Noam Chomsky on Moral Relativism and Michel Foucault
Video Statistics and Information
Channel: Chomsky's Philosophy
Views: 708,755
Rating: 4.8476305 out of 5
Keywords: Relativism (Belief), Moral Relativism, Noam Chomsky (Author), Philosophy (Field Of Study), Michel Foucault (Author), Value (Literature Subject), Moral philosophy, Progress, cultural relativism, Postmodernism (Literary School Or Movement), Morality (Quotation Subject), Ethics (Quotation Subject)
Id: i63_kAw3WmE
Channel Id: undefined
Length: 20min 3sec (1203 seconds)
Published: Sat Dec 05 2015
Please note that this website is currently a work in progress! Lots of interesting data and statistics to come.
Sometimes I feel like philosophy memes are really strawman-y. Like, I'm confident that most relativists wouldn't disagree that realistically, there are morals you can get pretty much everyone to agree with; that's simply empirical fact, but Chomsky seems to regard the theoretical framework of relativism as Sargon would a "kill all men" tweet. I feel like he just wants to dunk on "those absurd relativists."
Yes, pragmatically there are likely numerous constraints on morality imposed by biology, but theoretically speaking, that doesn't matter. These constraints are still arbitrary, even if they are destined to arise due to fundamental physical laws (which, I don't even know if we can definitively say, given that our only frame of reference is humanity). That most biological entities can agree that they'd rather live (most being a very operative word here), doesn't suddenly make living an objective moral, just a relatively agreeable one. Would moral relativists disagree with this? Half of philosophy has got to be just taking moral questions to theoretical extremes—in this case, perfectly relative, incompatible morals—but the other half is reframing these theoretical axioms in pragmatic contexts.
Also, the question posits "morals change over space and time," and Chomsky says "our morals changed over time" like it's a retort. Was it supposed to be a counter-claim? Yes, we learn morals like a language and language changes over time in a constrained fashion, but isn't one of the fundamental properties of language literally arbitrariness?
Philosophy noob here. These were what I understand to be his main points/arguments:
"Humans are biological systems";
"Moral systems are biological systems";
"Biological systems can function in a given range, but there are limits to that range";
"Acquiring morals from culture is only possible given the innate biological structure of humans: what can be acquired by this innate structure is limited by the limits of the structure itself - genetics dictates how it works, and therefore, the low number of possible results in terms of acquiring attitudes and behaviors".
"There has to be a set of basic principles from which culture, and morals, derives, like a logical conclusion from a set of premises"
Maybe I'm wrong, but the entire argument sounds circular. You get your morals from culture, and that process is limited by the culture itself and the limitations of the human body; therefore you can only get a certain set (although variable) of normative claims. In other words - the set of normative claims you get is the only possible set of normative claims you can get, with some room for variation, but not a lot. That's kinda of a "no shit Sherlock" statement.
While he doesn't speak of "objective" and "subjective" in the video, that last point is the foundational one, and the one I disagree with the most. He expands in the video to something like "Because you can observe multiple different cultures arriving to similar conclusions, there as to be a set of fundamental premises or principles there are being used", which would kinda make them "objective", in a sense. My objection would be that the main point in determining whether moral claims are objective or not is not so much what they are, per se, but where their content comes from.
You could make the argument that a group of humans running around murdering each other over petty shit is "worst" then the same group of humans working together, building and gathering and in general helping each other. A normative claim like "Killing is wrong". This is basically culture, in the sense Chomsky uses it: we agree that the outcomes of certain actions are "better" then the outcomes of other actions, so we teach the kids we eventually have to do those "better" actions; as they grow, they have the potential to eventually change their minds on what actions are "good" and "bad". But this whole thing is a practical process, not an "objective" one. The majority of people agreeing (or disagreeing) that "Killing is wrong" does not make this claim "objective" in any sense I understand "objective", at least. It would only be objective if you could demonstrate the content of "Killing is wrong" the same way you can demonstrate, say, the mineral composition of a rock (and here I'm hoping we agree the mineral composition of a rock to be objective knowledge).
His example of language even functions the same circular way - "car" means "car" because there's only a limited amount of articulated sounds humans can make, so eventually you would arrive at "car" for what it describes. No shit. Bu the fact that "car" refers to a thing with four wheels and "table" refers to a thing with four legs that does not mean that those specific sounds for those specific things are a logical/objective deduction. That explanation is largely practical, not really objective.
Hope this makes any sense and I didn't contradict myself too much.