Good afternoon, everyone, I'm Gloria Duffy, president
and CEO of the Commonwealth Club. So happy to have you with us here today. It's obviously a very important
and good time to be talking about Russia and U.s.-russian relations
and Russia's role in the world
given world events at the moment. Unfortunate world events you can find the Commonwealth Club
on the internet to read about other upcoming programs
and activities. Commonwealth Club dot org. And it's my very great pleasure
to introduce today's speaker, our format. It's going to be a short
talk by Dr. Cohen. And then he and I will have a conversation
and go more in depth. And of course, we do very much encourage
you to reach your questions. Hand them over to one of the helpers
on the sides and give us some good fodder for the discussion. Dr. Stephen Cohen is Professor
Emeritus of Russian studies and politics at New York University
and Princeton University. He's a contributing editor
to the Nation magazine. I should ask how many of you attended the event
last night with the Nation magazine? We're happy to have the publisher,
Katrina Vanden Heuvel here with us. And if you enjoyed last night's
presentation, you'll surely enjoy the presentation
with her husband, Stephen Cohen. The. Professor Cohen is a member of the board of a recently formed organization, the American Committee
for East West Accord. He and I were talking
a little bit beforehand and he reminded me that there was a committee on East-West
Accord back in the Nixon era, which was a pro detente organization. So it's back in the new era of possibly the need for greater
collaboration between the U.S. and Russia. So he's one of the founders
and a board member of the new American Committee
for East-West Accord. He is the author of Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives
From Stalinism to the New Cold War. The victims return survivors of the Gulag
after Stalin and Buchanan and the Bolshevik Revolution. He's one of the nation's most distinguished scholars on Russia
and the Soviet Union. Before that and a terrific,
thoughtful, insightful guy. So thank you so much
and welcome to Professor Stephen Cohen. They say that the farther you go from home,
the better introductions you get. I would say the farther
you go from Washington and the internet and the mainstream media,
the better introductions you get. Some of you
probably know that the small group of us who have been protesting American policy
toward Russia since the Ukrainian crisis began
two years ago have been described in harsh
and I would say derogatory language as Putin's apologist
and Putin's useful idiots pooh Putin's. America's best friend. Paris should have changed everything. But for these people, it hasn't. I clicked on the internet this morning
just before I came here, and there it was again. So let me begin with a word about myself. My answer to these charges is No, I not. You am the patriot
of American national security, and I actually have
been ever since I started studying Russia, which is about 50 years ago,
and I started out in Kentucky. I ended up in Indiana with my dear friend
Ralph Cohen, whom I haven't seen in quite a while, but who lives here in San Francisco
and is here today and a colleague. I studied with Professor Barry Shultz
so they could testify. I was doing this many, many years ago. Along the way, I came to a conviction
exactly why and how it doesn't matter that American national security runs
through Moscow. This was true
when the Soviet Union existed. This is true today. What it means in plain terms is that whichever
existential or grave world threat you might emphasize,
and for some people, it's climate change. For some people, it's human rights. For some people, it's
a spread of democracy. For me, it has been for quite a while, the new kind of terrorism
that afflicts the world. It's no longer
these so-called non-state actors. These guys are organized,
they have an army, they have a self-professed state and
they have a capacity to harm us gravely. Everybody seems to have forgotten
9-11 in Boston, but Paris should have reminded us of
what's at stake. So for me, the threat in the world
today, that gets the priority. And I mean, it gets the priority
of the president of the United States. I don't care whether he's a Republican
or a Democrat is the combination
of this new kind of terrorism. These civil wars, ethnic religious zealots, civil wars
which drive this terrorism. And the fact that these guys
desperately want materials of weapons of mass destruction. A cup this size of radioactive material aboard
those planes on nine of eleven would have made lower
Manhattan inhabitable even today. They're using conventional weapons,
bombs, mortars and guns. But if they had it in Paris, Paris
would have had to have been evacuated. This is the real threat today. This kind of threat cannot be even marginally diminished. And I'm not sure
we can ever end it in our lifetime. This may be the new normal,
but diminished and made. Probably not the right word manageable
unless we have a partner in the Kremlin. That's the long and the short of it. Note I didn't say a friend. Clinton and Nixon went on about their dear friend, Brezhnev
and their dear friend Yeltsin. It was all for show. I don't care
whether we like this person or not. What we need are these common interests
in a partnership. The way to business
people make a contract. They've got the same interests. They trust each other
because if one side violates the interest,
the other guy's interest is violated. We haven't had that. We don't have it today. Even after Paris. But that is essentially
what I've been saying for two years. And in return,
people say that's unpatriotic. And I argue, no, it's the highest form of patriotism
in regard to American national security. So I will make a few points
today, very briefly, very starkly
and rather than give a lecture. Which actually a lecture for me
means 55 minutes. I can't do a minute more a minute less than this is for discussion,
and I'm really less interested in lecturing than than hearing what's on the mind of my old friend
Gloria . We started out together many years ago. I more years ago than her,
but in the same geographical location and on your minds. The chance. For a durable Washington, Moscow
strategic partnership was lost in 1991
after the Soviet Union ended. Actually,
it was lost earlier because it was Reagan and Gorbachev who gave us the opportunity,
but it certainly ended in the Clinton administration
and it didn't end in Moscow. It ended in Washington. It was squandered and lost in Washington. And it was lost so badly. That today for at least two years,
and I would argue since the Georgian war of 2008, we have been
in literally a new Cold War with Russia. Now people don't want to call it that. Who made American policy
during the last 20 years because they said, yes,
we're in a new Cold War, they have to explain what they were doing
during this time. So they say, Oh, it's not a Cold War, OK? It's a really horrible situation
and exceedingly dangerous. And here's my next point. This new Cold War has all the potential
to be even more dangerous than the preceding 40 year
Cold War for several reasons. first of all, think about it. Those of us in this room
of that generation and we seem to be in the majority know that the epicenter of
that Cold War was in Berlin. Not close to Russia. And there was an enormous buffer zone
between Russia and the West in these satellite
or block countries in Eastern Europe today, the epicenter is literally on Russia's borders in Ukraine. It's Ukraine that set this off. And Ukraine remains a ticking time
bomb politically. And this is not only on Russia's borders, this is through the heart of Russia's
and Ukrainians Slavic civilization. This is a civil war even more profound in its ethos
than was the American Civil War. These are people who were raised
in the same faith, speak the same language, are intermarried,
didn't even know how many intermarried Russian and Ukrainians there are today. My wife, Katrina Vanden Heuvel. To paraphrase John Kennedy, I came I accompany
Katrina Vanden Heuvel to San Francisco. You'll remember John Kennedy's famous
remark about his wife, or you won't. But that? This is a profound division, and this issue for all the terrorism continues to be the ticking time bomb
that can do a lot more damage. So the fact that it's right? On Russia's border and any so to speak, the Russian Ukrainian saw saw at least half of Ukrainian soldiers. The other half yearns
for Western Europe for enough makes it even more dangerous. Still worse, you'll remember that
after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow and Washington
developed certain rules of mutual conduct. They saw how dangerous,
how close we came to nuclear war. So no one knows
whether they were encoded in treaties or unofficial understandings
between Soviet and American leaders. You don't do this. Each side knew where the red line was. Now we tripped over it occasionally,
but we immediately pulled back because it was a mutual understanding
that there are red lines. There are no red lines today. one of the things
that Putin and his predecessor, Medvedev keep saying to Washington, you're crossing our red lines in Washington shows
there are no red lines. You don't have any red lines. We are red lines. I mean, you can't have a military base
in Canada or Mexico, but we can have all we want
around your borders. Red lines don't exist,
so there are no rules and stop and think. In recent years,
there have been three proxy wars between the United States
and Russia already. Georgia in 2008. Ukraine beginning in 2014 and until Paris and maybe still in Syria, because we don't know what position
Washington's going to take on Syria. Allen made his decision. He declared a grand alliance with Russia. Washington, as I say in Russia. Is silent or worse? But we're waiting to see
if this new proxy Cold War goes on and there are no rules
in any of these three areas. Moreover, and I feel this because I remember the I'm old enough
to remember the seventies and eighties. There is absolutely no effective organized
Anti Cold War Pro detente political force
in the United States at all. Not in either political party,
not in the White House, not the State Department,
not in the mass media, not the universities,
not in the think tanks. I see Sharon Tennison,
who's here nodding your head. Yes, because we remember when we had allies,
even in the White House, among age of the president, where we had
allies in the State Department, and we had senators
and members of Congress who were pro detente and supported us and spoke for themselves and gave us
opportunities doesn't exist today. And without that in a democracy,
what do you do? We don't throw bombs. We argue. So this is exceedingly dangerous. My fourth point is a question to you. Who's responsible for this new Cold War? I don't ask this question
because I want to say, Oh, all right, let's name names
since you've probably been here. Garry Kasparov
and Michael Fall should repent. Repent. And they say Stephen Cohen should be shot. I'm not interested in that. I'm interested in the change of policy,
which can only come from the White House. Congress could help, but we need to know
what went wrong and why, or we're not going to have any rethinking and we're not going to have
any new policy. And at the moment, there's
no rethinking in the United States. There's a lot in the European Parliament. There's a lot of angst in the French press
today about this question and in Germany
and in the Netherlands. And even Cameron is rethinking suddenly wants his picture taken with Putin
thinks it might help him at home. Now, the
position of the American political media establishment is is that this new Cold
War is all Putin's fault. All of it, everything.
We did nothing wrong. At every stage, we were virtuous and wise, and he was aggressive. And a bad man. And therefore, what do we think he's got to do the rethinking? Not us. I disagree. And this is
what's brought the opprobrium down on me. I'm saying because I was raised
like this down in Kentucky, it's a silly adage, but it's probably true
there are two sides to every story. And these people are actually telling us
no to this story in the history of American
Russian relations, only one side. No need to see anything
through the other person's eyes. Just get out there and be a cheerleader
for our side of the story. And I don't want to make too fine
a connection here, but you keep doing that and you can have a lot of Paris's. Including here in the United States. And that's why I say we have to be
patriots of American national security. The reality is, for whatever reasons
the Clinton administration adopted in the 1990s, a Winner-Take-All policy toward Russia,
they said we won the Cold War. That isn't true. Get Jack Matlock out here
and he'll tell you the inside story. He was at Reagan's side when he negotiated
with Gorbachev at every step. You can look it
up, as Casey Stengel used to say. The reality is the Clinton administration adopted unwise policies
winner take all and what were the consequences of these
policies, whether they were a lot, they blew the chance
for strategic partnership. But the four policies that most offended Russia and offend them
today were the following, obviously. The decision to expand NATO's right to Russia's borders. I mean, it's a joke. We say Putin has violated
the post-Cold War order of Europe. Russia was excluded
from the Post World War because quote post-Cold War
Order of Europe by NATO's expansion, Russians was pushed somewhere out there
and Russia kept saying, Hey, let's do a pan-European security arrangement
like Gorbachev and Reagan said. And we said, This is no
this is this is not military. This is about democracy and free
trade is going to be great for you. Swallow your poison with a smile. And while they had no choice, they did, and then when they had a choice,
not they start pushing back. As any leader of Russia would, who was
sober and had support his own country. I don't see that as a joke. He was a joke by the end. Look at the pictures.
Yeltsin could barely walk. He was pushed out. He did resign voluntarily. But the point of it is, is
anybody could have predicted this back in the 1990s and some of us did. Secondly, there's the absolute refusal on the part of the United States
to negotiate on missile defense. Missile defense is now a neo project
that means missile defense building installations, whether it's on land
or sea, she's more dangerous, whether land or sea is now part of NATO
expansion. Encirclement of Russia
is part of the same system. Russians Russians are absolutely convinced
it's targeted at their nuclear retaliatory capability. We say, Oh no, it's about Iran,
it's not about you, but go talk to Ted. Postwar, it might. Stage four of missile
defense is an offensive weapon. It also violates the IMF agreement
because it can fire cruise missiles. Why we're blaming the Russians
for developing cruise missiles again as they are,
because we're back in this tit for tat mutual build up arms race. Thirdly, this meddling in Russia's internal affairs
in the name of democracy promotion. We've been doing this since the nineties,
are you aware? That when Medvedev was president of Russia
and Mrs. Clinton and Michael McFaul
had their wondrous reset, which was a rigged roulette game. If you look at the terms of it
that Vice President Biden went to Moscow University and said Putin should not return to the presidency
and then said that directly to Putin's face. So Putin comes over here
next week and tells Rubio he thinks he ought to drop out. And we say, well, OK. I mean, are there any red lines
left anymore when it comes to Russia? Do we have the right to be telling them? I mean, it extends to every issue. But it certainly extends to politics. And the White House simply can't keep its mouth shut,
and it's egged on by vested lobbies. We all believe in democracy, but you're
not going to impose democracy on Russia. If it is, you won't like the democracy,
you get there. So. Ask yourself two questions. Is there a Russian side of this story that needs to be considered
in the aftermath of Paris at least? And does Russia have any legitimate
national interests at all in the world? And if so, what are they on their borders? Do they have a legitimate
national interest in Syria? Israel thinks so. The Israeli security people in leadership urge Putin
to do what he did long before Paris. We need to think this through. My final point is one of
I would salt kind of sappy, prescriptive hope because until Paris happened,
I wasn't sure there was any hope at all. There's still a chance to achieve
this lost partnership with Russia, at least in three realms. first of all, Ukraine,
you all know what the Minsk Accords are. They were, they were. They were drafted by Merkel and by Alon. They were signed by Poroshenko,
the president of Ukraine, and by Putin. And they call for a negotiated end
to the Civil War in Ukraine. They recognize that it is primarily
a civil war, not primarily or secondarily Russian aggression, but the civil war
has to be ended and it steps. Here's what you got to do. And I don't care what the American media
tell you, it's Kiev that has refused to follow
through on its obligations. But this is a possibility. To end that civil war or mute it down would be
exceedingly security building today. Then there's Syria. I thought that until Paris
there was almost no chance of an American coalition
with Russia and Syria, partly to do, I think what? And I'm not big on psychological analysis, but with Obama's mind fixed about. He resents them
in ways that are not helpful. But since Paris, with Alan announcing,
I mean, literally announcing that there is now a French
Russian coalition with Germany agreeing and I would say almost all of Western
Europe on board and with a poll in Le Figaro
sent to me just this morning that when asked and some rather
conservative readership of Le Figaro, do you favor a full coalition
with Russia against terrorism? 87% said yes. And these are French conservatives. Finally, there's one thing we all forget, and it was another disservice
to the Clinton administration and to a certain extent of Bush
and his electoral campaign for reelection. That was the end of the Soviet Union. The nuclear threat ended. And we were told we were told all the time
the danger of nuclear war had ended with the Soviet Union,
the reality is it grew whether by intent, whether by accident,
whether by theft of nuclear materials. It got worse last year in an unwise
peak of anger. Of all the legislation we passed,
Russia withdrew from the Nunn-Lugar bill, which you might remember, which was one of the wisest pieces
of congressional legislation. We gave Russian money just to lock down and secure all their weapons
and materials of mass destruction. Plus pay their scientists who knew how to do this stuff
and might go to Syria or Yemen or wherever or to the caucus
and sell their knowledge to employ them. Russia withdrew, but Russia said it wants
to renegotiate this on different terms. The White House has refused. I mean, lordy, lordy. After Paris, one hopes Obama picked up
whether his cell phone or whatever they let him use to talk to Putin
and said, I'm sending somebody over. Let's get this done. Unfortunately, in today's paper, the lead new seems to be that what they're thinking
about in the White House and in the State Department is how to counter
Russian actions in Syria. They're worried. And this is what is reported that Russia is diminishing
American leadership in the world. And here's the bottom line
we don't lead in the world anymore and we can't long before this
globalization, all sorts of developments. They're slow, they're bumper stickers. But the unipolar multipolar world is over. There's a multipolar world
emerging before our eyes, not just Russia, but in five or six capitals
and Washington. Stubborn resistance to embrace
this has become part of the problem, not the solution. And that's where we are today after Paris. Our thanks to Professor Stephen Cohen, emeritus professor at New York University
and Princeton University. We have many, many questions. I'm assuming you're miked up. You have the there you go. I would use that. So we can all hear you. I went to an event last night
where the guy participated for 40 minutes, and it was only then he realized
he didn't have a mic. By the way, emeritus means on Medicare, I propose that they call it Professor Medicare of Russian policy,
that an anagram Medicare emeritus. And I like better. I like Medicare. I'm with Bernie on this,
not on everything, but on this one. So seriously, do you see Paris bringing about a before too long a confluence of U.S. and Russian interests? I mean, the Russians
and the French are allied. Do you see the U.S. moving over into position
to ally with them? Well, obviously from what I said,
you know, I hope that'll be the case. But the reality is that the Pro Cold War forces in Washington in particular, who control the New York
Times, The Washington Post, all the main broadcast and cable television networks, NPR and PBS are so powerful
that it is a shock when a dissenting voice
has gotten on their pages or on their air. In the last two years, but Paris is also a shock and one
I mean, I'm out in California. I'm not near where I normally kind of
follow these things, but. It's, I guess, the best way to tell. Because these folks will say anything
they think will get them votes is to see
what the how many presidential candidates we have now,
we still have a baker's dozen or so. Let's see what these people say
and do in the next two or three days. I mean, does Rubio still basically
he wants to go to war with Russia? That's been his program.
He doesn't care where it is, but somewhere I forgot her name. Fiorina,
she says she won't even talk to Putin. He doesn't get to come the club. I mean, the truth is that the person
who's made the best statements and they're not
sophisticated has been Donald Trump. And the reason is what he said,
because in his mind, there's a business model for everything is all get along with Putin
because I'll make a deal. Well, I say, OK, a deal
making is called diplomacy. It would be good to hear from him
what diplomacy has in mind. But he and Rand Paul have been
the only two who have said that this aggressive American military posture
and sanctions toward Russia were not a good idea, and
that was before Paris, so it would end. The Democratic debate
was bashed in my mind the day a couple of days after Paris,
so it would be great if there was a debate tomorrow, then we might know
the answer to your question. Or I guess we look at the editorials
in The Washington Post because they really set opinion
in Washington as much as anything. Those two papers
and The Wall Street Journal, do you think Putin shares your views that cooperation
between Russia and the U.S. is a necessity? Do you think he would welcome the U.S. joining this new coalition
that's forming up to deal with ISIS? It's my
I mean, what I do for my non living now since I am retired, is study Russia, mainly historically but lately
contemporary. I have followed Putin's career
very closely because I am a biographer of Russian leaders
and I'm not writing a biography of Putin. But I think biographically
I look at leaders. Let me sum up my answer to your question
in this way. The mantra the the the the. Consensual characterization of Putin leaving aside KGB thug. Is that he is an aggressor? That he his foreign policy has been neo Soviet imperial aggression. No serious historian writing 20, 30, 40 years from now will characterize Putin as that. They will see him as as I do as primarily not exclusively you want to break it down
two percentage 75%. A reactive leader. Political science has these concepts built
up between leaders who are proactive. That would be an aggressor and reactive. They're reacting
maybe in an aggressive way to things that are being done
to them in their country. This if you begin with Putin's attempt
to become an American partner after 9:11. If you look at all the things that he did
for the United States, we asked for during the reset,
putting heavier sanctions on Iran, supplying American and NATO troops
fighting in Afghanistan, which by the way, continues even today
we have no other safe route there. Pakistan is not safe. I would say that Putin 1,000%. Once this partnership
and he's wanted it from day one, and by the way, we fix on the Garry Kasparov of this world. Gary's not connected to Russia anymore,
he lives in a couple of blocks from me in Manhattan. But he represents an opinion in Russia, which probably at the polls
in a free election get about eight to 10%. And they should have elections
so they can have their eight, eight, 10% in the poll and they should be on TV . But then I should be on TV too. And so should a lot of you in this room. You are. Yeah, but not not on the TV
that reaches Washington any longer. I mean, I'm on the TV that we're
people in New York late at night. Watch when they go to dinner. The the the. The question I lost the I digress to Gary, what was the question
was, does Putin want but what? No, that that is absolutely agents
with the U.S. that is absolutely clear. And to me, at least at the same time, the bitterness regarding the United States in the Russian political class,
the security elites. Because Putin cannot make decisions
unilaterally. He can't. He he's the decider, as George Bush
used to call himself, he's the decider. But he has to bring along his team,
which is divided. But the anger at the United States. Has to do more than anything
with what they regard as broken American promises
to Russia over the last 20 years. And everybody says, Oh, you mean
Bush has promised to Gorbachev that Naito would not expand if Gorbachev would agree
to a reunited Germany and Naito? It began there. But look what happened after 9-11? Putin put himself way out of his ballpark with his own people when he told George
Bush, Whatever you want, we'll give you. And do you know what he gave us? He gave us American lives. Not only did he give us
Russian information and right to travel and supply Afghanistan over Russia,
but there was a fighting force left over from the Soviet adventure
in Afghanistan, called the Northern Alliance with the Russians and continued
to train Russian officers in Afghanistan. He gave that to Bush. To do the early fighting,
and so for every Northern Alliance soldier who died fighting the Taliban
to drive him out of Kabul, it would have been an American soldier. What did he get? What did Putin get in return? Quickly, Bush withdrew
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty unilaterally. That was the bedrock of Soviet
nuclear security, and we started this missile
defense again, and Bush undertook a second round of NATO's
expansion to Russia's borders. So how does Putin explain
how smart he is to his own people? You give and they take. And if you really wanted to go into it,
you could look at the reset because it was that all over again,
Russia gave everything we asked for. We gave nothing in return. So there is this anger
that you can't trust the Americans, and until recently,
the only person there were only two people who could vouch safe for American policy
in the White House. Henry Kissinger, because they trust him. But Obama won't seem
so far as I know and Merkel. But Merkel now is maybe going down her numbers have plummeted in Germany
because of Greece, because of Ukraine, because of the refugee crisis,
now because of Syria. So it's not clear
if some really important thing would come from Obama to Putin. It would be nice if he could get it in
writing and even in writing, of course. I mean, he really needs to know
that Obama has got his back, just as Obama needs to know,
Putin's got his back politically. But I think it's possible. It's called leadership. So in order to join up with this French
Russian coalition, the president would have to climb down from his position on Assad. How could he do that politically, how can he back away from the fight
against Assad? Well, first of all, Gloria,
we've been around long enough to know that that's what politicians do. They climb up and down, up and down, up
and down. It's called changing your position. Some do it more than others. I mean, this is what they're skilled at. But Kerry's done it already. So far, as I understand,
what Kerry is saying is Assad must go eventually. That's the new position. What we're all going. Eventually, all clocks stop. The point is is that the American position,
which has also been the British position, the French position Merkel
kind of didn't get too involved in Syria has been
that nothing can change until Assad goes. Obviously, London and Paris have changed their minds and it appears if Lavrov. I mean, Kerry is. Speaking policy, so have we. The problem is that it doesn't appear that Obama has always had Kerry's back. I don't know if you remember. I think it was. Late summer that Kerry went to Sochi in Russia and had a four hour
sit down with Putin. Came out and announced
certain breakthroughs, and Biden's office cut him to pieces the next day
by telling the New York Times, We don't even know what he was doing in
Sochi . So there is a war going on in the Obama administration
and the president must decide. And this president,
when it comes to international affairs, seems to have a hard time
making up his mind. But time's run out. So. It's easy if they want to do it, there's an easy way to do it,
you just say eventually, Assad must go. Not tomorrow. Do you suppose there's
sharing of intelligence already
going on between the US and Russia? Well, we know they're sharing
it was through Baghdad originally, but sharing with the French, the Germans and the Israelis. Plus all Russia's, of course,
Iran and Russia's so-called coalition. We're sharing intelligence about ISIS in Baghdad, we think. All we were told about the American role
was as we'd agreed with the Russians that if we were both flying over Syria
and remember, by the way, there's a nuance here that the Russians
are flying over Syria legally. They've been invited
by the Syrian government. We are flying over Syria illegally
because we have neither a U.N. mandate nor the invitation of the Syrian government. Now Iraq is inviting you for God's sake. Iraq wants Russia flying and bombing because ISIS is deep in Iraq,
and we're flying there too. So obviously they have agreed
and they said they've agreed to exchange
flight plans and coordinate flights. My guess is, is that yes, there's
there's they're sharing intelligence, but this dispute is this charge
that Russia is not bombing. ISIS forces its bombing
and the Assad forces, which is true. But that's because the conception
of how you fight terrorism is very, very different in Washington and Moscow. And then again, the question
is, does Paris in that dispute? It appears not as of today,
but the French have decided. What do you think the ISIS threat is stepping back from just the U.S.,
Russia question what's the threat? What to what extent are we going
to have to go to fight this threat? Well, you know, you can't say this in polite
company or you never get invited back. And San Francisco, really, I think I've been to California
only four times is very polite. Well, I'd like to get in. I'd like to get invited back,
but I'll say it anyway. There were some minuses
to the end of the Soviet Union. But we were all so happy about it
that we didn't think about it. one was the tremendous proliferation
of ethno religious nationalists civil wars, some of which radiate
out of the Caucasus region of Russia. But not only there's now,
Putin says there are 7000. Former Soviet or Russian jihadis fighting with ISIS and that Putin says,
I want to kill them there so they don't come home and kill us here and Russians agree with that,
and I guess it makes sense. And that's now the French attitude better,
we kill them there. I'm not sure you can do that. I mean, I'm
not saying that's going to work, but that's the political consensus. Terrorism has transformed in recent years. It's driven by almost intractable forces, including poverty young. Like in Chechnya. Chechnya was not was a very secular Muslim nation, but the grief that came upon Chechnya
after the end of the Soviet Union left so many young people without work,
without family, without prospect. Then the Russians came. And please
remember they didn't come first. Under Putin,
they came under Yeltsin's Yeltsin. He sent Russian troops into Grozny,
the capital of Chechnya, I think, in December 1994. Putin wasn't even on the map then. And they destroyed Grozny. So the young kids went to the hills. In the hills
is where you find the preachers of jihad. And then that spread to English area
and Dagestan, other small Muslim caucus nations,
and they made connection. We know this with jihadist all around the world because the internet
now gives them this amazing force. I mean. What's to be? I mean, it's going to be here,
but clearly the first thing we have to do is to deprive them of a basis of a state,
which is what ISIS wants. In other words, an infrastructure. Where they can organize
ice doesn't have an air force if it gets a state,
it'll have an air force. This is what bombing can do. Then the ground they've taken
has to be taken back so far, as I can tell, only the Syrian army
has any chance of doing this. And for that,
the Syrian state must be retained and that means Assad's got to stay until
you can retain the state without Assad. After that, you do what all liberals do. You address social problems at home? Chechnya might be a ruthless example,
it's been turned from a desolate, tiny little republic
until into a fairly prosperous place. Russians have said a lot of money
there, and young people seem to get jobs and get married and do what
we want to do, be secular Muslims. But this is our traditional
liberal solution to. You know, riots in the black community
to murder in the streets. But there is an underlying social problem. But it is a new world and obviously
we have to avoid this keeps coming up. I don't know what a radical Muslim is any more
than I know what a radical Jew is. I mean, radical doesn't
usually affix to a religion. It is fixed to a political movement. These are radicals are jihadists
who do not blow people up. They just preach the word
evangelical Muslims. You might say
the radicals get a gun and a bomb. But we can't go to war
against against Islam, obviously. And bear in mind, Russia
is in a very unusual situation here. I think I heard
there were 5 million people of Islamic faith in France,
is that approximately correct? I'm not sure. Russia has nearly 20. Russia is a multi-ethnic state,
and geographically, Russia sits
both in the Western and Islamic world. Russia, Russia's on the barricade,
the frontier. It's in the it's in the bull's eye. It's got to be careful,
but also by the same token, we need Russia to help keep the peace with the larger
Muslim world. Russia's got big problems in this regard. And one of its complaints against America is every time you bomb a Muslim country. The fallout hits us, it radicalizes our young. Islamic folk and they become jihadis,
you've got to stop toppling regimes. And by the way, I mean, why in the world? Sanders and O'Malley
let Clinton off the hook about Libya. It's not about Benghazi. It's not about Benghazi, crap happens. It was about deciding to kill Gadhafi and not stopping to think
what would come in his place. And the democracy promoters said, Oh, it'll be Thomas Jefferson or Bill Clinton
or the first George Bush. It's going to be great. And now it's the jihadist capital. And the Russians understand that,
and they have been exceedingly angry with the United States for continuing
this policy of regime change without the slightest clue
of what comes next. So that's
I guess the answer stop the regime change, make these coalitions and has Obama always likes to say get smart. Clinton used to have an expression. Don't leave your don't
check your brain at the door. I guess that's the answer. I'm reminding our digital listeners
and viewers that we're speaking today with Professor
Stephen Cohen, one of the Great Russia experts and foreign policy experts
in the United States. And this is the Commonwealth Club
broadcast. Let's turn to Ukraine. An equally thorny question. Why do
you think the U.S., do you think the U.S. tilts towards Ukraine,
which I assume you do? And why? Why do you think we tilt towards Ukraine? Is it that same Thomas Jefferson
syndrome promotion of democracy? This is the the little guy,
the hope for democracy that started in the
with the fall of the Soviet Union. Why have we supported
Ukraine to this degree? So this is where I got in trouble two years ago? And where are these
lobbyists began to go after me and after Katrina Vanden Heuvel
because she published me? And they even have been
after Jack Matlock, and they even attacked Henry Kissinger for promote for suggesting
we should negotiate. The problem is in the way
you formulated the question, and this was the first sentence
I wrote that brought the wrath of these people down on me. There is no the Ukraine in the sense of a civilization
or a country. There was a post-Soviet Ukrainian state
and it was a mess. And even Ukrainians themselves agree
it was corrupt. It was divided. But historically,
and this is not Putin's fault. If you want to blame somebody, blame God. If you're of such a frame of mind
or history to be more agnostic about it. History created on the territories upon which set the post-Soviet
Ukrainian state a very divided country politically, religiously,
ethnically, linguistically, culturally, a large part of the country,
primarily in central Ukraine, in western
Ukraine wanted to become part of Europe, and a large part of the country,
primarily in eastern and southern Ukraine, did not want to give up its ancient
century old attachment to Russian civilization, the Russian church
or to its Russian in-laws. Though, of course,
if you want to get rid of your in-laws, it would be a good idea to join Europe
because they're not going to get visas. And you'll say sorry, can't have you for Christmas this year,
but this was a profound. Gorbachev has made the point
that his wife, Raisa, his beloved wife, was Ukrainian
and all his in-laws were Ukrainian. And my wife, Katrina,
and I've met more Russians than not who have
Ukrainian family, extended family. So you begin with the fact
that this was a divided country, and if there was ever a country
that needed some kind of federation to stay together,
keep people happy to mediate differences, decentralization,
it was Ukraine. We have a federation. Canada has a federation. Germany has a federation. Lots of countries have. Federations are federated governments. But in Ukraine, when the crisis began, the president of Ukraine appointed
the governors of all the regions, and sometimes even the mayors of Kiev
decided that this was an underlying issue. Even the most prosperous parts of Ukraine economically,
which was eastern Ukraine, because it was the industrial heartland
of Ukraine with the real trade which was with Russia, paid
way too much taxes and got too little back from from Kiev. So there was this underlying tax issue. We fought a civil war. Which was about slavery, but these other issues were embedded
in the slave issue. But we fought a civil war. There was no need for Ukraine
to fight the civil. Over this show,
I don't tilt toward Ukraine. I'm aware that there's Ukrainian Civil War and civil wars
are the most horrible of wars, and in the modern day
they lead to a proxy war. Yeah,
Putin could not let after February Dunbar, which is the region in eastern Ukraine. That's both
most industrial and most Russian. Well, not only ethnically Russian, because there are a lot of ethnic
Ukrainians for whom. Excuse me,
Russian is their native language. They can't even speak Ukrainian. You guys know Klitschko, the former
heavyweight boxer guy, six foot eight. His brother is now
the heavyweight champion of the world. I get them confused. Vitali and Vladimir. Well, one went back to Ukraine, retired,
gave his championship to his brother, went back to you, became mayor of Moscow. He quickly turned out
that his first language was Russian. His second language was German
because he'd been fighting out of Germany for 15 years. His third language was very poor English,
and he could barely speak Ukrainian. But Maidan was about ethno nationalism. So you couldn't really, and Poroshenko,
the president's Ukrainian, wasn't very good. What's the point here? More Russians, at least
when this all began, the more Ukrainians, no matter where they lived, spoke
Russian as their everyday language. Fluently, grammatically, culturally well, and watch more Russian TV
and all the rest than they did Ukrainian. Now the Ukrainian government is trying
to stop that by unwise methods forcibly. But you can't say you're
for or against Ukraine, and that's of course, the bunk
that the State Department's putting out. You've got to say this is a civil war. Now, you could say, Gloria,
if you wanted to do something Americans shouldn't, which side we favor. But we shouldn't do that. And if people ask me, well,
which side is worse? Kiev or the guys
running the rebel operation in Donbas, I revert when asked, which is worse to the Russian intelligentsia proverb. Both are worst. Both are worst, so Minsk. And Merkel put a lot of political capital
on this island at that time, had no political capital. He was trying to get some
political capital on these Minsk accords to resolve the Civil War
because of the Civil War stop. The killing would stop. And then, as Churchill like to say, George, all don't fight, fight, fight. But this required certain
constitutional agreements that could only be passed
by the Ukrainian parliament, the RADA in Kiev,
which it has refused to pass. And mainly,
they involve something we all understand more home rule for eastern Ukraine. But and this is what's interesting. A constitutional amendment that devolves
what we used to call it, states rights. And we're hearing about it
from the Republicans now budgetary political in the rush to eastern
Ukraine is not specific. It involves
these same rights to western Ukraine. And whether you like it or not and whether this is the right word or not, there is a surging neo fascist movement
in Ukraine. They took 30% of the vote in Kiev
last week. Klitschko won reelection,
but he was forced into a runoff. 30% of the vote because the candidate ran
not on one of the neo-Fascist parties, but on some surrogate party
he got 30% is a lot. When people tell me
neo-Fascist are marginal. Forces in Ukraine. That's 30%
too much for this to way too much. I can live with 1% if I know where they are and they running strong and these traditional. Ultranationalist
Western provinces of Ukraine. So if. The Minsk Accords are fully implemented, and if the decentralized constitution
is democratic, you're not going to get virtue everywhere. But at least it puts it to the
the Ukrainian people, to all of them. And one of the conditions,
of course, is that there will be a complete cease fire
and all foreign troops leave the country. And you say, Oh, that's great, the Russians will have to go home well,
so will the Americans. We are told officially we have twelve
hundred. American soldiers boots on the ground in Ukraine, training Ukrainians under Kiev's control to fight. If you think it's twelve hundred,
I will give you the George Washington Bridge for a dime. I mean, that's what we're told. But they're running a lot of special op operations there. But if this happens, we have to go home to
and the Russians have to go home. But the trouble
with sending the Russians home is that really in some fundamental way,
leaving military aside, they live there. Like their in-laws or not,
they live there. And there's never been a time
when there wasn't free passage back and forth from Russia, Ukraine is just a stake driven through the heart. Of a vast family. And now Crimea. Is is remains an irritant,
but for the Europeans, the sanctions are no longer about Crimea, and I assure you, Obama doesn't
remember why he put sanctions on Putin. I guarantee you the first time here
he doesn't remember. But it's all about now
the fighting in eastern Ukraine. But Crimea could be solved to everybody's
reasonable satisfaction. But they won't talk. They don't. Will perish change that? That's a view that the pro-Kiev lobbies in America
are not merciful in this regard. They just do not care
what happened in Paris. They came out immediately
by saying Putin is the worst terrorist. He's the worst terrorist. So those Ukrainian lobbies are the ethnic Ukrainian emigres, or let me let me put another theory to you. So I served in the Clinton administration
and I did a lot of work in Ukraine. And we formed some very close
relationships with Ukraine, essentially holding the Ukrainian
with Kiev hands. Yes. Through the process of their deciding
to give up their nuclear weapons, we got involved in providing assistance. We got involved
in advising them about their economy for what good that did
or didn't do over the long run. We got involved
in, you know, trying to bring about rule of law and all kinds of exchanges
and so on. So there's a certain depth,
at least in the U.S. government,
of experience and commitment to Ukraine. Do you think that plays a factor? Plays a role? Well, I mean, you would know
better than I would. But all I can say is
we did the same thing in Russia. I mean, they didn't
turn over their nuclear weapons, but I would say
Nunn-Lugar was deeply intrusive. You'd agree with that.
Not as much as Ukraine. I was. Well,
Ukraine handed over the weapons. Russia wasn't asked to give up
their nuclear weapons. I was involved in that program
and I was 17 times in Ukraine through that process and less in Russia
because Russia wasn't. We weren't asking them to turn over
all their rights. There were some changes and and reductions
and so on. I just feel that there was a linkage
between the U.S., certainly the policy community
and Ukraine going back to that time. Oh, I don't know know if you're asking me
whether there's been a big vested mainstream economic political. Cultural ideological commitment
in Ukraine for 20 years. That's very much the case
and whether that played a role after 13, that's the case. And there's nothing bad about that. It's just a factor. I mean, the reality is is George
Soros has been deeply involved in Ukraine in ways
that have not been made public. Though he writes an article about it, 5000
words, it seems, or somebody writes it for him in the New York
review of books every other month. I mean, his commitment
there has been longstanding and deep. On one side, he's
not been an ecumenical figure. He's bitter about Russia
because the same operation in Russia failed,
and he left Russia in anger and fury. So there are a lot of people people
who sincerely believe in democracy promotion, that we can bring rule of law
to other countries. And I think that's all virtuous
and there's nothing wrong with it. I have a lot of students. When I taught at Princeton
who went to work for these organization as to the CIA, my position was
that would be great if my smartest students went to work
for the CIA. They didn't go to work as spies. They sat in little cubbyholes. But unlike me,
they got classified information and what their estimates
as they call them, how far up they got. We never know. But we want the smartest people and most
open-minded people in all these agencies. But it's also true, Gloria. That very representative. Spokespeople like Carl Gershman. And Charles Krauthammer, people
who speak for vested interests have said literally the following since 1993 1994 and then repeatedly thereafter. The fall of the Berlin Wall was
only the beginning of the American march. The brass ring as Ukraine. I mean, there has been at least one group,
and I don't know, because I'm not. Never go to Washington to speak of
whether it was a big and influential group or a marginal group
that from the beginning, as soon as NATO's expansion began,
which was when the Clinton side 9697, that Ukraine was the brass flying. And you know, Zbigniew Brzezinski,
whose famous statement that made note
makes no geopolitical sense whatsoever. But it was clever that without Ukraine,
Russia is a normal state. With Ukraine, it's an empire. This became the kind
of ideological justification that then we would have a tamed Russian bear
who would do our buildings. But as long as they're allied with or
control Ukraine, Russia will be an empire that threatens us. So they had a perspective. It was serious. I don't deride the intellectual
thought that went into it. It was just profoundly wrong headed. It was dangerous
to American national security because it either didn't understand
or didn't care about the way the world was train changing, and I don't want to say
they're they're responsible for power us. But how many more Bostons in Paris, us? And 911's. And by the way, just
so you don't forget this to be humane. Russia has still lost more souls
to terrorism since the 1990s than any country on Earth. They tend to lose them in batches of two
or three or four hundreds in airplanes, pitch battles
that school in Beslan, that theater. What was it called the North in Moscow. We lost 3000 plus on nine. Paris lost. I think they're saying 150 or so. Some in the hospital will die,
unfortunately. So, but Russia, if you're counting victims
of terrorism, gets to be number one. It's not the sporting event
that it was competing in. But you got to be aware of the fact that in addition
to being part of the solution. Russia has suffered probably more
than anybody else from the problems, and that was what was lost,
I think in Washington in the 1990s,
this sense of this is the real brass ring. From our audience, why is a Europhile
Ukraine on an economic trajectory similar to the Baltic states
to be opposed by Russia? Can this question be answered
without reference to NATO expansion, in other words, is right? Russia has an independent difficulty
with Ukraine's economic westernization. But I don't. So what, why is Russia threatened? Why does it feel threatened
about Europhile Ukraine right on economically part of Ukraine
anyway on an economic trajectory similar to the Baltic states? So, in other words, what the Baltic states already have
and Russia's learn to live with. Why did it create a fuss over Ukraine? That something like that? Well, not many Russians are married, divorced to begin with. Secondly, the Baltic states
clearly came into the Soviet Union. They were the last to be brought in
and they were brought in by brute force. Most of the other parts of the Soviet
Union were parts of either the Czarist empire or came in through Civil War
as the fallout of World War one. But the Baltic were clearly different
in American policy never recognized. I think this was right, Laurie. Officially, we never recognized
that is the way of captive nations, but in law, we never recognized them
as being part of the Soviet Union. And that's why if I remember my history, Stalin told Churchill,
like Roosevelt at the U.N., If you're not going to count the balls,
we want three seats, right ? And so Ukraine and I think Belarus
or somebody got it. But the balls were clearly exceptional. Secondly, when people tell me Putin is going to take the Baltic countries,
I see such. But what does he want
the Baltic countries for? He's already
subsidizing their energy 100%. Now he wants to pay their pensions to. For a sliver of indefensible land, I mean, what so partially,
it just makes no sense, but economically the questions
are absolutely right. The. And this is for economists to work out. The Russians took the position. That the you all know what the Eastern Partnership was, right,
the narrow Eastern Partnership. You're not sure. In 2008, the Bush administration
tried to fast track Georgia and Ukraine into NATO,
and it was vetoed by Germany and France. So a guy in Poland
who became foreign minister named Sikorski
dreamt up with Carl Bildt, the former. Foreign Minister of. Scandinavian country. The so-called Eastern Partnership
that instead of bringing them into Naito, we would offer them these wonderful
partnerships that would bring them into Europe
as part of European free market, free visa travel, et cetera. Clearly, it was meant to be. Eventually, erode the Natal membership. The Russians did not object to that. They just objected to the trade terms because they said Ukraine. We are Ukraine's largest trading partner and vice versa. It's an enormous trading relationship
built over centuries. If you are going to let Europe's goods flow through Ukraine without customs into our markets,
our producers are going to be destroyed. This has to be negotiated,
and the European Union absolutely refused to negotiate
for two years with Russia on this. So Putin then said, OK. Let's make this a tripartite arrangement. Let's do a trade partnership
between Russia. Ukraine. Kiev and the European Union,
and he was told take a walk. So now go look at the partnership
agreement that the elected president. He was a rotter, but he was elected of
Ukraine, signed refused to sign in November 2013 that set off the protest
that that did the bye don. That day, the fellow that followed them
led the Civil War. It's 1000 pages. I did not read 1000 pages,
but a person I know said, Read these seven pages
buried at the end. And in that agreement
that Yanukovych was supposed to sign, that was allegedly only about economics. And by the way,
it was the world's worst economic deal. I mean, it would have cost Ukraine,
which was already impoverished billions and billions of dollars
and given it nothing until it went through the austerity program
that has brought Greece to its knees. But you know,
the Ukrainian people want to do that. Good luck. It hasn't worked any place,
but if they want to do it. But buried in these seven
pages was a section called military security issues, military security issues. Naito was not mentioned, but it shows
an increase in signing this agreement. Ukraine agrees to abide by the military security policies
of the European Union. What are the military security policies
of the European Union? Naito. Any lawyer would have picked that up
quick. Russia has a lot of lawyers, good lawyers,
and they were on this. That was never reported
the American press. But the fact is that Yanukovich signed
that now he wouldn't have abided by it. But he was saying,
if Naito decides X, we have to do it. And Russia knew about this. So. If this narrow issue. That's created this problem,
along with the divided Ukraine that's different from the Baltics. Profoundly different,
not to mention, as you're talking about 400 million souls in Ukraine,
and I don't know how many. Less than in San Francisco,
maybe in the Baltics, I don't I don't know, it's
not a not a popular show, by the way. If you give me one digression
because this is a big issue and we need to talk to our, particularly
our young people about this. It's gone down as like, you know, the 11th Amendment
to the United States Constitution that every country has a right to join
NATO. No, they do not. Naito is a security organization. It is not the American Association
of Retired People. I have a 24 year old daughter with my beloved wife,
Katrina, as well as some who are getting close
to qualifying on their own, whom I gave $15 to buy a membership
in the American retires so she could win a car more cheaply
and get a lot of discounts. They take anybody for 15, and they have very good discounts. That's not what NATO's about, NATO's either increases security or it doesn't. That's the only criterion. It's not Wal-Mart, it's
not a nonselective fraternity or sorority, it's security organization. This bunk that the expansion of NATO. Has increased the security of Europe
and all the new nations. Died in eastern Ukraine. 8000 dead. 2 million displaced. And no end in sight. A ruined Ukraine. Ukraine is totally economically, fiscally, financially ruination. The IMF is going to violate its own rules. It doesn't give money to countries
that have sovereign unpaid debt. It's going to it's going to it's
going to violate the rule. They've got to save. They can't let Kiev default. They're going to violate the rules. But it's ruination. This is security. Are the Baulch really more secure today? Is poor little Georgia,
a lovely little country where we tried to pull them in tornado
more secure? I mean, it's brought nobody security. And one of the problems
is is that little countries with historical grievances against Russia and who doesn't have
a historical grievance against Russia. My grandfather didn't like the pogroms. Everybody's
got a grievance against Russia. But you can't build your modern life
or your modern security on ancient tombstones
and going around, kicking them over. That's what the Muslim world is doing. It's kicking over ancient tombstones and resentments
and turning them into murderous movements. You can't do that. So NATO's membership? Should never have been increased
after the Russians abolished the Warsaw Pact. But certainly, if you really believe in
Mato, you don't start taking in countries that are going to be ticking time
bombs of insecurity. Now whether anybody will ever act
on Article five or 65, which says that if one nation is attacked
while the FAA revokes Article five, all the others
have to come to this defense a law and is trying to decide now. But he won't be the decider. Whether France should Article five
because of what happened in Paris, which would mean that every natal country
has to join along and whatever he's doing, which is probably not
the smartest thing in Syria. But remember, you are saying that if you take in Ukraine and NATO. And a couple of emails. Get into the kind of. Feuds that the boot runners in Kentucky used to shoot out every week,
the United States has to go to war. That's not security.
That's something else. So this notion of a right to join NATO,
which the NATO's bureaucracy in Brussels has used to enrich itself at our expense
because the United States pays the defense budget of NATO
and the reasons countries there don't mind staying is
they don't pay for their own defense. Good deal. But this has become dangerous
now, this ideology that there's some God given right
to be a member of NATO. I think. We are out of time, unfortunately, because this interesting discussion
could go on for a long time. So let me thank on behalf of the
Commonwealth Club our wonderful guest, Dr. Stephen Cohen, Professor Emeritus of Russian Studies
and Politics at NYU and Princeton. Thank you to our audiences here on the radio
and on the internet. Take a moment. Professor Collins books are here
and they're for sale several books that he's written in recent years,
and he will sign the books. But please help me offer a thanks. Hardy, thanks to Steve Cohen.
