Operation Iraqi Freedom - How NOT to Plan an Invasion

in March 2003 the United States United Kingdom and their Coalition allies launched operation Iraqi Freedom a war to depose Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein the campaign went relatively well the Coalition methodically Advanced North and captured Baghdad without serious casualties however operation Iraqi Freedom was plagued by constant problems during its planning phase multiple revisions political interference and in large Parts based on sketchy or Flatout false assumptions it can be argued that military Des disaster was avoided only through the efforts of several key officers who successfully stood their ground on key aspects of the plan in this video we will discuss the military strategy and planning for operation Iraqi Freedom furthermore the military and post-war consequences of the planning process will also be examined the United States already had contingency War plans for Iraq before planning for the the 2003 invasion was ever considered during the 1990s United States Central Command or centcom developed a plan to depos Sadam should he try to invade Kuwait again op plan 1398 called for three calls and a Marine Expeditionary Force to push the enemy out of Kuwait before attacking North into Iraq itself the operation would have involved over 400,000 troops who would be needed for stabilizing the country following the presumed fall of saddam's government this was centcom's official War plan for Iraq before President George W bush assumed office in January 2001 the first serious attempts to build a new plan came 2 days after 911 on the 13th of September members of the US third Army's planning staff were pulled into a windowless room and informed they had just 72 hours to sketch a plan to seize and hold Iraq's Southern oil fields Lieutenant Colonel James Danner the chief fifth core War planner finalized and expanded the plant which was given the name Vigilant Guardian in a hypothetical operation Vigilant Guardian an invasion force of between 75,000 to 100,000 troops would take 30 to 45 days to deploy to Kuwait when the attack came the American forces would be expected to occupy the southern half of Iraq in 4 days the ground forces would stop 75 Mi south of Baghdad and establish a security Zone to prevent saddam's Army from counterattacking although it was a thrown together contingency Vigilant Guardian reflected many of the assumptions that would guide the actual Invasion Plan American Military Officers predicted that the Iraqi military was so weakened by sanctions that it would collapse easily and that the United States would be treated as liberators by the predominantly sheer population of Southern Iraq however Vigilant Guardian would also be the last plan to not involve the direct supervision of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Rumsfeld was in his his second stint as Secretary of Defense and was determined to control the planning process for the invasion of Iraq he saw himself as an innovator and intended to transform the US military into a Lena force on the 21st of November 2001 Rumsfeld met with sencon Commander General Tommy Franks to discuss the regime change in Iraq acting mostly of his own accord rosfeld laid out his criteria for what the campaign should look like the defense secretary emphasized to the general that The Invasion had to have the element of surprise both the deployment and attack needed to be quick and it had to use the fewest number of troops possible even suggested that The Invasion should start before all of the American forces earmarked for the operation could be deployed to the Middle East arguing that they could be fed into the advance as reinforcements General Franks took rell's criteria and formulated a plan that would shrink the American troop contingent from over 400,000 to 275,000 and take 45 to 135 days to secure the country about half of that number would join The Invasion as it was happening the initial deployment time would be 90 days for Rumsfeld this plan took too long and used too many troops he ordered Franks and his staff to return to the planning table in the meantime Rumsfeld had been introduced to Colonel Douglas McGregor by former Speaker of the House of Representatives n Gingrich Gingrich was a member of the defense Adis Advisory Board and had recommended McGregor for his unorthodox thinking McGregor argued that a force of just 177,000 troops could defeat Sadam in 96 hours behind a powerful armored attack aimed at Baghdad for reld this was the Bold Innovative thinking that was lacking in the modern Army he arranged a meeting between McGregor and Frank's staff in January of 2002 it did not go well in an initial meeting with Colonel Mike Fitzgerald one of centcom's Chief planners McGregor dismissed Fitzgerald's concerns about logistics and even argued that artillery was not needed for The Invasion Fitzgerald an artillery man was so disgusted that he walked out Franks and the rest of his staff believed that McGregor's ideas had no basis in reality but defense secretary ronfeld was convinced that the generals were relying on Old thinking the Doug McGregor episode was an ominous sign that rosfeld intended to intimately involve himself in the planning for operating Iraqi freedom on the 1st of February 2002 Franks presented his new plan to Rumsfeld Cod named generated start under generated start the air and ground forces were deploy to the Middle East in 60 days and once again involve attacking Iraq before all US forces were in place Rumsfeld rejected the plan again and ordered a new one where deployment would take just 30 days Franks now realized that this could not be done unless the United United States had access to foreign bases and emphasized that a coalition would be needed in order to satisfy rumsfeld's demands Franks went on a tour of the Middle East to persuade potential allies to allow US troops on their soil while sencom struggled to formulate a plan to rell's liking tensions between the war planners and the Pentagon continued to rise during the Spring of 2002 at one point General Frank's subordinates learned that representatives from the under secretary of defense for policy to were feeding confidential information about the planning process to defense secretary Rumsfeld they were altered as mold and expelled from centcom's planning team the interference from ronfeld would become so bad that even n Gingrich who sided with the defense secretary on most issues warned him to stop micromanaging the military gingr joked the worst they can do is take away my designated parking spot at the Pentagon at the same time a new problem emerged what to do with American Air power Rumsfeld insisted upon a lightning quick Invasion defined by shock and or and rejected the need for a long drawn out air campaign similar to Desert Storm however Buzz Mosley the air War Commander vehemently argued that he needed at least 10 to 14 days to destroy Iraqi air defenses eventually a compromise was reached American aircraft would systematically Pummel key enemy installations in the months before The Invasion under under the guise of operation Southern Focus the ongoing campaign to enforce the Iraqi noly Zone this would satisfy Mosley's demand for more time and reassure ramsfeld that the war would not drag on as a result operation Iraqi Freedom would be a rarity in Modern Warfare in that The Invasion specific air campaign and the ground campaign would start at roughly the same time more plans were developed throughout 2002 the most controversial of which was nicknamed The Running start the running start most resembled Colonel McGregor's plan it called for 18,000 troops to assemble in Kuwait within 25 days before striking into Iraq Rumsfeld was pleased that both the deployment time and Troop count had been shaved to drastically lower numbers but other key Figures were alarmed chief of the United Kingdom's defense staff so Michael Boyce described the running start as a hazardous option and did not believed that the United States had a workable plan the other concerned party was the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff The Joint Chiefs believed that war could not be fought on the cheap and urged for a plan that relied more on a larger Invasion Force larger Logistics buildup and increased weight of fire Secretary of State Coen Powell had overseen Operation Desert Storm and was also concerned with the lack of attention given to Logistics and security behind the advance ronel dismissed the their concerns as Legacy thinking the appointment of Lieutenant General Dave mckinon as the overall ground commander in September of 2002 was a turning point in the planning for operating Iraqi Freedom McKinnon reviewed the newest plans and believed they were solely deficient in Manpower unnecessarily complex and lacked enough Firepower to win the war quickly mckannan felt Vindicated in his view when his staff conducted a war game to test the newest plan nicknamed the hybrid retired General Fred Franks not to be confused with Tommy Franks who had led the American 7eventh Corp in Desert Storm observed the exercise before giving his own opinion that the plan was fatally flawed the most pressing concern was the lack of initial combat power which could carry the advance all the way to Baghdad thus he began work on his own plan which he codenamed Cobra 2 after the American breakout from the Normandy Beach head in the second world war on the 5th of December 2002 mckinon presented Cobra 2 to General Franks the new Plan called for adding an entire division to the 86,000 strong Invasion Force along with two more Marine regimental combat teams and additional Logistics and air support he ditched the more complicated aspects of the previous plans and argued for two separate pushes one from the Army and one from the Marines that would converge on Baghdad at the same time the US fourth infantry division would attack out of turkey to to tie down Iraqi forces in the north Franks was impressed with the plan and gave it his approval but most surprisingly Rumsfeld also liked the plan it met the requirements for a fast campaign with little buildup even if it used more troops than he would have liked the headaches would not stop though as the deployment process also turned into an ordeal Rumsfeld believed that the United States had sent more forces and supplies than needed for Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and was determined to control the deployment in addition to the plan Rumsfeld was especially concerned with deploying as few reservists as possible arguing instead that any reserves should be stationed in the continental United States until they were absolutely needed for the drive on Baghdad he was still obsessed with keeping the Manpower deployment count as low as possible when US Army Chief of Staff Eric shinsei testified in front of Congress on the 25th of February 2003 he estimated that it would take several 100,000 troops to control Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein Rumsfeld was Furious that one of the Joint Chiefs had contradicted his thinking and attempted to have Shinseki reprimanded Secretary of the army Tom white stood his ground and ramsfeld dropped the subject to those in the military tasked with carrying out the deployment it appeared as though Rumsfeld had no idea what reservists actually did the 17,000 Reserve troops that mckinon requested would would be vital for securing supply lines and pacifying rear areas keeping them in the United States would actively harm the advance as one of his subordinates later said we often joked that we would like to be able to invite Mr Rumsfeld down here to say to him Mr secretary meet Isaac Newton we live in a Newtonian world we cannot change the size of the ocean or the distance between the United States and Iraq with no maintenance problems it takes 21 days to sail from Texas to Kuwait having them so far away from the combat area would be pointless because they could not be deployed fast enough if needed at the front however ramsfeld would get his way because the Bush Administration apparently had a great plan for getting more manow in theater the CIA had intelligence which suggested that entire divisions or brigades of the Iraqi Army would switch sides and fight for the Invaders sencom developed a plan that would use members of the IRA regular army to control the country's borders and take on other tasks to help overstretched Coalition forces these men would also be augmented by Iraqi Freedom Fighters who would be armed by the CIA and flown into the country once the invasion began Rumsfeld also suggested letting other Arab Nations field additional Security Forces but mckinon vehemently disagreed with this premise arguing that it would be problematic for soliciting post-war aid for the Iraqis he humored the defense secretary but his staff never drew up such a plan ultimately nowhere near as many enemy soldiers surrendered to the coalition to serve these purposes much less an entire Brigade to complete the embarrassing episode the CIA never recruited enough Iraqi Nationals ending the entire plan as Michael R Gordon and Bernard e trainer wrote in their book Cobra 2 the inside story of the invasion and occupation of Iraq the Bush Administration was not only confident that it would quickly defeat the Iraqi military but also counted on Iraqi forces to work under American supervision and even to help police the occupation rarely has a military plan depended on such a bold assumption while this Saga was occurring ramsfeld continued to make centcom's life hard just before Christmas of 2002 General JD Thurman McKinnon's operations Deputy was summoned to the Pentagon to discuss the deployment process according to COBRA 2 Thurman had to go down the list of individual Reserve units Name by name and insists they be deployed in late 2002 President Bush decided to take the case for war against Iraq to the United Nations which gave sencom breathing space to complete preparations for The Invasion and they needed it because the planned Northern front was in deep trouble on the 1st of March 2003 turkey's Parliament rejected a measure to allow ow Coalition troops to attack Iraq through turkish's territory this was a serious situation as general mckinon estimated that he needed a minimum of 35,000 troops to attack from the north and put pressure on the Iraqi Army however Secretary of State Powell believed a northern front would be unnecessary and wanted to recall the US fourth infantry division which was currently waiting on ships in the Mediterranean Sea for turkey to give them permission to land both Powell and mckannan thought that if the fourth infantry division couldn't take part in The Invasion from the north it might as well be deployed to Kuwait and insist in The Invasion From There Yet General Franks rejected this idea he believed keeping the fourth infantry division in the Mediterranean would keep the Iraqis guessing and prevent them from concentrating all of their forces in the South po argued that any enemy divisions moving south would be easy targets for American Air power in the end Frank won the battle attle and kept the fourth infantry division out of combat until it was redirected to Kuwait towards the end of the campaign however Howell was proven right that the unit's presence in Turkey had no effect on The Invasion General Thurman later remarked in the summer of 2003 that not committing the fourth infantry division to action earlier was a huge mistake we wanted more combat power on the ground but the decision was made way late to move the fourth ID South we've still got people getting shot by insurgents and dying up there right now we've got to clean that up Against All Odds the Coalition Invasion forces were ready by the 20th of March 2003 and The Invasion began on schedule so what were the consequences of this chaotic planning process for one Coalition forces figured out quickly that their Logistics were far more vulnerable than initially expected the lack of reservists to guard captured territory and escort Supply columns had a negative impact on the drive towards Baghdad American commanders in the field found their supply lines constantly harassed by Iraqi militia or paramilitary groups such as the fedin a year after the invasion an investigation by Former Defense secretary James schlinger determined that Donald rell's decision to take the deployment process out of the military's hands contributed to the chaos that would engulf Iraq following the invasion Reserve units arrived without much of their equipment and the general lack of troops left the Coalition forces spread too thin to effectively police the country defense secretary rumsfeld's determination to control every aspect of the invasion down to the Battalion level created a rift between the civilians in charge at the Pentagon the military in the field and The Joint Chiefs who were essentially ignored later pmow would tell President Bush in a private meeting that the National Security decision-making process was broken rell's constant interference in military matters was unprecedented in post Vietnam American Military experience at one point the defense secretary so infuriated General Franks that he confronted Rumsfeld after a particularly exhausting conversation Mr secretary stop this ain't going to work you can fire me I'm either the commander or I'm not and you've got to trust me or you don't and if you don't I need to go somewhere else tell me what it is Mr secretary ramsfeld backs down the the invasion of Iraq was a military success in that Saddam Hussein's government was overthrown without unacceptable Coalition casualties however the actual planning for the campaign was fraught with problems that would eventually manifest themselves during the war it certainly didn't help matters that Tommy Franks would prove to be a controversial commander in the field but that is a story for a different upcoming video the most serious consequences would be felt after the fall of saddam's regime whereas operating Iraqi freedom was a hastily thrown together plan with many flaws the plan for rebuilding post-war Iraq was borderline non-existent thanks again to our amazing patrons who make series like this possible welcome to all our new patrons this month and a special thanks to our patron of the week the man they call Asher each week we select our favorite patreon reactions to shout out this week isaf Ace says as the military Geniuses among us should know planning an invasion around the premise of don't worry they probably won't shoot back much isn't the best idea and art who says learning rell's effect on the invasion is horrifying in such an expected way if you'd like to join our patreon and get access to exclusive benefits such as Early Access to videos add and sponsor free we would love to have you as part of our community

Channel: The Intel Report

Views: 229,825

Keywords: operation iraqi freedom, us army, us air force, us navy, us marine corps, invasion of iraq, donald rumsfeld, tommy franks

Id: QhwcfmMR9KI

Length: 19min 50sec (1190 seconds)

Published: Sun Apr 14 2024