Prospects for the Trump-Kim Vietnam Summit

good morning welcome to the Center for Strategic and International Studies I'm Andrew Schwartz I'm our senior vice president and chief communications officer so glad to have all of you here for this terrific panel or panels one thing I wanted to alert you all to is we have this new podcast it's called the impossible state if you haven't heard it it's Victor cha and sue Terry Mike Green other Bob King other experts here I host it it's all about North Korea we do it almost every week you can find it anywhere you get your podcasts with that I'd like to bring up our first panel please take Nick you want to bring everybody up and we can start great thank you all for being here everyone my name is Nick Schifrin I am the Foreign Affairs and defense correspondent for PBS Newshour and welcome to this amazing event this hour and next hour for the next hour we're going to be talking about potential outcomes for the summit prospects for denuclearization prospects for some kind of political declaration to end the war and the economic in place implications of the summit for Northeast Asia and I don't think my panelists really need introductions but I will do so quickly Victor cha CSAs Korea chair director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council staff during George W Bush administration deputy head of the US delegation during the six-party talks Laura rosenberger the director of the Alliance for securing democracy and a senior fellow at the George German Marshall Fund foreign policy advisor during the Hillary Clinton campaign and senior adviser to then Deputy Secretary of State Tony blinken mark Lippert vice president at Boeing International former ambassador to South Korea and a former intelligence officer and I predict that question may come up sue Terry senior fellow for the Korea chair here senior out former senior analyst on Korean affairs the CIA and former NSC staff at the end of George W Bush beginning of Obama for Korea Japan and oceanic affairs and last but not least Richard Johnson at the nuclear threat initiative he's the senior director for fuel cycle and verification he led the Iran nuclear implementation at the State Department and was the director of non-proliferation at the National Security Council staff during the Obama administration so thank you all for being here and thank you guys for having this fantastic cast and Victor let me let me start with you and let's let's start by talking about the expectations first about North Korea during the summit and and you've said this that they'll probably be willing to negotiate their past be willing to negotiate their future but not their present so explain that and explain why that's such a concern for you sure they so first thank you everybody for joining us this morning the so what I mean by that is essentially that the North Korea has programs that I think that they will be willing to give up next week in Hanoi but they are things that they've already talked about giving up and in fact have stopped operations at right after the Singapore summit and you know my guess is that they're going to allow the United States or some international body to go in and sort of monitor this the the decommissioning of the of these sites and as we saw in Kim jong-un's New Year's speech in January he has put forward the idea of stopping further production in the future as well as a pledge not to transfer any capabilities or knowledge so if you think about those things that is negotiating your past things that you don't need anymore and it's negotiating your future things you promised not to do in the future so you're actually not really giving up anything but and in the meantime I'm pretty certain they're going to be clear demands for the United States to give up things very much in the present whether that's exercises whether it's the deployment of troops sanctions you know a variety of different things it's you know it's a smart strategy I mean if you know if I were the North Koreans like North Koreans are not stupid they've got a smart strategy about how they want to do this but in the meantime they are keeping their presence if you will which are you know 20 missile bases that we at CSIS have been studying short medium-range intermediate-range missile bases their current stockpile of weapons anywhere between 20 and 60 nuclear weapons probably on the higher end you know in other sorts of capabilities WMD chembio capabilities so you know I think that is sort of the situation that the president's walking into and so he just needs to be aware of that mark Lippert does the u.s. have leverage this situation as Victor who said that the that the u.s. is walking into does the present United States have leverage in order to get that much or even more good question I would say yes he still does I think the multilateral sanctions there's no doubt the North Koreans want relief from that and I've always been a believer of the theory that the model that Kim jong-un has in North Korea while allows him to stay in power is not sustainable over time especially visa vie the rise of internal markets which I think are slowly but surely reshaping North Korean society bothering the regime information flow and then the the isolation he faced early on in the Trump administration and late Obama administration in terms of diplomatic space and then finally I would say you know the military forces arrayed against him now the question is I think some of that leverage or some of the pressure has been reduced after the Singapore summit and the question is can we use what is left of our leverage number one number two what is what we have in the way of incentives and number three I would say couple that with the other relevant parties mainly the other members of the six-party talks give or take to try to cobble together a deal so I do think we have a leverage I think there's an open question whether whether it is enough leverage and I think the more leverage in my view you have in the situation it essentially forces the North Koreans into choices they wouldn't want to make in other words perhaps give up the present more of the present as Victor talked sooner and as well as probably on the economic reform basket as well and I'll stop there for those of you who know the news era we try and have debates and so I will try and create division on this panel and so sue does the u.s. have any leverage anymore well you're going to make me to be I think we had when we pursued maximum pressure in the fall of what is it now 2017 well we had leverage we saw for the first time China actually implementing sanctions doing things that actually surprised me I wish that we continued when when we had that leverage to continue that pressure I didn't like the fire and fury rhetoric but I like the sanctions and pressure but I think we gave away that leverage too quickly by having Singapore submit when we were not prepared I'm not against finding this out at the highest level but I thought when we were just getting getting going we really let go of their leverage and met with Kim didn't really get anything out of their Singapore summit we're just really this an aspirational statement that we got and you can argue that not much has really changed yet right now I think that sanctions implementation we know we're getting reports that that's being loosened by China they're not just there's just a lack of incentive there Kim jong-un has been engaged in diplomacy and symmetry met with champagne was four times President Trump already and three times with President Mun Jane and he's out there now legitimize normalize and I think she has everything going for him and my concern is long-term concern is I think we are actually heading towards the direction we're on path to accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons power I do think there's gonna be some sort of interim agreement that's gonna come out next week but that's not denuclearization that's really a freeze proposal it's an arms control negotiation which which is what North Koreans have always wanted so by having some sort of freeze deal and eventually even an ideal an ICBM that's exactly what North Korea wants and I think we are on that path and I don't know if there's any leverage now that we can stop that Richard Johnson can you can you respond to that are we just on the path of accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state and you you and I spoke the other day and you had a good line that the process of denuclearization has to be done with North Korea not to North Korea can you explain that yeah that's absolutely right I mean I think if you look at the history of any other country that's given up a nuclear program whether they had weapons or not they didn't but the rare exception of Libya they didn't basically say come in fly out all of our things put them in a box and send them to Tennessee they were done by the country in question and often with the assistance of one or more other countries look at the Iran deal for example look at what happened in the case of the former Soviet Union where the United States and others came in and helped to secure nuclear facilities move missiles move nuclear weapons back into Russia so I think the idea that has been put forward by some that you might be able to just come in and in one fell swoop just sort of clean it out is very well very misplaced I would say in terms of you know where are we heading I I think we get caught up sometimes in these debates about accepting North Korea as a nuclear state I don't actually think that least the current administration position is to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons State which by the way you know would run completely counter to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty that's just sort of impossible from a legal perspective I do think though that it makes sense to acknowledge that North Korea has a nuclear capability probably has nuclear weapons that we've never actually seen a real one potentially in person and so we have to figure out where we can start and in my view where you can start is essentially talking about a freeze it's not ideal but it's a starting point and if we can see North Korea which is currently producing highly enriched uranium and plutonium as we speak if we can see that production ceased in a verifiable way and of course there's question about how you can verify that that would be a positive step but it's certainly not the only step and I think the bottom line is this is not going to happen in a year it's not going to happen in two years if it happens at all it's gonna happen over many years so just to put a point on that you're talking about a freeze not just what we see now in formal freeze basically on testing but you're talking about fissile material production free I think the essential next step is a fissile material production freeze Laura let's talk about the u.s. approach and what the priorities are as we all saw probably Steve Egan the the lead negotiator for the US on this gave a speech at Stanford a few weeks ago it was really his first time where he's laid out exactly what thinking and and he made a couple points which a lot of us picked up on which were a little different than what the US has been saying over the last year he said full inventory only has to be provided before denuclearization can be final that's that's a different approach than the inventory coming at the beginning he talked about parallel and simultaneous action again rather than front loaded and he really presented North Korea as having a future in Northeast Asia so if that's the Steve Beacon approach is the US on the right track I think broadly speaking I don't have major concerns with that approach I might quibble or tweak a few things there you know for instance while I don't think a declaration needs to be the the first step I mean we know in in the last round of the six-party talks in fact what was really the final sticking point was the question of a declaration so I think it's reasonable to not ask for that to be the first thing but I have concerns about it being too far toward the end of the process because how do we really know if we're getting to the end of the process if we don't know what we're looking at so one one piece of that on this parallel and simultaneous my question there really comes down to what are we talking about in terms of sanctions relief assuming that that would be one of the major steps on the US side I would be fine with relaxing some of the more economic focused sanctions if we were to do that in exchange for real steps on denuclearization like meaningful steps not symbolic steps but I think it's really important to recall that the core of the sanctions regime actually remains focused on non-proliferation it's not you know there's the economic pressure aspect of the sanctions there's a whole host of those sanctions that are in place to prevent material for the nuclear and missile programs from flowing into North Korea and for those materials from flowing out of North Korea those have got to remain until we can be completely confident that there's not a proliferation risk on the future in Northeast Asia again that's something that's actually been on the table in the past even in the six-party process I think the question there though is you know that really comes down to not just a question of the nuclear issue obviously we're in have a whole panel next on human rights abuses which are a real concern there's also other nefarious North Korean activity for instance its ongoing cyberattacks that had been quite destructive really impressive report came out October in October from fire-eyed detailing all of that activity which i think is a real significant concern so I would want to see those kinds of things be a part of this conversation so for me I think the question is not do I have a problem with the approach that is laid out there as such but it's sort of what's not there and and the last point that I would make on this is that in addition to the substance process really matters here and I know that that always sounds like an inside like you know DC Wong curry point but one of the things we've seen repeatedly over the last years is that Kim jong-un has realized that he can just go straight to the top and that he doesn't have to deal with anyone beneath him and I'm worried in the run-up to this summer that we're starting to see the same thing you know reportedly president Trump said to moon jae-in the other day that the Trump is the only one who can solve this you know we see another one-on-one meeting happening we see mixed messaging coming out with the president saying he's in a rush for denuclearization while a different official on a background call yesterday said that they're looking to move quickly and in very big bites so we have inconsistent messaging a lack of a process and the undercutting of the negotiating team unless we actually have a real meaningful process in place the substance isn't really going to matter so Terry is there a meaningful process and if President Trump is the one to make these decisions do you have faith that he won't give away too much no because Laura is absolutely right there is no process there's no coordination and so one of the biggest concerns that I have is president Trump giving away our nice equities and if you just look at his decision to put troops out of Syria that was not coordinated there was not coordinated among it was not what his you know own advisers supported he would consider pulling out of NATO he consistently talked about you know US troop presence in South Korea as some sort of he didn't support this for me this is that he believed for years questioning why we have troops in rich country like South Korea even though I do think that because the special measures agreement between u.s. and South Korea has been just reached even though I have a concern that it's only one year deal that now the president troop bring sort of promising him or declaring that he's gonna pull your troops out of South Korea that probability has now decreased that this is going to happen next week however I don't doubt I mean I I do have doubt that President Trump could potentially tell Tommy Kim he has two days that this could be on the table in the future because of his just his consistent belief and questioning about you know why we have troops in places like South Korea I do think one good news is that there is no support in the US government to pull troops out of South Korea I think there is bipartisan support for continued troop presence and so when you look at McCain John McCain Defense Authorization Act last year there was passed in August it stipulates that we cannot pull troops out we can reduce it below 20 2009 Secretary of Defense says it's in the national interest and I think that's all good side but I don't I don't I don't I can't I don't have faith the President Trump because he doesn't believe in this process it's not a normal government where this policy coordination that he's just going to be able to sort of do what he wants to do and kind of just you know do whatever he wants to do without coordinating or Lisp or without listening to his advisers and I think that's truly the wild card when it comes to next week's summit that's my biggest concern just piggyback that so so you know so I'm not I mean so just so you don't think we're all a bunch of like you know you know turds in the punch bowl right Hanoi next week so look I mean okay so we are in a negotiation right that's better than World War II in 2017 right you had this president who is personally committed to this and really wants it to succeed I mean he won't say a bad word about he won't tweet a bad water I mean he is committed to this like like we've never seen before right and and you know all of us have worked in past administrations where the idea of a leader level meeting was really not I don't know about for Obama but it was it really was not certainly not for President Bush you know it wasn't in the cards so you know so those those are all good things however at the same time this is the thing that you worry about president goes to goes to Hanoi next week you know he's at being in and Pompeyo that have tried to negotiate excruciating ly these small little steps forward like yes you can go in and see the rocket fest down or you can go see the missile nuclear test site you know these excruciatingly small steps and the president comes in there and he's like this is small ball right this is I want big steps so I'm gonna put big stuff on the table right and in part because he really wants it I mean he really wants us to succeed but also as sue said it's also also informing this desire for big steps to succeed not for this to be small ball is a deep lack of appreciation of the importance of the Alliance right a deep lack of appreciation of the importance of not just the US pre alliances but Lyons's in general we're gonna publish something this week that basically catalogues all the statements that Donald Trump is made about troops overseas in Europe and in Asia going back three decades right and if you go back three decades it is very consistent right why are we paying for rich nations security they should be paying for their own security at the same time they're beating us on trade so why do we have these forces there it is consistent going back to 1990 and and the one thing you know we know about President Trump is if he believes something he really acts on it right he really acts on so that I think that's a thing that we worry about Richard Johnson can you respond to that is is a small ball okay and is the administrator you know when you listen to Steve Egan that they are talking about you know simultaneous steps they are talking about a lot of small ball as a way to get to the big thing eventually is that okay I think you have to play small ball I'm a national league guy so that's just how I think about things but I mean in seriousness I think look I hate to say the diplomatic weenie answer but you need both you need to know what the long-term goal is here and I do think it's useful that Steve Beacon and others have said things like there's a place for North Korea in Northeast Asia and that you know we're not looking to pull you know troops out of South Korea we're not looking for regime change per se you do need to send a vision to Kim jong-un in Pyongyang to say this is kind of what we're looking at down the road but you're not going to get there without dealing with these nitty-gritty issues and if you look at previous successful arms control non-proliferation agreements they're very detailed I hesitate to under the five letters jcpoa in this town but if you look at the Iran nuclear deal that's what you were involved with so which I was involved in it's something like 140 pages long and it's very very detailed down to citing specific texts of which part of US code sanctions will be revoked you know how much uranium has to go from which location to another location so you know another reporter asked me yesterday they said what do you want to see as an outcome from this summit and what I said was I'd be okay with no deliverable if you will I would be okay though if there was an actual negotiating process that was launched at the working level at the beigen kim yeongcheol level and two leaders said hey these are you two folks you guys go back write a real document and start exchanging these papers back and forth I don't care if you cross all the lines out and rewrite it a million times but we have to get into the really hard work of negotiating these texts and unless you get into detail and substance you look back it I just wrote a paper that's coming out I think today that says that if you look at all of the previous North Korea cases a lot of them fell apart because of misunderstandings about what the words actually meant because they were so vague and while ambiguity can be great and a diplomat's best friend sometimes I think when you're talking about technical issues you want specificity and so I would think that as difficult as that is and as naive and as that sounds I think that if you really want to see a process succeed that's what you need to do and one last point I would add is a sign if that is actually happening is if you start to see technical experts added to future delegations in the six-party talks in in Iran in Russia you had people from the Department of Energy from the National Labs from the Department of the Treasury from the US mission to the United Nations dealing with sanctions if those folks start getting added to delegations that will make me think we're going somewhere if it stays at the political level that's hard to do so we'll say a senior administration official told a lot of us yesterday that there were technical experts as part of Steve beacons last trip we didn't divulge where they were from so they might just all just be people from state but but we'll see but but we don't love stage yeah but mark let's let's go into that so let's get beyond ambiguity so what the same senior administration official said specifically about the three priorities that the US had coming to the summit yesterday developing a shared understanding of denuclearization a freeze on WMD and missile programs and a roadmap that real kind of what is the future going to bring with some specificity is that enough to get beyond that ambiguity I mean it you know let me just maybe dovetail off of what we were just talking about and take a little bit of a contrary in view just just for argument's sake since you want to debate you know on the on kind of the leader versus working-level because I think it gets to the point you know I think on the leader issue I mean we all have worked in offices where we're both you know grateful for all the access to principles but then tera terrified what the principal will actually say when I get this is not a totally unique problem to the Trump administration and but I would say what seems unique here is that and so that's point one the second point is I do think having come from this from a political background versus sort of a diplomatic background I tend to be a little more biased that leaders really right and you get leaders in a room and they can change paradigms quickly will it happen here I'd say low lower probability and you know Sue's points about giving away leverage I think come into play but I think it's important to not discount the fact that leaders in a room do tend it can change paradigms let's put it that way they do have unique vertical integration challenges within the Trump administration is Scott Snyder has said and they they do have to marry this up to process at some point because as we were all discussing the program is just too big it's too complex there are too many details and moreover it's married all the nuclear issues are married up against you know peace and security in Northeast Asia the inter-korean process so you've got to get some process around it you know is this enough I think to me I would say it sounds like a good a decent start right and I think the trick though is that we've spent a lot of time two summits and it's not you know it's probably enough to play another hand but is it really what you would hope for after two summits at the highest level and then the question becomes to your point is there it's kind of Laura's point which i think is an excellent one which is you can have all the sort of the the top level agreement but the devil is in the details to paraphrase Laura and how its implemented is there a road map is critical to see if you play another hand and finally I think the the the issue here too is as much as I really think leaders do matter and I do think summits are really important then the trip trip becomes how do you get this out of you know the leader to leader conversation right every you know I'll use a football analogy every handoff to the fullback three yards in a cloud of dust that's the president's problem right I mean you've got to start devolving this down and accelerating so I think you know fine I'll just stop here and say is it enough it could be it could be interesting and the details implementation and how you devolve this down are really critical so Laura rosenberger how should the details evolve how should we look at this summit and be able to judge whether this was successful or not on the senior ministration officials specifics right developing a shared understanding denuclearization getting a freeze and creating a roadmap so I think there's a couple of different things to look at both in the immediate sort of we do outs or outcomes in the summit and then what what happens afterwards right so one is you know the the background background Ling from officials indicates that there may be some kind of joint statements coming out that certainly requires a whole lot of detailed negotiation is many of us who've been through negotiating joint statements before no you know but what my concern and I think it frankly that would be a great sign if we're actually able to get to a point where there's a joint statement that's negotiated in advance that's detailed in some way that's then agreed to by the leaders um color me a little skeptical that that will happen but I would absolutely love to see it but what I think we also need to see is that when the president and can join and presumably come out and have a press conference afterwards that the president's messaging is consistent with what is in that statement because if we rewind the tape back to Singapore folks may recall that there were three points in the document which was a very vague document but then the president also then went further and in particular the question of military exercises was not anywhere in the document that was purely something that he rift on in the press conference and then took on a life of its own after I would say and so in many ways I think that it's both what's in the document and is president Trump consistent with what's in that because if he's not Kim jong-un we'll see no reason to follow the letter of what is in a in a statement and we'll just go with where President Trump goes so that's in this sort of immediate outcome phase in the follow-on phase if we again go back to after Singapore there was agreement in the statement that there would be follow-on meetings and channels between agreed officials although it was a little vague on the North Korean side and we really didn't see much activity right we saw fits and starts secretary Pompeo had some trouble getting access it points Steve vegan wasn't able to meet with is negotiating counterpart well there was turnover first of all and then second of all really wasn't until there was essentially a parent agreement on a second summit that we really saw Steve Egan getting access to his counterpart in direct negotiations and so those conversations weren't as a follow up to implement the previous summit agreement they seemed to be in terms of a preparation for the second summit that can't happen again we need to have immediate follow-up conversations at the agreed working level to begin to implement whatever hopefully comes out in some kind of joint statement so Terry one of the follow-up conversations one of the follow-up actions that are likely to come out of this summit is some kind of verification some kind of inspection can you talk about whether you have any faith that that's going to be significant and legitimate and how should we judge any kind of agreement that the North Koreans will make about verification and inspection going forward I don't want to sound like the biggest pessimist in this group but I do think actually I do think there's a couple things that North Korea's gonna put on the table and this is exactly what Victor was talking about so it's gonna sound and look good enough for a joint statement by the way it's from Gary there's so here tung chung knee and then they got for young beyond make up father god be after it's gonna be quick just quickly explain just in one or two sentences that's just to make sure that aside and satellite launch site and young beyond but it's not gonna be all of young base so they're gonna so I think they were allowed if this is the deal I think that's what they're gonna put on the table and all corresponding measures would be something like a peace declaration some easing of sanctions by allowing South Korea to go to United Nations to get the exemption needed to reopen Kaesong Industrial Complex and clean down and so on an opening of the liaison office we there's going to be some sort of a deal in terms of revocation I think and I think North Korea could even agree to roadmap for those sites for those things and this is what Victor was talking about don't pass it you can argue whether this is or not but I think they can even agree to a timeline or verification or lung inspectors in for those sites so I guess the question then is I guess debate is is that good enough or he said but but I don't see more than that how do we see North Korea has not North Korea is not gonna pee on then I think these three sites gotta be good enough from North Korea's perspective to to just drag this out because it's going to take a lot of time because each one can be negotiated in terms of getting people in oh this is going to be a time-consuming process and that's gonna be enough to last the entire Trump administration and I think that is North Korea's game plan we can then debate whether this is a good enough deal or not Richard Johnson as you know this is a complex problem what's wrong with a an agreement or at least some kind of framework or a road map that does admit that this will take yours I don't think there's anything wrong with that I think that's the agreement you want and I should say that I completely actually agree with everything that sue said but I also don't think it's that bad in the sense that if you're shutting down young beyond which by the way young beyond is a much bigger site than just the five megawatt reactor and even what we know about enrichment there but if you're getting at parts of young beyond you're starting to shut down their nuclear material production if it can be done in a verifiable way and I think your question about verification is key because it matters what the verification is who's doing that verification and I think expectations for verification are really key one of the mistakes I think we made in the six-party talks was we put off verification until late in phases and we kept saying that will come later there were reasons we did that that politically made sense but at the end of the day I think that was a mistake we risk doing that again here by doing this kind of step by step approach if we don't at least signal to the North Koreans look at the end of the day what we're gonna you were asking about a roadmap at the end of the day what we're gonna look for is the IAEA having a comprehensive what's called a comprehensive safeguards agreement with you signing up to the Additional Protocol which is the highest standard of nuclear safeguards and and being able to confirm that you don't have any non peaceful nuclear activities that's what we're going to want from eventually we're probably not going to get that at the outset but they need to know that that's coming so that they can't claim oh you're moving the goal posts on us we don't want to take you to undeclared facilities so but that having been said if the announcement next week in Hanoi is some sort of shutdown and young beyond would real verification which by the way includes letting the IAEA go in and start to assess how much material was produced there that would be okay one last thing I would add going back to a discussion earlier on declarations I disagree I think it was Laura that said I really agreed that you don't need the declaration right away and I would argue you don't need one declaration you want a series of declarations and we can start with whatever the deal is in this round if the deal is young beyond then North Korea should declare young beyond declare what they're freezing how much material they made there and use that as a starting point for verification a lot of people forget they gave us a declaration in the six-party talks was sitting in my safe for a while it wasn't a very good declaration but it was a starting point and I don't think that we should discount when that declaration comes out that if it's incomplete that we should say that this whole process is a joke no declaration when it first comes out is completed correct in this case they'll be they will be holding things back from us intentionally but you can use the process to get more at what they're not telling us I have a slightly different view since you want like some discussion debates oh by the way so we've got about five or six more minutes before I turn it over to questions for the audience we can go on forever but we do want to hear from you so think about what you want to ask and okay go just Victor and mark so the you know if they give up the things that sue is talking about and they will probably allow some sort of verification of it right and that'll be because they will have cleaned out everything that was in there so in during the 1994 agreed framework you know there were questions about another facility in a cave that there were concerns about we finally got access to it but long after they had cleaned it out literally there was nothing he was just a cave right so and obviously the intelligence agencies would not have said we want to look at the sighs unless there's something in it so they may clean it all out now I mean from a practical perspective look if that's what they're gonna give us in the negotiation okay maybe we can build on it like Richard said maybe we can get like some sort of declaration not a good one as stepping-stones the key question to me then is what are we giving up for that mm-hmm and we should not be giving up too much for that mm-hmm the process can continue but we should not be giving up you know too much for something something along those lines we haven't done South Korea yet so mark you can respond to that if you want but I also want you to talk about how you've been following the South Korean politics on this and and concerns or what you think about how president moon is approaching this moment no and thanks for this it often gets lost that in addition to the denuclearization issue which is a very international oriented process we have this inter-korean process that's going on that in many respects is linked explicitly by president moon but also an argument that's positive by the some in South Korea is that if you make progress quickly on the inter-korean process that will spill over into the denuclearization so they're more linked than they've been in the past I would argue that the vegan has explicitly said that exactly that's a good point too the just quickly on on where they are I guess what I would say is that for those who don't follow South Korean politics closely I follow South Korean politics and Korean baseball on the Left is in power they've been out of power for ten years president moon was never elected was elected with never got above 42 percent in the entire time he was running for office but had this big bump after this summit restarted the bump has started to come down he got another bump when there was another summit but the bump wasn't as high and his big problem in South Korea is the economy and the economy is rapidly deteriorating especially among young people so and with that the disorganized conservatives are starting to I'm probably a little more optimistic than some they're starting to congeal and they're starting to tick up in the polls right how much that is as a matter of great debate depending on though they lost a recent election did they I mean local yeah but look their polling numbers are coming up there's no doubt and some are saying it's by a lot some are saying by a little so I think that's the array and I think the question here is two things one will this inter-korean process where the South Koreans really want to get Kaesong reopen Kuman gong the ski resort the rail system up and going fast sooner rather than later will that cause frictions within the alliance I think that's point one I think something to watch and the second point is as this process goes on and if it doesn't produce some tangible results and I think part of what the South Koreans want out of this is end of war declaration Kaesong cannot to show results will moon Jain and the blue house become more constrained over time and less free to act and final thing and I'll stop here is that I think you've already seen a slight nod to this with the moon Jain presidency and that his New Year's Day speech was principally about the economy right now there hasn't been big economic policy change in South Korea but it's starting to show I think at least acknowledgment that the South Korean public while supportive of this and quite interested there are real bread-and-butter issues that are I think starting to come into play in this in this inter-korean process that quite frankly could spill over into some of the Alliance issues so we've done three rounds but just in one minute plus one Vietnam but US officials are beginning to say that hey North Korea look Vietnam is a communist state that stayed communist opened up to the west economically and diplomatically and look how good they're going isn't that a model what is the response from the North Koreans about okay Vietnam is the model for North Korea right and that is so that's absolutely correct but that's not the way the North Koreans see right right I think the North Koreans in general feel insulted whenever there's a comparison of Vietnam to them because they that they see themselves as an advanced industrialized country and they see a Vietnam is a small poor Southeast Asian country so we may look at it that way and you know perhaps the president will talk about it that way and perhaps Kim will be polite and not say it but inside you will be thinking don't compare us to be enough all right on that note we have taken our 45 minutes so just I there just open or just raise your hands and we'll see if we can get to everyone here so I think I saw your user in the third row as the first question I'm Peter Humphrey Intel analyst and a former disciple I'm Peter Humphrey Intel analyst and a former diplomat I'm wondering why I'm the very first thing you do when you shut down a nuclear program you stopped the uranium mining and I'm wondering why that hasn't even gotten on the viewing screen of any of us it doesn't come up as a demand a suggestion I mean she when that we raised that one right to the top as soon as possible yeah yeah I'm not sure that I would agree with that I think if you look at other programs I think part of the question is what do you mean by shutting down a nuclear program and we have this debate about denuclearization and definitions if North Korea is going to continue to have a civil nuclear program I wouldn't necessarily start with the uranium mines I would also add that the uranium mines are the least proliferation part a concern of their program because natural uranium yellowcake you really can't do anything with from a proliferation perspective I would say that the place you want to start when shutting down a nuclear program is fissile material production because that's what can go into a bomb now the I J CPOE provides a model that Iran was required to have enhanced monitoring over their uranium mining and their uranium production and I do think that's something that could be adapted to a North Korean model but if I had to pick what do I want to see first it wouldn't be the mines and in fact by the way those mines might be able to be repurposed into something else we know that North Korea has potentially a very large cache of rare earth metals that could be very useful economically and maybe they want to change those mines into mining not uranium but something else that rushman from The Associated Press here laughing so quickly two questions one two questions one you mentioned that you were worried that he was going to give up too much so it in Vietnam what would be giving up the store in terms of Trump and secondly anyone who's negotiated with the North Koreans I'm wondering what is the hardest thing about negotiating with North Koreans in a working-level situation so I think the first one was to just repeat that's all nice equities that's giving up too much I initially I think also look there's gonna be a peace declaration I it's just political statement it's not legally binding and I understand that and I think it's I was just a little bit concerned though that if you don't have a real understanding of what that means and we saw this problem before when even just a definition of denuclearization from the single summit there was a different interpretation of what that meant right North Koreans means South Korea and the u.s. troops and everything else and we met denuclearization of North Korea so if there was a peace declaration I think it's extremely important that we have in we spell out what that means so we don't leave with Washington can have a different interpretations of that so if that means there's no change to armistice no change the United Nations command no change the us-rok combined forces find that we need to spell that out I think it's it's dangerous if we leave and we have different integration interpretations so first I was very worried about potentially president Trump ring Alliance Akua is pulling all US troops thing on the table I think that chance of that is now lessened but now with peace declaration our lattice is something very concrete and very detail otherwise it's it now leaves room for different interpretation and we know that's a problem we saw that with the Singapore summit even with the definition of degradation Loretha do you want to take the yeah well just I also I'm so glad so you made that point because I think it's I couldn't agree more we've had all these conversations about what does denuclearization mean I think the you know for us the peace declaration and the war declaration does feel very symbolic I think the North Koreans have something much more specific in mind and I do worry that the ambiguity will allow them leverage to be able to come back and say well what you're doing is not consistent with an end to the war you need to stop doing X Y and C I think we really need to guard against that on the question of negotiating with the North Koreans I would just make two points I think all of us probably have some fun stories but but two things to keep in mind one is that the North Koreans I mean they have had they have actually had some significant change over in their negotiating team which is notable from the past previously it had really been the same people for years and years and years and years and years now so so some of us may change with that turnover but in general they know us and our negotiating history with them better than we know ourselves the nature of the turnover of our personnel both at the political level and the career level just with rotations around through different positions means that they they tend to be able to dredge up all kinds of stuff that we may not even really recall it's really important for anybody who's negotiating with them to know the history inside out that's number one number two is on the flip side and this does get to Mark's point about why the leader level piece of this is interesting is that oftentimes it's been difficult at the working level to get empowered counterparts and some of that is about you know power structure from the top they're a part of that is frankly the foreign ministry within North Korea is not a particularly powerful ministry at all and so dealing with negotiating counterparts who may or may not actually have you know the the guidance from the top or the ability to make decisions can lead to very drawn-out decision-making processes did you want to jump in so just quickly so if you had to draw a picture for the president since he likes pictures you'd have a big red line down the middle say and here are Alliance assets you don't negotiate those right because they are not to be given up in return for denuclearization on the other side of that line it's things like sanctions right maybe liaison offices things of that nature those are things if North Korea wants sanctions relief you don't give them US troops if they want sanctions relief the sanctions are on them for proliferation and for human rights abuses so if they do something on those ends then you get comparable sanctions relief and this gets to your second question about negotiating with North Koreans one of the challenges are sometimes we want success so badly we start falling into their negotiation loops right and so one of their classic negotiation loops is this end of war declaration right they want it to be a position where we declare an end to the war and then for that reason we should also lift sanctions because we're not at war no more why do you have sanctions on us so that's like falling into their negotiation loop where no the sanctions are up on them for proliferation behavior and human rights abuses they improve those things then you lift some comparable sanctions let me just make one point on that not to answer the question directly but just to underscore something that I think we've all sort of touched on but not said explicitly but you know you get the end of war declaration you get liaison offices you have the two presidents are the president and the chairman negotiate are talking a summit level that starts to look like de facto recognition of a nuclear weapons state so I think there's a proliferation concern embedded in all of this too that I think is worth underscoring as well I think I saw that and the third row there yes I'm I'm Bill Brown and retired from their government I I work my non-resident fellow at Kei and I followed North Korea quite closely and they can't economics I um one thing I'm wondering if y'all could address we have we we'd like to talk about Trump but we don't talk much about Kim what's going on with him the way I'm looking at it right now looking at the trade data for example 20 last year I suspect North Korea's trade with the rest of the world was the lowest level since the Korean War imagine that trade with China officially was down 88% harming their their ability to export to China was down 88% to me since Singapore there's been a lot of pressure a huge amount of economic pressure from these trade sanctions and that's what we've seen them reaching out for but other things are happening there - I'm wondering if it's quite fair to say they haven't really nothing's happened since the Singapore summit hugely important to me is the propaganda regime where they're not apparently I don't know for a fact but apparently there's much less propaganda anti-us propaganda in North Korea kind of a paradigm shift there we're instead of treating America as the enemy there they're sort of laying off that seems like a pretty important thing to be happening that plus the markets are growing like crazy the place is changing rapidly I guess when I'm asking what what do y'all think is going on in Kim jong-un's mind and Industry shame since Singapore are they are they really feeling the pressure or are they feeling like they're strong and able to deal with America and I'll just break that into two economics and propaganda so who wants to take economics so I'll just say that I think we we have to all I think we would all agree that there are economic changes taking place in North Korea again we just released a study that geo-located the 431 official markets in Norway so there's clearly stuff happening but you I think one has to one can accept that that is in fact happening but at the same time also accept that the regime's intentions with regard to political control human rights abuses proliferation II would have not changed either and one good example of that is what's happening with cell phones in North Korea right there are now what five million cell phones now in North Korea dramatic increases but at the same time I don't know if that question is here from intermedia they've done a great report that shows that the North Korean government is now trying to monopolize a cell phone market it used to be you know the Egyptians and the Chinese they're trying to monopolize that market because they're trying to put stuff into control you know through cell phones this sort of activity so you can see both things that look like economic modernization and liberalisation but at the same time see the same political intentions to control the part of the regime that's broke I just just two seconds on the economic piece which I do think that comes down to why probably have a slightly different view than sue on the leverage question right I do think that there is internal pressure through markets and all of that to get some sanctions because it is changing the society the regime wants to maintain control as Victor says and sanctions really complicates that so you're right I think we talk a lot about the leverage we have in the US side but I think it plays into their calculation as well on the propaganda piece you know I'm not an expert as I do know some guys in Seoul who do nothing but this propaganda stuff and having been featured in a couple of propaganda they came running up to me and saying did you see this can you autograph this but it did I did talk to them a lot about it look I would say I guess what I would say is interesting development so deeply ingrained and so it's gonna take time to see whether or not this is just a temporary toggle or something more meaningful all right who must ask a very quick question and then we get quick answers anybody on this side okay yeah back in back row hi Troy wells Georgetown SFS let's say Trump comes out of this and is actually able to negotiate everything he wants and and we have like a Libya style denuclearization theoretically what then like what do we open up an embassy there do what we just forget about them because I don't have nukes anymore what where do we go from there all right 30 second lightly Matt everybody take a shot at that you're not gonna get a Libyan deal that's physically impossible I think that you if he got quote everything that he wanted I think that you are having to do that roadmap of what is the future of us North Korea relations and I don't know what that looks like if North Korea doesn't feel integrated to the region so I think the short answer is you got to get the regional partners involved at that point see I I think there's a less than zero percent possible is just a wrong model for North Korea and it's a very different situation North Korea it's already on nuclear weapons power so how do we see that happening at all it just as one more thing with it just linking with the econ question I don't think I I don't disagree that North Korea wants to reform and economically improve and Kim Jang wants all this I mean they're always at hue if you can have his cake and eat it too why not but it's not economic reform instead of nuclear weapons it's a cannot reform and nuclear weapons to so this is why I don't think it's we're not going to see that happening next week or anytime soon I all this happened I'll stipulate to the skepticism if lawless happen I think there'd be a lot of interest in investment especially from South Korean companies probably Chinese companies the real question then will become sort of rule of law questions and all of that because it's it's a terrible investment in climate right now and how much especially the South Korean chaebols and government would want to put in into a highly risk high-risk situation is an open question and that doesn't even in your hype your hypothetical you got to build into all the human rights actions and everything else just pile on to that and I noted earlier that the concerns about North Korean cyber activity they are significant they are aggressive they are growing they are hugely problematic North Korea has shown repeatedly at particularly under Kim jong-un's leadership his willingness and ability to use various asymmetric tools that challenge the international system and can prove highly destructive in addition to the cyber piece there's of course you know the fact that not so long ago North Korea conducted a chemical weapons attack on foreign soil in a civilian location that could have imperiled hundreds and hundreds of people so we are talking about a regime where the nuclear issue is not the only barrier to having it as a normal nation in the in the international community if I could add one other last point while I haven't Mike we've gotten through this entire conversation without talking about China and and so we could have a whole other conversation about China and the dimensions here but I think it's really important to bear in mind whether it's talking about the economic development piece whether it's talking about sanctions relief piece whether it's talking about the end of war declaration China has an enormous interest in all of these things and in some ways I actually think that North Korea is sometimes actually carrying some of China's water in part because North Korea has an interest in getting certain things from China you know China Russia and North Korea had a vice-ministerial statement last year calling for sanctions relief there are a number of different interests that are at play here that go beyond just North Korea when we start to talk about some of these potential gibs on the US part that we've got to keep in mind take your last words yes so the question was if President Trump succeeds in Hanoi next week I think the answer is in his own mind he has already succeeded and it will be a huge success thank you very much sorry we didn't get to all the questions but thank you guys we will not have a formal break if you could just sit tight for about two minutes we're going to transition to our next panel on human rights and humanitarian issues thank you again for this panel which is very insight you Lyndsay Lloyd I'm director for human freedom at the George institute in Dallas Texas very happy to be here we have our own modest North Korea effort which focuses on the topic of this conversation on human rights in North Korea and why that matters I think you all have BIOS but just very briefly starting with Roberta Cohen Roberta is the co-chair emeritus for the committee for human rights in North Korea also a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution has a long long record working and studying these issues next to her is ambassador Robert King Bob King is senior advisor here at the CSIS Korea chair served notably and was this distinction as the special envoy for North Korean human rights throughout the Obama years he is the most recent person to be in that position as that position has gone unfilled for two years now next to Bob we have Jung Park who is a senior fellow and also at the Brookings Institution she is the SK Korea foundation chair in Korea's studies she held a number of senior positions in the intelligence community at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of National Intelligence and then on the end is Victor cha who in addition to a CSIS role and Georgetown role we're proud to have as a fellow in human freedom at the Bush Institute's the first panel is a tough act to follow I think it's probably likely that the strategic issues the nuclear issues are going to form the bulk of the the conversation in Hanoi next week but we believe there's another dimension that's equally important and in fact linked very closely to to the security issues and those are the human rights concerns if you haven't seen it I'd refer you to a piece published yesterday on Bloomberg by Victor we hear he outlines four principles that maybe conserve as a bit of a guideline or framework for this conversation about human rights and and the talks with North Korea the first is integrating human rights into our strategy as a necessity not an option or a choice the second is that human rights and denuclearization are interlinked and you may really can't be separated the third is that raising the human rights issue actually strengthens our hand in these conversations and forth is that mainstreaming human rights into these conversations is a smart thing to do so I hope we can look into that a little bit but maybe to start off Roberta the scope of human rights in North Korea maybe a little refresher for a moment maybe those who aren't aren't as familiar why does this matter and and specifically if we were going to raise human rights with the North Koreans what topics what subjects do we need to be thinking about thank you good morning everyone I'd like to just recall that President Trump said last year I believed that the character of the North Korean regime makes the nuclear threat more dangerous and I think that would follow that no real peace can take hold on the Korean Peninsula if half is governed through political repression suppression of information labor camps crimes against humanity at state policy level not to mention the failure to provide for the welfare of the population so yes there are changes occurring in North Korea I was as was mentioned in the first panel particularly with the markets but we are speaking about normalization of relations with a regime that is not normal for normalization to succeed in any meaningful way human rights will have to become part of the equation it's not an option first the US must negotiate a halt to the routine political detentions of its citizens 15 and 9 years if Americans are going to travel to North Korea and do business there and teach they cannot be subject to intimidation constant surveillance arrests on spurious grounds harsh sentencing and a denial of visits from the protecting power the three freed Americans last year one of them was a business person another was an agricultural specialist teaching at the piano University of Science and Technology the third was also teaching there he was in accounting and of course there was a fourth who was a student and who was a tourist and came back in a coma second economic investment can't proceed well without attention to labor standards protection of property the rule of law and let me refer to Victor's op-ed and Bloomberg because he points out that the international financial institutions and general counsel to American companies aren't gonna be able to support involvement where the forced labor or abuses of workers are part of the supply chain third the US will have to press for the loosening of restrictions on freedom of information if there are to be people-to-people exchanges and seminars and training and travel it can't go hand in hand with arresting North Koreans for listening to the voice of America or any other independent media jamming these broadcasts or arresting people for watching an American film or a South Korean film a fourth the US law calls for unrestricted family reunifications so if we are going to be negotiating on that which we should family members should be able to see each other and be in contact after the initial reunion but that will require telephone calls to other countries that will require mail that would try out some kind of travel and all those are heavily restricted in North Korea if not criminal arms the next point I would refer to is insistence if humanitarian a is going to resume insistence on humanitarian standards so it's not reinforcing the regime and its favorite groups in part attention must be paid to addressing the significant constraints on humanitarian operations that the secretary-general of the UN has drawn attention to in his last report and he has appealed for full access free movement private contacts with beneficiaries and with the local population reaching the most vulnerable effective monitoring these are very basic humanitarian standards and he's had to appeal for that this has to be part of any arrangements reaching the neediest I would add means seeking access to those who are suffering the most acute cases of hunger and disease and those are the tens of thousands of men women and children incarcerated in the political prison camps and the re-education facilities General Assembly resolutions highlight these people and so do UN reports it will be a moral lapse I repeat a moral lapse to look away from that finally let me say there is need to explain to North Korea the terms of bilateral US sanctions under US law sanctions can be lifted not only for denuclearization steps but for human rights improvements and the law sets forth what these steps are and it includes release of political prisoners it includes free flow of information it includes repatriation of abductees it includes standards for distribution of aid and monitoring this is bipartisan legislation with strong backers in Congress so I would just say that progress toward normalization will not move forward in a meaningful in a substantial way unless human rights is part of the equation thank you Bob King moral lapse there's more to it though as well it's apart from the moral dimension there is this sort of practical dimension that Roberto touched on at the end that in fact we have sanctions we have other provisions written in the US law talking about the human rights issues could you maybe speak about that for a moment yeah one of the things that I think is is particularly important is that with regard to the nuclear program we are trying to move North Korea in a direction of accepting standards that have been accepted and adopted by the international community the international order that has been in place since the end of World War two has set a framework for the relationships between countries and the enormous increase in trade and in contacts between countries and the the fact that we have not had a major war involving great powers in the last 70 years is largely the result of the international system that's been created if North Korea is going to be able to participate the way it wants to in terms of its economy and so forth it needs to be part of that process if we are going to be successful in terms of moving North Korea in the direction of denuclearization it is to get the North Koreans to accept the international standards that were set up International Atomic Energy Agency various other kinds of processes part of that process is the International commitment to human rights North Korea is one of the hundred and seventy-one countries which is signed and ratified the International Declaration of Human Rights if North Korea is going to be fully accepted economically politically and in any other way they've got to be part of this broader Internet Consensus this international agreement on standards the North Koreans clearly want to be part of that even in the area of human rights the North Koreans have tried to participate they haven't gone as far as we'd like to see them go on human rights but they have made progress in the situation for example of the UN Human Rights Council there's a process there called the Universal Periodic Review where every five years or so each country in the world goes through a process of evaluating self evaluation of its own human rights record its achievements its problems and then all of the other countries have the opportunity to comment on that country's examination of its human rights record north Korea has participated North Korea has been very anxious to be seen as a member of the international community we've had a couple of very interesting occasions of where the North Koreans have spoken up and talked about what they've done they've given very glowing reports about how good human rights are in North Korea but the other countries who participated have raised issues and raised questions about North Korea's record when North Korea went through the process the first time in December of 2009 North Koreans presented you know rosy scenario how beautiful Human Rights were in North Korea several countries including the United States raised questions about North Korea's record about areas where there was room for progress there were some non sensitive areas that were singled out including for example dealing with persons with disabilities the North Koreans by the time they went through the process five years later had ratified the Convention on persons with disabilities had made some progress and was quite quick to pronounce how what progress they had made in terms these these areas there's a lot more they need to do revertas outlined a lot of those areas but it seems to me that if we don't involve North Korea and press the North Koreans on human rights we are not encouraging North Korea's full participation in the international system which includes limitations on nuclear weapons and other kinds of activities that we like to see the North Korean ceased carrying out so I think that's an important part of what we need to do in terms of moving forward with North Korea we need to press them on human rights unfortunately this administration has taken human rights as largely an instrument with which you beat the North Koreans until they pay attention to you and as soon as they make positive signs no word about human rights Trump spent in his first State of the Union speech in January of 2018 he spent 10 percent of his speech talking about North Korea and particularly North Korean human rights there were North Korean defectors in the hall of the House of Representatives there were family members from the warmbier family who were there who were recognized acknowledged human rights was given great attention three months later Trump and Kim jong-un agreed to meet in Singapore not a word since then about North Korea's human rights not mentioned in the State of the Union earlier this month we've got to move beyond the point of where we think of human rights as simply a way you beat up on the North Koreans to make progress in other areas it's an integral part of moving North Korea in the positive direction okay jump are you optimistic this is going to be topic one for the US no I I'm pessimistic about the whole sumit 2.0 to begin with but I would have to say that that not having human rights on the agenda of denuclearization is like locking the front door but then leaving your garage and your back door and your front porch wide open or it's it's it it's the effect of having just opening up the refrigerator and taking all your food and straight and putting it straight into the trash I think human before any sanctions could be lifted by law it has to pass the human rights smell test but you know I want let me step back and talk about credibility putting aside the credibility of us negotiations in general I think you we've all seen all of the reports that suggest that there is a little bit of policy dysfunction in a look and a bit of disarray in how the US and the Trump administration is approaching the summit and so and and the inconsistencies between what the the big progress that President Trump has been touting versus what the intelligence community and what the reports and the various satellite imagery are reporting about North Korea's ongoing activities they're below the surface literally right with the with the missile bases and the underground facilities but but also that they the Newark the North Koreans themselves have been pretty clear about what they're willing to give and not give and there's a disagreement within the Trump administration itself despite all the progress the progress that has been touted special representative vegan and Secretary of State Pompeo and others have said that and the National Security Advisor Bolton have said that there's nothing happening on the nuclear issue that's why the president has to meet with him again so let's put that aside despite the fact that I spent two minutes on it but let's go to the credibility of the what the Trump administration is offering to North Korea the big bright future and that the bright future for North Korea Kim wants a bright future for the North Koreans we believe in Kim look at all this real estate that Kim has right smack in the middle of in a very strategic position among the second third and 11th largest economies in the world great location so and the the way the the president has been catching this is you know give up your nuclear weapons and you're going to have this wonderful bounty that's the refrigerator not raising human rights is like putting that bounty into the trash because I think that without as Victor and and others have mentioned and Victor in your in your op-ed you know if you don't have human rights improvements in North Korea you can't get investors you can't get you're not you're not going to be drawing lots of people and also without improvements in human rights like loosening of the information blockade and freedom of assembly and freedom of expression and the and the ability for entrepreneurship to thrive that is not possible a brighter future for North Korea is not possible with all of that happening so you know the Trump administration has talked about how they're going to be different they're going to be different because they're going to not waste all billions of dollars and squander billions of dollars on making very small or no improvements in North Korean nuclear issue but where the where it's in danger of doing just that why would Kim be incentivized to trust the front administration especially given the jettisoning of the Iran deal why would he trust the treasured sword of nuclear weapons to a u.s. president who was hampered by lots of interview domestic issues so I think you know the human rights issue has to be part of this conversation for even just for the Trump administration policy of this brighter future for North Korea Victor you you said kind of a similar thing in this this rights first approach can you talk about why that matter and maybe give us your thoughts on on the the likelihood that this is even gonna come up in ten or next yeah well so so the first thing I'll say is I'm not on the second panel because I like being on the stage so much but we actually invited somebody else a US official to join and they could not get approval to join which may be an indication and of itself but how how much this is gonna come up in Hanoi so let me sort of take off from where John left off I mean the first thing is that the human rights issue is important to the overall strategy of the president even though he doesn't realize that if if we are going if singing I'm missing but if Hanoi is really going to be a success then as we said in the last panel there are things that the North Koreans that will put on the tape that will put on the table that we've seen before and so they need to put something new on the table to get us all the skeptics to say alright maybe it's different this time right and so in that sense doing something on human rights might be one of those things they could put on the table that would cause you know like skeptics like sue and others to go okay that's different right the other is that if the president really wants final and fully verifiable denuclearization of North Korea it is entirely implausible that that could happen given how closed and restricted access is in North Korean society both for domestic people as well for foreigners how can you have fully verifiable nuclear as denuclearization when nobody is allowed to move around the country anywhere and then third I think it's the point that everybody else has made which is that you know President Trump has gone from calling Kim jong-un a little Rocket Man to the economic rocket right there North Korea is now the economic rocket of Asia well you know I think is everyone has said the if they come out of Hanoi next week and the president says you know they're committed to denuclearization now you know the World Bank the IMF you can all go in there you know Pepsi Kentucky Fried Chicken you can all go into North Korea now it's all open for you you know including a trump casino or whatever else you know again nobody none of that is gonna happen given existing US law and the fact that there are you know four there's forced labor human rights abuses along the supply chain you know no company will want to be in violation of US law you know simply to get into North Korea it just doesn't make sense so so for all of these reasons it is in the president's interest to raise this issue to achieve what he wants to achieve now the point that Bob made about you know human rights being sort of baseball bat we used to hit the North Koreans over their head with I mean the reality is is that after the commission of inquiry report the UN Commission of Inquiry report they came out five years ago it was that called on that the international community went became behind to call for the North Korean leadership to be taken to the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity you know this was for the North Koreans of real vulnerability they were quite concerned about it and they did two things and the first of these I think is it's not debatable the second one may be debatable the first thing they did was they started sending their diplomats to Russia and other members of the European Union to lobby against vote in the UN General Assembly in the UN Security Council to raise the issue of human rights as a topic of debate I think that and that is something the North Koreans have never done right so they clearly spelt vulnerability there the second thing they did and this is some this may be debatable is that they quietly became more open to discussions on humanitarian assistance I mean Bob is probably the best who could speak to this because he was in the position at the time and possibly to discussion on human rights but the point is is that they were not going to raise this in Hanoi unless the president raises it and again so for this reason I'm reminded of that famous line from Jerry Maguire you know help me help you I mean that there is an opportunity here to raise this issue in ways that are positive not negative for both the President's agenda and for North Korea's integration into the international community the rota Victor just alluded to this sort of Achilles heel that this is a this is a sensitive issue it's one that provoked reactions from Pyongyang if you if you had the president's a year where would you start you you know what issues might you suggest this is a good place to start the human rights conversation with North Korea and let me say that North Korea has taken the view and they've publicly announced it that human rights is an obstacle to peace and I think that unfortunately the Republic of Korea South Korea has deferred on that line and I see even that Steve vegan and speaking at Stanford refers to the fact that the United States and North Korea have different views about human rights as if it were a kind of a think-tank discussion and that there's a parity of views and that on one side we'll go we have one view and then there's another view and they're all legitimate they're not because the Commission of Inquiry has found systematic widespread crimes against humanity in North Korea it's a very different situation so with the president's ear Human Rights is the identity of the United States it's not a jacket that you say oh we're going to leave that by the door and take it off it's the history our heritage our laws it's a very strong identity and the same should be for South Korea so the idea that we become something else that we do not deal with this issue that we put it aside is really putting aside one of our greatest strengths what our reputation is built on and making that a kind of a putting that aside and deferring to North Korea so immediately the negotiations become an agenda set by North Korea rather than set by what are in our interests now these some of the issues I believe I indicated before and they're not they're issues that are American interests as I mentioned the arrests of Americans in North Korea is an issue that has to be taken up if there's going to be any kind of normalization and new relations with the countries that has to be taken up and the reunification of families issues these are American interests these are human rights issues this also has to be a stronger point and greater information flow and the ending of the jamming of Voice of America in North Korea these are all part of what we should be promoting as our as our goals and if humanitarian assistance is wanted then there are standards these have to be discussed and as everybody has mentioned we have US laws and I think that the what was also mentioned Bob mentioned it the part of the International Human Rights system if they are to have a place in that system they have to move toward some kind of compliance with international standards and one of the biggest blots on that exclusion of them are these political prison camps to which the UN has no access to which humanitarian organizations have no access and I will repeat for the third time that this has become one of the great moral lapses to look away from that because it's a distraction when one talks about nuclear weapons it has to be part of the agenda yeah Bob King is is there any sort of low-hanging fruit where would you start if this were your task for the day one of the difficulties with human rights is you it's hard to say which is the most important and we don't take our own Bill of Rights and say the most important provision there is is freedom of speech or the most important provision is the right to bear arms or something like this so I mean I'm reluctant to say you know let's focus on this one on the other hand I think there are ways we can make progress with North Korea and we probably should do that there are a couple of things that I think are useful one as Roberta said access to information is critical and I think if we're going to see change in North Korea it's going to come about in part through access to information we broadcast with The Voice of America and Radio Free Asia there are other broadcasting into North Korea South Korea as extensive broadcast operations listening to the radio is an old-fashioned thing to do but in North Korea it is one of the only ways you have have access to information we need to do what we can to increase the availability of information in North Korea and we need to press the North Koreans so that people in North Korea have access to that information one of the things that we need to do is is try to create a situation where pressure in North Korea pushes the government in more positive directions and critical to that process is people in North Korea having access to information so I think you know if I were gonna prioritize that's one that I would put very high on the list it is very difficult when you look at political prisoners and what they are forced to go through and there have been enough defectors who've had experience with the North Korean prison camps to know that this is one of the most horrible experiences that a human being could endure and we certainly need to press on that I'm not sure that starting with that as the first point we need to press the North Koreans to make progress on is is the best way to go the North Koreans are likely to respond much more negatively pressing on rights for people with disabilities is something that North Koreans made progress on it does not threaten to the political monopoly there are in fact members of the elite who have children or family members who have disabilities and so I mean there's some support for making progress in those areas my sense is that you can't go in and do the entire thing but there are areas which maybe are less sensitive politically that we can and shouldn't push on I think in terms of for example providing humanitarian assistance both through the United Nations through private organizations and even through United States involvement humanitarian assistance has benefits we do not make decisions on humanitarian aid because that has political benefits in fact our laws prohibit that but the things that are required if we are to provide humanitarian assistance either the United States or other organizations are certain things that are helpful in moving Korea in a positive direction one of the things that we are required by law to do if US assistance is involved is to be able to determine independently the need for assistance the United Nations agencies are involved also are required to do that this means that people who are making decisions on humanitarian aid in North Korea need to have access to areas where people are in need they need to be able to go to areas which in some cases are off-limits to foreigners I think we need to press on that I think we should be providing humanitarian assistance we should insist that we'd be able to determine the need also in providing aid we need to be able to monitor the distribution of assistance to make sure that it's going to those for whom it was intended this means short short notice visits to check on distribution and so forth these are things that we need to do and we can and should do and so these are important humanitarian things that we ought to be encouraging we certainly ought to be encouraging private organizations that are involved in humanitarian aid but we also need to make sure that the international standards in terms of assessing need and determining monitoring the distribution are carried out these are things that I think we can make progress on now and I think we ought to be pressing on those things that it shouldn't be where we stop but I think that's where we can begin good place the star jump you heard a little bit about just now about broadcasting and information getting in can you offer any insights into sort of where South Korea is on these issues and and why that may matter where the moon' administration is where South Korean policy has has changed on human rights and some of these issues I think what what we've seen in some of the reports is that there's the funding has been cut severely for Human Rights type of organization than defector organizations and I think that creates a pall even if you're not targeted directly there it creates a pall or a fear of being singled out and being punished for bringing up human rights and a and and the assumption is that you don't want to you don't want to offend Kim and then you have to preserve this delicate moment of peace in this and the summer tree with Kim but I think when you bring up human rights if Kim makes any movements movements on human rights I think that would be one of the key signposts that he was serious about denuclearization because I think in a way that you know these would be cost that would be these are actions that would be costly for Kim to go back on and so if he had if he starts to loot if Kim starts to loosen up you know the information blockade or he releases some people in the and the prison camps that they that would be a sign that he is willing to open up and that he is he doesn't vision a bright future for his country and that that would that would make me much more comfortable and I think a lot of the skeptics more comfortable about the Trump administration's approach to the North Korea nuclear problem victory you touched on it earlier but the United Nations maybe can you talk about what we can be do or should be doing at the UN and how do we how do we just mark the fifth anniversary of the COI as you as you noted have we lost momentum there and if so how do we how do we regain it yeah I mean I think it's a great question we've lost a lot of momentum I mean it was actually five years five years ago that we held an event in this room and everybody here participated and into a standing-room-only audience with members of the Commission so there was a lot of interest there was a groundswell of international attention to the issue and it really has dropped off quite a bit and probably the one of the lowest points has been this inability of the UN Security Council last fall to agree to raise the you you and the North Korean human rights issue for debate and Security Council you know that was one of the biggest achievements I think of the momentum behind the other momentum subsequent to the UN Commission of Inquiry report and you know I think many of us hope that in that there will be an opportunity for the UN Security Council to vote on this again but but it requires leadership and it requires the US leadership and we don't have an ambassador in the UN there Roberta and Bob can speak to us as well there are other potential countries who could our coalition of countries that could play a leading role but China and Russia are going to make it very difficult I think and and so I think there's a lot of momentum that's been that's been lost there unfortunately I want to go to audience questions in just a segment yes please can I add one more comment one thing that the United States has done that has severely limited our effectiveness in pressing North Korea on human rights is to withdraw US participation in the UN Human Rights Council the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva is the focal point of human rights discussion in the United Nations it's an important institution it's created a lot of the the procedures and the processes that we use to identify and work on human rights issues we have not we the administration announced a year or so ago that we were not participating that has limited our ability to use the United Nations institutions which are critical in this process of pressing for human rights and we basically weakened our own position by withdrawing by no longer participating yeah go ahead I just wanted to say that the other piece that we should mention that hasn't been done is that no one has been appointed to succeed the gentleman next to me we have no special envoy on human rights in North Korea so that if we did an advocate within system and even if there was no you an ambassador and there should be you would have this special envoy at least able to go up to New York and begin to strategize of how we move to a Security Council meeting so I think that that particular lack of appointment you told me I had the presidency here before what well I would raise that as well I just wanted to say one thing on what Jung said about South Korea and I think she's right there's been in this administration a real drop in support for NGO groups that are doing this the balloon launches have stopped and and I was gonna give a shout out to Sandy but he left sandy burst bail our ambassador it was actually one of the first US officials to speak more openly about human rights abuses in South Korea and and and was you know attacked basically for taking that position which again speaks to how there's a political climate in Korea particularly when you have a progressive government in power where they see this you know as would you say an obstacle or obstacle to peace or so they see it as something that's that's negative and you know I think many of us believe that that's that's wrong and it's the wrong way to look at it in terms of you both u.s. and South Korea negotiations I mean if the if in the end the goal is putting aside the weapons piece if the goal is fully normalized relations with the United States interaction with the international business community and acceptance in the international community then it's impossible to get to those things without some movement on human rights so this should again be something that is part of both South Korea and the u.s. strategy now for those in the audience who don't follow Korea closely you might think progressive government they're against human rights in North Korea we'll explain it to you later it's very complicated but but but that is that is where we are and so I think there this should you know as Bob said we we shouldn't look at this as a baseball that there's a positive agenda here for everybody for the North Koreans for the South Koreans and for the United States yes but before I go to the audience here just couldn't someone speak to the why this issue matters in terms of Congress the the interest on Capitol Hill and why that is it's another reason that the administration ought to be considering this as they as they go forward having spent 25 years on the hill these days there are very few issues on which there is strong bipartisan support on the hill North Korea human rights is an issue for which there is very strong bipartisan support a week and a half after the summit in Singapore when human rights was not mentioned the North Korea Human Rights Act was reauthorized by Congress the vote in the House of Representatives was 415 to nothing the vote in the Senate was taken by unanimous consent that legislation is one of the few issues in the last two years or so that has come through with such strong bipartisan support there is very strong interest in the Congress in human rights in North Korea and members of Congress have played a very important role in terms of pressing administration's over the last 20 years to take a more active part on North Korea human rights and I think that support is still very much in place on the hill and before the sanctions could be lifted it would have to pass the smell test with Congress before anything to show that North Korea is making tangible progress on the human rights issue I think you know let me circle back to you know Victor's comment about help me help you help the way to if I were with with the president I would say listen you know you want to make sure that can't trust you to make this big deal but you have you know that you have to have congressional approval for sanctions removal how can you be credible if you can't drag you know if you can't if you don't have the support of Congress and just yesterday or two days ago the the house Intel Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees wrote a letter to the president saying that you're not giving us any information you're blocking our access to information on North Korea and so that undercuts any any progress that we're trying to get with North Korea trust us because we can we can do this for you and deliver on the spra egan a bright future for North Korea okay they will throw it up into your questions if you have if you wait for the mic let me start up here I don't know where the mic runners are right now coming out if you can just identify yourself and if you're representing an organization please get to questions Bill Brown again two short questions actually I went on the low-hanging fruit you know the president moon and certainly Kim both seem to be a focused on case can you hold the mic closer sorry yeah I'm sorry yeah regarding the Kaesong Industrial Zone seems like this is one that actually might happen something might happen on this moon and Kim both want something badly is there some way we could push the South Koreans I mean it's a South Korean project to force if Kaesong is reopened that that become a bright spot for human rights in other words much better rules for the workers there just just a question seems like that might be a low-hanging fruit something that we could aim for secondly I'm just curious last week the sky of the UN North Korean of the UN mission up there's said something about Oh their rations are being cut they really need food aid I'm wondering how you got what you what all of yours reaction to the that statement was okay thank you like to take on a case long so that's actually bill it's a great idea you know I think I mean I we know what the North Korean response will be which is that we said no conditions right that that was what he said and kim jongwan said in the new year speech that they'd like to see a reopening of the two big inter-korean cooperation projects Kaesong and Kumgang mountain with no preconditions so I'm sure that's what they would respond but I think it's a it's a very good point I mean one of the reasons that there was so much controversy over these projects as you know was that the workers were not being paid directly South Korean managers were now allowed to have contact with the workers the workforce was entirely women because they didn't want a whole bunch of men commingling together so they're you know they this was supposed to be this beacon of inter-korean cooperation and the future of inter-korean cooperation and yet in the eyes of many people in the West and also in the Congress it was just you know a shining example of North Korean human rights abuses even when they're trying to engage with the outside world you've forgotten your line bill which was just pay the damn workers right I mean it's it's a pretty simple thing to do and it's a pretty it's a reasonable demand for opening up the industrial complex you may have any insights on the rations being cut question yeah I heard that too I don't know if you I I had heard that too yeah go ahead it's the normal time when North Korea runs into problems with food shortages basically in the fall they do quite well the harvest holds them and now they're getting to the end of being what was harvested last year is pretty well running out it's not yet warm enough that you can start planting a few garden crops that will carry you through till the harvest later this year north Korea has that problem and there's always a tight time this time of year the difficulty in terms of dealing with North Korea on providing food assistance is there isn't enough food because the government system controls agriculture and extracts agriculture products for what they want to use them for it is very much the problem with the government system this is a government created problem there are things they could do there are things a lot of other countries have done to move forward and make progress on the other hand people are not having enough to eat and this puts people who prove you provide humanitarian assistance in a very difficult situation what do you do people are starving and there are probably some instances where this is the case from the humanitarian point of view you try to ignore politics if you can determine in fact that there is need if you're able to provide assistance and if there are ways that you can provide the assistance and monitor its delivery to make sure that it's going to those who are truly in need and those who are most in need which tends to include children women that are pregnant or lactating these kind of things are ways that you can deal with it there's no easy solution it's not one you know it's not a problem like you have in other countries where the failure of the weather is the problem here it's the failure of the government but people are starving and there ought to be some assistance provided if it can be provided in ways to guarantee that it goes to people who are in need and that it's getting to them Nations has estimated that 40% of the country is food insecure those numbers can rise 30 percent of children under five are stunted and 14 million about having limited access to safe water 23 percent have no access to basic sanitation and here I would say that I think the United States has an opportunity to raise with North Korea their own priorities because these are very very damning statistics the UN is asking for 111 million dollars North Korea probably has that 111 billion dollars which is used in other ways on military programs or luxury items or infrastructure and I think that should be a talking point that shouldn't stand in the way that we we don't that Aid is not given but I think it has to be a discussion point agencies have been operating in North Korea for 20 years these figures are not maybe the stunting figures have improved the figures are not showing that the aid is used in any way that becomes sustainable and I think this is really a discussion point and I do want to just comment on I guess we do have a slight disagreement on the panel on the issue of low-hanging fruit at the United Nations North Korea begins to talk about protecting children they raise women's issues and they did allow the reporter on disabilities to come in but and these are their steps these are this is their low-hanging fruit I really don't think that we should be just picking the low-hanging fruit and I'm not saying you're going into some great confrontation I think that wouldn't make sense but I think our goals have to be far greater there are plenty of UN agencies and committees and other things that deal with the low-hanging fruit but they've had no UN official given permission they've given no UN official permission to come on a human rights mission once did but they have linked it to a change in the UN resolution to remove paragraphs from it on crimes against humanity therefore with the International Criminal Court and when that did not happen they would drew the invitation a UN Human Rights official should be able to go to the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross should be supported to go into the prison camps which they do in countless countries I mean this maybe is not low-hanging but really it has to be the the fruit that we bring forward otherwise I think we'd ourselves that would be ignoring the 300 plus pages of the commission of inquiry report and everything else we know so please so the thing about low-hanging fruit is that if we start going for the low-hanging fruit then go talk to the nuclear negotiators because that's sort of what we got into was just going for the low-hanging fruit so that's the first one the second is that you know I think on an issue like this it you know requires reaching for more but it also requires us us being either the US or the international community to tell North Korea what might be what they could do right largely because and I feel it's the same way on the nuclear cutting off Richard feel the same way well like they're not very good at coming up with ideas like we always have to give them the ideas and so that was certainly the case on the nuclear side and it may also be the case on the human right side to actually give them I'd like to raise ideas with them with things that they could do so yeah okay I think we had a question here in the second row microphone hi my name is Megan McNamara I'm with the Cohen group and I wanted to ask a question on Kim jong-un kind of twofold dr. Pak you mentioned Kim's reaction to human rights and you know if he was open to that that would mean that he's serious about next steps I was hoping that you could elaborate a little bit on his actual openness to that and similarly his openness to the big shiny future if opening if in fact Oken opening access to information business etc realistically probably puts his own regime at risk I I would say that Kim fears his people if not more than the the United States and that because the people are his most proximate threat and that justified and that is the reason for the human rights violation and violations and the incentivizing of the elite and neighborhoods and women and children and and workers to tell on you know various disloyal comments by their by their neighbors and so when you're when you're incentivizing human rights violations in support of the regime and to get get ahead economically politically in the party or elsewhere that you have a system where that is built on repression and and that repression stands as one of the pillars of regime survival for Kim the other side the other pillar is the nuclear weapons so if I if so if Kim were to give a little bit on the on that side the repression side it means that he's that he's willing that he would be for me that would be a signpost that he's serious about this this new future where nuclear weapons are not as important or important for his survival so I think that I think unless we can chip away at both pillars at the same time I think you know in a lot of ways you know national security it's always about and what we can do but I think in the North Korea example the change has to come from within as well and so I see human rights as part of the seed be part of the strategic conversation on how to get Kim to move on on various things but if we're afraid to bring it up because we're afraid Kim might be might get angry then there is no incentive for him to loosen any part or weaken any part of that pillar that is buttressing his existence this point you know in 2002 Kim jong-un's father Kim jong-il decided to admit that North Korea had abducted Japanese and that was an admission that was obviously a calculation and that they would get some relationship and financial help and other economic benefits that are political they might want from Japan and so they admitted it and they even allowed the departure of some of those abducted it was quite extraordinary because for a very long time they had totally denied that they ever abducted anyone so this to me points to that they can take steps they wanted to summit with the United States they released three Americans that were held you know they can take steps they can do things if they feel it's in their interests and if it if the United States makes it clear it's in their interests and there are positive or incentives then I think you can begin to make some little progress okay we are we are basically out of time up for my part like to thank our panel for their their thoughts and their their opinions Victor I don't know if you want to close out the conference in general or yeah well thank you all for coming and staying with us this morning I want to thank our the first panel as well as the second panel for taking time out to be with us we'll probably do something else after the summit next week so stay tuned and let's we'll see what happens next week you are [Music]

Channel: Center for Strategic & International Studies

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Id: Os4RDECRZI4

Length: 118min 37sec (7117 seconds)

Published: Fri Feb 22 2019