bipolar world then we went to unipolarity now we're in a multipolar world and um the uh uh the 1939 1945 case was a multi-polar world and what makes it very interesting is that during during the runup to World War II and in the conduct of World War II uh there were two areas of the world that we cared about and there were two great powers that we cared about one was Japan in East Asia and two was Germany in Europe of course the Soviet Union mattered but Germany was seen as the principal threat so we had to deal with two threats at the same time and then once the war broke out we had to fight two Wars right and this was a real Balancing Act Roosevelt by the way was a genius I think one of the great strategic Geniuses of all time um uh but anyway today if you look at the situation we face right we Face a Chinese threat we Face a Russian threat because we've turned it into a Russian threat I don't think it's a serious threat but there's a Russian threat that we're dealing with a chines threat they're the two great Powers right and then there's the Middle East and one of my favorite arguments these days is that the principal threat that the United States has to deal with today is China and the last thing you want to do if you have to deal with China is you want to be bogged down in the Middle East thinking about attacking Iran are you kidding me this is the last thing we need to do the threat is in Asia furthermore there's Ukraine what in God's name are we doing in Eastern Europe it just doesn't matter the idea that the Russians are a potential hegemon a pure competitor come on stuck in eastern Ukraine they can't even get out of eastern Ukraine I'm going to worry about them I'm worried about China so you see The Balancing Act here furthermore to take it a step further let's go back to World War II The Genius of Roosevelt and this was not due solely to Roosevelt is that we formed an alliance with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union paid the principal blood PR price to defeat Nazi Germany it was very clear from World War I that to defeat Nazi Germany in World War II was going to involve an enormous blood price and the question is who was going to pay that blood price right and one of the principal driving forces behind appeasement in Britain was that the British said we don't want to pay that price we've been there done that and it did not work out very well well it was the Soviet Union that paid the blood price you all know that roughly 24 million Soviet citizens died in World War II that's military plus civilians right unbelievable unbelievable blood price when we land on the beaches at Normandy on June 6th 1944 this is less than one year before the war ends the war ends in Europe on May 8th 1945 we land on the beaches at Normandy June 6th 1944 that's less than a year before the war ends at that point in time 92% of all German casualties were on the Eastern Front 92% they paid the blood price what am I saying if you're the United States of America you want to lie with Nazi Germany you want to lie with Nazi Germany this is one of those cases where you're doing kind of the morally incorrect thing allying excuse me AE with the Soviet Union you want you end up allying with the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany right fast forward to the present instead of allying with Russia having Russia as an ally to help us contain China because of the Ukraine war we have foolishly pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese right so when look at what we did between 1939 and 1945 I find it hard to see a mistake that Roosevelt made and I could go on and on about this but I won't but I I can I see evidence of hardly a mistake that he made he played it perfectly uh in terms of fighting a two-front war and in terms of allying with the Soviet Union even though it was the morally incorrect thing to do because it was imperative to defeat Nazi Germany if you look at American policy today I think we ought to pay more attention to thinking about priorities right and the importance of focusing on Asia and not focusing on the Middle East not focusing on Europe and forming an alliance with the Russians to contain the Chinese but that's not going to happen yes this thank you so much for the talk today so I'm writing a thesis on civil conflict and I was wondering if you had I know this talk is all about International War multipolarity but I was wondering if you had any thoughts or lessons you think you could extend from these Concepts to concepts of Civil War preventing them preventing them from recurring the only thing I'll say about Civil War which I don't know much about and I've learned over the years it's not good to talk about things you don't know much about especially when you have a high profile because people remember the foolish things that you said what I would say about Civil Wars is civil conflict is an excellent illustration of my point that politics is a contact sport okay remember what I said politics is a context sport but in the context of a state inside the black box where you are right inside the Black Box you have the Leviathan you have the night Watchmen and that's what protects people and that's fundamentally different than the International System where there's no higher authority that was my argument but the fact that you're studying civil conflict tells us that even when you have a night Watchman and even when you have a leviathan War or conflict still breaks out which just goes to show you how intense and how much enmity there can be inside the the Black Box it shows you that Politics as a combat sport conflict is all about combat intellect or combat of one sort or another contact sport sorry but that's not to say that that happens all the time right uh but it's always there right and that that's why you want to stay uh thank you Professor my name is Josh um earlier you said that once we're in a period of War it's much easier to rationalize military action um what do you think about the idea that I don't understand what that means sorry once we're in a period of War yeah like just kind of what when you what you were saying earlier like when we're in a period of conflict it's easier to like offensive action or even just action military action in general is much uh easier to I would say convince of like to convince to the public convince to the general population the country like what through period of War people are are are generally more nationalistic I would say uh they want to win the war like like you like you were talking about earlier your point to generals right the generals like wanting to win the war decisively so I wanted to ask um what do you think about the idea of the military industrial complex um actively like wanting to keep us in a state of War prolong like a prolonged state of War like as an industry like what do you think about that idea yeah great question I I get asked this question uh occasionally and I I always give an answer that my uh the audience finds unsatisfactory um but go my answer goes like this I think there's no question that the military-industrial complex let's call it the mech the mick has an interest in security competition uh because the more security competition there is the more more need there is for an arms buildup um but in terms of initiating war and even initiating a security competition I've never seen much evidence that the mick matters that much uh when I was your age uh the international relations literature was broken up into three parts there were the realists there were the Liberals and both of those groups are still here and today there's the social constructivist they're the third group there was no such thing as social constructivist when I was your age there were marxists I know you find that hard to believe but it is true there were real Marxist uh I I used to know a huge amount of marxist literature I took a course of graduate school on Marxist theories of the State uh and uh but anyway so Marxism was one of the three bodies of literature and there were some people in that bellwick who tried to make the argument unsurprisingly that it was the mick that was really driving American foreign policy and uh I looked at a lot of those pieces and I read a lot of the counterarguments and I think it's just very hard to make the argument that the mick matters that much uh and uh if you can find the piece that you know makes the argument that the mick is really really uh driving America's aggressive behavior abroad uh I be more than happy to sort of read it and change my mind if it was a convincing argument but I've just not seen a lot of evidence that the mick matters that much and just one final point I'm not arguing it doesn't matter at all that would be a stupid argument to make it matters somewhat but I think there are other considerations that drive foreign policy this is an argument you would expect from a realist like me right and then when you go back to the unipolar moment go back to the unipolar moment as you know John's argument is that it was liberal ideology Crusader state that was really driving the train so you see me bouncing back and forth liberal ideology in the unipolar moment and bipolarity and multipolarity realist logic and I'm staying away from for lack of a better phrase the Marxist argument or the mech argument uh so that's my thinking on that one last for physics Professor my question is is there a purely preventive War uh my example is 1999 NATO bombarded Serbia and the argument was that to to protect the civilian in Kosovo but actually the other opinion is that they wanted to have a strategic military base NATO base in Kosovo I'm not sure that's a preventive War I mean a preventive War just go back to me and Mike is that uh I'm very fearful that Mike is going to grow much more powerful and because I can't know Mike's intentions I want to cut him off at the knees now I'm preventing him from becoming a threat your story seems to me this is the unipolar moment there's really no threat in Europe right there's Soviet Union is gone Russia's you know on its knees at the time of the covo war right but what you're saying is that I pick on a small power uh just because I want to uh have uh a NATO base uh in coso uh I I think that's possible but that's just it's just a different logic does that make sense uh so thank you for your talk Prof so you define the unipar moment as starting around 2017 but so do you think that US policy makers have embraced the uh the end of the unipolar moment or are we still thinking in terms of the United States being the power or being yeah more every Everybody hear his question yeah okay excellent question uh you know 2017 is when Trump comes to power and trump jettisons our policy of Engagement towards China and he develops a hard-nosed containment policy okay uh and uh a lot of people argue that if Trump came to power in 2017 and unipolarity ends in 2017 and he abandoned engagement in favor of containment it's Donald Trump who's responsible for the end of uniparity that's not an argument the realist like me would ever make because for me unipolarity bipolarity multipolarity these are uh these distinctions are a function of the structure of the system it's a function of the growth of Chinese power and the resurrection of Russian power under Vladimir Putin right that by about 2017 creates a world where in relative terms relative balance and power dot dot dot China and Russia are back in the game or Russia's back in the game and China is in the game for the first time in centuries right so you then have three great Powers but it has to do with the wealth and population size and the military might of these countries it's not um Donald Trump and the interesting case here is Joe Biden and we talk about the Chinese case uh Joe Biden was as the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as vice president an arch proponent of Engagement with China he thought that this is based on the liberal policies the idea was that you could help China get rich help it get prosperous integrate it into International institutions it would become a responsible stakeholder and as it grew more prosperous it would turn into a democracy this was what engagement was all about a realist like me I argued for a long time everybody thought I was crazy but I argued for a long time this is a remarkably foolish policy the idea that you would help China grow into a very powerful country when you can't know its intentions and in fact I know what its intentions will be right and furthermore how do you know it's going to become a democracy and as you all have noticed it has not become a democracy so anyway Trump jettison engagement Trump lasts for four years and uh Biden comes into power in 2020 so the question is what does b Biden do does Biden go back to engagement or does he follow in the footsteps of trump and actually what he does is he doubles down on Trump he's actually tougher on the Chinese than Trump was right and this I think is supports my structural argument right my realist argument that it's not so much Biden's belief beliefs right he believed in engagement at one point but China had become powerful enough by the time he moved into the White House in January 2017 that he had to pursue uh uh containment now just one other point on this it Bears on your question which is a fascinating question uh Ukraine I believe that the Ukraine crisis Ukraine war is a vestage of the unipolar moment and it's when liberal ideas were in the driver's seat right the liberal ideas that underpinned engagement underpinned underpinned the Ukraine war now you're saying to yourself why is John saying that well the start of the trouble in Ukraine is the famous April 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit remember George Bush gets defeat he doesn't get defeated he runs out of his two terms in November 2008 and Obama wins so George is going out in January 2009 uh he wants to leave uh a legacy and in April 2008 he pushes NATO expansion into Georgia and into Ukraine down the throats of Angela Merkel and Nicholas sarosi and the Europeans more generally they do not want to bring Ukraine into NATO but Bush wants to so that's when we decide to do it it's very important to understand that there is no evidence I have ever seen that it was designed to contain Russia we did not consider Russia a threat at the time what we were trying to do was we were trying to spread institutions like NATO and the EU Eastward on the belief that we would integrate these countries into these institutions they would become responsible stakeholders we would spread the EU Eastward people would get hooked on capitalism they would get prosperous would reinforce democracy remember we had the color revolutions the orange revolution in Ukraine the rose Revolution in Georgia all designed to promote democracy so if you talk to Mike McFall right who I disagree in fundamental ways with on this whole subject of Ukraine he will tell you that he was he was although he's a Stanford Professor he was the US ambassador to uh uh to Russia Mike will tell you that he talked to Putin and told Putin that he had nothing to fear from NATO expansion that the United States is a benign Hedge ofon and it was basically spreading liberalism Eastward and it wanted to create a giant zone of Peace in Europe where Eastern Europe looked just like Western Europe it was kind of a seamless web that was the goal it's not until the crisis breaks out in 2014 February 2014 when we switch gears and all of a sudden Vladimir Putin is a really serious threat right that's 2014 but any anyway uh what you see here right is that the Ukraine crisis which broke out in 2014 and continues to this day has its Genesis in that April 2008 decision and it was the unipolar moment that's 2008 the unipolar moment it's when liberalism was in the driver's seat right and the problem that you face this is you know a huge problem for the United States I learned this when I was a kid during the Vietnam war you know it's one of the main lessons I took from the Vietnam War it's very easy for the United States to get into a conflict it is very hard to get out right once you start shooting you know getting out is really trough think Afghanistan 20 years and the problem with Ukraine is it blew up in 2014 so all John writes is piece this is the piece that you were referring to that wrote in 2014 John says we should back off here right this is going to lead to no good right but we double down right we're still in the unipolar moment but we're you know heading out of it we double down and and by the way one of the reasons we Double Down is it's the unipolar moment we think we're Godzilla we're so powerful screw the Russians they're protesting by the way NATO expansion first trunch 1999 Russians scream bloody murder what what did we do we ignored him just pushed on 2004 second trunch of NATO expansion and this included the Baltic states right Russians scream bloody murder what do we do shove it down their throat move on April 2008 Putin screams bloody murder he's just to show you what good friends we were with Putin in 2008 and the NATO expansion into Ukraine and Georgia was not aimed at Putin pu not not aimed at Putin Putin was at Bucharest we're playing kissy face with him at Bucharest right we didn't see him as a great threat we just thought we were Godzilla shove it down his throat right you all know that two countries were going to come in April 2008 we said Georgia and Ukraine will come in a war broke out in Georgia in August of 2008 on this very issue people like me said oh my God right the Russians are serious Putin wasn't blowing smoke then the war breaks out in Ukraine the lowlevel war in February of 2014 February 22nd 2014 I say this is what I say time to back off this is you know going to lead to no good right the Russians are deadly serious but we're in we're in the fight now right getting out you think we're getting out of Ukraine you think we're getting out of the Middle East we're seeking into the deep muddy you know the Deep muddy Pete Seager you remember Pete you're all too young to remember you you probably are too young to remember Pete Seager I heard about him I read about him history this gentleman looks like he remembers Pete Seager sinking into the deep muddy right we're in the Deep muddy in the Middle East we're in the Deep muddy in Ukraine right I just make I know you want to get out of here will you give me one more minute please please uh we're gonna have one heck of a time getting out of both of these places you look at the Middle East it's just you know going up and up and up and these people are going to fight back right and for us to just sort of say this is the end we're getting out of here good luck anyway uh I just want to say before you say anything thank you all uh for coming and listening to me thanks for the great questions I thoroughly enjoyed this and I'd stay for another half hour if it wasn't for this guy thank you very [Applause] [Music] much

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Published: Tue Feb 13 2024