DECOMPRESSED violently, in an instant. The six men
of the Byford Dolphin oil rig found themselves in history's most gruesome diving accident. What
began as a routine Saturation dive ended up in absolute horror. However, only one would
make it out, and not without severe injuries. On Saturday, November 5th, 1983, while
drilling in the Frigg gas field in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea,
the divers Roy P. Lucas, Edwin Coward, Truls Hellevik and Bjørn Giæver Bergersen
were tasked with maintenance, deep beneath the rig. Assisting them were two brave dive
tenders, William Crammond and Martin Saunders. Truls Hellevik and Bjørn Bergersen descended to
a depth of 295 feet for maintenance on the rig's bottom frame of the drilling infrastructure.The
ability to reach such depths was made possible through the use of a diving bell, which could be
connected to a set of chambers where the divers temporarily lived. Unlike other divers, they
spend up to 28 days in a cramped high-pressure chamber, working, eating, and sleeping.
On the Byford Dolphin, the oil company expected the divers to work long 18-hour shifts
on barely 3 hours’ worth of sleep before forcing them to work again. The pay was excellent, often
averaging $30,000 to $45,000 a month, but the work environment was claustrophobic and challenging.
The oil rig relied on hundreds of crew members to work very hard at the same time. But they had no
idea what was about to happen. The four divers' routine procedures would soon become a nightmare.
As they entered their pressurized living chambers, the bell chambers consisted of Chamber One,
Chamber Two, an escape capsule attached on top of a lifeboat, and a trunk that was connected to the
diving bell. The bell would then clamp onto this trunk as the two diving tenders, William Crammond
and Martins Saunders, operated it from the outside on the rig. The pressurized chambers were
stationed on the rig, while the diving bell could be separated to descend to the required depth.
This setup allowed for the optimal utilization of time and resources, streamlining the transition
between the high-pressure underwater environment and the pressurized living quarters.
When diving below the surface of the water, pressure is a diver's worst enemy. Ambient
pressure increases by approximately 1 atmosphere for every 33 feet of water depth. Each additional
atmosphere adds a crushing force equivalent to 14.6 pounds per square meter on the body.
It’s inevitable, but these saturation divers face severe limitations due to the nature
of their work. The main issue with diving is not descending to high pressures but returning
from those depths. When submerged deep enough, the increasing water pressure causes nitrogen
and helium to dissolve into the bloodstream, saturating it in proportion to the rise in
pressure. This saturation occurs as the divers breathe a specialized mixture of gases inside the
chambers, typically including helium and oxygen, known as “heliox”. This mixture is adjusted
based on the depth of the dive. Hence, the term 'Saturation diving'.
If divers resurface too quickly, the rapid pressure release leads to
decompression sickness, or "the bends." This condition forces the dissolved nitrogen
in the bloodstream to become a gas again, forming nitrogen bubbles throughout the body.
The bends can cause nausea, dizziness, severe joint pain, paralysis, and even death.
The only way to prevent decompression sickness is to cautiously return to the surface,
allowing sufficient time for the nitrogen to diffuse naturally. However, the oil
industry isn't known for its patience On this routine day, the life support technicians
ensured that the air composition in the hyperbaric chambers matched what the divers needed
to breathe underwater. At the same time, the dive control team operated the diving
bell, which they raised and lowered on a crane as they monitored the divers' activities.
At 4 AM, Truls Hellevik and Bjørn Bergersen had just completed their maintenance work at a
pressure of 9 atmospheres required for a depth of 295 feet and ascended back to the surface using
the diving bell. Upon reaching the surface, the diving bell needed to be reattached to the diving
chambers, both operating at the same atmospheric pressure. Meanwhile, on the surface, Roy Lucas
and Edwin Coward were resting, ready to take over the next shift when Truls and Bjørn returned.
One of the most crucial roles in Saturation diving belongs to the Tenders, who assist
with deploying and retrieving the Umbilical. The umbilical is the physical lifeline of the
divers, a thick line connecting the diver's air supply and communication with the surface.
In the past, Tenders were also responsible for docking the diving bell to the pressurized
living chambers, as was the case on the Byford Dolphin. The Tenders hold the lives of
their diving comrades in their hands. However, they were already working for over 12 hours.
The two experienced Tenders, William Crammond and Martin Saunders, were ready to connect
the diving bell back on to the hyperbaric living chambers, as Truls Hellevik and
Bjørn Bergersen returned from the depths. Crammond successfully connected the diving
bell to the living chambers and safely deposited Bjørn Bergersen and Truls Hellevik
in chamber one. This diving team had repeatedly performed the process and knew it by heart.
Under normal circumstances, depositing divers into the rest area and removing the diving bell
was reasonably straightforward. It goes like this: 1. Close the diving bell door, which
would have been open to the trunk. 2. Slightly increase the pressure in the
diving bell to seal the bell door tightly. 3. Close the chamber 1 door,
which was also open to the trunk. 4. Slowly depressurize the trunk until
it reaches a pressure of 1 atmosphere. 5. Open the clamp to separate the
diving bell from the chamber system. Suddenly, all hell broke loose! Crammond opened
the clamp, causing a chain reaction that violently decompressed the chambers. The diving bell
disconnected before the chamber doors fully closed, releasing an "explosive depressurization."
The pressure differential tore through the living chambers, yanking Hellevik off his feet as
it indiscriminately rampaged around the deck. The air pressure inside the bell instantly shifted
from 9 atmospheres — the pressure experienced while 297 feet below the water — to 1 atmosphere,
the average air pressure at the surface. The explosive rush of air out of the
chamber sent the heavy diving bell flying. The diving bell struck Crammond
and Saunders, critically wounding them. Either Crammond disconnected the diving bell
without receiving an order to do so, or the diving leader ordered the coupling lock to be removed
despite the tunnel still being pressurized. Crammond ultimately succumbed to his injuries.
Although Saunders survived his injuries, he didn’t walk away unscathed. When
crew members found him in the aftermath, he was partially under the 4-ton diving
bell. His lungs collapsed from his injuries. He also suffered from 3 fractures in his
back and a broken neck. But the fate of the four divers inside was far worse. While
it's impossible to confirm this, the speed of the violent and unplanned decompression gave
the four divers an instant and painless death. Decompression like this is a death sentence, and
no one would or could survive. One difference between the recent Ocean Gate disaster
and the Byford Dolphin incident is that the diver's remains weren't lost to the sea.
Knowing what precisely happened to these poor, unfortunate souls provides little comfort
and very real images of the torture their bodies went through which can still be found
in the official reports of the incident. The divers never once realized what
happened to them nor felt the terrible effects of their horrible deaths. Despite
their proximity to the door, Lucas, Coward, and Bergersen's blood "boiled" instantly in
their bodies as enormous amounts of dissolved nitrogen suddenly returned to their gaseous state.
The divers died instantly. After the blood boiled from nitrogen expansion, fat accumulated and
solidified in their arteries, veins, hearts, and livers. The explosion of force from the gas
expansion scattered the blood and the bodies of the divers throughout the inside of the chamber.
While the events left Lucas, Bergersen, and Coward unrecognizable, Hellevik suffered
the worst death since he was the closest to the connecting door. The pressure equalization
caused the door to chamber one to partially jam, causing Hellevik’s body to be forced through a
small, 24-inch crescent-shaped opening with a tremendous force of 25 tons Unable to fit
through, the sheer pressure resulted in the horrifying outcome of his internal organs
bursting out of his body through the opening. During the examination, investigators found
Hellevik's spinal column, part of his windpipe, and some of his small intestine left behind inside
the bell. His other organs looked intact, almost as if they were harvested or expertly dissected
and then forcefully ejected from his body. In the end, the incident resulted in a total
fatality count of 5 and the brutality of the accident left little blood behind despite
the shredded state of the diver's bodies. At first, people were quick to blame the crew, a
potential miscommunication, or poor routines as the causes of the accident. The crew worked
over 12 hours on many occasions – a mistake could have easily happened. However, no one
could identify the exact factors behind the decision to unlatch the system incorrectly and
expose everyone to such horrible deaths. And with Crammond having passed away, the true reason
for him opening the clamp was forever lost. To minimize the considerable risks, only
flawless execution of every operation detail, most importantly the pressure-driven transfer,
can help crews avoid this catastrophic outcome. However, the North Sea Divers Alliance,
a group of activists made up of active divers and the victims’ relatives, believed that
negligent higher-ups issued the Byford Dolphin divers faulty equipment. They maintained that the
pressure chamber system was obsolete, lacking the necessary fail-safes to prevent the disaster.
It's important to mention that the crew's equipment during the operation was from
1975 and didn't have modern fail-safe features. One key missing feature was an
interlocking mechanism, which would have prevented Crammond from opening the trunk while
the bell was still under pressure. As a result, officials revised Norwegian regulations to
mandate interlock mechanisms for all bell systems. Still, many people believed the sole
cause of the accident was the locking mechanism. But decades later, the story changed.
Regrettably, it took decades for the Norwegian government, which was in charge of the
Byford Dolphin in 1983, to acknowledge their responsibility for the incident and
compensate the families of the deceased men. It was only in 2009 that the government
provided undisclosed settlements to the families of all six victims, including
Saunders. According to the report, faulty equipment caused the accident rather than
human error. In addition to faulty equipment, the loud environment interfering with communications
and unclear orders contributed to the accident. The Byford Dolphin rig was a prominent fixture
in offshore drilling for over four decades, operating in various locations worldwide. By
2016, they decommissioned the Byford Dolphin rig, ending the saga of its eventful and
storied career in the oil and gas industry.
