The Bombing of Rabaul, November 11, 1943

[Music] it is november 11th which in the united states we commemorate as veterans day a day to honor american veterans of all wars but there's a particularly irony in veterans day because of course the day was first armistice day representing the cessation of hostilities in the great war a time to not just recognize the veterans of that war but also the hope that such veterans would never again need to be recognized congress first officially recognized the date in 1926 and the resolution read november 18th 1918 marked the cessation of the most destructive sanguinary and far-reaching war in human animals and the resumption of peaceful relations by the people of the united states with other nations which we hope may never again be severed but severed of course they were just 15 years later there's always a bit of extra bitterness talking about people at war on november 11th the anniversary of the day that the world hoped would mark the end of war in november 1943 the allies in the south pacific engaged in a series of desperate nearly unprecedented and extraordinarily risky attacks that culminated on november 11th armistice day 1943 deserves to be remembered the 323 mile long island of new britain is part of the bismarck archipelago part of the islands region of papua new guinea it is separated from the island of new guinea by the southwest corner of the solomon sea in 1942 new britain was part of the australian territory of new guinea and the capital of the territory was the township of reball on the far eastern end of the island rebel was strategically valuable having both a protected natural deep water harbor and two airfields as tensions rose in 1941 allied forces initially had plans to fortify reball making it a safe fleet anchorage but eventually was decided that the base was not defensible from a naval perspective however a small garrison of approximately 1400 troops of the australian army defended the town when war started in december in january the japanese conducted bombing raids and an invasion of the island quickly overwhelming the small australian army force in the 1942 battle of rabal the location was particularly important to the japanese with the harbor and airfields not only helping to defend their large naval base on truck island in the carolina islands to the north but also to interdict the line of supply and communication between the united states and australia braval became the main japanese naval base to support their operations in the solomon islands and new guinea the solomon islands lied to the south and east of new britain and the solomon islands campaign was one of the largest battlefields of the war in the pacific the campaign started as part of operation mo the japanese attempt to take new guinea particularly the port of port moresby to extend their perimeter to the south and several lines of communication and supply between the united states and australia while the attempt to take port moretzby failed largely due to the may 1942 battle of the coral sea japanese forces have managed to take and occupy bases throughout the solomon islands operations supported by the base at rabal but the allies sought to turn the tide and responded in august with the invasion of guadalcanal the guadalcanal campaign combined with allied offensives in new guinea was part of operation cartwheel an attempt to neutralize the japanese naval base at rebal the most significant obstacle the allies faced in their goal of retaking the philippines put simply raval become the key to both allied and japanese strategy in the south pacific but the allies knew that taking such a well-defended base would be extremely costly and the early detention was still focused on europe over the pacific instead of an invasion they hoped to isolate the base and reduce it by air raids but that was still an unlikely goal in 1943 while the allies had slowly taken ground the fighting was still far from reball and the base was well defended by 1943 the port had been substantially fortified defended by five airfields and 367 anti-aircraft guns defenses so strong that reball had earned the nickname the pearl harbor of the south pacific with characteristic verbal flair the 1950s documentary series victory at sea described her ball as an immovable secure and impregnable aircraft carrier that blocks the american climb up the ladder of the solomon islands the base was seen as particularly dangerous for naval aviation the conventional wisdom at the time was that carrier-based naval aircraft could not challenge the land-based aircraft professor robert c rubell dean of naval warfare studies at the u.s naval war college explained in a 2014 paper published in the naval college review called a theory of naval air power generally speaking land-based forces can generate a greater rate of fire per unit time than naval air forces of equal strength can so the latter must compensate by bringing larger forces to bear moreover air bases on land are easier and cheaper to reconstitute than sunk or badly damaged carriers in brief land-based air forces can rear more quickly thus producing more firepower and while still subject to attack airfields cannot like an aircraft carrier sink despite a significant allied buildup of naval air assets in the pacific allied naval forces have not contemplated an air attack on reball the extensive airfields and anti-air batteries that were ball were called a hornet's nest by naval aviators with the exception of the surprise attack on pearl harbor which sought to neutralize the land-based aircraft before they could get off the ground carrier-based aircraft have never been used to attack a position as heavily fortified as rabbal such an attack was seen not just as a near-suicidal risk for the navy's planes but would also risk their carriers operation cartwheel depended upon attacks by land-based aircraft medium and heavy bombers better able to withstand the anti-aircraft defenses and inflict more damage the solomon island campaign in fact was largely designed around the idea of taking islands to serve as bases for the air campaign against for ball to create a ring around rabal in october planes of the us fifth air force the royal australian air force and the royal new zealand air force had begun a sustained bombing campaign against the airfields in port it looked to be a long and costly campaign eight b-25 bombers were lost in a single raid on november 2nd army air force major raymond elkins was awarded the medal of honor for the action posthumously while rebel was in range of bases that supported heavy allied bombers the joint chiefs of staff recognized the need for an airbase closer to reball that could not only allow them to deploy light bombers and attacking greater numbers but also provide a base for fighter aircraft that could defend allied bombers from the significant japanese fighter presence at the airfields around rabal thus a plan was made for the us third fleet under the command of admiral william halsey to take a portion of the island of bougainville one of the northernmost of the solomon islands the bougainville campaign was nearly focused so only a defensible airstrip was needed not occupation of the entire island which always thought was defended by as many as 65 000 japanese personnel the allies chose to invade on the west side of the island where the japanese presence was small and no air base had been established the allies planned to take empress augusta bay a protected anchorage that was surrounded by mountainous terrain which the eyes hoped would provide a barrier against japanese counter-attack allowing the allies to consolidate a landing and establish a strong defensive perimeter while the attack came on the heels of the successful yet costly guadalcanal campaign it was still a precarious time for the allies when there was a great demand on resources not only were the allies prioritizing the war in europe over the pacific but the allies were planning a major amphibious operation on tarawa atoll in the gilbert islands later in november an operation that would require the redeployment of many of halsey's heavy fleet assets while the landings at bougainville of some 15 000 marines of the u.s third marine division beginning on november 1st went well the biggest risk came from the japanese navy admiral centauro omori collected all available fleet elements at reball creating a formidable fleet of two heavy cruisers two light cruisers and 60 storers with the goal of attacking the transport and supply fleet supporting the invasion with many of the heavy fleet elements redeployed to the central pacific in preparation for the invasion of tarawa amore's fleet was opposed by a screening force of four cleveland-class light cruisers and eight destroyers under command of rear admiral aaron s tip merrell while on paper the november 1st battle of empress augusta bay was a mismatch with the superior japanese force in fact omori's fleet had been quickly thrown together and the ships had not trained or fought together and while the u.s cleveland class cruisers were classified as light cruisers they were nearly as large and powerful as japanese heavy cruisers in a night action superior us radar as well as tactics that had matured since the guam canal campaign won out omori was forced to withdraw losing one light cruiser and one destroyer sunk in the battle but the americans were in for a surprise the japanese have been hoarding assets over the course of the year largely keeping them out of allied range at truck island but now they saw the risk to a ball and they quickly accumulated a significant force of seven heavy cruisers a scout plane saw the formation and report went to halsey he later recalled presumably they would refuel he recalled then run down to torquina the following night and sink our transports and bombard our precarious positions holsey was in a bind his battleships and the bulk of his cruisers were more than a thousand miles away supporting the planned division of tarawa he had no surface force capable of defending against the force the japanese had assembled even merrell's screening force was not available having sailed south to refuel what he had was the air groups of rear admiral frederick c ted sherman's task force 38 consisting of the aging fleet carrier uss saratoga in the independence class light carrier uss princeton sherman's air groups would have to attack the japanese cruisers at rabal hoping to catch them by surprise as they refueled thus the irony of the situation the invasion of bougainville was exactly to prevent the need for a naval attack on the well-defended base at reball but now the hopes for that invasion depended upon exactly that halsey would be sending his aviators into the hornet's nest it was a risky plan born of desperation encountered a conventional wisdom about the use of naval air power hulsey would later say that the threat that the japanese cruiser force at rival posed to his landings at bougainville was the most desperate emergency that confronted me in my entire term as commander south pacific on november 4th halsey sent an order to sherman task force 38 proceed maximum formation speed to launch all-out strike on shipping in reball and north thereof order of targets cruisers destroyers retire thereafter and the aircrews flying in the hornet's nest were not the only ones at risk the decision meant placing two carriers at the time the only two us carriers in the south pacific within range of the japanese aircraft at reball included in that gamble was halsey's son william f halsey iii aviation supply officer aboard saratoga the carriers had to steam nearly 500 miles at flank speed to reach a position to attack by the morning of the 6th at 7 a.m planes began launching from the two carriers 97 aircraft in all 33 f-6f hellcat fighters 16 tbf avenger torpedo plans and 22 sbd dauntless dive bombers from the saratoga and 19 hellcats and seven avengers from princeton it was an all-out strike no planes were left behind for combat patrol to defend the carriers as the attack group neared the harbor they could see that it was full of targets but the sky was also full of dreaded a6m zeroes defending the base at hellcat pilot lieutenant marvin harper recalled we looked up with other astonishment it was just mind-boggling with the number of airplanes and the altitude advantage they had they should have decimated us but the japanese planes held back apparently expecting the attack force to split into groups to attack making them easier targets instead they held together and by the time the japanese realized the poi the groups had entered into rebels anti-air defenses and the zeros could not follow without risk of being hit by their own guns on the ground the zeroes veteran crews engaged the hellcats in a freewheeling dogfight the plan was to damage as many ships as possible rather than trying to concentrate attacks to sink a few the heavy cruiser maya was struck quickly a bomb striking its port side scout plane deck causing a fire took five months to repair the damage her sister shipped to kyle took a 500 pound bomb on its main deck near misses on the cruiser otago caused casualties on board including the ship's captain the mogami was struck by a thousand pound bomb between its four turrets the bombing of our ball harbor on november 5th 1943 was an extraordinary success five heavy cruisers two light cruisers and six destroyers were damaged enough to eliminate the threat by the cruiser force to the american forces landing on bougainville both sides exaggerated their air victories the americans claimed 29 aerial victories but the japanese claimed only to have lost four aircraft for their part the japanese claimed was shot down 49 american aircraft but the americans claimed only to have lost 13 aircraft most of which survived the battle but had to ditch in the ocean later due to damage the japanese sent a torpedo bomber force to try to attack the american carriers but they missed their target completely although on radio tokyo they made outrageous claims of having sunk two aircraft carriers three cruisers and a destroyer halsey's gamble had come at significant risk but it has paid off spectacularly the princeton in saratoga returned six days later but this time reinforced by three of the large new essex class fleet carriers and a massive attack on bougainville which not only did more damage in the harbor but shot down 35 japanese aircraft the japanese were compelled to remove their battle fleet from reball and essentially the offensive capabilities of the japanese naval base at rival had been neutralized it was november 11 1943 armistice day well much credit is given to the naval attacks in raval on november 5th and 11th 1943 the task of reducing reball by air largely fell on the heavy and medium bombers of the united states army air force the royal australian air force and the royal new zealand air force with the fleet removed the allies saw no reason for a costly ground assault reball held to the end of the war and bombings continued almost through to the end of the war more troops ended up being isolated on rabal essentially removed from the fight than the japanese had available to defend okinawa in 1945 the neutralization of reball on the loss of experienced pilots there was crippling to the japanese in the pacific i hope you enjoyed this episode of the history guy short snippets have forgotten history between 10 and 15 minutes long and if you did enjoy please go ahead and click that thumbs up button if you have any questions or comments or suggestions for future episodes please write those in the comment section i will be happy to personally respond be sure to follow the history guy on facebook instagram twitter and check out our merchandise on teespring.com and if you'd like more episodes on forgotten history all you need to do is subscribe 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Channel: The History Guy: History Deserves to Be Remembered

Views: 330,742

Keywords: history, history guy, the history guy, military history, world war ii, wwii, Rabaul, allies, us history

Id: JpwQKEFpGeM

Length: 14min 32sec (872 seconds)

Published: Wed Nov 11 2020