Liar In The Cockpit | Tatarstan Airlines Flight 363

this is the story of tatterston airlines flight 363. on the 17th of november 2013 in russia was the 737-500 on that particular day the plane had to fly from kazan to the domo de devo international airport in moscow and then back again the plane took off from kazan at 11 22 a.m as the plane passed through 6 000 feet the air got a bit choppy but the crew made a flawless landing at domo de davo airport now they just had to do the exact same thing for the trip back on the hop back the plane had 50 people on board 44 passengers and six crew members the plane was fueled up with 7 800 kilos of fuel or 17 000 pounds of fuel with everything done they took off and climbed the controller asked for their assigned flight level the pilots told them that they were assigned to flight level 3-1 but flight level 3-1 was occupied by another airplane so they flew at flight level two nine as the plane entered the kazan area control the crew asked the controller for permission to descend down to seven thousand feet the kazan radio controller greeted the crew tatterstand 363 kazan radar good evening cleared for ils runway two nine qfe 980 descend to 500 meters at 3 18 pm the pilots were setting themselves up for an ils approach onto runway 2-9 as they turned onto the final the plane began to turn a bit too soon so the plane was nowhere where it was supposed to be when it started turning they were flying parallel to the runway but the issue was that they were displaced by about 3.5 kilometers or 2 miles the plane was handed off to the tower from the approach controller the tower controller said tattersand 363 kazan tower good evening distance 14 kilometers right of heading the controller had noticed that they were off to the right at 3 21 pm the plane was 5 kilometers or 3 miles away and at 1700 feet add to that the fact that they were well to the right of the extended center line the crew said on glide path gear down cleared to land the controller gave them their landing clearance tatterstand 363 wind 220 degrees at 9 meters per second gusting 12 runway 2-9 cleared to land for the rest of us 9 meters per second is about 17 knots and 12 is about 24 knots so quite a windy day but as the plane reached one kilometer from the runway threshold the pilots came to the conclusion that their landing attempt was not salvageable at all they said tatterstand 363 going around non-landing position they were going around the plane leveled off at about 900 feet the plane then started to climb but not in the way that you'd expect the plane was climbing a bit more steeper than usual within no time it was at 2 300 feet at 2 300 feet the plane started to pitch down violently the plane pitched down at an angle of about 75 degrees and it started diving towards the ground the plane picked up an immense amount of speed and it impacted the ground at 240 knots destroying the plane no one survived in about 43 seconds a normal go around had turned catastrophic as with any crash the cvr and the fdr were of paramount importance going over the fdr data they saw something strange the fdr showed that the recorded flight path and the actual flight path did not match up during the takeoff the recorded flight path was about two kilometers to the south of the actual flight path before takeoff the crew had to calibrate the irs or the inertial reference system the inertial reference system is what calculates the accurate position of the plane the process involves typing in the plane's accurate coordinates while it's stationary at the departure airport this is known as alignment in the case of flight 363 by the time they got to their destination that difference between the actual flight path and the flight path that the plane was calculating had grown to about four kilometers the plane is designed to correct errors like this it is designed to use vor and dme beacons to correct the position given by the irs but the irs once aligned cannot be changed in flight the fmc uses data from nearby vors and dmes to correct the data given by the irs in essence the fmc is fact checking the irs with all of the other signals that it receives as the plane got closer to its destination the pilots got an irs nav only error this was the plane telling them that the navigational accuracy was well below a certain threshold for this portion of the flight with the controller telling them that they were off course by a bit the crew discussed the issue and changed the plane from lnav to the heading select mode in lnav the plane uses vors and dmes and other beacons to fly a particular path but in heading select mode the plane flew a heading that the pilots told it to they turned the plane to 73 degrees from 68 degrees but this wasn't enough to guide the plane back towards the runway they were four kilometers to the north of the miss me waypoint they then turned to zero nine zero degrees in an attempt to fix all that was wrong but that did not work either they were still off the path that they were supposed to be on at 3 16 pm the plane turned 8 degrees to the right in an attempt to fix their navigational issue the controller thought that they were starting their base turn and the controller said tardisand 363 early for base turn soon the plane was at the point where they had to start their base turn but despite everything that the pilots had done the plane was nowhere near the standard terminal arrival route that they were flying the controller knew this the crew knew this the crew knew that they were a bit off course but they did not have a clear idea of where they were in relation to the approach after their turn on to final they were still offset by about four kilometers this explains why the vor slash loc mode didn't line the plane up with the center line when you intercept the localizer for a runway you can turn on the vor loc mode and the plane will use beacons at the foot of the runway to line the plane up with the runway but since flight 363 was so off course that did not happen at 3 20 p.m the pilots wisened up the pilot flying said well we neither have the landing position nor anything else just four miles to go now it's going to appear we'll press the go around the pilots knew that this approach was a lost cause their best option would be to go around and try again the pilots discussed the glide path a number of times the controller asked the crew if they were ready to land the crew said yes but the mood in the cockpit did not back that up the first officer said it feels as if we're going the wrong way the captain said if something goes wrong we can go around now the pilots were glued to the ils display hoping that it would show them that they were on the glide path and lined up but how could it the plane was still four kilometers to the right the controller cleared the plane to land despite it being nowhere where it needed to be at 3 2 pm the localizer was captured and the plane started to line itself up with the runway the crew said the runway heading on the mode control panel should they need to go around they still could not see the runway the cloud base was at about 820 feet they passed through 1000 feet they soon broke through the clouds and the first officer sighted the runway only one issue they were too high they were so high that they were right on top of the runway the papi lights showed four white lights the first officer said huh that's it here the runway underneath us no we're too high four white lights were too high the captain frantically searched for the runway the co-pilot said here it is the runway no go around go around the captain listening to his first officer said go around report we are going around position unsuitable for landing at 3 22 pm the togo mode was enabled as per design the landing autopilot mode was cancelled and the plane changed the flight director mode the flight director told the pilots to maintain 15 degrees of pitch to perform the go around the flight director would then change when they reached the altitude that they needed to maintain six seconds later the go around thrust was achieved and the plane accelerated from 130 knots to 115 knots but no significant control inputs were made due to the way the 737 is built the plane started climbing since the engines are well below the center of gravity a significant increase in thrust will pitch the plane up even if you don't give it explicit control inputs at this point physics was playing the plane the nose continued to pitch up going through 15 20 and even 25 degrees the fdr recorded a one degree nose down input from the pilot as the plane went through 20 degrees the plane also started banking at this point due to the excessive pitch the speed began to fall it was down to 117 knots to prevent the plane from stalling out the trim system trimmed the plane's nose down by 1.7 degrees the first officer reminded the captain to retract the landing gear which the captain did after that they then set the go around altitude to 1700 feet the plane was still at 25 degrees of pitch and at 125 knots the pilot now pitched the nose down in an attempt to get the plane back under control but now they had the opposite problem within 25 seconds the plane went from 25 degrees of nose up to about zero degrees but then the plane started to pitch down the captain pulled back in an attempt to slow his descent but the plane was now pitched 20 degrees nose down and it was at 140 knots and accelerating at 10 knots a second they were now descending at 5 000 feet per minute and that's how the plane was till impact the word that the report used to describe the control inputs was chaotic and i can't help but agree feel the investigators were of the opinion that the linkages to the elevators had jammed and that's why we didn't see any pitch up commands during the go around they compared the data for the accident plane and a turkish plane that had an elevator jam they didn't see any similarities moreover the cvr did not indicate a control issue and the control inputs made by the crew were wildly different from the ones made by the turkish crew moreover they tested the valves in the system afterwards and it worked perfectly now they switch their attention to the crew and this is where things started to fall into place the captain's initial pilot training was not from a recognized institution his training documents were fake and his pilot license was quote issued unreasonably the captain had about 2 500 hours in the 737 so the captain had some sort of piloting skills but as per the last few minutes of the flight we can see that the captain lacked situational skills moreover it was possible for the management of the airline to find out that the pilot's license was fake quote even a superficial analysis of the documents that allegedly confirmed the pic's conversion training to become a pilot could help to find out obvious inconsistencies for example when the pic was allegedly undergoing training and passing tests he continued conducting line flights for the airline end quote moreover the institute where the captain got his license was shut down and no one thought to verify the skills of the captain and his credentials the captain's history is just riddled with things like this the captain had lied and faked his way onto the flight deck the captain's command of the english language was questionable the captain as a part of his training attempted a test which lasted for about one and a half hours he scored 57 percent he retook the test 15 minutes later and on his second attempt he scored 89 on the test the investigators found this suspicious moreover during their training the captain got from charter sand airlines they found that the captain was only trained in one engine go around and he had not trained for a go around with two engines moreover the captain thought that the autopilot would carry out the go-around by itself but in reality the autopilot disconnected when the go-around started the captain was not qualified to fly the 737 and he should not have been in control of the plane this crash has mainly three phases phase one is the part where they were off course due to the map being offset phase two is the go around itself and phase three is what happened after the go around was initiated there's so much more to this crash the crew was working under a heavy workload the co-pilot's license was valid but he was a weak pilot himself the negative g's that they were pulling during the go around could have disoriented the crew and there's just a lot more nuance to this crash but in this case the pilot in the cockpit just wasn't up to the job thank you for watching this episode of mini air crash investigation if you like the videos that i make do consider liking and subscribing it will really help the channel grow i'll catch you guys next time stay safe

Channel: Mini Air Crash Investigation

Views: 284,839

Keywords: air crash investigation, avaition history, aviation, mayday, air crash confidential, boeing, boeing 737, avaition, 737 history, why planes crash, aviation geek, avgeek, aviation documentary

Id: AMhbpyteT4s

Length: 13min 23sec (803 seconds)

Published: Fri Sep 11 2020