The Battle of Singling - 4th Armored Division Vs. 11. Panzer Division

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Just like so many battles, the battle of Singling hardly gets mentioned, but none the less it was an incredibly interesting tank on tank battle where Sherman tanks of the 4th Armoured Division would fight against the Panther tanks of the German 11. Panzer Division. For months the 4th Armoured division had had to fight in the most trying of conditions. Heavy rain kept the planes on the ground and turned the roads into quagmire. The Division of Major General Hugh Gaffey, who took command on the 3rd of December 1944, just 3 days before the battles of Singling and Bining, had already suffered terrible casualties against the well-entrenched German defenders. The battle of Singling, which was fought on the 6th of December 1944 by B company of the 37th Tank battalion and B company of the 51st Armoured Infantry Battalion was the farthest advance northeast made by the 4th Armoured Division in its difficult advance towards the German border which had commenced nearly one month prior, on the 10th of November. Singling in itself is just an ordinary agricultural village but, it was incorporated in the famous French Maginot line. This meant that next to the various stone houses the town was also littered with bunkers and pillboxes. In the valley to the east of Singling were Rohrbach and Bining. These towns were surrounded by high ground and thus made it difficult for the Americans to attack. The ridge to the north however was of tactical importance and the XII corps ordered the capture of the ridge. The primary objective for the XII corps was Sarreguemines, a relatively large city on the Sarre river and the German border. A railroad and one of the main motorways east out of Sarreguemines to Germany passed through Rohrbach and it was the task of the 4th Armoured Division to capture the locality while the 35th Infantry Division would attack Sarreguemines itself. Next to the important motorway towards Germany, Rohrbach was also an important link where various local roads passed through, including the roads out of the large forest area to the east, which was then under command of XV corps, 7th army. The 4th Armoured Division was however faced with a problem if they wished to attack Rohrbach. The main road leading east to north into the town, and which was the easiest approach wasn’t suited for an attack as it had several small ridges over which the tanks had to drive. Quickly an alternative was sought and the ridge to the west of the Vallée d’Altkirch was considered. But Singling command the approach, so did the several hills to the east. Both routes were found to be dissatisfactory as on both routes the Tanks would be seen well in advance by the German defenders. Eventually it was decided that taking the west side of the ridge would provide the most protection of flanking fire and that route was picked. Singling however had to be captured in order to take Bining and Rohrback. The trouble wasn’t over yet for the men of the 37th Tank battalion and 51st Armoured Infantry Battalion which were picked out for the task. Due to the configuration of the ground and the appalling weather which had caused so many problems the days before, the attacking force was compelled to come up from the east of Singling and then make a 90 degree turn southeast on the high ground into Bining. If that wasn’t enough, Singling itself was dominated by a ridge a kilometre away to the north which was in the main defences of the Maginot Line. The Americans had a first taste of the difficult nature of the fighting on the 5th of December 1944, when Lieutenant-Colonel Creighton W. Abrams’ 37th Tank battalion attacked from Schmittviller. The orders were simple, advance as far as possible into the German lines. Miraculously Abrams’ tanks reached to within 900 metres from Singling until they were checked by the difficult terrain, heavy artillery fire and thick fire from Singling itself. 14 Sherman tanks were lost that day, 5 of which were hit almost as soon as they crested the ridge to the south of the small village. The battalion had been reduced to an effective strength of 2 medium companies and was compelled to fall back and regroup near hill 349. During the night, Combat Command A received their orders for their attack of the 6th. Task Force Abrams, which for the most part consisted of the 37th Tank battalion and the 51st Armoured Infantry battalion, was to attack Bining and Rohrbach and they were to reconnoitre the high ground to the north of both villages. The other Task Force of Combat Command A, Task Force Oden was to push on from the Eichel river bridgehead at Domfessel in order to take Dehlingen and Rahling from where Oden would be in an excellent position to support Task Force Abrams. Combat Command B was ordered to take Singling but on Colonel Abrams’ recommendations, changes were made. Lieutenant Colonel Creighton Abrams asked Combat Command A if he was allowed to take Singling as well. He had his doubts about the initial plan since Combat Command B was still at Voellerdingen and Schmittviller and that they wouldn’t make it in time to conform with his line. Abrams heard nothing of his desired changes so he presumed that the original plan had to be carried out instead. Two companies were selected for the assault, B company of the 37th Tank battalion under Captain James Leach, and B company of the 51st Armoured Infantry Battalion under 1st Lieutenant Daniel Belden. When both company commanders briefed their platoon commanders no attention was given to Singling which was meant to be an objective of Combat Command B. The assault force was heavily undermanned. Only 14 tanks could be mustered, one of which was a headquarters 105mm Sherman tank. The 51st Armoured infantry battalion had a combat effectiveness of 180 and 57 of those were assigned to the attack. On the 6th of December it quickly became clear that it wouldn’t be an easy task. The muddy ground proved to be too sticky for the half-tracks of the infantry, so they had to be left behind. The infantry subsequently mounted up the rear decks of the Sherman tanks to proceed with the assault. The time was 08h35am, and they were already behind schedule. A company of the 37th Tank Battalion which was at the head of the column started to take heavy fire from Singling itself and their advance bogged down. 2 batteries of the 94th armoured Field artillery battalion started to drop smoke shells to provide cover but in spite of the best of efforts, the German fire continued to be incredibly fierce. During the hour that followed, no attempt to advance was made. Several opportunistic shots were fired at the hardly visible defenders in the town, but it was to no avail. Lieutenant Colonel Abrams seeing no progress of Combat Command B which was supposed to be on his left took matters into his own hands… He ordered Team B, consisting of B companies of both battalions to take the town and attempt to hold it while the remainder of Task Force Abrams was to swing east and capture Bining. Team B had no time to make new plans and they were literally thrown into the fight. Captain Leach quickly informed 1st Lieutenant Belden, but he on his turn couldn’t inform his platoon commanders as they were riding on different tanks. For both the tank commanders and the infantry commanders, uncertainty reigned due to the promptness of the new orders. Many were convinced throughout the day that they were fighting for Bining, while in fact they were fighting for Singling to the west. Captain Leach quickly deployed his tanks. 2nd platoon under 2nd Lieutenant James Farese was put on the left while 1st platoon of 1st Lieutenant William Goble was put on the right. 3rd platoon under 1st Lieutenant Robert Cook was in support. Leach in the meantime moved between the three platoons under his command. All the infantry were riding on the Sherman tanks of 1st and 3rd platoon and the command tank and artillery observe tank was also used for the infantry. This left 2nd platoon infantry-less. By 10h15am, the attack was underway. A company of the 37th Tank battalion in the meantime moved further eastward and they covered the Singling-Bining road. The tanks of B company raced across the fields after the artillery had lifted. The planned formation was however rapidly broken. Sergeant Joseph Hauptman of 2nd platoon had engine trouble and lagged behind, while Staff Sergeant Max Morphew of 3rd platoon had a broken radio. Morphew stayed behind in order not to bring the others in peril. 3rd platoon kept suppressing the Germans inside the town until they were ordered to cease fire as not to bring the attacking platoons in danger. So far, the German tanks inside the town held their fire and as B company approached the small village, 1st platoon swung east while 2nd platoon swung west. 3rd Platoon in the meantime moved in through the gap. This move led to a line of 13 tanks being in more or less a straight line moving up on Singling. Only 2nd Lieutenant Farese of 2nd platoon was notably further than the others. Farese moved up the hillside south of the village and turned left into an orchard. As he crested the ridge his tank was hit three times by Armour piercing shells, probably coming from a Panther tank parked beside a stone barn. The tank was immediately set on fire and 2nd Lieutenant Farese and his loader were killed. Sergeant John Parks on seeing the disaster quickly moved up and parked his tank behind the rise from where he radioed Hauptman not to advance. 2nd Lieutenant Farese had unfortunately ran into a cluster of German tanks, towed guns and defensive emplacements. At least three Panzer V Panthers, two self-propelled guns and one towed anti-tank gun were in the village doing their very best to keep the Americans back. Sergeant Sowers and Sergeant Parks found that if they even tried to crest the ridge they were met by heavy anti-tank fire. The advance of 2nd platoon grinded to a halt. At that time only the two sergeants were aware of the dangerous presence of the German Panther tanks. Until then, only one tank and one gun were accounted for, but as Captain Leach was informed of the loss of one of his platoon commanders, leach was preoccupied in dealing with a Self-propelled gun to his front. As the tanks of 1st and 3rd platoon arrived at the southern edge of Singling, the infantry under 1st Lieutenant Belden dismounted and B company of the 51st Armoured Infantry Battalion was quickly reorganized into three platoons. 2nd Lieutenant William Cowgill was the first to assemble his men. He was ordered to take the left side of the town. 2nd Lieutenant Theodore Price was ordered to take the right side while 1st Lieutenant Norman Padgett on his turn was ordered to support Cowgill. Nobody knew the town and nobody knew that they were up against nearly 4 times their own numbers. The infantry was to clear house by house, street by street. Although a good many were reinforcements, all men had had battle experience and they quickly set about clearing the village. Inside the village were elements of the four companies of the 1st battalion, 111th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Their strength was up to 3 or 4 times that of B company, 51st Armoured Infantry battalion. They were supported by two Self-propelled guns and a handful of Panther tanks. Aiding them in the defence were multiple artillery guns. The 111th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 11th Panzer Division had been fighting Combat Command B of the 4th Armoured Division for a few days before they were seen retreating. In fact the Panzer Grenadiers had been ordered to pull back in order to prepare the defence of Singling. While several tanks and a battalion of Panzer Grenadiers was holding on the Singling, Bining was only defended by one single company, the 1st company of the 61st Antitank battalion of the 11th Panzer Division. The 50 men strong detachment was armed with 8 old 75mm anti-tank guns mounted on the chassis’ of Panzer IV’s. Near Bining a further two companies of the 2nd battalion, 111th Panzer Grenadier Regiment were deployed. The men of Team B were clearly facing the bulk of the German defences in the area, armed with several heavy weapons. 2nd Lieutenant Cowgill, the commander of the 3rd infantry platoon was the first to set foot in the town. He quickly noticed one of the self-propelled guns next to a burning house [No44] in the town square. Cowgill was quick to warn the Sherman tanks which were following up to stop their advance. Captain Leach dismounted his tank and proceeded on foot, ahead of his tank. Upon seeing the German commander in his hatch, the American platoon and company commander opened fire forcing the German commander to withdraw in his tank which quickly moved back. More and more GI’s were by then entering the town. As 1st Lieutenant Belden arrived on the scene he was annoyed at how his infantry was crowded up on the street. Soon word spread that a machinegun nest was holding back the infantry and not long after, Sergeant Kenneth Sandrock of 1st Tank platoon was ordered up to deal with the situation. Instead of following his platoon into an orchard on the eastern part of the village, Sandrock moved up the south street where he found no machinegun. He fired a few pot shots at the church steeple before falling back behind a house where he remained for the rest of the day, cut off from the rest of his platoon. The German self-propelled vehicle had been able to turn. This however didn’t stop Leach from emptying a Thompson magazine into the German vehicle. But in so doing, he accidentally blocked his own tank from firing and destroying the German piece of equipment. The Self-propelled weapon eventually managed to escape. By then, Captain Leach heard about what had happened to Farese. Leach thought it wiser to try to flank the retreating tank rather than trying to catch it. He subsequently ordered up his 3rd platoon to head to the west end of the town. Leach placed his own tank close to the village square where he could command the situation more easily. He called up 1st Lieutenant Cook of 3rd platoon and his two tanks. Sergeant Haywards’, and the Sherman 105 of Sergeant Grimm. In front of the three advancing Sherman tanks was a large farm building which obstructed the view drastically. 1st Lieutenant Cook moved to the right of the farmhouse and moved between it and a burning house opposite the farmhouse. Nearly overturning the tank, Cook proceeded with his advance, closely followed by Haywards and Grimm. The three tanks founds themselves in a dangerously exposed position and Cook intended on crossing the road. Just in time 2nd Lieutenant Cowgill arrived with his infantry to warn Cook of the presence of several German tanks just down the road. Cook ordered Grimm with his 105mm to cut a hole through the corner of the house but in so doing, they attracted the fire of the Germans tanks down the road. Cook decided to reconnoitre on foot. After having established the location of the German tank, Cook went back to his Sherman but despite the best of efforts of both Cook’s platoon and the 2nd platoon no direct line of sight with the German tank could be established. In the meantime, 2nd Lieutenant Cowgill’s platoon of infantry spotted several Germans in the valley to the north, without hesitation, the GI’s opened fire and the Germans quickly dispersed after taking a few casualties. Under the cover of 2nd Lieutenant Price’s platoon, several GI’s tried to work their way down to the valley, but they were soon stopped by a thick barbed wire fence. The platoon’s wire cutters had been entrusted to a man who had been evacuated just two days before. So, their path was blocked. But, thanks to the continuous machinegun fire of Cook’s tanks and the small arms fire of 2nd Lieutenant Price’s platoon the Germans in a pillbox in the valley below were seen surrendering. They had had enough of the high explosive shells and machinegun fire. The Germans came out of the pillbox and surrendered to Price’s men. The situation up north was dealt with. But, at that precise moment, German mortar fire came raining down in the village. As the shells came crashing down the town square, 4 men of Price’s platoon were hit and wounded. The rest of the platoon quickly sought cover in the houses along the square, where they remained for the rest of the day. To the east, 1st Lieutenant Padgett saw 7 tanks on the ridge to the northeast. He also saw a rocket-launcher firing to the west of Welschoff Farm. Fortunately for Padgett, the 4 tanks of 1st platoon under 1st Lieutenant Goble arrived on the scene. The German tanks on the ridge, how daunting they may have been, were too far away to pose threat. In the town itself, like in many city battles, a good coordination was sometimes difficult to find. When an inhabitant was asked whether there were Germans inside the inhabitant said no, the Americans got suspicious after seeing an antenna and entered anyway. Inside the house they captured 2 officers and 28 other ranks without resistance. On the western side of the village, 2nd Lieutenant Cowgill was still trying his utmost to establish the number of tanks the Germans had in the village. As he finally found a commanding spot inside an attic, he saw the outlines of 3 German tanks. He immediately went back to Cook to spread the bad news. The situation for the GI’s had drastically worsened. Next to the 2 self-propelled weapons, there were now an additional 3 panzers. 1st Lieutenant Belden was quickly informed. As that was not enough, more and more reports arrived at the company headquarters of the difficulty in dislodging the Germans from their defensive positions. The initial success of entering the town was gradually turning into tough house-to-house, close quarters combat. A meeting was set up by the various commanders on the field. It was decided that artillery was the only option if they wished to dislodge the staunch German defence, but 1st Lieutenant Guild, the artillery observer thought it unwise since there were still a lot of GI’s in the village. He opted for mortars, but these were left behind since there were no men left to carry them. Eventually it was decided that infantry armed with bazooka’s would be the most safe and effective way in dealing with the multiple German tanks in the West of the village. The dangerous task of knocking out the German panzers was given to 2nd Lieutenant Cowgill. While Cowgill and his bazooka-men were trying to deploy, the situation for the Americans inside the town was slowly getting from bad to worse. To the north, multiple panzers were seen heading east while artillery shells were continuously raining down on the village. At the same time the German Panzers in the west of the village were showing an increased interest in the Sherman tanks of 2nd platoon which were still in the area. Trying to deal with the recent threat coming from the north, 1st Lieutenant Cook quickly moved his tank to a better position. All out of a sudden, on the west side of the town, a white signal flare went up and shortly after artillery of all sorts, including rocket fire was crashing down on the village. The tanks of 2nd platoon were forced to withdraw to the orchard road as a result of the intense shelling. After the shelling had lifted, the tank of Sergeant Hauptman was hit and destroyed after an armour piercing shell ricocheted off of the ground and went straight into the right side of his turret, killing Hauptman’s loader. The two remaining Sherman tanks of Sowers and Parks were quickly ordered back into hard cover behind 3rd platoon. In the meantime, Sergeant Grimm, armed with his 105 came face to face with one of the Panther tanks to the west of the village. Fortunately for Grimm, the 75mm shell whizzed past giving Grimm the time to move back into cover. As Grimm was hurriedly moving his tank back into cover a shell hit the sprocket of Sergeant Hayward’s tanks crippling it. Another four shells quickly followed and Hayward’s tank started to burn. In the unfortunate event Hayward’s gunner and bow-gunner were killed while the other crewmembers managed to escape. Sergeant Grimm successfully managed to extricate himself and his tank out of the perilous situation, but as he had broken contact with the German tanks, his Sherman got bogged down due to the thick mud. It took Sowers’ tank to pull him out. In a matter of minutes two Sherman tanks were lost and it was getting ever clearer that the infantry hadn’t the numbers to punch through the staunch German defence. All the infantry could do was hold their positions and wait it out until Combat Command B would arrive and take over the battle, which had been their objective from the start. But by that time, no forces of Combat Command B were seen although Captain Leach had been informed by Lieutenant Colonel Abrams that reinforcements were on their way. While the infantry hunkered down, the German tanks to north were still causing a potential problem. Runners were sent to inform 1st Lieutenant Goble of 1st platoon, but his platoon and him had no direct contact as a large hedge obstructed the view. 1st Lieutenant Padgett had had enough and he decided to seek for the artillery observer himself, unaware that the main road was enfiladed by German fire from the west, it took him four attempts to cross the main road. But as he couldn’t find 1st Lieutenant Guild he went back to his headquarters in the late afternoon. Guild had however beaten Padgett to it and Captain Leach had already been informed of the armoured threat to the north. Goble figured that should the Germans decide to attack, they would come straight down the road, or at least straight towards the houses to his front, so he sent Sergeant Robert Fitzgerald to the right from where the Sergeant could observe the Germans’ moves to the northeast. The first German tank to appear however, didn’t come from the ridge to the north. It was suddenly spotted between two houses less than 150 metres across the main road. The Panther tank started to traverse its turret, but Fitzgerald was the first to fire. His round, fired at point-blank range connected and the Panzer V Panther was starting the burn. One of the crewmembers hopped out of the burning tank, but Fitzgerald quickly pumped two more rounds into the burning carcass. Sometime later, more German tanks were spotted to the northeast. Sergeant Fitzgerald tried to move to a better location and when he spotted a second Panzer, he suddenly found his tank engulfed with the smoke and rubble of the rockets which were crashing down next to the Sherman tank. Fitzgerald quickly pulled his tank back and left his tank to meet with his platoon commander when he spotted yet another Panther tank in the valley below. Fitzgerald quickly hopped back into his tank and headed east to take up a favourable firing position. The second round connected, knocking out the Panther tank. He immediately had to switch his fire to yet another Panther which was just over 700 metres away. Sergeant Del Vecchio, behind Fitzgerald was already occupied with shooting at the Panzer, but despite the best of efforts, both the 75mm and the 76mm shells bounced clean off the sloped frontal armour of the Panther tank. Fitzgerald subsequently retreated. From his new position, Sergeant Fitzgerald spotted a Self-propelled gun moving east, close to the Welschoff Farm. In order not to risk losing his tank he decided to wait until the German Self-Propelled gun would emerge again, but it didn’t. Instead it had taken up a firing position from where it could pummel the location of 1st platoon. Suddenly, two rounds hit 1st Lieutenant Goble’s tank wounding the platoon commander and his gunner. The first round set the Sherman tank on fire while the second round penetrated the turret and finished the job. Yet another Sherman tank was lost in a village which wasn’t even their task to clear in the first place. Sergeant Fitzgerald was quick to take over the command of the platoon and he ordered his tanks back to the safety behind the hill. While the 1st tank platoon had been hotly engaged in fighting off several Panther tanks, 2nd Lieutenant Cowgill’s bazooka teams had taken up positions in the attics in order to fire down onto the German tanks below. Of the two bazooka teams, one weapon failed to fire so it was down to one bazooka to finish the job. Of the 5 rounds fired at the tank, only the last one managed to hit it. Although it had done nearly nothing to damage it, it had forced the crew to bail out. Two were immediately gunned down by the GI’s covering the street. Hardly had the German crew jumped out, a Panther tank drove up alongside the abandoned self-propelled gun and it started to fire at the infantry below. As It was getting late in the afternoon, team B which had to fight for Bining was still fighting it out in Singling, the objective of the neighbouring Task Force B. The relief should already have taken place but the men of Task Force Abrams were still hotly engaged within the village. It was shortly after noon on that 6th of December that Lieutenant-Colonel Abrams had been ordered by Brigadier-General Herbert Earnest of Combat Command A to switch from Singling to Bining and Rohrbach. During a meeting Abrams told Major Albin Irzyk of the 8th Tank battalion and Major Alanis of the 51st Armoured Infantry Battalion that he was ready to hand over Singling to them. Although heavy fire still came from the general direction of village, both battalion commanders were of the assumption that the village had been cleared by team B. Major Irzyk decided to commit his C company together with B company of the 10th Armoured Infantry Battalion. 1st Lieutenant William Marshall, commanding C company of the 8th Tank battalion was ordered to pick up the infantry and head into Singling, establish contact with Captain Leach and take over outpost duties with the infantry and tanks. They set of at about 14h00pm. As they reached the southern edge of the village, the leading 1st tank platoon of 2nd Lieutenant George Gray swung northwest where they came across the two wrecks of Farese’s and Hauptman’s tanks. Without suspicion Gray proceeded. After all his orders were to take over a village which had already been cleared of all German opposition. As he cleared the corner of the large stone house on the southern side of the town, Gray was hit by two armour piercing shells. Gray’s gunner was killed while Gray himself was seriously wounded. As soon as 1st Lieutenant Marshall saw Gray being hit, he ordered his second platoon under Staff Sergeant Edwin De Rosia to move east in order to circle behind the German tank that had knocked out Gray. De Rosia didn’t have to move far before he came under direct fire. With De Rosia also taking heavy fire, 1st Lieutenant Marshall ordered his C company to retreat to the reverse slope of the ridge to the south of Singling. 1st Lieutenant Robert Lange, in command of B company 10th Armoured Infantry Battalion headed into town where he met up with Belden and Leach. The three commanding officers decided that B company of the 51st Armoured Infantry Battalion was to be relieved and Lange divided his small force into two understrength platoons. In turn Captain Leach went out to look for 1st Lieutenant Marshall so he could arrange the relief of his own remaining tanks. As the day wore on, Lieutenant-Colonel Abrams was starting to get worried and he wanted to pull his tanks back. A telephone call to 1st Lieutenant Cook really didn’t improve his state as Cook told him that 5 Panzers were inside the town while a handful of other tanks were spotted heading towards the village. A little while later, Abrams informed Cook that he should organize the remaining tanks, pick up the 51st Armoured Infantry Battalion and move out at once. In practice, the withdrawal took a half an hour to commence in order to allow the relieving infantry to consolidate their new positions. As it was slowly getting dark, Cook finally pulled his tanks out of Singling together with the tired GI’s of B company, 51st Armoured Infantry Battalion. Most of the wounded had already been taken back to safer lines by Sergeant Morphew’s tank, whose radio had died before the battle commenced. As no evacuation vehicles were made available, Morphew’s tank had to be used instead. As the three platoons of tanks fell back, German artillery came crashing down amongst them, but fortunately for the GI’s, only one man was slightly wounded because of the artillery. As the tanks retreated, blazing away at the town, several return shots were fired by the German tanks still inside the village. Two rounds landed very close to Sergeant Del Vecchio’s tank, but no damage was done. The Sherman tanks of 1st Lieutenant Marshall took over the fight and the German tanks began to concentrate on them instead. The retreat of B company, 37th Tank battalion however led to the fact that the relieving infantry was left alone for several hours without any armour support. The Germans had used that time to get deeper into the town. As they reached the broken down tanks of Farese and Hauptman they tried to start the engines. The Americans inside the town believed that they were the tanks which were promised to reinforce the lines. A reconnoitring party was sent out and they were very surprised to see men with long overcoats on top of the tanks. The party quickly retreated and came back several minutes later. Better armed, they managed to scare the German infantry away. Further to the south, the American commanders on the ground discussed the situation and pondered about if it was still reasonable to hold on to Singling. One particular action in which the Americans captured a German field kitchen full of hot soup for at least a full-strength company convinced Major Irzyk of the 8th tank battalion that pulling back out of the village was the best option. In order to cover the withdrawal, C company of the 8th Tank battalion, then under Sergeant De Rosia as 1st Lieutenant Marshall was away on other duties, was ordered to move back and forth on the reverse slope of the hill. This they did to convince the German defenders that they were entering the town. B company, 10th Armoured Infantry battalion successfully retreated, but their brief time in Singling had cost them five wounded. Singling was once again fully in German hands. The day’s battle had all been for nothing. During the night the 12th Armoured Division took over the frontline and Singling was finally taken on the 10th of December, 1944. The battle for Singling was a small action, but it resembled the incredibly difficult fighting at the border between France and Germany during the winter of 1944. In total, 6 men were killed in the attack on Singling and a further 16 men were wounded. 5 Sherman tanks were also lost during the fight. In return, the known losses to the Germans were 2 Panther tanks and a further 56 prisoners were taken, but as one can imagine, the Germans also suffered multiple dead and wounded. The attack on Singling had to be made without preparation and during the battle itself, the American GI’s had constantly been fighting a numerically superior German battalion. While Team B was hotly engaged in the fighting for Singling, other units of Combat Command A, namely the 1st battalion of the 328th infantry and D company of the 37th Tank battalion had bypassed Singling and captured Bining, the primary objective of the day. By probing the stiff German defensive line, the attack of the 6th of December had opened the way for the 12th Armoured Division to advance. This was The AceDestroyer, I really hope you enjoyed this video. It was a longer and much more detailed video, but none the less I hope you found it interesting. Don’t forget to like and subscribe, and do leave a comment down below! Cheers!
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Channel: The AceDestroyer
Views: 570,850
Rating: undefined out of 5
Keywords: WW2, War, Documentary, 4th Armored Division, Tank battles of WW2, 1944, Creighton Abrams, Panther tank
Id: 1PVJ8JYpAPI
Channel Id: undefined
Length: 31min 0sec (1860 seconds)
Published: Sat Oct 12 2019
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