In our first video covering the armies of the
Byzantine Empire, we outlined why and how the all-conquering legionary armies of Caesar
and Augustus transformed into the balanced, limited military of Justinian’s era. One of
the most symbolic qualities of the Byzantine military as it developed was the use of so-called
military manuals. Primarily aimed at preserving and proliferating sophisticated military
doctrine to army officers and commanders, these treatises played a formidable role
in retaining the Byzantine military as one of the most formidable, organised and
disciplined forces of war in the entire world despite Constantinople’s loss of hegemony.
Perhaps most notable among all military manuals is the main subject of today’s video, the large
compendium known as Maurice’s Strategikon. Sponsor of today's video MagellanTV is the
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Start your free trial today! Clinical, analytical writing on the topics of
tactics and strategy are truly ancient in the Hellenic tradition, with the oldest surviving
work being that of Aeneas the Tactician, authored in the fourth century BC. His
work, and many more lost works besides, were followed by a slew of other pieces on
subjects as diverse as archery, proper use of siege machines, spies and secrecy, and every other
aspect of what might be called military science. By the late antique Byzantine era then, the
libraries of Constantinople and the eastern empire were stocked with a vast array of material to
which the Byzantines themselves continued to add. Notable among their pre-Strategikon
military works are those of Syrianos, Urbikios and a Justinianic era
writing whose author is not known. Some of them just repackage the contributions of
ancient authors, while others are suspiciously theoretical. The piece of instructive military
literature which can in no way be accused of being an armchair general’s inexperienced fantasy,
however, is the aforementioned Strategikon, perhaps the single most influential
handbook of war in all Byzantine history. The first thing of note about this text
is that despite being known popularly as ‘Maurice’s Strategikon’ it was not necessarily
written by the eponymous reformist emperor. Most historians concur that the Strategikon was
broadly penned in the rough half-century between 575, when the Eastern Romans renewed hostilities
with Sassanid Persia, and 628, when the Sassanids were finally defeated after a long war. Using
information within the text which can be dated, such as battles, sieges and document convention
the time of authorship can be narrowed down even further to between 592 and 610 - late in the reign
of Maurice and into the following tenure of the usurper Phokas. Even though the Strategikon was
referred to definitively as being of ‘Maurice’, that was a common practice possibly implying that,
as emperor, Maurice instructed that it be made. It might even be that a prominent general or veteran,
such as the emperor’s brother-in-law Phillipicus, wrote the piece and then dedicated it to Maurice.
Equally, however, there are many personal touches and bits of literary flair which makes it
seem directly planned and written by Maurice. Whatever the answer to this mystery, we know
that the author was an experienced soldier, educated in ancient history and had commanded
troops on at least two fronts. He is intimately familiar with weaponry, armour, martial laws,
as well as the daily life of a soldier on the march and in camp. More telling is that he also
knows Byzantium’s enemies and how they fight. Rather than tediously listing every single
book, chapter and point of the Strategikon from detailed battle formations to sieges, it is worth
considering the attitude shown by Maurice towards war and how that contrasts to the bold, warrior
ethos of Rome in earlier centuries. Appropriate to their diminished military position, war to
the Byzantines was not a means of demonstrating superiority or expanding, but the least
desirable way by which the empire could achieve its goals. Whereas earlier Roman Republican and
Imperial armies were notoriously bad at scouting, regarding the ambush and irregular fighting as
not a proper battle, Maurice’s pragmatic Byzantine army promoted by the Strategikon was precisely
the opposite. Costly all-in battles were to be avoided if at all possible, and trickery as well
as cunning employed at every opportunity. In that way, the Strategikon is very much fashioned in the
mould of Sun Tzu. So prominent are these aspects of war in the mind of the author that two out of
the twelve books making up the Strategikon - books IV and IX, cover the topics of ‘Ambushes’
and ‘Surprise Attacks’ in considerable depth. Even the books not especially concerning
misdirection and deviousness, such as those detailing cavalry and Tagma formations, are laced
with advice on how to mask one's strength and deceive an enemy. In a section on the prescribed
depth of a Tagma formation, for example, the text advises that any reading officer or general
avoids arraying all of his forces for inspection in lines of an identical size. This was because
such a uniform deployment made it simple for enemy spies or scouts to quickly extrapolate the size
of the entire Byzantine field army by counting the size of one rank, and the number of ranks, rather
than having to trawl through the entire throng. Such advice is also given regarding the size
of deployed Byzantine cavalry units. This is a particularly illustrative example because it
shows starkly just how deadly a mistaken advance caused by bad intel could be. If a foe is
advancing with 4,000 cavalry, and their scouts, deceived by the Byzantines’ obfuscation tactics,
report 3,000 cavalry opposing them, that foe might decide to attack and only then would
realise they faced 5,000, and were outnumbered. Another characteristic of the type of
warfare championed by the Strategikon is its extreme carefulness and balanced nature, a
theme which is clear throughout the entire text. ‘A ship cannot cross the sea without a helmsman,
nor can one defeat an enemy without tactics and strategy’ begins Book VII - Strategy, and this
analytical approach to warfare is prominent in the entire piece. To engage in rash, albeit ‘glorious’
battle is the mark of a bad Byzantine general, and `’it is ridiculous to try to gain a victory
which is so costly and brings only empty glory.’ A keen sense of caution is also shown in the section
concerning war against unfamiliar foes. ‘If we find ourselves at war with a powerful people and
one whose ways are strange to us, and the army, not knowing what to expect becomes nervous, then
we must be very careful to avoid getting into an open battle with them right away’ This kind of
approach brings to mind the approach of Achaemenid king Darius the Great recorded at Behistun
- ‘First I will think, and then I will act.’ Even in the face of defeat and humiliation, this
practical and cautionary approach to warfare dominates. Adroitly acknowledging the often overly
superstitious and religious nature of common soldiers, the author recommends that a general
does not immediately attack again right after he is defeated, even if the general understands
why the defeat occurred. The soldiers, he says, are likely to view the loss as God’s will and
therefore have their morale devastated. In such a situation, the Byzantines are to unashamedly
leverage their equally powerful weapons to gain some kind of benefit. If emissaries are
sent by a victorious enemy for terms, and those terms are reasonable and easily
accomplished, then they should be enacted without hesitation to conclude the fighting.
But, Maurice relates, such conversations ought to be kept private from the rank and file
soldier unless it is an absolute emergency. A nitpicky but important consideration is
also made in this sense when the author speaks concerning the polishing of weapons
and armour, something that the majority of people would never even think about. But
the point isn’t to keep equipment polished, but to conceal it on the march so that the army
can’t be picked out easily by enemy scouts, who might see the sun reflecting from
the point of a lance, or a ring of mail. It would be easy to also list the 101 maxims
listed by the Strategikon for use by any reader who might find himself commanding an army on
campaign, but that is not necessary. These range from such personal matters as exercising
mental self control and balance at all times, to operational considerations such
as maneuvering with the cover of sun, wind and dust to their advantage of one’s
army, and the detriment of the enemy’s. Compared to the other militaries of its age,
especially in the later part of the first millennium, that of the Byzantines is regarded
as professional and almost futuristic by the standards of the time. The Strategikon has a
section dedicated entirely to what we in the 21st century might call intelligence-gathering
and counterintelligence operations, and how enemy attempts to gather information about imperial
forces might be diminished or stopped entirely. Men who are chosen to be the army’s spies, the
text states, ‘should be reliable, they should look very manly and be a cut above the other soldiers
in physical appearance, morale and equipment, so they may project a noble image in confronting
the enemy and if captured, make a good impression on him’. These enterprising, ancient 007s
were, then, expected to serve as paragons and representatives of the emperor’s armies -
formidable and intimidating even if captured, capable of influencing the enemy into doubt by
their robust demeanor. More broadly, scouting and patrol parties, mounted on swift horses and
clad in light armour were to be dispatched in quantities depending on the situation. When the
enemy force was at a distance, scouts should only be sent out when specific information is
necessary, such as the nature of roads, the properties of a nearby fortification, and other
such things. However, when the enemy army is near, the entire area surrounding the imperial army
should be swarming with scouts, instructed and able to take prisoners for interrogation if
discovered. So crucial was this duty that the Strategikon’s author recommended that patrols be
regularly inspected by capable officers. Any among the reconnaissance parties found to be negligent
‘should be punished for seriously endangering the whole army’. It is worth noting that this is
one of the only occasions in which the author attributes such grave responsibility to soldiers,
further emphasizing the importance of scouting. The text later goes on to detail a trick or
scheme which can be used to capture enemy spies roaming around busy Byzantine encampments.
Every few hours, a trumpet could be sounded at which the soldiers, informed beforehand must
immediately return to their own assigned tents or face punishment. Naturally, the enemy spy
would either be captured for being outside alone or, if he entered one of the tents, be recognised
as a stranger and arrested by the squad inside. It might be said of the Strategikon, based on its
general nature and emphasized content, that it describes the final formalisation and readjustment
of a Late Roman Army into its typically Byzantine form. As we introduced last episode with
Procopius’ prominent display of mounted archery in his History of the Wars, Maurice or
whichever imperial servant wrote the Strategikon emphasized first and foremost the training
and drill of archers, both mounted and foot. If the text was followed in future
generations, which it seems to have been, every single ‘Roman’ man up until the age
of forty, and perhaps even beyond, would’ve been required to possess a bow and a quiver.
Swords, lances, spears and other instruments of melee combat are, in comparison, barely even
mentioned. Those men who are ‘unskilled’ in archery were to be given a light bow, so that
they could practice this ‘essential’ skill. Interestingly, the book also contains even
further evidence that this transformation of the Byzantine army was heavily driven by
contact with nomadic nations from the steppe, partly because Maurice saw the sheer efficiency of
their way and means of war, or in order to counter steppe cavalry armies who were bearing down on
the empire at the time. Such ‘Hunnish’ peoples included the Gokturks and the Avars, which
are grouped with all nomads as ‘Scythians’. The ‘scoundrel’ Avars, as Maurice describes
them, are particularly important in the realm of Byzantine equipment and materiel. Throughout
the entire piece, the reader is advised to supply items of the ‘Avar type’, such as tunics cut in
the Avar manner, round and spacy Avar-style tents, Avar-inspired cavalry lances and even Avar
scarves made of linen on the outside and wool on the inside. This, much like with the
adoption of the gladius, shows just how eager the Romans always were to draw in aspects of other,
hostile civilisations for their own benefit. Furthermore, the chapter on ambushes contain small
tips on how to perform complex surprise attacks in the Hephthalite and ‘Scythian’ manner. The
so-called ‘Scythian Ambush’ essentially describes the infamous feigned flight, a tactic so common
among mounted nomadic tribes. Maurice recognises this frequency of use, justifiably pointing out
that ‘The Scythian peoples do this all the time’. Among other terms, the post-Maurice
Byzantine army described and brought about by the doctrines of the Strategikon
might be described as calculating, pragmatic and limited in its action. There was very little
of the heroic, glorious flair of battle remaining, just a relentless desire to gain victory by any
means necessary and to, through that victory, enhance the prospects of the Byzantine Empire.
Among the myriad of military manuals in the Hellenic tradition, the Strategikon is
particularly important because of its profound influence on later generations. In its
general form, the military of Constantinople would remain moulded by this most weighty
of texts for almost half a millennium, even inspiring a slew of updated editions from
later authors of similar texts. Approximately three centuries after Maurice’s overthrow
and death, for example, Byzantine emperor Leo VI ‘the wise’, who was a prodigious author on
many topics, penned or sponsored the penning of a famous military treatise known as Taktika. This
particular text is essentially a carbon copy of the Strategikon in style, if not in content, even
quoting the earlier text verbatim in many areas. Had the Strategikon been
written half a century later, we might think there would be a key characteristic
missing. In the book’s later sections, there is a fascinating segment detailing the various enemies
which might be confronted by imperial armies. Included in this roster are Lombards, as
well as other Germanic peoples, the Persians, Slavs and others. The insignificant and peripheral
Arabs, meanwhile, were barely worth a mention. Next time in our series on the Byzantine armies,
we will examine how the empire responded to the crippling blows inflicted by an ascendant Muslim
caliphate, and particularly the notorious theme system, so make sure you are subscribed and have
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The video alludes to the Maxims and how some include how to maintain mental discipline in the field. Does anyone know where I can find those somewhere online? I tried doing a google search and nothing came up.
I feel like those would be fascinating to read.
This channel is excellent.
This was excellent and enjoyed watching it.