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independent history productions. And now that I have rambled for way too long,
over to Jesse and The Great War. It’s January 1920, and in Constantinople,
the Ottoman Parliament adopts Mustafa Kemal’s National Pact, which promises resistance against
the Allied and Greek forces in the country – it's the Greco-Turkish War and the War
of Turkish Independence. Hi, I’m Jesse Alexander and welcome to The
Great War. In late October, 1918, the Armistice of Mudros
had brought a stop to the war between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire. But the region was gripped by uncertainty
made worse by hunger and the threat of violence between ethnic and religious groups, especially
between Muslim Turks and Christian Armenians and Greeks. Although the armistice did not call for a
full occupation, it did give the Allies the right to station troops in areas they felt
vital to their security. This was interpreted liberally, and the harbour
at Constantinople was soon full of Allied warships, and Allied military officers entered
the city. British, French, and Italian troops also landed
along the Anatolian coast and advanced into the southeast. This caused great resentment amongst the Ottoman
Turks, since British Admiral Calthorpe had told the Ottoman negotiators there would be
no occupation. Husein Rauf Orbay, the head of the Ottoman
delegation, wrote later: “There was a general conviction in our country that England and
France were countries faithful not only to their written pacts, but also to their promises. And I had this conviction too. What a shame that we were mistaken in our
beliefs and convictions!” (Macmillan 379) Sultan Mehmed VI’s government
adopted a conciliatory policy, and agreed to most Allied demands, including war crimes
trials and disarmament. SEGUE
So with Allies having begun a de facto partial occupation of the Ottoman Empire, the Paris
Peace Conference turned to the so called Eastern Question. This was the riddle of what do to about the
long decline of the Ottomans, a problem for European diplomats since the late 18th century. The Ottoman Sick Man of Europe had been crushed,
but re-organizing Asia Minor would prove to be a difficult task. For one thing, various secret wartime agreements
had allotted different spheres of influence, but these were sometimes vague and sometimes
contradictory. The Greeks and Italians, for example, had
been promised overlapping zones, and the plans for Russian involvement had to be scrapped
due to the revolution. Each power had its own interests to look out
for as well. The French had important financial interests
in Turkey, and were not keen to see the Italians or the British dominate the eastern Mediterranean. The British needed a new partner in the region,
which was vital for communication with India because of the Suez Canal. Lloyd George saw the Greeks in this role,
but his cabinet was divided on the question. The Americans, for their part, had never even
declared war on the Ottomans, but were getting on quite badly with the Italians at the Peace
Conference. Wilson’s 14 points included one about the
Ottoman empire, but it promised the Turks quote secure sovereignty and the minorities
a quote unmolested opportunity of autonomous development. (Macmillan 387). It was not easy to see how all these circles
could be squared, even if many Allied leaders had a soft spot for Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios
Venizelos based on their admiration for Ancient Greece. Clemenceau said of him: “Ulysses is only
a small man beside him. He is a diplomat of the first rank, very sensible,
very well prepared, very shrewd, always knowing what he wants.” (Macmillan 443). Lloyd George was no less enthusiastic, and
called him: “The greatest statesman Greece had thrown up since the days of Pericles.” (Macmillan 364). In Paris, there were endless discussions about
spheres of influence, mandates, whether Constantinople should be given to Turkey or Greece, and what
should be done about the Armenian and Kurdish questions. A tentative agreement was reached in early
May, by which Wilson half-heartedly agreed to a US mandate for the region, including
a large Armenian state in eastern Anatolia. This was subject to the approval of the US
Senate, even though according to the conference records: “[Wilson] could think of nothing
the people of the United States would be less inclined to accept than military responsibility
in Asia.” (Macmillan 390)
But this agreement proved to be short-lived, and fell apart soon after it had been reached. The Allies could not agree on what to do,
and, after the human and economic cost of the previous years of total war, they lacked
the military forces necessary to impose their will even if they had a common policy. It was clear the old Ottoman Empire would
be no more, but it was not clear what would take its place amid the growing tensions in
the unstable region – and everyone was hoping for a share of the spoils. And that is where the Greeks come in. Now, Greece had entered the war late and was
politically divided between those who still supported the exiled King Constantine, and
those who followed Prime Minister Venizelos and his ambitious plans for expansion. For Venizelos and many other Greeks, 1919
was an historic moment that might finally see the realization of the Megali Idea, the
dream of 19th century nationalists. This would see a Greater Greece stretching
from the central Balkans deep into Anatolia, including lands that had been part of Ancient
Greece and the Byzantine Empire. And there actually was a large Greek-speaking
minority in the Ottoman Empire, especially along the Aegean coasts centred on Smyrna. The city had a Greek majority, some of whom
wanted union with Greece, but was surrounded by majority Turkish regions. Chauvinism played a role in Greek aspirations
as well, and some felt they had a right to rule over the inferior Turks. Venizelos described how he felt: “The Turks
were good workers, honest in their relations, and a good people as subjects. But as rulers they were insupportable and
a disgrace to civilisation, as was proved by their having exterminated over a million
Armenians and 300,000 Greeks during the last 4 years.” (Karsh 330) Wartime deportations and deaths
of Ottoman Greeks, though fewer than Venizelos claimed, helped radicalize the Greek community. Venizelos argued forcefully for his ideas
at the Paris Peace Conference. On February 3rd, he presented Greek claims:
Thrace and southern Albania in the Balkans, numerous islands in the Aegean, and a large
part of the western Anatolian coast, including Smyrna and its hinterland. (Macmillan 362) He did not ask for Constantinople,
though privately he still hoped that it would go to Greece eventually (Macmillan 359). The Orthodox Patriarchate, which was based
in Constantinople, went further, and lobbied the Peace Conference to give the city to Greece
(Macmillan 383). So the Greeks based their claims on history,
ethnicity, and cultural arguments. And in the confusion and deadlock of the Peace
Conference, Greater Greece was about to get its chance. In April and May, the Peace Conference was
in crisis on several topics. In particular, the Italian delegation clashed
bitterly with their Allies, and left the conference. While they were away, the Italians decided
the time had come to take what they felt they had been promised in Asia Minor. They landed more troops on the Mediterranean
coast, and rumours reached Paris of Italian warships off Smyrna. The other Allies, and the Greeks, were incensed. Clemenceau said of the Italians: “If we
don't take precautions, they will hold us by the throat.” (Macmillan 440). Lloyd George and Venizelos agreed now was
the time for Greece to intervene, and the British Prime Minister pushed the issue with
Clemenceau and Wilson. On May 6th, the day before the Italians were
to return to Paris, Wilson, frustrated with the Italians, suggested the Greeks land sooner
rather than later. The Big Three agreed, and the die was cast. But in doing so, they had ignored the warnings
of some of their own advisors. A British general staff report pointed out:
“[Greek occupation] will create a source of continual unrest, possibly culminating
in an organised attempt by the Turks to reconquer this territory.” (Criss) General Wilson described the plan
in his diary as quote mad and bad, and Winston Churchill opposed it as well. The American experts questioned the wisdom
of a Greek presence in Smyrna, given the economic importance of the city to a viable Turkish
state. Even the Greek General Metaxas had his doubts,
as he told hid Prime Minister: “The Greek state is not today ready for the government
and exploitation of so extensive a territory.” (Macmillan 441). But in spite of the warnings, the Allied leaders
had decided the Greek army would land at Smyrna and occupy the surrounding countryside. It was officially a mission to maintain law
and order, but many Greeks had hopes for more. Greek troops began landing at Smyrna the morning
of May 15, 1919. The previous night, thousands of Turks had
drummed in protest, but on this day thousands of Greek-speaking residents turned up to welcome
the Greek army. Due to a mix-up with their orders, one unit
marched past an Ottoman Army barracks. A shot was fired at the Greeks, though it
is still disputed who pulled the trigger. Outraged, the Greek troops returned fire and
stormed the barracks. As they marched the captured Ottoman soldiers
to the prison ship in the harbour, several prisoners were killed by Greek troops and
Greek-speaking civilians. (Smith 89) The passions aroused by wartime
oppression of Ottoman Christians ran wild, and riots soon broke out across the city,
with deadly results. Sources disagree on the exact numbers, but
by the end of the day some 300 to 400 Turks and 60 to 100 Greeks were dead or seriously
wounded. (Macmillan 444, Gerwarth 344)
Venizelos had appointed a civilian governor to administer the region, Aristeidis Stergiadis. Stergiadis needed to restore calm, and this
he was able to do relatively effectively in Smyrna. He punished most of those responsible for
the killings, and insisted on strict legal equality for both Christians and Muslims. He also resisted demands from the Orthodox
Church and more extreme Greeks for anti-Muslim legislation. (Gerwarth 231, Smith 92). He reorganized public administration and began
to resettle 100,000 Greek refugees who had fled or been deported during the war (Smith
100) - a task complicated by the presence of Turkish refugees from the Balkans, who
were also in a desperate situation. Some of his policies, along with his fiery
temper, were unpopular with more zealous Greeks, who called for him to be dismissed. But Venizelos defended Stergiadis and instead
criticized the army: “[…] if in particular our military men in Smyrna do not pull themselves
together from their intoxication and do not prevent any new excess, and punish […] all
those that have occurred, we shall end by being driven out of Smyrna, humiliated and
degraded.” (Smith 99-100) The very nationalism that had
prompted the Greek intervention now threatened it. But even as the Greeks began to try to stabilize
the situation in Smyrna, in the countryside outside the city, there were violent clashes
between Greek troops and Turkish armed groups known as cete - and the civilian population
also participated in the killings. A case in point was Aydin. Greek troops entered the town at the end of
May, and massacres ensued. Then they left, but returned in late June. A see-saw battle raged into July, with the
town changing hands several times. Each time one side advanced, new atrocities
were committed, and both the Greek and Turkish quarters were torched. One Greek soldier recalled: “It was hell. The regular Turkish army was in retreat, but
the cete had remained and were slaughtering, plundering, and torturing Greeks and Armenians,
and were rounding up women for their harems [...] Then reprisals began – mosques set
alight, the beards of hodjas set fire to; trousers were pulled down, followed by shots
in the buttocks [...]” (Gerwarth 231) SEGUE
So the Greeks had established themselves in and around Smyrna, and local Turkish resistance
groups had organized in response. But farther East, in the Turkish Anatolian
heartland, a much bigger political and military movement was growing. The Turkish cete bands in the west were not
the only Turks who were unhappy with the presence of Greek and Allied troops in Asia Minor. Ottoman General Mustafa Kemal was convinced
that there was no other option but to expel the foreign troops. Upon seeing the Allied fleet at Constantinople
in late 1918, he simply observed: “As they have come, so they shall go.” (Karsh 328)
He would get his chance when the Ottoman government appointed him Inspector of the 9th Army, based
in Eastern Anatolia. He arrived in Samsun on May 19, and immediately
began to rally provincial officials and officers to the cause. In his words, he wanted to: “[…] create
a new Turkish state, the sovereignty and independence of which would be unreservedly recognised
by the whole world.” (Karsh 328)
The incidents at Smyrna had sparked many Turks out of the shock of defeat. One nationalist supporter wrote: “After
I learned about the details of the Smyrna occupation, I hardly opened my mouth on any
subject except when it concerned the sacred struggle which was to be.” (Macmillan 444) On this foundation of outrage
and national pride, Kemal planned to organize in Anatolia, out of reach of foreign forces. He secretly met with other prominent Turks,
and along with the help of General Karabekir and others, called for resistance. This activity was at odds with the Ottoman
government’s conciliatory policies, and Kemal was dismissed from his post and recalled
to the capital. But instead of returning, he resigned and
pushed ahead with his plans. He sent a telegram known as the Amasya Circular
to Turkish officials, outlining the principles of resistance discussed in the secret meetings
and announcing upcoming conferences to take action. This was a major step in the beginning of
the Turkish War of Independence. The Erzurum conference in July and August,
and the Sivas Conference in September, were attended by fewer delegates than expected. But, they adopted a program that would soon
become influential. This program, which would later become known
as the National Pact, set out the basis for Turkish national resistance. It rejected foreign influence, proclaimed
the territorial integrity and independence of a Turkish state where Muslim Turks formed
a majority, and asserted the right to use force of arms to achieve these goals. (Karsh 332) It also called for plebiscites
in other parts of the empire. Now there was some support among conference
delegates for the idea of an American mandate for the region, but only if it did not infringe
on Turkish independence (McMeekin 421). Now although he didn’t publicly come out
against the Sultan, Kemal favoured a move to a modern republic: “To labour for the
maintenance of the Ottoman dynasty and its sovereign would have been to inflict the greatest
injustice upon the Turkish nation... As for the caliphate, it could only have been
a laughing stock in the eyes of the really civilised and cultured people of the world.” (Karsh 328) But instead of attacking the Sultan,
who represented centuries of tradition and pride, he criticized Grand Vizier Damad Ferid
Pasha and his ministers instead. But the Grand Vizier also tried to preserve
the country’s sovereignty. He travelled to Paris and on June 17th addressed
the Big Four, pleading against the breakup of the Ottoman state. But he made a poor impression, and left empty
handed. President Wilson remarked: “They had exhibited
a complete absence of common sense and a total misunderstanding of the West.” (Macmillan 448) The Ottoman government fell
back on hopes for Allied leniency, or an American mandate to shield them from Greek and Armenian
claims. SEGUE
So the Greek intervention at Smyrna had galvanized Turkish nationalist forces, who were growing
in political and military strength and by fall 1919 controlled much of Anatolia. Meanwhile, the Allies still struggled to find
an answer to the Eastern Question. While tensions mounted, the Allies continued
to be at a loss of what to do about the region and the mess it was in. In June, even Clemenceau was confused: “As
for the way we will dispose of the territories of the Turkish empire, after our last conversations,
I must say I no longer know where we are.” (Macmillan 449)
The British, the most influential Power in the region, were still very much divided amongst
themselves. Lloyd George still supported the Greeks, but
was concerned with the violence. Forgetting the warnings he had received in
May he remarked “Our military intelligence had never been more thoroughly unintelligent.” (Macmillan 445). Lord Curzon wanted Constantinople taken away
from the Turks, but he feared the impact of abolishing the Caliphate on British Muslim
subjects in India. Edwin Montagu, British Secretary of State
for India, urged a moderate position: “Let us not for heaven sake, tell the Moslem what
he ought to think, let us recognise what they do think.” But others objected, like Lord Balfour: “I
am quite unable to see why heaven or any other power should object to our telling the Moslem
what he ought to think.” (Macmillan 391) Churchill, never one to shy
away from international involvement, recommended leaving the Ottoman Empire intact (McMeekin). The Americans were by late 1919 turning towards
isolationism, and President Wilson was gravely ill after suffering a stroke, which made a
mandate much less likely. The new Italian government was distracted
by domestic affairs, and in any case Italy had some interests in common with Kemal in
opposing the Greeks and French. The French were also wavering, and Clemenceau
hinted to Venizelos that French troops would not be used to prop up the Greeks. The complexity of the dilemma was made abundantly
clear by two investigative reports which reached the Supreme Council aka The Big Four that
fall. British General Milne’s conclusions about
the situation were grim. The first report confirmed that there was
a state of virtual war between the Turks and Greeks, and the government in Constantinople
could not stop the violence: “The greater portion of the Turkish forces is composed
of organised bands of brigands, reinforced by armed peasants driven from the villages
by the Greeks and determined to prevent further advance of the Greeks […] The Turkish government
has no control over these forces." (Smith 111)
The findings of the second report, on the events in May at Smyrna, were even more worrying. The report criticized the Greeks, and recommended
ending the occupation, which was compared to an outright annexation: “It is the duty
of the Commission to observe the fact that the Turkish national sentiment, which has
already manifested its resistance, will never accept this annexation. It will submit only to force, that is to say,
before a military expedition which Greece alone could not carry out with any chance
of success.” (Smith 112)
Publicly, Venizelos maintained a confident air – but privately, he despaired. Kemal grew stronger as time passed, and Greece
was too weak to impose its will alone. He argued that the troubles could be stopped
if the Peace Conference made a decision, and made his case again in Paris: “The Supreme
Council notices that the occupation of Smyrna was only decided for political reasons, and
constitutes no new right in the future […] The Greek claims on Smyrna and the neighbouring
region were not only well known, but they had been officially formulated to the conference
[…] In occupying Smyrna, Greece knew that [if] she was not yet legally, she was at least
morally, entitled to it.” (Smith 114) In November, the Milne Line was
established to define the Greek occupation zone, and it certainly seemed to the Turks
as though the Greeks were planning to stay. Anatolia was a ticking time bomb, and by now,
everyone knew it. But while the Allies continued to discuss,
the political and military situation continued to evolve. In January 1920, Clemenceau resigned, and
Alexandre Millerand replaced him as Prime Minister. Allied talks on the fate of Asia Minor resumed
in February, but Turkish nationalists were already taking action. After the December elections, the new parliament
met in Constantinople in January and adopted most of the points of the National Pact, which
was announced a few days later. Turkish troops attacked French and Armenian
units at Marash in January and Urfa in February. When Marash fell on February 20th, Turkish
forces entered the city and killed some 10,000 Armenians (Gerwarth 237). As they withdrew through nearby villages,
the Armenian soldiers also murdered local Turks. For the Allies and Greeks, the situation in
Asia Minor was spinning out of control, and the nationalist camp in Anatolia was now a
force to be reckoned with. The words of British Admiral Richard Webb
were to prove more prophetic than he realized when he wrote them in June 1919: “The situation
in the interior, due practically entirely to the Greek occupation of Smyrna, is getting
more hazy and unsettled. Were this anywhere but Turkey, I should say
we were on the eve of a tremendous upheaval.” (Criss) Now that we have caught up with events in
Asia Minor, it’s time for our roundup segment, where we take a look at what else is going
on in January 1920. On January 10th, the Treaty of Versailles
entered into force – even though the United States, China, Greece and Romania had not
ratified the treaty. The League of Nations officially came into
existence the same day. On the 15th, local elections were held in
Ireland amidst growing tensions about British rule. Sinn Fein won control of a majority of urban
councils on the island, but came in third in Ulster. On January 16th, the Allies demanded that
the Netherlands extradite former German Kaiser Wilhelm II, so he could stand trial for war
crimes, but the Dutch refused. On the 26th, assassins tried but failed to
kill German Minister Matthias Erzberger, who had signed the November 1918 armistice for
Germany. In Russia, on the 4th, following a string
of defeats in Siberia at the hands of the Reds, White Admiral Kolchak resigned as Supreme
Leader in favour of warlord Grigori Semenov. Two weeks later, he was turned over to the
Reds by the Czech Legion. And finally in the United States, on January
2nd the Red Scare continued as more Palmer raids against socialist radicals result in
3000 arrests. On the 15th, in US-occupied Haiti, the Battle
of Port au Prince took place. Some 300 Haitian rebels known as cacos attacked
Haitian gendarmes and US marines, but were defeated after dozens were killed. We want to thank Dr. Konstantinos Travlos
and Athanasiou Valantis for their help with this episode. As usual, you can find all our sources for
this episode in the video description, including links to our amazon stores. To get access to all our podcast episodes
with expert interviews and other perks, you can also support us on Patreon or by clicking
the join button below. I’m Jesse Alexander and this is The Great
War 1920, a production of Real Time History and the greatest YouTube history channel thrown
up since Pericles.
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