The night time collision between
Cutter Blackthorn and the much larger, Tankship Capricorn... was violent...
and substantial, yet one that left both vessels still safely afloat, with little to
no water flooding either ship's compartments. But on that fateful evening of January 28
1980, coincidentally, the night of the US Coast Guard's 65th anniversary... immediately
after the collision, Blackthorn was performing initial damage assessments, holding an
only 5 degree list to port and radioing their emergency to Coast Guard sector St
Petersburg in Tampa Bay Florida... when, as if being suddenly ripped open and pulled down
by some massive claw from the deep... The vessel was instantly rolling over and going under
faster than anyone onboard thought possible... From the US Coast Guard; A "Cutter" is basically any Coast Guard
vessel 65 feet in length or greater, having adequate accommodations
for crew to live on board. Built by Marine Iron & Shipbuilding out of
Duluth Minnesota in 1943, the U.S. CGC - or "Coast Guard Cutter" Blackthorn was one of many
Buoy Tending Cutters with the mission to install and service ATONs or Federal Aids to Navigation
throughout Inland and Coastal Waterways. Just prior, by 1942 the Coast Guard
began classifying cutters with a "W" at the start of their prefix and Blackthorn's
original designation would be WAGL-391... a Navy designation at the time meaning
Auxiliary Vessel, Lighthouse Tender. From the smallest 65 Ft inland tenders and
river tugs to the mightiest 400 ft & 420 ft Polar and Healy Class icebreakers ...cutters
are the backbone of Coast Guard operations. The black hull with red racing stripe and white
superstructure, is perhaps the most iconic and classic cutter image... a close second in my mind
being the high endurance 378 ft Hamilton class. Buoy tenders though, as the name
suggests, are given the much less glamorous, yet no less important task
of servicing navigation aids throughout US waters... and occasional ice breaking.
Certainly capable of patrol and Search & Rescue if necessary but arguably not in the public
eye as often as those high endurance cutters with THEIR helipads and frequent involvement
in high profile security and rescue operations. Commissioned in March of 1944,
the Iris Class 180 ft Blackthorn had a width of 37 feet a draft of 12
feet and displacement of 984 tons.
391 began initially as a Great Lakes
ice breaker in its first few months of service. By mid-1944 the vessel was
then reassigned to San Pedro California. ...and if you're curious like me, this
reposititioning journey was accomplished by exiting the Great Lakes via the St Lawrence
River, turning south toward the Panama Canal then turning north up the coasts of Central
America and Mexico toward Station San Pedro. In early 1950, Blackthorn was
reassigned to Mobile Alabama, Which meant another trip back through
the Panama Canal to the Gulf Coast. Over the years, in addition to its primary
mission of servicing navigation aids, the vessel had participated in
many high profile incidents like; -Searching for Survivors after the Esso
Greensboro had collided with the Esso Suez in '51 -Assisting in the search after a B-17 crash in '53
-Helping to searh for survivors and then recover the wreckage after the tragic crash of
National Airlines Flight 470, also in 1953 -Rendering assistance to sister
ship Iris after the vessel beached itself due to hull damage in '57
-And multiple other incidents assisting merchant mariners in distress
from various vessels throughout the '50s; the Ocean Pride, Kerry Mac, Mission Carmel,
Beatrice and Miss Cain to name a few. The Blackthorn's designation changing in
1965 to "WLB", or "SEA GOING Buoy Tender". The vessel would receive its iconic
racing stripe paintwork in 1967, when the practice was adopted fleet wide.
The Blackthorn's class being so prolific that these Coast Guard workhorses were known
by those involved as simply "The 180s". And in 1976, Blackthorn would be
reassigned to Galveston Texas... performing its mission along the
Louisiana and Texas gulf coast. Built by Alabama Dry Dock &
Shipbuilding out of Mobile... the oil tanker Capricorn started its
life as the Powder River at about 523 feet (159 m) long and 68 feet wide (20.78 m)
...referred to as a "Standard T-2 Tanker" in size & configuration, with a two house
superstructure... the aft house containing engineering and the bridge actually
amidships. Common in the time period. Tankers, also sometimes referred
to as "bunkers or bunker ships". Laid down and launched in 1943 the vessel was 1
of hundreds commissioned by the United States War Shipping Administration, hastily manufactured
and pressed into service to haul fuel oils, diesel or crude oil. Whatever the allies
needed most at the height of world war 2. Like so many other War Department Ships, Powder River was among the glut of vessels
then sold off to the Private Sector once the war came to a close... purchased by Independent
Tankships out of Wilmington, Delaware in 1948. Then changing hands to Hess
Tankships Company in 1955 when the name was changed to "Hess
Bunker" - also based in Delaware. The most significant refit and modification came
in 1961 when the vessel was quote; "jumbo-ized". The refit "Jumbo-ized T-2" meant the tankship's
overall length was now 605 feet (184.4 m), 80 plus feet longer than original (and over
3 times the length of Cutter Blackthorn). The Bridge relocated from its original
Midship location to the aft house... a more common configuration seen in modern
bulkers and tankers... the bridge now 465 feet from the bow. And while it
did have a raised forecastle deck, there was also a solid raised
bulwark around the bow periphery. With a draft depth of 31 and a half feet, the tanker's Dead weight tonnage would
go from roughly 16,600 to 23,300. In 1977, Hess Bunker was purchased
by Kingston Shipping Company of New York where the name was then changed to Capricorn. Operated by Apex Marine Corporation
in January of 1980, the Capricorn had a compliment of 9 Officers,
22 deckhands and one passenger. Of note were the captain or "master";
a graduate from the US Merchant Marine Academy some 12 years prior who'd worked his
way up as officer on tankships as large or larger than Capricorn throughout his career...
becoming Capricorn's Master in January 1978. The first mate; who'd served as officer on various tankships since the mid 1940s. He'd
reported aboard Capricorn in June 1979. The second mate who'd just graduated SUNY Maritime
in '77 came aboard Capricorn in November of '79. And the 3rd mate graduated Suny in '79
joining the Capricorn that same year. Coast Guard vessels like Blackthorn,
traditionally have very long lifespans and careers... and thus need the ocassional
overhaul, refit and/or upgrade to remain viable. The onboard Commanders of these vessels
are also given quite a lot of latitude. So, in 1979 when the Blackthorn came due for a
complete overhaul... the crew was insistent their vessel be hauled out and serviced at what
was, in their eyes, the best yard for this; Gulf Tampa Drydock Company in the Port of Tampa Bay.
After all, the vessel had served for about 35 years by that point, was getting tired
and had seen much wear and tear... So the upcoming overhaul was expected to
be comprehensive... months long in fact. The Cutter reached the Port of Tampa Bay in October of 1979 when this
painstaking process began. The blackthorn was serving with a compliment
of 6 Commissioned Officers and 44 crew. Commanding Officer at the time
was Lieutenant Commander Sepel, a near 10+ year Coast Guard veteran. Aside
from 5 years of shoreside duties, he'd served; -16 months commanding a 95 ft patrol boat
-2+ years as second in command or "executive officer" aboard another 180
Tender similar to Blackthorn -And another 16 months as an Officer On Deck
aboard 2 different High Endurance cutters. Coming aboard Blackthorn as
Commanding Officer in July of 1979 ...just a few months
prior to the Tampa Bay refit. Blackthorn's Second in Command,
the Executive Officer or "XO", Lieutenant Crawford, a 6+ year Coast
Guard veteran had served 2 years as a watchstander and navigator aboard
another 180... his only officer on deck The Underway Officer on Deck or "OOD",
also serving as watchstander on the bridge was Ensign Ryan, again,
fresh out of Coast Guard Academy, reporting aboard in June of '79; his
first seagoing assignment as well. The remaining 46 crew on board
ranged from ages 18 to 40, just over half with more than
a year of seafaring experience. According to the NTSB; "None of the deck officers onboard
BLACKTHORN had previously transited Tampa Bay before the inbound voyage to
Gulf Tampa Drydock on October 15, 1979." The entire crew of 50 sailors would be put
up in local hotels as the coming overhaul meant Blackthorn would be inaccessible, leaving
the crew idle for an untold number of months. Tampa Bay, one of the busiest ports in the
US, is widely known in the maritime world for its challenging ship channels.
Most bays and harbors have channels that are just wide enough for a 2 ship
encounter, one inbound, one outbound... and sometimes not wide enough for both.
Many harbors will coordinate ship traffic so that all deep draft ships are
aware of one another, or so that 2 ship encounters (one inbound, one outbound)
only occur at the widest points and so on. Ship channels are dredged, dug out from
the seabed and maintained at a deeper floor than the rest of the harbor...
allowing a path for large ships to go directly from anchorage, outside the bay,
to their desination port or vice versa. With the risk of ground strike always present should any deep draft ship stray from
the relative safety of the channel. This almost always requires local pilots
to come aboard, take the conn and aid the bridge crew in navigating very specific
routes the pilot has experience with. Many ships that dock in a harbor with complex
channels don't have crews with the same level of local experience, even those that frequent
the area will oftentimes... still hire pilots. This applies to all ships with a deep enough draft
to require use of the channel... Cruise Ships, Cargo ships even Military Vessels.
And in Tampa Bay, even if a vessel doesn't draft enough to fully require
the channel's depth... ships the size of Blackthorn still need to utilize the Cut A
channel at the Bay's entrance to pass underneath one of Tampa and St Petersburg's most iconic
features ...a miles long shipping obstruction, spanning the width of the lower bay's
entrance; The Sunshine Skyway Bridge. Ship channels can be challenging enough,
especially those with several bends... some of which nearing 90 degrees. But
the Skyway bridge (the version in the time period) created a narrow point (400
ft wide - down from a charted 600 ft width for the remainder of the channel),
preceded by 2 bends on either side, intersecting waterways just on the exit side
and is located nearer to the mouth of Tampa Bay, some 20 miles southwest from the relative safety
of Hillsborough Bay for example... leaving the entrance much more exposed and susceptible to
challenging sea states and weather conditions. You might remember the Sunshine
Skyway Bridge from my previous video, when the bulk cargo ship Summit Venture
slammed into its support columns at night, completely destroying the highest
points of the southbound spans. Even in the time period, bringing
on Pilots was mandatory for all large foreign vessels and for all US
vessels under registry in foreign trade. While it wasn't required for US Government
ships, Tampa Bay pilot testimony stated that quote; "All US Navy vessels transiting
Tampa Bay do carry a Tampa Bay Pilot." According to the NTSB; After 3 and a half months, the Blackthorn not
only received routine maintenance and refreshing; -But had the main propulsion
generators also overhauled -A Large section of its
port shell plating replaced -And a new Closed Sanitation system installed
-Although, no improvements were made to any of the Cutter's outdated survival systems...
something that will play a crucial role later The crew had returned to their ship and extensive
dock trials of all systems were performed by Sunday January 27. With the only issue of note
being they could not reach maximum operating speed with the new Westinghouse Brand generators.
On January 28th from 12 noon to about 2 pm, they'd conduct sea trials in the bay to again
test propulsion, confirming there was an issue. Determining that it couldn't
be fixed while underway, they'd return to Gulf Tampa Drydock where the
problem was corrected by Westinghouse Service Personnel and the Commanding Officer or CO
ordered a 6pm departure for that same day. During their moths long downtime,
Blackthorn had presumably rotated out 7 enlisted sailors as
7 new crew had come aboard; sailing for their first time when the vessel
would leave out on Monday January 28th. Still with the same total compliment
of 6 Officers and 44 Crew. Interstingly, the crew's shore leave hadn't
been spent... entirely idle. Brought on board for the return trip home, were;a
-A small car, lashed to the starboard side of the buoy deck, presumably
a Crew Member's Personal Vehicle -One Regrigerator
-A small wooden watchstander's shack -Five Batteries
-Two Drums -5 Motorcycles lashed to the aft deck (reportedly,
partially obstructing some of the walkways) -An emergency life raft that had accidentally
been triggered so was kept inflated and lashed behind the deckhouse
-And the Cargo holds were empty other than the crew's luggage
-To be clear, it's not that this cargo was heavy or causing instability, relative to
the massive buoys Cutters routinely carry... Just, a very curious part of this story... and
it's presumed the Commanding Officer allowed this since they'd be heading straight
to their home port in Galveston, Texas. And during normal circumstances these
vessels commonly have a deck full of large, heavy buoys... but the decks were empty
during their time at dry dock. So, the space was... available? for all
those large personal items... I guess? I really can't speak to whether this
fell under Coast Guard regs or not. Blackthorn's Commanding Officer Opted NOT to
bring a Tampa Bay pilot on board, despite having the authority to do so... stating they'd been
quote; "...in and out of several strange ports with Blackthorn and I felt our navigation team
was sufficient to safely navigate the area." On deck were;
-The Commanding Officer or "CO" -Executive Officer or "XO"
-The Navigator & Assistant Navigator -Officer of the Deck or OOD
-The Radar Operator -One Helmsman
-and Two Phonetalkers (enlisted sailors who handle the relaying of orders over
shipboard phones to various parts of the ship) The Capricorn, fully laden with
22,500 tons of Number 6 fuel oil on board was anchored about 3 and a half miles
west-southwest of the Tampa Bay Sea Buoy. At about 6pm the Tanker's first mate confirmed
the radar, navigation lights, steering gear, engine order telegraph, general alarm, VHF
radio and ship's whistle were all operational... The ship weighed their port side anchor
and got underway toward the harbor by about 6:45pm. According to the Coast Guard,
leaving the port anchor ready for letting go. With the brakes still set and
holding the anchor firmly, this means the devil's claw and
riding pawl or chocks are left released so that the anchor can be dropped
more quickly should the vessel require it. The starboard anchor was left housed
and was NOT ready for letting go. They'd pick up their Tampa Bay pilot while
underway at roughly 7:11pm... their Pilot that night, an experienced member of the Tampa
Pilot's Association... actually had 2 previous, successful navigations piloting the
Capricorn istelf, one as recently as October 1979... familiar with the
Tankship's maneuvering characteristics. On duty aboard Capricorn, in addition
to the pilot now, were the master, first mate and helmsman... with a
deckhand posted on the bow as lookout. The seas were calm that
evening and weather was clear, with at least 7 miles of visibility.
There was a light breeze from the north and the air temperature was about
61 degrees, water temperature, 64. But with sunset time of 6:07
pm, darkness was setting in... Blackthorn, having gotten underway about 6:04 PM, would exit the shipbuilder's
marina via the Sparkman Channel, traveling about 7 or 8 knots. With an estimated
transit time of about 2 hours to exit Tampa Bay. Off-duty crew were getting settled for the
evening, relaxing, watching TV... taking showers. The Cutter made no attempts via radio to
assess that night's traffic in Tampa Bay, nor did they announce their outbound
presence to other vessels in the area. It wasn't a requirement to do so but is typical
for larger vessels in a busy port like this. In addition to radio calls between vessels for
instances such as inbound/outbound encounters, giving way... or other relevant alerts to each
others presence... as the distance closes between vessels, it's then common to acknowledge one
another's intentions via whistle signals... And, a bit of on an aside; its referred to
as the "whistle" officially in the maritime world but this is usually accomplished
with the loud horn blasts you may have heard ships use. A couple relevant examples here; Rules of the Road for Inland
US Waters are well known; -One Short Blast Says: "I intend
to pass by you on MY Port Side." -Two Short Blasts Say: "I intend to
pass by you on MY Starboard Side." If the other boat agrees, acknowledgement is
by sounding the same blast pattern in response. We're really gettin in the
"Maritime Weeds" here sorry... As Blackthorn approached "Cut D", where
Seddon and Sparkman Channels meet... the much larger cruise ship "Kazakhstan" was
also traveling South via the Seddon Channel. Blackthorn being smaller, was obscured by the
trees on the southern tip of Harbour Island, the pilot on Kazakhstan stated no
whistle signals or radio communications were exchanged when suddenly quote;
"the cutter shot out fairly close in front of the cruise ship as the two
vessels approached ... Cut D Channel." The Tampa Bay pilot aboard Kazakhstan made
calls on VHF channel 13; the Common channel for Bridge-to-Bridge Navigation Safety. It is common
maritime knowledge for ships 65 feet or longer, to maintain a listening watch on this channel
in US Waters... I cannot emphasize this enough.
The Cruise Ship Pilot made calls prior to
getting underway in the Seddon Channel but the only response they received was from a Tug
called Dennis, about 2,500 yards down channel. He also stated that once they'd reach
Cut D, transiting Hillsborough bay, with the Blackthorn just ahead... the pilot
tried to contact the cutter as the cruise ship was now only about 200 yards behind them...
and closing... but received no response. It appeared (at least to the cruise ship crew)
that the cutter was traveling quite slowly. As the Blackthorn reached Cut C,
the Commanding Officer ordered full speed ahead (about 12 knots)
and was then relieved by the XO. The cutter began to pull away from the
Kazakhstan but the cruise ship had planned to transit these open portions of the bay at 14
knots... which they accelerated to soon after. Nearing the southern end of Cut C, Kazakhstan
was again starting to overtake the Blackthorn. The cruise ship's pilot said he
tried to call the cutter once again, and still received no response.
With no overtaking arrangement made, the Kazakhstan reduced speed
to half ahead, roughly 9 knots. In the Gadsden Cut, it was the same
routine... the cruise ship sped up, wanting to travel at about 14 knots, began to
catch up with the cutter as the vessels turned into Cut F and again, Kazakhstan's pilot
couldn't get a response from Blackthorn. As the two vessels entered Cut F, the Cruise
Ship was hailed by a tug called "Pat-B". Pat-B was traveling in the opposite direction, hailing Kazakhstan to arrange a port
to port encounter as the vessels met... this way both vessels know which side
of the channel they'll use to yield. Pat-B also stated they'd been able to
raise the approaching Blackthorn and that they also agreed to meet port to port
but when the time came, for whatever reason, the cutter remained in the center of the channel,
forcing Pat-B to suddenly move over farther to the right... the two vessels passing dangerously
close; within 15 to 20 ft of one another. After this encounter and by the
time Blackthorn reached Cut D, Kazakhstan's pilot tried yet
again, to contact the cutter. Finally getting a response, the faster
cruise ship requested to pass... the Blackthorn acknowledging and, their draft not
nearly as deep as the cruise ship, exited the channel to allow the cruise ship to pass...
reentering after at the northern end of Cut B. Tanker Capricorn, with their pilot on board
was planning to transit the Egmont Channel, then Mullet Key channel on their path to
Cut A. Cut A being the primary concern in lower Tampa Bay as its the channel
that passes under the Skyway Bridge. Prior to entering Egmont Channel, Capricorn's
Master and Pilot discussed upcoming traffic conditions in the bay... the pilot had
assessed they'd be meeting Cruise Ship Kazakhstan and possibly one other
outbound vessel called Brave Eagle. As they entered Egmont Channel,
Capricorn announced their inbound presence to all vessels in the area via
securite call over VHF channel 13. The Pilot ordered full ahead which meant roughly
12 knots for the tanker when fully laden. A portion of the tanker's crew
was relieved at this time; -A different helmsman took the wheel
-The Third Mate relieved the First Mate at the Engine Order Telegraph
-And the lookout on the bow was also relieved. According to the relief lookout
his instructions were quote; "to report any small craft in the vicinity, any unlit
buoy and any ships which may cause problems." And also told by the third mate quote; "not
to report any WELL LIT ships because we know of them and if the lookouts keep
calling in every ship that we pass, they would be taking up too much
of our time handling the vessel." Partway through Egmont Channel, Capricorn's pilot
spotted a brightly lit vessel about 7 to 8 miles up the bay, to the northeast... based on their
traffic assessment and its lighting configuration he assumed this was the Cruise Ship Kazakhstan.
About this same time, VHF Channel 13 came to life again with another securite call... this time
from a Tugboat called Ocean Star, outbound in the Mullet Key Channel. The two vessels agreed
via radio on a port to port encounter as Ocean Star transited outbound, coming toward the tanker.
Once the distance closed, Capricorn's pilot stated they exchanged a one-blast whistle
signal to acknowledge one another. However, the Tugboat's Master stated this whistle
exchange did not take place but that they did pass port to port without incident... the Capricorn
still traveling "Full Ahead" or roughly 12 knots. Capricorn's Pilot saw the Kazakhstan (the
cruise ship recently having passed under the Skyway Bridge) now making its turn
from Cut A to the Mullet Key Channel. Both Pilots began making their
arrangements over the radio, to meet port to port as their distance closed. Now in Cut B, with the Kazakhstan far ahead, Blackthorn's XO was relieved of the Conn at
this time by the Ensign, Officer on Deck. The Commanding Officer was still on the bridge
though, sitting in a chair on the starboard wing. The XO returned to the bridge but only to
have a coffee break with the Commander, bringing him a cup from below... the Blackthorn
turning into the Cut A channel at this time. The Commander walked over to the starboard
wing and observed a shrimp boat briefly, a boat called the "Bayou"... which was following
the Cutter and as he walked back toward the port wing they were then passing under the Skyway.
Back on the port wing, the Commander spotted Buoy 1A but saw no inbound ships...
he then returned to the wheelhouse. At which time the XO asked
the Conning Officer the OOD, "Have you talked to that guy?" Referring
to the inbound Tanker Capricorn. At which point the two vessels were
less than a mile and half apart, 3 minutes or less from an encounter. There was the possibility, at specific
points, that both the Kazakhstan and Skyway Bridge Columns would have obscured
the Capricorn from view in the darkness, but not for the entire duration through Cut-A. Just moments prior... Blackthorn's Navigator was busy using the
farthest range light of Cut A, a Buoy roughly 4 nautical miles away, to plot their current course
outbound... presumably looking at charts to do so. The Cutter's lookout, posted on the flying
bridge (the small fully exposed deck above the wheelhouse)... was busy looking aft, observing
the shrimp boat and hadn't noticed the inbound Capricorn until one of the bridge's enlisted
phonetalkers pointed out the tankship's lights. The lookout above turned to observe the Tanker, confirming the sighting but the information did
not get relayed to the Conning Officer as the phonetalker assumed he was already
aware of the Capricorn's presence. So when the XO asked the Officer on Deck; "Have
you talked to that guy?" ...for whatever reason, this was what prompted the Conning
Officer to finally set his own eyes on the rapidly approaching tankship, for
the first time... immediately requesting the XO then make contact with the
Capricorn, to arrange an encounter. The Conning Officer was having a difficult
time getting a bearing on the Tanker using the Blackthorn's equipment, using their "Gyrocompass
repeaters" going back and forth between the port then starboard wing... finally getting the inbound
ship's bearing he came back into the wheelhouse, glanced at the Cutter's radar but didn't
see the Capricorn on screen... he went out to try taking bearings again from the port
side gyrocompass... when he heard a garbled transmission over the radiotelephone; "Just came
out of anchorage, and I won't be in your way"... Assuming this was a response
to the XO contacting Capricorn, confirming a port-to-port
meeting of the two vessels. The conning officer then ordered a slight
right to begin turning into Mullet Key Channel. Just prior, the Commander had also taken a look
at the radar himself and saw a large contact... he looked forward and saw the stern of Cruise Ship
Kazakhstan up ahead thus assuming the CRUISE SHIP, was the large radar contact and went about
instead studying the chart for Lower Tampa Bay. This was when HE heard the garbled transmission
"... and I won't be in your way" ...this prompted the Commander to step out onto the Port
Wing overhearing the Conning Officer give that order for the slight right to 263
degrees (the turn into Mullet Key Channel). The Commander finally saw the Capricorn for HIS first time... the vessels now less
than 400 yards or 30 seconds apart. The Commander suddenly intervened; "Come Right Some More!" The Helmsman acknowledging... The Commander quickly following
up; "Right Full Rudder!" "Sound the Collision Alarm!" Just a few minutes prior...
back onboard the Capricorn, The lookout on the bow had first sighted the
Blackthorn just as it came out from under the Skyway Bridge but stated he did not
report the sighting because it was a well lit vessel in the channel and appeared
to be approaching in a normal manner. With the tankship and cruise ship Kazakhstan
passing without incident... the Tankship's pilot was still engaged in lighthearted
conversation over his handheld radio with his fellow pilot on Kazakhstan.
Making his way to the starboard wing, Capricorn's pilot wanted to check Mullet
Key's range lights when he noticed the lights of another outbound vessel in Cut
A, already on their side of the bridge. The pilot immediately switched his
handheld to Channel 13 and attempted to contact the (unknown to them) outbound vessel. Stating that at this point, the vessel was
about 1200 to 1300 yards off their port bow by roughly 10-15 degrees... this would
put them at less than 2 minutes apart. The Pilot assumed a normal port to port meeting
would occur and that the outbound vessel would turn into Mullet Key Channel before the
Capricorn would have to begin its turn into Cut A ...estimating the two would pass at the extreme
eastern end of Mullet Key... the intersection of these two channels having been widened somewhat
on the north side of the bend, for these reasons. Capricorn's Master had actually noticed the
unknown outbound vessel a few moments earlier, just as the Tankship and Cruise Ship
Kazakhstan had finished their encounter. Walking back into the wheelhouse, the master
checked the radar and position of the outbound vessel... which was about 2 thirds of the way down
Cut A from between the Skyway and buoys 1A and 2A. The master then heard the Pilot
attempt to contact the outbound vessel. They waited about 30 seconds with no
response and tried again... meanwhile, the oncoming vessel still hadn't changed
course toward Mullet Key Channel. Trying to contact it again, Capricorn still received no response. But
also maintained their speed at full ahead. After about 30 more seconds, the pilot and master became concerned
that a critical situation was developing. Those in the tanker's wheelhouse soon realized
that the oncoming vessel had instead began to CROSS mullet key's centerline... and if the
smaller outbound vessel remained on that course, would soon be dead ahead of the Capricorn
with a port to port encounter no longer possible... potentially crossing
the bow of the tankship and at best, barely avoiding collision
while exiting the channel. While this was happening, Tug boat Ocean Star
addressed the outbound Cruise Ship Kazakhstan over channel 13 stating to the effect; "Just came
out of anchorage, and I won't be in your way." The message heard on the
Blackthorn's bridge as well. Capricorn's master walked over to the pilot, referring to the oncoming unknown vessel,
he asked; "What's that guy trying to prove?" The outbound ship's behaviour appearing to go
from aloof and erratic to downright dangerous. The vessels were 400 yards, 30 seconds apart
when the pilot abruptly changed intentions ordering a two blast whistle signal and 10
degrees left rudder to try and initiate a starboard to starboard encounter... but
still made no attempt to decrease speed. The situation was quickly worsening as the
oncoming cutter didn't respond to the two blast signal and just seconds later the
pilot ordered 20 degrees left rudder... Before the helmsman could even
execute the 20 degree order the pilot ordered HARD left rudder
and sounded the danger signal on Capricorn's whistle... an unmistakable
5 short blasts of the ship's horn. Capricorn's lookout could see though, that
the Blackthorn was now 50 to 100 ft away, close enough that he heard someone
aboard the cutter yell "HARD RIGHT!". A STOP order was finally given by
Capricorn's *Master* and the engineroom executed the order immediately...
about 5 to 10 seconds from collision. The Blackthorn, traveling at
about 11 knots... The Capricorn, 14 knots... and with both vessels unknowingly
turning TOWARD collision... the relatively small cutter SLAMMED into the massive
tankship's port bow... a full, head on collision narrowly avoided but the impact still
heeled the Blackthorn 10 degrees to starboard. Immediately after impact, Capricorn's
pilot ordered engines full astern. The engines were immediately set to full
reverse but the tanker was massive, it would take quite some time to
bleed off that much forward momentum. Keeping the rudder at hard left intentionally now,
the tanker's pilot sought to exit the channel as quickly as possible and ground the vessel. In the
chaos it had veered far off course and with its momentum, was now at risk of colliding with the
Skyway Bridge if they didn't get it stopped soon. Blackthorn's engines had been set to full reverse
as well, since moments prior to impact and as the cutter was grinding along the tanker's port bow...
before the smaller ship's forward momentum ceased, Capricorn's port anchor was grinding
along Blackthorn's port plating when it grabbed hold firmly and ripped into
the cutter amidships, penetrating into the crew shower area... becoming so firmly
embedded in the Blackthorn's port side that, when the vessels finally separated...
the anchor came along with the cutter... pulling it from it's mounting and
straining the anchor chain's brakes... The Capricorn was now turning even harder to
port, pulling Blackthorn in reverse faster than the Commander had ever seen...
while both vessels remained afloat. Sparks, dust and debris filled the air at
the tanker's bow and forecastle as the anchor chain overpowered its brakes... now running
freely, dumping loosely out the port opening, the slack running underneath the Blackthorn
as it was no longer being pulled taught. The vessels were steadily drifting apart though.
The Cutter moving backwards somewhat but the Capricorn was still increasing its distance from
the Blackthorn... not intentionally of course but this put the cutter off Capricorn's stern, and
slightly to port, as their separation increased. Onboard the Blackthorn, the initial list during
impact *was* at most, about 15 degrees to starboard but the anchor's weight brought it back
to port, maintaining a roughly 5 degree list... "Prepare for Collision" had
been piped over the Cutter's PA, just prior. But the General Quarters
Alarm even afterwards had still not been triggered and no further instructions
were being given over the PA by this time. Roughly 20 off duty crew members had gathered
on the messdeck, located on the main deck, amidships on the starboard side. This
included those brand new crew members fresh from boot sailing for their first time.
Panic and confusion ensued on the messdeck. Some crewmembers went to check the station bill
posted near the ship's office aft of the mess to check their collision at sea assignments.
An experienced Petty Officer soon took charge and ordered those in and around the
mess hall to execute condition "Zebra"; meaning all appropriate doors, fittings,
hatches and in their situation, portholes as well, should be closed and dogged or, made
watertight to prevent any potential flooding. Another petty officer used the
messdeck's telephone to check in with the bridge but was told
to standby for instructions. A crewman who'd been in the shower at
the time of collision, was found naked, injured and in shock by two others in the
maindeck passageway just aft the crew's shower. He was mumbling something about "...the anchor in
the shower" and one of those who'd found him went forward to check and sure enough, he saw with
his own eyes, the 13,500 pound or nearly 7 ton anchor embedded in one of the bulkheads
that doubled as the shower area's wall. Another sailor that had been out on the forecastle
at impact, was also being helped... two crew bringing him to the messdeck which was now
doubling as a sort of defacto triage in the chaos. While this was happening, several engineering
officers and machinery technicians were below decks checking the engine room, aft steering
and other lower compartments for water ingress but they were dry and sealed off... the
only water ingress had been through the portions ripped open near forward berthing,
below the main deck which may have allowed flooding to aft berthing as well... but
this was possibly sealed off already. Up above, two crewmen were trying desperately
to free that inflated liferaft from the railing behind the wheelhouse but were unsuccessful.
Very few crewmen were aware of lifejacket locations and even fewer knew how to actually
launch the liferafts from their enclosures. Back on the Blackthorn's bridge; One
of the quartermasters was directed to broadcast a MAYDAY on VHF Distress Channel 16 while another located the inflatable
lifejackets for those on the bridge. THE BLACKTHORN TRANSMITTED: "Mayday Mayday Coast
Guard Group St Petersburg, group St Petersburg. This is Cutter Blackthorn. Be
advised we had a collision. A collision to the seaward side of the Skyway Bridge. Approximate position one
alpha, Mullet Key Channel, over." GROUP ST PETE RESPONDED: "Cutter Blackthorn, Group St Pete Roger. Request to know if you are
taking on water and how bad the damage is, over." BLACKTHORN FOLLOWED UP: "This is Blackthorn,
standby; standby this channel..." Amidst the chaos and darkness,
it's presumed the cutter's bridge crew was unaware of the unwelcome 7-ton
passenger, embedded in their port side. The Commander and Officer on deck were
working to find the nearest shallow water area and they'd decided on Mullet
Key Shoal to the north. The Commander brought the engines to a stop... preparing to
engage them forward again to head toward... The vessels had drifted far enough apart
that the anchor Chain reached its length of 990 ft and suddenly tightened
with a force of about 126 long tons. The chain ripped through some
of Capricorn's shell plating as it wrenched Blackthorn over to
its port side almost instantly. As the vessel rolled, both the Commander and
Officer on Deck yelled "ABANDON SHIP!" but in the sudden, even more severe chaos, no one was
able to get this message out over the Cutter's PA. From the US Coast Guard; As Blackthorn began to capsize in the darkness,
Seaman Apprentice William Flores and another crewman located the lifejacket locker. They
threw lifejackets to crewmembers already in the water and Flores used his trouser belt
to hold open the locker door and allow more to float to the surface. After most of the
survivors had abandoned ship, Flores stayed with the sinking tender determined to save
more shipmates trapped in the sinking hull. Another crewmen had also valiantly
attempted to cut the wooden life BOATS free as the vessel overturned but the
cutter was just rolling over too quickly. From the NTSB; As the cutter capsized some crewmembers ran to
the nearest hatch or door leading to the outside; the four men in the engineroom remained at
their station; and other crewmembers did not know what to do and remained on the mess deck.
Some crewmembers on the bridge and forecastle jumped overboard. In escaping, the forward door
leading down to aft berthing was left open. About 15 crewmen were trapped on the mess
deck when the cutter capsized. One crewman forced open the starboard watertight
door at the forward end of the mess deck as the cutter rolled over, and he
and two other crewmen quickly escaped. The roll over had taken roughly
15-20 seconds total and the vessel's generators had cut out partway
through. Primary lighting went out and the independent emergency lanterns
reportedly never kicked on either. The crew, still left struggling
inside were in total darkness... A few seconds later, when the
cutter had completely capsized, but was still afloat, while
in or near the mess deck, another crewman found what would have
been the escape hatch from the engineroom, that leads up into the mess deck. But the ship
was inverted and this hatch was now overhead. He yelled; "I've found a way out!" ...and yet another tried to stop his
shipmates from going through that hatch. He was successful in convincing two men
that this was not an avenue for escape. The three crewmen attempted to swim out
the starboard watertight door to safety, while the others climbed up into the
engineroom through that inverted hatch. Only one of the three crewmen who used the starboard door was successful in his
efforts to escape the sinking hull. THE CAPRICORN TRANSMITTED: "[This Is] Tanker
CAPRICORN, KIHX, West of Skyway Bridge, just had a collision with another
vessel which appears to be sinking." Then another vessel, thought to be the Shrimp
Boat Bayou chimed in 30 seconds later... "...the vessel has sunk,
requesting assistance on scene!" Those in the water grasped anything they
could for flotation; floating planks, rolled up inflatable lifejackets,
and... since all survival craft aboard Blackthorn had failed... it was that wooden
watchstander's shack which had broken loose, that provided the nearest,
largest refuge for flotation.
Some were still clinging to the cutter's upturned
hull, others trying to swim away from it. A Chief Warrant Officer began ordering those who
could, to gather around the floating wooden shack, ordering the sailors clinging
to the sinking hull... into the water and to swim towards the group.
One crewman found floating unconscious was hauled up onto the floating shack
by 2 others as the group came together, prodiving mututal support to one
another while they awaited rescue. Many simply used the rolled up
lifejackets because, at the time, the style of inflatable life preservers on board
were found too difficult to fully deploy in an emergency... they were extremely cumbersome, bound
together tightly by several complex straps. But even in their pre-deployed form still provided
at least a bare minimum of life saving flotation. Capricorn had started launching one of
their lifeboats right away, but, like so many others in the time period, the launching
process was overly complex with its screw type davits and was just an open wooden rowboat
with no other form of propulsion. The men had difficulty in getting it launched
and in maneuvering it to the scene. The Capricorn was exempted from
having a proper motor lifeboat and gravity launching davits because its last
major conversion was prior to May of 1965. The Blackthorn filled with water almost
instantly once it was completely overturned so it's important to note, this entire
sequence from collision to capsizing to completely underwater... was only
about 3 and a half minutes long. Collision was roughly 8:21 PM and
the transmission that followed, reporting the vessel had "sunk" was about 8:24 PM. Capricorn also reported their own vessel
had grounded just one minute later. That shrimp trawler though, The Bayou, that
was following Blackthorn out of the bay, had rushed toward the chaos and was on
scene within just a couple minutes... The 3 crewman aboard the trawler were
able to haul 23 sailors aboard right away; providing clothing, food and warmth. Capricorn's lifeboat had actually taken quite
some time to get underway... not fully deployed until 8:45... about 24 minutes later and then was
having difficulty maneuvering toward the scene. Those survivors in the water later stating
they never saw any lifeboats or liferafts. A 41 foot Coast Guard utility boat (CG-41452)
had been dispatched immediately from Sector St Petersburg and was next to arrive
after the Bayou... joining the search and rescue by 8:52 pm, rescuing
4 more survivors and recovering 1 lifeless victim... some of those rescued
on the Bayou went over to the patrol boat, one even jumping into the water... to assist
in getting their unconscious crewman up on the 41 footer's deck... even attempting CPR
until the patrol boat reached the shore of mullet key where the men were turned over to
emergency personnel waiting on the shoreline. With 28 blackthorn crewmen accounted
for that night, 22 remained missing. The Capricorn's life boat remained on scene to
continue searching for the next few hours though, crewed by their 2nd mate and 6 other sailors
from the tanker. Joined by 4 helicopters; -2 from Coast Guard Air Station Clearwater
-1 from the Pinellas County Sheriff's Department -And another from the Tampa Police The Blackthorn lay at the bottom of
the channel now, about 48 feet deep. The first divers on scene were Scuba Divers from
the Eckerd College Search and Rescue Unit out of St Petersburg, arriving about 2 hours after
the sinking... stating they found no signs of survivors. But did not enter the vessel
and were struggling with equipment problems, strong currents and deteriorating conditions...
plus; entering such a tight, complex overhead environment with near zero visibility would
be an extremely dangerous proposition. By roughly 4 AM, the Coast Guard
Inland Construction Tender "USCGC Vise" with their hard-hat divers, would assume command of all underwater operations
and started searching more thoroughly... In addition, Cutter "White Sumac", multiple Coast Guard Auxiliary Vessels and 2
fixed-wing aircraft arrived on scene as well. The Vise was positioned directly
over the Blackthorn. Which lay on its port side across the ship channel. According to the US Coast Guard; "On the third dive the starboard side of
the hull was tapped on from the outside. Debris could be heard randomly striking
the hull from the inside of the vessel." As they dove again, on the 4th, 5th and 6th dives
- 3 victims were recovered but no air pockets or surivivors were found after a thorough
search of all accessible interior spaces. 2 more victims were found near the
buoy deck and recovered later that morning by scuba divers from
Pinellas Park Fire Department. The active, exhaustive search
for survivors would continue for another full day... being terminated
at 4:50pm on Wednesday January 30th. 3 more deceased were located in the water within
5 miles of the scene on February 3rd, 5th and 6th. With 14 of Blackthorn's crew
remaining unaccounted for. From the NTSB; On February 7th, a company hired by the
Coast Guard conducted a side scan sonar survey of Cut A Channel west of the Sunshine
Skyway Bridge. This survey showed where the CAPRICORN grounded, its anchor chain,
its anchor, and several debris fields. To raise the vessel as quickly as possible took a
massive effort. Positioned above Blackthorn were; -2 Commercial Heavy Lift Derrick Barges
-The 650 ton lift vessel "Cappy Bisso" -And the 100 ton lift vessel "Little David" Their combined efforts would have the
Cutter upright on the bottom by the 13th... Then the lifting effort spanned a full
week, when the stricken cutter was finally above the waves by February 19th...
dewatering taking about 10 hours after that. The remaining 14 victims were then
located and recovered from interior spaces deemed inaccessible while underwater. A quartermaster was found in the chartroom and 13 sailors were found in the starboard
side, upper level of the engine room. Death Certificates list official
cause as drowning for all 14. However, by the Coast Guard's own
admission; 12 of the autopsy reports suggested evidence that instead increased
the possibility of eventual suffocation. From the US Coast Guard; In his selfless effort to save more lives,
Flores sacrificed his own life. As if given the gift of life by Flores, (another
crewman) later recounted, “As I struggled, suddenly a life jacket from the locker that
was on the main deck came floating up to me.” In Total; All 32 aboard the Tankship Capricorn, reported
either minor or no... physical injuries. Of the 50 crew on board Cutter Blackthorn; 27 survivors reported minor
or no physical injuries... And 23 souls were lost. After going hard aground, Capricorn also dropped
the Starboard anchor so that the vessel would hold its position safely during the aftermath.
After a thorough inspection, no punctures were found and the tanker was
deemed ready to be re-floated. They would first cut the Port anchor free
from the forecastle in fear that it might still be snagged in the Blackthorn and to
not disturb the underwater debris field. At high tide, the Capricorn floated
free about 7:20pm Tuesday January 29th and proceeded under its own power to
Weedon Island Station to be offloaded. A 5 month long investigation followed, which
ended up quite controversial as it saw the US Coast Guard, a military agency, investigating
itself in a high profile incident where their own unit had high potential of being found at
least partially responsible... which can create significant conflicts of interest, for several
reasons. It's not to say the Coast Guard didn't come down hard on their own, I found they
very much did... in their report at least. But it simply cannot be overstated,
this ordeal was a massive wake up call and extremely raw time emotionally
for the US Coast Guard. Putting in the spotlight some very lax attitudes and
practices, towards safety and seafaring... It's especially crucial in times like these to
have a civilian agency like the NTSB who can investigate as impartially as possible.
The safety board finding many standard practices that the Coast Guard themselves
held merchant mariners to, for example... completely flouted by Blackthorn as the
tension-filled investigation got underway. In describing the incident in this video,
I personally had the luxury of getting the sequence of events from point a
to point b without breaking stride. But at the time, as with
many incidents like these, much of this information wasn't
uncovered until investigators dug deep and parties involved finally spoke
up... slowly piecing the puzzle together. For instance, it wasn't revealed
until late 1980 when a court-martial was brought against Blackthorn's
Commanding Officer, that he quote; "Opted NOT to bring on a Tampa Bay channel pilot
because ...he wasn't aware of how to do so." This was in addition to his original statement
that... "they'd been in and out of several strange ports with BLACKTHORN and I felt our navigation
team was sufficient to safely navigate the area." When he finally confessed during the trial, it
was reportedly through tears and much remorse. According to the Coast Guard; "During proceedings, the 3 officers, the
Engineer and Damage Control Officer were unable to demonstrate basic theoretical
knowledge of vessel stability. They also did not understand the information
contained in the vessel's stability book." Now, stability, or lack thereof was not found at
issue in this incident but this lack of knowledge; -Of COLREGS (or Convention on the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea) -Of Inland Water Navigation & Rules of the Road...
-Of Basic Seafaring This was of great concern to investigators. From the NTSB, quote; "During testimony...
the conning officer just prior to collision, demonstrated a lack of understanding
of the Inland Rules and Pilot Rules relative to whistle signals and of vessels
meeting in a bend in a narrow channel." Meaning; if a vessel is operating in Inland
Waters (which by definition Upper and Lower Tampa Bay do fall under and are NOT considered
high seas) the rules state the following; "Article 18 - Rule 1. When steam vessels are
approaching each other head and head, that is, end on, or nearly so, it shall be the duty of each
to pass on the port side of the other; and either vessel shall give, as a signal of her intention,
one short and distinct blast of her whistle, which the other vessel shall answer promptly by a
similar blast of her whistle, and thereupon such vessels shall pass on the port side of each other.
But if the courses of such vessels are so far on the starboard of each other as not to
be considered meeting head to head, either vessel shall immediately give two
short and distinct blasts of her whistle, which the other vessel shall answer promptly
by two similar blasts of her whistle." Which, for whatever reason Blackthorn completely neglected all or most
of this, based on these reports. It was also driven home by
the NTSB that Blackthorn's Fore and Aft Masthead lights were indeed a factor, which can create the illusion, from a 3rd
party's perspective, of a smaller vessel. By definition, from the "COLREGS"
(as of 1972 in this citing); "Rule 23: Horizontal positioning of masthead lights. Rule 23(a)(i) and (ii) and
Paragraph 3(a) of Annex I, 72 COL REGS, require, in part; that the
horizontal distance between the forward and after masthead lights be not
less than one half the length of the vessel." When a vessel is viewed from
a distance, those trained can quickly ascertain it's approximate
size... based on mast head lights. However, if their separation appears to be
similar to that of a much smaller vessel... well. But the practice was found to be
common at the time on Coast Guard cutters of similar size because
they were given an exemption; Quote; "Because of special construction,
the following Coast Guard vessels cannot comply fully with this
requirement and are exempted from compliance." This exhaustive list containing
many cutters including Blackthorn whose lights were only separated by about 16 feet. The Blackthorn's unused liferafts were
also tested and examined by investigators. Quote; "The five liferafts on board the BLACKTHORN were
recovered and examined by an expert on March 3, 1980. Two of the rafts were Mark 3 liferafts
manufactured in 1954 and 1955 by United States Rubber Co. The expert stated that, because of
the deterioration of the fabric due to age, these rafts should not have been placed
on a ship for use as survival equipment. One raft had slashes in both inflation
chambers and the second raft had no CO2 inflation cylinders. Two rafts were
Mark 5 rafts manufactured by Uniroyal in 1968 and 1970. Both rafts were
recovered in their flexible rubber carrying cases. One of the rafts found on
board the BLACKTHORN after the cutter was raised had a 4-inch cut in one of the inflation
chambers and no CO2 inflation cylinders. The other raft, found on the bottom of Tampa Bay,
inflated properly after being recovered and sent ashore. Another raft, also a Mark 5, was found
partially inflated on the surface of the water." Survivors testified that, as the cutter
capsized, BLACKTHORN's lights went out, no emergency lighting came on, and about 15
crewmen were trapped on the mess deck. About nine of these crewmen became disoriented in
the dark and climbed into the engineroom... (those that were found after
the cutter was raised.) "As a result of its investigation... the Safety
Board urgently recommended that the Coast Guard: Provide automatic emergency lighting for egress from all manned spaces on
all Coast Guard cutters." The sudden capsizing and sinking caused by the anchor were of course truly outside
anyone's scope to have foreseen. But regarding the collision the NTSB *was*
critical of Capricorn's decision making but came down hardest on Blackthorn's
Officer Corps... stating quote; "The ...Safety Board determines that the
probable cause of this accident was the failure of the BLACKTHORN to keep on the
proper side of the channel when meeting another vessel in a bend because the commanding
officer failed to adequately supervise the actions of an inexperienced officer-of-the-deck.
*Contributing* to the accident was the failure of the commanding officer of the BLACKTHORN
and the pilot of CAPRICORN to establish a passing agreement using bridge-to-bridge
radiotelephone or whistle signals and the failure of the commanding officer to keep
himself aware of all traffic in the channel. Contributing to the high loss of life
was the sudden capsizing of BLACKTHORN due to the CAPRICORN's anchor getting
caught in the cutter's shell plating." To expound on this a bit, a few of the high
impact statements from the NTSB's Conclusions; "The BLACKTHORN, a relatively small,
shallow-draft, maneuverable vessel, could have maneuvered at the edge of the channel or outside
of the channel and kept out of the way of the CAPRICORN, a large deep-draft, less maneuverable
vessel, which was restricted to the channel." The CO was not aware of the inbound
CAPRICORN until seconds before the collision, although he was on the BLACKTHORN's bridge
and ultimately in charge of its navigation. The OOD... should have verified that
the XO had established an agreement. The pilot of the CAPRICORN should not have
attempted to meet the BLACKTHORN without first establishing the same type of agreement
via radiotelephone or whistle signals. A one-blast signal sounded by the pilot of the
CAPRICORN after his first radio attempt might have prompted the crew of the BLACKTHORN to take
action to accomplish a safe port-to-port meeting. The collision may have been avoided if
the pilot of the CAPRICORN had sounded the danger signal and slowed at any time
between the two radio transmissions, or even promptly after the second transmission. The failure of the BLACKTHORN and
CAPRICORN to make radio contact was probably due to interference from
the OCEAN STAR radio which was being operated on the high power setting on channel 13. The CO's lack of recent seagoing experience and unfamiliarity with Tampa Bay made his
decision to sail at night imprudent. Neither the CO, XO, nor EO of
the BLACKTHORN understood the fundamentals of ship stability or how
to use the BLACKTHORN's stability data. The OOD's knowledge of navigation and the Rules
of the Road were not sufficient to enable him to navigate the BLACKTHORN in Tampa Bay
without direct, competent supervision. The pilot of the CAPRICORN misinterpreted
his responsibility under the Inland Rules of the Road for initiating a one-blast
signal when meeting an outbound vessel at the junction of Mullet Key and
Cut A channels. His reasoning being; "He did not sound a one-blast signal because the
two vessels were approaching each other obliquely and a one-blast signal would mean the CAPRICORN
was going to maintain course and speed when, in fact, the CAPRICORN was going to turn left to
remain in the channel." The OOD was not closely supervised
while he was conning the BLACKTHORN in unfamiliar restricted waters at night. The Coast Guard's system for selecting
officers for assignment as commanding officer and for qualifying officers to
take charge of deck-watch was not adequate. The crew of the BLACKTHORN was not
adequately trained in locating lifejackets, using liferafts and water survival techniques. The accident might have been avoided if a
pilot had been employed aboard BLACKTHORN. If the BLACKTHORN had transmitted a securite
call before getting underway or in Cut A channel before passing under the Skyway Bridge,
a passing agreement might have been established between the CAPRICORN and BLACKTHORN and
the collision might have been avoided. The commanding officers of Coast Guard
cutters can improve the operational safety of all vessels in pilotage waters
by informing local pilot associations of their movements and by broadcasting
securite calls when getting underway. Although in compliance with the Inland Rules of
the Road, this class of Coast Guard buoy tenders can be brought into closer compliance with
the international regulations for horizontal spacing of masthead lights and should comply
as closely as possible to the regulations. Rule 34 of the proposed unified
rules for preventing collisions on inland waters should eliminate
the confusion concerning whistle signals when vessels are meeting
in the bend of a narrow channel. The intersection of four
channels at buoy 2A in Tampa Bay poses an unnecessary hazard to navigation. This accident may have been avoided if ships in
Tampa Bay were prohibited from passing in bends. There is a need for a higher level of
vessel traffic service in Tampa Bay. The Coast Guard's use of Mark 3 liferafts is
unsafe and should be discontinued immediately. The location of liferaft stowage
on the BLACKTHORN did not render the liferafts ready for launching in an emergency. The hydrostatic releases for
liferafts on Coast Guard buoy tenders are set at too great a depth for
these vessels' normal areas of operation. The failure of the emergency
lighting system hindered the escape of crewmen from the BLACKTHORN. The use of nonbuoyant liferaft containers on board the BLACKTHORN made one of the
three usable liferafts ineffective. The lack of a motor lifeboat on the CAPRICORN
greatly reduced its rescue capability. The utility of lifeboats on U.S. cargo ships
is greatly reduced by the continued use of screw-type davits which increases the time
required to launch them in an emergency. The lack of automatic data recording devices on both vessels prevented an accurate
reconstruction of their tracklines. Keep in mind, when we do recommendations
like these from incidents back this far... many have been acted upon, some made
obsolete by advancements in technology and engineering... while others may be
simply outdated for whatever reason. That being said, I personally still
feel it's imperative we cover them as it's crucial in understanding the
lessons learned and steps we've taken or can keep taking as a society
to minimize loss of life at sea; Like one of MY favorite instructors used
to say; You keep training the fundamentals, the basics until you're tired of 'em... absolutely
sick of 'em. And then you train 'em some more. From the NTSB; As a result of its investigation, the Safety
Board REITERATES the following recommendation to the U.S. Coast Guard... meaning they'd
recommended this prior to this incident already: "Require the installation of an
automatic recording device to preserve vital navigational information aboard
oceangoing tankships and containerships." ...and these days, we ALL know how crucial those Voyage Data Recorders or "Black
Boxes" have been in modern times. In addition, the Safety Board
recommended that the U.S. Coast Guard: "Require all Coast Guard candidates for command
or designation as qualified deck watch officer on Coast Guard cutters over 100 ft in length to;
-Pass an examination similar to that required for corresponding merchant marine licenses
and to be reexamined on a periodic basis. -To take a course in basic ship stability and
demonstrate their knowledge of the stability and loading data for the cutter to which assigned.
-To have a period of underway training before assuming command if they have been
ashore for an extended period." "Require that the commanding officer of
each Coast Guard cutter ensure that all personnel are aware of the location of all
lifesaving equipment, such as lifejackets, and are aware of how liferafts are
launched before getting underway." "Review current water survival training programs
for Coast Guard personnel assigned to cutters, and increase the effectiveness of these programs." "Require that commanding officers of Coast
Guard cutters over 100 ft in length to; -Employ pilots when the commanding officer
is unfamiliar with pilotage waters. -To conform to local practice regarding
exchange of information with local pilot associations regarding their movements in
pilotage waters and broadcast securite calls when getting underway to inform other vessels
of their presence, unless such information would not be in the interest of national security.
-And Emphasize ...the important obligation to sound whistle signals in accordance
with the appropriate rules of the road. "Modify the lights on Coast Guard
buoy tenders to comply as closely as possible to the regulations by moving
the forward masthead light as far forward as possible and rescind or modify the
exemption for Coast Guard buoy tenders." "Prohibit ships from meeting
in bends in Tampa Bay." "In conjunction with appropriate
Federal and State agencies, relocate the intersection of the
Intercoastal Waterway and the Southwest Channel and the main shipping
channel in Tampa Bay away from buoy 2A." "Reevaluate the proposed level of
vessel traffic service (or VTS) in Tampa Bay and determine if a
higher level of VTS is needed." "Require all U.S. merchant vessels over
1,600 gross tons to be equipped with at least one motor lifeboat on each
side and gravity davits throughout." "Inventory the liferafts on
all Coast Guard cutters and replace all Mark-3 liferafts with Coast
Guard-approved liferafts immediately." "Conduct a one-time inspection of
all Mark-5 liferafts on Coast Guard cutters and replace or repair them as necessary." "Examine the stowage location of
liferafts on all Coast Guard cutters and ensure that the location permits
ready manual overboard launching." "Require that the hydrostatic releases on
buoy tenders and other Coast Guard cutters which operate principally in coastal
waters be set between 5 and 15 ft, as required by Coast Guard
regulation for merchant vessels." "Provide all liferafts used on
Coast Guard cutters with buoyant containers so that they will float
to the surface if the cutter sinks." "Examine the reliability of automatic emergency lighting aboard Coast Guard cutters
and make necessary modifications." *MAYBE The trials for the Blackthorn's Commanding
Officer and Officer on Deck amounted to a General Court Martial for the Commander but only
an "Admiral's Mast" for the Officer on Deck. The court martial could have resulted in 2-8
years of hard labor and dishonorable discharge if found guilty... but the Commanding
Officer was not convicted as a result. The Commander receiving only a
letter of admonition (the same outcome as the Officer on Deck) for
not taking proper care in monitoring the movement of other ships and
lax execution of their duties. The Tankship Capricorn did not continue on
much longer as it was sold to Shipbreakers in Taiwan by September of 1984, with work
to scrap the hulk beginning that same month. After the Blackthorn was raised, dewatered
and searched thoroughly for victims... by February 20th, the Cutter was brought back to Gulf
Drydock in Tampa where investigations continued. There was so much damage throughout, that the US
Coast Guard placed Blackthorn in a decommissioned, inactive status... going into effect immediately. Eventually, Blackthorn WLB-391 was brought
out to sea and sunk as an artificial reef in the Gulf of Mexico... nowadays
teeming with sea life but still at least partially visible as of this writing.
It's actually a popular dive site about 80 feet deep and just 200 feet away from another
similar sized vessel, a Tug Called Sheridan. From the US Coast Guard; "In the years after Blackthorn’s sinking,
surviving crewmembers who witnessed Flores’ bravery, lobbied the service to recognize and
honor their fallen shipmate. Flores’s shipmates gathered records and eyewitness accounts to ensure
that he was duly recognized for his self-sacrifice and devotion to duty. In September 2000, William
Flores’ family accepted from the service the posthumous award of the Coast Guard Medal, the
service’s highest award for peacetime heroism. Twelve years later, the service honored [him]
again with the commissioning of his namesake; Cutter William Flores... a 154-Foot Sentinel Class
Fast Response Cutter Homeported at Sector Miami." Flores was the one that stood out to me
but there were many heroes that day and multiple Memorials have since been commissioned
along with ceremonies held... to honor them. By January of 1981, perhaps the
most prominent one was founded; The Blackthorn Memorial about 2 miles north of
where the incident occurred, on the shore at the Skyway Bridge Rest area off Interstate 275.
A memorial buoy that stays lit at all times and plaque were dedicated in Coast Guard
Sector Galveston... and an underwater memorial called the "Circle of Heroes" off
the coast of Florida features a plaque and 6 foot statue dedicated to the heroic 18 yr
old, William Flores and his shipmates... I put these case studies together
with much diligence in fact finding, information gathering and then cross referencing
multiple reputable sources as I write the script. Being that well informed on these topics makes
it possible for genuine critical thinking on my part. Brick Immortar partnered with Ground
News for these same reasons. Ground News is a groundbreaking way to have a news feed free from
algorithms and partisan bias... a way to see the factual rating of sources, to see where their
partisan bias might lie and to cross reference multiple sources and stay better informed.
One easy way to support the channel is by checking out Ground News at Ground
dot News slash Brick Immortar. Videos of this size take quite the
amount of effort and time... so your patience is appreciated. This is one I'd
been putting together behind the scenes slowly for the past couple years
so I knew it was gonna be massive. The larger projects like these
are only possible because Brick Immortar has so many wonderful supporters. And a special shout out to
those top tier supporters; Trayson
Robert G P Rush
Paul Rohrbaugh Nathan M
Melon Lord Maximum Hats
Manuel M Kenneth P
Christian T Broken Spectrum
Andrew S Andrew M
Alex S And Don't Forget; Your Safety Matters.
