Severomorsk.
At the beginning of the 20th century, it was home to about 13 families
of huntsmen and fishermen. Today, it houses the main base of the
Russian Federation's Northern Fleet, and it's not easy
to get permission to visit. But we haven't come to one of
the most secret cities in Russia just out of mere curiosity. I'm here to tell you
about the K-21 submarine. In the spring of 1942,
command of this ship was entrusted to Captain 3rd
Rank Nikolai Lunin. This was the beginning
of one of the most vivid pages in the history
of the Russian Navy. Naval Legends:
K-21 Submarine The Soviet K-class submarines,
nicknamed "Katiusha" by sailors, were created thanks
to efforts of Mikhail Rudnitsky, the chief of the submarine department
at the Institute of Naval Shipbuilding. At the beginning of 1935,
he presented his own project of a "cruiser and fleet submarine"
to the U.S.S.R. Naval command. The specifications of this
submarine were so promising that even before the final technical
project had been approved, the decision was made to construct
a large series of ships of this class. The author of the project, which was sometimes nicknamed
"Rudnitsky's cruiser" in his honor, managed to create a ship with very
extensive and varied combat capabilities, that were a perfect match for the
Soviet naval doctrine of that time. It was supposed that, in order to
perform the tasks of a fleet submarine, she would stay within
a specified area and patrol it. If an enemy appeared, she would let
the main Allied forces know about it. Then, using her
advantageous situation, she would be able to deploy mines in
the path of the advancing enemy fleet. After the hostiles suffered
some losses in this minefield, the sub would carry
out a torpedo attack. After this, she would disengage and wait for the enemy
to sail away from the quadrant. Thanks to her higher speed, she
would then move to another position and reengage
the hostiles there. That's the action algorithm
of a fleet submarine. Simultaneously, large submarines
were to carry out cruiser missions: acting on sea communications in remote
areas, far from home bases and shores. The technical project
of a "cruiser and fleet submarine" was developed and improved
for a further two years. In December 1936, the first three
ships were laid down in Leningrad. This series of submarines
received the number XIV; in the Navy they were
designated as the K-class. Specifications
of K-class submarines: Length: 97.6 meters.
Beam: almost 7.5 meters. Mean draft: 4 meters.
Submerged displacement: 2,104 tons. The boat has a double hull. Maximum diameter
of the pressure hull: 5.3 meters. Thickness of the
pressure hull: 18 to 22 mm. The submarine is divided
into seven compartments: The first and seventh—torpedo
compartments with crew berths. The second—
bow battery compartment. The officers' mess hall and five single
cabins for the commanding officers were located on its deck. The first group of accumulator
batteries was installed in the hold. The third—control room with
the conning tower on top of it. The artillery magazine found
its place in the compartment's hold. The fourth—
aft battery compartment. The petty officers' mess hall and
24 crew bunks were on its deck; the second group of batteries
was installed in the hold. The fifth—diesel compartment.
The sixth—electromotive compartment. Armament:
Ten 533-mm torpedo launchers: six at the bow and four aft,
with two of them in the superstructure. Ammunition: 24 torpedoes. Artillery armament: two 100-mm
B-24PL dual-purpose guns, two 45-mm 21-K dual-purpose guns, two
7.62-mm M-1 removable machine guns. The boat carried 20 EP ground anchor
mines developed for fleet submarines, which could be deployed
with a mining device located underneath
the control room. Power plant.
Two diesel engines, 4,200 hp each. A diesel generator, 800 hp.
Two electric engines, 2,400 hp each. Two groups of accumulator
batteries, 240 elements each. Maximum surface speed: 21 knots.
Maximum submerged speed: 10.3 knots. Submergence depth: 80 meters.
Maximum depth: 100 meters. Cruising range at 10 knots: surfaced—
7,500 miles, submerged—11.5 miles. Endurance: 50 days. Maximum time
submerged: 72 hours. Crew: 66 people. The boat had it all:
a long cruising range, high speed, powerful torpedo armament—
with ten torpedo launchers, and, moreover,
she could set mines. But in order for a sub to have
good underwater maneuverability, you need one
kind of hull shape; to make her agile on the surface, you
need a slightly different hull shape; and if you plan to use the
boat as an artillery platform, you need a third kind. Soviet engineers—much to their credit—
managed to combine all this in one ship. However, all these advantages came
at a price, and the price they paid came in the form of the overall
lightening of the submarine's hull. Moreover, when the engineering
blueprints were being prepared, errors in the calculations for the
metacentric height and boat's load were discovered,
which caused stability issues. To fix them, engineers
had to remove the gun shields, make the plating of superstructure and
conning tower railing out of aluminum, and reduce the thickness
of the outer hull to 6 mm. The reduction of the outer-hull thickness
had very negative consequences. Any explosions of depth charges nearby
would cause welded seams to crack, watertight fuel tanks
would be compromised, and leaking fuel would
expose the submarine’s position. Even rough seas could be enough
to severely damage the hull. For example, after K-1
was hit by a Force 10 storm, her superstructure
shifted to such a degree that it jammed the
capstan and bow rudders. However, these individual
technical drawbacks of "Katiushas" weren't that important compared
to the shortage of prepared crews. By the end of the 1930s,
the U.S.S.R. hadn't managed to organize the fully-fledged training of submarine
officers directly in naval schools. The Navy, meanwhile, had only two training squads
for underwater operations, which prepared Commanders
and specialists for submarines. The problem was that these
schools weren't able to prepare the necessary number
of Commanders and specialists at the rate at which the shipbuilding
industry was producing new submarines. By the summer of 1941, the Soviet
submarine fleet included 212 ships: 85 in the Pacific fleet,
67 in the Baltic fleet, 44 in the Black Sea fleet,
16 in the Northern fleet. 118 of them were either under repair
or at different stages of construction. The remaining 94 were
complemented with crews that underwent practical
training directly on them. The most important thing—a crew required
time to master all the machinery. To this end, a training
program was developed. The training program for submarines,
adopted in 1938, consisted of 21 tasks. Here are some of them: Task 2: controlling
a submarine when submerging, carrying out submerged
maneuvers, and surfacing. Task 13: attacking a ship sailing
along an alternating course with torpedoes
from a long initial range. Task 21: joint maneuvers of a group of
submarines when evading the enemy. Ships whose crews had completed all the
tasks were considered fully combat-ready. The highest
certification of a submarine was to successfully
complete a submerged attack against a high-speed formation of
warships with anti-submarine escorts, moving along a zigzag path. The Soviet submarine fleet
had very few certified subs. So, the reality was that, despite having
a large number of boats at our disposal, only half of them,
at best, were combat-ready. Only two submarines were fully
prepared for combat in the Baltic Sea; 19 in the Black Sea;
and none in the Northern Fleet. On September 17, K-21 was
commissioned into the Northern Fleet, and after very tight and
intensive combat training, she went out
on her first war patrol. During the autumn of 1941,
"Katiushas" had to adapt to sailing conditions in the
Northern Arctic waters first of all. The Barents Sea tested the endurance
of the ship and her crew on every cruise. It turned out that surface speed was very
much dependent on the sea conditions: at Force 5 roughness, which is quite
characteristic for Arctic latitudes, speed dropped twofold; while during a storm a submarine
could list up to 50-55 degrees. To help submarines stay
on course and maintain their position, a system of automatic
movement stabilization was installed. It was able to adjust
both course and depth, and was also
called the “autopilot.” However, the electric motors
of this system were too noisy and sailors would often disable it during
missions and switch to manual control. For the German
troops in the Far North, shipments by sea were virtually
the only source of supplies. That's why these routes were the primary target of Soviet
submarines throughout the war. However, the enemy didn't conduct large
ocean convoys near Norwegian shores, and the K-class
cruiser submarines were designed to hunt
exactly for this type of convoy. Active transportation was carried
out by small groups of ships with modest tonnage that sailed along
the shoreline, taking cover in fjords. Often, these were common motorboats
and mobilized fishing vessels, and it made no practical sense
to spend torpedoes on them. In September 1941, on their
way back from a combat cruise, the commanding officer
responsible for artillery on K-2 suggested firing a blank shot from their
main gun when entering the harbor, in honor of their victory. Later, this tradition was adopted by
all submariners of the Northern Fleet. It's worth noting
that the K-class submarines scored their first and
last victory with artillery fire. In terms of artillery armament, "Katiushas" surpassed all
Soviet submarines of that time. Their 100-mm
dual-purpose guns were even sometimes used for
anti-aircraft defense at home bases. Of course, these submarines found
the main application for their guns at sea and near enemy coasts. The events that occurred at the end
of 1941, during a combat cruise of K-3 when she was helmed by
Lieutenant Commander Malafeiev, present a very
characteristic example of this. On December 3, K-3 discovered
a small convoy off Hammerfest that included the cargo ship
Altkirch and three submarine chasers. The Soviet submarine carried
out an attack, but failed— all torpedoes
missed their targets. Moreover, by firing a salvo
the boat revealed herself and was immediately
spotted by the enemy escorts. The Germans set
chase to K-3 at once, and in just a couple of minutes
dropped around 30 depth charges. While evading them, "Katiusha"
hit the ground three times, and finally laid on the bottom
with all noisy mechanisms disabled. However, the attack continued,
and each new series of charges with the correct depth setting
could have become the last for K-3. Water started gradually
leaking into the pressure hull, but enabling the drainage pumps
would cause too much noise. In this critical situation, the Captain
had one extreme measure left— to surface and engage
in an artillery battle. With her fifth salvo, K-3 hit the
aft of one of the German chasers, where the depth
charges were stored. The ship went
under almost instantly. The second chaser, armed
only with 20-mm autocannons, hurried to disengage
by setting a smoke screen. The third ship was too distant, and
her salvoes fell short of the submarine. K-3 disappeared beyond the
horizon before the enemy's eyes. Later on, it was found out
that an enemy coastal ship had hit a mine cluster deployed by
the sub a week prior to those events. Thus, the first mission
of K-3 in the Northern Fleet turned out to be very successful. This hatch was used
to load anchor mines, which were stored in the
hold in mine and ballast tanks. By the way,
the submarines of this class proved themselves to be
excellent minelayers during the war. More than half of the enemy tonnage
they sank was from their mines. But what’s most staggering is
the audacity of Soviet submariners, who entered narrow Norwegian
fjords with unfamiliar fairways on their almost
100-meter long ships. Often, they were spotted
by lookouts on the coast, but cool-headedly ignored
all of their signals and requests, and deployed mine clusters and minefields
across enemy communication routes. Submarine K-1, commanded by Captain
2nd Rank Mikhail Avgustinovich, holds the absolute
record of the Northern fleet for the number of enemy
ships destroyed by mines. During the course of her service,
this boat deployed 146 mines that destroyed five
transports and two guard ships. What's interesting is that the number
of confirmed victories of Avgustinovich surpassed the number
of claimed victories— a very rare exception
in the Soviet underwater fleet. Post-war studies showed that
the effectiveness of submarines was often overstated. It wasn't caused by their Commanders'
ambitions, but rather the lack, or absence of resources and means
to verify the results of an attack. When newspapers or radio
informed people of the victories of the Soviet submariners, they
didn't require verification anymore. In 1942, when the Red Army suffered a number
of crushing defeats on other fronts, the Soviet people badly needed
to know that somewhere, at least, the enemy was
getting successfully hit. He launched four torpedoes at the
German task force—at battleship Tirpitz. Ten spare torpedoes were stored
in the forward torpedo room, and six more were loaded
and ready in the launchers. Initially, submarines of this class
weren't equipped with a system that enabled bubble-
free torpedo launching, which was a substantial
tactical disadvantage. The enemy could detect
a salvo fired from a submarine and perform evasive maneuvers. Moreover, by firing several
torpedoes underwater, the boat risked
disclosing her position. For this reason,
some Soviet Captains fired torpedoes from
the maximum effective range. On K-21, the system of bubble-free
fire was installed in March 1942. By the way, it was partially
Nikolay Lunin's initiative to install the system for
bubble-free torpedo launching. He was an
experienced submarine officer who had completed five war
patrols on submarine Shch-421, and carried out
seven torpedo attacks. On March 4, he was
appointed as K-21's Captain. An interesting fact: the order
giving him command of K-21 came exactly one day after the decree
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which awarded him the
title of “Hero of the Soviet Union.” Thus, he first became a hero, and
the very next day was given command of the largest and most powerful
submarine in the Russian Navy. Everything started
with submarine cruisers. I mean, a plethora of new things were
introduced on ships after World War II, and the first ships to accommodate
such novelties were cruiser submarines. Hygiene was improved,
and more bunks were installed: each sailor, petty officer, midshipman,
and officer had their own bunks. Water distillers were
installed for the first time. Two distillers, each
of which was able to provide around 40 liters
of distilled water per hour. The most interesting part—
stall showers were installed. You know, in practice, such things
as distilling water, heating water, and everything related to it
is just wasted energy. Almost no Commander would
agree to spend energy on water, and potentially spend the resources
required for a torpedo attack, or the chance to flee from
enemy ships after an attack— I mean, from submarine
chasers and destroyers. Our grandfathers served
on submarines in the North in severe and
Spartan conditions. Moreover, the submarines of the
time didn't even have any heating. On June 18, 1942,
K-21 started her fifth raid. For ten days, the submarine cruised
along the northern coastline of Norway, searching for targets. During the night of June 28,
Lunin received an order to move to another location close to
Cape Nordkinn to cover convoy PQ-17. Several days later,
the Allies learned that a task force of surface ships,
headed by Tirpitz, had set sail. The largest German ship was
a highly valuable piece on the board, and by losing this piece, the Kriegsmarine would lose
their advantage in the North. Both opposing parties knew that,
which was why the German command valued concealment and secrecy most
of all while planning their operations. The Allies, in their turn, took all
possible measures to detect Tirpitz. In the evening of July 4, convoy PQ-17
received the fatal order to spread out. The German squadron
wasn’t aware of this and continued along
their previous course. By the second half of the next day,
the squadron had neared Cape Nordkinn. The characteristics of the
listening sonar installed on K-21 weren't that impressive. But Lunin was lucky enough
to have a good sonar operator. At 16:22 on July 5, 1942,
he reported to the officer of the watch that he had heard
some indistinct noise. The noise was getting louder at a course
angle of 30 degrees on their starboard. The Commander ordered the sub to turn,
and extended the periscope several times in order to identify
the source of the noise. As the boat continued
moving towards them, dim outlines transformed into
large ships escorted by destroyers. Lunin declared
a torpedo attack state on K-21. The enemy was
following an irregular course. In other words, the ships were moving in
formation—an anti-submarine formation. It meant there was a group of destroyers
in front of three large ships, which were moving
in a front formation. The task of the destroyers moving ahead
of large ships in a front formation is to detect submarines. Not just detect submarines, but
force them to change their course. Either a submarine is detected, or she will try to avoid
the collision at periscope depth. Therefore, when a submarine
submerges and then surfaces, she will have only
one chance to attack, because the ships
are moving at high speed. Initially, Lunin planned to attack
using the bow torpedo launchers, but at 17:50
he raised the periscope and saw that the squadron
had changed the course. This made a torpedo attack from
the bow launchers impossible. The Commander made
a decision to launch the aft torpedoes. A lack of experience in attacking
fast-moving targets with strong escorts, imperfect tracking devices,
errors in analyzing target motion, and the risk of being revealed with an
additional extension of the periscope— all these and other factors made it
harder to prepare a torpedo attack. Nevertheless, Lunin made
a second attempt, a risky one, to launch torpedoes at a receding
target from an obtuse angle. According to his calculations, the
distance was maximum, but acceptable. At a particular moment, K-21
was surrounded by the escort ships and could have been detected. Lunin gathered all the data for
a launch, extended the periscope, and waited for the target
to enter the computed zone. The parameters he had, indicated
that the attack would be successful. He launched four torpedoes at the
German task force—at battleship Tirpitz. Immediately
after the torpedo salvo, K-21 submerged to 30 meters and
left the attack area at full speed. Approximately an hour later, a radiogram was received at the Coastal
Command HQ of the Northern Fleet. "At 1800, latitude 71025`N, longitude
23040` E, attacked enemy ships comprising battleships Tirpitz
and Scheer, and eight destroyers. Attacked battleship Tirpitz.
Heard two blasts. Commander of K-21." Meanwhile, in the North,
far away from K-21, German aviation and submarines
were pillaging convoy PQ-17. Soviet destroyers
left the Northern fleet bases, and aircraft took off from the coastal
aerodromes to search for the enemy. The radiogram from Lunin was
still being decoded on the coast, which is why nobody knew the exact
location of the German task force. Nevertheless, everyone understood that
they had to be detected at any cost. At 19:16, the German squadron
was detected by the crew of the Il-4 airplane from the Second
Guards' Composite Air Regiment. Severe weather conditions
obstructed the flight— low clouds and fog made it almost
impossible to detect the enemy ships. But the persistence of Soviet pilots in
fulfilling their mission was rewarded. The pilot noticed
a small gap between the clouds, plotted the course
in that direction, and found himself right
above the enemy forces. The scout
immediately sent a message about detecting a German
squadron comprising 11 ships, and following a course of
65 degrees at a speed of 10 knots. The error in determining
the squadron's speed played a crucial part
in the coming events. The text of the decoded
radiogram from K-21 and data from the
reconnaissance aircraft led to the conclusion that the
speed of the German squadron had been reduced because one of the
ships had received serious damage. It proved that Lunin's
attack had been successful. After our British allies
received the message about detecting the German task
force, they radioed it in such a way that guaranteed the
Germans would intercept it— and they did intercept the message
in two hours and decoded it. The message was decoded both by
the task force, and on the mainland. The German command saw the message
as a reason to abort the operation. That message had
basically eliminated the secrecy that was the top priority
of the German command. They realized that
they had been discovered. Moreover, there were messages
from aviation and submarines stating that the convoy
had been dispersed, and was being successfully destroyed
by aviation and submarine forces, so the capital ships
had nothing to do there. In the evening of July 8, the Soviet
Information Bureau transmitted a message saying that the submarine under the
command of Captain 2nd Rank Nikolai Lunin had scored two torpedo hits
on German battleship Tirpitz. The news about the torpedo
attack on the largest German ship was published not only
in the main Soviet papers, but a corresponding note was
also released in the foreign press. This was why, the following day,
when K-21 arrived at the base, the whole world was already
aware of the heroic deed of the submarine
and her Commander. By the fall of 1942, after the events of the fifth raid
had been reviewed in detail, Nikolai Lunin
and his submarine, K-21, were decorated with the
Order of the Red Banner. Over time, that attack had created a plethora
of speculations and assumptions, and finally became a legend
that still causes many arguments. It's all clear from
the historical perspective. The specific facts
which are now available to everyone who's
eager to study them undeniably suggest that the attack took
place, but that it was unsuccessful. However, the attack itself was
a heroic deed in any case. Lunin did everything he could,
and everything he had been taught. The first torpedo attack failed, but he still took a risk
and attempted a second attack. That was the first and only attack by our
submarines on large enemy surface ships. In November 1943,
Nikolai Lunin became Commander of the 1st Submarine
Division of the Northern Fleet. Six months later, he was sent
to the Military Naval Academy. He graduated from the
Academy after the war ended. Submarine K-21 had seven more
war patrols, primarily for laying mines. At the time of her last raid,
the conning tower of the submarine was decorated with the number 17—
the number of her victories. As a matter of fact, the combat cruises of submarine
K-21 ended on April 12, 1944. She required midlife repairs, and
after being docked, she didn't take part in any further military actions
until the end of the war. That might have saved the life
of the submarine and her crew, because she was the only submarine
out of six boats of her class that survived the war. After being decommissioned
from the Navy in 1954, K-21 was converted
into a training facility where submariners
practiced survivability skills. In 1981, the Military Council of the
Fleet proposed to make submarine K-21 a memorial to honor all the submariners
who had died during the war. Four compartments
were rebuilt as a museum, so just the forward torpedo
room, forward battery room, and control room with the conning
tower remained almost unchanged. The victories of submariners from
the Northern Fleet are sacred to me— no matter what anyone says. The numbers can be
exaggerated or underrated. To my mind, it would
be an insult not only to me, but to the veterans
who are no longer here with us, when someone who only
read the numbers would say: "Come on, how many
ships did you sink, you say? You just sailed
about at sea and that's it." In wartime, huh?
In the conditions of the North, a patrol by any submarine
is already a heroic deed because their crews always left
the base with a one-way ticket— they never knew whether
they would return or not. It's not hard to understand the
idea of the memorial’s creators. A famous warship, the only preserved
K-class boat of the Northern Fleet, united with the coast
that she once defended. It symbolizes the memories of the
heroic deeds of Soviet submariners that are preserved by today's sailors,
and the connection which unites them.
