JFK Jr PLANE CRASH - Setting the Record STRAIGHT!

Video Statistics and Information

Video
Captions Word Cloud
Reddit Comments
Captions
It's 8 40 p.m., the sun has been set for  16 minutes and the Saratoga's occupants   have only one hour to live. As the Saratoga is  descending through 2500 feet something happens   that begins the accident sequence. John, Carolyn  and Lauren have less than three minutes to live.   it's now been over 20 years since the tragic  airplane crash that killed John F. Kennedy Jr,   his wife Carolyn and sister-in-law Lauren Bessette.  So why do we need another JFK crash story now?   Since the world first learned of John's missing  single engine Piper Saratoga on Saturday   morning July 17, 1999 there have been numerous  documentaries, news stories, magazine articles,   and YouTube videos produced on the subject. I think it's safe to say this crash has been one   of the most scrutinized General Aviation crashes  of all time. But here we are over 20 years later   and you would still be hard-pressed to find an  accurate accounting of what actually happened.   Unfortunately but somewhat understandably, along  with the highly focused interest in this tragedy   came a lot of misinformation in the form of  speculation, misinterpretation of facts, and   jumping to conclusions. And frankly there's been a  collective throwing of John Kennedy private pilot   under the bus. It's time to set the record straight  and that's what we're going to do in this video.   What does the evidence show and what doesn't  it show. So what really did cause John's plane   to crash in the water just 17 miles short of  the Martha's Vineyard destination airport? The   National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) listed  the probable cause using boilerplate terms such as   "pilots failure to maintain control" and "spatial  disorientation" along with "haze" and quote "dark   night" listed as contributing factors. So was John  a bad pilot? Was his training inadequate? Was his   airplane poorly equipped or did it malfunction  in some way? Was he careless, reckless, arrogant,   or just having a bad day? The short answer is no, no,  no, and no! Look, if we dismiss this accident as just   another case of "failure to maintain control",  we're missing key information discovered by   accident investigators that provides a much better  understanding of all the factors that cause this   fatal crash. Let me just say this right off this is  not going to be some far-fetched conspiracy theory.   I am an instrument-rated private pilot with  over four decades of aviation experience.   I have spent countless hours researching the  information contained in the highly detailed NTSB  Aviation Accident Final Report. I thoroughly  considered every conceivable scenario that   might have caused John's accident. One by one I eliminated every link in the chain of events that   isn't supported by the hard evidence. In the end  we're left with only one sequence of events that   completely explains why a highly trained very  proficient pilot ends up in a fatal loss of   control accident. Now nothing i'm going to say  will change the tragic outcome of this accident.   At the end of the day John was acting as  pilot-in-command. By doing so he alone has   the final authority and responsibility  for the operation and safety of flight. With that said, it is my hope to clear up the   mountain of misinformation  surrounding this accident. In this video we will recreate John's flight path,  the weather conditions, and the time of day that   John took his last flight. You, the viewer, will be  riding in the same front left seat of the Saratoga   where John sat as pilot-in-command. You will see  what John saw and what John didn't see. You will   be in John's seat during the entire three minute  accident sequence that ended with the Saratoga   slamming into the water. Let's run through a  quick review of some background information.   John F. Kennedy Jr was the only son of  the 35th U.S President John F. Kennedy.   Most people who are old enough can tell you  exactly where they were when they heard the   tragic news that President Kennedy had been  assassinated. Ironically most people probably   remember where they were when they heard John's  plane was missing. At the time of his accident   John was 38 years old and had been married to  Carolyn Bessette-Kennedy for almost three years.   In the previous four years John had been working  as editor-in-chief of his political magazine   "George". John had earned his private pilot's  license 15 months prior to the accident. Two and   a half months before the accident John upgraded  from his single engine four passenger Cessna 182   to a 1995 single engine 6 passenger Piper  Saratoga. The Saratoga with its 300 horsepower   engine and retractable gear was faster and better  equipped than John's former Cessna. At the time of   the accident John has already logged 310 hours of  flight time with 55 of those hours being at night.   John had also accrued 238 hours of flight training  flown with Certified Flight Instructors or CFI's.   238 hours of training! That is twice the amount  of training that a typical 300 hour private pilot   receives. Although john was only certified for  flight in VMC or visual meteorological conditions,   he had passed the FAA written instrument rating  exam in March of 1999. John had also begun flight   training for his instrument rating satisfactorily  completing 12 of the required 25 lessons. He only   paused on his instrument rating training to focus  on flight training in his newly acquired Saratoga.   I think we can all agree as a private pilot  John Kennedy did not skimp on flight training.   John was planning to attend his cousin's wedding  in Hyannis Port on Saturday June 17th. John planned   the Friday evening flight from Caldwell, New  Jersey to Hyannis Port with a quick stop at   Martha's Vineyard to drop off his sister-in-law  Lauren. The Piper Saratoga was capable of flying the   175 nautical miles to Martha's Vineyard in about  an hour. One of the last things John does before   leaving his office and heading to the airport is  to log into the Weather Service International's   "PilotBrief" website around 6 32 pm. The route  briefing John obtained included in-route weather   observations from 15 different reporting  stations along his attended route of flight.   These observations indicated visibilities varied  from 10 miles along the route to 4 miles in haze   at the departure airport. Almost every station  was reporting clear skies. No cloud was forecast.   The temperature dewpoint spread was 6 degrees  which is well outside the normal range for fog.   In short, visual meteorological conditions  VMC prevailed along the route of flight.   John had planned to arrive at the Caldwell  Airport between 5 30 and 6 pm on Friday evening.   After doing some last minute shopping wife  Carolyn would meet him at the Caldwell Airport.   John's planned departure time would have allowed  plenty of time to conduct a one-hour flight during   daylight hours. But anyone who knows anything  about aviation understands delays are not unusual.   There's no doubt John was a busy guy. He's dealing  with deadlines at work and isn't able to get away   from his office until around 6 40 p.m. Much later  than he had planned. John picks up sister-in-law   Lauren around 7 pm and arrives at the Essex County  (Caldwell) Airport in New Jersey around 8 p.m. Anticipating   John's arrival a ramp worker has already moved  John's Saratoga from the hangar to the tarmac.   Carolyn arrives at the airport around 8 20 pm. John  has completed his pre-flight preparations and is   ready to go as soon as Carolyn and Lauren are  buckled into the two rearward-facing club seats.   I was able to plot John's actual route of  flight using data from the NTSB report and   from Air Traffic Controls' radar track of John's  final flight. John was familiar with the route to   Martha's Vineyard having flown to or from the  destination area about 35 times in the previous   15 months. John flew at least 17 of these flight  legs without a CFI on board of which five of these   were at night. John was well trained and qualified  to act as pilot-in-command on a VFR night flight. It's almost 8 30 pm when John  starts the Saratoga's single engine. John runs through standard checklist  items. He checks flight controls, flight instruments, and listens to the automated terminal  information service or ATIS broadcast.   The ATIS broadcast is a standard feature at  an airport with a control tower in operation. Caldwell information "Quebec". 2-2-1-4 Zulu. Wind 2-2-0 at 5. Visibility 5 in haze. Sky clear below 12,000. Temperature 3-1. Dewpoint 1-9.  Altimeter three zero zero seven. Landing and departing  runway 2-2. Advise controller on initial  contact you have "Quebec". Caldwell information.. (repeats)   With standard checklist  items completed, ready to taxi   John contacts the Caldwell Ground  Controller for taxi clearance.   Caldwell Ground Saratoga 9'r 2 5 3 November ready to  taxi with "Quebec" right turnout northeast bound.   Saratoga 9'r 2 5 3 November Caldwell Ground taxi runway  2-2 via papa. Cross runway 2-8.  Runway 2-2 via papa cross 2-8 Saratoga 5-3 November. Taxi  light on, parking brake released, it's 8 34 pm. John taxis the Saratoga the short distance  to the departure end of runway 2-2. Saratoga 5-3 November monitor tower. Switching to tower Saratoga 5-3 November. John completes a few final pre-takeoff checks in   the cockpit and calls Caldwell  Tower for takeoff clearance.   Caldwell Tower Saratoga 9'r 2-5-3 November holding  short runway 2-2 ready for takeoff. Saratoga 9'r 2-5-3   November wind 2-3-0 at 4 runway 2-2 cleared for takeoff. Runway 2-2 cleared for takeoff Saratoga 5-3 November. And Saratoga 5-3 November are you heading  towards Teterboro? No sir I'm uh actually   heading a little north of it uh eastbound Saratoga  5-3 November. Saratoga 5-3 November make   it a right downwind departure then. Right downwind  departure Saratoga 5-3 November. It's 8 40 p.m,   the sun has been set for 16 minutes and the  Saratoga's occupants have only one hour to live. John advances the power, checks his engine gauges, releases the brakes, and  tracks the center line using the rudder pedals.   Airspeed's alive 60 knots, 70, 80 knots rotate easing back  on the yoke, positive rate of climb, gear up. 400 feet above the ground start a right  turn for the right downwind departure.   Adjust the power setting to  30 inches manifold pressure, and adjust the prop to 2400 rpms. John levels the Saratoga off at about 1900 feet  and turns to a northeasterly heading. John is   intentionally staying at a low altitude to remain  below New York's Class Bravo Airspace. In fact he   would need a clearance from Air Traffic Control  (ATC) to enter the Class Bravo Airspace. Like many   VFR pilots John has chosen not to request "Flight  Following" or radar services from ATC for this   flight, nor is he required to do so for VFR flight.  That's another topic for later discussion but for   now just know it's doubtful that "Flight Following"  would have changed the outcome of this flight. John maintains this direction of flight  for 20 nautical miles or about 8 minutes   until he reaches the Hudson River. Reaching the Hudson River in the  vicinity of the Tappan Zee Bridge   John banks left to a more  northerly heading up the river. Nearing the outer limit of New York's Class  Bravo John gently pulls the Saratoga's nose up   by easing back on the yoke to initiate a climb  to his planned cruise altitude of 5500 feet.   It's likely that around this time he inputs the  Martha's Vineyard Airport identifier into his GPS.   Kilo, Mike, Victor, Yankee, (KMVY) he hits  the "direct to" button and confirms.   After six miles on this heading  he begins a right turn on course   remaining clear of Westchester  Airport's Class Delta Airspace. John levels off the Saratoga at  his cruise altitude of 5500 feet.   He makes adjustments to his heading to  intercept the GPS course to Martha's Vineyard.   From the radar track of John's flight it's  apparent that John used the autopilot to   maintain his altitude and course. The Saratoga  tracks a direct course to Martha's Vineyard   and remains at 5500 feet for the next  100 miles or approximately 37 minutes.   It has been suggested by some that the Saratoga's  autopilot is the one piece of equipment on board   that could have potentially saved John and his  passengers lives. I agree an autopilot can reduce   the single pilot cockpit workload, especially  during busy times such as departure and arrival.   In this particular instance however i'm very  suspicious that John's use of the autopilot   may have in some ways been a link in the  chain of events that led to the accident.   More on this in a few minutes. The 100  degree course continues just south of and   parallel to the Connecticut and Rhode  Island coastlines. Even in the dark and   hazy conditions John is still able to maintain  visual reference with lights along the coastline. As the pilot of a high performance single quickly  learns it's important to stay well ahead of the   airplane. Staying ahead of the airplane means  being prepared for the next phase of flight   well before the airplane gets there. While still  in level cruise with the autopilot doing the work   of maintaining altitude and heading, John would use  this time to turn radios to the proper frequencies,   calculate time and distance needed for normal  descent, and run descent checklist. Although   John was not required to communicate with Air  Traffic Control while in-route on this VFR flight,   the Martha's Vineyard Airport has a control  tower. John will need to contact the Tower   Controller for a landing clearance. John will also  need to listen to the Martha's Vineyard ATIS,   automated terminal information service broadcast  prior to contacting the controller. John tunes his   number two radio to the Martha's Vineyard ATIS and  flips it to the active position. He's too far away   to pick up the broadcast but at this altitude he  should start receiving it in the next few miles.   There's a problem. John has made a very small  and very common mistake that every pilot is   prone to make. He has mis-tuned the frequency  for the Martha's Vineyard ATIS by one digit.   John tuned 127.25 when the actual frequency is  126.25. Since currently he's still beyond the   ATIS broadcast range John doesn't realize  he has the wrong ATIS frequency tuned in...   yet. The other frequency John tunes is 121.40 which  is the Vineyard Tower frequency. Once he receives   and listens to the ATIS broadcast, pressing a  single button will flip the tower frequency into   the active position. He typically makes initial  contact with the Tower Controller when he's   roughly 10 to 15 miles out from the airport. The  initial call would be something like "Vineyard   Tower Saratoga 9'r 2 5 3 November 15 miles to the  east inbound landing with (ATIS) information "Charlie".   On this night John will not have  a chance to make that radio call.  Next John does a quick calculation to determine  when he should start his descent into Martha's   Vineyard. He will need to descend from his cruise  altitude of 5500 feet down to 1000 feet to prepare   for a standard visual approach to the runway. A  500 feet per minute descent rate is a good rule of   thumb for planning purposes. At 500 feet per minute  it will take 9 minutes to descend 4500 feet.   The Saratoga will be descending at 160 knots  ground speed which calculates to almost 3 miles   per minute. 9 minutes at 3 miles per minute is  27 miles. John would want to be at the 1000 foot   altitude about 5 miles before reaching the airport  so he needs to start descending when he is about   33 miles out from Martha's Vineyard.   One more item to check in preparation for the arrival is fuel.  The Saratoga has two fuel tanks, one in each wing.  Like many low wing single-engine aircraft the   Saratoga's engine only draws fuel from one of the  two tanks at a time. An inherent problem with this   type of fuel system is a persistent fuel imbalance  that develops as flight progresses. The Saratoga's   pilot operating handbook (POH) recommends switching the  tanks at one hour intervals. Side note, in all my   years of flying low wing aircraft I have always  switched the fuel tanks at 30 minute intervals.   The Saratoga's 300 horsepower engine consumes  around 16 gallons of fuel per hour at normal   cruise flight. At 6.7 pounds per gallon 16 gallons  of aviation fuel weighs over 100 pounds. Since the   Saratoga carries some of its fuel well outboard  in each wing a 100 pound fuel imbalance is bound   to cause the airplane to have a banking tendency  if the autopilot is disconnected. If John took off   on this one hour flight with the fuel selector  set on the left wing tank and waits until he is   nearing Martha's Vineyard to switch tanks, he would  have a right wing heavy fuel imbalance, and it's   very possible that fuel imbalance could cause the  airplane to begin a right bank. Hold that thought   for a few moments. The procedure for switching  tanks is; auxiliary electric fuel pump - ON   The Saratoga's fuel selector is located below  the center of the instrument panel near the   cockpit floor. Move the selector to the right  tank. Verify the fuel pressure remains normal.   Switch off the auxiliary fuel pump. Double check the fuel pressure  remains normal. You're good to go. Okay, Point Judith Rhode Island is  passing below the left wing and the   Saratoga is heading out over the 30  nautical mile stretch of open water. In preparation for the descent John starts slowing  the aircraft by slowly reducing power easing the   throttle back in small increments. The autopilot in  John Saratoga does not have the option of allowing   the pilot to pre-select an altitude and use the  autopilot to fly to and maintain that altitude.   John's autopilot has a vertical pitch trim rocker  switch that the pilot uses to trim the aircraft   nose up for a climb or down for a descent. To initiate  the descent John would disengage the altitude   hold mode by a press of the ALT button and use the  trim rocker switch to pitch the nose down slightly. John is probably wondering why he hasn't heard  the Martha's Vineyard ATIS broadcast yet   but that will have to wait. It's time to start  down. Based on the radar data it's likely that   John's still using the autopilot to  maintain course while he descends. From his left window John still has decent  visual contact with lights along the coastline, but the view out of the windshield is  slowly diminishing to almost no visual references. In this situation John will be keeping  a close watch on the lights he can see   because those are his only  remaining external visual references. It's now around 9 38 p.m. John, Carolyn, and Lauren  have less than three minutes to live. As the   Saratoga is descending through 2500 feet something  happens that begins the accident sequence. As the   descent continues the Saratoga begins a slow  steady turn to the right at a shallow bank angle.   After about 30 seconds the descent  stops at an altitude of about 2200 feet.   The aircraft starts to climb at a  rate of near 600 feet per minute. The right turn stops on a southeasterly  heading of around one five zero.   The aircraft levels off at 2500 feet, the  same altitude it was at when the right turn   off course commenced. Ror the next 50 seconds the  Saratoga proceeds in straight and level flight.   The airspeed returns to 160 knots, heading 150,  altitude 2500 feet. Although for the moment   everything seems to be under control, John's  currently heading away from Martha's Vineyard   out into the vastness of the Atlantic Ocean. And  to make matters worse he has now completely lost   all outside visual references. The only way  for John to know which way is up is to rely   completely on his instruments. It's something John  is certainly trained for... but what John is about   to encounter has caused even highly experienced  veteran pilots to lose control of their aircraft. John begins a left turn back towards Martha's  Vineyard at a bank angle of around 28 degrees.   The aircraft climbs slightly and then begins  descending at about 900 feet per minute. John rolls   out of the turn on a zero nine zero heading towards  the vicinity of the airport again, momentarily   slowing the descent. Wings are level and if he  can just hold this heading he will surely see the   airport within five or six minutes. But within only  about eight seconds the aircraft begins another   right turn. What happens next makes it clear  John is suffering from the onset of spatial   disorientation. The Saratoga begins descending again  and the bank angle continues to steadily increase. As bank angle increases, rate of descent  increases. John knows he's descended, he's   pulling back on the yoke trying to arrest the  descent. But with the Saratoga in a steep turn   that's only making it worse. John's now entered  into what aviators call the "graveyard spiral".   He advances the throttle the full power. Why wont it  climb? The bank angle continues to increase all the   way to 125 degrees. The nose is pitched downward  30 degrees, the airspeed indicator goes off the scale The aircraft slams into the water  inverted at a speed of 250 knots.   It's 9 41 p.m. An hour since taking off from  New Jersey. John 38, Carolyn 33, and Lauren 34   all died instantly on impact. Based on the fact that the  flight was made over featureless water at night,   and the possibility that the horizon could have  been obscured by haze, it's hard to argue with   the NTSB's boilerplate probable cause findings;  "the pilot's failure to maintain control of the   airplane during a descent over water at night  which was the result of spatial disorientation". The question that looms for me is; what caused  the Saratoga to begin the initial right turn off   course that went unchecked for 30 seconds? Without  that right turn this accident doesn't happen.   Let's replay the accident sequence to see what  makes the most sense as to why a well-trained   very proficient 310 hour pilot lost control of his  aircraft within minutes of his destination airport.   Without having received the ATIS broadcast  John begins descending from his 5500 foot   cruise altitude. He knows he needs to stay ahead of  the airplane and Martha's Vineyard is only about   12 minutes away. He needs at least nine minutes  to descend 4500 feet at 500 feet per minute.   John disconnects the autopilots' altitude  hold mode. He uses the autopilots' electric   trim rocker switch to pitch the aircraft nose  down for a descent. NTSB calculated performance   parameters indicate that Saratoga's descent rates  were varying between 400 and 800 feet per minute.   Now there are aerodynamic explanations as to  why manually trimming an aircraft for a steady   descent rate can be tricky and I don't want to go  down that rabbit hole now. Just know for the first   three minutes and 40 seconds of descending John  is focusing on obtaining a constant descent rate.   During these first minutes of the descent even  though John is preoccupied with establishing a   steady descent rate, the aircraft maintains an  own course heading towards the airport. Accident   investigators found the Saratoga's horizontal  situation indicator or HSI with the heading   bug located at the 095 degree mark. That's  pretty convincing evidence that John was   most certainly using the autopilots' "heading" (HDG) mode  to track the inbound course to Martha's Vineyard.   It isn't until the Saratoga is descending through  3000 feet that John attained a 600 feet per minute   steady rate of descent. Also he's descended at  a faster rate than he intended. If he continues   descending at the same rate he will be at only (a) one thousand foot altitude within two minutes   and he'll still be 20 miles from the airport.  That's too low too far out. So what if at 2500   feet John decides to stop descending? It's what  I would do if I were in John's seat. He's descended a   little quicker than planned and he doesn't want  to fly at only a thousand foot above the dark water   for the last 20 miles of his trip. Also from  his previous experience of numerous flights   into Martha's Vineyard, John knows he should have  already picked up the ATIS broadcast before now.   He needs to double check the frequency to  make sure it's properly tuned. He needs that   ATIS information now because he needs to contact  Vineyard Tower in about three minutes. He's flying   towards the airport at 160 knots and he's starting  to fall behind the airplane. A sense of urgency is   creeping in. He really needs the autopilot to fly  the Saratoga straight and level to give him enough   time to double check the Martha's Vineyard ATIS  frequency. Leveling off at 2500 feet seems like   a good decision to me at this point. And it's at  precisely 2500 feet indicated on the altimeter   in the dark cockpit John reaches over  to re-engage the altitude hold mode (ALT)  But in his haste he has actually inadvertently  disengaged the heading mode. The two buttons are   located side by side and it would be easy to  press the wrong button if you were in a rush.   Thinking that the autopilot is flying the airplane  straight and level, John grabs his flashlight and   his notepad or his chart trying to verify the  ATIS frequency. Now remember the fuel imbalance.   With a right wing heavy fuel imbalance and without  the autopilot to maintain the Saratoga's heading,   the aircraft has begun a subtle 13 degree bank  to the right. Momentarily distracted with looking   up the ATIS frequency John doesn't notice the  slight right bank or that the aircraft is still   descending. 30 seconds after the right turn started  John glances up to his instruments and realizes   not only is the aircraft still descending but now  it's also in a right turn. He doesn't have time to   troubleshoot why the autopilot isn't doing it's  job so he quickly hits the autopilots' master   disconnect switch. Easing back on the yoke he pulls  the nose up... adds left aileron to level the wings. John climbs back up to 2500 feet and levels off. Now he's flying to Saratoga by hand with  reference only to his flight instruments.   John keeps the Saratoga flying straight level  for the next 50 seconds. I'm certain John decides   to forget about tuning in the ATIS. He needs  to keep all his attention focused on the   Saratoga's instruments. There are worse things than  contacting the tower without the ATIS information.   John presses the button to flip the Vineyard  Tower frequency into the active position   of his number two radio. All he needs to do is turn  back towards the airport and contact the tower   in a couple of minutes. The shoreline that John  had been relying on for visual reference is now   directly behind him. There's nothing to  see out of the windshield but blackness.   Scanning the instruments John realizes he has  turned about 50 degrees to the right of his course   to Martha's Vineyard. He puts the Saratoga in a 28  degree left wing down bank to get back on course.   The Saratoga climbs slightly up to 2600 feet. In  the 28 degree turn the Saratoga starts descending   at 900 feet per minute. John levels the wings  when he reaches a heading of zero nine zero. He   pulls back on the yoke and momentarily slows the  descent. Head movements, gentle turns, acceleration,   deceleration, etc all can contribute to the onset  of spatial disorientation and the effects are   starting to set in. John's senses are screaming  to him! He feels strongly the aircraft is still   turning left. He applies right aileron to stop  the turn. He's convinced something must be wrong   with his instruments. He doesn't want to descend!  He pulls back on the yoke, he's still descending!   He pulls harder and adds full power! John  wasn't past the point of no return yet.   Recoveries from unusual attitudes are practiced  in primary flight training and instrument flight   training... but they are practiced in daylight,  without the hideous effects of full-blown spatial   disorientation. A nose-down steep turn power-on  unusual attitude can be recovered from quickly if   the pilot can rapidly interpret and completely  trust what his instruments are telling him. We   can hear the engine is racing, the VSI is showing  a descent, the altimeter is winding down, the airspeed is increasing, the heading's spinning right.  We're in a high speed diving right turn! Pulling   back on the yoke in an attempt to stop the descent  at this point only causes the bank angle and rate   of turn and nose down angle to increase into the  classic "graveyard spiral". What we must do to save   our lives is reduce power while simultaneously  leveling the wings with ailerons. Only after the   wings are level do we pull back slightly on the  yoke to ease the nose up and arrest the descent.   When the descent has stopped we can add power back  in, continue to ease the nose up to climb to safety.   I can only imagine the immense intensity of  the confusing and debilitating effects John   suffered from the onset of spatial disorientation.  It's so easy in hindsight for pilots to quickly   pass judgment saying, "that would never happen  to me because..." blah blah blah. The truth is what   happened to John can happen to any pilot. It  definitely could have happened to me and my   family on more than one occasion. Many times  in aviation the difference between success   and failure, life and death, is razor thin. Now  don't forget at the time of this accident John has   logged 238 hours of flight instruction from FAA Certified Flight Instructors. Way more instruction   than the average private pilot receives. I think  this accident begs the question; Is there something   in the private pilot training syllabus that needs  improving? It has been suggested by some aviators   that there is insufficient awareness among  VFR pilots about the hazards of night flying.   The FAA only requires a student pilot to log  three hours of night flying to qualify for a   private pilot's license. That license subsequently  allows a private pilot to fly with passengers   at night as long as there is a minimum of three  miles visibility and a 1000 foot cloud ceiling. As pilots we are often faced with less than  ideal circumstances to complete a flight. As we   build flight hours and experience every pilot can  look back and recall moments of near catastrophe.   Aviation, and particularly General Aviation  is often conducted in a hostile and   unforgiving environment. Fortunately most  pilots live to learn from close calls   and we become better pilots for having done so. John F. Kennedy Jr was a good pilot. Described as  skilled and cautious by his instructors. On this   flight John made a minor mistake tuning a radio  frequency that began a chain of events that ended   in tragedy. John's misfortune cost the ultimate  price... his life and the lives of Carolyn and Lauren. From the first day of his life John seemed to  belong not only to our family but the American   family. The whole world knew his name before he  did. But John was so much more than those long ago   images emblazoned in our minds. He was a boy  who grew into a man with a zest for life   and a love of adventure. He saw things that  could be lost in the glare of a spotlight.   And he could laugh at the absurdity  of too much pomp and circumstance.   He drove his own car and flew his  own plane which is how he wanted it.   And for a thousand days he was a husband who  adored the wife who became his perfect soul mate.   He was lost on that troubled night. But we will  always wait for him. So that his time which was   not doubled but cut in half will live forever in  our memory and in our beguiled and broken hearts.   We dared to think in that other Irish phrase  that this John Kennedy would live to comb gray   hair with his beloved Carolyn by his side. But like  his father he had every gift but length of years.   We who have loved him from the day he was  born and watched the remarkable man he became,   now bid him farewell...
Info
Channel: FS MaNiA
Views: 649,836
Rating: 4.7666917 out of 5
Keywords: FSX, Flight Simulator, yt:quality=high, FS Mania, MSFS, Microsoft Flight Simulator, Flight Simulation, Realism, Real World Pilot, Aviation, Pilot, JFK Jr Plane Crash, JFK Jr Crash, Plane Crash, Aviation Accident, JFK Jr, john f kennedy jr and caroline kennedy, plane crash documentary, aviation accidents, aviation accident documentary, aviation accidents caused by human factors, aviation accidents caused by pilot error, air crash investigation
Id: jj-4jf3e5_A
Channel Id: undefined
Length: 39min 45sec (2385 seconds)
Published: Sat Jun 12 2021
Related Videos
Note
Please note that this website is currently a work in progress! Lots of interesting data and statistics to come.