The Tank for 1945: A Tale of Demand, Supply and Capacity.

greetings all okay before we get started a quick merchandising plug i mean the tank museum are fairly blatant about it why can't i be the lads over at everpress are currently selling the next batch of t-shirts in addition to the previous tankers on fire significant emotional event drive me closer and remove it designs which have been relisted we've also launched a new design for my emotional support missile which seems to have started a bit of a fan of following of its own now unfortunately the sample shirt hasn't gotten to me yet and i need to record in the faint hope that deliveries will occur by christmas though the shirts have been on sale and advertising my facebook and twitter feeds for a while but it's only a couple of days after the release of this video that orders will remain open before they have to go into production and of course can openers is still available but now to business and back to some exciting readings from the archives i have in the past done a few videos as to the what and how of us vehicle development and of course i've covered some of the feedback reporting in the initial campaign in north africa i have not however really spent much time on the decision making over what will be sent to the troops and how again some of this probably is already known to you but perhaps needs to be placed in a different context after all for example it's very easy for us in hindsight to say something like well this equipment existed and should have been used but when a decision was made at the time was it just ignorance or was it a rational choice after all we know what was being developed in the u.s we have a general idea of what was being said at the pointy end but what are the folks who are making the decisions as to what to send from the u.s to the troops i've already mentioned how in 1943 a decision had to be made as to which vehicle will be the backbone of the us forces for the invasion of europe tank-wise and how the m4 was selected over the various developmental vehicles that ordnance was proposing notably the t23 by way of example a conference was held in december of 1943 in the words of colonel osborne of requirements division army service forces who chaired the meeting quote to analyze the list of modifications for the medium tank n4 series and determine which modifications should be presented to theater commanders for their consideration unquote now they categorize these as either essential or desirable what these were were field modifications for issue to units in the field basically kits not improvements which were going to happen on the production lines for future production because it was already being done the list of modifications was initially compiled by armored board but the point of asking the theater commanders was to see whether or not they desired the modifications and if so in what quantity this was done in the words of colonel dean requirements division army grand forces quote in the interests of limiting shipping space and avoiding the waste that would result if these kits were shipped over on the basis of a guest made in this country now it's easy to think that the country were just pumping out liberty ships and ridiculously short timelines might be a little bit short on shipping space but there was a very definite bottleneck between the production plants and the keysight in the uk the first solution was incredibly obvious but it also makes a very obvious statement as to the limitations of shipping tanks are being produced in the u.s faster than they could be shipped overseas as a result the depots started to have a backlog of tanks and there wasn't any particular thought being given when shipping space was available to take tanks out as to which tanks should be sent overseas from this depot of backed up tanks and oftentimes the most recent production vehicles were not the ones being shipped out it might go first in first out for example if the more recent production tanks were sent first it will be that the older vehicles would not be sent for a very long time and thus conversion kits for them or update kits at least them would not need to be shipped either as much as possible these older tanks would be retrofitted by the us-based artificers before they would be shipped out meaning it would not be unusual for units on the receiving end to receive older tanks after more modern ones probably to their confusion the next obvious comment but also worth mentioning was that the field units were set up to maintain the tanks which were in use not to in effect extend manufacturing capabilities overseas and there would be only so much capability in an ordinance unit to install it think about it when you create your ordinance unit you're creating it to support the table of organization of the unit as a result priority was to be given to fire control equipment to help destroy enemy tanks still the limitations were such that it was concluded that it may well have been more practicable to simply ship new production tanks instead of relying on field modification kits and that should tell you how seriously they consider the issues of trying to not overload the guys in the theater now i might have thought that sending a few more guys to do the work by taking less room but that's the way that they were thinking about it send completed tanks not kits another example of the problem is given in the case of an improved cam for the oil gear traverse motor apparently 1332 of the things have been shipped to europe by this date in december 43 only to discover that only 700 tanks with oil gear traverse were actually there to accept them then there was a discussion about the quick fix armor protection kits now these are the additional plates welded over the turret side for the gunner and the ammunition stowage in the sponson together with the skeletonized turret basket which removes some of the protective walling around the turret basket and allows greater access from the turret to the hull nato had requested 500 of these kits these were time consuming modifications but not massively difficult to actually do so perhaps the tasking could be cascaded down to troops in rest areas on the other hand thought the committee the troops wouldn't exactly be getting much rest if they were spending all the time welding and cutting steel in the end the theater commander they decided could figure out the division of work because after all the theater commander had asked for the kits in the first place now as a counterpoint there was a decision to not send conversion kits for the m34 gun mount to the m34a1 standard now this basically consists of the installation of a coaxial telescope to be used in addition to the periscopic site this was however considered to be too labor intensive to do in the field so the decision was made to simply ship over completed new production m34a1 mounts which could then be installed in the field score went for the modular design of the sherman's turret as that all it you needed to do was just undo a whole bunch of screws and bolts around the outside of the mantlet even if the actual size and weight of the components either the entire m34a1 mount was much bigger than just a simple conversion kit but it makes it easier at the far end another example of the differences between what was desired and what was possible was a chain of meetings around april of 1944 now at this point of course d-day hadn't yet happened the 76-millimeter tank was in full production but still you know things people folks are thinking about the future major general c.l scott set up a conference with the best officers that he could find at fort knox they included anybody from general camp who wrote tankers in tunisia which is freely available online by the way and general robinette who was a combat command commander in first armored division in north africa then you go down colonel williams of armored board the directors of tactics the gunnery department medical research i.e ergonomics today doctrine and organization tests and equipment sections and a whole bunch of other folks for combat or development experience now unfortunately nobody from the r d or service forces was present and so this is purely a matter of this is what we want without any regards as to whether or not such things were possible not just technologically but also in terms of production the premise was quote to provide our soldiers with a tank which will give them at least an even chance against the enemy on the battlefield some quoting from the report of the conference follows open quote except for a short time after the appearance in battle of our m4 german tanks have consistently excelled our tanks in quality and design of suspension systems performance of guns caliber for caliber and in fire control equipment the present torsion bar suspension is tested in the t24 tank may eliminate the first deficiency our present fire control instruments which are coming off production will equal if not excel the german in every respect our present tank guns are inferior to the german tank guns of light caliber in muzzle velocity and consequently in harbor piercing qualities the new german panther tank is superior to any american tank including the t25 e1 and t26 e1 in the following respects power with figures given of 690 horsepower for the hl230 armament sea attached chart for armor penetration power and ammunition stowage the panther carries 75 rounds of 75 millimeter ammunition the only comparable tank we have the 90 millimeter tanks t25e1 and t2061 carry only 48 rounds of 90 millimeter ammunitions while it is conceded that the primary objective of our armor is to engage the enemy infantry in position artillery and rear installations experience has shown that the enemy will always counter an armored penetration with his own armor therefore in order to operate successfully against renumerative and desirable enemy installations we shall first have to defeat the enemy armor to do this we must have a fighter tank which is superior to the fighter tank of the enemy available information on the characteristics of german tanks as compared to those of our nation show that no american tank can equal the german panther in all around performance this german tank first appeared on the battlefield in early 1943 and it can be assumed that the enemy is progressive and is continuing developments to improve his fighting vehicles to a point where even the panther will be superseded by a more powerful and better all-around vehicle now i'm going to detour out a little bit now and quote the same general scott in early 1945 but even half later not even even after april 44 about a year later and just to show some of the difference of this is what i think after experience quote since the third army started fighting the germans in august german tank losses have been virtually double those of third army 287-136 mobility and offensive ability and equipment are requirements which best fit our tactics and strategy and the characteristics of the american soldier this is not idle chatter but is being proven daily in combat and by nearing defeat of one of our enemies who is supposed to be the last working armor in the blitz all in all to meet the requirements of many theaters and many varying conditions of combat in each theater we have the finest all-around all-purpose light medium tanks in the world a fighter tank to pierce heavy armor and to fight hostile tanks is now ready only a year and a half after the demand for it came from the battlefront and that is quite a reversal i mean score one for 2020 hindsight anyway back to april 44. in order to perform the primary mission armored units should have the following types of tank they said a light tank for battlefield reconnaissance and security this need will be amply met for future operations by the t24 light tank b a medium tank for assaulting renumerative targets such as in between position artillery and rear installations this tank can fulfill the role of infantry support tank by adding heavier armor and accepting reduced mobility this heavier tank can fulfill the requirements as an assault tank the necessary characteristics for such a tank have been outlined in letter 14 february 1944 quote military characteristics for a medium tank end of title this tank requires a gun with good high explosive effect against primary targets since the ammunition requirements for this type of weapon are high the 75 millimeter gun has up to now being standard equipment the requirement for a gun of greater high explosive effect has been met by supplementing the 75 millimeter tank with tanks carrying 105 millimeter howitzers in the m4 tank the stowage 105 millimeter ammunition is 20 less than 75 millimeter ammunition and the rate of fire is somewhat reduced only after trial in battle can it be determined to what extent the 105 millimeter will replace the 75 millimeter in the new medium tank c a fighter tank for the primary purpose of defeating enemy armor and for the secondary role of providing direct fire support to troops assaulting fortifications and to provide a tank capable of furnishing overwatching fire for the light medium tanks an attempt has been made to meet this requirement by the m4 e6 76 millimeter and various experimental models mounting both the 76 and 90 millimeter guns to date no satisfactory experimental models including the t23 t25 or t26 have been developed because of failure to provide in them one or more of the following characteristics one a gun superior or equal to the german two adequate stowage of ammunition and equipment three adequate fighting space for the crew to handle ammunition and fire the weapons rapidly four low ground pressure 5. adequate muzzle brake and ammunition combination to permit rapid and accurate fire and this refers primarily to smoke and obscuration from firing 6. adequate motive power we have a 500 horsepower engine against a known 690 horsepower engine it has been proposed by the armored board on 6 april 1944 that for 1945 production we produced the t25e1 carrying the following guns 105 millimeter howitzer 75 millimeter gun 76 millimeter gun it is conservatively estimated that in order to make the present t25e1 a fightable tank to train personnel in its maintenance and use and to get on the battlefield in sufficient quantity will require 14 months july of 1945. this estimate does not include the development procurement and issued to theaters of suitable engineer bridging equipment a large number of tank transporters special tools and adequate spare parts and again i'm going to go on to an aside here the standard american bridge the m1 treadway bridge maxed out at about 20 35 tons give or take now it was officially rated for 25 but especially after some pontoon modification to make the m2 sherman weight proved feasible however in late 1942 ordnance told the engineers that there was no reasonable likelihood of a tank heavier than that being procured so there was no merit in spending any effort and further bridge development and acquisition so i mean i guess he understood the writing on the wall for the m6 heavy no matter what burns felt but of course in the end they go and build t26 which required a new bridge the m4 pontoon bridge and though the m4 pontoon bridge was approved in november 44 and thus predates the series production of the t26 e3s that the persians went overseas no m4 bridges made it to the war zone before the end of hostilities which of course leads to the firm the famous delay or american when sherman could cross to support infantry on the rsi but the pershings had to wait a few days the transporter issue was solved by modification of vehicles already in existence subject of course to the man hours required to do it anyway back again to april 44. and but if you're new to this channel as probably a few of you are uh especially after the tks video which seems to have blown up you'll discover i do tend to detour on occasion sort of a national trade since the proposed 1945 tank development program cannot be affected before july of that year it is apparent that initial operations in europe must be carried out with present equipment okay if the initial operations are not decisive a completely new tank superior to anything yet developed in this country will be required for new operations it is believed that such a tank can be produced in approximately 18 months the time gained by a tank known to be inferior to the present german panther i.e t25e1 instead of this proposed fighter tank offers no advantage it is therefore recommended that the proposed 1945 tank production program be reconsidered that in order to provide the type of medium tank reference to above immediate steps be taken to initiate and vigorously carry out development of a new medium tank that in order to provide the required fighter tank the ordnance department in conjunction with armored board national defense research council and armed medical research laboratory be directed to develop immediately a gun with ammunition turret and fire control system which will excel the german 7.5 kwk 42 and which can be mounted on the same tank chassis above that if this recommendation is impossible what yeah i mean look how long it took them to design the other tanks the above agencies be directed to produce a replica of the german panzer 5 with a 75 kwk 42 which will permit our troops to fight on at least equal terms with the enemy now of course this entire report was promptly ignored by most everybody however it's still informative as it is demonstrated of to how the perceptions of tank inferiority applied to some of the senior staff of armored force at the time not only the tank crew it's also interesting to note that they didn't say a thing about armor they only talked about the gun which actually does again if you digress you look what the germans were saying let's say when i met the kv says you know we don't need more armor we need a bigger gun we get a bigger gun we're happy we can deal with the light armor americans were saying the same thing even in the field give us a gun that would kill tanks we don't care about the level of armor but either way the this this whole uh this whole conference that he had and it looks like he just came up with the idea on his own and just gathered every the guy's a major general you can't exactly say no when if you're a colonel and this major general comes along and says hey i'm putting together a meeting you are invited invited you're going to go nobody had asked him to put this together and obviously as i say with nobody there from ordinance or or procurement some of the realities of what they're talking about still as an ex as an exercise shall we say in in a focus group in wishful thinking i guess you have that valid however less ignored than this conference was a message from london army ground forces asked the european theater what sort of armament they wanted on 1945 production of tanks because again he got a bit of lead time here a colonel heath brought back the reply hey armament 105 millimeter howitzer 75 percent of the tanks 90 millimeter gun 25 of the tanks the two types of armament are definitely desired the proportions must be considered as tentative b ammunition 70 rounds of ammunition is the minimum acceptable in each tank with both types of weapons 70 rounds is to be considered as the minimum figure more rounds are urgently desired see mobility the theater desired no reduction in mobility additional armor is not desired if it cuts into mobility the theater considers the mobility of medium tank m4a1 is unsatisfactory because it is underpowered the standard of mobility is the medium tank m4a3 d widths greater than 124 inches are acceptable only if bridges capable of handling wider tanks are furnished e the bow machine gun to be retained f it must be kept in mind that tanks must be moved by transporters g reduced ground pressure is desired they then gave the european perspective on the information that they were receiving about this proposed new tank that they were about to get the t25 e1 not the 26 the 25 the one with less armor it listed the following is advantages as european theater saw it designed with the 90 millimeter gun turret has a torque converter for simplified driving has improved suspension providing a smoother ride provide improved ground pressure characteristics if provided with the t26 e1 track and suspension which is wider has a favorable silhouette it also lists the following as disadvantages of the t25 it will not meet the theater's stated requirement for ammunition extreme difficulty is being encountered in providing an accessible stowage of 52 rounds of ammunition a satisfactory turret for the 105 millimeter howitzer has not been built and indeed it wouldn't be until you get to the the m45 which saw service in korea this tank is a new design and its mechanical perfection is not yet complete now there's an understatement for april 44. it must be expected that it will have to go through a period of teething troubles wide bridges are required if this tank is to be used the rate of fire will be very slow unless vast improvement can be made in the ammunition stowage this improvement is doubtful progress is slow on the development of smokeless flashless rounds of ammunition for the 90 millimeter gun in fairness they would fix that one the time required to place this tank in production will be considerable and it is estimated that adequate quantities for combat service cannot be available before 1945. considerable training will be required when units previously equipped with medium tanks m4 series are re-equipped with this tank when the t26e1 track and suspension are added the weight of the tank now at 78 000 pounds will be increased by between two to three thousand pounds now the other proposal considered was for the m4a3 with a 90 millimeter turret and it says of this possibility it is possible that the requirements for the european theater of operations can be met by mounting a 90 millimeter gun turret similar to the t25 design on the whole of the medium tank m4a3 the whole of the medium tank m4a3 will be equipped during the latter part of 1944 production with the 23-inch track and the horizontal valued spring suspension such a tank will have the following it is estimated that between 60 and 70 rounds can be stowed in this tank without overcrowding the fighting compartment again because you got the big sponsons it's always an advantage to having a high tank as well as a disadvantage there is in production in 1944 a 105 millimeter 105 millimeter howitzer turret on this tank the mechanical components of this tank are very well developed and proven the change in spare parts to ensure adequate maintenance will be a minimum the retraining required for troops to be re-equipped with this tank will be a minimum this tank can use existing 124-inch bridges this tank can be transported on existing transporters the time required to place this tank into production will be a minimum since no new hull and mechanical components are required the principal design work required will be to redesign the ammunition arrangements on the negative side an increase in height of silhouette due to the greater height of the 90 millimeter turret which was about four and a half inches over the 76 millimeter tank and about a foot higher than the silhouette of the t25e1 it will have less armor protection than t25e1 but will be equal to the m4 on the hull and greater than the m4 on the turret the suspension will not provide as satisfactory riding characteristics as the t25e1 suspension okay you've got bogey versus torsionbar estimated gross weight of tank 80 490 pounds or 4490 pounds more than an m4a376 hvss they then suggested making an entirely new hull design to meet the eto's requirements but since they realized that the chances of this happening for 1945 production will be slim so obviously they're doing better than general scott already and that the final vehicle will probably have less armor than the 255 and also look at a heck of a lot like an m4a3 hull i'm just going to skip over that section of the report it doesn't go any further anyway really so armored board had a chew on this and they came up with a couple of rfis requests for information so for example they figured that they could install 52 rounds into t25e1 and an additional 18 rounds not in wet stowage if you took away the bow gunner's position you just got rid of the bow gun you put the 18 rounds in there and that'll get you to 70. would the eto accept such a modification because after all they said they want they want to keep the bow gunner how quickly would they require the tanks if they want the t25 e1 it would be may or june 45. if they would accept a 90 millimeter m4a3 maybe they could get them by january 45. if they would take the 52 round t25e1 would they accept a tracked armored ammunition carrier to resupply the tanks to make up for the you know the ammunition deficiency they also observed that the t26 e1 would have the same advantages and disadvantages as the t25 you want except would have increased weight and reduced mobility which would not meet etl requirements the board stated quote in the opinion of armoured board none of the available tanks are entirely suitable as 90 millimeter gun carrying tanks it appears that none of them will completely meet the requirements established by the european theater of operations the medium tank t25e1 has its principal deficiency in the matter of ammunition stowage and incomplete development the medium tank m4a3 with 90 millimeter turret has less disadvantage in a matter of ammunition stowage but has greater advantages from the standpoint of being readily placed in production causing less disturbance to spare part supply and in less training of troops in the opinion of armored board the use of a 90 millimeter turret on the m4a3 chassis offers the most promising means of meeting the european theater of operations requirements a powerful consideration in this opinion is is the uh the fact that with proper support the medium tank m4a3 with 90 millimeter gum can be made available in combat quantities from six to eight months earlier than the t25e1 both the medium tanks t25e1 and medium tank m4a3 with the 90 millimeter gun when ready for battle will weigh approximately 80 000 pounds thus it appears that neither solution will meet the eto desires in the matter of mobility in any event the use of either the medium tank t25 e1 with the t26 suspension or the medium tank m4a3 with the 90 millimeter gun can be regarded as only an unsatisfactory expedient in providing a 90 millimeter gun tank every effort should be made to design a tank which will be a satisfactory 90 millimeter gun tank the most important consideration in determining which expedient tank since they're both going to be expedient anyway is to be used to meet the european theater of operations requirement is of when 90 millimeter gun tanks are required on the battlefield in europe so armored board recommended that based on the limited information at the then present time waiting for the rfis to come back from europe again the medium tank m4a3 mounting a 90 millimeter gun be considered the most promising means of meeting the eto's need for a 90 millimeter gun tank but before the final decisions were made wait till you hear back on those rfis from europe they also recommended a new tank be designed to meet the latest characteristics required a couple of weeks later 17th of may 1944 another meeting was held in fort knox and this time they dragged general barnes out from his office in dc to partake so now you know you know got somebody on the supply side or the design side actually partaking in all this firstly it was observed that after doing some rejiggering technical term they could manage to put 71 rounds into t25 and t26 of which 12 would be in the turret stowage items may have to be sacrificed or moved and the protection of wet stowed was no longer an option they just didn't have the room the turret would be crowded and access to the driver's compartment difficult this is caused by the requirement from eto to retain the bound machine gun the 71 rounds though could be attained if all other matters were subordinated that's a direct quote the t25 with the t26 suspension would be possible it would add about a ton and a half to the weight of the tank and obviously also to the weight of metal being dragged around by the by the engine but ground pressure would drop to about 11 psi the over strength t2060 suspension would probably also require less maintenance the m4 with the 90 millimeter turret as mentioned would not meet the ets requirement for mobility of the m4a3 with a 75 mm gun or better but t25 and t26 would the width problem was being addressed by changes to regulation and engineer equipment which as mentioned earlier was not actually going to end up going to europe until after the war ended most importantly though and why this wasn't stated as item number one and just stopped the argument to begin with i've no idea ordinance branch declined to agree to the use of the 90 millimeter m4 tank instead of t25 or t26 the m4 with the 90 millimeter gun was not a better tank overall than t26 and it would not have been possible to get 90 millimeter guns before the t25 and t26 tank center production the bottleneck was 90 millimeter gun production which have been completely stopped orders had to be placed immediately for any requirements desired a year later so if you're going to get a 90 millimeter gun tank you are not going to get it any sooner if it were mounted on a sherman or on a pershing hole and thus it was that the 90 millimeter on sherman became an item of curiosity as opposed to a program of record it was done like many experiments in the u.s did just to see if it could be done and what would happen the issue of the ammunition by the way did not go away so easily on the 5th of january 1945 a letter was sent by general gatehouse of the british supply mission to dc to the chief of ground requirements army grand forces a general waldron the british noticed that in the revised fighting compartment designs of the 76 millimeter sherman the t26 and t29 armored board were now prepared to accept the principle of placing unarmored ready rounds high up in the tank in a turret on this point the director of the royal armor corps raymond briggs found himself quote in complete disagreement with the armored board when referring to the arrangements that there would be occasions or or specific circumstances which would consider the risk of extra ammunition more justified and acknowledging that the argument was hardly new he wrote quote it appears to us that such arguments do not justify the production of a vehicle with a lower degree of protection against fire that has been proven possible to obtain he then referenced a reporting from italy which said that a high percentage of churchills had caught fire and that the cause appeared to be due to ammunition which was also observed that no knocked out 76 millimeter shermans had burned when there was little doubt that a regular sherman would have burned this confirmed the british opinion that the chief cause of tank fires was ammunition information coming in from western europe to the british army was no less convincing and gatehouse said that the old system of positioning unarmored rounds high up in the tank was a retrograde step which only the man on the spot is justified in taking for special reasons for a specific operation the british proposed a compromise a small ready rack consisting of armored rims minimum of 5 maybe up to seven if they can get them to fit they would rather have a few armored rounds than a large number of unarmored ones the american reply must completely baffle the british in its inconsistency firstly it says that the lack of wet stowage in the turret rack was a result of an eto demand for extra ammunition but that the folks in the us felt that with the increased armor on the tank it was an acceptable change then it notes that u.s tankers initially wanted to carry as much ammunition as possible in the tank when they entered battle but as it became more experience carrying extra rounds was not as prevalent and was now actively frowned upon however they say lack of suitable battlefield resupply has resulted in excessive ammunition being carried regardless also regardless there was a universal demand for redirects then quote an analysis of the tank losses in the first us army indicates that ammunition is not the primary cause on the majority of fires in burned tanks then a quote again while there is considerable weight in the thought that most burned out tanks are due to initial fires in the ammunition there is no conclusive proof of this theory and there is considerable doubt seriously i mean audience are fairly convinced they did tests there is a reason that they created wet stowage there's a reason why carrying extra ammunition is quote frowned upon by the commanders in the field then he goes and says it is recognized that unprotected ammunition high up in either the turret or the hull of the tank offers a definite hazard so far as fires initiated by enemy projectiles piercing the tank is concerned and what else has been causing those fires in first army then in any case their position was that if you were to armor any worthwhile number of rounds in the ready rack there will be a serious reduction in space for the loader which if comma is anything to go by is true in view of this fact and of the questioned cause for the majority of tank fires it was believed that the calculated risk of unprotected ammunition and ready racks in the turrets of tanks must be accepted but to make you happy we'll look at trying to invent an armored one anyway so god knows what the british thought about that bs it is of interest to note of course that over time the use of unprotected stowage became again more and more common as tank rounds kept getting bigger and room to stow them all became more of a premium i mean look at an m60 or a leopard one or an arietta and no one seems to bat an eye the unprotected ammunition and deterred and of course the ordnance would have been very happy to dispense with the bow gunner in order to simplify and strengthen the front hull but the end user would have nothing of it the firefly sherman conversion would not apparently have sat well with them but i didn't anyway best for it for the turret reasons anyway i thought all this might be of some interest to you in understanding the deliberations behind why the vehicles came out as they were it wasn't just the designers on the drawing boards and mock-ups trying to be as efficient as possible with the guidance of armored force the end users who are in the front line seemed to know what they wanted now of course all these exchanges with the exception of that last one about ammunition storage happened before d-day when in practice the eto didn't seem all that pushed about 76 millimeter tanks let alone anything bigger after all a month later from all this those 76 millimeter tanks would be left behind in the uk for reasons that really weren't as serious as the concerns they had over the 90 millimeter tanks right so that said i hope you found the above interesting and informative and i will see you at the next one which i shall add is going to be pre-recorded and not released live unlike all these other ones due to my being out of town on military leave for a couple of weeks so i'm also not going to be responding very much on patreon sorry patreon or discord so right as i say again look at the link below for the t-shirts and i'll see you in the next one take care

Channel: The_Chieftain

Views: 94,627

Rating: 4.9577203 out of 5

Keywords:

Id: hQggt4Co54A

Length: 38min 53sec (2333 seconds)

Published: Sat Nov 28 2020