The Battle of Midway: The American Perspective and The Strategic Consequences of the Battle (3/3)

so if you made it this far i know what you're probably thinking what happened how did the japanese lose so badly it seemed like everything had been going fairly well for them at the start of the battle even defeating all the airstrikes midway had thrown at them but then suddenly and seemingly out of nowhere the american carriers appeared then the dilemma began followed by all the fatal complications it entailed and it all ultimately led to the disaster at 10 22. to see how nagumo got into this mess we will have to view the battle again but this time from the american point of view so the reason the americans were able to get the drop on the japanese was that they knew that the japanese were coming the whole time and this was thanks to their radio intelligence by may the americans had partially broken the japanese naval code and had deciphered enough of the radio messages that they were able to get an accurate idea of when and where the japanese would appear so admiral nimitz commander of the pacific fleet decided to set up an ambush on the approaching japanese fleet the plan was straightforward his carriers would lie in wait northeast of midway and launch a surprise counter blow against the japanese flat tops while they were preoccupied with hitting midway although simple the plan was daring for it to work he needed to be in the right place at the right time thus everything hinged on the accuracy of his intelligence also nimitz was well aware of the strength the japanese were coming with he knew he would be outnumbered in carriers yet he was confident that as long as he retained the element of surprise he would be able to fight the battle on favorable terms task 416 with the enterprising hornet left pearl harbor on may 28th followed by the damaged but hastily patched up yorktown on the 30th and by the time the japanese submarine cordon had appeared the ships had already passed through thus nagumo's forewarning scheme had failed the two task forces rendezvoused on june 2nd collectively the three carriers had 234 aircraft on board midway itself had 127 planes stationed on it so given these numbers we can see that it was actually the americans who would outnumber the japanese at the point of contact on june 3rd a pby flying boat spotted the japanese transport force about 700 miles west of midway the transport group was subsequently attacked causing minor damage to it this sighting on june 3rd confirmed to the americans the authenticity of their intelligence and that it wouldn't be long before the japanese carriers made an appearance so on june 4th the game was on the americans were prepared for the uncoming japanese force whereas the japanese were still oblivious to the fact that three enemy carriers were lying in weight to ambush them june 4th as we recall nagumo had only seven planes to conduct his searches in contrast the americans had more than 30 conducting theirs in carrier warfare reconnaissance is key and it was the americans who came out on top getting the first sighting at zero five thirty however the report gave cause for concern to fletcher it claimed there were two carriers present 175 miles southwest of task force 16. in retrospect the report was incorrect in two aspects the first was the location it was about 30 miles off the japanese were actually over 200 miles away this was well beyond the range of their short-legged fighters and torpedo bombers but most crucially it erroneously reported that only two carriers were present and this worried fletcher intelligence had previously told him that the japanese were coming with four maybe five carriers and that it was possible they would be operating them in two separate task forces so the question followed if these two carriers were here where were the others based on this information fletcher had to make a decision not ideal under the circumstances since the report wasn't entirely accurate but so goes the fog of war in a way he was caught in his own type of dilemma albeit not as difficult and perplexing as nagumos but his subsequent actions do exemplify the flexibility the americans had during a situation like this so what does fletcher do after a quick deliberation fletcher ordered task 416 to close the distance and strike the reported contact in the meantime he would hold back yorktown strike group as a reserve in case the other japanese carriers appeared if no additional information was forthcoming he would follow up task 416 strike on the reported contact with yorktown's as well fletcher's orders were both flexible and prudent it allowed him to maintain the initiative by striking first while holding back a reserve as a contingency well done fletcher he had made the right call as ordered admiral spruance in task 416 did the best he could to close the distance he and his staff scheduled the launch to begin at 0-700 there was a clever reason behind this by launching at this time it was hoped that their airstrike would arrive over the japanese flat tops as they were resurfacing the planes that had just attacked midway meanwhile as all these events transpired the americans got what would be the first of their two lucky breaks during the battle and in my opinion this is probably the most crucial one despite the criticism towards nagumo's scanty air search the irony is that it should have been sufficient this day because by all rights task 417 should have been spotted early that morning sometime around 0-6 30 chikuma number one float plane flew right over task 417 but because of cloud cover failed to spot the american ships wow what a lucky break for the americans and an unlucky break for the japanese if the pilot had been a bit more thorough in his search and if nagumo had gotten a sighting at this hour it would have avoided his dilemma altogether and he most likely would have had time to launch his counter-strike although as a side note it appears that nimitz had known this area would contain bad weather if that's the case then credits should equally be given to nimitz for brilliantly choosing the spot that concealed his carriers nevertheless the letdown of jakuma number one search plane can be seen as one of the critical failures for the japanese so thanks to this favorable event the americans were on the path of delivering an unanswered first strike against their enemy so far so good the americans have performed well up to this point they still maintain the initiative and fortunately remain undetected but what follows next is the most controversial aspect of the battle it was the poor handling and coordination of task force 16's airstrike in summary it was terrible spruins and his staff had plotted an interception point for the enterprise to follow however the most bewildering action was the core selected for the hornet it was scheduled to head west entirely off course from the reported sighting to understand why the hornet flew in the wrong direction we have to remember the fact that only two carriers have been definitely located up to this point so it's possible the hornet was trying to search north of the reported contact in the hopes of finding the remaining carriers but as will be seen the decision to head west would turn out to be disastrous for hornet's air group at 0-700 task 416 began to launch and this is where the lack of organization begins to show whereas it took the japanese seven minutes to launch 108 aircraft it took the americans almost an hour to launch 116. as a result of the lengthy process many of the attack squadrons proceeded individually and piecemeal to their target the hornet was the first to take off at 0-746 it headed west on what would come to be known as the flight to nowhere on its westward path an argument ensued lieutenant commander waldron leader of vt-8 knew they were going the wrong way he openly challenged the air group commander over the route they were going however his argument fell on deaf ears frustrated he definitely broke off from the group and went his own way towards the enemy his torpedo squadron loyally followed him waldron was of course correct in his course and not long after vt-8 would meet its end in a blaze of glory the rest of the group were talking 34 dive bombers and 10 fighters discovered nothing as they reached their maximum flight range they were now low on fuel and had no choice but to head back home their formation broke apart as some decided to land on midway and others back to their carrier all the fighters ended up ditching on the way and a third of the sbds landed on midway to sum up task 416's most powerful strike element of 44 aircraft never engaged the enemy and they lost 13 planes in the process enterprises dive bombers set out at 0-7-52 leading the air group was lieutenant commander clarence wade mccluskey jr due to some confusion during takeoff mccluskey ended up having no fighter escort the torpedo bombers were late in taking off and were trailing behind but as a result they spotted the japanese carriers on the horizon and turned towards the enemy vt6 would attack unsuccessfully and suffer heavy losses for their effort meanwhile the dive bombers had carried on they reached the interception point where the japanese were expected to be but found nothing at this critical juncture mccluskey made one of the most important decisions of the battle a logical assumption would have been that the japanese carriers had passed the interception point and were now between midway and himself but as mccluskey intuitively suspected midway's attacks had delayed nagumo and had probably forced him to change course following his gut instinct mccluskey headed north a most fortunate decision for the americans on the way mccluskey and his men began to run low on fuel and they were on the verge of giving up and returning home when lo and behold they spotted the arashi the destroyer had been detached earlier that morning to hunt for the submarine uss nautilus well now was dashing north at 30 plus knots trying to catch up with the kido bhutai and mccluskey figured hey this guy must be going somewhere important so he tagged behind the destroyer and it promptly led him to the japanese fleet for the americans god bless mccluskey but before we get to the attack we're gonna pause here for a bit the lack of coordination was something that would frequently plague the americans in 1942 they weren't able to coordinate their strikes efficiently like the japanese but ironically this shortcoming had an unintended advantage their piecemeal attacks faithfully delayed the japanese counter-strike when one looked at the time chart the japanese were in a jam they needed breathing space exactly 45 minutes of a breathing space to safely spot their aircraft and launch them but the only time they had was between 0837 and 0910 but this was precisely when tomonaga's air group needed to be recovered nagumo could have launched between 0910 and 1020 but this was prevented due to the continuous piecemeal attacks by vt8 and vt6 and this was vt8s and vt6's true contribution to the battle they prevented the spotting of nagumo's counter-strike thus their sacrifice had not been in vain the only carrier that has successful coordinated launch was the yorktown after waiting for over two hours and not having received any additional information regarding the unlocated carriers fletcher decided it was time to strike at what he could get he began launching his aircraft at 0 8 30. the launching process went without a hitch and the proficient air group departed it flew a straight path to the japanese with his torpedo bombers slightly ahead of the dive bombers when it make contact all the combat air patrol fighters were pulled down to this sector to fight after torpedo assault as the dive bombers swung around unnoticed and approached from the north and it was upon their arrival over the enemy carriers that by lucky happenstance the enterprise group also made their appearance [Music] and it is here where we can see the second lucky break the americans had because it was exactly at this moment when all the zeros were bunched up in this sector that the enterprise and yorktown dive bombers having been launched at different times and flown widely diverging courses to the enemy converged in the fleet simultaneously and from two different directions the timing had been exquisite and had been a pure product of chance and it was this attack that finally broke nagumo's back at 10 22. but if there was ever a time where the outcome rested on a knife's blade it was at 10 26 when the akagi was almost spared her fate now i'm going to dive into some alternate history but hear me out mccluskey as great as a leader as he was had recently transferred to his dive bombing post from fighter planes so he wasn't as familiar with doctrine as the others doctrine stated that when two divisions of dive bombers arrived over multiple targets the lead division should take the farther of the two this would make the attacks happen simultaneously over saturating the defenses and thus likely to succeed but mccluskey by mistake took his division on the kaga the nearer of the two thus kaga found herself at the end of a mega size attack of over 25 dive bombers but this man lieutenant bess saw what was happening thanks to his quick thinking he broke off with his two wingmen to attack the akagi and it was bess's bomb hit that single-handedly knocked out the flagship of the kidobutai and it was for good reasons too because the akagi had the best torpedo squadron of the fleet if she had survived the counter-strike at 12 10 would have been made with this deadly torpedo squadron alongside hideo's accurate dive bombers no doubt the yorktown would have been taken out on that first strike accordingly the second strike would not have been wasted on the same ship that means that sometime after 1400 it would have been 2 vs 2 with task 416 facing the second counter-strike and at that point it would have been a crapshoot who knows who would have won it's entirely possible the japanese could have pulled a pyrrhic victory or at least salvaged a draw from the battle after 10 30 the battle was all but decided in just five minutes japan had lost the battle but as we saw it had been a near-run thing at the cost of a carrier and a destroyer nimitz had destroyed japan's most capable carrier fleet midway stands as one of the greatest victories in naval history and rightly so the battle is an example of american ingenuity at its finest the americans were facing an enemy vastly superior to them in both quality and quantity the only advantage they had was their radio intelligence and they exploited it brilliantly once they got a heads up of the midway operation they began to cleverly lay a trap on the unsuspecting kido bhutai despite the numerical odds nimitz has such great confidence in his intelligence and in the skills of his men that he believed it would offset any advantages the japanese had it must be acknowledged that it was bold of him to offer battle against such a powerful opponent [Music] granted he was aided by the numerous mistakes the japanese committed before and during the battle but thanks to doggy determination perseverance good leadership and yes we must admit a great amount of luck the americans in return got a spectacular and well-earned victory [Music] what was the importance of midway well although it was a decisive victory it was not a decisive factor in determining the outcome of the war because to be frank japan was never going to win against america's industrial strength and military might their hopes for a negotiated peace with the u.s was near impossible after their sneak attack at pearl the enraged and determined united states would have never accepted anything less than an unconditional surrender from them this is why i share the belief like many others that japan lost the war the moment those first bombs fell at pearl harbor hence even if japan had won at midway all it would have done would have been to buy it some time before the u.s replaced its losses and ultimately struck back given the disparity in strength japan's defeat was inevitable so the reason midway is important is because it changed the course of the war the first six months of the pacific war were the dark days of world war ii the japanese were running wildly and victoriously all across the pacific with nothing to stop them the japanese firmly held the initiative and this was largely thanks to the kirobutai it could project tremendous offensive power wherever it pleased meanwhile all the united states could do apart from a few raids was to avoid direct confrontation and be on the defensive the reason for this defensive posture was simple the pacific fleet was numerically inferior to the japanese particularly in carriers this would all change after midway to better illustrate this let's look at the carrier strength of both sides during the first six months of the war at the start of the war america had four fleet carriers to japan's six in january the saratoga was torpedoed by a submarine and would be out of operation for a few months in march the pacific fleet received a slight boost when it was joined by the hornet finally in may we have the first confrontation between the carriers at the battle of coral sea during that battle the uss lexington was lost in return for the japanese light carrier shoho but more significantly was the fact that both the shokaku and zuikaku had to return to japan for repairs and replenishment after the battle as a result both ships would faithfully miss out on midway so on the eve of midway carrier strength was now down to four against three the japanese still have a slight edge in numbers but not for long because then we have the climactic battle of midway and ouch the dramatic shift in balance can clearly be seen now the pacific fleet possessed three carriers soon to be joined by a fourth coming in from the atlantic japan on the other hand had only two fleet carriers and a couple of second-rate light carriers japan's mighty carrier force was no more now that it had been shattered so too had its offensive capabilities evidence of this is the fact that they would never again significantly be on the strategic offensive for the remainder of the war so to sum up the significance of midway was that by destroying the core of japan's carrier force japan's expansion had been halted and the balance of naval power had been restored for the americans this was great news they had finally reached parity in carrier strength with their enemy with morale and confidence at an all-time high the americans decided to react boldly to these favorable changes in circumstances in august just two months after midway the united states launched its first offensive in the pacific war by landing its marines on an obscured island called guadalcanal oh how the tables had turned now it was the americans taking the offensive you

Channel: Montemayor

Views: 2,255,582

Keywords: Pacific War, Midway, U.S. Navy, Animated Battle Map

Id: WHO6xrSF7Sw

Length: 21min 49sec (1309 seconds)

Published: Tue Aug 11 2020

Reddit Comments

[u/whatsinthesocks]

Fuck yes. I've been checking for this for a long time

[u/insaneHoshi]

This is the final part of Montemayor's 3 video series on the Battle of Midway. In this series he has (which I have seen rarely done) broken down the battles purely from the incomplete perspectives of the Japanese and American Naval Leadership.

The Battle of Midway 1942: Told from the Japanese Perspective (1/3)

The Battle of Midway: Hiryu's Counterstrike (2/3)

I highly recommend Montemayor's videos as they are quality whose only downside is that they are so few in number.

[u/oxero]

I forgot about these! I'll have to watch it again. That was like last year or so, really great videos!

[u/liljackass]

He got around to doing it the mad lad! Cheers!!!

[u/[deleted]]

Great I been waiting for this. Now I have to watch the 3 videos, download World of Warships and listen to all the Supernova in the East series.

[u/CaptenJackHarkness]

This battle is what made the quote: "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve "

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Don't forget about fuel. Not a mistake.

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Reads like how my history teacher taught me common sense.