Iran’s Nuclear Proliferation Strategy: U.S. Policy Options

foreign foreign to the Washington Institute for near East policy we're having a policy Forum today on Iran's nuclear proliferation strategy U.S policy options and we will have three speakers first is going to be Michael eisenstadt from the Washington Institute who has just finished a study on Iran's nuclear hedging strategy which you can find on our website and then he will be followed by masaruhi who's a research fellow with the center for strategic research at the National Defense University's Institute for National strategic studies and following um Masa we will have comments from Suzanne Maloney who is the vice president and director of the foreign policy program at the Brookings Institution if you have questions that you would like us any of the speakers to address please direct them to the Q a function at the bottom of your screen or if you're watching us by a YouTube send email them to policyforum at washingtoninstitute.org that's one great big long word policy Forum at Washington institute.org and I neglected to introduce myself my apologies I'm Patrick Lawson I'm the director of research here at the Washington Institute for nearest policy and the director of our Victor B program on Iran uh with that let me turn to Michael eisenstadt thank you very much Patrick and I just want to say that I'm delighted that Susanna Massa are here today I'm very much looking forward to this conversation um just a few introductory comments about why this monograph um for a long time I've kind of had the feeling that the U.S policy debate on Iran and DC has tended to focus on the technical dimensions of the last mile of the proliferation process with a focus on centrifuges breakout times weaponization Etc now if you're talking about a crash program such as the American experience during World War II clearly technical factors really are the dominant factors when you when the country's trying to get the bomb as soon as possible for military reasons technical factors Dominate and the result of this focus on uh The Last Mile and Technical factors is a narrow policy focus on efforts to Halt or disrupt these activities mainly by sanctions and diplomacy next slide please um or covert action okay now all of these are essential elements of any non-proliferation policy but this narrow Focus comes at the expense of a more holistic approach and so my hope is that by this discussion we can look at Iran is a case of a nuclear hedger and I'll discuss what that means in a moment and hedging countries generally their proliferation calculus is suffused with politics and influenced by a broad range of factors Way Beyond the technical factors that are often examined in in Washington and from a policy point of view that raises the question of how do you shape all the factors that influence tehran's proliferation calculus using all the instruments of National Power in order to persuade Iran that proliferation restraint is in its interest so getting away from an approach was focuses exclusively on deterrence and coercion and one that looks at dissuasion as well in order to as vipin narang has said to keep the hedger hedging next slide please now a little bit about hedging what it means basically hedging is all about creating or maintaining options to produce nuclear weapons and you can hedge with the idea of trying to kind of like a tentatively exploring your options with regard to nuclear weapons or as a way to slowly and stealthfully proliferate in a way that manages risks and I'm kind of agnostic in terms of which path Iran is taking I think there are people in the system in Iran who are focusing um who who support either approach next slide please now a little bit about Iran's the history of Iran's nuclear program and why Iran adopted a hedging strategy Iran's nuclear program went through three three phases first what I call nascent hedging starting around the mid-1980s at the height of the iran-iraq war when um it was Iraq was using chemical weapons against Iran um it was known that Iraq had a nuclear program that they were trying to rebuild after the Israeli strike in 1981 um so they kind of cast a wide net to gather technology and know-how by the late 1990s apparent probably because they were concerned about the possible Iraqi progress towards a bomb they instituted their own crash program called the Ahmad plan which was their plan a for acquiring a bomb and that went on for about four years until about 2003 or so at which time they transitioned back to a focused hedging and leveraging strategy to create an option for a bomb or create a bomb on a very long timeline and that was their plan B and that's the that's the um uh approach they've been taking since the mid to late 2000s until the present now as I mentioned they originally tried to build a bomb in secret but events led it to later on to conclude that the risks and cost of proliferation might be greater than they anticipated because the first of all foreign foreign intelligence penetration of their program which became clear starting in 2002 until the present likewise after the U.S invasion of Iraq there was concerns of a U.S military attack and they gave a halt order for their weapons program in 2003 in order not to give the US a a reason to attack or invade and then a few years later the threat of U.N and multilateral sanctions between 2006 and 2012. these all these all factors combined to cause Iran to revert from active the trying to dashing towards the bomb to hedging I would also note that like a lot of hedging countries Iran has decided to Halt or reverse elements of its nuclear program at various times because either the program entailed unacceptable costs or continuing with the program would have jeopardize other key objectives such as um the economic health of the Islamic Republic which had the potential to lead to instability and things like that I'll just note though that even when they agreed to Halt or reverse elements of their program they still continue to make progress in other areas so for instance their missile program almost which is very closely related to the nuclear program in many ways continued almost um without any hindrance during this entire last 20 years and likewise even when they froze parts of their nuclear program other parts were often able to move forward and again the goal I think is either to create a latent deterrence by accumulating large amounts of fissile material on hand or weaponize deterrence down the road by creating a bomb we'll talk about that a little bit more maybe in a minute next slide please now the point is Iran's ambiguous ambivalent hedging strategy I think might create opportunities to dissuade and deter it from pursuing what I consider to be the three American red lines we could talk about that a little later either a build up a fissile material a breakout which I Define somewhat differently than conventionally used that is the version of fiscal material from safeguarded to unsafeguarded facilities or an actual bomb and again the policy objectives should be to convince Iranian decision makers to Halt or reverse the nuclear program or at least keep kicking the nuclear can down the road to avoid the decision to build the bomb for as long as possible now in doing so I think that the US has not used all the tools at its disposal in its nuclear diplomacy with Iran we've focused very narrowly on sanctions which is a very potent capability but we've not done other things and and critics say we need to focus more on a credible threat of force which which I agree although I have kind of a different approach to doing this than I think others I'll discuss that a little bit more in a minute but I don't think either sanctions or a credible threat of force they are necessary but I'm not sure they would be sufficient in order to effectively shape Iran's proliferation calculus in order to prevent them from getting a bomb down the road for a very variety of reasons um basically sanctions especially to the degree that we rely on sanctions on Iran's oil and gas sector are subject to geopolitical considerations price of oil worldwide and it's not a lever that we're able to use without um um you know hindrance likewise a credible threat of force might not be available in all situations especially for instance if there's a crisis in a different part of the world with China or Russia um we might not first of all the last three administrations have not been willing to countenance the use of force it seems even though the current Administration has you know set a very strong red line that Iran will not get nuclear weapons under at least under President Biden's watch and um so this option may not be always available so we need to think about different ways of convincing Tehran that proliferation restraint is in its own interest and we need to use a holistic approach that uses all the instruments of National Power diplomacy informational means military means economic means and cyber um whether or not the jcpua is concluded and it seems like that's highly unlikely at this point next page please so here and I apologize for the density this is the kind of slide that Patrick loves to hate that I do um the key to an American shaping strategy to influence Iran's proliferation calculus should aim to raise doubts in the minds of decision makers in Tehran about the risks costs and benefits of the bomb in order to influence its proliferation calculus I'm not going to go over all of these they're in the monograph you could read them and I'd be interested actually to hear some of uh what Masa and and maybe Suzanne have to say about some of these for instance fear of becoming a priority whether this is still an important factor for Tehran or not I'm just going to focus on four of these right now um first of all with regard to the credible use of uh critical threat of force like I said before I think it's a necessary but not sufficient element of U.S policy and it's not it's something that we have not um kind of put enough thought into simply because you know in the wake of the the kind of uh the aftermath of our interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan there really isn't a lot of support for considering the military option in in this region but I think it's important to make the point that repeatedly American presidents who tried to avoid entanglement in Middle Eastern Wars have done policy u-turns dramatic policy returns so for instance George H.W bush during the crisis between Iraq and Kuwait in 1990 said the U.S actually his our ambassador um to to Baghdad said the U.S doesn't have an opinion about inter-arable quarrels and then when Iraq invaded Kuwait it turns out that we did have an opinion and we LED an International Coalition against Iraq to get them out of Kuwait um President George W bush or candidate George W bush and running for president said that U.S does into the nation building but after 9 11 the US invades Afghanistan and then Iraq and engages in the biggest nation building efforts since World War II President Obama running for president says no third no Eastern War then Isis takes a third of Iraq and it turns out that we had a third Middle Eastern War President Trump said desert and death I want to you know the Middle East is there's nothing good in the Middle East I want to bring our boys and girls home but he's the one who under whose watch ended up killing um um qasim suleimani and he incurred the potential for escalation in order to achieve that goal so he took some risks in that regard and then President Biden with regard to the crisis in Ukraine before the Russian invasion said well the U.S response might be shaped by the degree to which the the the Russians invade how deep they go and how extensive The Invasion is and it turned out when Russia did invade we responded very robustly and organized NATO um to um engage in an effective response so the US is capable of turning on a dime and I don't rule that out in this case as well I'd also say that in order to further give credibility to the Potential Threat of the military option the U.S should Telegraph its acceptance of greater risk by responding firmly to Iranian attacks on U.S interests in the region mainly through Gray Zone activities you know kind of whether unacknowledged or or covert responses to um Iranian attacks on U.S personnel and interests and Iran will kind of make I think the decision makers in Tehran will make the connection that if the U.S is willing to incur risk with regard to low-level attacks that threaten small interests albeit American lives um that maybe with regard to the potential Orion decision to get the bomb they might be more willing to act militarily in such a case and therefore it's it's not worth the risk of of doing so the other point I wanted to make has to do with Iran the vulnerability of potential Iranian nuclear stockpile to sabotage the cyber attacks which would then turn them into a double-edged sword against Iran and that's number uh item number five on this list here Iran has learned and I mentioned before that they've you know one of the reasons they engage in hedging is because that they learned in 2002 that their system to agree with which their nuclear program had been penetrated by Foreign intelligence services and this is something which has been reinforced in the years since then they've learned that they cannot protect their most important nuclear scientists they cannot protect their most important nuclear facilities from sabotage and they cannot protect their nuclear archives um from Sabbath uh from from being uh spirited out of the country but foreign intelligence services and this creates an opportunity to make the point that if they were to get nuclear weapons there's a possibility that this affected elements of the irgc might um especially in light of you know the current interest in the country might divert um weapons um and use it against parts of the regime or that for or they might um you know elements within the system working for foreign intelligence Services might sabotage the weapons or introduced you know um um you know defects into the weapons so they may not use uh work if uh needed and in the situation God forbid that they ever have to use uh or launch uh missiles tipped with nuclear weapons they may not end up where they're intended where they're launched at that people either through cyber intrusion or people working for foreign intelligence Services might introduce um different aim points so that the missiles end up hitting military sites in Iran rather than in neighboring countries so maybe this is not a good time to get nuclear weapons and this is something that which needs to be con you know repeatedly um emphasized to Iran through cyber activities which indicates the ability of foreign intelligent services to penetrate Iran's cyber infrastructure the next Point has to do with its stabilizing potential of dual-use conventional and nuclear arm missiles Iran right now Iran's missile force and drone force is the kind of the crown the crown jewels of its of its military and provided with tremendous deterrent and striking capabilities but if Iran was to introduce nuclear weapons into its missile force that might actually in some ways undermine the utility and their ability to use conventional missiles so for instance God forbid in the event let's talk about an event of a scenario involving Iran and Israel I think Iran's tactic for penetrating Israeli missile defenses is saturation attacks using very large numbers of missiles but if Israel sees large number of missiles coming at it and it doesn't know whether these are conventional nuclear might it respond with a nuclear Counter-Strike because they're potentially in a use or lose situation now one way that Iran could counter this possibilities by using very small numbers of missiles in strike but then it's unlikely they'll get through Israeli missile defenses so again introducing nuclear weapons into the missile Force creates dilemmas regarding the use of these missiles and might undermine the effectiveness of Iran's missile force and then the final point I want to make is Iran's acute vulnerability to even a limited Nuclear Strike now in 2001 actually on December 14th if I remember correctly 2001 so almost um you know 21 years to to the day former president um Ross and Johnny made a statement to the effect that um two or three bombs could destroy Israel but um you know a nuclear Counter-Strike against the Islamic limo would not destroy the ioma and this is not something which is unrealistic to think about praise Iran is very vulnerable to a missile Counter-Strike and if you could go to the effects radii graphic here um first of all Iran is perhaps the most urbanized country in the Middle East in Asia 75 urbanized Tehran is extremely important in the life of the country you have about you know only about 15 of the total population but 50 of the industry 30 percent of public sector Workforce and most of the higher education institutions are concentrated in the area of the capital and then almost all the cities in Iran are very dense and very Compact and you have very poor you know generally poor construction standards in the country which would ensure that nuclear strikes would um produce maximum casualty so I remember in the 60s when I was growing up I would see these kind of maps about attacks on New York and la and DC and I would look and look at where I lived and you know where I fell in Within These effect radii and it really had a demoralizing effect on me as a kid to understand you know the the devastating impacts of nuclear war I think Iranian decision makers understand this but it's useful to make these points and also to make the point for the general public I don't think public opinion plays much of a role in these kind of decisions but I think it's useful to kind of keep making these points and public these kind of things in Persian and Farsi in order to perhaps change thinking in Iran about nuclear weapons the way that in the United States in the 60s and 70s people's attitudes towards nuclear weapons changed very dramatically as a result of movies like Dr Strangelove and on the beach and the and the day after and Bedford incident and like all of these things movies of which I I watched when I was a kid anyhow next next slide if we could get to the last slide please so anyhow let me just wrap up here and and the hope is again that these shaping um activities will change Iran's attitude or the the the the attitude of decision makers are on with regard to the risks and potential costs of proliferation as well as the utility of nuclear weapons and cause them to keep hedging so the question I would just end up with and this is something which I hope um Masa and Suzanne will dwell you know dwell on a little bit in their response or maybe we could discuss it during the you know q a after can Tehran hedge indefinitely Or is it their hedging strategy a temporary detour on the road back to active proliferation and what factors are likely to affect tehran's calculus in this regard and and how does that affect our ability to kind of shape the cataclys you know for instance their ability to get the bomb without getting caught perception of U.S Israeli or european resolve with regard to sanctions or military action the effects of preparations for the succession will that make a return to active proliferation more likely or less likely in the future I would just say that's simply the very fact that Iran is heading towards a succession in the future means that Iran might be heading towards an inflection point with its nuclear program because people are policy and since we might have different people at the top we might see a different policy in this Regard in the future the impact I would also ask the impact of domestic arrest in Iran today on its new proliferation calculus none or does it have an impact the impact of the war in Ukraine and possible Russian use of nuclear weapons um so anyhow these are things that I hope we'll have in our discussion but the point the bottom line I want to make from a policy point of view is the US needs to do all it can do now in order to shape tehran's nuclear proliferation calculus because in many ways Iran has already engaging and one of the things that I said it was important for the U.S to prevent which is build up a fissile material in the country which could provide Iran with a latent deterrent that is they have very large quantities of high enrich uranium on hand and the message to adversaries is if you push us we might weaponize it and this in itself provides it with many of the many of the benefits of nuclear weapons without actually weaponizing so we will face challenges even if we have this situation at the end of the day anyhow this concludes my presentations uh my presentation and I look forward to the comments of Masa and Suzanne and thank you very much as well as the discussion afterwards over to you guys thank you very much Mike and so now let's turn to master ruhi for her her reactions to this all this issue thank you for putting together this great discussion I first have to start with a disclaimer that what I share with you today is my personal views and does not present views of National Defense University um Department of Defense or the US government um and I wanted to say kudos to Mike for this great study which I thoroughly enjoyed reading it was very in-depth very comprehensive um and you know it's a great piece to get us started on thinking about how we move forward in the future um I I'm gonna try to answer the question about sort of Iran's hedging strategy or the calculus cost benefit calculus and whether and how the US can impact it and I'm going to start with a pessimistic or skeptical note which is if you ask me this question um two years ago three years ago or any time up until that point I would have had a long list of suggestions um of how this could be done or how us could could actually shape or change that uh that calculus unfortunately for the time being I'm not sure there's much that we could do in the short run to change the calculus um what I think U.S could do and should be focusing more on would be um would be a strategy of sort of managing the escalation that is lying ahead and uh just sort of uh managing the status quo and at the same time planning for a completely new approach um as we move forward in terms of you know I don't think P5 plus one would be the viable option moving forward and sort of an approach that will incorporate all different factors including Iran's domestic Uprising and the human rights violations and the brutal Crackdown and how that will unfold the war in Ukraine China Etc so there's I think there's a lot of different factors that have changed and I will make a couple of points about sort of why um I I make the argument that I just did um and then I finish up with a couple of suggestions so if I were to just broadly generalize the factors that sort of um have the most significant impact or shape Iran's calculus um I would say the number one would be a combination of threat perception of a military strike and um the flip side of it they're deterrent capability um and I I think it's important for me to put sort of a caveat which is there's a lot of debate about well attacking Iran's nuclear facilities does not necessarily mean another Iraq war it could be a limited Military strike and I think for the past few years uh Iran has has sort of shaped its deterrent strategy in a way to make that limited strike a very costly and sort of not attractive option for the West right so in their view they have put their uh pieces and they've created strategic depth um to impose costs in a way that there could not be an easy calculation for U.S and Israel or uh to to have a limited strike without being being able to endure sort of consequences and escalating into into war so that's one piece second I think for them has been their perceptions or the evolving perceptions about the world order and what implications um it would have for World economy for security and the third factor I would say is their Technical and sort of security abilities and conditions for I think what Mike you call sneak out or creep out or overt breakout so basically it comes down to the question of their perceptions of whether they can quickly and covertly break out or not what the risks are um and sort of the level of threats and how they perceive the response would be to each of these categories as as they go on so that's kind of the calculus um the way I see it and looking at sort of the um the perception about sort of so this calculus the reason I said if you had asked me this before I would have had a long list was that four years there was a there was a strong Vision in Iran um that Iran could normalize relations with the west and could become sort of a normal State and come out of this period status and have normal economic trade investment and sort of grow and at the same time incrementally make progress on the nuclear program saying with within some limits and I won't get into the sort of the history of it which is very detailed but just overall sort of that has been the view and Mike you mentioned this too um with the uh Trump Administration withdrawal and the maximum pressure strategy and the inability to return to the deal sort of swiftly um when the Biden Administration took office and a variety of other factors the challenges of sanctions relief that Vision has completely evaporated it disappeared right there is no more um strong Prospect of if we make compromises on our nuclear program if we make our hedging strategies slow and stick with it um we will we will have other um sort of benefits out of it which means a sanctions relief and we are at a situation particularly Now with uh with the human rights violations in Iran that the layering of the sanctions on Iran are as such and it will continue to be more even more layered and complicated that I cannot imagine a scenario where they can have um enough other sanctions relief benefit that it would be worthwhile losing leverage and add to that the uncertainty of U.S domestic politics in the next Administration Etc so all of these factors to me is that I'm skeptical that there would be sort of a um viable solution for the U.S who made that kind of incentive that it used to be able to create um for and then we have the perceptions about U.S Decline and a new world order which has been sort of happening over uh the past years and particularly the the hardliners have been um you know using this kind of strategic thinking and vision and they believe sort of the war Russia war in Ukraine and the U.S response and how it's unfolding has been and then U.S China the Taiwan issue and all the tensions that we'll see um is an indication of the U.S Decline and a move towards a multi-polar world in which they can redefine a new role for themselves and so we are dealing a very different calculus for them in which they would have to think whether in this new world order and the way they assess it um what would benefit them most having a nuclear weapon or having continuing a hedging strategy and I do not think that's even like 100 clear to them I mean you mentioned their different views on that but I think we are in a very complex sort of international structure situation that they're really evaluating the situation and I don't think when I when I hear discussions about well Russia is losing the war Russia will lose the war from from Devon's perspective from what I understand it's not about who wins or loses this war it's about what are the implications of this war the sanctions on Russia for the future of financial uh system um in the world would the sanctions in Russia really prompt or accelerate a new uh kind of uh a new Financial structure that would allow Iran to um second sanctions more or you know use its resistance economy more efficiently um an add to that the uncertainty about the domestic situation which I'm happy to discuss in the Q a if there was an interest but I won't go into the details of that and so what is that what is the US can do and I think first is that currently as I said um I don't think nuclear negotiations or or diplomacy in in the sense of Reviving The jcpoa or having a new deal is is a viable option and I don't recommend that for two reasons one that is I do not think it could lead for the reasons that I mentioned and for the fact that it would not yield to sustainable benefits for Iranians um it would not yield to any kind of sustainable or favorable deal that would meet sort of U.S um requirements and for that reason I think um taking a a step back and allowing the domestic politics and the uprising and and people sort of um protest and how this unfolds domestically um would be would be wiser to do rather than sort of thinking about okay we're going to separate this and and talk about the nuclear and let the others slide because there's just there is no separation um and then so that and they're sort of what U.S can do and I think would be helpful to do is there's so much unclarity about what we think about about the red lines or what are the consequences so I think if we think about defining the rules and limits of escalation on either side that would be quite helpful um in the current circumstance so clearly laying out consequences for um you know uh horizontal escalation like adding to the stockpile versus vertical escalation enriching to 90 percent uh what are the consequences of sort of um clandestine you know different scenarios that we can Envision I think if we can create a framework and and make clear what the consequences will be and what are sort of the the non-unacceptable escalatory measures um and I think Iran could convey similar uh you know framework to the US I really think that's the best that can be done at this time and I think I'll end with that I think a big portion of how Iran will think in the future looking at this sort of evolving World Order um about how to approach it its nuclear program again would be its perception of whether Russia and or China uh would be able or we would be open to Iran sort of stepping out of the hedging strategy to one of the categories that you mentioned Mike so um I'll end with that and I'm happy to discuss other questions in details thank you Martha very interesting and now if we can turn to Suzanne Maloney please thanks Patrick and and thanks so much to Mike for inviting me to be part of this conversation and for his terrific monograph which I think is a really important contribution to the current policy debate on Iran one of the the great things about being the cleanup batter uh in this lineup is that uh most of the really smart things have already been said and I find myself in violent agreement with both Mike and with Masa around where we're at and and where the Iranians may be at this time and I think one of the most important aspects of the conversation today where I guess I I will try to focus and to some extent reinforce some of what Masa has just said is that we're having a conversation that isn't focused on the joint comprehensive plan of action or or on the idea of multilateral diplomacy to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis which has now been with us for at least two decades and I think that that's an important paradium shift that we have to embrace and it needs to be sort of formally recognized on the part of both the analytic Community but also of course on the part of policy makers here in Washington and and in other key capitals um you know this has been the the sort of framework that we have approached the problem of Iran with the nuclear issue at the Pinnacle of all the concerns that we have about Iranian policy and with the idea of uh some kind of multilateral diplomacy really since 2006 when it was in fact the Bush Administration that sort of devised this construct of uh the P5 plus one uh sought negotiations with Iran having backtracked from a prior position of of issuing any direct contact with the Iranians and since that time you know that it's been a highly partisan issue obviously there's been almost a fixation on should we or shouldn't we with respect to the nuclear negotiations and I think that in effect it has dumbed down the debate and it has blinded us to the real necessity of movement at a time when diplomacy doesn't appear to be effective and so you know we we we're here now 20 plus months after the Biden Administration came into office um with uh you know sort of a determination to try to use diplomacy to resuscitate the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran um and uh I give a special Envoy Rob Malley all the credit in the world he has traversed the globe essentially looking for every opportunity to try to develop a plan that would in fact bring the Iranians back into compliance with their obligations in exchange for the United States doing the same there has been you know quite a number of rounds of negotiations none of which have in fact involved direct diplomacy between the United States and Iran because the Iranians refused to engage directly with American officials and despite a couple of false starts early earlier this year and then again in late summer when it appeared that we were on the brink of some sort of an agreement with Iran at this stage it doesn't seem remotely viable that we're going to be able to negotiate a successful day taunt on the nuclear issue much less get to any other sort of agreements with Iran that would curb some of its most dangerous behaviors and so you know the focus should should needs to shift away from this uh you know sort of fixation around the nuclear deal and the jcpoa in particular to an alternative options the challenge is when you talk to policy makers um you know first of all I think there still is this almost defensive idea in part because of the adversarial debate that took place around the deal back in 2014 and 2015 and Beyond um that that you know diplomacy has to be is the only possible alternative that we have because there there are no better Alternatives I think that's true obviously we'd be in a better position if we could find a way to persuade the Iranians to re-embrace Serious constraints to in fact go beyond the constraints that they agreed to in 2015 and to put new curbs on on their missile program and other elements of their nuclear infrastructure but we have been unable to do so and there are a variety of reasons obviously the ground has shifted the fact that the Trump Administration walked away from the deal but the the simple reality is we're never going to get back into the agreement and and the conditions have changed within Iran as well as mafsa said I think the debate at the leadership level is quite different today than it was over the course of the of 10 10 or 12 years ago when the seeds of the jcpoa were being were beginning to be put together and obviously Society is in a very different place and here I guess I I will take a moment just to say a few words about what's been happening on the ground because I think that um there is still a a sense of I think analytic incoherence about exactly what's happening um there is a a very vocal discussion among the diaspora especially and among Iranians um to the extent one can engage with them directly about uh what is happening uh in terms of the protest movement and and in many ways I think the the consensus is that it is quite different than any uh prior round of unrest that we've seen in Iran but there's also a tendency to dismiss the salience of this as senior U.S and and other intelligence officials have indicated nobody anticipates that it's going that the unrest on the ground today is capable of threatening the near-term viability of the system in Iran and so therefore I think there's a sense that you know this is uh you know even if it may be different even if there is something new and important about what's happening on the ground in Iran they're fundamentally the same parameters remain in place for our uh International Security concerns I think that's not true I think that um you know in fact what's happening on the ground does have an impact on the leadership's calculations and that the fact that we have a a serious and probably quite long-term threat to the the resilience of the Islamic Republic to the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic has a direct impact on Iran's on the leadership's capability for diplomatic flexibility on its Readiness to cooperate with the west and on its capability to make durable commitments I watch what's happening on the ground closely and I think back to the Obama administration's efforts in 2009 to try to jump start diplomacy with Iran at a time where it seemed very difficult to do so and at a time when obviously Iran was at that time also in some a period of domestic turmoil and in fact there was a brief success story there in October of 2009 when a confidence building measure around provision of fuel to the Tehran research reactor was concluded the deal immediately fell apart in part because of this uh infighting within the system itself uh as a result of what was happening on the ground and I think that we can anticipate that even if we could get back to some uh possibility of of movement around the jcpoa we would find ourselves in a very uh very quickly in a situation in which we would not in fact have much confidence in the durability of any agreement that we negotiate with the regime whose people are rising up against it every day and who's committing atrocities and executions simply to stay in power so I think that the the domestic situation is particularly important in terms of shaping Iran's calculus I think the other big set of issues is something that Masa spoke to and that is the the change in the in the geopolitical order worldwide and and my interpretation is that the Iranians are benefiting directly from what appears to be a a more empowered China and empowered Russia as meaningful alternate viable alternatives to a future that is dependent on the western-led economic and and geopolitical order we know that back in 2013 that you know in fact in 2015 it was a supreme leader who said that Iran did the deal to to see sanctions relief and that the foremost Demand on the part of Iranian negotiators was for the removal of the sanctions that prevented Iran from accessing the Swift payments mechanism I I think that this Iranian leadership both because of the the ideological composition of the the current lineup as well as because the the world has changed so dramatically since 2015 is no longer interested in a in a world in which Western companies are their primary trading partners they're counting on an economic future that relies on China relies on Asia and a security future in which they are tied directly to the the Russian leadership and this this is to my mind a very very much a losing calculation but I think that we see no evidence that there that Iranians can be persuaded to try to um withhold or or to um or or to continue their hedging on the basis of a fear of isolation from the west and so I think that puts the challenge even more significant when we think about how it is we might persuade the Iranians to to move down on the escalation ladder and one piece of evidence around this is simply that we can see that the the regime has become much more malign and more risk tolerant in terms of its willingness to engage in violence Beyond its borders not just beyond its borders in the region but an uptick in the targeting of dissidents and former government officials both in the United States and Europe and other parts of the world and that was a a sort of behavior that the Iranians appear to have gotten out of after 1997 when the European powers withdrew their diplomats from Tehran as a result of the conviction of the regime or the indictment of the regime in in Terrorist activities in Germany um but you know clearly whatever restraint had been counseled within Tehran all the gloves are off today and so I think that what we're seeing is a shift in the regime to uh to embrace more risks and that has direct implications for its willingness to continue along the nuclear escalatory ladder I think it's important for us to have a plan B essentially um and and that we have to actually develop a set of alternatives to the pathway of diplomacy that rely on some of the shaping mechanisms and tools that Mike has outlined in this monograph being clear about what the red lines are and looking for ways to reinforce to Tehran that the military threat is not simply a paper threat that it is very much a real threat and that requires working not just with our partners and allies in Europe but I think there's there's a role to play for other powers as Masa said it's hard to imagine that P5 can be a a viable construct at a time when the U.S Russian relationship is so necessarily uh toxic but I do think that the Chinese have a different role to play than they have at any point in Prior uh diplomacy with Iran because it's effectively the Chinese who are keeping the Iranian economy alive live and so I you know one of the things that I I hope the administration is considering is re-engaging in diplomacy around managing the threat of Iran just as they did in the run-up to the the 2013 uh interim deal with the Iranians that was the product of intense diplomacy or after the 2009 uh confidence building measure fell apart an intense effort by the Obama Administration to mobilize economic pressure on Iran and to develop a real consensus about the urgency of the threat posed by Tehran we have a lot of issues and divisions uh at stake with China but I think that there can be nobody who wants to see this government get access to the most dangerous weapons in the world and so whether or not we can find some Avenues to persuade the Chinese to take on a more Central uh role in the diplomacy of coercing and persuading the Iranians to move back is going to be particularly important because what I find challenging about our current situation is that there is a concern about adopting any pressure mechanisms toward Tehran about how they will react that if we in fact set red lines that they will seek immediately to to uh to violate them and they essentially it becomes something of a standoff because of the concern that the Iranians if we take any additional actions say Snapback of the U.N security Council resolution sanctions that that they could simply ramp up to 90 percent or they could throw out the ieea inspectors and I think we have to make clear about what's going to be necessary to sustain uh the the the situation that we have at hand no peace no war but if we are not able to do so that there are real measures if the Iranians do undertake some of the measures that that are of concern that there are measures that we can take to make that highly uh highly uh unpleasant for them so I'm going to wrap up there I think I've gone over my time but I really do look forward to the rest of the discussion and thanks very much to both Mike and masa for putting all the right issues on the table thanks ever so much and now comes the moment I enjoy most where I get to start asking questions but I want to encourage all of you to send in your questions please use the Q a function at the bottom of your screen if you're on Zoom or if you're on YouTube please email your questions to policy Forum at washingtoninstitute.org that's one great big long word policy Forum at Washington institute.org so let me start with some questions first I guess this is primarily to Michael I'd be interested in uh our other participants views in this question the United States government appears to have had little success influencing Iranian support for terrorism it's destabilizing activities to in rights violations why do you think we could do better influencing their their calculations about nuclear issues well actually I think we've had um I would say modest success it's it's a mixed record with regard to some of Iran's other destabilizing or or malign activities um part of the problem I think to degree and I mean I'll go back I mean there are times for instance um going back to the Mykonos Affair in 1992 where that was the last time for about um 20 years a little more than 20 years in which Iran engaged in activities in Europe against dissidents and then after I think 2015 or so they started ramping up these activities um in part I think due to um EU breaking relations with Iran although it only lasted for a few months um and then there's other things that we've done that have I mean look the fact of the matter is we did get Iran to go from crashing and dashing a crash program between 1999 and 2003 to hedging by the by the threat of I mean it's not something we did intentionally it's because we invaded first we were in Afghanistan and Iraq but the the perceived threat of um the perceived imminent threat to Tehran caused Tehran did dramatically change its approach um you know to to nukes and likewise sanctions on Iran between 2010 and 2012. um you know laid paved the way for the diplomacy that um you know Masa and Suzanne discussed you know jpoa and then jcpoa now of course I I think they're right that the current conditions are not conducive to a return to diplomacy but the point is I think it shows that certain levels of National Power can influence Iranian choices um although under a different context um and there's also as I mentioned in my in my uh talk there's a lot of levers we're not using um and I think part of the problem you know one of the reasons I wrote this paper is because those of us who have been kind of hitting our heads against the wall with regard to trying to get the administration to be a little more um forward-leaning with regard to willingness to use Force even if in the um con you know in response to Iranian activities even if in the context of Gray Zone activities you know I felt that we that that's in itself because of the reticence of of several administrations around row to use the military our military capabilities in response to things that Iran was doing we need to develop other options and I agree there's a there's a bit of kind of throwing spaghetti on the wall to see what what sticks and that's what policy is about though it's it's it's a learning it's a learning process and you see what works with the adversary and what doesn't work and you what works you try to refine and what doesn't work you try to ask yourself why it didn't work and then maybe you can kind of um refine your approach so I don't claim that any of these things will work but I think we need to if you're fighting if you're if you're engaging with an adversary right now who's kind of moving forward with high enriched um with the enrichment or stockpiling behind the geranium and and we're facing the possibility of them producing weapons granted uranium we need to do something or we need to do more than we're doing now and so we have to see what works so again I I don't know if any of this will work but we're doing there's a lot of things that we're not doing that I think we can be doing and we could do it without incurring a significant risk of escalation comments NASA thank you I agree with Mike but I'm gonna actually um try to give a different answer to a question about the difference on the nuclear versus the two other you know I I consider three pillars to Iran's um deterrent strategy one is what it calls a strategic depth or it's network of uh non-state actor Partners in the region the other is the missile program and the nuclear and the the big difference between nuclear and the other two is that the other two are short-term immediate capabilities right so Iran knows that if it were attacked tomorrow these two capabilities will be what it can resort to immediately and they already create a deterrent um capability for Iran whereas nuclear is more of a long-term option they don't have the weapon yet right so they don't have the benefits of it and so they can afford in return for or they at least in the past it has been the case that they have been able to afford to sort of prolong this and make it more incremental in return for receiving other um other benefits whether economic conventional military Etc and so I think the reason why the other two has been off limits um and the nuclear has had on and off some level of progress um is that but I will add is that as they are just getting like inching closer and closer and we move forward um I think Patrick you're right that we you know our ability to have success with nuclear will become kind of very similar to um to the other two I'll just jump pylon um very briefly to say that uh I I think we have to be very realistic about our ability to shape the calculations of the Iranian leadership particularly the current constellation of leaders in power in Iran um Patrick as you said there are there are certain positions that the the leadership appears to have held over many many years um and and despite considerable pressure and efforts on the part of the United States we haven't been able to ingrain a more constructive attitude um so I I think you know you start with that point of of awareness that we are going to have to work very hard and we're ultimately going to have to use very blunt instruments but as Masa said we have um at times persuaded the Iranians that there have been that there are off-ramps rather than escalation would be preferable and I think that that's an important precedent to remember and I do think that you know there's a there is an understanding of the the the consequences of the nuclear program uh with a greater degree of sensitivity um in terms of uh Iran's own vulnerabilities as Mike has said um then the some of the other issues that we have uh sought unsuccessfully to impact in terms of Iran's strategic thinking so I I think that you know there's there's value in in this approach recognizing though that we have to have um uh uh other other policies and other tools that are prepared to address uh Iran's tendency toward recalcitrance and in fact I could just add one more point just a few weeks ago there were the reports that came out of a pen or a preparations for an Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia and apparently didn't happen and um perhaps in part due to things that the United States did but that only underscores the fact that this will take a lot of bandwidth of senior decision makers in order to achieve results and I'm just not sure it's not it's there at the time that we're dealing with a crisis with uh Russia and Ukraine China domestic economic concerns covet and the like um this is this is high maintenance policy Iran always is well just to make the task a little more difficult I'd like to ask you we not only have to have success containing uh Iran's aspirations but we have to persuade other states that were being successful at doing that could you talk a bit about what you what impact the measures you propose might have on uh dissuading Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates and others from pursuing uh proliferation along the lines of what Iran's doing if if um my sources don't want to deal with that first and don't be shy speak up easy problem right so not not hard to persuade them well let me just jump in on this and just uh start things um let me just say that um one thing that impresses me is the degree to which um despite the fact that Iran was moving forward until 2015 and then has resumed um its activities since 2019 in the nuclear Arena we don't see a lot of Rapid movement at least those of us outside of government we don't see a lot of Rapid movement in turkey or Saudi Arabia never mind Egypt in this regard so um I always felt that um we do see some hedging Behavior among some of these countries to create kind of a modest uh degree of nuclear latency as they say or kind of an infrastructure that could be used as a springboard in the future but it's they're not on a fast train any of these countries so that does give us I think a little bit more time I think the the issue that you raise though that's related to this is confidence in American um you know uh in the Americans American Security guarantee this is where we and I think this is all kind of related we have a lot of work to do based on um decisions taken by the Biden Administration the Trump Administration and the Obama Administration which have undermined uh mistakes and also the Bushman uh Administration before that for instance the the invasion of Iraq was seen as a gift to Iran um almost intentional by many of our Gulf allies that why did you hand Iraq over to Iran um you know some of President Obama's policies and his interviews um in the media I'm criticizing some of the Gulf States was was understandably you know um taken you know they took it very hard um president Trump not responding to the um the attacks in Saudi Arabia and in September of 2019 and then likewise the attacks in uh in uh UAE um of uh January of um last this last year so um we we've kind of by mistakes we've made and by our inaction have undermined our the standing are standing with our allies and it's going to be very hard I don't think we could ever put the toothpaste back into the tube but we can do more to regain some of the Lost ground in this regard by taking a more proactive approach for our own reasons because it's in our own interest to do so and I think it'll help mitigate some of the problems we have but I think they're into hedging now in their own in their own diplomacy going forward never mind in the nuclear domain so I'll just leave it at that um we have a problem and I don't see an easy way out of it care to contribute all right let me move on to the next question um so could you talk about what impact you think there is on the Iranian nuclear calculations when the United States or the European Union designates the irgc as a terror organization to put pressure on the regime do these kind of steps uh affect Iran's nuclear calculations I don't I don't see many connections but I'll I'll you know if Suzanne romasa have a comment I agree with Mike um I don't see that particular designation by the Europeans have an impact on nuclear program per se um I do think that it's important for um the Europeans and also for the US to take measures in response to Iran's um increasing sort of uh violations in the Crackdown um but as to whether this will have an impact on the nuclear program I'm I'm not sure how I can make that case I'll just say that if you look at since 2019 since Iran in response to maximum pressure has been ramping up its nuclear program it was it was mainly on a kind of a Tit for Tat basis which is kind of their modus operandi they tend to compartmentalize um not Not always completely but um so you know in response to pressures related to um their nuclear program they'll respond with um nuclear progress uh and I think that's generally been their their approach so I I'm not sure this this is kind of as is relevant in this case all right another major excuse me it's been discussed at times is uh should the nine what impact is there on Iran's nuclear calculations if the United States cooperates more with Israel of providing Israel with capabilities that could be used for military actions against Iran's nuclear program there's been a lot of discussion over the years of providing various things to the Israelis uh some things they've asked for like air tanker refuelers and some things they haven't asked for as much uh like uh bunker Buster bombs okay you know my concern is that um I mean first of all Iran already is dispersing hardening and and and burying you know and and they've been going doing this since they've built in the towns and fordo in the in the um in the 20 in the 2000s they've been you know trying to um Harden their program against attack um might they then decide to disperse to some material away from um uh safeguarded facilities in response to moods like that I think only in the context of a crisis not as a routine move because I would have major implications um in terms of their International standing and and and and the iaea and the U.N security Council so um I think they will constantly look for ways in which they can further protect their program and also they've been building up their air defenses that's been a big um kind of as as our colleague farzi nadimi has noted one of their big breakthroughs in recent years um that's not given the attention that their drones and missiles are given but um so they'll continue with this stuff but I don't see them taking any dramatic steps in regard to kind of routine upgrades of Israeli capabilities in response to things that the US might be uh you know providing Israel so if I may um just add to that I think it has been kind of an implicit assumption in in their calculus for years that um if there were to be an Israeli attack it would be with U.S support or combined with sort of U.S attacks so they kind of see this as as one and so um as Mike mentioned I'm not sure and they have been accordingly sort of uh making decisions or or or or strategy and so I'm not sure how just sort of transferring would be any different for them I'll just jump in to say that um you know I agree with everything that both Mike and Masa have already said uh on this point but I do think that they're uh you know is some utility to demonstrating that the United States and its partners and allies have options that's obviously the the fundamental approach of the administration in trying to build up its defense cooperation and security cooperation through the Abraham Accords with a number of Iran's neighbors but one of the the key factors in Iran's decision making is whether it judges the United States is willing to take military action in response to provocation or escalation on the part of the Iranians and and so you know and I think that there's good reason given both the the kind of precipitous departure from Afghanistan last year as well as the other big security challenges the United States has prioritized and is deeply engaged with right now both the the Urgent threat of Russia and the pacing challenge of China um that that you know there's there's just no appetite on the part of the Biden Administration for any kind of fight in the Middle East so I I do think that signaling um including through our partnership with the Israelis but also in terms of what we're doing on the ground in the Gulf um that you know just well well we're not eager for another fight and while there are limitations to what we're able to take on at a time where we're so deeply engaged in these other crises that we're also uh willing if necessary to take the actions to prevent Iran from from acquiring nuclear weapons capability because fundamentally that's something that every president including current President Biden has said and if we're going to make that rhetoric uh actually have an impact on Irani the Iranians calculus we've got to be able to demonstrate that we're putting our money where our mouth is and putting our material where our mouth is so I do think that there you know is it we we have to think strategically but you know the Israelis have been quite successful in some of their own efforts to try to deter or erode Iran's nuclear capability uh and so that partnership is incredibly important can I jump in and ask um Susanna Massa a question if you don't mind Patrick um I I one of the things I kind of wrestled with in this paper is the whole issue of latent deterrence and really what does it give Iran and I I made a comment um you know during my presentation that maybe from their point of view Leighton deterrence gives them many of the benefits of nuclear weapons without the risk of actually building a weapon but is that really true and and this is something which I'm in my in my own mind kind of have not decided um so I just do you do you either of you have opinions on this matter I mean it was on the one hand you know the United States this despite you know possessing nuclear weapons was defeated in in Vietnam and and you know Iran likes to say they were defeated in Iraq and Syria as well um and that's what actually the comedy says the reason why they don't want nuclear weapons is that look we defeated our enemies without nukes but they are going down this path now of building up a stockpile of high enriched uranium which potentially gives them this kind of kind of perceived latent deterrence so what's your thoughts about that I guess I'll start I mean my City Iran have itself as a threat the threat of power is going to be unwilling to cede that capability in any fashion that because it does Grant some prerogatives of of Greater immunity from threat and coercion and that's what the Iranians are fundamentally after I I find it interesting that you know as your paper points out the Iranians have had a longer nuclear program without success than any other state in the world and that does lead to you know obviously there are reasons for that in terms of the external environment and the impediments that have been put in in the way of Iran's progress but I think it also creates some question about what the ultimate uh what the ultimate destination for the Iranian leadership is and we have you know heard nothing from the U.S intelligence community that leads to any questioning of the the infamous nie that the Iranians have abandoned their weaponization activities we know that of course there's a there's been more money thrown at some of these activities um in the course of recent years as a result of some of the efforts by the Israelis and others to sabotage Iran's program but ultimately the Iranians appear to be um appear to be comfortable with the destination which is not a fully operational nuclear weapons capability and I believe that that reflects a calculus that it serves their purposes without increasing the risks um I I tend to agree I so there are a couple of things I mean I the argument Mike that you mentioned and I've I've heard from many colleagues before is that well if they're they think they're hedging for deterrence then that's they're also inviting military attack by doing so by escalating so how is it going to sort of balance and I think there are several factors to that one is that they didn't start from point zero they started from already having a lot of sanctions and throughout their Journey um they sometimes developed further as leverage building as bargaining chip they sometimes develop further as making smaller steps or incremental steps as as you categorize I think as a creep out into having that kind of capability but in terms of long-term Vision as far as I can remember sort of ever since at least 2003 the overall agreement has been a Brazil model right and um I'm not sure that will remain the same so I think a lot has changed but the idea was Iran and I and I quote sort of something that was debated in in a discussion about the utility of Iran's nuclear program and its strategy in a discussion with um zarif and harazi the former foreign minister and some experts which um it was said that well if compare Iran with Pakistan and Malaysia and Malaysia being a very developed economic sort of um actor and then Pakistan having the nuclear weapons and we you know our aspiration is neither because Iran is not inward looking just for security so developing a weapon would not would not sort of be sufficient because it has sort of extra territorial Ambitions and power projections regionally and globally and so the hedging kind of provided um The Best of Both Worlds in a way or at least the objective provided The Best of Both Worlds and then they went down this path which already paid a heavy cost that you go deeper and deeper and deeper that you really need to get enough return than for being able to make a compromise so I think there's several facts actors and at each point in time I think there has been an evolution of how they think about this hedging strategy and I and I actually think we are at a turning point right now and the future of not only sort of um how the geopolitical uh system in the world changes but also the how this domestic Uprising unfolds I think we'll have significant impact on how Iran will um whether it will revise or completely change or diverge from that that that strategy or not let me return to a comment that uh Suzanne made and explored that a little bit Suzanne was talking about the firm statements that the United States government has made for years now that the U.S will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons and that all options were on the table and of course we've heard even stronger language from the Israeli government about uh all options are on the table um how credible is that I mean why should Iran pay attention when the both the Israeli government and the U.S government have at various times Define certain actions that Iran might take like enriching to 20 much less 60 percent is being utterly unacceptable and yet Iran has done them and not doesn't seem to have paid heavy consequences for this why should Iran believe that in fact all options are on the table and why not think that through a hedging strategy you can eventually uh gain acquiescence to um nuclear weapons development Mike let me start with you on that one actually I'll just if I could if I could turn to either Masa or Suzanne okay I'll just I'll just on that one I mean look I I agree with you right now Israel and the United States doesn't have a lot of credibility the Israelis have been kind of you know repeating their their their um warnings that Iran um would reach a point where they would you know need to take action and um I think common e in 20 last time that he kind of expressed himself that um you know at least looking at his his speeches about concerns about the possibility of an attack we're around 2013 2014 or so before the jcpoa and since then I see no sign in fact just a couple of years ago he said if you remember um I think it was during the Trump Administration he said there wouldn't be no war there was a there was a speech he gave we said there will be no war and I think that is basically their fundamental approach that um that they've been hearing you know kind of um these threats for so long that they kind of just uh you know kind of have kind of factored it into their you know uh calculus and they just don't believe that's going to happen which is why kind of why I said warning you know kind of exercises are just not enough exercises on their own which demonstrate a capability to strike at Iran's nuclear infrastructure is not enough there has to be actual tangible American action that indicates that America's risk calculus has changed that we are more accepted in order to change Iran's thinking on this issue so I I just think without and I don't see any willingness in DC to do that at this time so um I'm just skeptical that we'll be able to um without a fundamental decision to actually accept a greater incremental risk and I don't think it's it's a lot but more assertively respond to Iranian attacks on U.S interests um not to handle plots to conduct attacks in the United States through the law enforcement system but but you know through but responding to them militarily um we're not going to be able to change Iran's perception uh threat perception in this regard and alter their um proliferation calculus oh no there's an optimistic note we do it but we just we need to be do we need to do things that we've not been willing to do until now yeah what you're saying you don't see any appetite in Washington to do that right now so uh Suzanne uh Masa would you would you care to comment on that um I'm I'm gonna make you comment Dad I completely agree with sort of what Suzanne mentioned and and your question and why they should believe that and I think the the there's no way that you can just credibly say work we're gonna attack like we mean it um especially because as I said everything is so vague and unclear under what circumstances there will be attack I mean um how would it look like or you know when I mentioned there has to be sort of some rules of uh escalation I think as as Mike mentioned it can start with sort of Little Steps right you draw um red lines elsewhere where Iran has activities and U.S has interest and you follow through with that and those steps are slowly build up into at least the uh a sort of a not a complete change in the perception but you know it would make it clear that we mean what we say right so if we say this is you should not do X Y and Z in Iraq or Syria and then you do that this will be the response and those things I think you know I understand politically there might not be the Aphrodite in Washington but I think those are net I mean without those kinds of smaller steps actions to make a sort of clear um line I I don't see how we would change their perception about the viability of a military attack I'm not sure I have much to add I think that um you know there's more that the United States can and should do to try to um reinforce the message to Tehran that we have options available to us and that the the commitment to ensure that Iran does not obtain nuclear weapons capability is one that is uh meaningful in practice as well as in rhetoric I don't know to what extent we're going to be able to make that persuasive um in the mindset of Iranian decision makers but again I you know come back to the to the timeline and the calculus that we've seen so far the Iranians have exhibited some willingness for restraint it took a year after Trump walked away from the deal before we saw the Iranians begin to Edge out of their compliance with the terms of the their own obligations under the deal even now they have not taken the most extreme steps um and so I think that you know they they have some capability for pregnant autism and I think that there is enough recognition that even if the United States weren't prepared to hit the Israelis would be and there should I think there can be real no real doubt about that and and even if they did so um without the knowledge or support of the United States we would very quickly be pulled into a conflict with Iran so there could be a Fed a complete even if they don't believe that the United States has the will or the resources to undertake the use of force to stop that and stop them from crossing the nuclear threshold and that itself can have some deterrent effect on their actions if I could jump in and I just wanted to ask a question um that I kind of tried to Grapple with in writing this piece um of both Susanna Massa um you know one of the I think reasons that Iran um engaged in hedging beside the proximate reasons that it enabled a satisficing approach with regard to this different factions within the regime so that there were those that you know and in the words of Nima garami who wrote the a really great piece on this a few years ago you had detractors and centrists and supporters with regard to the nuclear program and by hedging and then agreeing to the jcpua you gave to um um the detractors of the nuclear program or centrists actually um some you know some of what they wanted the sanctions relief and and and but still you know preserving the nuclear capability in terms of supporters you gave them a a road map to further development the program down the road so it's kind of like a satisficing approach can you talk a little bit about the domestic political landscape today because a lot of the um kind of uh the reformers are out the pragmatic conservatives for the most part are out for the most part and among those who are most important today in decision making I mean how many of them are kind of um centrists versus supporters centrists with regard to the nuclear program versus supporters who would would you know support going for the bomb um what what is the internal balance like and is there a need for satisficing anymore um or is that still a a dynamic that there are different factions even within the current power structure those arguing for rest rain versus those beside the supreme leader those arguing for restraint versus those are going to move forward or has the success of the hedging strategies just basically converted everybody or the opposite let me jump in quickly and then also will correct anything that I miss State uh or expand upon anything that I may try to say um I think there's been a tendency to impute uh the kind of factional differentiation to a strategic orientation which is to say that pragmatic conservatives were pragmatic they weren't necessarily opposed to Iran's nuclear program they simply saw benefits to some kind of a negotiated arrangement with the West which enabled them to preserve the Iranian nuclear program there there have been very few serious political figures within the Iranian political establishment who have you know sort of disavowed the investment the enormous investment that the regime has undertaken over the course of 30 years in this nuclear infrastructure I can't think of anyone who has any real decision-making Authority who was a notable opponent of the nuclear program it was really just a question of what is the end State and what is what what are we prepared to do along the way to that end state where there may have been some shades of difference so I think you know it's it it's important to recognize that that those who are who Embrace negotiations weren't necessarily in favor of uh of uh you know some sort of Abandonment of the nuclear program but I think you know your fundamental point is right I I personally don't see any evidence that there is a um uh you know a serious poll within the current system which would advocate for significant concessions on the nuclear program in order to sustain its relationship with the west and I think that's one of the challenges to the kind of isolation component of your strategy which is that I don't think this government is particularly afraid of isolate Nation at least not of isolation from Europe and the United States [Music] um thank you Suzanne I mean I I tend to agree except that I think you're right that there was never sort of a division and I don't like sort of the Hardline reform is sort of moderate but I you know the way I I describe them in my research I would say there are two competing two major competing Visions for Iran's Grand strategy and that applied to the nuclear as well and I think you're exactly right it wasn't about whether we should have a nuclear program or not um but I think still that the difference between them from our perspective was drastic right there's a big difference between a hedging um strategy then actually going for a bomb or a clandestine activity or not and so there's sort of the the the different sort of shades of the gray that Mike has put out I think in in that sense there were there have been major differences and you know as I said in the beginning of um what I mentioned about sort of that perception of the sanctions relief is gone I mean that's why also that faction that supported normalization and sanctions relief is gone because they failed and sort of the failure of uh any possibility or viability of normalized economic relations um you know it just disappeared and with it uh the supporters of it and so having said that and and said that still the hedging strategy has more support with varying degree of um differences in in in views of how accelerated or how to escalate when to escalate how to restrain or not Etc I do think that it's worth mentioning that over the past and I would say from from president Trump's withdrawal from the deal up until now I personally have seen an increase in the support for a nuclear weapon within the political Elite and I've also seen it been more publicly and and vocally um sort of shared than ever before so I think that's that's something to keep in mind and um to look out for and you know and there was the former Iran intelligence Minister who on national TV made a point about well you don't want nuclear weapons but when you Corner a cat like what do you expect kind of uh argument which had never been stated officially so that's my two cents on that great well we're just about out of time but let me ask her some final comments from uh our three speakers let me start with Mike no I'll just say even though I I said before I was kind of skeptical that the U.S Administration would be willing to adopt a more assertive um approach to Iran for reasons related to kind of in part post Iraq Afghanistan hangover as well as kind of having a full plate with regard to external and domestic crises the the fact of the matter is Iran is is moving forward with the production of um highly enriched uranium and we have in a way kind of a slow-motion nuclear crisis occurring now and um so the the point is I I think we can there is more we can do um if there's political will and the question is whether there will be the political will and there's more we can do and there's more we can do to I think shape Iran's decision making even in spite of I think the um the the the difficulties that I think mass and and Suzanne kind of discussed and I agree with them 100 this is a very different context than the past but there's more we can do and I I don't give up hope that we can you know shape their approach moving forward always The Optimist Masa sure I'm just going to say a couple of things one is um I want to highlight again that I think there's not as much appreciation for the political changes and the implications of the current Uprising in Iran and I think the sooner we start giving it the attention that it requires in understanding it and planning for it the better and second I would say more important in my view more important than being more assertive or or aggressive on the U.S side um what's needed is Clarity in similar ways when we make a nuclear deal we have details very detailed actions on both sides I think in a situation like we are now for managing this kind of escalation we require we need to be very clear and very detailed about at least some of the steps uh that we think about and um and and at least simultaneously um with what we're doing right now Suzanne final word I'll just end with thanks to both Masa and Mike for a really challenging and interesting conversation and and just a note of I guess warning that I think um you know it's been a quiet relatively quiet year on the Iran nuclear front not a quiet year at home for Iran um I think that the nuclear crisis is going to inch back up uh on the list of of real urgent priorities and I don't know that there has been enough good thinking about how we manage escalation in lieu of a formal diplomatic Arrangement and so I want to commend Mike for this paper and and masa for all the great remarks and and look forward to many more conversations like this thanks thank you and my thanks to all three speakers and especially to Suzanne for teeing us up for our our next event which I'm sure will be coming in a few months thanks ever so much and thank you for joining us today here at the Washington Institute for nerius policy

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Length: 91min 44sec (5504 seconds)

Published: Tue Dec 13 2022