Neville Chamberlain Did The Right Thing

now it is my turn to welcome you to intelligence squared and to a debate among four extremely distinguished historians about one of the most controversial moments in twentieth-century history in September of 1938 Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain together with his French counterpart agreed to let Adolf Hitler occupy the Sudetenland an ethnically German part of Czechoslovakia calling the crisis a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing he returned home waving a promise in that picture up there signed by Hitler not to pursue war any further so was he right to do so those in support of this motion will argue yes and those against will argue no at the end of the evening you two get to see heavier say and you will vote by tearing your ballot ticket that's I was told to show you this in case you didn't notice that it was handed to you upon entry and you tear it in two and you vote by placing either the four or the against part or there we go sorry for against into the ballot box and if you are a don't know which is almost inconceivable after this distinguished panel speaks you're bound to have very strong views then you should place the entire ticket in the ballot box so each of my speakers is going to have twelve minutes maximum to speak and at ten minutes I'm going to ding my glass like this so be warned this is very harsh very severe military discipline which we have to impose on with on these military historians in the room our first speaker for the motion for the motion is John Charlie professor of modern history at the university of east anglia who can now stand up and he's the author of Chamberlain and the lost piece as well as Churchill the end of glory also as I recall he was the author of a couple of controversial articles in The Spectator some years back which addressed precisely these issues professor Charlie thank you very much madam chairman if I can start with a quotation and finish with one it is also a help to our country into a whole Empire on our whole decent faithful way of living that it is known through the world that we were guiltless of the bloodshed terror and misery which have engulfed so many appeasement was a long term policy it had been pursued by British governments throughout the nineteenth twentieth century one exception the Great War the Great War did not suggest that getting involved in a rock in Europe was really very good idea so the first thing to say about Neville is he simply pursuing a policy that would be in the policy of the British Empire with one disastrous exception there was no body in the 1920s and 30s arguing World War one have been jolly good idea in fact the policy of appeasement the policy of amelioration and we should come back to these things was reinforced by the experience of getting involved in world war war and that horrendous loss of life so you could not have had a public opinion less favorable to fighting in foreign parts of course it might have been open to the prime minister to have done what a later prime minister did perhaps sex up a dossier really I would have thought of all generations this generation would know the foreign the utter foolishness of trying to take a country to war that does not want to go that would not have conduced to one of the things that never managed to conduce to which is a national consensus that by the time war came there was no alternative now if we are in the presence of a long term policy if we're in the presence of what reinforced by the slaughter of Passchendaele and the trenches we are also in the presence of a policy reinforced by economic reality in 1931 Britain had gone into what one used to be able to say to me a serious economic slump in its history but thanks to Gordon & Company we have a much worse one god it's probably being historic even had to revise your comparisons nonetheless the slump was serious the great and good man up there had been the Chancellor of the Exchequer who would help nurse back a crippled economy the Treasury warmed we could not afford is a long war the War Office said we couldn't win a short one oh how foolish of the Prime Minister to listen to his advisers now I think again we know from more recent examples that is really rather a good idea the Prime Minister's listened to the men who paid to advise them and perhaps to public opinion and who knows Parliament and who knows they might tell the truth all of these things Neville did I will leave to my learned friend professor Stan there are many reasons why the other thing that would have made war problematic was Britain hadn't their allies I do hope he mentions I commit Zog but I don't think he would have deterred Hitler very much but now to have reasoned itself it is much misunderstood largely because of church appeasement was not simply a search for peace what's wrong with peace I think we're all rather in favor of it particularly those of us with young sons it was not a policy of peace at any price as I shall say at the end but it was a search to prove whether peace was possible but it was also two other things it was a search to see whether if peace was not possible that would produce a United Nation around a different policy and it was accompanied by a sensible rearm on policy not the one favored by Churchill full of medium-range bombers and make the country as banker as Churchill was Churchill was able to win the Battle of Britain because Neville Chamberlain's rearmament policy produced the most sophisticated air defense policy in Europe Spitfires and radar and cue Neville so it was not a piece at any price it was not a disarmament policy it was a search to see whether peace was possible with an iron fist inside the velvet glove and when in 1939 oh of course with hindsight everybody as we shall no doubt hear this evening has 20/20 vision Hitler was a terrible man when nobody doubts that so it was Stalin so was Saddam Hussein so was Mussolini in fact I'd never known a leader of another country who was not demonized by those seeking to go to war that's not enough if we are ready to go to war on the side of nice people with nice allies we shall probably reduce to going to war with the Isle of Man as our cell ally and why not so we have a situation where you have a country that is still traumatized by the great war still wishes to find a peaceful way an establishment a political establishment the degrees an economic situation that won't allow for it a military situation was also going to allow for it as professor stem will say a foreign policy one that went either it's not that appeasement was the right policy it was the only conceivable policy as Professor Paul Kennedy of Yale has put it it was the most over determined policy in British history even if he was quoting professor Paul's rather when he said it nor is it a complete failure because when Britain goes to war in 1939 there is the United country which that would not have been if they've gone to eat war a year earlier on a false prospectus Hitler has no allies because Mussolini is mysteriously ill perhaps tying his shoelaces and France goes with Britain so Britain has an ally Hitler does not of course in 1940 it all goes wrong that's cuz the British and French army were crap what was never supposed to do imitate Stalin and shoot the general staff I fear some of the general staff at Hitler made of solid teak in the bullet would have bounced off so appeasement far from being a total failure was an honorable attempt to see whether or not peace was possible it proved beyond peradventure and that's why the country was united even in the trauma of 1940 part from Oswald Mosley and the buf needed locking up probably need locking up earlier nobody dissented what apart from a few communists but if you've got Oswald Mosley and the Communists against you you're probably right so to finish off it was not only the right policy it was the only policy and I want to finish with a quotation whatever else history may or may not say about these terrible tremendous years we can be sure that Neville Chamberlain acted with perfect sincerity according to his lights and strove to the utmost of his capacity and authority which were powerful to avoid war to save the world from this awful devastating struggling which we are now engaged this alone will stand him in good stead as far as what is called the verdict of history well tonight ladies and gentlemen you have the chance to be that verdict and to prove the author of those words what Winston Churchill right so remember when you come to cast your vote vote Churchill proving right by voting for Neville thank you very much thank you so our first speaker against the motion is Sir Richard Evans the Regis professor of history and the president of Wolfson College Cambridge University and he's among his many books his many books include the Third Reich in power and the Third Reich at war huh thank you very much madam madam chairman ladies gentlemen I'm in in 1935 Hamid Goering known as the second man in the Third Reich arrived late at his hunting lodge for a meeting with the British ambassador Sir Eric Phipps I'd been out hunting he said animals I hope said the Ambassador and Fitz's reactions showed how well he understood the murderous nature of the Nazi regime I had the impression he wrote in one dispatch that the persons directing the policy of the Hitler government are not normal many of us indeed have a feeling that we're living in a country where fanatics hooligans and eccentrics have got the upper hand already in 1935 Phipps wrote let's hope our pacifists at home may at length realize that the rapidly growing monster of German militarism will not be placated by mere cooing but will only be restrained from recourse to its ultimate Co ie war by the knowledge that the powers who desire peace are also strong enough to enforce it and when Chamberlain came to power in 1937 as Prime Minister immediately replaced Phipps with some Neville Henderson who thought Goering was a gentleman and told the Foreign Office if we handle Hitler right my belief is that he'll gradually become more Pacific but if we treat him as a pariah or mad dog we shall turn him finally and irrevocably into one history madam chairman ladies and gentlemen history has shown that Phipps was right and Henderson was wrong Chamberlain knew little about Europe and cared even less and as you've already heard he told his listens to the BBC radio broadcast in 1938 how horrible fantastic incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom you know nothing the country was speaking of wasn't Mongolia or Antarctica it was text of our cure just a few hundred miles away he was slow to react to the German threat because he didn't take it seriously and like Henderson unlike Phipps and the many well-informed experts on continental Europe who thought like Phipps Chamberlain regarded Hitler at a normal conventional statesman he as a man whose word can be trusted he wrote in a letter to his sister he had given him assurances that he had no more territorial demands after the Sudetenland the part of Czechoslovakia that was taken away and given to Germany in the Munich Agreement to 1938 Hitler's were mrs. Bond waving the scrap of paper hit at signed Chamberlain told crowds that it meant peace for our time and he should have known that Goering had referred to all treaties and scraps of paper to be torn up when there were no use anymore Munich appalled mi5 who according to the official history were well-informed enough to realize Hitler's aims were without limit and that Poland would be next they sent Chamberlain a memo to try and stiffen his resolve with secret intelligence reports describing how Hitler was absolutely contemptuous of him in private describing him as a worm and even an arch law which the mi5 translated accurately and hopefully as it had no effect Pisa was even more dismayed to the German army chief of staff Franz Halder who knew that Germany in 1938 was in no way prepared for a war with Britain and planned the arrest of Hitler if war broke out to be followed by immediate negotiations for peace how the even went to his operational conferences with Hitler carrying a loaded revolver in his belt in case the opportunity should arise for a quick shot plans had reached an advanced stage for a coup when the Munich Agreement pulled the rug from underneath the conspirators feet they were simply stopped in their tracks by Chamberlain who refused of course to believe that the Germans weren't ready for war the Czechs had a strong army they had defensible borders the British backing they could have resisted a German invasion but Chamberlain forced them to surrender British government refused to believe that Germany wasn't ready for war even in 1936 when German rearmament had made so little progress that when Hitler sending his troops to the Rhineland in the west of Germany which is a demilitarized zone by the terms of the peace settlement in 1919 the troops are under orders to withdraw the slightest sign of anglo-french objection had the French sent in troops for example in tercera later the military force at our disposal would not have been enough even for the limited resistance strong action by the British in 1936 or 38 could have prevented war with all its disastrous loss of British lives it would have encouraged resistance to Hitler within Germany as it was both the unopposed remilitarization of the Rhineland and the Munich Agreement over Czechoslovakia persuaded Hitler they did nothing to fear from the feeble witless British and their supine allies the French far from calming him down these events along with the unopposed annexation of Austria in March 1938 all fruits the policy of appeasement made him accelerate his policy of conquest and aggression now what you think of appeasement depends of course on what you think Hitler's aims were Chamberlain and I'm in full agreement here with presently a decent and sincere man thought Hitler just wanted a few revisions of the Treaty of Versailles in the name of the self-determination of the German people but knowledgeable and intelligent man like Phipps knew from the very beginning this wasn't the case and anyone who read my camp faithless political tract from the mid 20s or who listened carefully to his speeches or who found out what he'd been saying to his generals or even to American business magnate correspondents knew he was planning a war of European conquest and ultimately aiming at world domination war was the essence of the Nazi regime men like fits store this from the start Chamberlain horizons were too limited to conventional to grasp this basic reality there's no evidence that he had some kind of cunning plan to keep Hitler on hold while Britain rearmed he was in fact naively obsessed with a desire to avoid war at any price on the 2nd of November 1939 following the Nazi invasion of Poland he appeared for the House of Commons placing his faith in Italian mediation extraordinarily in the Cellini of all people the most unreliable people in modern history the members of the House Commons who knew full well that the Nazis were aiming for European domination that Poland was just the first step were furious so leader of the opposition rose to his feet began with the words speaking for the Labour Party a Tory back Venturer shouted angrily speak for England a few hours later an emergency meeting of the cabinet forced Chamberlain to issue an ultimatum to the Germans to withdraw when this is ignored a declaration of war issued over the radio by visibly shattered and disappointed Prime Minister now let me remind you this point so draw my remarks to close the motion is not whether Chamberlain was pretty pursuing a tried and tested British policy it's not whether this is the only policy available to the rigid government it's not whether the Treasury didn't allow him any choice it's not whether public opinion wasn't behind it the motion is about whether the policy of appeasement Chamberlain's policy of appeasement was in the best interests of Britain it was not a search to prove whether peace was possible as I've argued it was a it was a desperate search for peace at any price pleaselet was not in Britain's national interest because it prevented Britain and France and putting a stop to Hitler's drive for world domination when it was still possible to do so indeed because it actually encouraged it was not in Britain's national interest because it undermined opposition to Hitler from the leadership of the German armed forces it was not in Britain's national interest because if Britain left left Britain woefully unprepared for war when it came as the disasters of the first year of the war showed till things began to improve a bit with the Battle of Britain it wasn't in Britain's national interest because leaving continental Europe to its own devices would have been a betrayal of staggering proportions first for Czechoslovakia then for Poland and for the rest of Europe 4ps Minh had continued as Chamberlain wanted it to even during a Nazi invasion of Poland Hitler would have scored an even more complete victory in Europe than he did in 1940 Britain and the Empire would have been next in line thank you very much thank you very much trust a the Regis professor of history to get it correct it was peace for our time and not peace in our time right our second speaker for the motion is Glyn Stone the professor of international history at the university of the west of england and the author of books on a huge range of subjects from Neville Chamberlain and the Spanish Civil War to anglo-french relations in the 1930s Flinstone you've heard my colleague John Charlie argue that appeasement was the best policy for the British government and I have no reason whatsoever to disagree with that verdict I think he has demonstrated very much that it wasn't only the best policy it was the only policy and in considering this question we ought to also bear in mind that there ought to be alternatives to this if it wasn't appeasement then what was the best alternative what was a better policy than that of appeasement and historians tend to come up with just as Churchill came up with and so on with the idea of a grand alliance a grand alliance of the powers because after all that was what is defeated the Kaiser in the First World War and that was what of course he eventually defeated that of Hitler in the Second World War so it made sense common sense therefore for Chamberlain and his government to construct a grand alliance to deter and to confront Hitler with with with war now of course the question is is this realistic I'd certainly Chamberlain didn't believe it to be realistic it was an occasion in march 1938 when he in a letter to one of his sisters he wrote regular correspondence with both of his sisters he mentioned to her that the whole question had been examined the idea of a grand alliance had been under great scrutiny and the Chiefs of Staff had been involved and so on and it was a marvelous idea in theory but the problem was in practice that when it came down to practicalities the whole thing disintegrated and it was quite right there was no way no possible way of constructing a grand Alliance in the 1930s that might deter an oppose Hitler the only realistic combination in the 1930s of powers was that which actually materialized that of an anglo-french alliance and that of course materialized in march in february/march in 1939 neither the Soviet Union nor the United States was prepared to commit to an alliance to confront and deter Hitler's Germany neither neither of those parts whether Franklin Roosevelt or Joseph Stalin if we look at the Americans first of all we see America deep in isolation ever since the fateful decision of 1919 when the Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles and America's membership of the League of Nations America to increasingly become deeply and much more isolated as far as International Affairs was concerned and the height of American isolationism was reached of course in the mid 1930s with the neutrality legislation passed through Congress and that of course coincides with the period of Neville Chamberlain's government Franklin Delano Roosevelt was reluctant to get involved in any of the affairs in Europe or in the Far East whether it be Abyssinia whether it be the Spanish Civil War whether it be the sino-japanese war which broke out in the summer of 1937 Chamberlain was absolutely correct when he said on one occasion you can expect nothing from the Americans only words certainly not actions that would be the last thing an America would offer and the Czech crisis of course I think demonstrates this probably better than anything else because during that crisis a time and again American diplomats were discouraging both the British and the French from taking action that might lead to war they for example a bullet in Paris as William Bullock the ambassador in Paris constantly telling French politicians and statesmen that they could expect no help from the United States and indeed at the height of the Czech crisis when it looked like war was going to occur as the British Navy mobilizing as the French garnered their Armed Forces and Roosevelt I made an appeal to both Chamberlain but also to a doll fitler as well and followed up with another personal appeal to Hitler appealing for peace and to find some way a solution so that there would not necessarily be war over the Czech issue and when Chamberlain announced that he was going to a Munich on the 28th of September 1938 Roosevelt sent him a telegram a telegram was two words good man good man and so when Chamberlain delivered the verdict to Munich Roosevelt afterwards mentioned to several of his confidence that he was not at all disappointed about the outcome of the Czech crisis itself and there is no doubt that Roosevelt was incapable really of persuading is Congress to adopt a more supportive policy with regard to Britain and to France this is clearly shown when in 1939 during the spring and summer of 1939 the French were making a bid for French American aircraft trying to buy weapons from the United States to help with their rearmament Congress refused even though Roosevelt himself was in favor of this Congress refused to endorse what we call a policy of cash and carry to enable the French and the British to buy weapons and other materials and pay for them with with cash that policy was only adopted in November 1939 after the war had started if we look at the Soviet Union we can see that again that the charges be made against Chamberlain that he failed to secure an alliance with the Soviets and that he was to blame for this because of his blind ideological prejudices against the Soviet Union well there's no doubt that Chamberlain and his cabinet were all anti-communist but at the same time they were also of course aware of the Soviets they were aware of the military problems that the Soviets were experiencing largely because of the destruction of the Soviet High Command the purges in the Red Army in 1937 98 38 but a huge question mark over the military credibility of the Soviet armed forces but apart from that there was also a question of trust could you trust of Stalin would Stalin actually make an agreement and alliance with Britain and France well at one level it looked like that might be possible because negotiations took place in the spring and summer of 1939 to make an alliance but in the end of course as we all know Stalin opted for an agreement with Nazi Germany in the infamous nazi-soviet non-aggression pact of the 23rd of August 1939 and the reason he did that was because he was able to gain massive benefits and advantages from that association benefits and advantages which he could not possibly have got from Britain and France Britain and France could not sell Poland down the river could not sell the Baltic States down the river could not sell theirs Arabia down the river the same time they could not offer the sort of economic support which Stalin himself believed he needed and Stalin was able of course to pay for that back by providing raw materials and foodstuffs to the 3rd Rush and also of course by making the pact Stalin bought himself time time to reconstruct the Soviet economy and time also to undo the damage that had been done to the Soviet armed forces through the purges time and absolutely valuable commodity and by making that alliance that was very much favorable favorable decision for Stalin to make but above all with regard to this there was also an opportunity with regard to the pact that in actual fact Britain and France might go to war with Germany and that therefore there would be a war of the capitalist powers fighting each other and if they fought each other in a similar way as they'd fought during the First World War this will be a long war of attrition and the effect would be the there would be a I said a long drawn-out struggle that the various parties would exhaust themselves and this would leave Stalin as Russia meanwhile rearming for all it's worth in a much much stronger position to dictate the future of Europe and there is no doubt that this was in Stalin's mind because four days before he made a pact he said as much to a meeting of the Politburo on the 19th of August on the 23rd of August president Benesch former president of Czechoslovakia now in exile in London spoke with the IVA my ski the ambassador of the Soviet Union and again got a same message from from my sake and then on the 7th of September a week after the war had broken out in a meeting with Zidane off who was a member of Politburo with Molotov the foreign minister and with GOG dimitrov the head of the Comintern or third international Stalin again repeated the advantages and opportunities which would be available for the Soviets should this war continue for a long time as he himself hoped it would so there was no prospect at all of making any alliance in 1930s and especially in 1939 with the Soviet Union and the fact is of course that Stalin would strive might and main after September 1939 to maintain soviet-german collaboration up to the point of even dismissing intelligence reports in 1941 about an impending and invasion about that Nazi Germany which of course took place on June 22nd 1941 this finally therefore leaves us with the one Alliance which Britain had that with France the problem with France was was France a credible ally France was riven by social and political problems and as a consequence of these problems it put a question mark over the the credibility of the French particularly in terms of their rearmament simply the the the power of their of their military forces and the bottom line was at the end that despite this Chamberlain made an alliance with the French and the two countries went together together in September 1939 to fight against Adolf Hitler they're the only two countries actually who declared war upon Hitler's Germany certainly Joseph Stalin and Franklin Roosevelt didn't thank right our final speaker against the motion is Piers Brendan the former keeper of the Churchill archive centre and fellow of Churchill College Cambridge and among other things the author of the dark valley a panorama of the 1930s Winston Churchill memorably defined Anna Pisa as one who feeds a crocodile hoping it will eat him last like me of Churchill's impromptu remarks this one was carefully prepared in advance but it did not express his full mind on the subject appeasement as he admitted need not be a matter of Cardus it could mean peaceful conciliation Churchill also acknowledged that Neville Chamberlain and John Charlie had said had good motives for trying to appease the dictators during the 1930s he wanted to avoid a repeat of the first world war he wanted to right the wrongs of the Versailles settlement and to preserve the empire without jeopardizing the British economy during the Depression however as I shall try to persuade you the appeasement policy as actually implemented by Chamberlain which sacrificed the Czechs to Hitler in December 1938 was an absolute disaster when Chamberlain returned from Munich in triumph clutching his umbrella waving his piece of paper and announcing that he'd brought peace with honor Churchill was right to respond that Britain had been offered a choice between war and shame she has chosen shame and she will get war of course Churchill himself has neither consistent nor infallible but he did grasp the full danger of Nazism as early as March 1934 Churchill alerted Parliament to the tumultuous insurgent insurgents of ferocity and war spirit in Germany Chamberlain would not listen arguing with Churchill he said was like arguing with a brass band he wasn't far wrong in that particular point but Churchill had a better point when he said that Chamberlain a good Lord Mayor of Birmingham in a lean year looked at Foreign Affairs looked at Foreign Affairs through the wrong end of a municipal drainpipe Churchill could could couldn't see that Hitler wanted war he could he thought he could do a deal he offered him various titbits such as the return of Germany's former colonies not realizing how unimportant these were to Hitler and ignoring Bismarck's warning that he who seeks to buy the friendship of his enemy with concessions will never be rich enough it was insatiable lust for conquest his pathological anti-semitism his insensate drive to win Lebensraum in the east his homicidal quest for an Aryan World Order all this was beyond the comprehension of Chamberlain it was a smart vain fundamentally naive man who thought that jokes in Christmas crackers were funny and liked to win at games and musical chairs and only really showed anger when his umbrella got broken the national government's first great act of appeasement took place in response to Mussolini's rape of Ethiopia in 1935 the Royal Navy could have crushed this in a moment just by blockading the Suez Canal and the and this would have had a great moral effect throughout Europe and unshunned and helped to shut hit the ramp or at least to warn him that that we meant business as the military historian little Hart wrote never again would the be so good a chance to check an aggressor so early and the failure to do so in this case was the most fateful turning point in the history in the period between the wars the national government heeding the supposedly but not really a pacifist electorate was timorous over the react in its reaction to nazi rearmament which violated the Treaty of Versailles and to Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 which violated the Treaty of Locarno equally feeble was their response to Hitler Caesar of Austria in March 1938 Lord Halifax kind of Christian said Churchill who deserved to be thrown to the Lions sent a pathetic protest which Hitler contemptuously ignored meanwhile a pogrom was taking place in Vienna whose ferocity embarrassed even the Gestapo itself some of Austria's 400,000 Jews fled to Berlin where the anti-semitism was less acute despite such evidence of Nazi barbarity and belligerents Chamberlain neglected potential allies he cold shouldered Roosevelt ostracized Stalin snubbed alladhi a once remarking that the French but for the French premier the darkest R was always before lunch but but Chamberlain ardently wooed ma Cellini whereas Churchill agreed with Goering practically anything they did agree about which was that in any future war it would be a positive advantage to have Italy as an enemy in his eagerness to modify Hitler however Chamberlain confirmed Mussolini's view that the decadent Britain was led by political eunuchs he said that the Ethiopians had obviously caught them young Ethiopians went in for castration the impression of impotence was compounded by Chamberlain's appointment of obtuse mediocrities such as Sir Thomas inskipp the Minister for the Coordination to defense of whom it was said that he could look with Frank and fearless gaze on any prospect however appalling and failed to see it similarly Chamberlain's real menthe programme was too cautious and penny-pinching to convince the dictators that he would stand up to them at no risk to the economy he could have done far more to provide the seniors of war British soldiers understandably feared that the government's real aim was as one said not to fight a war but to be able to pay an indemnity after losing it combined with half-hearted rearmament wholehearted appeasement invited the aggression that it was designed to prevent no wonder the French called Chamberlain Monsieur a shame bear Helene Hitler was convinced that the democracies would cave in when he Menace Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1938 and he was undeterred by diplomatic hints that Britain would intervene if he used force not least because the foreign office simultaneously pressed president Bennish of czechoslovakia to yield by hinting that britain would not intervene some officials did urge firmness and even the head of the Foreign Office so Alexander Cadogan was shocked when Chamberlain argued quite calmly for total surrender after Chamberlain's three airborne overtures to Hitler which culminated in the session session of the SU date infringe of the cheques of a key of the german-speaking fringe at the Munich conference this saying echoed around Whitehall if at first you can't concede fly fly fly again however humiliating the terms though Chamberlain's defenders argue that Munich gave Britain a vital vital breeding spray breathing space in which to defend itself notably with fighters and radar yet as John Charlie himself acknowledges this was not his intention Chamberlain's main objective says John was to avert war and he was prepared to go a very long way down the road of national dishonor to get his way as it was Germany made much better use of the years grace than Britain and France the democracies would have done well to fight in 1938 when the Luftwaffe had no plans or ability to bomb London the French had a 5 to 1 superiority to Germany on the on its vulnerable western border and 35 well-equipped Czech divisions perhaps supported by the Red Army would have embroiled Hitler in a war on two fronts after Munich no full-blooded rearmament program was initiated in Britain largely because Chamberlain assumed that he'd secured peace the British public was less gullible after the initial euphoria about Munich it quickly concluded with hawks like Churchill that Munich had been a total and unmitigated defeat and that the Nazis were criminals whose hands are still dripping with blood and who have just slapped our embarrassed faces before the whole world the abject failure of appeasement was confirmed in March 1939 when Hitler swallowed the whole of Czechoslovakia Chamberlain's reluctant response was to guarantee the independence of Hitler's next major target Poland among other countries yet this did not mark the end of appeasement it was a further attempt to contain and deter Germany not a preparation for war but a construction of a peace front anyway the times which was pieces softened its commitment to Poland and sir Neville Henderson are pro-nazi ambassador in Berlin sabotage dick to the fury fury of Clifford Norton the British chargee d'affaires all and he wrote in an unpublished memo to the Foreign Office this very interesting memo the historian of the future may well ask what right Henderson had to falsify the British spirit and attempt to drag our name in the mud again God knows if Poland fights it will be hell for her and for all of us but there is a worse hell for cards and traitors then for those who go down because they kept their word Hitler was encouraged by other signs of appeasement among among them dove like wings from the BBC Britain Sark Tisha's payment of Dane geld in the shape of foreign credits to Germany the continued exclusion of Churchill from the cabinet and Chamberlain's ineffectual courting of starting having seen the Democratic worms at Munich Hitler Hitler said he could not believe that they would now turn succumbing to his own illusions he was convinced that the democracies would lead the poles in the lurch Chamberlain's own illusions flourished Hitler has concluded that we mean business he said on the 23rd of July 1939 and that this time and that the time is not ripe for a major war that's sir six weeks I suppose before the war was declared after the nazi-soviet pact even after the assault on Poland began he clung to the hope that Hitler might be peace of peacefully placated as a threat to Britain's existence and a menace to Western civilization if not as the embodiment of evil Hitler should have been confronted earlier Chamberlain's tragically mistaken policy made his Premiership the darkest hour before our finest hour I beg to oppose the motion I can now announce the these are the results of the voting that you did before you heard the four panelists speak so before the debate there were 25% for the motion 41% against the motion and 34% don't know so I reckon that that 34% is is the the four motion can still win if it wins over this 34% don't know I will take questions in groups of three please make you can make short statements you can ask a question to one or two all of the panelists please and I will do my best to see with lights blaring in my eyes right gentlemen right here in blue well a key point which has only been mentioned by one of two other speakers is of course is the fact that dirty of course gave full support to Neville chained me throughout as I understand it when as I my understandings that when the the whole thing started got going in April 1938 Bono the farmer Esther went to London and basically conceded you know said whatever you whatever you decide will support and of course that last one is it is that Wendell area returned from Munich he thought he was going to be lynched but in fact erm he faced cheering crowds all the way for know from the airport into Paris and the French National Assembly overwhelmingly approved the Munich Agreement with just the Communists voting against and this is a very important thing which should we borne in mind right in in orange in the back oh hi um I wanted to ask about um getting Guernica pronounce that correctly um because for the first time a Guernica showed us that the war could come to the civilian population and not be fought in a far-off land and I understood that we believed it was possible we could lose up to 60,000 civilians in about a week to two weeks from bombing and that Guernica had taught is quite a lesson that Neville Chamberlain was quite aware of and we were not prepared at that point - you know evacuate people we didn't know about that or we couldn't have done this at that point it's not not correct right thank you and one more and then what happens would evening and Pierce Brendon talks of Neville Chamberlain ostracizing Stalin well if talking to Stalin is such a good idea what's so wrong with talking to Hitler alright okay so maybe we'll start there was one direct question for Piers Brendan maybe he would like to answer that and then we'll sorry I'm de la da I'd like to answer that and then you get de la dia next so yes I'd like to answer answer all of them but that would be cheating yes of course it's the difference between a lovely isn't it Stalin and and and Hitler the difference I suppose is this that Hitler pose an existential threat to this country whereas Stalin had his own problems in in the late 1930s and in the end of course it is absolutely true that Chamberlain did try to mend his fences with Stalin but he did it in an extraordinarily inept way he sent a cross as his emissary not a senior politician to negotiate with Stalin because he wanted to come to some sort of grand alliance with Stalin at this late stage he sent an emissary called Admiral original Plunkett only old Drax and Surrey gional Plunkett only old Drax when he arrived in Moscow was greeted with incredulity by the Russians partly because of his name and partly because he didn't seem to carry any weight and and and and finally because it turned out that he didn't have any authority to act for the British government this was the kind of ineptitude that that that that Chamberlain was guilty of in other words he did not make a serious effort to create anything in the way of a grand alliance and Churchill who who's anti-communist record was was greater than anybody's that you could think of came to that awkward and embarrassed conclusion by about 1938 that the real menace was posed by Hitler and that he would therefore have to swallow his anti-communist I mean he had written these wonderful things about how that the the Bolsheviks like hordes of ferocious baboons were hopping and capering over the ruins of civilization and all that sort of thing but he came around in 1938 but realistically to saying what we need is the kind of alliance that we had in 1914 with the Russians right professor stone can I just come back on that for answer your de la da one because we hear again and again about Neville Chamberlain and the negotiations with the Soviet Union and that they didn't show any real seriousness or sincerity about it and that the military mission headed by Drax is a clear proof of that the fact of the matter is wouldn't matter if we sent all our top generals we'd sent cabinet ministers or anyone else Stalin was not not going to make an alliance with Britain in the summer of 1939 because he had a much much better offer and that offer came from Adolphe Hitler and the offer contained as I was saying in my speech that things that Britain and France could not possibly give as democratic countries they were not able to do what Stalin was able to do cut a bargain with sorry Hitler cut a bargain with Stalin so it's immaterial whether Drax went where there was a slow boat to Moscow which has also been pointed out in issues of that kind that fundamental and crucial issue was about whether or not the Soviet Union would support this country and France in a war against Nazi Germany and Stalin had no intention of getting involved in that kind they were all capitalist powers as far as he was concerned and as far as he was concerned the best outcome would be a war between the three from which the Soviet Union itself would benefit de la da you're quite right in September 1938 the French are absolutely hysterical about this coming war and don't forget it's their problem more than Britain's they've the ones who've got the Treaty of agreement with the Czechs not the British we are no way obliged or committed to support Czechoslovakia in 1938 absolutely not and to be committed and to actually go to war on behalf of France because that's what we will be doing we would have to be absolutely convinced that we were putting our entire nation at risk and I mean at real in genuine risk on behalf of an issue of three million Germans rejoining the Third Reich because that's what this a date an issue is about and if that could be actually brought about you could resolve that issue then peacefully then that was worth worth worth worth very much and if you could also get if this agreement to conduct a diplomatic relations in a more peaceful manner in future as propel the Anglo German declaration that would be as well but can I just say when Chamberlain was coming back from the airport in England and he made that silly statement about peace in our time and so on he actually turned to Lord Halifax and he said Edward we must hope for the best we must prepare for the worst and therefore it made absolute sense to pursue a policy that would ensure that you will continue to try and strive to reach an agreement but that you are not going to do new the defenses of your own country you're going to prepare it to make it ready for war subsequently if that proved impossible but for Daladier can just say one point the French absolutely hysterical because they had no way of defending their country by air the French Air Force was a way behind that of both the Royal Air Force and other fafa voluma the French editor chief of the air staff told the de la DEA that the air force would last up best six weeks so they have a reason to support a Chamberlain at Munich professor Evans you you were interested in answering the question war could have hurt civilians we weren't prepared for that yes there's a reference there was a question about gennyca which is a Basque town which was bombed to bits in the Spanish Civil War by a German bombers of the so-called Condor Legion and with serious loss of life and it was this led to kind of widespread fear across Europe of bombing it was thought that the next war would be an air war and there was no really satisfactory effective defense against aerial bombardment now Chamberlain typically of course was extremely ill informed about the the German what he regarded as the German military threat the Germans didn't actually have a very effective strategic bombing force certainly not in 1936 seven or eight and with severe limitations even even in the Battle of Britain he enormous ly overestimated the the German potentiality but that the real effect of Galica was in Germany itself where people were absolutely terrified of the next war Hitler did not have a support amongst the ordinary German people for a war the secret reports of the SS surveillance service roots of good talking and I've listened to people and cues and on trams and so on and made it quite clear then every crisis 1936 remilitarization the Rhineland and 38 Austria 30 30 and in Czechoslovakia people were suffered from what they called a war psychosis they were absolutely frightened that there would be war in beginning of September 1939 the Comerica correspondent William Shara went out when war was declared looking for the cheering crowds that have been there in August 1914 nobody streets absolutely empty everybody very depressed about a war with some justification because the Germans weren't prepared either professor Charlie that Chamberlain overestimated the German potential and the Germans were not prepared or enthusiastic for war true-false nor were the British the difference is Hitler could afford to ignore his public opinion because he wasn't going to be elected to anything Chamberlain had the sob beliefs as a democratic prime minister he should actually listen to what public about view and clearly not one that modern neoconservatives or indeed those who seem to think that some weird sort of ethical foreign policy would have worked in the 1930s would share well that's fine fact of the matter is that the policy advocated by the other side simply was not crack is no point with 20/20 hindsight saying we know this we didn't know it then and everybody is a winner I mean you know if you ask me what last week's lottery numbers where I could win it for you the other side are very much knowing what last week's lottery numbers was after the event professor Evans wants one sentence history history is all about hindsight without hindsight we wouldn't be historians right hindsight right three more questions I see a married couple quarreling who gets to ask the question okay the wife is conceding husband first and then sorry and then in the white shirt there and then one more up there is it not true that both the Canadians and the Australians had made it quite clear that if we had gone in 1938 they would not have been with us and that being the case is it really conceivable that without the support of the Commonwealth we would have had the British people truly onside in time to get the effort going so question about what Canadians and Australians would not have gone with us in 1938 yep um next basically my question would be that if we had attacked Germany and we do declared war and we were going to attack Germany at that point wouldn't that have actually driven the German people to support Hitler in the defense of Germany and then your into a full-blown war and then even if you win that you're back in the space of where we are with Iraq today for instance hmm right see you some applause here for the question and there was one up here no resigned okay to somebody else front row there right no wait gotta wait for the microphone what was timberlands calculation with regard to Poland when he offer guarantees did he simply mean to prolong the transition they did to have longer period of preparation for law or did he mean it seriously right was Chamberlain serious about Poland so professor Charlie is it correct that the Canadians and Australians would not have supported war in 1938 and wouldn't it wouldn't that have riled up the Germans as well and what yes yes jolly good points if you go round declaring wars on war on people they didn't say oh that's a joke they fight back and oddly enough you should declare war on and their people rally round the regime on the Empire point absolutely rise people sometimes say the Britain stood alone in 1940's another one of those Churchill in exaggerations they actually stand with the United Empire around the menagerie if you look at what the Canadians in particular contribute to the British war effort in 1940 it's tremendous they would not have been there in 1938 nor would South Africa nor indeed with the rest of the Empire and this problem people forget that Britain was not a little half shore island back there worldwide Empire oh let's ignore the Empire let let again it's very well to say course we're all these stories with hindsight what one shouldn't do is to ignore the circumstances of the times Lord Macaulay a very great a weak historian once said the real task of the historian is to remember what is now past was once the future and people know as much about it as we know about our future and I think that's a very good point to me right professor Evans just well let me just remind you again of the motion which is the best policy for the British government in our judgement knowing what happened later um that is that is that is all about that is all about history is all about results and outcomes and we we are in a very privileged situation we know what happened and from that point of view we can judge whether Chamberlain the British government were right or not in their policy as for the question about Germany 9:38 just just to remind you that as I said general Haldor and a whole bunch of leading generals are ready to stage a coup d'etat if a war broke out so those who were the only group who were in power and who had it who had enough power clout who were able to stage a conspiracy of that sort would I think of acted without if there had been a war Germany was weak in 1938 they knew it it didn't require the entire British Empire to to fight against the Germans just one portion of collapse from inside groaning groaning you instead of groaning speak yes I'm drowning almost because how can a Democratic leader base a policy on what might happen if you take or don't take particular action with regard to opposition's within another country whether the army would or would not have acted in that way how can you take a risk that might then lead to a war which will involve the lives of millions and millions of people and that was the thought at the time that the war would bring huge civilian casualties as well as battlefield casualties but it's interesting to note in September 1939 8 that first of all you have the Sudetenland well the Sudetenland is where the fortifications are and the problem is is lots of Germans in the Sudetenland and what are they going to do which were they going to go in terms can the Czechs rely upon the will upon the loyalty of their German population and also it's clear Peter Jackson historian of French intelligence wrote an article a number of years ago in which he pointed out that French intelligence was absolutely convinced that the Czechs would be rolled over in to a matter of days so this argument about whether or not the there were formidable fortifications formidable Czech forces etc is one of course as all things are debatable and from the French point of view at the time there was a clear feeling that Czechoslovakia would not be able to withstand assault by the by the German forces and bearing in mind of course as well that what the French would have done was mobilized behind the Maginot Line right they had no real offensive capability to actually attack Germany I see desire for response on this side of course the Czech army was extremely well equipped it was very modern up-to-date unlike the poles it had defensible lines the Germans were certainly pretty convinced that there would be a really hard fight if they tried to invade it what they did not think there will be a roll over the the the question was that again I think Dean the Germans were in a position in 1938 where they felt weak they felt vulnerable that was a moment for Britain and France to put their foot down and say it's not going any further even more so in 1936 when Germany barely started to rearm right three more questions Oh No are you ok I just there as well we haven't yet yes about a very quick one which is I I think that we haven't sort of examined that the nature of of Chamberlain's prime ministership it one MP said that he was that the Fuhrer of the of the Conservative Party in other words he was he was not a weak Prime Minister he was a strong Prime Minister and um what one of the things that he did very very consistently as my book still available in all good book waterstones to Lisbon after this ladies and gentlemen shows is that the propaganda incentive was terrific during the during the the late 30s I mean the times was on side the BBC was I mean so so involved that even children's are could not broadcast programs about current affairs the recksleeper who was in charge of the Foreign Office's propaganda department said that he could turn around British opinion in in three weeks simply by using the propaganda weapons at his disposal and where the Commonwealth was concerned they tended to go to follow the line that the that 10 Downing Street was was pursuing and therefore I I don't at all think that it's a foregone conclusion that the Commonwealth would not have come round had there been a leadership that was actually defending Britain's national interests in 1938 as opposed to sacrificing right three more questions and of course the speaker's can return to some of those that were unanswered in this round because I know but catch it in the later round okay so okay my question is though with the opening remarks the appeasement has been used over almost a century of foreign policy previous to world war ii and the fact that Britain was unprepared up until declaring war I'm would you therefore advocate that going to what over Poland was actually the wrong thing and that in fact Britain should have let Hitler take Poland to not get involved in war in which case either the freedom of the D half of Europe and acceptable casualty to allow us to live comfortably at home in the United Kingdom right so another question about Poland was it an acceptable casualty next next and professor Charlie attempt to put Chamberlain's policy in to fit it into the pattern of British foreign policy during the 19th century I would put it that that's wrong British policy in the 19th century was indeed built on non involvement with Europe but it was also strong defense of British interests and credible deterrence which did on one or two occasions lead to war I would say canning castle or a Melbourne Disraeli and of course Palmerston none of them would have behaved as supine Lee as Chamberlain and let's potential opponents take vital vital victories at Britain's and its allies expense number three no one's mentioned the resignation of Antony Eden he resigned before Munich on the basis that he and Chamberlain had fallen out because Roosevelt had suggested to Chamberlain that Roosevelt would share a Peace Conference in 1938 I'm curious to know why no one none of the speakers have mentioned this point because Eden had a clear vision of an alternative we've been offered two or turns as either war or peace Eden had a different program and he resigned it because Chamberlain wouldn't agree with him I'd like some comments on that if possible right thank you three good questions we'll start with number one was that this one was directed directly at professor Charlie was British policy in the 19th century in fact based on a long involvement with Europe and did Chamberlain therefore was he there for a long out of step with what had come before if I can try and deal with both and the deterrence issue because they are actually part of the same thing I think that the evidence is that where as for example with Portugal Spain British see how it could be used then certainly Britain was able effectively to intervene however when it was a matter of Central Europe say for example the austro-prussian war even the franco-prussian war and one only has to mention although one doesn't want to get into it but we are in the Royal Geographical Society the Sheikh hold on crisis and the plain fact automatic right so the plain fact of the matter is that certainly where Britain's deterrence could be used that's the Navy Britain intervened where she could not she did not and last time I looked Poland wasn't really amenable to British sea power and Czech Slovakia was landlocked so I think that in that sense Chamberlain's policy was exactly one without of the 15th Earl of Derby with that of the 14th Earl of Aberdeen where it involved an area that Britain could not fight they actually agreed with camming which is eat is better not to bluff where you cannot be effective but of course if any we'd known all the German secrets and we hadn't listened to our intelligence well if my auntie was my uncle she'd have a different set of equipment right we have a taker for the Antony Eden question role of Anthony Eden significance there of peers Brendon Antony is an interesting figure um he was the son of a half mad baronet in a very beautiful woman and somebody said that he was a little bit of both himself and the problem with Eden was that he that he was highly emotional and he fell out with she fell out with Chamberlain really I think because he felt miffed that Chamberlain had taken a front seat in in foreign policy I think Eden was pretty overrated he was as Beaverbrook described him he was a rebel in velvet gloves and he he was not not really he was regarded by Churchill as a sort of white hope of the future and I I don't think that I think the proof of the pudding was in 1956 where he proved that he wasn't the white hope at all that he was an absolute disaster area III think he didn't represent any serious resistance to the appeasement policy if you look at what he said he was very feeble and after he'd resigned he didn't really support Churchill in his his assault on upon appeasement so I I would say really that Eden is a bit of a broken Reed in this particular area and I'd certainly always have preferred Churchill drunk to Eden so right we've now had two could do one word about Eden and then we're gonna move to public cause you did raise the question about Roosevelt and about the Roosevelt initiative as it's called which was based on a secret telegram sent by Washington in January 1938 offering the prospects of an international conference to discuss disarmament etc etcetera that plan was first conceived by Sumner Welles a member of the State Department his boss executive State Cordell Hull didn't agree with him they were in dispute over this within Washington circles for a while but in the end the president sent this telegram asking whether or not the British take the lead in requiring a conference to be held just at the point when and asking for disarmament to the point when the British are really actually now really giving their rearmament and Chamberlain believing quite rightly that this was again just another gambit by the United States more words nothing to reinforce it Center a mild rebuff and it wasn't much of one and certainly Roosevelt didn't take offense and in the end there's some Wells initiative as it really was a filing in March 38 the point is that afterwards Churchill and in trying to make a use great play of it trying to say this was in Churchill's was the less blessed chance to to avoid a war what was he talking about there was no prospect of avoiding a war based upon some American verbal commitment the fact of the matter is in 1939 in September 39 the secretary stating of a war in in Washington had to admit that the Americans need to have one available division to actually fight in Europe that was the state of the American military establishment only 2% of American gross national product was devoted to rearmament in 1939 compared to 23% the Britain a 28 percent or thereabouts for Germany right we had one other question which we've now had in two versions going to war over Poland what wasn't that a waste of time shouldn't we shouldn't Poland have been in it wasn't it an acceptable casualty we should have let Hitler occupy Poland professor Charlie I they're both very good questions and indeed they both illustrate why Chamberlain's policy was right because by 1939 it had become clear neat secret intelligence reports anymore you certainly didn't need some press attache strike to sex up dossiers pretty dangerous line let's not do that people aren't actually that stupid you can't actually change public opinion in three weeks whatever a boastful chap says in his diary what changed opinion was Hitler breaking his word what changed opinion was what happened to Czechoslovakia and what looked like it was going to happen to Poland as Glenn said there were only two countries in World War two that went to war voluntarily that was Britain and France after they had exhausted all other possibilities and precisely the same factors which were much of the 1930s militated against involvement in 1939 convinced most people Harry Paulette the leader of the Communist Party and sir Oswald Mosley apart that the moment had come and there was no alternative and that is why when the disaster happened in 1930 1940 and Britain was almost alone and under tremendous threat public opinion did not crumble Churchill was right each contradict him on one of the few occasions when he's being modest but he was right when he said I gave the lion's roar and the reason the rat lion was roaring in favor of a war where it had not previously is that Neville had gone to the farthest and to the uttermost and we can see and everybody could see 1939 there was no alternative that was not clear in 1938 right professor Evans responds it was a Chamberlain himself did not see that in 1939 he was still appeasing away when Poland was being invaded that he was overruled by the House of Commons and died a broken man a few months later yet there was no limit to the policy of appeasement it was not something where we're which was going to have an end for him he thought Mussolini could intervene now my point is that Poland was not the actual subject of the declaration of war the subject the reason for war was the final realization in British political elite that and militarily that Germany was about conquering the whole of Europe and I agree with Professor Charlie that realization came in March 1929 when Hitler invaded the known german-speaking part of the Czechoslovakia but of course all of this could have been prevented in 1936 over the remilitarization of the Rhineland would French could have been prompted by the British to move in and invade and stop the Germans it could have been done in September 1938 when the British were prepared for war but it was not also of course therein one shouldn't just poopoo intelligence intelligence reports were coming in it there's a sort of curious footnote the older members of the audience may remember Peter Ustinov who was a wit raconteur and actor and his father clock was actually intelligence agents and Euston off remembers and when he was young a group of people in great secrecy coming up tramping upstairs the flats who talked to his father it turned out later these were people who would come to tell British intelligence service that the German generals were going to overthrow Hitler in 1938 if it came to war did Chamberlain take any notice of it no of course he didn't because he was blind to this kind of thing in his manic pursuit of appeasement right I will take three more questions and then we will be slowly moving on to summing up speeches so right I think I'm right in saying that Churchill was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty by umm Chamberlain um is that correct yeah so does this not rather give light to the fact that the proposition that Chamberlain was not ultimately opposed to Nancy ISM by appointing Churchill who um you pull in my point the Luftwaffe is coming sir then there was one sorry blue shirt there and and then one will take one more from the top and then we'll have summing up the one right this man right here and with the panel agree that every time Chamberlain appeased Hitler Germany got stronger so for instance when Germany took over Austria they managed to take over all their reserves I think it's about then about 800 million pounds which is very valuable to them and when they took over Czechoslovakia they took over their industries so by appeasing Hitler each time he actually made him stronger and when it came to war he put us right behind the game and now we had one over here during the 1930s not now in hindsight but during the 1930s one crisis after another you could see that Hitler was achieving territorial gains and appeasement kept continuing and he kept making more territorial gains he kept making Hitler kept making Hitler kept was making territorial gain okay one find out what this is the final question then we will have summing up speeches in which the panelists can answer whichever of these questions they they they choose before Munich Hitler had written mine camp - looking for leoben's Helmer in the east he had imprisoned large numbers of the Communist Party and killed many more in Germany and he had taken opposite sites as Stalin in the Spanish Civil War did Stalin really make a trade with Hitler because he thought he could get more out of it or because he was desperate at the lack of serious cooperation from the British on the French right thank you very much so for final questions what if he's meant the easiest policy for British in the 1930s the best for Hitler every time Hitler gained more - every time Hitler was appies he gained more pop more territory more power I will let the panelists think about these questions and as they print as they prepare their summing up speeches and while they do so and while they speak uh sure's will be around with ballot boxes for the final vote and once again a reminder you vote by tearing your ballot ticket which was handed to you upon entry into and you vote by placing either the for or against part into the ballot box and if you are don't know then you should place the entire ticket into the ballot box and vote for both sides ok summing up speeches will be made while you vote and they will each last 2 or 3 minutes and we make them in the reverse order to which they were that speakers spoke at the beginning so first goes Piers Brendan I'm fairly unprepared to do this what what what I feel is the most important thing really is that the the origins of this business of appeasement go back to 1935 what I was very struck by the by looking at 1935 and discovering that popular opinion was absolutely outraged by Mussolini's occupation of Ethiopia not least of course because he was using poisonous gas and because the British who had got completely foolproof evidence of the fact that he was using poisonous gas refused to condemn him on that Hanan fact got up in the hospitals and said that he couldn't impugn the honour of of a great country but the British public and I think again and again it comes back to this in a democracy what are the people think and in 1935 what they thought was strange because we ourselves had had a long Imperial tradition but they thought that Mussolini's behavior in Ethiopia was absolutely disgraceful now there wasn't an easy option which we did not take namely of blocking the Suez Canal and I think this would have arts this sort of satisfied outraged public opinion in Britain it would have isolated Germany it would have sent a signal to Hitler that these that we were not political eunuchs that we could in fact stand up for ourselves and it would something that we haven't talked about at all it would have served notice on Japan because don't forget that what was going on all the time from 1931 onwards was was the the continued nibbling away of China by Japan breaking out into a major war in 1937 the first the Second World War started in 1937 in the Far East this I think had we made a stand there had we made a stand the following year over the over um the occupation of the Rhineland which would have been easy the Germans hadn't got any proper bullets in their guns they had dummy bullets and they were under orders to retreat if that if any opposition was shown it would have been the easiest thing in the world to stop Hitler early and in 1935 would have been backed by public opinion so I I sort of see the Justice of what Churchill said in his book on Second World War um when he called it an unnecessary war I rest my case on that right Thank You Glenn stone I like to emphasize the kind of strategic problems faced by Britain in the 1930s because we are not only to consider Europe we had to consider the Mediterranean we had to consider the Far East as well and it would have been massively helpful to the British if the Americans have come in and helped us in the Far East and certainly Chamberlain hoped that the Americans would do that but they fail to offer any real support in the Far East as much as in Europe and elsewhere this created really proms Ferrari armament because we utter rearm our naval air and land forces and that would require enormous amounts of investment that investment was made made under considerable basis both through increased taxation and through loans and so on but in the end it would never be sufficient to actually beat a Germany by ourselves or even in tandem with the French when I'm allowed to look at the First World War to see that it had taken for great power is to finally bring Germany to the to surrender in 1918 and indeed it took a combination of powers during the Second World War to achieve that as well and there was no prospect of as being able to do that or fighting a war certainly to win a war more importantly probably not to lose a war without the support of other other great powers and the United States was in a sense the real problem if the Americans had been prepared to give that kind of support then maybe it would have been a different story but it's interesting to note that in 1914 when we were actually now at war with Germany along with the French during the period called the phoney war Sumner Welles came to Europe and visited Paris and Berlin and London and he talked about making concessions to to Germany he actually angered Chamberlain because he won't even consider the idea of the dismissing Hitler he was prepared to actually even think for a moment about it Hitler continuing as as a leader of Germany and as I said gem Lee was incensed that was a kind of thinking that was going on in the State Department through the 30s and into the Second World War there was still a possibility of making a settlement and of reaching some kind of agreement with what with the Hitler even in March 1940 fact in the matter was what they didn't want what they really feared and is what they got was a Europe particularly Eastern Europe that will be dominated by the Communists and in the end that is what happened that failure to give real and concrete support to Britain in France ended with their great nightmare that in the end your it was divided and it was divided between communism and capitalism thank you thank you Richard Evans just to come back to one or two of the last questions did appeasement make Germany stronger yes undoubtedly did appeasement encourage Hitler yes I argued that in my speech did Stalin just do a deal with Hitler because he despaired of the British and the French being able to do a deal yes he was desperate of course he will one thing we all agree on I think is that Soviet Union was weak after all the purges of the armed forces Venetians factories and so on at the end of the 1930s darling terrified wanted some kind of temporary stability while he put things back together again I just want to come back also to four stones arguments about Britain's seeking alliances and so on all of this would not have been necessary had appeasement not destroyed the credibility of the League of Nations the League of Nations was what was a collective security the idea the idea that what happened in 1935 with the invasion of Abyssinia was that the League of Nations attempted and made a valiant attempt to try and condemn Mussolini to try and raise sanctions all of this is very popular United Kingdom but it was completely sabotage by the British government because it believed in one-to-one diplomacy not in invoking collective security in that destroyed any further prospect of it so the final point I want to make is about the economy the British economy was far stronger than the German it survived the depression much much better than the than the German economy journey is extremely hard hit by the depression and it took a long time to recover recovery was driven by real Mon but it didn't really happen until the very late nineteen nineteen thirties in the mid 1930s Britain was a much stronger economic position to to deal with Germany had it wished to write thank you John Charlie has the last word for change um well I did enjoy the Alice in Wonderland world with 20/20 hindsight produces in which this war like Italy was always determined on war was determined on war because he was appeased what you've been deter Owen if some German generals were going to shooting at German James was gonna shoot Hitler and when they finally got rounds trying to do it they mucked it up God really let's give it a whole Empire millions to war on the on the rumor that some German generals gonna get your shot right that's a good one oh the wisdom of the Monday Morning Quarterback it's wonderful the fact is the policy was as Paul Schroeder and Paul Kennedy have said the most over determined in British history now weather was possible Richard is of course quite right the British economy was strong by 1939 that's because Neville had not bankrupted the country by going for the stupid rearmament Churchill wanted which would have produced a bunch of medium-range bombers in 1940 wouldn't a pretty Churchill wasn't in favor of Spitfires or radar he wanted medium-range bombers that would have worked now come mom I do hope you've voted the right way but it was a wonderful exercise in nostalgia listening to the other side I feel like Eric welcome they gave the same old arguments but not necessarily in the right order thank you thank you thank you thank you to all of our panelists yeah I know well they don't have the voucher as we are still waiting for the vote I am I'm going to take away from John charm lead the the last word and I'm going to hand it to want to decide because both of them were groaning and making faces at the same time you were groaning - but you got yourself one final response whichever one of you wants it here's Brendan and then we'll have the vote after you know after you know we're talking about this some kid says I'll give it wait I say he'll give it wit um I think I'm right out of wish at the moment um half-wit perhaps no I was this an exercise in nostalgia we should you should maybe answer that question I don't I think John's position is is completely indefensible on this and I I said at the last consultation that we had with him that I would I would um support any particular argument that he was against and I certainly I said makes it easy that on this particular occasion we're justified in doing this I beg of you do not allow this this spurious argument that he has been putting forward to convince you that um that he's right to lay and now I have the secret bedroom but also it was also John John's final speech was also far too late because you'd already voted by then thank you yes I I should point out that our some of our panelists voted on the way in and some of them didn't so there by there by twisting the initial vote anyway we now have the result before the debate there was 25% for the motion and after the bait 44% for before the debate there was 41% against the motion after the debate 52% against the motion who don't know shrunk from 34% to 4% so Bravo to all the panelists for having changed at least 30% of my you

Channel: Intelligence Squared

Views: 174,421

Rating: 4.2828145 out of 5

Keywords: Intelligence Squared, Debate, great oratory, Intelligence Squared debate, speech, top debates, best debates, most interesting debates, educational debates, intelligence2, intelligencesquared, is debate, iq2, iq2 debate, iq squared, Neville Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Richard Evans, Glyn Stone, Piers Brendon, John Charmley, Anne Applebaum, appeasement, Munich Crisis, Munich Agreement, Peace for our time, peace in our time, Sudetenland, etabednialrebmahc, talk, event

Id: fmyecSXOla8

Length: 91min 44sec (5504 seconds)

Published: Wed Jun 12 2013

Reddit Comments

[u/ZaltPS2]

I've just recently discovered this channel and it has some interesting debates on some historical topics, such as British appeasement prior to WW2 but also current topics such as the impact of Merkel and Europe's stance with Russia. The debates are well rounded and seem to be balanced from the ones I've seen so far.

[u/Szkwarek]

And yet 77 years later many in western Europe take the same stance. Nothing's been learned.