LSE Events | The Global Distribution Of Income And The Politics Of Globalisation

it's a it's pleasure for get Franco which here when the when the inequalities Institute is really ascending to get stars coming coming to talk coming to talk to us oh but I'm remember I have to say first of all hashtag LSE capitalism okay hashtag LSE capitalism and this is being put on by the inequalities Institute and if you want to know more about the amazing things which the inequalities Institute has been doing and is going to do get on to its website whoopsie-daisy [Laughter] so Bronco is going to talk for half an hour thirty five minutes or so and then Marie Anna and Paul and I'll introduce them when they speak and to are going to be discussing and then I hope we have about 25 minutes or so for questions and discussion so I almost don't need to introduce Bronco except to say he he he wrote well the two books which he's rehearse but which is just coming out which is super exciting books where he wrote the book in 2005 called worlds apart and this really for the first time engaged with the idea what would happen if you tried to do a world distribution of income and nobody rate I mean people maybe talk about nobody really I done this before before then so I would say that this is the this is an extraordinary achievement putting a big big big picture thing on the on the map and then in a book heart global inequalities about three years ago he introduced the concept of the elephant and you may well know the concept of the elephant but the elephant illustrates free features of income distribution in the world one is the rising weight of the middle classes outside the advanced world a second is the declining weight of the middle classes in the advanced world and then the trunk goes right up like that to tell us about the top 1% so this was a marvelous way for certain people to remember what was what was going on and I will without more ado get you to come and talk to us thank you very much well thank you so much David thank you for this excellent introduction actually saved me some time because I'm not going to explain the elephant graph you did it it's always a huge pleasure to be to be at LSE obviously like I'm very grateful to all of you to have come over here tonight it's Friday evening it's a beautiful weather outside so I doubly appreciate your being here and I hope you will not be totally kind of regretting having come here so let me go then quickly into what I want to talk you know you know the title actually Paul and I and Anna I've had a little bit also over the discussion I think this could be a new term which we actually talked about globalization embedded liberal capitalism it's really quite a mouthful but I think actually maybe managed to explain why we had had decided to call it like that obviously we'll talk about global inequality and the evolution over the couple of centuries but before I do that of course we everybody this is now general practice we have to advertise our work and this is as David said the global inequality most of my talk will be based on this book which you can also find out there at a very affordable price and then the new one is coming actually it would I hope it will be out this August and it's called as you can see somewhat enigmatically capitalism alone but I might explain later maybe in the Q&A why I gave it such a title so now I will first actually start and I would then explain and show what I believe like our two key features of the world that we are living through now and I think it's particularly interesting I believe for the young people because I would you would have think seeing empirically how different is current period compared to the periods over the last two centuries and I think I mentioned that I think it's very important because we are too much so should I say we suffer what what you might call present yzma actually we ourself will focus on what is happening today now that I think very often we forget to actually look backwards and to see what is happening now in the context of history so two points which I think are important to realize first one and that's partly why my book capitalism alone is called capitalism alone is that capitalism for the first time in history is I think the sole socio-economic system or the mode of production in all the countries in the world obviously the immediate question will be like how is China capitalist I will not talk about it today there's a whole chapter in my forthcoming book but I think that the arguments are pretty strong so just believe me for the arguments until the book is out and then you can criticize it and the second point is that we also have what you might call rebalancing of the world with the rapid increase of incomes in Asian countries again China but don't not only China we are talking about countries like big countries obviously huge countries like India Indonesia Vietnam Thailand Burma more recently and so on so there is this rebalancing of the world which i think is important because we again focus too much on what's happening today our Chile this very moment between China and the US and we forget that actually what is happening now is the return to the relative income levels when I say relative it means relative between you know Asia and China and Western Europe to the position where they were in around like 1500 so in other words when you look at the distribution of income in the Eurasian continent and now we could include of course North America in that as well I mean more recent period you actually then had really higher developed regions in the maritime regions of India obviously eastern China and then of city-states of the of Italy the Netherlands and the UK and that's where we're really the more developed parts are and that's exactly I think what we are going towards in this century so the rebalancing of the world and the rise of Asia is to some extent the return to where the world was 500 years ago but obviously a much higher level of income then I will say something about the emergence of the global middle class this is again something related obviously to the rise of Asia as you will see in a minute it's also I want to mention a very new development we have never had in history a global middle class we have never had actually sufficient number of people who were located around the median and that number I think actually again because of Asian growth is increasing every year now of course as Asian growth is outstripping others they are moving upward in there in the global income distribution which then again has an impact on the position of the middle classes of the advanced or the rich countries and David said that before is that of course we have now a really lots of interesting developments that you really have to kind of sometimes the problem visualizing them you have the growth of the global middle class or I call it still middle but it's really global medium class because there are not really rich people by the Western standards but they're in the middle of the global income distribution and we have shrinkages of the Western middle classes so the two movements I believe are actually are quite related but they as you can see they have different implications that the shrinkage of the Western middle classes has a clear political implication the growth of the global middle class doesn't have as clear political implication as at least to me because there is no political space within which they can actually exercise whatever political role then they might have so it is mostly they may be similarity in education similarity in consumption patterns but not political role now it remains maybe for political scientists maybe political philosophers to think whether there will be this new development would actually produce some forms of or some new political space where that middle class would be able to Express itself I'm talking about global middle class then if we time permits we'll talk I say something about the last 25 years in the rich world and I think that's basically it then we would move to the to the Q&A so let me start with the long run very long run again I will not go into the data like how it was derived as you can imagine the numbers which are over 1820 1850 1870 are much more tentative than the numbers that we have now on the vertical axis you have the Gini index and all the horizontal axis as you can see you have the time or the years so the data start from in 1820 it's actually essentially driven how it is done let me just say in one very simple sentence what you depend on in order to do these numbers from the 19th century or you depend on two pieces of information first it's a crucial one it is medicine agnus medicine database of GDP per capita so you need a GDP per capita all expressed in the same units it is actually I have to say it is now updated by me using 2011 PPP's and then you need a kind of a distribution function for large countries so how these distribution functions are actually derived is really kind of a little bit like when you go into sausage factory you don't want to see too well how it is done because obviously you know distribution function for China 18:20 distribution function for India in 1020 it's merely a lot of that is is a guesswork but what is important is that actually we have these benchmarks of GDP per capita which are crucial and they don't vary very much from one revision of the medicine database to the other and then you essentially then essentially put these distributions on top of these benchmarks of GDP per capita and derive global income distribution in the past now in the last 25 or 30 years of course we are more sophisticated we have now household surveys so this is what David was alluding that we do that before you collected from all the countries you actually then adjust for the price levels you even adjust for the under estimation of the top 1% so our data are obviously much better now but they are far from ideal now what does this graph show it shows you that we start is the world with a relatively high level of global inequality of 55 Gini points which is actually about the level of inequality in Brazil today and then over during the entire sent 19th century and all the way to the early 20th century we have an increasing global inequality so what is behind that increasing global inequality is as you can see Industrial Revolution and the rise of the West I will explain that in the next graph with more detail that this is all for now and then we have the global inequality staying in an extraordinary high level of inequality of Gini 70 points or even over 70 points through the latter part of the 20th century all the way towards until practically the last decade or maybe the two last decades of the 20th century and then what do you see you see a significant decline of global inequality which is related to the rise of Asia now the intuition there I think it should be very clear the intuition is that the rise of Asia drives global inequality down because these are people who have lots of people first lots of people who are very poor in the beginning of the period and then they become less poor middle class or richer and consequently that middle becomes larger and global inequality goes down it is a very very sort of up I mean culture is a broad-brush view of history a particularly recent history because there are many other issues there for example what will happen in the future with Africa and so on but let me still still remain at this kind of a very broad brush general level because I want to show you how also you can look at these two centuries and see our period I think much more clearly then then we would see the way when we don't look at the past I will explain in a minute but you remember the title from Karl Marx to Franz fanon and back to Marx with a question mark there Eddie at the end so what's that inequality that I've shown you can be also what you can do with that inequality of the Gini 55 you can decompose it into two components and that's of course what everybody has been doing and actually the original of work was done by France a bourguignon and Christian movie song but the issue is actually and I'm just saying that really many young people they teach whenever you do the composition you should really not simply decompose you should actually think what is behind it because every decomposition has a story to tell so if you take impose global inequality what you have here is a blue bar is inequality which is due to inequalities between the countries so that's the inequality between for example in today's world because you know it goes all the way to 2013 it's the difference in average income between the UK and Bulgaria to say to use the example from the European Union its Mexico versus the US it is Spain versus Morocco it is Malaysia versus Indonesia so it is the mean to compare to the other mean and then that could be cold as they call it location in other words how much of total inequality is due to the differences between the countries and what you notice there and of course we have problems because the number of countries is increasing in over time but these are population weighted numbers so you know it doesn't you know it does matter the number of countries but less than if you just got no population weighted data so what you notice is that 19th century all the way to the 1950s is the period of dramatic divergence in mean country Incas where does it come from it comes from the fact that the Western Europe and North America and later Japan are becoming much richer India is stagnating and China went even down so essentially these three large groups of people China India the West are moving in very different directions and that's a more or less that's what is actually driving inequality up on top of that what you have during that period and it's actually very interesting period this is now the second part which is inequality with nation states so this is the second part of which global in a quiet is composed now what is the second part it is inequality within each country then added up across all the countries of people in that country so you should think of this red bar and it's difference in income between the farmers and landlords between workers and capitalists between you know rich classes in poorer classes in the UK plus in Russia plus in China plus in India and so forth to all the countries and what is that what is very interesting over that period of this 100 and plus years is that you have the rise in both blue part and the red part the blue particles up because countries become different in income levels which then of course you can say led to the economic domination of the west over the rest of the world colonialism and the Age of Empires it were is driven by the blue and the red was is increasing as well and it's rising class conflict and when you look at the importance of this red bar then you can of course also say well if you're writing that's why Mars was in the title if you're writing if you're like Marx sitting and writing in eighteen sixties and so on you obviously don't have don't know these numbers actually we know these numbers only recently we have known them since probably twenty years fifteen years or so but you your whole perception of the world is based on two things first of all that the class conflict within each nation-state is a dominant cleavage the second point is people who are poor in each country are at relatively similar material circumstances so there could be some solidarity between them now think of this how it would change then in the second period which I call you know Frantz Fanon period because they're the blue part which was really large income gaps between poor and rich world and the creation of the three worlds the first second and third mean now that actually the cleavage the difference in income between the countries is really the key cleavage so you cannot now have say and and put some of the who know you're Marty's literature well it became already clear in letras between angles and Mart's in 1880 1870 I think 78 was the letter when they talk about the abou Hoosiers mount of the English working class it's essentially what happened is that the poor people in the rich countries became much richer than the poor people in poor countries so you really do not have similarity in economic circumstances anymore between them moreover in the second period you have obviously after the World War Two introduction and even before introduction of the welfare state is you know goes back in Germany to Bismarck and you have reduction in income inequalities within countries so the second period is a period where you have the creation of the three worlds and that's Frantz Fanon is actually a very good exemplar of ideology of the three worlds where really the third world is the proletariat of the world and the advanced countries of the first world are the bourgeoisie of the walls and actually there is a quote from out the tomb which says exactly that and then the class conflict within countries diminished because you have reduction of inequalities within nation-states and it's not only the case in in the West it's actually case in many countries that have actually gone through the period of developments and obviously that's the case in all the communist countries and others and why are we now in the third period because as you can see the graph really looks very different now is because the rise of Asia which have spoken before is shrinking the blue bar very significantly at the same time we do have an increase in inequalities within most countries over the last 40 years which increase slightly in the graph because we are really talking about the world here but they're increasing the red bar so the current period is very different from the others because this is the age of convergence between the countries or among the countries rather and it's the age of rising eternal cleavage so we don't have unlike the first period which you can say was bad on two grounds divergence of the countries and divergence within countries in this period we have convergence between countries which is good remember it is population weighted so the fact that China is converging is much more important than if child were to converge and the second thing is reappearance of the important cleavage within nation-states so I think this is the story I will have to actually finish it with a slide here but this is actually a story which I think essentially if you extend it into the future into the 21st century is going to dominate I think the 21st century it is the story which is behind the creation of the global middle class it is a story which is also behind the creation of the global plutocracy of the global 1% and it is basically a story where the difference is in income between the nation-states would go down again with the caveat what will happen to Africa but the cleavage is within nations might become exacerbated and would become stronger than they were in the second period second age so now let me go over some other parts of the story this is I think a graph which illustrates what I've already spoken about it is really the the rebound of Asia yes you can see China Indonesia and India here compared the China and India to the every GDP per capita of the of the UK Indonesia to the GDP per capita of the Netherlands and of course during the colonial period you have a significant relative decline of those countries now it is up to the historians to figure out whether that the significant decline relative decline was only due to the increase in real incomes in the West or whether that increase in real incomes in the West actually was a condition was conditioned or influenced the decline of incomes in the south but whatever it is the facts are to think quite straight forward then you actually have a period where actually the way you and that actually period is interesting coincides more or less with the Indian independence and the Chinese Revolution and of course independence of the of the of Indonesia where you have the stabilization of these relationships but an extremely low level as you can see actually the ratio was then I mean the the relative income of those countries was about 7% or which then meant the ratio of something like you know 13 to one compared to the relative income of the UK or the net worth and then you have the rebound and then if you extend that you know because this rebound is really now happening relatively fast because with growth rates of five six percent and absence of growth in the rich countries you know you actually have you know you start capturing that position which you had in the beginning so you know by with some simple projections you basically can say by 2040 you will have China at a position where it was in the beginning of the industrial ocean and in India Indonesia coming later but certainly by the end of the century they would have been under such assumptions they would have exceeded their position which they had it 1820 and I saw I was saying before there will be a return to it to a relative distribution of economic activity which existed in you know early Middle Ages by what is called Middle Ages by European segments that is all obviously present in all the different forms and shapes I can particularly with China I can go on showing all kinds of things for example in this case I am showing I'm showing you the the convergence of Chinese and American incomes the u.s. distribution is on the right in in red the Chinese is on the Left in blue and it's in relatively short period of 11 years we have much more of an overlap now there is as you can see there is still a very imperfect overlap because China is significantly poorer than the US but the overlap is becoming more and more significant just to give you an idea what it means if you had on this graph a UK and Germany you would have almost total overlap between the two in other words there would be not much of a difference if you're at the 30th percentile in the UK your difference with the 30th percentile in Germany is very small from the global perspective maybe you know Germany has a higher incomes at the bottom and UK could probably would have higher incomes at the very top but the differences are small whereas obviously with China and the US the differences are large a different way to see that and I don't have it here but I can tell you is that if you take for example you take the third urban de salón China in 1988 and then say okay at what global position were they and they were something like 35th percentile in the world meaning that they're better off than about 35% of the people in the world and then you look at them like 15 years or two about two 20 25 years later and they have leapfrogged over about a billion and a half people which means they have lived fraud over 20 percent of the population of the world so these are actually particularly said with the Chinese data the numbers are quite staggering and that's what I'm saying we have now we are now witnessing the largest reshuffle of relative income scenes in dust revolution what it means is that you know relative income by definition are limited in the sense that you have your position you know the percentile you are a dis percent all debt percent well if I'm catching up with you and becoming richer you might still grow your real income I still draw but I would be ahead of you because the number was lost is a hundred slots or thousand slots so the relative positions obviously are limited and what is now I think would be happening in the future it's already happening with the advanced countries is that the bottom of their population and it was actually implied in what David was saying before about the elephant graph is being gradually taken over by the middle classes and others from the emerging economies so their relative position in the global income distribution is shifting down it's very dramatic for example in the case of the u.s. bottom which actually shifted down like seven percentiles in in 25 years so what will actually the the world from the Western perspective rich countries perspective in about 40 years is going such it's going to be such that people in rich countries would be there will be people who will be in a very many different positions in the world income distribute which I want to show it in on this graph which was not the let me just skip this one so I will not have the die maybe but which was not the case until recently so this is 2011 I will go very quickly this is you know you have the global income distribution you draw it the line of six hundred dollars you have ten percent people who are in absolute poverty here is your median income of the world which is very you know moderate as you can see it is actually less than six dollars per day then you have the mean which is which is hard because the strike of in the the feature of all the asymmetric distributions is obviously to the mean is larger than the median so that's the global mean as you can see it's five thousand five hundred but what I really wanted to show is that this is actually the median income of the Western world if you are it is actually West Western Europe North America and Oceania so that median person in the in the rich world is the 95th 91st percentile today and even very poor people like for example this is from the Western perspective relatively poor very poor actually this I'll which is the u.s. bottom visa is here at something like 74th percentile in the world what what was saying before this encroachment on that position will mean is that that this that that Desalle for for the UK or the US or Germany would start shifting down and actually it can actually shift down relatively quickly because the inflow of the richer people is large because these are large countries that are growing so that's why I'm saying in about twenty years or so you will actually have in rich countries you would have the people who are in the global top 1% people who are in the global ten people who are the global you know quintile but you would also have something which didn't exist maybe for two centuries you would have people who will be the median global median income and that actually means it's a novelty because basically all the income distribution that we have dealt with in rich countries was the income distribution as you can in the top 20% of so that's worth all the activity and all the fights about the distribution were taking place and now that would be actually that would change now as I said before it doesn t mean that you actually become poor in in real terms it simply means that your real income growth is such that actually you can know you are being overtaken by people who are coming from behind you but with higher real income growth and basically your position is is lost thereby so David how many more minutes do I have two three oh okay Jessica white sir no no no I'll just really have to finish right but I want to finish oh I want to go backwards back I'm not going to talk about the elephant graph since actually they would explain it very well I want to show something which is actually new I was using medicines data and it is also related obviously to my talk but it's a little bit of a detour but because it's new for me I actually like to present it what it shows is mean world income based on GDP per capita flow medicine data which is of course which is the blue line which is actually the bars and of course that you see but of course this tremendous increase in in real income from end of the World War two especially essentially the multiplication by four and then on the other hand you see the coefficient of variation of the GDP per capita which to some extent can be assimilated it's not the same thing but it's similar to what I talked about global inequality between individuals because here it is not between individuals but each individual is given the GDP per capita of kids or her country so it's similar but it's not exact the same however this graph is very often used by people like Bill Gates who love sort of nice stories you know like in in Citizen Kane there was you know remember that the guy who was old and they deliver him newspapers only with really beautiful stories Bill Gates's little bit like Citizen Kane he loves only good stories yeah he a good story that he loves is this story says look we have become much richer the world is really becoming richer we have multiplied so it's always we we we but who is we multiplied Inca by four times six times whatever and at the same time we we are becoming more equal because as you can see this coefficient of variation is going down so really the things are really going swimmingly but the same graph same data show you also which I thought actually it was interesting to just take the same thing but look at that little bit differently and what I did here and this is actually finish with that what I did here I said I put the following question let me take the richest country in 1820 which was Australia let me take the income level of Australia Dan and it's all the same prices in PPP of 2011 and say how many people in the world live in countries that have a GDP per capita below Australia in 1820 and the number is that 7% in blue so basically you can say 7% of the of people live in countries that are basically two centuries behind the I mean today's world so they're basically they're two centuries behind then you ask the same question take the the country that was richest richest in 1914 which is the UK and say how many but what percentage of people in the world live in countries below the level of UK hundred years ago one hundred and five years ago and the number is 33 percent of the world lived there and then you do the same thing for the United States in 1970 and that's basically 50 years before today so essentially even if you leave this aside the 45 percent of people who are live in countries that are that are behind they're lower than the u.s. 50 years ago you have still 40% of people who live really in a different century and you have this 10% of the world that I've showed you before which is below the poverty line or 7% of people who live in the poorest countries that they're like two centuries behind you essentially have people who live at the same income level that they have lived probably 1,000 years or not day but the poor people have lived in it in a thousand years so what I want to say and I will stop here is that actually every when you work with global inequality the the thing is actually complicated in the sense that every nice picture it's like when you look at the coin there is a nice side to the coin and you can really tell a nice story because indeed the world has become in many respects better but I'm just saying be aware be wary of averages averages are great and I use them a lot but the average is very often particularly in an unequal world with the symmetric distributions with many people at the very very top actually are somewhat misleading and to give us a simple example imagine the situation where you have one one hand very rich people and another hand very poor people so very high polarization in a society and in that case the average would really in a reflect nobody's experience it doesn't explain the experience of the rich nor of the poor and I think that we should actually keep that in mind and when we look with the net a look at the data and numbers we should always actually I think go further particularly now in an unequal world go further than the averages I'm snow I am playing I am actually pleading you know guilty on that because oftentimes I've also worked with the averages they are simpler because they you add them up and you get the total which is very nice but there as I said sometimes misleading and I think this is a story which I think I try to illustrate that with with this number so I think I'll stop here and thank you again for your attention Thanks [Applause] [Music] [Applause] well thank you thank you so much I'm totally I'm totally wowed by these by the various crafts you're putting out actually particularly the china-us distributions over period us from 2000 to 2013 incredible anyway so now k to introduce Mariana go who's who was at Oxford sometime taught at Oxford and then there he is set very sensibly as I say escaped to the World Bank where she had been rather wizard at developing multi-dimensional measures of unemployment and is a is a real expert in in that whole that whole field however the World Bank be an organization they felt she needed moving and being put in charge of the Middle East now let me say she's just come from Baghdad this morning and in Baghdad she had to go around wearing armor with a bodyguard so you should she's now feeling very happy and relieved to have got rid of this heavy heavy clothing and and I am very very happy to welcome you to discuss Broncos paper thank you [Music] it does rather it does feel rather safe thank you very much baby for the invitation and quality Institute and for Bronco and Paul for allowing me to sit next to this great mind speaking after Bronco is always a challenge and in this case more there more than one reason that that is a challenge the first challenge is that he's such a great and inspiring speaker and thinker and going through the work that he's done and more more recently it just makes you go start thinking about everything that you know and we think in this very intuitive ways that he has of explaining things the second reason why's challenging is because I thought he was going to speak about something else I prepared these beautiful slides that I might not show but I have one or two that might be relevant so let me try to go all over all of the other slides unless there is a better way to go all of them there's a keyboard but otherwise how do I get to my slides oh gosh these please take away a lot of animation in his life which is great okay I have me I don't fight my comment yeah I'll get closer so this is me I had three sets of comments I'll just stop on the first one and the advantage is that I can talk a lot on one slide and be very thorough in detail on that one in my ten minutes but so the first point is on global distribution of incomes and just to give you a starter this is a graph he I think you showed a graph like this on the global distribution of incomes I think you show 2011 also but from a previous paper the brankwyn and Christopher Wagner did what they show in this actually beautiful graph was how the distribute the global distribution was moving from 1998 to 2008 but what the graph has is the it's highlighting China and India and then you have the rest of the world sub-saharan Africa and the mature economy so you really see how how did issue how China is moving alone and how India is moving alone now at the World Bank last year I was calling a report on it's called poverty and shared prosperity report and we focus on more Stanley on poverty and the way that the World Bank defined in terms of extreme poverty so in a sense we're focusing on so what what we've seen which is consistent with with I'm going to show you in this graph is is the incredible improvement that China and India and and the whole so Asia and East Asia region had made since the 1919 in reducing extreme poverty so this is the slide I speak to for 10 minutes so bear with me this is the number of poor people measured by the one dollar 90 so it's extreme poverty from a global point of view clearly it's very very low but this is to focus in a sense it helps us focus the attention in dogs that are there are less disadvantaged across the world so from 1990 to 2015 what we've seen is that in terms of poverty rates poverty has gone down 25 points in 25 years from 35% in 1990 to around 10% in 2010 now what's behind it and you see it here in terms of numbers is the impressive improvement of East Asia and South Asia and the line the vertical line over there is 2015 our latest numbers are for that year where we have 10% and around half were in sub-saharan Africa and and the rest were were in the rest of the world what you see going forward and these are projections and we made several projections more than 10 projections and this is an average of those projections when we look of what will happen by 2030 what we expect to happen is that poverty is going to continue declining but not at the same rate I in fact at a much lower slower rate so that means that by 20 Y in 2015 poverty was a 10% extreme poverty was a reach 10 percent by 2030 it will be more around 6% so that would be only a four point decline about four percentage point decline in 15 years relative to the impressive movement that we've seen before but what's more important about this figure is the fact that by 2030 the prediction is that more than 80 percent some closer to 90 percent of the extreme poor will be in sub-saharan Africa now there is a there is a general view for many decades now that the poor are in Africa and you have that idea at the global proof from some perspective you might have an idea that idea in your mind but if you see this graph this was not true and and it wasn't true until very recently most of the poor in the past were in this region so South Asia and East Asia that have made these impressive progress so so I thought that showing this this figure was a nice complement to the discussion that Bronco has they he's focusing on the impressive convergence that we've seen from 1990s or going forward from nineteen eighties to today and in terms of the improvement Eastern and South Asians have done but on the other hand there is a divergence because what this graph shows is that for the vast majority of people they're living in countries were extreme poverty is eradicating or will be eradicated very soon more than half of the countries in the world extreme poverty is less than 3% they have reached the sustainable development goal and this will be almost all countries except for those in sub-saharan Africa and conflict-affected economy so so on the one hand there is this good news it's optimistic news the the world is may not we but the world is making progress in reducing extreme poverty but on the other hand the pessimistic side of it is that there's there is a part of the world in which extreme poverty is not only not being reduced but in terms of absolute numbers it is increased and that extreme poverty is much more complex is much more entrenched and I need many cases is associated with conflict of suspected situations so we have that these divergence in the world that that you'll see when you focus on the extreme and and upon the bottom part of the distribution that that it that it I want you to put into the table as a food for thought and yes and I think that will be all for me thank you very much that I want to share with you afterwards on the other path so now to Matt welcome Paul Paul Segal who Paul teaches at Kings but he's also he's also a member of the inequalities Institute he has a highly prestigious and desirable leave a human research fellowship at the moment which is why he's looking so so relaxed and he's one of one of the experts on global income streams in fact his his his Bain work has been looking at the top 1% of the global distribution I not true what what you can't talk about that thank you very much David it's a great pleasure to be here and to talk after these two great thinkers and speakers and good friends of mine I'm very glad to say and unfortunately my leave Hume finished a while ago so I look relaxed it's because I'm faking it so I title to my comments the rise of the global meritocracy so some of you may realize that that's a reference to Michael Young's 1958 book on meritocracy so I'm gonna start with talking a little bit about global elites the global top 1% as David said and hopefully that will complement some of what Frank has said and conveniently while marianas poked about spoke about the global poor I'll be then talking about the other end of the distribution and then as a discussant I thought I could I thought I could be a bit speculative at the end and so I'm gonna give some speculative food for thought on the idea of meritocracy which black and Rihanna refers to another part of Branko's talk which which he didn't give this evening but which is which is going to be a significant part of his forthcoming book which is gonna be very exciting so I'll give you a taste of some of the issues that I think you'll be able to look forward to in his book ok how this work there we go all right to start with this observation in 1996 there were no Chinese billionaires in 2005 there were two Chinese billionaires according to Forbes world Rich List in 2016 there were 251 Chinese billionaires okay that's 14% of the world's total India had 4.6 percent of the world's total and over a third 35% were from outside the advanced economies so this is all very new right now we've just seen some some research on global income stratification and there's a lot as we knew it about global poverty and also quite a lot has been written about the middle class but if you're interested in in questions of of class in a more sort of classical sense then neither the poor nor the global middle class are really classes in us in that classical substantive sense so these are defined by income levels and these are very important findings about what's happening to the global distribution but people within these class don't share the characteristics that we think of classes per se as typically sharing so Branco referred to some of these issues so for sure they you know as people on similar income levels in the middle of the of the global distribution but in different countries they'll be in very different forms of markets they'll be in different types of labor markets arguably this is only for later discussion arguably some of them aren't actually in capitalism so you might have proprietary producers like smallholder peasants or street vendors or small Market Market vendors who employ a little working capital and their own family members perhaps but don't have employees so how these people respect into the global system is quite different so neither poor nor the global middle class form classes in the classical sense the global elite on the other hand do look more like a global class so what do I mean by that well first of all and this in work with Sudhir Anna and we find that a family of four need a disposable income a poke their take-home income of about $200,000 per year that's in PvP dollars so that's going to include highly paid professionals in rich countries also capitalists large landowners and senior executives in both rich countries and poor countries and that's something I'll come back to a little bit later so if you think about these people well they're typically internationally very mobile they travel a lot they meet each other sometimes they're actually educated in in other countries they literally meet each other they work together they do business together often in what saskia sassen is called global cities they even share English as a language and to a large extent in the sense that a class shares interests they share interests in the in the global capitalist system now what we looked at in this particular paper was the regional composition of this global elite the global top 1% and what's quite remarkable is at the same time as you see just the last ten years or so global inequality starting to decline we also see the share of that global top 1% that come from the rich countries that also starts to decline so up until about 2005 for the previous couple of decades around 85 or more percent of the global top 1% were people who lived in rich countries in the advanced economies in the pre in the last 10 years or so that's fallen from 86 percent down to 77 percent so there's a significant increase in the number in the share of the global top 1% coming from the rest of the world now were they coming from specifically that's in the low graph you can see we it's it's dominated the rise of course unsurprisingly is that green line that East Asian or Pacific which of course is primarily China so China's a big part of that story the purple line going up to 3% that's Central Europe and mainly driven by Russia Latin America is coming back a little bit as well South Asia including India doesn't really feature on that graph of the 2012 but maybe today in 2019 and most likely in the coming years that's gonna feature more strongly as well we also had a look at the the share of attendees of the World Economic Forum and you see a similar story there you see these data don't go so far back they just started in 2002 but you can see again from around to that five the share of attendees at the World Economic Forum who came from the advanced economies declined quite noticeably not quite as much as the global 1% but still quite substantially from you know around eighty percent to the to the low 70 percent okay who are these people I said it's you know you can imagine who the rich are in in the developing world but I wanted to look more specifically at some of these professions this is data from a global executive search company though he managed to convert and you can see in in Brazil China Malaysia and South Africa these are senior executive positions in international companies based in those countries and in those specific cities that these are all kind of global cities if you like and you can see that these these senior executives are for instance in Rio de Janeiro a chief financial officer in an accounting and finance firm their gross income is going to be between 88% and 150% of the threshold required for a family of four to reach the global top 1% okay so in in Brazil they require four hundred eighty thousand reais to reach that threshold converting into PvP dollars and and a chief financial officer in accounting and finance is going to quite likely to make more than that remarkably high in Shanghai up to double the threshold and even higher than double the threshold between the global to one percent for a family of four and similarly in Malaysia and South Africa there they're a little lower but they they're some of those guys are getting towards the global top 1% so it gives you more of a picture of who it is in this this new rising global elite including people from emerging economies now how do how do people how does the rich think about their position how do they elites legitimize their position well we can see meritocracy as the modern ideology of inequality and this is where I'm this is on the one hand is going to be more speculative on the other hand is referring to to material is going to be coming out in in Branco's book on the idea of liberal meritocratic which is one of the one of the elements of capitalism on the types of capitalism we have and is arguably it's applique lien P realistic type of capitalism it's spreading I would argue so there's some very interesting research on this here at the III so so Catarina Hecht who's here in the audience I think did some research on the very rich in London really really rich people in London and similarly Alice Crozier did did research on the very rich in Mexico City and they both found that the very rich justify their outsized incomes based on the idea that the market rewards merit okay I'm surprising but we find that this isn't indeed how they think about their their high incomes another high researcher Jonathan mice found that countries with higher inequality also tend have a stronger belief in meritocracy so in work that Mike savage and I have been doing we've been looking at the idea of how different varieties of inequalities interact with one another how one type inequality can change another so this is where I'm going to get a little bit more speculative thinking about how inequality affects meritocracy and how meritocracy effects inequality so this is trying to get inside the idea of liberal meritocratic capitalism so on the one hand we have this the Great Gatsby curve that you may have heard of which shows that countries with high levels of economic inequality have low social mobility so the usual interpretation of that is that higher income inequality causes higher inequality of opportunity and the mechanisms are pretty obvious when the richer richer they have more capacity to invest in the production of Merit in their children they give them fancy schooling they they they take them to museums and so on and also they have a stronger incentive to keep their children in the elite because when you've got high inequality if you drop out of the elite you have much further to fall so you really want to make sure your kids stay in the elite that's inequalities effect on meritocracy but what about meritocracy is effect on inequality and here I'm gonna go straight back to Michael Young 1958 so he's writing 1958 who's imagining the future which he imagined was going to be highly meritocratic but for him that was a dystopian vision and here's why he says the eminent know that success is just reward for their own capacity for their own efforts and for their own undeniable achievement they deserve to belong to a superior class so later observing that this had come to pass he remarked so assured have the elite become there's almost no block on the rewards they arrogate to themselves so you've got this sort of intense in intensive ideology of meritocracy actually leading to higher inequality because the rich feel they can just take whatever they want because they deserve it but compounding that not only do you get higher inequality but the the combination of meritocracy and high inequality has a big leap initiative echt on people lower down the distribution because then the poor recognize that they have an inferior status not in the past because they were denied opportunity but because they are inferior so what are the inequality interactions implied by this well they suggest the following on the one hand Jung's argument higher equality of opportunity might actually lead to higher income inequality but also from the Great Gatsby curve we think that higher income inequality leads to lower equality of opportunity and that gives us a contradiction at the heart of what Branka talks about when he talks about liberal meritocratic capitalism which is the targeting equality of opportunity while neglecting income inequality is self-defeating ok just fall around the arrows you increase equality of opportunity that leads to higher income inequality which leads to lower equality of opportunity so one conclusion you can draw from that is that widening access to the elite is a poor substitute for closing the gap between elite and the rest of us so how in the light of that how do you think about this widening access to the global top 1% in terms of emerging economy is now taking a having higher participation at global top 1% well as we've seen if caused largely by growth in emerging economies and that's clearly a good thing that's a huge improvement in human welfare but at the same time it's also caused by the fact that those emerging economies have very high levels of inequality because that means that the small share of people at the top are receiving a particularly large share of their national income and that's what allows them to get into that global elite that global top 1% so you can compare this with with a study of the u.s. elite that's very interesting so there they the the US as has increased in its categorical diversity more women more ethnic minorities and so on and quite substantially of recent decades even as inequality has risen and those elites have pulled further away from the rest of the population and of course it turns out that a female CEO for instance shares interests more with her firms shareholders and with her female employees this is where the class question comes in again so equally fitteth of developing countries who reach the global elite may simply find themselves further removed from their own compatriots I think that supports Branko's argument about we're moving back to an age of the Marxists style conflicts driven by inequalities within countries thank you [Applause] well thank you very much indeed Paul we've now got another about 25 minutes for questions and thank you thank you very much for a fascinating lecture and for some wonderful comments I'd like to get back to your data Bronco since you presented averages but presume you know the data and much much more detail and the GDP figures that you use to get into these averages I have a somewhat speculative question in terms of where you see these trends going in the future because at the moment this data comes from a period where we've had relatively unconstrained development but going forwards I could see two major factors interfering with us one is environmental constraints and the other one would be the eruption of technology into GDP growth figures and development so I know it's a speculative question but I'd like to hear your view on how you think this would pan out in the future okay I promised I would be mean quick in answering because they think actually I would like to give people a chance to us ask him any questions positive and also would like to say few words about Anna Maria and Paul's comments but let me go I mean it's very speculative busily we are talking about the future there yeah don't I cannot I mean I really don't do projections and I don't like them very much when I talked about projections that were really very broad-based not actually with any numbers in them in that sense really what would be the effect of the climate change you know I don't think I don't know they are not there but clearly they can't be but I would like to say the following thing actually and it is only slightly touched in capitalism alone also is that essentially I think the the the situation the trade-off and that's what I had of course discussion with some people who are much more into the D growth literature and stuff like that essentially you have the envelope of the world GDP which exists now if you really want to stop that develop for growing I think there are three possibilities I mean three way to do that one is it actually you can say people who are currently poor and others will have to remain at at level of poverty forever which of course it's not very politically popular the second Nicoli unpopular will would be to argue that there should be largely redistribution for people who are rich in the rich countries and this is not a small reservation we're talking about half your income to be lost to the poor people and that would keep the envelope unchanged if you want to grow the envelope to actually increase the GDP and still not to run into the limit then you have to say okay I'm a technology mist or technological say it's all these things and all that so I think this is what I actually find it sometimes annoying within discussion with people who are actually in the data growth side is that they are unwilling to actually acknowledge that these are the trade-offs and they use like words like thriving which really don't mean to me anything because does it mean that I'm thriving with five dollars or per day or doesn't mean I'm thriving with five thousand dollars a day you know so but I think it would be I have not answered your question directly but this is where I see the future going and one thing which also they're going back to Anna Maria's point is that the importance of Africa because the population growth rate and because of the so far absence of ketchup a significant ketchup which would be even more difficult in the future because we are talking of per capita stuff and these countries are growing at very high rates of growth population growth so it's really I mean for Africa would be even more difficult than for Asia to catch up and that that's another of course thing that I don't project in numbers but when we can actually sort of put on the table as well as you did thank you thank you for a great presentation I would like to pull this now go we are in the in eco international inequalities Institute in contact with other kind of inequality which is living standards I mean you are familiar with the word pie Leandra Prados long-term estimations of living living standards and actually his estimations say that it global inequality in health in the last 40 years I've been widening and actually increasing even more the last ten years so how will you put this in context you know the fact that actually between countries in income inequality is going down but at the same time even including China and India between countries living in standards inequalities are going up I will be very brief and I know Landrus word work quite well you know because obviously this is the work which actually goes historically by using the the Human Development Index on top of that of course Landru puts also the negative definition of freedom so it was all there you know I you know there was an increase in I we all know that I mean this is nothing new but actually a decline in life expectancy which was driven by AIDS in Africa and by the collapse of the medical system in former socialist countries and you have all you know these two things I'm not an expert on health and education so I will not speak much I will not say almost anything at that but just to point out that of course things don't go together like take the example of China China between nineteen the revolution or 1950 and 1980 had a significant increase in life expectancy at the same time that of course many people who died during the Great Leap Forward as well so the costs were very high on the other hand the life expectancy went up literacy rate rate went up and so on and income actually the average income or the GDP per capita whatever really increased still did increase actually but didn't increase nearly at the rates that we are witnessing today so I am not too totally shocked by the fact that you can have the two indicators of three indicators moving in slum of different directions so I have two questions first to Bronco to what extent is the comeback of internal cleavage after 2003 is due to the rise of inequality within China and what do you think I'm is raising inequity inside China or India will actually bring back the rise of global inequality in the future and the second question to Paul actually to what extent the global top 1% has actually global consumption or local consumption so maybe I mean the other way it was this question is to what extent we should use PPP in deflating incomes of these people I mean a lot of these people probably they want to send their kids to LSE and they're going to pay the same tuition fee as people from other countries okay so on use of ppp's for the rich that's a very interesting question so there are kind of two two conflicting arguments there on the one hand you say right the very rich might want to send their kids to LSE they fly around they've they consume a lot of you know there's a lot of luxury imported goods and so on so you might think that on that basis we should be using market exchange rates for their incomes but on the other hand very something else that I'm working on which I didn't mention here they also consume a lot of service domestic service and domestic service is the paradigm attak non-tradable good and that you should be using well different are different the index that I've been working on but it's kind of moving in the other direction from PPP's so if pvp is a kind of an average of credible zand non-tradables your argument was they consume more tradable x' which is true but also they're quite intensive in use of the non-credible domestic service so it's anyone's guess how you those things will actually balance out and that's an interesting question to then examine empirically on on the China and India increase of inequality within countries obviously it says in I've been negative in the same effect on global inequality in the sense that actually it pushes in I mean technically speaking I mean mathematically is positive because it actually increases global inequality everything else being constant and indeed of course China you know let me just own Chinese inequality Chinese clearly by all indicators has gone up and actually I mentioned my book in capitalism alone that I don't think that there is a single partition in China that you take whether you take skill versus non skilled where you take urban versus rural province versus other province there is no single partition that where inequality is not greater today then it was like in 1980 I suppose 85 but at the same time of course the forces of convergence of meaning currents are very strong and I have to say the results in issue the data issue maybe going back to also the question before is that the results are a little bit for example for India are different and I'm actually now much more of the opinion that we should use income data for India which so much higher inequality India G Gini for income is really Latin American actually India is the factor when you look at that a Latin American country with genii over 50 we have been using for historical reasons only because it was always available since 1952 and it says a survey which is consumption based and there you have Gini of 38 or so on but that actually fire in equality in India does have an impact on in on on global inequality and it's not going to overturn the results but it actually would make them less dramatic I had a little comment on Chinese inequality very interestingly so of course Chinese inequality is way higher today than it was 30 years ago but since about 2005 it seems to have been declining and that's partly because of declining effect largely driven I think by declining inequality between urban and rural areas but how that's going to play out in the future is is a huge and interesting question so thank you all for your presentations we've heard quite a bit about incomes in the world and not so much about wealth I'm not really sure where that comes from but I just thought I might like to bring in two other dimensions of the world we live in because we live in a world not only of money obviously but experiences relationships and life and those two dimensions are well being and the existence of non-human beings and so on the well-being side there was an article in The Economist pretty recently about change over time since 1990 in the subjective well-being of China of the Chinese and quite extraordinarily in they reported that well-being or happiness in China had mostly gone down over that time and it probably had started to rise again recently but not yet attained the levels it was already at in 1990 before the giant shift in income distribution that you were presented and more generally there's a large research literature showing that people with materialistic values tend to be less happy and the people with more materialistic values can somewhat catch up if they have much higher levels of material consumption and the other side is just the fact that most of the terrestrial mammals in the world now are either humans or actually but predominantly animals for human consumption and we're facing an interlocking set of accelerating ecological crises and so I'm just wondering if you have any thoughts on how that those considerations could be integrated with or related to what you presented here thank you thank you very much on the second one I really don't have so that's an easy answer on the first one I how should I say well of course it's also not something that I deal with it because it's what I deal and I'm actually have plenty to work with that it's really ink I'm not even well so it's really ink but I have of course seen and I know that the Chinese life satisfaction is even down and I think it's an important fact to it but you know one has to realize income is an unbounded number you know you can have billions or whatever when you ask life satisfaction questions or happiness patience these are questions that are bounded you know from one to ten moreover these are the questions we know that because of course the literature has existed for like 30 years these are the questions that actually reflect your position to your view today compared to what you believe you should have another scam and so on so to me when people say well happiness in China is not as good as it was before that's an important fact but you know the happiness cannot track income simply because nobody here if you were to interview people nobody we will not get an average tend for happiness of life satisfaction but each of us probably is much richer today then we would have been in the same position like 50 years 300 years ago and we probably would have had the same answer but what I'm what I'm going to say is that if we were at the level where we were at 200 years ago today we would not have this answer in other words if I know that you guys are rich and I'm at the level of Australia 1820 I'm not going to be happy but if I'm in 1820 in near Australia I'm going to kind of say I'm you know ok I'm 8 so I think that you know using that against sort of as an argument against significant growth is China is again fine but it's not dispositive if a well women hi hi thank you very much for your respective presentations max from the inequalities Institutes I would like to ask Branca about something your latest blog posts there is a titled democracy or dictatorship which one is better so I thought that's quite interesting you know I wonder which one it is and you know but I come from Ukraine so we have a very flourishing democracy that our latest election shows but in terms in terms of the economy we aren't quite you know that phenomenal but I was wondering I wanted for you to elaborate on that points and you mentioned China and Singapore where the social spheres aren't very democratically organized yes they are very efficient and growing very fast and you kind of hinted to the point that that might be tempting for some of the more democratic social spheres to switch to that so I'm just wondering if you could elaborate on that and this is such a big question in I have to say in the third chapter of my book this was about China he starts with just to give you a preview but you you should read it it starts with a radiation of the role of communism in a global history no less than that so that's it then it continues with Chinese experience and then comes to the question that you have asked and I have a list of I think 12 countries at a core political capitalist countries which are actually countries I find the main characteristics of those countries is technocratic government absence of rule of law and relative autonomy of the state and of course China Singapore a really prime example of that now I I don't come with an answer nor do they come out with an answer in a blog although you know other people should also read it when whether one is better or the other is going I'm just sort of saying that if there is a significant out performance of more technocratic types of regimes which I call political capitalism by default their attractiveness would become greater and that's where I actually mentioned China because there are China has many other characteristics but one thing which actually one has to realize whatever was whoever was thus a most successful country historically we go back to the UK to the Netherlands to the UK to the United States has been pushed in a position of either themselves trying to impose or sell their model of others taking it and you know China is in a position which we have had like 50 years almost of unprecedented growth and it is not surprising that actually with so many people in such growth it is a country which is now at the threshold of moving into that direction so but I am very agnostic i if you read my book I don't come on one side or the other but I just see the arguments which actually might make that particular type of regime more attractive my my question is addressed to Branko up what's the implicit as you mentioned were back to the 19th century world where global income inequality is driven by the rise of inequality within countries so my question is that what's the implication of this for the outbreak of conflict between countries the obvious example that comes to my mind is World War one have you written on it do you see any parallels between the US and today's world so basically what's the implication for the World Peace I actually as you mentioned that I will not go through this argument it was a joint paper with Thomas Fowler and the sewage Naidu we're actually inequality is a contributory factor or actually let me put it like that we use this basically what with what you find in Hobson's Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin there are different kind of claims and we empirically show that all these claims actually were true where the data which they didn't have because we of course again had better data but I you know I wish I could actually come up with some story that that similar process of concentration of incomes in the chance of the top 1% which then led to the desire to use these savings in order to invest outside and then control those countries because of short lack of property right protection that that I could have come up with something today oh I I cannot so I really cannot answer satisfactory this question however in my book when I said about global role of communism I compared that with the kind of a historical narrative of liberalism and I think one problem which I hope that we don't have to face that is that really the peak of capitalist development before now was really before 1914 and all the elements that we believe you know you have a book by Marc by block which was then popularized by angel about in so called impossibility of confi because everybody would lose so people knew that conflict would lead to a disaster - whoever is the wind loser or of an even winner in the conflict and that type of globalized capitalism that is an ideal of neoliberal movement provoked though the most the bloodiest conflict in history of the world up to that point so it's something which actually is very difficult to explain because all the elements that you traditionally think you know commerce leads to peace you know you have democratic governments or quasi democratic people Germany was quasi democratic austria-hungary was posited Emma Craddock Russia had a Duma they all go for war and that I find something which is deeply how should I say worrisome thank you very much I just wanna refer to the the comment about moving people out of extreme poverty this I believe to be a ridiculous notion especially when trying to measure wealth of a community we should nothing which is to do with money but to do with political power I think the grat when I see that graph ever been coming out that or people say we've got people out of extreme poverty all that is to do is to justify people in society that everything's going ok this is all good just don't worry it's all working and in fact we're not monsters committing horrific acts across the world my question is which is a my question is do you think that all poverty is designed thank you very much well I guess I have some friends here the look I'm in the business of taking household survey data and putting into a global distribution and and and in a sense that's all but but I know that the concepts of poverty is actually a political concept construct it's is it's just a useful you could look at it as as as a way to cut the distribution and you have the top and you have the bottom and you have the people in between and focus your attention or you can look at that graph and and see some more political phenomenon going on behind it in terms of what it meant for me that graph it meant that the concept oh I guess they can quote me here right so I can't really say don't follow me on this no but the the one thing that no the one thing that to me that graph showed was what I was trying to explain it to express is that the bank has this public good element of measuring global poverty not many other people would care about it but it's essentially it's a tool for for alignment of incentives in terms of support for people across the world so what that graph gave me is is these two messages the first one is extreme poverty or the concept of one dollar day nine one ninety dollar a day nine is becoming very relevant for for a large part of the world and and therefore the report conveniently goes into looking at how countries across the world define their own their own poverty lines and trying to take them some meaningful averages and mediums of the poverty lines and and presents different poverty lines and says that below 320 there twenty five quarter of the world and below 550 there's almost half of the world and and and and tries to to expand the monitoring tool that the World Bank offers for people to cut the distribution at different points so you can look at that but the other message that you can look at is is the fact that could be a political construct I don't particularly think that it is is the rich world trying to impose poverty on the poorest that's not really my view but it but it does it does seem to me a call for the international community to to support countries that were you see that the number of people that are poor is growing and it's related to the growth is related to inclusiveness of the gross and it's related to many other equal to conflict and people and human investment that people do sorry we've we've we've actually come to we think we've got literally half a minute left for a question right up there yeah thank you very much and my question was about a potential solution I'd love to get your view on and it's linked with the existence of dictatorial regimes in resource holding countries so the Saudi Aramco IPO was going to be the biggest in the world to Italian Softbank is buying up companies across the world and it's also the toy of a couple of rich people who have never been elected a couple of these people then put a lot of other people in the ritz-carlton hotel for of weeks and they achieved hundred billion in savings which could be redistributed so my question is imagine I struck a deal with the Ritz Carlton chain and you got ten thousand homes across the world in hits Carlton's to put in there the non-elected people who have been exploiting the resources of non democratic countries and stealing it basically from the people so imagine you had ten thousand rooms and got these people yeah last sentence how much of global inequality do you think you could address in percentage by just doing one time the ten thousand people who have been stealing the resources I can give you a paper I have a paper on the distribution of resource revenues around the world but I don't have time to explain it now I think I think given that with a hundred people they got a hundred billion the ten thousand well thank you thank you we goodnight thank you [Music] [Applause]

Channel: LSE

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Keywords: LSE, London School of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics, University, College

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Length: 90min 20sec (5420 seconds)

Published: Wed May 22 2019