Peter Robinson: Welcome to Uncommon Knowledge,
I'm Peter Robinson. Today revisionism; those who would revise our understanding of World
War II and those who would defend it. Victor Davis Hanson, military historian, professor
of classics, a fellow at the Hoover Institution, I quote you, World War II was worth it. You
intend to stand by that? Victor Davis Hanson: I think so. Peter Robinson: You will. Christopher Hitchens,
author and journalist, quote, is there anyone shared principle or assumption on which our
political consensus rests? One would probably get the widest measure of agreement for the
proposition that the Second World War was a good war. You'll stand by that? Christopher Hitchens: Well I've certain; I
will say that it's my view as well as the consensus view. Peter Robinson: All right. World War II was
a good war. Christopher Hitchens: And believe me it, it
gashes me somewhat to put it like, like that. Peter Robinson: All right. Our first revisionist
here today, Pat Buchanan in his new book, Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War,
the background and then Buchanan's central argument. It takes a moment to set up the
background, but bear with me here. September 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain
visits Munich to negotiate the agreement to the German annexation of the Sudetenland,
which is the boarder region of Czechoslovakia, which is heavily populated by German speakers.
In return, Chamberlain believes he's gotten Hitler to agree to give up any further territorial
claims in Europe. In the follow weeks Hitler renigs. He not only annexes [phonetic] the
Sudetenland, but moves in and occupies Prague, then places Poland under increasing pressure
to give up Danzig, a free city hived out of East Prussia by the Treaty of Versailles.
But Poland is in control of Danzig's external affairs. Danzig has a German population of
about 95%, completely surrounded by Polish territory. March 31, 1939, Chamberlain reverses
his policy of appeasement rising in the House of Commons to announce British support for
Poland in the event of, quote, any action, which clearly threatens Polish independence.
Close quote. August 24th we're three, three items from the end, August 24, 1939, the Soviet
Union and Nazi Germany signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; they agree not to invade each other.
September 1, 1939, Hitler invades Poland. And September 3, 1939, Chamberlain announces
that a state of war exists between Great Britain and Germany. Buchanan's central argument,
quote, what made a European war inevitable was not Hitler's occupation of Prague, but
Britain's guarantee to Poland. Had there been no war guarantee, Poland might have done a
deal over Danzig and been spared 6 million dead Pol's. Had there been no war guarantee
there would have been no British declaration of war on September 3rd. And there might have
been no German invasion of France in May 1940 or ever. There was nothing inevitable about
Hitler's war in the west. Victor? Victor Davis Hanson: Well, it's not an isolated
act. You remember that what made Chamberlain. Peter Robinson: The invasion of Poland. Victor Davis Hanson: No. What made Chamberlain
come to his senses, it was a long line that had gone from a violations; and Buchanan makes
the argument the Versailles Treaty as he quotes this creepy Lady Aster that it, Hitler was
born at Versailles. But the point is. Peter Robinson: Creepy Lady Aster is an American
Victor that's. Victor Davis Hanson: Especially creepy, we
should as Americans point that out. Christopher Hitchens: Yes, her, her home in
England was the social headquarters of the, the Munich set. Peter Robinson: The appeasers.
Christopher Hitchens: Yes. Peter Robinson: [unclear] Christopher Hitchens: Right. Victor Davis Hanson: But anyway, it came after
the violation of the demilitarized riman, [phonetic] the Anchlutz, [phonetic] the fragmentation
of Czechoslovakia, the murder of a form, the former German Chancellor, the murder of the
Austrian. I mean this, it, it already there were the crystal nightmic [phonetic] and not
with the Jews. So all of this was sequential, and serial, and incremental. And finally,
the allies, especially England, realized it was, they had no choice. It, essentially they
were bankrupt in ideology and courage all that, unless they finally drew the line. It
was unfortunate that they were not in a position to draw the line militarily, at least Britain
wasn't. Maybe France could have invaded on the west when they went into Poland. But the
point that Buchanan makes in the, the book is always out of context. He says that Hit,
Churchill considered this a disastrous move. And he quotes liberal thinking people who
thought it was a disaster. Not because they finally drew the line, but because for five
years they did not draw the line and then they had no choices when they were at the
point of war. Peter Robinson: Christopher, when Chamberlain
gives Poland a war guarantee, Britain has at its disposal five divisions; the Germans
have a hundred. In the six months between the granting of the war guarantee and, excuse
me, yes nearly six months between granting the war guarantee and Hitler's invasion of
Poland, Britain extends no credit to Poland. It places no advisors on the ground. It offers
no concrete aid to Poland what so ever. They shouldn't have done it, because it was a bluff.
And you ought not to make bluffs when you're dealing with Adolph Hitler.
Christopher Hitchens: There, there's not much to quarrel with that. I mean it is a rather
quixotic gesture. But it's, it's rendered quick, sorted by the fact that it's, it's
the last stand you can make unless you're going to follow Buchanan's invitation to tautology,
which is to agree that there won't be war as long as we gave Hitler everything he wants
all the time. I mean, to, to an extent that must be true. But to the extent that Buchanan
derives this from appeasable Germans grievances, such as the Sudetendeutsch- Peter Robinson: Right. Christopher Hitchens: Party, for example.
He's, I think consciously, trying to deceive us. The example I gave in my polemic against
him in News Week was this. In 1936, Germany and Italy combined to invade Spain with some
rightwing Spanish fascist mutineers to overthrow Democratic [unclear] Republican government.
Spain isn't a profiteer country from Versailles. Spain doesn't. Peter Robinson: No, no German population in
Spain. Christopher Hitchens: Spain doesn't have a
German speaking [unclear]. Spain can't encircle Germany; it's on the other side of the Pyrenees.
It's a pure act of calculated fascist imperialism. And my, my strong suspicion is that Buchanan,
who's tradition is that of the cafidit [phonetic] fascist lead. Father Coughlin in the United
States, his well-known sympathy for General Franco, and so forth, is conceding something
from us that would be very unpleasant if further explored. Peter Robinson: I want to return to the Polish
War Guarantee. Because Buchanan argues that absent that guarantee things might have been
much better for everyone involved, including the Pol's. It seems to me that you, you don't'
need to grant Pat Buchanan's entire ethic and view of the war to think that that may
be, that may actually be so. That is to say if the Britain had not granted the Polish
War Guaranteed, kept its mouth shut, and rearmed as quickly as it could, then 18 months later
or 2 years later there may, may have been in a better position to face Hitler down.
No? Is there not an argument there? Christopher Hitchens: No, but look, no [unclear]
really wants to play this speculation that Peter Robinson: Right. Christopher Hitchens: There, there is a terrible
way of doing this that keeps one awake. It comes from Sebastian Hafner's brilliant biography
of Hitler. Was something that Hitler's generals noticed when it was too late. Hitler was,
was physically and mentally decomposing. We know, we know, we know this now, right? They
suddenly began to understand that the insane orders he was giving them Peter Robinson: Were strictly speaking insane.
Christopher Hitchens: About the war, the war in the east. Yeah. Cause, cause he knew he
didn't have much time. And he had to either see Germany totally ruined, which he wouldn't
have minded, or totally triumphant, which is, which is what he would like, very soon,
very quickly. Once he realized that Germany was being run by a psychopath; the concession,
by the way, that Buchanan doesn't make. He, he seems to regard Hitler as a very canny
and brilliant statesman, which I'm, I, I want to dispute with him. But once you've grown
to the, he's a decomposing, probably syphilitic term as it may, of course it'd be very intelligent
just to wait it out. Peter Robinson: Right. Christopher Hitchens: Run out the clock on
him as long as you can. Deny him the chance to start a, a global war, because under the
cover of war he can also start the Holocaust. If you really want to play this game you can,
but you can't play it as a, as a sympathizer of Charles Lindbergh, Father Coughlin, and
General Franco and the Sudetendeutsch. Victor Davis Hanson: Okay, but one point is
that he, he assumes that all of these atrocities are unleashed only because of war, and only
because the British box Hitler in. And suddenly out of the head of Zeus comes the final solution.
As if altering the 30's, whether it was the deportation of the mentally ill, or racial
exclusionary laws, or the ostracism of Jews, that you didn't have the nucleolus of what
was going to become whether you had a war or not. It was only predicated on one variable,
German power. As soon as German had the, Germany had the power then this awful vision was going
to be realized, war or not war. Peter Robinson: Let me come to that, the Holocaust,
the next segment here. Pat Buchanan quote, for what happened to the Jews of Europe, Hitler
and his collaborators bear full moral responsibility. But was the Holocaust inevitable? Close quote.
Now I'm needless to say I'm bastardizing an, the argument is made at length here. But very
briefly, Buchanan notes that the Swansea [phonetic] Conference, which the, works out the administrative
details of the final solution, doesn't take place until January 1942. That Hitler himself,
that, and he quotes several times from the diaries of propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels,
including February 1942, quote, world jewelry will suffer a great catastrophe. The fewer
realizes the full implications of the great opportunity offered by this war. Close quote.
From this chronology Buchanan writes, the destruction of the Jews was not a cause of
the war, but an awful consequence of the war. With no war in the west all the Jews of Norway,
Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Greece might have survived,
as did the Jews of Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. Close quote. Victor Davis Hanson: And where did all this
idea come from? I mean, he's in a war and suddenly he finds he's in a war, an extrastential
[phonetic] war, and suddenly it comes it him that he has to start killing Jews. Or is he
saying that it's, he says he bears full responsibility throughout, throughout the book. But, and
that but is, well he wouldn't have really been able, capable of, it's like a heroin
addict that really wouldn't take heroine unless somebody gave it to him. As if they can't
find a way to find it any other way. I mean there were already, there were already mechanisms
all during, when they start killing people at Bobliar [phonetic] they start going in
with special groups on the first day of the Russian invasion. All of those things can't
be organized, contemplated, envisioned just because of a war scenario. I mean all of these
thing, and the character, ritual assignations, systemic ethnic cleansing. I mean, what he
had done was on a smaller, it was absolutely consistent with a Holocaust. Peter Robinson: So you don't believe that
the actual, the war unhinges them from the last vestige of morality. You don't buy that
at all. Christopher Hitchens: A tie [phonetic] agree
with, with what Victor says there. I would intensify it a bit by underline it by saying
there's a program for genocide laid out in a book called Mincomft, [phonetic] that comes
out on the 20th. The entire electoral program of the National Socialists Party of Germany
is to say that the, the woes, not just of their country, but of the world are to be
blamed on world jury. The, the motion for invading the Soviet Union, for breaking Hitler's
Stalin Pack, in the first place is to, is to exterminate what they call Judeo Bolshevism.
They think Communism, they are the great enemy, is a Jewish plot. Peter Robinson: And we know that it may be. Christopher Hitchens: So it's written into
that the, the [unclear] of Nazism is anti-Semitism; the organizing principle. Peter Robinson: And isn't it the case, I'm
trying, remembering [unclear]. Christopher Hitchens: [unclear] makes it to
something that's opportunist and contingent. It's a completely [unclear]. Victor Davis Hanson: What was, what was the
[unclear] plan? They were all going to be peacefully deported to where, Madagascar?
And this was all gonna be done under the auspices of a peaceful German empire. Peter Robinson: Well now Buchanan does make
the argument that passage of the Nuremberg Laws, which were, harshly discriminatory toward
Jews, that takes place in 1935. Between that moment and Kristallnacht 1938, between the
passage of the Nuremberg Laws and the Kristallnacht violent, violence against the Jews, perhaps
half of German Jews have left. And then after Kristallnacht and before the war the statistics
indicate another half leave. So something like, and he makes the distinction that there's
a difference between, in effect, driving Jews out of your country and penning them up and
sending them to the gas chambers. That's a, that's a, that, that's a, that's a critical
decision, right? Victor Davis Hanson: And where did a lot of
the Jews go? They went to places like Warsaw that [unclear]. Planning to invade.
Peter Robinson: Oh is that so? Victor Davis Hanson: Absolutely. Peter Robinson: Well, because the largest
numbers went west. Victor Davis Hanson: Not necessarily. Kristallnacht
was caused by the assassination of a German diplomat by a, a Jew who was denied access
to Warsaw and was stateless. And remember this is a guy who had to bathe seven times,
because he discovered his chief of staff had what? Married a Jew. And so, I mean Christopher Hitchens: During the war. During
the, during the night and fog period under the cover of which in article six, there’s
very often they will, they will use scarce resources like railway trains. Peter Robinson: Right. Christopher Hitchens: It would be important
to attach oneself to get on with killing Jews when, when the, these people were needed at
the front. They, they were willing to jeopardize their war eggs than they were to finish with
the, with the Jewish people. This is not something that comes as a Peter Robinson: This [unclear] a spasm of
anger. This is a high priority fully thought out. Victor Davis Hanson: Remember the, you gotta
remember the ideology of the Buchanan argument, it accepts certain things that Hitler is a
monster and he's capable of all of these horrible things, but if you, and he wants to get out
of his cage all the time. But you one day were not a careful zoo keeper, so you left
the cage slightly open and he got out. And therefore you're responsible for all the crimes
he committed, as if it's, you know. Christopher Hitchens: You see it's, it's as
if to say that Hitler was a rational actor. Peter Robinson: Well that's, that's, that's
exactly, that I think is a, is one, one, that's a historical calculation one has to make.
That if, if they had not made the, if the British had not made the guarantee to Poland.
One of the critical arguments is, if the British had not offered the war guarantee to Poland,
would there have been a Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact? And the notion there is, no! Because
Hitler would Christopher Hitchens: It's Munich that leads
to the Hitler, Stalin [unclear]. As Trotsky points out at the time the only person who
noticed it. He said, now that Mr. Chamberlain has done this, and sold the Czech's to try
and preserve the British Empire with Hitler, the next thing that Hitler will do is make
an agreement with Stalin. But you see it's just as insane for the Germans knowing. Peter Robinson: They had that extra [unclear].
Christopher Hitchens: It's just as, it's just as insane for the Germans knowing that if
they invade Poland, they hold war with the British Empire. It's just as irrational and
quick sorted of them to do that as it is for Chamberlain to say, if you charge Poland we
really will fight you. Now Buchanan says, ah ha! Hitler was so upset with, by Britain's
failure to take his deal, we have Europe, you have India. Peter Robinson: Right. Right. Christopher Hitchens: That he invades Russia
to impress them. This is the action of an insane Victor Davis Hanson: Remember what he said
when he went into Pol, he, already well before 1941 he stated again and again to his generals,
maybe we can handle Britain and maybe we can handle Russia, but we cannot handle the United
States. This is a country that put 250,000 people every 2 months in World War I. Peter Robinson: Right. Victor Davis Hanson: And finally he had up
to 3 and a half million people by 1919 on the European continent. And Hitler had known
that, so he understood that eventually if he was going to go down that path it was inevitable
that. It wasn't just that British was, Britain impotent when he went into Poland, but it
was a whole mechanism that going into Poland was the last straw for all liberal thinking
people and democracies. And so this idea that we, that, that Churchill and Roosevelt cooked
up this war was crazy. Peter Robinson: Hold on. Buchanan; Hitler
and the Jews one last time. Buchanan, grant everything you said, that still leaves the
question, was it correct for the allies to push for unconditional surrender? Did the
war aims go to far? Buchanan quote, at Casablanca in 1943, Churchill and FDR declared their
warning was, quote unconditional surrender. At Kaybeck [phonetic] in 1944, Churchill and
FDR approve the Morgenthal [phonetic] Plan calling for the destruction of all German
industry. Goebbels used the Morgentahl plan to convince Germans that surrender meant no
survival. And here's the critical sentence, annihilation of their hostages, the Jews,
was the price the Nazis extracted for their own annihilation. Close quote. Give the Germans
terms earlier and you might have saved some large number of Jews. Plausible? Madness? Christopher Hitchens: It's the argument also
that's made for hoping, working for the success of the Stalinburg [phonetic] plan for the,
for the German general staff to take out Hitler and negotiate a separate peace with the west.
Some people say that would have been better too. Peter Robinson: We do hope, we do wish that
Danish Stalinburg had actually succeeded, right? Christopher Hitchens: I guess we do. Peter Robinson: All right. Christopher Hitchens: But there's one, but,
but, I'd have to add the same cavil. Peter Robinson: Right. Right. Right. Christopher Hitchens: Which is this, which
I, I, I get from a number of my German comrades and Austrian comrades. They, they wanted to
be sure that Nazism was absolutely extirpated. There was no possibility of the, there will
be another Dolslosh [phonetic] Theory that Germany had been stabbed in the back or betrayed
from within. And that [unclear] had hung on, so the Germans wouldn't be doing this kind
of revisionism any more. That it would be an uttered feat, something un, unarguable,
something finish [unclear]. Horrible. Peter Robinson: All right, Churchill. Next
segment Churchill. Again a word of background. With the war spreading in May 1940, political
support for Chamberlain government, the Chamberlain government collapses, Churchill becomes Prime
Minister. In that month of May 1940 its clear Germany is be, making diplomatic overtures.
Halifax in the cabinet is probing Churchill over a critical period of several days. Will
you accept a deal? They let us keep the Empire; we stay out of the general war. There's now
some, there's some evidence in peoples, that Churchill seems to have considered it for
about 48 hours. There's no deep consideration, but he doesn't rule it out immediately. But
the final decision is, no! He rejects the overtures and insists on going, on pursuing
the war, prosecuting the war. Now here Christopher Hitchens: Remember the media as
it was proposed was Mussolini. [phonetic] He'd, they'd have had to Peter Robinson: Is that where [unclear]. Christopher Hitchens: They'd a had to Victor Davis Hanson: Yes, Garchano. [phonetic] Christopher Hitchens: They'd have had to accept
a mediation with Mussolini. Peter Robinson: All right. Christopher Hitchens: The, quite a lot he
has to swallow. Peter Robinson: Right. Right. Now I have to
say when I'm, with reading this strikes me as a reach, but not implausible, not all together
implausible. Buchanan argues that Hitler is convinced Churchill wants to prosecute the
war, because Churchill has the lingering hope that he'll be able to turn the Soviet Union.
That Britain and Russia will be able to align themselves and force Germany into a two front
war. So Hitler decides things went pretty well in France. France falls in 6 weeks. He
decides on a lightening strike in Russia to knock Russia out. But all the time he's doing
it with an eye on Churchill and trying to impress Britain. And there are quotations
here, he quotes again there are general, generals writing in their diaries that the main enemy
is Britain; we're moving into Russia because of Britain. Quoting Buchanan. By his refusal
even to consider a negotiated peace, Churchill caused Hitler to commit his fatal blunder
invading Russia. This would bring the downfall of Hitler, but add 4 more years to the war
and bring death to 10's of millions. Was it worth it? Churchill should have settled. Victor Davis Hanson: No. Remember this is
the same guy who, same author who argues that had Britain just stayed out of things and
had continued the policy of appeasement then Hitler and Stalin would have inevitably clashed
and they would have had this war. Peter Robinson: The Nazi's and the communists- Victor Davis Hanson: Absolutely. Peter Robinson: [unclear] Victor Davis Hanson: And we would have. And
the, and the democracies would have sat out and watched these two atrocious systems wipe
each other out. And it would be probably a little bit better, because he thinks Russia
would have probably lost, and European Christianity, and a white race, and all this would have
won. And then, but, and this, then the after, that's the subtext of most of the book. And
then after saying that he says that Britain caused this war in the east, eventually, by
giving this, this guarantee to Poland. And what keeps it completely out of the argument
is, of course, while all this is going on there's unrestricted submarine warfare that
is destroying American ships, which he knows and he's getting this pressure from his navel
commanders. Remember he declared war on the United States, we didn't declare war on him. Peter Robinson: Right. Victor Davis Hanson: Because he wanted to
destroy Britain economically, and the only way you could do that was to destroy the convoys
from the United States. So the idea that he wasn't doing things that were precip, precipitous,
dangerous, and would inevitably lead to war is crazy. Peter Robinson: Churchill. You by the way,
let the record show that you've been quite critical Christopher Hitchens: Yes. Peter Robinson: Of, of the Churchill myth,
the Churchill legend. Christopher Hitchens: I have. And of the overuse
to the point of diminishing returns of the Munich analogy [unclear]. Peter Robinson: Right. Right. Right. Exactly. Christopher Hitchens: The, the, by the way
I think this might be the point to which to say that the other hidden agenda [unclear]
has a problem to whitewash. You got a Catholic fascism and collusion with it is, is to oppose
the war in Iraq. Peter Robinson: Right. I actually will come
to that, but go ahead. Christopher Hitchens: Okay. All right. Well
[unclear] that monitor in case you. Peter Robinson: That's fair. That's fair.
He's explicit about that. He's explicit about that. Christopher Hitchens: Churchill, remember,
was, had been very pro Mussolini in the early days of fateliam [phonetic] fascism. He had
written in his book, The Great Contemporaries, a very flattering portrayal of Adolf Hitler
saying he hoped that if Britain was ever to suffer similar extremities that Germany had
that they would find a savior of the same type. Not a guy who was very hard to persuade
when it came to hard line anti-communist right-wing forces. But for that reason, very impressive
when he would suddenly realize this, this is not that. This isn't what I thought it
was. This is something pornographic and, and insane, and really menacing. And there isn't
any possibility of co-existence with it. We can't, he said, we can't breath the same air
as these people. They have to go. He would have loved to manipulate a, a war between
Germany and Bolshevism. I mean it would have been Churchill's idea initially to invade
the Soviet Union. Peter Robinson: Right. Exactly. That's exactly
[unclear]. Christopher Hitchens: [unclear] 1919. Not
just an idea this carried to execution with the American forces as well as British ones. Victor Davis Hanson: And his defense also,
we forget that this, while Buchanan is quite accurate in pointing out the poultry resources
of Britain in September of 1939, what he doesn't realize is that Hitler, it is true that Churchill
is asking two things. He wants to rearm, and he wants to by 1939 stop the appeasement.
But after the fall of France when Churchill takes the reigns of government he didn't have
a lot of options. This is a man who was making an argument, finally. And Christopher is right
about his sordid statements in the middle 30's. But finally he was making a stand with
very few resources. And he was making on a, on a, it speaks well of him that he was trying
to rally the best in the British people to stop a nightmarish ideology, of which he didn't
have a lot of resources at his, at his disposal. Peter Robinson: Can I? Grant everything you've
said about Churchill and the importance to all of world history of that moral insight.
Did he prosecute the war wisely? Was he good on strategy and tactics? I mean there are
plenty of American military historians who would say, we could have moved into Normandy
a year earlier if Churchill hadn't insisted on that ridiculous approach from; it'll, that,
that it was Churchill, he got all kinds of things wrong. He got the moral insight right. Christopher Hitchens: Michael House [phonetic]
just written a very interesting critique of the Italian campaign, for example. Every account
you read of the Norwegian campaign is absolutely calamitous. Well the accounts aren't calamitous;
the campaign was calamitous. Peter Robinson: Yes. Yes. Right. Christopher Hitchens: That, that's true. It's
just that the accusation made regularly by Goebbels on Nazi radio that Churchill enjoyed
war and was, and was half, half drunk all the time. Literally drunk, because he, he
really loved doing it with a big glass of brandy and a cigar. Had a [unclear] with the
business, absolutely true. Victor Davis Hanson: This is true. This is
true. Christopher Hitchens: Yeah. All true; and
just as well. Just as well. Victor Davis Hanson: But I, there's no way
I think most military historians would agree on this. There is no way the United States
was capable of invading western Europe, Normandy, or wherever [unclear]. Peter Robinson: Normandy took place as soon
as it could have done? Victor Davis Hanson: Absolutely. Yeah. Okay.
The deoperated [phonetic] show that the United States was not in a position, whether it's
landing craft or tactics. And even after we, we forget 3,500 killed landing on Normandy
may have been an impressive achievement, but the cost, but then we lost 80,000 people in
the next 6 six weeks in the Hedgerills. [phonetic] It was not a, it was a near run thing even
in 1944 in June. Peter Robinson: Buchanan's second charge against
Hitler, excuse me, against Churchill, that he focused so monomaniacally on Hitler that
he underestimates, or he looses sight of the threat from Stalin. I quote Buchanan. The
destruction of Germany to which Churchill had dedicated himself, this is following on
the point that Churchill refused to deal, refused to offer them terms. He presses for
unconditional surrender. The destruction of Germany to which Churchill had dedicated himself
left a power vacuum that Stalin inevitably filled. Britain fought Nazi tyranny only to
pave the, pave the path to power for a greater tyranny. Close quote. Christopher Hitchens: It's the first thing
I ever wrote about Churchill. With, actually with the help of someone, which doesn't write,
Gamasigbre Taylor. [phonetic] Many years ago when the, when those papers were opened in
1974, the premier papers. Peter Robinson: The state papers? Christopher Hitchens: Yeah. Churchill's Premier
Papers as they're called. The deal he made with Stalin in Moscow 1944, literally on the
back of an envelope giving Stalin 90% of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania in exchange
for Britain retaining predominant interest in Greece and Turkey. And when you consider
that it was Poland that Britain had gone to war for in the first place, it's a, it's a
pretty sordid and shabby deal. And there's, I think, no arguing with that. Buchanan though,
I think, is short-termist [phonetic] about this. He says that Stalin, and Stalin isn't
Communism, was the greatest profiteer of the Second World War. That's only true for a couple
of decades really. I mean, we, we can now see that, the, the war that started really
in 1914 that goes on Peter Robinson: The century of war. Christopher Hitchens: Various, various truces.
There aren't truces, and doesn't' really end till the Berlin Wall comes down in 1989. By,
by that stage totalitarian ideology has known as being defeated in modern society. It's
been discredited thoroughly. And without it, without a through going stand to root out
Nazism in the first place I don't think that could have happened. Peter Robinson: We depart from Pat Buchanan
for a moment here. Neil Ferguson [phonetic] has a book and a PBS television series of
the same name, The War of The World. Ferguson stresses, here's the list here, American soldiers,
this is based on the first installment of the series. American soldiers sometimes executed
prisoners, as surely as did the Germans, and especially the Japanese. The destruction by
the allies of Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, resembles a lot. The terror bombing that the
Germans inflict on London and other cities. Churchill and FDR hail Joseph Stalin as an
irreplaceable ally. Joseph Stalin is, of course, a mass murderer. Now listen to two quotations.
Neil Ferguson quote, the allies adopted the most brutal tactics of those they were fighting.
Close quote. Rush Limbaugh, I direct this one to you particular Christopher. Quote,
now we've got this revisionist historian trying to say we're no better than the people we
beat, because we were using the same totalitarian tactics. This is a latest example of the attempt
to convince as many Americans as possible that the United States is no better than any
of the worst despots and mass murderers that have ever lived, thank you PBS. Close quote.
So who are you with on that one Christopher? Rush Limbaugh or, Christopher Hitchens: Spirited Peter Robinson: Or Niall Ferguson. Christopher Hitchens: Well Mr. Limbaugh was
very flattering about my good self in the New York Times last Sunday. So I Peter Robinson: Yes, he was actually. Christopher Hitchens: I suppose I owe him
one. Actually he some how, I, try as he make he could never find my G spot. I don't understand
why people [unclear]. Peter Robinson: Oh, you don't? Christopher Hitchens: No. Peter Robinson: Oh, well, have a drink Christopher Hitchens: I can't, I can't get
it. But, but anyway, if I haven't had the advantage of reading Mr. Ferguson's book.
I'm an admirer of his work in general. The, the difference I suppose would be this, Germany
and Japan in defeat were very expensively and carefully nourished back to life, and
health, and democracy, and prosperity. I don't think that would have been the case for a,
a German occupied Russia, or a German occupied United Kingdom. And I think I rest my case
on that distinction. Peter Robinson: And, and we know what happened
[unclear]. Christopher Hitchens: Yes. Right. Victor Davis Hanson: The difference is that
in all war there's a process of brutality, and, and it becomes worse and worse. Every
party tool, or no matter whether a liberal democratic government or an autocracy will
find themselves caught in that spiral, that, that dissent into barbarity. But the difference
between the allies in Germany and Japan was two fold. Number 1, it atrocity was incidental.
It was not essential to the war making. In, in the sense that you didn't have special
groups of British soldiers who went out and found Jews and slaughtered them. Or you didn't
have anything like the rape of Menking. [phonetic] Or you didn't have 10 to 15,000 Asians per
week being killed in the last years of World War II by Americans and British in China,
and Korea, and Formosa. That's one thing. The other is magnitude. Christopher Hitchens: No, and no term to make
their own civilians commit mass suicide in the face of [unclear]. Victor Davis Hanson: And there's Christopher Hitchens: There wouldn't have
been. Victor Davis Hanson: But the, the other argument
is more of a subtle one and it involves magnitude, which I think Neil Ferguson didn't point out
clear enough, clearly enough, excuse me. And that is that while there was this difference
in the way that, and first of all Hiroshima was really in reaction to the savagery of
the island hopping campaign. Peter Robinson: Right. Victor Davis Hanson: And people, remember
after Okinawa was declared secure and they looked back and saw 50,000 causalities, the
popular American outcry at the end of the war just 90 days later was not, we dropped
the bomb. But surely you must have, if you, you exploded it in mid July you must have
known it was there and you could have avoided Okinawa. So the point that I'm making is its
magnitude. Peter Robinson: You speaking to the son of
a man who was on a ship just off Okinawa and watching kamikaze planes. Victor Davis Hanson: My, my grandfather, my
namesake was killed there. So the point that I'm making is that the fact that in retaliation
to stop atrocity that the allies engage in types of activities that kill a lot of people,
doesn't make it the moral equivalent of people who would have done far worse, only they didn't
have the access to the technology or the material resources. Christopher Hitchens: There is some very unpleasant
stuff there if you read the, the conversations of Cha Wil, [phonetic] and Lindamen, [phonetic]
and the advisors to the Cheswan [phonetic] area bombing they say, we recommend that you
bomb the working class areas of Hamberg, because the houses are closer together, the people
are packed more tightly. You'll get more deaths per bomb. And remember these are the, these
are the areas of Germany that have never [unclear] to Hitler. Hitler I think, I'm, I'm right
in saying, barely even visited Hamberg even when he was Chancellor, cause he knew he wasn't,
he was hated there as a Socialist working class city. It's horrible to think when we
ask a, a rather smug question, what happened to all the good Germans during the terrible
period of Nazi's. And well a lot of them were being killed by the RF. Peter Robinson: Nagasaki, by the way, was
the center of Catholicism in Japan. Christopher Hitchens: Yes. Peter Robinson: Took out the one, the one
place where there were actually a large concentration of Christians in Japan. However, we are, we
have ratified this. There is a fundamental moral distinction to be observed, and to miss
it is obtuse. That is to say, all three of us agree that Mr. Rush Limbaugh is correct. Victor Davis Hanson: Yes, I think [unclear] Christopher Hitchens: This time, this time
I'd have to say so, yes. Peter Robinson: Got it. Got it. Christopher Hitchens: It's, it's just rather,
it's phrased in a rather spirited way too. Peter Robinson: The proof that [unclear] can
count on him for. Victor Davis Hanson: Ask yourself that the
proof of the pudding is in the eating. Imagine a Japanese victory and a German victory in
1945 and ask what Europe and Asia would look like today, [unclear] what they do look like
today. And why is the, why is there a probable difference. Peter Robinson: Let me tell you Naill Ferguson's
second point that Ferguson makes. The principle beneficiary of the Second World War, quote,
was Stalin's Soviet Union. The wartime alliance with Stalin for all its inevitability and
strategic rationality, he grants that, was never the less an authentically Faustian pact.
Get ready for this sentence; the victory of 1945 was a tainted victory, if indeed it was
a victory at all. Close quote. What do you do with that? Victor Davis Hanson: Well we've discussed
that already that in the short term you can make the argument that in a geopolitical sense
Russia was empowered. In the long term, you can see World War II as part of an intrical
[phonetic] process that lead to, not only the destruction of Japanese militarism, fascism,
Nazism, but also the discrediting of the Soviet Union, and the world that we see today that's
free of both Communism and Nazism. So I think, I think that's an, important to point out. Peter Robinson: The victory is not tainted. Victor Davis Hanson: No. Peter Robinson: It is a victory that's not
tainted. Victor Davis Hanson: But I don't, I don't
understand Christopher Hitchens: Cause I, I would just,
I don't disagree with it, shouldn't necessarily, but the argument that you can put against
Buchanan or Ferguson. Peter Robinson: Right. Christopher Hitchens: Is that there's always
the option, and it did exist, was real, if standing out of Fascism a lot earlier than
we did. A lot, a lot of the catastrophic consequences are the result of postponing the resistance
until 1940. Instead of drawing a line with, with or with out the League of Nations and
appealing for American help in no, no later I would say than 1936 in Spain. Or, or maybe
better opposing on the [unclear] genocide and aggression in what was then called advaciniary
[phonetic] therica [phonetic]. Now all these chances are missed, but, but because of the
beast. Peter Robinson: What is the year Christopher Hitchens: Cause the beast of Fascism
is Peter Robinson: [unclear] moving speech to
the League of Nations, what year was that? Christopher Hitchens: Gosh, I really ought
to know, I think it's 1934. Peter Robinson: 34, so that's during the Spanish
Civil War. So it's the early 30's. Christopher Hitchens: Yes. Peter Robinson: First half of the 30's. Christopher Hitchens: Yeah. Peter Robinson: Is your argument. Christopher Hitchens: And because the, the
beast is insatiable, it doesn't recognize any of these things as concessions, it just
thinks of them as signs of weakness. Victor Davis Hanson: Two other things that
are, remember, I don't see quite the argument that Soviet Union comes off so well. This
is a country that lost 20 million dead in World War II and is, is very weakened severely.
And a lot of the problems it shows in the 50's, and 60's, and 70's, and the Cold War
was a direct result of the damage that was inflicted in World War II. So it's not, and
I'm, I know that was by Germany, but nevertheless the idea that it, it just was markiavellian
[phonetic] and figured out this war how to be on the right side, and how to use the allies.
And it comes out in 1945 when this wonderful, there were, you know, millions of Russians
who didn't' believe in Communism. They were wonderful people that went out and fought
the Vermark [phonetic] and saved Mother Russia. Not the Soviet Union, that's not what they
were fighting for. The second thing is this notion of post fractal utopianism, in which
we sit here in the, in the most wealthy affluent age of civilization and we go back to our
ancestor, who really in a direct lineal process gave us everything that we have. And we say,
you know what? They weren't perfect, and therefore they weren't good. Peter Robinson: Pat Buchanan, his book, The
Unnecessary War, and The War in Iraq, this is from Pat, of, of, Buchanan's introduction
in which he's discussing the reasons for writing the book. Quote there, there's a longish quotation,
but I'll just put it on the table and let you have it. There has arisen among America's
elite a Churchill cult. After 911 the Churchill Cult helped to persuade an untutored president
that the liberation of Iraq from Saddam would be like the liberation of Europe from Hitler.
Democracy would put down roots in the Middle East as it had in Europe after the fall of
Hitler. And George W. Bush would enter history as the Churchill of his generation. This Churchill
Cult gave us our present calamity. If not exposed it will produce more wars and more
disasters. Close quote. Christopher? Christopher Hitchens: Yeah, well there used
to be a slogan in the 1930's, a slogan of the left and the popular front, actually said,
fascism means war. And a good slogan, I think, because it, it meant both that fascism intends
war, desires it, but also it, it necessarily involves it. It means it. It is equivalent
to it. You can't have one without the other. In other words, you can't have peace with
it. I think the same can be said of the Saddam Hussein regime in a route, which modeled itself
partly on Stalin and partly on Hitler. [unclear] ideology helped itself to, to both of these.
And was ceaselessly engaged in aggression against its neighbors as well as genocide
against it's on inhabitants. So, the, the reason, there was no, there was no compromise
possible. There was no containment. All the, all the horrors of this last war result again
from having put off the confrontation with Saddam to fight Iraq. Allowed him to be in
power, so enough time to invade 3 neighbors, and to attack 3 neighbors rather, and to stay
in power for the best part of a quarter of a century. Victor Davis Hanson: I would add that, that Christopher Hitchens: So it's actually quite
a good analogy. And we owe it to Buchanan for, for [unclear] it. Victor Davis Hanson: The two reference, or
maybe the two catalyst Peter Robinson: Essential moral insight is
the same. This is someone with whom we cannot abide. Saddam Hussein and [unclear]. Victor Davis Hanson: When you read the end
of Buchanan's book and you start to see that there's a contemporary catalyst encouragement
for this type of revisionist thinking of World War II, what made him write this book. It
seems pretty apparent when you read it that it was the events post, not just 2001, but
say 1996 and all. And because prominently is the Serbian situation, where we, in Buchanan's
world view, went in a bombed a Christian white nation in the heart of Europe, for whom? Muslims
[unclear] apparently. But when you look at his two examples of what we need, what we
did wrong, and how we had to learn from World War II, they're very shaky. Because where,
where are we now? Peter Robinson: You mean Serbia being one, Victor Davis Hanson: Absolutely. Peter Robinson: And Iraq being the other piece? Victor Davis Hanson: We stopped the genocide
in the middle of the Balkans that killed over 200,000 people, or wounded them, or exiled
them. And a monster named Milosevic is gone. And there's the seeds, at least, of consensual
governments in that area where there were nothing but maybe a rogue fascist commy, [phonetic]
whatever you want to call Milosevic and his click. And then we had Saddam Christopher Hitchens: National Socialists Victor Davis Hanson: Yes. Christopher Hitchens: actually would be a
good description. Victor Davis Hanson: And then we have Saddam
Hussein and with just this week the Maliki Government is discussing with us whether we
should leave their country, and we will. So there's a constitutional government in the
heart of the ancient Kaliefe, [phonetic] which was absolutely preposterous to even think
that. And then we're supposed to believe that, that what we see today in Iraq with the Patria
[phonetic] surge and the constitutional government, what we see in the Balkans is a complete folly,
because we didn't learn that we should a let Hitler alone in World War II. And the alternative
of having Milosevic and Saddam Hussein would be much better for the world and for us. It’s
preposterous. Peter Robinson: We close out the program.
Clare Loose [phonetic] used to say that history would give even the greatest men only a single
sentence a piece. Lincoln freed the slaves. Let me give you a couple of names and ask
you for one sentence in return. Christopher, Adolph Hitler. Christopher Hitchens: Well, the, the greatest
enemy of the German people. Peter Robinson: Victor? Victor Davis Hanson: He's our, the worst nightmare
within the human species. Peter Robinson: Joseph Stalin? Christopher Hitchens: Firm, but fair. Just
kidding. Just kidding. Joseph Stalin, the gravedigger of Communism. Peter Robinson: Really? Christopher Hitchens: Yes, the gravedigger
of communism. Peter Robinson: Victor? Victor Davis Hanson: Ah. Peter Robinson: That's a separate show; we'll
have to sit you down one more time. Victor Davis Hanson: The co-greatest evil
of the human experience in nature. Peter Robinson: All right. Franklin Delanor
Roosevelt? Christopher Hitchens: First class temperament. Peter Robinson: All right.
Victor Davis Hanson: For all his weaknesses and human, human pathologies, which he displayed.
And numerous thing he was on score at the right person at the right time in World War
II. Peter Robinson: In the Second World War. Victor Davis Hanson: Absolutely. Peter Robinson: And Winston Churchill. Christopher Hitchens: The lover of war, and
wine, and brandy, and of genialindom. [phonetic] Gena [phonetic] victory and on Berlin defeat. Peter Robinson: Victor? Victor Davis Hanson: He usually did the good
thing last after he thought, and wrote, and said all of the other bad things first. Peter Robinson: He did the right thing last,
I like that. Neither of you is gonna call him the greatest man of the 20th century? Christopher Hitchens: That's very clever of
Victor, because that's what Churchill says about the Americans, they always do the right
thing after they've tried everything else. Peter Robinson: ah ha. All right. All right.
Victor Davis Hanson, Christopher Hitchens, thank you very much. Christopher Hitchens: Thank you. Peter Robinson: I'm Peter Robinson at the
Hoover Institution for Uncommon Knowledge. Thanks for joining us.
