(APPLAUSE) Thank you. Good evening, and
welcome to Q&A. I'm Tony Jones. And here to answer your questions
tonight - Senate President Scott Ryan, human rights lawyer Diana Sayed, Professor of Strategic Studies
at ANU Hugh White, Shadow Foreign Affairs Minister
Penny Wong and executive director of the Centre
For Independent Studies Tom Switzer. Please welcome our panel.
(APPLAUSE) Thank you very much. Q&A is live in eastern Australia
on ABC TV, iview and NewsRadio. Our first question comes
from Chris Breen. Hugh White, you suggest in your book
that Australia must start arming ourselves
with nuclear weapons. In light of the recent
Cuban Missile Crisis-style stand-off between the US and North Korea
because of this very reason, what makes you think that
our instigation of a nuclear arsenal won't have a similar effect? Well, that's a really good question. Just to be clear,
I don't actually argue that Australia should acquire
nuclear weapons, what I argue is that Australia's
decision about nuclear weapons - the one we made 50 years ago when we decided that we weren't
going to develop them ourselves - was made in circumstances
very different from the circumstances of today, and even more different
from the circumstances we're going to live in I would say
20 or 30 or 40 years from now. And the biggest difference is that
I think Asia is going to be more contested and more dangerous, and America is going to be
less reliable as an ally. So, at the moment,
we depend on US nuclear weapons to deter any possible nuclear attack
on Australia. The less confident we are of that, the less confident we are that
we can rely on America to do that, the stronger the arguments
for Australia to acquire its own. Just briefly,
why are you less confident of that? And why would Australia need
its own sabre to rattle if the US still has
a nuclear umbrella, as they call it? Well, I'm less confident
of America's place in Asia, primarily because
of the fundamental shift in the distribution of wealth
and power. America has been the dominant power
in Asia for decades, as long as any of us can remember, primarily because it's been
the world's strongest power, the world's biggest economy
and so on. As China grows, China's wealth challenges
America's position. And its ambitions to be
the leading power in Asia challenges America's capacity
to sustain that position. Now, it's not Donald Trump, it's not the sort of
toing and froing in US domestic politics
year by year, it's the long-term shift in wealth
and power and the rise of China and its ambitions to become
the leading power in Asia, which makes it seem to me
very unlikely that America will be able to sustain
that dominant position, particularly looking far
into the distance. Alright, but before I pass on
to the other panellists - and we'll come back to you as well - at what point
would China's military power, which seems now primarily defensive, pose a direct threat to Australia, such that Australia would need
nuclear weapons? We don't know, but what we do know is
that the factors which have made it so unlikely
that China - or for that matter
any other major power in Asia - might threaten Australia, the things that have made Australia
so secure from that kind of threat in the last few decades are
going to be less true in future. We don't know how much less true. But the choices we have to make
today are ones which encompass the possibility - I think the quite significant
possibility - that Australia will face
both better armed and potentially more aggressive
major powers in the region. An existential threat? Well, at least
a very, very serious threat, and one which we can no longer rely
on America to defend us from. You know, the fundamental shift
is that for 50 years, we have been able to depend
on America to prevent a major power
threatening Australia and to defend us if that happens. And the further ahead we look into
the future, the less confident
we can be of that. And we have to look
a long way into the future when we talk about developing our
Defence Forces in the next decade. OK, we're going to explore this
a little more with you. Penny Wong, is it time
for Australia to have a debate about whether we need
our own nuclear weapons capacity, as is being suggested here? Well, on this
I don't agree with Hugh, insofar as he is
actually saying that, and I take his point. I think that Australia faces a far more complex and wide-ranging
set of circumstances than simply focusing on, you know,
a potential attack on our territory. But I think what Hugh is
grappling with is actually the right thing
to grapple with, which is how do we deal
with the most challenging set of external circumstances
since World War II? How do we deal with the disruption
we see globally and in our region? How do we deal with the fact that the two
most important nations to us - our friend and ally the US
and China - are, in different ways,
making decisions and acting in ways
which challenge the status quo? Now, that's a very short summary
of a much more complex discussion. And I think what Hugh is seeking
to do is grapple with that it. I think we do need, as a nation,
to focus very clearly on what we want in our region, and what can we do to achieve
sustaining the sort of region we want. We will come back to... We're going to talk more about
the general thing, but what about the strategic issue about whether or not we could ever
acquire or develop nuclear weapons in this country? Whether a government would ever
condone that? Well, I think in many ways
it's the wrong question because I don't actually think
getting into an arms race with China is
a sensible proposition. What we do want is
a multipolar region in which the US stays
deeply engaged, and that is
in Australia's interests. Tom Switzer? Well, I think that Hugh's thesis
is premised on the observation that the United States is
in serious decline in East Asia. But to paraphrase Mark Twain,
I think reports of America's retreat from the region
are grossly exaggerated. Hugh and I, and I think Penny
as well, would agree that America's made
some very bad decisions in the post 9/11 era, most notably the invasion of Iraq which did cost America dearly
in prestige and credibility, and power and influence
to some extent. But nevertheless,
I think across Asia, whether it's India, Japan,
Vietnam, Singapore, there's a well-founded conviction that America,
even under a Donald Trump - or a Bernie Sanders,
which can't be ruled out in 2020 - America will still be
the predominant power on military, energy, self-sufficiency, education,
innovation and demographic trends. Whereas China, as the saying goes,
will grow old before it grows rich. So, I have more confidence
in American staying power than Hugh does. I'll just quickly come back to Hugh
to respond to that, briefly if you can. Yes. Look, America will remain
an extraordinarily powerful country with huge assets. But our own Treasury, in the government's Foreign Policy
White Paper in 2017, predicted that by 2030
China's economy will be $42 trillion and America's will be $24 trillion. 42 to 24. The fact is
that America won't remain the most powerful country
in the world, it won't remain the primary power
in Asia. It's just wishful thinking
for us to keep on thinking that what's worked so well
for us in the past will keep working indefinitely
in the future. And it's the implications
of that really radical shift in Australia's international setting which is what I'm trying to
grapple with. I'm going to try to quickly bring us
back to the nuclear weapons issue since you've sponsored this debate,
effectively. Let's imagine a future in which
Australia did have nuclear weapons. What would the targets be? It's a really important question.
Let me just make one point clear. I think all the arguments, including
the arguments from the question, all the arguments against
Australia getting nuclear weapons are really strong - have always been strong,
remain strong - but the arguments in favour
of us getting them are stronger because the reliance we can place
on others is less. What would we want them to do? There's only one thing Australia
will want nuclear weapons to do, and that is to deter
a nuclear threat from others. The idea that we'd use
nuclear weapons to fight a war I think is just bad strategy
and bad morality. They'd have to be pointed
at something, though? Oh, yes.
Generally speaking, what nuclear weapons are pointed at
is cities. Well, the nuclear weapons
that would make sense for Australia to acquire
would be aimed at cities, they would be aimed to impose
massive damage on an adversary, to deter them from using
their nuclear weapons against us. And that's the only purpose
which they'd be used. So, it would be -
what's called in the trade - a minimum deterrent strategy. But as I spell out in the book,
it's a pretty grim idea. TOM SWITZER: And meanwhile, how would our close neighbour
Indonesia respond? Surely this would ignite
Indonesian nationalism, which is hardly in the Australian
national interest, Hugh. Not to mention Indonesia acquiring
its own nuclear weapons. Of course, of course. Which is the logic
behind nonproliferation, isn't it? Yes. Whatever one's views
about nuclear weapons to date, the international community
has said - and obviously North Korea
is an exception to that - enough, because the world is
not more secure because of more nuclear weapons. Sorry. We'll come back to you,
Penny. Sorry. I was just finishing my sentence.
OK, Senator Wong. (LAUGHTER) I just think that the fact that
we're even having this conversation about Australia becoming nuclear
is just astonishing to me. And nuclear weapons are the most
inhumane and indiscriminate weapons that we have to date on this planet and it causes
such severe environmental damage, it undermines national
and global security, it directs vast public resources
away from human needs, and this whole
nonproliferation treaty that Australia has been
spearheading with ICAN, the International Campaign
Against Nuclear Weapons, have done a phenomenal job
of getting 122 countries on board to sign this. As what you have mentioned previous, it would actually, you know, trigger
a nuclear arms race in our region, particularly our closest ally
in Indonesia. And the dangers of having
a nuclear weapon arise from their very existence. So, the fact that Australia would
even be entertaining this thought is unfathomable and
unconscionable to me, and it goes against everything
in international law. OK, it's not that
we've never had the debate before. And before I come to Scott Ryan,
I'll go to the next question, because it'll go do him,
from Bo Pang. So, in the late 1960s, Prime Minister John Gorton
pressed for developing a domestic nuclear weapon option. However, this effort failed
to result in any substantive result due to the lack
of bureaucratic support. The effort ended in 1973 with Australia's ratification of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation
of Nuclear Weapons. What is the current prevalent
bureaucratic stance in Australia? So, Scott, I'll go with you, because I think the last
prime minister - John Gorton, as was just said - in '68,
was the last prime minister to actively think it was a good idea for Australia to have nuclear weapons
of its own. Well, we've,
over at least my lifetime, I was born after that, have historically viewed
nonproliferation and the alliance with the US
as a combined way to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons and the risk that poses,
particularly with rogue states. And the alliance with the US and, obviously, they being
a nuclear power is core to our security interest. I think one of the things
Hugh highlights, and I haven't read
the entire book yet - I apologised to Hugh earlier,
it only came out last week - is that, unlike that era, we are now in the front line
of the strategic competition. In that era,
Europe was really the front line of strategic competition, albeit there was a great deal of
activity, of course, in our region. Now the nation we are looking at,
to our north, the growing power, economically and militarily,
being China, is, of course, the focus of this. So we're in a different position.
I am not as pessimistic as Hugh. I don't criticise him at all
for raising it, that is the job
of people like Hugh - to float ideas
and to challenge current thinking. But our values underpin a
relationship with the US. Values and interests underpin
an alliance. The key test, I think,
Hugh talks about is resources. What is the capacity,
in relative terms, of us and the United States
in our region? That balance is obviously changing. I, however, am
slightly more optimistic, like Tom, about the capacity
of the US demographically, economically,
technologically to maintain its lead, even if the relativities
slightly change. And I cannot see a time,
where we might talk about issues much further away from Australia
later tonight, where US interests aren't going
to be directly impacted by activities
in our immediate region. And that will underpin
the ongoing involvement they have. Sorry, Diana, just for one second, let's just go quickly back
to what happened in '68. Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State,
came to visit John Gorton to try and get him to sign up for
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and Gorton said, "I can't trust America to defend us
against a nuclear threat, "so I don't want to sign that treaty. "I want the ability
to build our own nuclear weapons." His scientists said to him,
"We can do that very quickly." We only learnt this because
those State Department cables were leaked a few years ago. Could you ever imagine
that argument happening again? Because Hugh is saying that the United States
may not be trustworthy, as allies. Look, as I said before,
I think interests, as well as relationships and values,
underpin alliances. And I can't see a time where
the US is not going to have direct, very important interests
in our region, particularly even around shipping lanes, let alone
our ongoing military cooperation, let alone the fact they are
our largest foreign investor. There's commercial interests
as well. I think the relationship
we have with them, we've got to be careful
not to just view through a military or ANZUS prism. Now, I don't know if those
conversations will happen again. And if I did know they would happen, I probably wouldn't talk about them
on television! So, I can't imagine that discussion
happening again in those terms. And, you know,
that happened nearly 50 years ago. Diana, sorry,
I interrupted you before. No, I was just really curious
to know, like, if there is a shift in prominence
of the US to China, and there's going to be
this Asia pivot, I'm just curious to know
why we have to talk about it through a nuclear armament lens. Why can't we critically engage
with China on other fronts? We do it already through trade
and other multilateral fora, and influence that way. What has China done
to show any signs of aggression? There's no ideological agenda there that we really have anything
to fear from China. And being a nuclear deterrent state
to me is still not justifiable. Let me put that
straight back to Hugh. I mean, you're a strategic analyst, so your plan, really,
is to look forward some time in the future,
and predict what China will be and how we should respond
going forward. So, what is it that you see that causes you to think
we're going to need nuclear weapons? Yeah. Well, just to be clear, I'm not sure myself
that we DO need nuclear weapons, I think that
the probabilities are changing. I'm not sure that nuances work.
(LAUGHTER) Well, but it's actually
a very important one, you know. There's a difference between saying
we need these things and saying we need to debate them. I agree. But I want to go back to Diana.
Look, I share your view. I mean, this is the hardest issue
I've ever dealt with in 40 years of thinking about
the unpleasant business of war. And I really find myself - I say in the book -
I find it appalling that Australia might confront
this situation. The situation where
we might find ourselves making what would seem to me to be,
in many ways, a tragic decision. The reason why I think we might -
and this goes to your point - is that we don't know
what kind of country China will be 30 or 40 years from now. And I just have to stress, 30 or 40 years is the time frame
we have to think about. And not just China, we don't know what India will be
30 or 40 years from now. And so the choice we make today
and the choices we make in future, about both our conventional forces
and our nuclear forces, have to acknowledge
that maybe it will all go well, maybe China will become
an extraordinarily powerful state, probably the dominant power
in the Western Pacific, but it will use its power
in a moderate, kind, gentle kind of way. And if so, we're in good shape. But if not, then our failure
to make that decision soon will put us
in a much more dangerous position. And it's that sort of tragic dilemma
that we have to deal with. Just a quick question, 'cause we've seen Iran
trying to go through the process of building a nuclear capacity,
then stopping and pausing and now maybe moving
in that direction, we don't know. Could Australia,
or does Australia, have the technical capability
to build nuclear weapons now? Gorton was told
it could happen very quickly. Yes, we're probably
not as well placed as we were in Gorton's day because Australia had
a stronger nuclear industry then than we do now. Opinions differ on that. Some people tell me that
we could actually move quite fast, within a few years,
some people say it would be longer. From my point of view,
the hardest thing is not actually
building the weapons, but building the delivery systems. And the weapon by itself, of course,
is only part of the picture. And just to confirm what it is
you're suggesting might be needed - you're talking about
ballistic missiles based in Australia or on submarines? I mean, what kind of capability
are you talking about? Just to go back, I find it kind of distasteful,
actually, to get into this business,
but I do in the book. Once you start the debate.
Exactly! No, exactly. And it's also appropriate because you don't want this to be
a kind of a fact-free conversation. I think the only kind
of nuclear capability that would make sense for Australia would be the same kind
of posture that, for example, Britain and France has, which is ballistic missiles
based on submarines, because they're so secure,
they're so hard to target. OK, I'm going to move on
to the next question, from Louise Claridge. It's a broader question
that's still in this general area. Louise? Is it possible
for Australia to maintain its primary security relationship
with the US whilst still maintaining our strongest economic relations
to China? Will the Trump presidency
and growing US-Sino tensions force Australia's hand to recalibrate
our geopolitical foundations? Tom Switzer? Well, I certainly agree that this is
a very delicate balancing act, and it's become more delicate
over the last few years, trying to reconcile our most important
trade partner, China, and our most important security
alliance, the United States. And in a way, history has not really
prepared us very well for this because for the first half
of the 20th century and even before that, when we were
a collection of colonies far removed from the Western world,
our political class, the public at large,
took refuge in having a very close security relationship with what Menzies called
"a great and powerful friend". And that, of course,
was Great Britain. Then, after World War II
and the onset of the Cold War and then the Suez Crisis in '56, that great power
became the United States. I think the US alliance
will remain the centrepiece of our foreign policy
because, among other things, the United States provides so much
top-quality defence equipment, such as the Growlers
and the Joint Strike Fighters. It's also got a very important
investment relationship with Australia. But our alliance will change, and it will change
because of the rise of China. It's difficult. We've never been
in this position before. It's like riding two horses
simultaneously. (LAUGHS) I've said this before, but the difficulty now
is that those two horses are going further and further apart, so it requires
new diplomatic skills, more agility, more nuance, not necessarily giving unconditional and unqualified support
to Uncle Sam. And take a leaf
out of Lord Palmerston's dictum, the great Victorian
British Foreign Secretary of the 19th century. He said that, "A nation has no permanent enemies
or eternal allies. "Our interests are permanent
and eternal." Penny Wong.
I said we'd get back to this. Yeah, I think the two things
that Tom just said which I think are worth repeating,
and I agree with - history hasn't prepared us well
for it. I think that's true. I use the phrase, you know, "The play book of the past decades
is of limited utility." But you probably said it
more succinctly than I. I agree also that
the US alliance will remain, you know, a key pillar
of our foreign policy, our key security relationship. And it is a relationship
of interests and values. But it is the case that
we are living in a time where the two relationships you described
are with powers, both of whom are making choices
which are changing the status quo. And I think what this era
will require from Australia is frankly more from us. I think there'll be
greater Australian agency required, both in terms of
the sort of region we want and the work we do with
regional partners to that purpose, the work we do in the alliance, as well as the work
in our bilateral relationship. And I think there is
a much greater weight on us to assert and prosecute
our interests at this time. And that is a different world, frankly,
for Australian foreign policy and Australian strategic policy,
to a great extent. Hugh White, you've pointed out
that both Germany and Japan are recalibrating their relations
with the United States and reconsidering the natures
of the alliance. Oddly enough,
both have started debates on getting nuclear weapons as well. Do you see that we're in
the same boat as they are? Yes. Yes, I do. But I think, in some ways,
our position is even more acute because it goes back to something that both Penny and Tom
have mentioned, and that is
this is new for Australia. Ever since European settlement, we have had either Britain
or America as our guardians. We have never confronted
a future in Asia without having
a great and powerful friend to make Asia safe for us. And I think,
even on their more optimistic view of America's future role,
I think they'd agree - putting words in their mouth - that it's at least going
to be more complex for America to get its way
and to help its mates in Asia than it has been hitherto. I mean, I think the key thing for us in squaring the circle
between America and China is that it's not entirely up to us. Penny's right,
our agency is important. But how difficult it is for us
to ride those two horses depends on them -
depends on America and China. The more intensely
they see one another as rivals, the more
they will each expect Australia to side with them against the other, and I think that's exactly
what's happening at the moment. As their rivalry has intensified
over the last few years - and will, I expect,
continue to intensify over the next few years - Australia will face
tougher and tougher choices. And there will come a point,
perhaps, and, you know,
this is a gloomy prospect. I'm not one of those who,
for a moment, thinks that war between the US and China
is inevitable, but the kind of contest that's now under way
between America and China as to which of them will be
the dominant power in the world's most dynamic region, and that is what's going on
right now... And, Hugh,
let's not discount the fact that there are significant voices
in Washington, and in the broader
American academic community, such as Professor John Mearsheimer, who'll be debating you in a few
weeks' time here in Canberra, and they make the point that it's inevitable that US allies,
like Australia, will support a containment strategy
against China. That's right. And the question for us is,
are we willing to support the United States
in trying to contain China's rise? Because people in Washington
expect us to. That's it. Let me move across to the other side
of the panel. Scott, what do you think? And has Donald Trump
complicated this picture, and could it change
after the next election? The strategic rivalry
between China and the US has multiple facets. I mean, we're seeing, for example, the trade and economic phase,
particularly at the moment with the debates
and ongoing issues with the WTO and the US role
and China role there. What Hugh talks about
is the longer-term strategic role. I agree with Tom
and Penny and Hugh on this. This is challenge
for foreign policy here. We are going to have to balance
our competing needs. We have an interest in maintaining
strong economic links. We also have an interest
in maintaining our strong security links
with the US, and a strong US role
as a protector of the order we have in the region. But there's also other nations
changing profoundly in the region. I mean, Indonesia's going through
enormous growth. I mean, it's still
a very young country, unlike China, which is actually ageing,
as Tom mentioned. Japan is going through
a different phase. When I look at
the trade-based conflict between China and the US,
for example, I do remember, in the '80s, that happening with Japan,
albeit at a lower level. But there was huge angst
in the United States about Japanese trade policy and the impact upon
the American economy, particularly in manufacturing
in the '80s. We managed to get past that, but it was, of course,
without what I might call the cultural
and ideological competition, or broader strategic competition. This is going to take nuance. Now, I actually have faith
that Australia can do that. I have a lot of faith
in our officials. The fact that we're here
on a program like this, and Hugh brought out a book
raising such challenging ideas as he did last week,
and we're talking about it, is, I think, a sign of the maturity of the way we,
as a country, can discuss this. Mm. I wonder China
considers it mature to be talking about nuclear weapons
aimed at Beijing. 'Cause they see things
very differently, obviously. But I think China is also
very realistic to know that there are
people like Hugh in Australia, and other people, who think about
the long-term strategic aims. You know, we're not naive,
and I don't think they are either. OK.
Sorry, just quickly. Just remember, there are very real
weaknesses and limitations in China. I mean, even if they sort out
their demographic challenges, they still face problems
like debt, corruption, you know, pervasive air
and water pollution. Ruchir Sharma from Morgan Stanley, someone who's judgement
I respect immensely, he calculates in
his award-winning book The Rise And Fall Of Nations, that between 2000,
when China became part of the WTO, and 2014, 90,000 millionaires left
mainland China for greener pastures, and a lot of them came to Australia
and New Zealand and North America. So, that tells you that
if those trends continue, China will have a lot of
internal challenges to deal with. OK, look, I'm going to go to
another global threat, because we'll run out of time if
we keep talking about the one issue. The next question
is from Cynthia Mifsud. The US, as recently as last week, were willing to start
air strikes on Iran. There appeared two triggers -
one an unmanned drone shot down, and two, allegations that Iran
had struck oil tankers. At the same time, reports that Iran
was either breaching or planning to breach
its 2015 agreement in regards to enriching uranium
also arose. This, of course,
following the US's withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, which was working the way
it was supposed to. Are we heading for war? Diana, I'll start with you. Yeah, and thank you
for your question. I just want to promise it with
the drone strikes. It's alleged. We don't know for sure
if this is what's happened. This is what the media
is reporting on. And I really want
to focus in on that. And I want to make it really clear
to the audience that Iran does not have
any nuclear weapons, nor has it indicated any intention
to acquire nuclear weapons, nor does it have any
uranium-grade weapons. We actually have to be
really careful at this time, because we cannot make
the same mistake that we did in 2003, under this false pretext
of weapons of mass distraction that we did in Iraq, and the disastrous war
that ensued from there. So, I have to...I want to be
really clear about that, because we don't want
another Iraq 2.0. And it seems that the playbook
that's playing out in the media, with the tweets now back and forth between Donald Trump
and the Iranian government, is really problematic. And it's a dangerous game,
and, yeah, we could be headed, very likely, towards war, given that the US withdrew from
the nuclear deal only last year, and then the crippling sanctions that they've put on
the Iranian people at the moment is really devastating. And it's a really troubling
and dangerous time. Scott Ryan,
what you think about that? And bear in mind that
the prime minister, Scott Morrison, asked about this, asked if there were any US request
for Australian military assistance in some kind of conflict in Iran, it would be considered seriously
and on its merits. Can we take that at all to be
a kind of affirmative suggestion that Australia might willing
to get involved in another conflict in the Gulf? Well, I believe he also said that
there'd been no such request. Look, I think we've got to start... He didn't say there'd been
no conversations, though. Um, no, but he did say, I think,
there'd been no request. I think we have to start from
the premise of a few things. Iran is not a normal
international actor. Iran is a state
that sponsors terrorism. Now, I'm not having a go
at the Iranian people, but this is not a normal
international actor like one in our region where we might have a difference
of opinion with. It would be a very bad thing, not only for the region,
but for the world, for Iran to be able
to not only have nuclear weapons, or to be able to scale up quickly
to be able to get them, whether that be enriched
more quickly or have a delivery mechanism
more quickly. It would spark
an incredible amount of tension in a very, very volatile region. Let alone the global economic impact
of the potential closure of oil supplies out of
the Persian Gulf. So, I don't think we're dealing
with this in the way... ..we can deal with this in the way we might deal with
a normal international... ..a challenging
international situation. But should we deal with it... Taking Diana's point, should we deal with it in
the same way that we dealt with the progress towards war in Iraq, where fraudulent information,
or intelligence, led the United States,
and inevitably Australia, into a conflict?
Well, I don't... I mean, I don't see anything
like that on the cards, and with all due respect
to the criticism, there was a lot of debate
at the time. But even people who were
after-the-fact critical of the events in Iraq -
well before my time in public life - there was a general,
or more widespread, agreement about the quality of
the intelligence at the time, that there were weapons, there was a risk of weapons
of mass destruction at the time - even if people had disagreed
with the actions the Americans took. There was a strong belief among some
that the intelligence was real, but it turned out it wasn't.
Absolutely. And, as a result,
there was a massive war, and hundreds of thousands
of people died. And I'm... 600,000 people, actually,
and more internally displaced. And what I'm saying is
what we've got now with Iran is a state that does
sponsor terrorism, that if it got a nuclear capacity,
or the ability to get one quickly, would probably provoke an arms race
in a very volatile region, which no-one wants to see. So, preventing that happen is,
quite frankly, a global good. I'm not proposing
or supporting any action. I'm just saying that I don't think we can deal with this
through the prism of dealing with
a normal set of circumstances. OK, Penny Wong.
Well... The question was,
are we headed for a war? Well, a military conflict and escalation are in
no-one's interests... Absolutely. ..and I note...I note...that
the prime minister has said that no such request has been made. I do agree that
a nuclear-capable Iran is a frightening prospect. That is why we, and the government, supported what's known as
the JCPOA - so, the nuclear deal - as a means of averting
the development of that capability. We were disappointed with
the US decision to pull out of it. We expressed that publicly, as did,
I think, it was Bishop at the time. And we would urge the existing
partners to the agreement, given the events of
the last couple of weeks, including the additional thing -
new story tonight about enrichment - urge them to utilise
the dispute mechanisms within the agreement. If there were a request,
would Labor, on principle, reject it or oppose it? Well, it's a hypothetical. No such request has been made. The point I have made, though, is that I think we have
a fair degree of history to look at about this region, and I don't think
military escalation is in anybody's interest - the region's or in the interest
of global stability. And, you know, that...that... So, you're saying it's just
too early for Labor to come to an
"in principal" decision. Well, there's been
no request made of Australia. Mm. And I think one of the issues
that was raised was we do have, as I understand it,
some assets in the Gulf which are part of a range of
maritime operations, I think, around, you know,
countering criminal syndicates, etc. I think it's one thing to talk about
what those might be engaged in. In terms of civilian ships,
it's a very... ..it's another thing to talk about
military conflict. Tom Switzer,
there's one thing we know. Trump actually used a tweet to talk about the potential
obliteration of parts of Iran if this were to escalate. We do know that among
his key advisers, there are people like John Bolton, who have in the past
recommended military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. How seriously do you think
this is going to end up? Well, bear in mind, Trump won the 2016 election
in part on a campaign to, you know,
"make America great again", but also be a less interventionist
foreign policy. I mean, he portrayed Hillary Clinton
as the more hawkish candidate. Mm. And he did this for
understandable reasons. I mean, the American people
are tired of the world. They're suffering from
foreign policy fatigue. And all the available
polling evidence indicates that there's no hankering
for support in the... ..in middle Aus...
in Middle America... Or Middle Australia! ..for yet another war in
the Persian Gulf in the Middle East. I mean, I think Trump's decision to pull out of
the Iranian nuclear deal from 2015 was a grave mistake, because it now means
the Iranians can pull out, which they've just done. They're now enriching uranium, and they are now bent on
becoming a nuclear power. You think about that. My advice to the president,
for what it's worth, is to adopt a more
balance-of-power strategy, and talk to the Iranians,
as well as the Saudis, and try to play off
the Iranian Shia bloc against the Saudi Sunni bloc, create a balance of power so
no one power dominates the region. And then, meanwhile,
if they don't do that, Trump will have to deal with
the nuclear Iran. And what will he do then? He'll have to contain and deter it,
not conduct a pre-emptive strike, which will just lead to all
sorts of unintended consequences, the likes of which we saw in 2003. And if a key ally like Israel
conducted those strikes, would America support it? Would they do anything about it?
Would Israel take pre-emptive action? I think the Americans
probably would support it, and I think Trump has got himself
in a bind here. But if he's true to his instincts, I don't think that
he would support this strike. Remember, he pulled back when
virtually all his senior advisers thought he'd go through with it. Hugh White. Well, I think the first thing
to remember is that the reason
we're in this situation at all is that there are no credible,
brief, quick, easy military options to deprive Iran of
its nuclear program. If there were,
they'd have been used by now. And so, you know, first question
you've always got to ask when you're talking about
armed forces, or at least one of
the first questions, is, "Is this going to work
to achieve our objectives?" And so far as I can see, the idea that you'd start
a bombing campaign, for example, against Iran to deprive it of
its nuclear facilities simply would not work. They're too dispersed,
they're too well-protected, and many of them are
too well-hidden. And so you bomb away for a week and you've still got
the same problem, except a much more angry
and hostile Iran even than you're dealing with
at the moment. The alternative is
a full-scale invasion, and when you ask
are we heading for war - and we all do think, of course,
about 2003 - it's worth making the point,
that would... Remember how big Iran...Iraq was. Well, Iran is twice as big
and four times as hard to invade, because it's eight times as unified. And it would just be
an immense undertaking. I don't think the United States
has the resources to do it, and it wouldn't get any allies. And it would also, remember,
take six months, maybe nine months, maybe a year to build up the forces. Never say never, but I think
that is more or less unthinkable, party for the point that Tom makes, that is this is not Donald Trump's
style of politics. He's a very strange character, but he does seem not to be that
addicted to that particular style... There's an election coming,
of course, next year. And one of the fears is
that during a war... Yes. ..as what happened
with George W. Bush, people tend to
vote for the president. Oh, yes. There are risks. I'm just really concerned that
this whole conversation about Iran, no-one has really factored in,
like, the people. Yeah.
The Iranian people. Like, we're talking about a population of over
80 million people, who have a culture, a history. They're, you know, very linked
to traditions in the region, and, you know, we're not just talking about dehumanising them,
and... Like, this has repercussions for
the whole region, as Iraq did, as Afghanistan did,
as what we're seeing with Syria now, Yemen, Libya. I can rattle off a litany. And this conversation
doesn't exist in a vacuum. We're talking about
people's lives here. And intervention, regime change,
nuclear armament, all of this conversation
that we're talking about, like, these people's lives,
they're not political pawns. And we don't want a... And a war with Iran
wouldn't just be swift and over with, um,
in a couple of years, we're talking
about long-term war here. And it would have devastating
repercussions for the entire region, um, from Morocco to Pakistan. And not to mention that,
you know, they have allies, very strong allies in Russia
and China as well, which we're not talking about
or mentioning here. They could activate their proxies
around the region. And this could have
devastating fa... ..devastating effects
for generations to come. We've already seen it. But having said all this,
let's not forget the fact that the Iranians are sponsoring
these Shia militias all across the Persian Gulf. They've committed
atrocious human rights abuses, to mainly Sunni families. Particularly in Iraq and Syria. Yeah, but, Tom,
don't discard the fact that there's already
a growing human rights movement within Iran. They are people
with agency as well. It's very easy for people here
to talk about war as if it's an abstract concept. If you've had no proximity to it, you haven't been
personally affected by it, it's very easy to sit
in your think tanks and sit in your universities
and just talk about it. This is real... (APPLAUSE)
..real people's lives. SCOTT RYAN: I think, Tony,
we can all agree... Hypotheticals are good
for discussion. They're not good for decision.
Yeah. And they're very difficult
in this circumstance. I think everyone can broadly agree
that successful policy here means no violent conflict
and no use of force. Exactly. Is it hypothetical, though, when the
President of the United States says, "We could obliterate
sections of your country "if you don't do what we say?" Not to mention the crippling
sanctions on the country. Well, actually, sanctions can
be a very useful alternative to the use of force. In fact, I remember when it came
to the second Iraq conflict, you know, under George W Bush, one of the arguments was sanctions
should be used instead of force. So I don't think anyone's proposing that we actually completely
wind back all the sanctions on Iran, because of the risk
that this region has, and of this particular regime,
which has been demonstrated. No-one's talking about...
I'm sorry, guys, I'm going to have... Tom, just make your final point,
we'll move on. Containment and deterrence can work. I mean, it can't work
against terrorists who can run and hide. But rogue states like Iran,
like Saddam's Iraq... What about Israel? Are we talking
about Israel as well? ..they have a mailing address,
and a return address. And if they ever use WMD, that would guarantee
massive annihilation. OK, let's move on. Remember, if you hear
any doubtful claims on Q&A, let us know on Twitter. Keep an eye
on the RMIT ABC Fact Check and The Conversation website
for the results. The next question, um, right down
to parochial politics in Australia, comes from Russell Adams. In Julie Bishop
and Christopher Pyne's new appointments
to business...businesses, whose major clients include
Australian government agencies, many Australians see them as having significant potential
conflicts of interest. Should a revised code of conduct
for politicians include not only avoiding
conflicts of interest, in and out of office, but also being seen
to be avoiding such conflicts? And should the arbiter
for potential conflicts of interests be an independent third party
rather than a Parliamentary body? Penny Wong. Start with you. Well, let's be clear about the ministerial
code of conduct says first. It relevantly says two things, one is after you have been
a minister for 18 months, you can't lobby in your area. And the second thing it says is that you won't take
personal advantage of information you've gained as a consequence
of your ministerial office that isn't otherwise available
to the general public. Who is the current enforcer
of the code? It's Mr Morrison. So I guess what I'd say to you
is that there's no point in increasing the stringency
of the ministerial code if the current code is not enforced. And it's, ultimately,
a matter for the Prime Minister to decide how he is going
to ensure that ministers, whether in office
or after they leave office, comply with the code. Now, I note... We raised concerns about this,
the public raised concerns about both Mr Pyne
and Ms Bishop's appointment. They assert
they're not breaching the code. That's actually not the test.
Er, it's not a subjective test. (LAUGHTER)
(CLEARS THROAT) I didn't mean that to get a laugh,
but, anyway! (LAUGHTER)
There you go! And I think it is incumbent
upon the Prime Minister to explain to Australians, "This is my code. I set it. "I'm the Prime Minister, "and this is how I'm going
to ensure it's enforced." Penny Wong, isn't the problem here
that these are guidelines? No, these are...
And they're not laws, so there's no way
of actually enforcing them? Nor is ministerial accountability
to the Parliament. That's a Westminster convention.
I mean, this is... But you can sack ministers, you can't sack a non-minister
who's retired. Well, then,
the Prime Minister should say what other sanction
he thinks is necessary. They are his standards. And he ought enforce them. And I think reasonable questions
have been raised about whether or not these two
particular appointments comply with the two provisions
that I outlined. OK, Scott Ryan,
are you disturbed by this? I'm more familiar
with professional services firms than I am
with the foreign aid component. So I'm more familiar with
Christopher Pyne's, um, position than I am with Julie Bishop's. It was certainly
a very carelessly worded statement. I'll be honest. I mean, I don't think
the statement helped in that sense. There's also the lobbying
code of conduct, and the ministerial statement of
standards does interact with that. And one of the things the lobbying
code of conduct talks about is a very broad definition
of what constitutes lobbying, and it also reinforces
the ministerial statement by saying that applies here as well. So I think it's a good idea
that the Prime Minister has directed the secretary of the Department
of Prime Minister and Cabinet - the most senior public servant
in the country - to look at this. But I do make the point this is a code of conduct
and a statement of standards that actually predates
the coalition government as well. It's been in a place
a very long time. Um, I think that...
PENNY WONG: You updated it. We... The changes...
Changed it quite a lot. Actually, the changes... Well, you're allowed
to hold shares... The changes weren't - don't relate
to anything to do with this. I believe the words are the same
about this. That's true. Now, I think let's wait and see what the secretary of the Department
of Prime Minister and Cabinet says. I mean,
community standards do evolve. Let's wait to see what he says. It seems the community standards,
that is to say the pub test, seems to be going
in the other direction. Well, I'm not...
There seems to be a distrust of these politicians
using these positions... And this is why I made
the observation. I think the statements
from a couple of the organisations were particularly carelessly worded. So, you're
the President of the Senate, your colleague Tony Smith is the Leader of...is
the Speaker in the House. Could you both take a stand here and set rules to take away
the permissions of these people to operate inside the Parliament? Technically, yeah, all passes
to Parliament, other than from MPs, are granted
by the presiding officers. Um, but that's not... Could you decide
that they're breaching the code... No, that would...
I mean, it's not... It's a government code,
it's not a code of the Parliament. There have been proposals, and I know some states have
Parliamentary ethics advisers, I make no observation on that. But that's one model
that's been put up to actually allow people
to ask questions and seek counsel, as well as to have
an enforcement mechanism. They haven't been supported
by either houses of our Parliament. So that's why I say let's look to see what the secretary
of Prime Minister and Cabinet says. They oversee the operation of this,
they may have recommendations. And we'll see
where it goes from there. But I note that Penny also said that there's not been
a breach of the code. I think part of this question
goes to - has community standards evolved? Well, I don't know
if there has or not. I mean, I think, on the face of it,
it looks problematic, doesn't it? I said, on the face of it,
that looks like a breach. What I said was they have asserted
there's no breach. Oh, my apologies.
But that's not the test. I don't think... I think this is space where... And as a former
Special Minister of State, I had to reform the expenses regime
for members of Parliament. And I saw
community standards evolve. And so there may be a space
for that here, there may not be. So just quickly,
just to clarify that - are you saying
that community standards may evolve to be more lenient? No, to be more... No, they might require tightening,
as they have in other spaces. Sorry, that's... I'm just going to leave that one
with the politicians because we've got
quite a few questions... TOM SWITZER: This bloke makes
a really good point, he reflects widespread concerns. Can I just make the point too
that Clyde... ..Christopher Pyne
entered Parliament in '93, Julie Bishop entered Parliament
in '98, which means that they're entitled to a very generous
Parliamentary superannuation scheme, which was changed
by Howard and Latham in 2004. So, getting to your question, they stand to make anywhere
between $250,000 and $350,000, tax-free,
for the rest of their lives. So it's not like
they're on Struggle Street. So why not just wait 18 months before you use your insider
influence to make a buck? Tom, they're aspirational! (LAUGHTER) I think there's
a widespread community view, and it's not just Penny, it's also
Pauline Hanson and the Greens that reflect this view. Alright, let's move on...
That's an interesting combo. (LAUGHTER)
That sentence is not often said! (LAUGHTER) OK, let's move on. The next question
is from Aisheeya Huq. As a Muslim youth,
I feel as though the response to Israel Folau's
extremist preaching would be vastly different if, rather than a Christian,
he were a Muslim. If Israel Folau were a Muslim, would the Attorney-General
be considering new laws to protect religious freedoms? Diana, we'll start with you. Yeah. Thank you
for that great question. Obviously, the topic of Folau's case
in particular has gotten a lot of air time lately. And I'm more interested
in the discussion that's happening this week
with interested groups and the consultation process that the Morrison government
is going through with this
Religious Discrimination Act. Um, I think
that most of us would agree, and particularly
as a Muslim woman myself, um, that, you know, we should - anyone who chooses to practise
or otherwise should be free
to practise their religion, free from discrimination as well. Um, and particularly in light
of the aftermath of Christchurch, having just gotten back
from New Zealand myself, I think it's even more pertinent now
than ever that we are protected
from religious discrimination. I just, you know,
it's really important though that during this whole debate
that's been sparked, and we've had this conversation
that's been aired out, you know, every week,
particularly on this show as well, it's really important
that these consultations, and the process
that's being undergone now, that the act doesn't allow people or give them a licence
to discriminate. And having those conversations are
really important to have because, particularly of communities
that could be affected - the LGBTQI community,
and women as well - single mothers. So it's really important
that this bill strikes a balance that people who are free
to practise their religion are not granted
a licence to discriminate. Scott, we'll just take you back
to the question. The questioner asked - would we still be having
the same debate and the calls
for a Religious Freedom Act if Israel Folau had been a Muslim? I'll be honest, I don't know. I mean, I think this debate's
been brewing for a while. I think this debate follows
a longer debate we've had about the laws around speech that has been going on
for several years. Now, I think this has got
two issues. There's firstly the issue of what
are you allowed to contract for? And is the state allowed to
interfere in the rights of contract? Then there is, secondly,
laws around limiting of speech. Now, I've said before, I am particularly radical
and liberal on this. I'm much more down the American
school of free speech in terms of - and that applies to defamation law, laws we have around vilification as well as laws we have
about publication, um, and freedom of the media. That's not a common view,
I must say. But I think we've got to be careful whether we go down to what I say - trying to use the Elizabethan phrase
of 'peering into people's souls'. I don't know
if something can be said, or something that is said
should be legal, because of a particular
religious view, whether that be being Christian,
being Muslim, or the writings of L. Ron Hubbard, that would otherwise be illegal if I didn't have a religious -
if I wasn't being that. I don't like laws going to motive.
I like laws looking at actions. And so I think the Attorney-General
is being very responsible here. I've had discussions with him. He understands the complexity, and he's undertaking consultation
within the Parliamentary party before he takes it out
to stakeholder groups. I just think we need to be careful. And I start from that point that I don't think we need
more laws limiting speech. But at the same time, I think this is a complex balancing
of competing interests - that we've got to be careful
we don't draft a broad law that then just kicks the ball
into the judiciary or tribunals, and we don't know
where the answer's going to land. Penny Wong?
OK. (CLEARS THROAT) Can I... There are two points
or two issues I want to address. First, in relation to Mr Folau. Can I say first
just on an emotional level - I wish that we could have more
expressions of love and forgiveness rather than condemnation
when it came to belief. And I wish that public figures - politicians, sporting stars,
et cetera - might consider for a moment - and I think I've been on this show
saying this before - where their words land
in vulnerable Australians... Yep.
..before they speak them. Now, he is entitled to his beliefs.
I disagree with them. And I think we ought remember
he doesn't speak for all Christians. In terms of the broader issue, we are an accepting,
tolerant nation. We...we...we aspire to deal
with each other respectfully. So whatever happens
in this current debate around religious freedom, et cetera, I think we mustn't lose sight
of those key characteristics of Australian identity. We don't want to become
less accepting, we don't want to become
less tolerant. We don't want to abrogate
our agreed view that people are entitled
to equality before the law, that we believe
that people are equal, regardless of gender, race, faith,
sexuality, disability, et cetera. We should hold, I think,
to those objectives, that we're not seeking
to diminish that. I'm open to a discussion about how
we deal with religious protections. But I would make this point - and I made this point during
the marriage equality debate - there is a distinction
between a right to belief and the assertion that
that belief should lead to you being treated differently
before the law. And that is a big thing to do. There are circumstances
where Australia has done that. We have particular provisions,
for example, in the Sex Discrimination Act where because someone has a belief
they are not required to behave as other Australians are
before the law. But I think we need to think
very carefully about how we manage this debate. I hope it can be done
in a way that's not partisan. I hope it can be done respectfully and I hope it can be done
with the objective of ensuring that just as Australians of faith don't wish
to be discriminated against, that Australians...that Australians
of other attributes also don't wish
to be discriminated against. Just a quick one on this
because we may be about to see it - religious freedom legislation. What would you be worried about? Well, I think I've just... The principles
I've just articulated. I'm happy
and I think the Labor Party is happy to engage constructively. What I don't want to see
is the objectives that are part of our
Australian identity - tolerant, accepting nation,
in which people are treated equally. I don't want those abrogated. That requires a very sensitive
and respectful discussion. Alright. I'm going to move on
because we've got a couple of other questions
we really should be talking about. This first one
is from Aakriti Shoree. Hello. So, over one million Uyghur Muslims are being held in internment camps
in China at the moment, with new reports
describing the forcible removal of children from their families. Considering that Australia
has imposed autonomous sanctions on countries like Zimbabwe,
Myanmar and Syria for human rights abuses in the past, do you think that
there is more we can do to prevent further systemic violence
against this ethic minority, or do our trade relations trump
our moral conscience? I will start
with our non-politicians. Tom? (RIPPLE OF APPLAUSE)
Well, I genuinely feel your pain. On my Radio National program
I've had a few segments dealing with the besieged Muslim
population of north-west China. And it's not just a question
for the government. It's also the media. How often do you see
this issue raised on the front pages of newspapers? It's hardly raised...I find. And it's quite extraordinary
given the systematic repression of these poor souls
in a brutal authoritarian regime. Now, with respect to your question, human rights is a very noble
and powerful impulse - one that shouldn't be
casually dismissed. And for human rights activists,
like Diana, they're a cause. But for governments, human rights
are one of many interests that they have to take into account when they deliberate
on foreign policy, such as, stability,
order, prosperity. They're moral values too. So in the course
of making foreign policy, governments will base
their decisions according to the circumstances and no-one in their right mind
is suggesting that Australia join some sort of economic embargo
on China to punish them for the way they're treating
the Muslim population. It's a tough, tough issue. But this is one of the dilemmas - getting back
to the original questions we were raising at the start
of the show - about how we deal
with our largest trade partner. How tough can we be with it?
Diana? I would suggest a lot tougher, Tom.
Absolutely. The one million Uyghur Muslims
that are in re-education camps, akin to concentration camps, are having to renounce their faith,
having to be arbitrarily detained, separated from their families. Some of them
are surmounting to torture, the way that they're being treated. Again, Muslims suffering
in neighbouring...in our region, and we're not saying anything,
really. We're remaining silent. Again, with Myanmar, as well,
with the Rohingya Muslims there, where Australia continued
to aid and support and train the Myanmar military, where there was an ethnic cleansing
campaign of Rohingya Muslims there. I mean, what is it going to take
for Australia to actually take a moral and
principled stance on human rights? I get your point, Tom, but human rights underpins
the stability of every nation. If they don't have that, then that country is not something
that we should be engaging with. We should be using all of the levers
that we have to try and influence
for positive change. Because how many more
Uyghur Muslims - over one million now in China. How many more Rohingya Muslims need
to be displaced from their homes? We're talking about people
here again. Men, women and children
being displaced from their homes. But how can we be effective
and not just merely feel virtuous? What can we actually do
to change the outcome? Let me throw that question to Hugh because I want to hear
from the other panellists as well. Go ahead.
Well, I think... The question you phrase - you framed the question
exactly the right way. On the one hand, we have a very
deep and passionate, really, anxiety about what's happening, for example,
to the Uyghurs. On the other hand we have
a relationship with China which just about defines
our economic future. You know,
if you ask the average Australian, "What's our economic future?" The answer is China. And one thing we can be
pretty sure of is that decisive action by Australia
on the Uyghur issue would have immense economic
consequences for us. And that's what these guys
do for a living. They strike that balance. And against a country like Zimbabwe, that doesn't matter much
to us economically, it's easy. Against a country, like China, and I don't want to trivialise this but our economic relationship
with China relates to the economic wellbeing
of just about everyone in this room. Everyone watching.
It is a huge issue. It's a terrible issue, actually. But I've got to say pessimistically I think the chances
that anything Australia would do would actually make any difference,
no matter how radical, are very low. That doesn't end
the moral conversation but it's certainly part
of the moral conversation. It leaves me very gloomy about it.
Penny Wong? Well, first,
as a sort of overarching principle, your foreign policy should be
an expression of your identity, your values and your interests. And it is a question of ascertaining
what is the right path through all of those propositions. Second, in relation to the Uyghurs,
that has been raised. I can't speak for the government.
I'll let Scott do it. But I certainly can say
we have raised that publicly. The then Leader of the Opposition
was asked questions about it at a particular speech he did
and he responded accordingly. We've asked questions
in the Parliament, in Senate estimates,
about these issues because we should
ask those questions and they should be made public - what we do know
and what our concerns are - because the rule of law
and human rights do matter. But I think there is a reasonable
question about effectiveness. There are times
where private discussions are... ..one judge's to be
the most effective way there. There are times
where public discussion is the most effective way. And the judgement about trade,
I think that you reference, I think Hugh is right. The reality is it's an asymmetric
relationship economically. So I'm not sure that that would be an effective way of dealing
with those issues. Scott Ryan? Well, in short, I agree with broadly what
Hugh and Tom and Penny have said. We have to look at this
through the prism of our values. We do have a human rights discussion
with China. But in politics,
you've also got to look at capacity, and the truth is that -
as Penny described as asymmetric - we would have little impact
upon China and an enormous impact
upon Australia. So the effectiveness of any action
we took would be virtually zero. On that basis,
I don't necessarily... I don't think we should be shy
about being realistic, that we can use economic sanctions
where we know they work. But there's no point, necessarily, in inflicting great harm
upon Australians if that would damage a relationship, prevent the conversations
that are always ongoing around a range of issues, but also not have the desired effect
the sanction is hoped to. I am going to give you the final word
because we're nearly out of time. You've heard the pragmatic arguments.
Yeah. Your response? What you essentially have all said
on the panel here today is that Muslim lives don't matter. That is not true.
PENNY: That's not fair. That's what people are hearing
at home. Diana...
They're hearing in the audience. That is just so heartbreaking
to hear that. And I'm just really disappointed
because we have so many levers in the toolbox that we could be
using to influence foreign policy. We could be using it - trade... And it doesn't... Human rights
are not mutually exclusive to our values around trade. It's really important that we try to engage critically
with these nations and try to influence
when these things are happening. It's not just happening... You know, it's a mass scale, ethnic cleansing campaign
in Myanmar. Re-education camps
of over a million Uyghur Muslims in China at the moment. This is the most
disappointing result, I think, from the panel tonight. SCOTT: The discussion we had is not
worthy of that bumper sticker, quite frankly. I'm really disappointed.
That's my opinion. In fact,
Australia on the Rohingya issue - has on a bipartisan basis -
been quite active internationally. We're still training...
Military haven't cut military aid. I understand your point. We're still engaging
with the Myanmar military. I don't think...
Senator Wong... I don't think it was a reasonable
proposition to put to us, that somehow...somehow
certain lives don't matter. All lives matter.
Well, that's what I'm hearing. That's what people at home
are hearing. That is not what I am saying.
That is not what I am saying. What people at home are looking at
is the time and I'm afraid we're out of it. That's all we have time for. Please thank our panel -
Scott Ryan, Diana Sayed, Hugh White, Penny Wong and Tom Switzer. (APPLAUSE) Thank you very much. Now, you can continue the discussion
and it's a very good idea to continue all of these discussions
with Q&A Extra on NewsRadio and Facebook Live where Tracey Holmes is joined
by Peter Fray of the Centre For Media Transition at the University of Technology
in Sydney. Next week, Q&A will be coming to you
live from Melbourne where we'll be joined by the Shadow
Minister for Families, Linda Burney, Jim Molan,
the former Liberal Senator, who may yet make a comeback, Rebekha Sharkie
from the Centre Alliance, marketing strategist Toby Ralph
of Gruen fame, and ABC radio announcer Sami Shah. Until then, goodnight. Captions by Red Bee Media Copyright Australian
Broadcasting Corporation
