Tragically Inexperienced: The Ocean Ranger Oil Rig Disaster

It was 1976 and as offshore oil  drilling was slowly reaching new depths   the semi-submersible drilling platforms often  referred to as Oil Rigs were also evolving   quickly and as with any emerging technology and  industry, with considerable hazards but massive   rewards for many parties involved. At a reported  cost of 120 million dollars, Ocean Drilling and   Exploration Co. Inc or ODECO out of  New Orleans would commission the world's largest   semi-submersible platform of the time  period, The Ocean Ranger. Semi-submersibles,   a much more stable platform for drilling, a  solution to the drill ship's lack of stability.   Don't let the look of these platforms fool you  though as often times they're portrayed in media   movies and tv all as stationary structures with  a foundation reaching all the way to the seabed   there are some examples of these, but many  times they're semi-submersible marine vessels   essentially a ship but with hulls underwater  and all you typically see is the superstructure   above. Traveling long distances is also  no issue being moved via heavy lift ships   tugboats and for more local positioning many even  have their own propulsion system via thrusters in   the hulls, also capable of riding atop the waves at  a shallow draft like a surface vessel if necessary.   The most common type of semi-submersible drill rig  is the rectangular platform atop massive columns   that reach down to two hulls or pontoons. The hulls  submerged well below the water line maintaining a   deep draft with each pontoon divided into multiple  massive ballast tanks, their levels of water   controlled by the pump room which regulates flow  into out of and between them keeping the platform   balanced upright and in the worst case scenarios  can act as an anti-healing system by design they   can maintain a position so deep beneath the water  line that when managed properly the platform is   inherently much more stable than typical vessels  at much shallower draft by comparison making   precise operations like steady deep drilling  possible laid down by mitsubishi heavy industries   out of hiroshima japan in 1976 the mobile offshore  drilling unit or modu ocean ranger made its maiden   voyage in june of that year taking it from the  shipyards of japan to the waters off the alaskan   coast the ocean ranger would be the largest at the  time at nearly 400 feet in length 262 feet wide   and 337 feet high featuring a hella deck crane  lifeboats and capacity for up to roughly 100 crew   with eight columns atop two pontoons it would  be capable of operating in a maximum of fifteen   hundred foot depths the approximate deepest of the  time period with well drilling operations capable   of a maximum 25 000 feet deep into the ocean floor  the odeco company also considering it unsinkable   moored by 12 45 000 pound anchors each fastened  to one length of three and a quarter inch chain   and another length of three and a  half inch wire rope for redundancy   giving this a breaking strength of approximately  1.2 million pounds per anchor mooring laid out   in a pattern radiating outward three to each  corner of the platform the chains stored in   massive chain lockers at the bases of each  four main columns with openings near the top   to dispense and retract the chains the vessel  operating in many locations like off the coast   of ireland the bering sea gulf of alaska the  coast of new jersey and more throughout its life   in november of 1980 the ocean ranger would arrive  in the hibernia oil fields as they're known an   oil-rich location off the coast of newfoundland  the grand banks area of the north atlantic   although this is an incredibly dangerous  job no secret there at the same time it's   commonly held that these types of platforms  are designed specifically to weather even   the roughest seas doing so however obviously  requires skill and seafaring and more crucially   a crew specializing in these platforms unique  ballast control systems contracted by mobile oil   the platform had been drilling in the hibernia oil  field successfully for the past year odeco crew   is responsible for the platform and mobile crews  responsible for the well and drilling operations   with a crew of 84 on board 68 canadian citizens  15 u.s citizens and one british citizen   the master captain clarence house a u.s citizen  held a master's license of self-propelled vessels   but prior to joining odeco in 1981 for the past  10 years had worked in non-mariner positions for   previous employers having been assigned to  the ocean ranger only on a temporary basis   just 19 days prior to february 14th although  important to note the master is actually not   in command only being responsible for training  and supervision of ballast control operations   the loading of deck cargo general marine  related maintenance and crew safety training   odeco and mobile organize these platforms command  structure such that the positions of tool pusher   and drilling foreman outranked the captain just  like so many oil drilling companies are known for   many processes certification standards working  conditions and just day-to-day operations are   often outside of what local provincial or even  federal jurisdictions require often making   attempts to keep issues or incidents internal  or within the company so to speak above the law   or above reproach are the phrases that come  to mind when discussing many of these major   oil companies this culture of course  permeating down throughout all ranks   the tool pusher the senior most odeco team  member and highest ranking officer on board   mr kent thompson a u.s citizen  with 15 years drilling experience   had certifications in well control rig  management and other related specializations   the drilling foreman a mobile employee there  to represent mobile's interest and essentially   the tool pusher's mobile oil counterpart mr  jack jacobson a canadian citizen with 16 years   related drilling experience many crewmen held  multiple roles supporting this complex vessel   both as an industrial installation and seafaring  structure operating in roughly 260 feet of water   off the coast of newfoundland the ocean ranger  was one of three rigs moored and actively drilling   in the hibernia oil field the other two being the  367 foot long zapata ugland roughly 19 miles from   the ranger and the 296 foot long said co 706  nine miles away each platform's support ship   remaining on standby roughly one to six miles away  from their assigned rig the hibernia oil filled   nearly 200 miles off the coast near st john's  weather forecast by mobile oils newfoundland   oceans research and development corporation  or nordco predicted that by early a.m sunday   conditions were likely to deteriorate with winds  of 60 knots and seas of up to 24 feet on their way   due to a disturbance coming northward from the  gulf of mexico the disturbance considered weak   at first but intensifying rapidly as it approached  newfoundland and the grand banks are roughly 35   knots the storm reached the hibernia oil fields by  2 30 a.m sunday february 14 with winds of about 30   knots nothing too concerning at this point  the ocean rangers pontoons currently had an   approximate 80-foot draft which put the ballast  control room at roughly 28 feet above the water   line these platforms having instilled such a high  level of confidence over the years withstanding   many major storms in the past meant drilling  operations would continue and remain a priority   unless waves reach a magnitude that vertical  travel or heave of the vessel exceeds 15 feet it   takes an incredibly strong storm to stop drilling  essentially ceasing operations being a last resort   the winds and swells intensifying throughout  the day and the forecast updated at 1 30 pm   by nordcode that by 8 30 pm wind speeds would  reach 90 knots and swells 35 feet in height   along with poor visibility snow and throughout  the night swells increasing to upwards of 46 feet   more than enough time and forecast for  preparations to be made by 6 58 pm after hours   of battling worsening conditions the storm living  up to predictions the ocean rangers tool pusher   kent thompson reported by a satellite phone to jim  counts odeco's shore-based drilling superintendent   the tool pusher's boss that the ranger had  ceased drilling operations and disconnected as   the winds had reached 65 knots with the platform  heaving to upwards of 22 feet the other platforms   disconnecting earlier ceasing drilling operations  a few hours prior the ranger having demonstrated   in the past its capability of continued drilling  and weather conditions too severe for its smaller   counterparts before now having disconnected  due to weather only once in its 5-year lifespan   standard procedure also dictated rigs d ballast  and raised their draft five feet or more after   disconnecting in severe weather a procedure  that the ocean ranger was discovered later   to have also never followed in fact on february  6 just over a week prior the platform suddenly   began to list six degrees to port when taking  on fuel from its supply ship six degrees and a   structure like this is significant taking on fuel  from the supply ship the ballast control operator   on duty at the time was relieved by the ship's  master captain house midway through the process   captain house for some reason when attempting  to pump out tank 14 assuming for balancing while   fuel filled tank 12 instead switched its c chest  valve to the wide open position the valve that   opens tank 14's fill directly to the surrounding  ocean water filling it rapidly the six degree list   was so concerning and happened so suddenly much of  the crew had started prepping at lifeboat stations   senior ballast control operator rathbun  called from his bunk to resolve the situation   quickly realized the issue took over  for captain house and corrected it this   narrowly averted disaster raised red flags with  odeco superintendent jim counts who agreed with   the ocean rangers tool pusher kent thompson the  captain house was unfit for his position aboard   the platform captain house agreeing as well as  he reportedly didn't even want to be there anyway   however no parties would take action  to replace him in the near future   further enforcing the impression that odeco  had been filling this position and potentially   others like it with temporary figureheads only  to comply with u.s coast guard regulations at roughly 7 pm sunday february 14th the sedco 706  was hit by a massive wave even larger than those   already battering the oil field that day at 70  to 80 feet high this wave was high enough to even   wash over the top of their helidek destroying  a small shed on the platform and tearing away   multiple pieces of equipment it also caused  damage to one of the sedco's longitudinal beams   underneath the platform a major structural element  and thus the sedco debalasted raising their draft   from 80 feet to 75 ft and would ride out the storm  the zapata ugland also hit by a similar wave at   roughly the same time was quote jarred severely  but did not sustain any considerable damage   at roughly 7 45 pm the ocean ranger was struck  by a similarly large wave but sustained what   the crew perceived was only minor damage the  ballast control room on the ranger about 28 feet   above the water line in its current configuration  utilized four portholes also known as port lights   for viewing outside conditions and more  importantly the vessel's only visual cue   as to its draft depth the draft markings  on each of the four corner columns this was   essentially the operator's draft gauges using a  search light to eliminate the markings at night   porthole number four had been shattered  imploded into the control room from the force   of this monster wave each porthole containing a  deadlight cover for use during rough conditions   closing and fastening these steel plates ensures  portholes don't become an entry point for water if   compromised however there were no standing orders  policies or training in place for their use on the   ocean ranger or biodeco in general by this time  and they were fully opened at the time of impact   only being closed after the damage was done  if at all regardless of the deadline covers   investigators concluded these portholes should  be able to withstand such forces and the ballast   control room's position combined with these weak  portholes was a fatal flaw in the rake's design water from the massive wave blasted into  the ballast control room via porthole 4   and all over the valve control panel the  control panel not made to be watertight   however operators in their superiors showed little  concern with nearby supply ships overhearing the   ocean rangers two-way radio chatter first from  senior ballast operator mr wrath button that   the panel is wet working on it  and getting shocks off of it   had the cover off high powered cables in here  and replies from tool pusher ken thompson   we'll get some guys in there and get it  cleaned up don't get anybody injured or killed   they're damaged soon after updates from rathbun  everything is fine and we're picking up glass   mopping up water tidying up cleaning up water and  broken glass another voice a few moments later all   valves on the port side were opening by themselves  there are valves operating or closing or opening   witnesses overhearing these  conversations on the supply ship radios   were conflicted as to their exact times nor did  they realize their significance in the moment   as they were understandably preoccupied  with the safety of their own vessels   in the ongoing hurricane force conditions along  with the control room's ship based communications   equipment being rendered inoperable the reason  they were now using two-way radios to communicate   with other areas of the vessel the ballast control  panel had also been either fried due to water   soaking it inside and out or power was otherwise  cut to some portions of it by personnel to prevent   electrical hazard either way it was inoperable  with only a few indicator lights left flashing   judging by the conversations overheard the only  way for personnel to get the impression that   quote valves were opening and closing on  their own would be via the indicator lights   left flashing on the control board back  and forth from red to green and vice versa   at 8 45 pm while these events transpired drilling  foreman second in command on the ranger and mobile   representative mr jack jacobson had a 14 minute  long conversation via the satellite phone with   mobile's shore based superintendent mr graham  amidst this conversation jacobson reported 50-foot   high seas and that a port light had been broken  in ballast control but that it was not causing   any problems and all equipment was functioning  normally further cementing into evidence the   fact that no one on board the ranger saw it  as anything more than a minor inconvenience   at 9 pm the ocean rangers supply ship the  seaforth highlander roughly 7 miles from the   platform at this point received a transmission  from the rig inquiring as to the supply ship's   status in the storm but giving no signs  that they were having issues in any way   around this same time the crew had decided to cut  power and air supply completely to the console   and possibly entire control room when power and  compressed air are lost in a system like this   valves are forced closed for safety with the  pontoon valves closed and power cut to the console   the ocean ranger in this state while not  ideal is presumed by investigators and   those with knowledge in the industry to have  been more than capable of riding out the storm   at 11 30 pm rick flynn mobile oil shore  based radio operator received the regularly   expected weather update transmission  from the ocean rangers weather observer   reporting weather conditions and nothing else  nothing to indicate the vessel was experiencing   anything of concern however for some unknown  reason shortly before 1 am the crew on board   the ranger decided to restore air and power to the  console it's thought to start affecting repairs   either by causing inadvertent short circuits  or otherwise tinkering with the controls   the inexperienced and untrained crew caused  the valves and the bowel pontoon tanks to open   immediately flooding the chambers until the vessel  reached a 10 to 15 degree bowel heavy list the   crew too inexperienced to operate the ballast  system and problem solve this now potentially   fatal condition even if the control system was  working well enough to perform these actions   on top of this the list was reaching a  degree that some investigators concluded   the bow tanks were reaching a point of no  return and even in ideal conditions the   pumps wouldn't have been strong enough  to shift the water and right the vessel   as a last-ditch effort a crewman suggested  inserting a set of brass actuating rods   that had been left in the control room these rods  only used for testing while under construction   and left on board by mistake when inserted into  the control panel solenoids they served only   as a way to override all their inputs and force  each corresponding pontoon tank valve wide open   regardless of switch states this erroneous action  was performed as none of the crew involved were   experienced enough to protest the decision with  the storm still raging outside and waves still   massive this list would lower the bowel columns  to a height in which the tallest waves could   begin pouring their force into the anchor's wide  open chain locker quickly filling the voids below   another fatal flaw in design and primary link in  this chain of failures at 1 am after attempting   to call mobile oil's shore base mr graham at  his home in st john's to declare an emergency   drilling foreman jack jacobson was unable  to reach him due to atmospheric interference   his call would be relayed via another mobile  onshore rep rick flynn via satellite yeah   yeah just a second ocean ranger jack are you there why the initial distress call was made only  by a private sat phone and only to colleagues   rather than 24-hour monitored distress frequencies  that would go out to all ships and authorities   within range no one will ever know five minutes  later at 105 am the rangers standby and supply   ship seaforth highlander now approximately eight  miles away received a transmission from the   ranger requesting it come to a close standby the  highlander still unaware of any serious situation   asked what the problem was the responding voice  seeming reluctant i am requesting to tell you   by the mobile foreman that we are listing badly  at 109 am a distressed telex message similar to   a text message was received by a merisat operator  in connecticut mirasat being the satellite phone   and telex system these companies were using in  the area this message since it seemed to be one   of distress was relayed immediately to the  us coast guard anyhow however from the royal   commission report little warning was given to the  mobile oil shore base in fact when the telex went   out for help at 109 am it was not in a proper  format to depict the urgency of the situation   since the word mayday was not used the telex  which had no addressee went out of necessity   to the marisat operator in connecticut who after  checking with the ocean ranger directed it to the   u.s coast guard in new york who later phoned  it to rcc halifax time would have been saved   if the telex had been addressed to rcc halifax  the joint rescue coordination center in halifax   one minute later ocean ranger radio operator ken  blackmore contacted mobile's shore based operator   rick flynn once again and requested flynn transmit  a mayday call on behalf of the ocean ranger   by 1 22 a.m the oil rigs cedco 706 and sapada  ugland ordered their supply vessels the bolton   door 15 miles away and norder tor 20 miles away  to proceed to the ranger and assist the final   transmission from the ocean ranger at 1 30 am  radio operator ken blackmore again phones mobile   oils shore offices informs them the crew is going  to lifeboat stations and requests another may day   be sent on their behalf under ideal conditions  rescue helicopters were now over an hour and a   half away and in the current weather potentially  unable to get airborne at all the nearest vessel   the ranger's own standby ship the seaforth  highlander was steaming towards the platform   but still roughly seven miles out the weather  not helping to speed up this process either   the list now exceeding 15 degrees waves crashing  over the bow and the storm's still at full force   it's presumed based on the final call the vessel  was suddenly and hastily abandoned at 1 30 am   the circumstances of the abandonment just as  mysterious as the lack of urgency and radio calls   this degree of list was such that all lifeboats  were either extremely hazardous or impossible   to use the bow lifeboat with the bow essentially  in the water would have been either underwater or   destroyed unusable the two stern lifeboats would  have been clearly a dangerous if not deadly fall   due to the ocean ranger's tilted condition  obvious even to the untrained attempting their use   and the life rafts on the upper deck determined  to have been completely useless at night anyway   due to the ongoing weather conditions and water  temperatures most importantly though the ocean   ranger was not equipped with survival suits  absolutely crucial for evacuation in waters   this cold and weather this deadly mist and spray  from waves freezing in mid-air it was so frigid   without the suits of protection from the water and  elements hypothermia setting in after just seconds   while the rangers list was slowly worsening it  wasn't happening instantly and the rig would   end up floating in this state for nearly an hour  and a half before ultimately capsizing completely   the apathetic attitudes by multiple crewmen  in the face of crisis even up to the final   call about heading to lifeboat stations yet as  rescue efforts and investigations would prove   a final seemingly panic induced sudden abandonment  with clothing later found ranging from light pork   clothes orange work suits to pajamas suggesting  to investigators a sort of sudden panic induced   confusion amongst all on board as the seaforth  highlander approached the ocean ranger still   floating in the same state became visible roughly  half a mile away at about 2 11 am however several   white light beacons could be seen off the  briggs port beam some distance from the platform   the highlander approached the area where  these were emanating and found the lights   were attached to life preservers floating on  the surface life preservers that were empty   the ship was now only about 1200 feet from the  ocean ranger with it clearly in sight and still   afloat when captain duncan noticed a flare  fired into the air off their starboard bow   it was approximately 2 14 am at this time and then  at 221 a second flare from the same location when   the lifeboat originated from briefly came  into view in what authorities would later   describe as miraculous crewman aboard the ocean  ranger had been able to deploy one of its stern   lifeboats successfully captain duncan however  noticed it was riding very low in the water   and at 1200 feet away he would maneuver the  seaforth highlander to intercept the lifeboat   once in range four deckhands went out onto the  aft deck and made preparations with what few   tools they had available the lifeboat however now  clearly visible showed signs of serious damage   it had holes on both sides of  its hull from stem to gunnel   the men aboard the highlander could see survivors  aboard vigorously bailing water and a man in the   aft hatch steering as the lifeboat was  still somehow moving under its own power   the seas though were still not giving way  with swells exceeding 60 feet in height and   winds still 60 to 70 knots the spray freezing all  around as the waves crashed all over the aft deck   captain duncan bravely maneuvering the highlander  stern first into the storm in order to approach   the lifeboat without ramming it and let  the lifeboat drift towards them by 2 32 am   duncan reported having the lifeboat alongside  finally positioned on their port side where they   needed it in order to effect rescue the deckhand  is now able to see lights and movement inside   and some men still bailing out water as it poured  in despite their proximity though the deckhands   and survivors were unable to hear each other  yet through the seas storm and heaving vessels   a rope thrown to the man steering in  the aft hatch was caught successfully   and he attached it securely to a handrail on the  lifeboats canopy deckhand jorgensen tying his end   to the crash rail on the supply ship a second  rope with a life ring was successfully thrown   and attached to the bow of the lifeboat by another  survivor then it too tied off on the supply ship   eight to ten of the thirty plus men  aboard began emerging from the hatches   but stood on the lifeboats port side gunnel  the men were still wearing their hard hats   and a handful wearing life preservers and heavier  clothing while others were very lightly clothed   and still don their work vests all clothing  completely unsuited to survival in such conditions   the lifeboat now began rolling  towards its port side slowly   away from the supply ship and within an instant  capsized tossing the men standing outside into   the violent freezing sea and snapped the  lines attached to the seaforth highlander the deckhands leapt into action throwing lines  into the water and intended to launch a life   raft towards the scattered survivors some  life preserver beacons now lit they were   clearly visible but the life-raft lines were  frozen solid and it took some time to cut free   by the time the raft reached them they  were completely immobilized by hypothermia   unable to board the raft or grab lines  in the water well within their reach   captain duncan maneuvered again to within 50 or  so feet of the capsized lifeboat still attempting   rescue if any remained on board also keeping the  other supply ships apprised of the situation of   survivors in the water supply ship bolton tour had  arrived at approximately 2 45 a.m and made visual   contact with the ocean ranger approaching the rig  closely and inspecting with their searchlights but   there was no signs of life or other lifeboats the  second of the two stern lifeboats was no longer   attached either the seaforth highlander and bolton  tour joining up to try and recover the wayward   capsized lifeboat now roughly a mile and  a half downwind from the stricken platform   the platform lifeboat soon to be out  of their sight as they gave chase   as the supply ship norter tour was approaching  the ocean ranger its captain allingham was   watching the radar closely when at 3 am radar  contact with the rig was completely lost   two small blips and appeared briefly at the  riggs location presumably the inverted pontoons   and disappeared soon thereafter this information  was relayed to mobile oils shore offices at   about 3 38 a.m with the captains of the vessels  assuming it would be forwarded on to search and   rescue officials currently mobilizing it would  not end up being relayed until 7 35 am however   leading rescue authorities in the meantime to  operate under the assumption the rig was still   upright and proceeding as rescue crews often do  as if survivors are still aboard to be rescued   the three supply ships by 3 40 am had joined up  to continue the rescue effort coordinating their   search developing drift plots and concentrating  downwind from the ocean ranger's last position   however recovering any victims they encountered  in the water was proving nearly impossible   in the current conditions the first rcc rescue  capable helicopter wouldn't be able to take off   until 4 15 a.m and oil company helicopters arrived  on scene at 4 35 am but were not rescue capable   attempting to aid the supply ships only as extra  eyes however with the storm raging and ceilings   as low as three to six hundred feet comprised of  mixed rain and snow the helicopters attempted to   search but visibility was near zero over 70 feet  and anywhere below this altitude put them at grave   risk due to massive waves still reaching these  heights below later in their search as the supply   ships had spread out to cover more area at 7 00 am  the northern tour spotted a capsized lifeboat with   a seaforth highlander life ring attached to it  after several unsuccessful attempts to recover it   captain allingham on their final attempt observed  roughly 20 lifeless bodies still strapped inside   several bodies suddenly floated  out through a gash in the bow   one of them washing over the aft deck of the  northern tour and was successfully recovered   captain allingham stating the lifeboat  eventually disappeared into the waves   and most likely sank this would be the first  of only 22 victims eventually recovered   from the ocean ranger with all 84 souls aboard  lost the rig however wasn't done taking lives the ocean ranger sank inverted into 260 feet  of water crushing the oil derrick tower in the   process keep in mind the information of how  these events transpired and all the details   that unfolded was only pieced together after a  years long investigation by multiple agencies   canada's royal commission the ntsb the us coast  guard and the nearby areas in newfoundland   devastated with odeco and their legal team pushing  back all along the way on that same morning   monday february 15 1982 the storm still raging  many search and rescue resources suddenly had to   be diverted as the mechanic terezov a roll-on  roll-off general cargo vessel of soviet flag   was stricken in the nearby area by the same  storm and sank at about 5 am with 32 souls lost with only 100 feet of clearance  between the bottom of the pontoons   and water surface now the sunken ocean  ranger was considered a shipping hazard   and the decision was made to relocate it further  out deeper at sea two divers prepping the pontoons   to be floated with cutting and welding tools  were killed in a sudden explosion and a week   later one more diver was killed reportedly from  an object mistakenly dropped at the surface above   eventually the platform would be floated towed  and buried further out at sea successfully   this disaster was down to a number of factors both  large and small like severe weather breakdown and   chain of command the ocean ranger's flaws  and design like chain lockers portholes   and other aspects of the ballast control room  lack of training and safety by oil rig owners   and contractors lack of specific regulation in  an industry that was overtly taking advantage of   inattentive governments an industry-wide culture  of being above the law the list goes on and many   changes in safety training and methods would  come about as a result of this monumental tragedy a very poignant memorial was unveiled in  the city of saint john's in july of 1985 the immortal supporters on patreon get 100  ad-free access to all of these videos and   help keep the channel going and a special thank  you goes out today to those top tier supporters   alex jenny jeremy kat and nathan thanks so  much for watching everyone and take care

Channel: Brick Immortar

Views: 3,019,294

Keywords: north sea oil rig, north sea, oil rig, clarence hauss, odeco oil, mobil oil, semi-submersible platform, semi submersible, ballast tanks in ships, why did the ocean ranger sink, how did the ocean ranger sank, north sea storm, grand banks, mekhanik tarasov, toolpusher offshore, offshore oil rig, offshore disaster, north sea oil rigs in storms, north sea oil rig documentary, ocean ranger documentary, unsinkable, north sea oil rig waves, why did the ocean ranger oil rig sink

Id: cyNFhthQ97Q

Length: 32min 50sec (1970 seconds)

Published: Sun Feb 06 2022