The history of the Late Eastern Roman Empire
is often told as a chronicle of long decline. “The Empire was doomed to fall in the 14th
century”, “The collapse was inevitable after Manzikert”. The variety of dates touted as the point of
no return for Byzantium is like none other. The most famous book about Roman history is
literally called “The Decline and Fall” and it covers a period of 13 centuries.There’s
probably someone out there making an argument that the Empire was doomed to fall once Romulus
killed Remus. They are all correct, of course, no king rules
forever and all that, but repeating these truisms doesn’t really advance our understanding
of history. As a certain fantasy character once said:
“All we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given to us”. So, instead of looking for another point in
time when it was “all over” I decided to examine the final few years of the empire’s
existence and try to figure out what could’ve been done differently to prevent or at least
postpone the fall of Constantinople in 1453. As a start of the observation period I am
going to pick a date that is probably very familiar to many of my viewers. It’s November 11th 1444, the day after the
Battle of Varna. The reason for picking this date is two-fold. The closer we get to 1453, the less freedom
of action we have. Once the Turkish troops are assembled beneath
the Theodosian wall, all of the pieces are pretty much set. I think that the conduct of the last Roman
emperor during the siege itself was beyond criticism, so we’re not changing anything
there. On the other hand, the farther we go into
the past, the more uncontrollable variables there are. The Crusade for Varna makes for a good breaking
point: Before it the Emperor’s efforts were primarily focused on its success, and the
campaign’s ultimate failure set the stage for the empire’s final confrontation with
the Ottomans. Every decision made by the last two Roman
emperors past that point can be judged by whether it made Constantinople safer or more
susceptible to the Turkish attack. So we are going to do just that and try to
devise a viable strategy that would increase the chances of the Empire’s survival past
the year 1453. And no, luring the whole Ottoman army to an
island and trapping them there with your boats isn’t a viable strategy. Mehmed was much smarter than the EU4 AI. We’re also going to be staying away from
wish-fulfillment fantasies and try to be as realistic as we can. Don’t expect this video to end with Constantine
single-handedly defeating the Turkish army, restoring the Empire to Trajan’s borders
and colonizing Mars in 50 years. We’re only setting out to prevent, postpone
or conceivably weaken the Ottoman siege. Every event in the span of those 8.5 years
that wasn’t directly affected by the decisions of John and Constantine goes exactly as it
went historically. Finally, we’re not going to be contemplating
any hare-brained plots to assassinate Mehmed. Admittedly, this is a tactic that had bore
some fruit for other Balkan powers in their struggle with the Ottomans, but it can not
serve as an element of a reliable strategy. First of all, we need to understand the situation
in late 1444, the state of the Empire and the surrounding powers. To do this lets briefly recount the events
leading up to it. In 1425 emperor Manuel II abdicated the throne
and joined a monastery, leaving the Empire to his eldest son John. During Manuel’s reign Constantinople faced
2 different sieges, but through clever use of diplomacy and a fair bit of luck, the city
stood. During the 2nd of those sieges John was in
charge of the city while his father was seeking help from the west, so he had already had
experience running the imperial government. In 1425 things were looking quite bleak for
Byzantium. John’s direct domains consisted of the strip
of the Black Sea coast from Varna to Constantinople, the city itself with its suburbs and several
islands in the Aegean. John also had a brother Theodore ruling the
Despotate of Morea as his subject. At the time of John's ascension, the despotate
of Morea constituted roughly the Eastern half of the Peloponnese. It’s capital Mystra was one of the key urban
centers in the Empire’s possession. From 1425 to 1432, The despotate absorbed
the neighboring principality of Achaea which increased its prosperity and strategic security. The other important Byzantine population center,
the city of Thessaloniki, was currently besieged by the Ottomans and recently given over to
the Venetians, in hopes that they would be able to defend it. Thessaloniki eventually fell to the Ottomans
in 1430. John also had 5 brothers. The one everyone knows is Constantine, the
4th eldest. Constantine was by far the favorite of John’s. It was to him that John delegated the reins
of the Empire when he went on his diplomatic missions. Soon after their father’s death Constantine
had proven his merit as a military commander. In 1427 together with John he repelled the
invasion on Morea by the Latin Despot of Epirus. In 1428 John appointed Constantine and their
youngest brother Thomas to jointly rule the despotate with Theodore. Thomas inherited the remnants of the principality
of Achaea from his father-in-law and became the de-facto ruler of the western Peloponesse
. Theodore was somewhat envious of the favor, shown to his younger brothers by John. He was the second eldest so he presumed himself
to be the heir apparent to childless John. Things were eventually smoothed out between
him and Constantine. To renounce his claim Theodore was given the
city of Selymbria, where he died in 1443. His only daughter Helena was married to the
king of Cyprus. I’ve already mentioned Thomas and what he
did, so there are only 2 brothers remaining. The 3rd eldest was Andronikos. Andronikos suffered from a debilitating sickness
since childhood. It was either leprosy or elephantiasis. While still around 8 years old he was appointed
the governor of Thessaloniki. Due to his condition he was unable to maintain
the defense of the city during the Ottoman siege and offered the control of Thessaloniki
to Venice. After initiating this very first of the long
line of wars between the Ottomans and Venice, Andronikos retired to a monastery where he
died six years later. This leaves us with the second youngest brother,
Demetrios. Demetrios was quite plainly, a pain in the
ass. By all accounts, he possessed just the worst
possible combination of ambition and ineptitude. The Palaiologos dynasty always had complicated
family relationships, but the real bane of the imperial family were people like Demetrios. The younger sons of the ruling house were
usually given appanages to govern, like the aforementioned despotate of Morea. In 1422 Demetrios was given the island of
Lemnos, but he refused to go there and instead fled to the court of the king of Hungary,
claiming that he was threatened by his brothers. He returned back to Constantinople 5 years
later, but he never gave up his ambitions to one up his siblings. John sought help from the Catholic west for
the defense against the Ottomans. Demetrios wanted the Ottomans to install him
as the emperor in John’s place. This wasn’t something unprecedented in Byzantine
politics, but the fact that his relatives knew about his intentions and still kept him
around is baffling to me. You’re going to hear a lot more about Demerios
as we progress in our timeline In late 1437 John left for Italy to discuss
the possibility of the church union with the papacy. The Orthodox and the Catholics were historically
on bad terms, especially after the 4th crusade. But the Ottoman threat could not be faced
by the Eastern Romans alone. They needed help from the west, and it would
be more likely to come if the churches of Constantinople and Rome were in communion. John was accompanied by the patriarch, several
important bishops and, surprisingly, Demetrios. Demetrios was staunchly opposed to the church
union. We don’t know whether it was a sincere distrust
of the Latins or just a desire to foil his brother's plan. Given how he didn’t have any qualms about
seeking refuge at Hungarian court, my money would on the latter. But it was probably some combination of both. Nevertheless, John took Demetrius with him,
because he decided it would be safer then leaving him to scheme in the capital. The council took until June 1439 to deliberate. Constantinople was relatively safe at the
time as sultan Murad II was focused on his campaign in Bulgaria. In 1440 John returned to Constantinople with
the Act of Union between the churches. What it essentially meant was the submission
of the Orthodox church to the authority of the Pope in exchange for military assistance. The popular reception in Constantinople was
very skeptical. Most of the citizens weren’t excited about
having to change the way they worship on the account of the Roman pontiff. The unionist churches, including Hagia Sophia,
were nearly empty and there was a fair bit of unrest throughout the city. Demetrios tried to use this sentiment to his
advantage, because of course he would. At the time he was governing Mesembria, a
city on the Black Sea coast in Thrace. Constantine wanted to swap domains with him:
he’d get a seat closer to the capital and Demetrios would become the new Despot of Morea. But the seat in which Demetrios was interested
was the imperial one in Constantinople. When Constantine’s envoys arrived in Messembria,
Demetrios was already assembling an Ottoman-backed army to march on the capital. Eventually this attempt was put down by John
and Demetrios had to apologize profusely. He and his co-conspirators were imprisoned,
but managed to escape later. When we meet Demetrios next time, he would
have already somehow weaseled his way back into the governorship of Lemnos. While this was going on, Pope Eugene was fulfilling
his end of the bargain and calling a crusade against the Turks. In late 1443 the crusade set out from Hungary
led by the king Ladislaus and his senior general John Hunyadi. The fighting initially went well for the crusaders. On the news of their successes, Constantine
launched his own attack from Peloponnese and subdued the sultan’s vassal, the Latin duke
of Athens. In the meantime, the crusaders have gained
a favorable peace treaty with the Ottomans and some of them went home, including George
Brankovich, the Despot of Serbia. But the papal representatives were not interested
in peace. Cardinal Cesarini thought up a legalistic
loophole to absolve King Ladislaus of his oath and urged him to resume fighting. This time, the luck didn’t favor the crusaders. Their weakened coalition army was defeated
and the king fell in battle. All of the earlier gains were reverted and
the Ottomans were once again dominant in the Balkans. This is where Emperor John found himself at
the end of the year 1444. For decades he campaigned for the assistance
from the west, he even became a catholic to secure it, alienating a good portion of his
subjects and all he got was this lousy crusade. Constantine was still advancing in Greece,
but Murad’s retaliation soon came in the form of a 60000 strong army, which devastated
Morea and destroyed the Hexamilion, a big defensive wall across the Isthmus of Corinth. To be fair, the crusade wasn’t completely
without benefit for the Eastern Romans. The Ottomans have won, but they still suffered
heavy casualties and needed time to recover. Murad had clearly demonstrated that he didn’t
plan to annex more of the Byzantine territories, so the emperor at least had some breathing
room. The question now was how to use this time. The historical timeline resulted in the capture
of the Empire’s capital 8,5 years later, so let’s see if there’s something that
could’ve been done differently to get a more favorable outcome. Before we start theorizing a way to prevent
the Ottomans from taking Constantinople, we should mention an approach that would’ve
been downright blasphemous to talk about if I released this video on the 29th of May. I am calling this strategy “Full Demetrios”. The basic gist of going “Full Demetrios”
is cutting all previously established diplomatic ties with the Catholic powers and playing
a good vassal of the Sultan for the foreseeable future. This means renouncing the act of union and
almost certainly having to appoint Demetrios rather than Constantine as the heir to the
Empire. Would this have resulted in a guarantee of
peace and autonomy? Who knows. Even with a very competent emperor in charge,
there’s no making sure that the Ottomans won’t gradually absorb the remnants of the
Empire. With someone like Demetrios, there is a solid
chance that he’d provoke some riot and the sultan would demand to garrison the city under
the pretext of keeping peace. And then the city is lost all the same, but
now you don’t even have a great story to tell. All in all, probably not the best strategy,
but I had to mention it as a possibility. In the historical timeline Emperor John decided
against going “Full Demetrios” and kept true to the act of union. I think this was a correct decision, because
it kept a lot of diplomatic possibilities open. I also think that some later Greek sources
exaggerate the effect that the emperor’s nominal catholicism had on the city’s morale. The problem with the primary sources is that
they are written after the fall and everyone is very bitter and looking for someone to
blame. Depending on their personal preferences the
authors blame either the supporters or the opponents of the church union. Those who blame the unionists just state that
it was wrong to agree to the Pope’s demands and that God had forsaken the Romans for that. Those who blame opponents of the union are
more specific. They accuse the anti-unionists of sabotaging
the imperial alliances and collaborating with the Ottomans. The person whose reputation suffers the most
is the imperial minister Loukas Notaras. He’s always portrayed either as a very slimy
character or as an outright traitor. A chronicler by the name of Doukas quotes
him saying: “I would rather see the Sultan’s turban in the city, than a Latin cap.” Another history tells that Notaras hoarded
the imperial wealth for himself and tried to give it to Mehmed after the city was captured. Mehmed loved the treason, but hated the traitor
and ordered Notaras executed. These accounts shouldn’t be taken at face
value. Doukas has many other claims that I find very
hard to believe. In his chronicle the Ottoman army has 400
000 soldiers and the Hungarian emissaries help the Turks to aim the cannon. For the events in Constantinople I rely more
on George Sphrantzes who was actually present, and he doesn’t accuse Loukas Notaras of
anything treasonous. Notaras might’ve been skeptical of the church
union like many other imperial subjects, but as an experienced diplomat he likely understood
its necessity. Rather than stir the riots in the city he
worked to calm down the anti-unionist party. We can be relatively sure that he wasn’t
some anti-catholic zealot, because he maintained personal connections in Rome, Genoa and Venice. During the siege of Constantinople, Notaras
commanded the defense of the sea wall which stood until the final assault. His daughters escaped to Italy, while the
rest of his family didn’t receive any special treatment from the sultan after the sack. This should be enough to say that any accusations
of treachery against Loukas Notaras is just frivolous slander. Now that we’ve cleared the name of Loukas
Notaras, let’s discuss the actual traitor in the Byzantine midst. Demetrios Palailogos should have been dealt
with preferably before the death of John. At the very least he should’ve been kept
under arrest. What ended up happening was that when John
died in October 1448, Demetrios rushed to the capital to claim the throne once again. Thanks to the intervention of Thomas and their
mother Helena, his pretension was thwarted and Constantine became the emperor, but it
was a close call. Then instead of executing Demetrios for fomenting
a coup, Constantine had given him the Despotate of Morea. The reason for this decision? According to George Sphrantzes Demetrios apologized
very sincerely. Admittedly, Constantine probably did so to
appease the anti-unionist party, who favored Demetrios. His rebellious brother had cultivated a considerable
powerbase using marriage ties to influential families. By this time the opportunity to get rid of
Demetrios quietly was gone. This was a big strategic blunder. Morea should’ve been an asset for the empire,
but with Demetrios at the helm it became a liability. Instead of fortifying the peninsula, Demetrios
spent his time quarreling with Thomas and provoking a local rebellion. Demetrios and his shenanigans should have
been the first issue on John’s agenda in the last years of his reign. Some sources say that Demetrios escaped imprisonment
after his first failed coup and was sheltered by the Genoese in Galata. In any case, he was clearly a threat to the
stable succession and should’ve been dealt with accordingly. When John dies Demetrios is a governor of
Lemnos. How this was allowed to come to pass is beyond
me. If John had been able to get Demetrios out
of the picture without major pushback from the anti-unionists, then upon his death Constantine
becomes an emperor without any problems and Thomas receives the full ownership of the
despotate of Morea. Thomas wasn’t any kind of administrative
or military genius, but he was loyal to his brothers. With all of Morea under his control, him and
Constantine would be able to better coordinate the defense against the Ottomans. We’ll get into more detail once we reach
that point in the timeline. When Constantine became the Emperor in 1449
he was unmarried. This was a diplomatic card that should’ve
been played wisely. Constantine began searching for a marriage
alliance in the first year of his reign. His first candidates were the princesses of
Georgia and Trebizond. When Sultan Murad II died in 1451, Constantine
offered to marry his Serbian widow, Mara Brankovic, but she refused. Eventually, he decided to marry the Georgian
princess, but the siege of Constantinople got in the way of the wedding preparations. I consider this to be another missed opportunity
for the following reason. Before becoming the emperor, Constantine was
going to marry the daughter of the doge of Venice, Francesco Foscari, but the betrothal
was broken upon his ascension. The explanation that George Sphratzes gives
for this is that no one would’ve accepted a Venetian empress, even if she was a daughter
of the doge. My guess is that it was another concession
to the anti-unionists. This is supported by the fact that all three
of his prospective brides were Orthodox, rather than Catholic. All in all, the alliance with Georgia might’ve
proven to be important in the future, but it did nothing to deter the Ottoman aggression. A marriage to a daughter of the doge, however,
would’ve secured an immediate and substantial strategic advantage. The mercantile city-states of Italy had the
most to lose if the Ottomans were to take Constantinople. The Mediterranean trade was the lifeblood
of their existence and the Bosphorus was one of its key arteries. A weak Byzantium wouldn’t interfere with
their business, but a powerful Ottoman Empire was unlikely to be as generous. However, after being snubbed by Constantine
the doge was reluctant to send help to the besieged city. Other Venetian notables eventually persuaded
him to send reinforcements, but by the time those ships reached the island of Chios, the
city had already fallen. If the Venetian help was sent without delay
it could’ve provided the defenders with enough staying power to keep fighting until
more reinforcements would arrive. But what possible reinforcements would that
be? Byzantine sources, like Sphrantzes, are famously
salty about the help from the west, especially from the Papacy. “We had received as much aid from Rome as
had been sent to us by the sultan of Cairo '' writes Sphrantzes. This is a bit unfair towards the Pope. Eugene IV at least sent 200 Neapolitan archers
accompanying cardinal Isidore of Kiev. He also petitioned the Catholic rulers to
come to the aid of Constantinople, but all these pleas were a little too late. That’s why I emphasize the importance of
the Venetian alliance. Having at least one fully committed ally at
the start of the siege would’ve allowed to prolong it until others could gather their
strength. On a longer timespan those may have included
Duke Philip of Burgundy and the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick III, but let’s just focus
on those who were already engaged in direct diplomacy with Constantine. The marriage proposal to Mara Brankovic which
we mentioned earlier was an attempt to secure the support of Serbia. This one sounds overly optimistic to me. After the failure of the Crusade for Varna,
Serbian despot Duradzh Brankovich was unwilling to participate in any anti-Ottoman actions. In 1448 he refused to join the coalition of
John Hunyadi, which was eventually defeated in the 2nd Battle of Kosovo. Add this to the fact that his daughter Mara
was very supportive of her stepson Sultan Mehmed and you get a very low chance of any
assistance from Serbia. The time Constantine had wasted trying to
secure it would’ve been better spent elsewhere. The time, indeed, was of the essence, and
Constantine might’ve severely misjudged how much of it he had to prepare for an eventual
assault. He had a truce with the Ottomans from his
ascension in 1449, which gave him a false sense of security. However, when Murad died in 1451 and was succeeded
by his son Mehmed, this treaty might as well have been thrown out. Some sources say that Constantine provoked
Mehmed. Allegedly he did so by suggesting that he
is going to release Orhan Celebi, a possible pretender to the Ottoman title. Orhan Celebi was a great-grandson of Sultan
Bayezid and the only male relative of Mehmed with a claim to the throne. He lived under house arrest in Constantinople
and the Ottomans paid a stipend to the empire to keep him under guard. Allegedly, Constantine sent a message to Mehmed
in 1451 demanding this payment be increased or else he might release Orhan and maybe even
proclaim him a rival sultan. Supposedly, this was the cause of the hostilities
that led to the Ottoman siege in 1453. I don’t put much credence into this story. It sounds way too stupid for Constantine to
provoke the Ottomans, and Mehmed doesn’t strike me as a guy who needed a pretext to
go on conquering. The Byzantines had made a similar move in
1421 upon the death of Mehmed I. The pro-war party in Constantinople had convinced
Manuel to withhold the recognition of Murad II and play a pretender Mustafa against him. Mustafa’s rebellion was put down and for
the Romans this gamble led to the sieges of Thessaloniki and Constantinople with the former
eventually falling to the Ottomans. The circumstances in 1421 were way more favorable
for the rebellion than 30 years later, so I highly doubt that Constantine would have
tried the same play. By the way, when the siege came, Orhan Celebi
was put in command of 600 Turkish defectors who helped to defend the city. Regardless of whether there was a provocation
or not, in 1451 the conflict was already brewing. In autumn that year rumors began circulating
that Mehmed was planning to build a fortress on the Bosphorus. When the construction began in April next
year, this should’ve been a clear signal of Mehmed’s intentions. The fortress was being constructed in the
Byzantine territory. Constantine’s response was too cautious
for the severity of the situation. Venetian and Genoese notaries were pushing
for an attack to disrupt the construction, but the Emperor had sent 3 delegations before
taking any forceful action. The first two returned without a response
from the sultan, the 3rd one was executed. By that time, it was too late to sally out,
the construction was almost finished. The newly built castle was called BoÄźazkesen,
the “Strait-cutter”. Together with a similar fortress on the other
side of the Bosphorus, constructed 50 years earlier, it gave the Ottomans full control
of the communications between the Black Sea and the Aegean. The Venetians were the first to taste the
power that the Ottomans now exercised over the straits. As soon as the castle was completed Mehmed
announced that every passing ship must stop for examination. A venetian captain Antonio Rizzo ignored this
warning. His ship was destroyed by the cannons of the
castle, the crew killed and the captain himself was impaled on a stake. Considering this episode, Venice should’ve
been way more eager to send assistance against the Ottomans. One of the possible reasons that they didn’t
was that broken betrothal. In the months before the siege, Constantine
ramped up diplomatic outreach to the west. The King of Aragon requested the island of
Lemnos in exchange for the naval assistance and the Hungarian regent John Hunyadi asked
for Selymbria and Messembria to bring his army against the Ottomans. These terms were agreed upon and the treaties
may have turned out to be valuable, but the empire also needed an alliance that would
serve as a lynchpin of the Christian coalition. The final element in the Byzantine defense
strategy should’ve been depriving the Ottomans of their decisive advantage in artillery. This revolves around the fate of the Hungarian
engineer Orban. Orban wasn’t the only engineer who was able
to cast large-caliber artillery at the time. In the early 1400s there were several artisans,
who showcased massive cannons. However, none of them were in the Ottoman
Empire, so finding and hiring such an expert would’ve taken a lot of time for Mehmed. The Ottomans had access to artillery, which
they successfully employed in the siege of Thessalonica and in the destruction of the
Hexamilion, but nothing of the caliber that Orban and his peers could bring to the table. The huge Basilica Gun is what Orban is best
known for, but he also oversaw the production of the rest of the 70 cannons that the Ottomans
brought to the Theodosian walls. Having a skilled artillery engineer in the
field was crucial for the Ottoman offensive. The siege of Thessaloniki supported by their
old artillery took the Ottomans 8 years. The walls of Thessaloniki were thinner than
even the outer wall of Constantinople. Without the unique expertise brought by Orban
the Ottomans would have to rely on the artillery of the same caliber during their attack of
the Byzantine capital, which would’ve greatly reduced their ability to breach the walls. The effectiveness of the Basilica Canon is
up to debate, but the Ottoman artillery force as a whole had proven invaluable for the success
of the siege. At the same time the defenders were ill-prepared
for an artillery shoot-out. They had some artillery pieces but those were
starved for gunpowder. In addition, the platforms of the Theodosian
walls were too narrow to accommodate the recoil of the guns. The vibrations of the firing cannons did more
damage to the walls than the cannons themselves did to the Ottoman forces. Laonikos Chalkokondyles wrote that in 1452
Orban was in the employ of the Byzantine Emperor. If that is true his presence in Constantinople
should have been another opportunity to affect the power balance in the upcoming confrontation. In hindsight it is easy to see that artillery
played a critical role in the siege. According to Chalkokondyles, Orban left because
he wasn’t receiving his stipend due to Constantine’s financial issues. He then left for the Ottoman court where his
arrival was seen as divine providence. In another version, Urban comes to Constantine
with an offer to build him a huge cannon, and only after being turned down ventures
to give the same offer to Mehmed. This one is probably apocryphal. It doesn’t make much sense for Urban to
come to an almost bankrupt Constantine with such an extravagant proposal. In any case it should’ve been imperative
for Constantine to not let Orban go to Mehmed. I may be using the Venetians a bit too much
in my strategizing, but I bet they were interested in some cannons and had enough money to pay
for Orban’s services. If all other ways to keep him out of Adrianople
fail, then who knows, maybe he just slips on a banana peel and breaks his neck on the
way to Sultan’s court. Even if Orban didn’t reach his capital Mehmed
would’ve still brought a lot of artillery to Constantinople, but without the Hungarian’s
expertise he’d have a much harder time making breaches in the Theodosian walls. The damage on the fortifications would be
diminished, alleviating a lot of pressure on the defenders. Ultimately it would’ve served Constantine's
plan: buying time until the reinforcements could arrive. In the historical timeline the siege began
on April 6, 1453. Mehmed had brought over 100, 000 men together
with 70 pieces of artillery. On sea they were supported by a large fleet
of galleys, over 100 vessels strong. In preparation for the siege, Mehmed also
sent his governor Turukhan Bey to Morea to prevent Demetrios and Thomas from sending
any help to Constantine. Demetrios’ brother-in-law had even won a
victory over one of Turukhan’s lieutenants, but it mattered little in the grand scheme
of things. The population of the peninsula was divided
and irritated over the despot’s mismanagement. It couldn’t be mobilized for an effective
campaign against the Turks. No help would be coming from Mystra to Constantinople. The defenders of the Roman capital numbered
somewhere below 10000 in total. This number included both the citizens put
under arms and the small professional contingents sent by foreign powers. The foreign aid to Constantinople consisted
of the Genoese mercenary company of Giovanni Giustiniani, 200 Neapolitan archers of cardinal
Isidore, several Venetian vessels, which happened to be in the harbor at the start of the siege
and the retinue of the Catalan consul Joan de la Via. During the siege 3 more Venetian ships arrived
from Crete. This ragtag band had withstood 53 days of
bombardment and sporadic assaults. Constantine, Giustiniani and other defenders
fought valiantly, but the numbers were overwhelming. Considering the advantage that the Ottomans
had in the troop quantity and firepower it is a miracle that the city held for even that
long. After the siege was concluded Thomas and Demetrios
remained in the divided possession of Morea for 7 more years. Demetrios was comfortable as an Ottoman vassal,
while Thomas held out hope that the papacy would send help. In 1460 after some missed tribute payments
the sultan decided to assume direct control of the Peninsula. Thomas kept on fighting in Achaea and eventually
escaped to the Venetian territory, while Demetrios surrendered to the Sultan after some token
resistance. Salmenico castle and its commander Konstantine
Graitzas Palaiologos were the last to hold out against the Ottoman forces. When its garrison surrendered in 1461 all
that remained of the despotate was the tiny piece of land on the Mani Peninsula. Now let’s summarize the actions that we
have proposed. The main idea of the strategy is making an
attack on Constantinople more trouble than it would be worth. First of all, get rid of Demetrius and appoint
Thomas the sole despot of Morea. This would’ve allowed for better communication
and coordination between the Palaiologoi domains, which would come in handy when the confrontation
with Mehmed begins. This also removes the issue of the messy succession
when John dies and it weakens the anti-unionists party. Secondly, when Constantine becomes the emperor
he should just go ahead and marry the daughter of the Doge. Venetians were the natural allies against
the Ottomans, who should've remained firmly committed to keeping Constantinople out of
the Sultan’s hands. Nothing justifies putting this alliance in
jeopardy. When it comes to other alliances, less effort
should’ve been spent appeasing the Pope, and more - bringing in the powers with more
pragmatic interest. Serbia probably wasn’t going to help much,
considering its own vulnerable position, but Hungary might’ve offered more substantial
assistance. We’ve mentioned an agreement with John Hunyadi
in exchange for land concessions and an embassy from Hungary had reportedly reached the sultan’s
camp and threatened war if he didn't lift the siege. Hungary was the only power in the region capable
of an open land confrontation with the Ottomans at that point. If anything could’ve been done to motivate
a more swift and decisive response from the Hungarians, it should’ve been one of the
top priorities. A closer alliance with Venice would’ve enabled
a more forceful answer to the Sultan’s provocative fortress building. Preventing that construction would’ve kept
open the communication with the Italian trading posts on the Black sea as well as Georgia
and Trebizond. Also, as soon as Mehmed reveals his intentions,
Thomas Palaiologos could’ve started fortifying Morea. Restoring the Hexamillion would have meant
that the Sultan either sends some of his artillery south, or leaves Morea undisturbed, in which
case Thomas would be free to send reinforcements to Constantinople. In both cases, the power balance shifts to
the Byzantine advantage. Finally, keeping Orban out of Mehmed’s camp
would have further eroded the Ottoman artillery superiority. When Mehmed set out to Constantinople in 1453
he correctly estimated his ability to take the city without dragging out the siege into
hundreds of days. Without a partial sea blockade and an overwhelming
artillery force he would’ve been reluctant to make this call. And even if he went for it under those circumstances,
the siege would’ve taken way longer, at which point more reinforcements would have
arrived. Mehmed was looking for a swift and decisive
attack, not the siege of Candia-type situation, when the defense of Constantinople would become
a go-to destination for every European adventurer hungry for some glory. The Ottomans still had targets for conquest
in Anatolia, so the Roman capital could be kept in the long-term plans for the time being. And then Constantine expanded the Empire to
Britain, Iberia and the Persian gulf, invented steam engine, nuclear reactor and the Internet,
and they all lived happily ever after on their space colonies extorting tribute from the
aliens like in the good old days. But probably not. Preventing or repelling the siege of Constantinople
in 1453 wouldn’t have automatically skyrocketed the Eastern Romans into pre-eminence. Catholic powers were not lining up to be used
by the Emperor as a hammer for bashing the Turks. Their assistance came at a price. Generally, that price would be trading ports
and islands in the Aegean. If the King of Aragon eventually shows up
to the siege, expect a quarrel between him and Giustiniani, both of whom were promised
Lemnos. If Mehmed suffered a defeat beneath the walls
of Constantinople the Byzantines wouldn’t be enjoying much of the possible territorial
concessions. Thessaloniki would have to be returned to
Venice to maintain that alliance, so the best that Constantine could hope for would be the
principality of Athens and that land in Thessaly that he'd been able to liberate briefly in
1444. Even something as fortuitous as civil war
in the Ottoman Empire after a sudden death of Mehmed II wouldn’t have resulted in immediate
Eastern Roman revival. The impoverished empire wasn’t in a good
position to take advantage of a situation like that. Most of the spoils of a potential collapse
of the Ottoman power in the Balkan were primed to be taken by the Italian mercantile states
as well as Serbia and Hungary. In these circumstances just being left alone
for a couple of decades doesn’t sound like a bad deal for the Empire. I think the key to the revival of the Byzantine
fortunes in this timeline would have been the despotate of Morea. A lot of refugees from the ex-Byzantine areas
were already preferring to move there instead of Constantinople. The despotate’s capital of Mystra was becoming
a new center of Eastern Roman culture and education. It was also an inherently defensible location. With adequate governorship it could have been
a backup powerbase for the Byzantine Emperors, similar to Nicaea and Thessaloniki during
the Latin occupation. Other than that, a key for the Byzantine survival
would have been to navigate the balance of powers around them. If any one power becomes dominant in the region,
then it would automatically start eyeing the city of Constantine. Being more trouble to take than to tolerate
is the name of the game in this situation. Money would have to be found to adapt the
Theodosian walls to the realities of the new era of siege warfare. Whichever power comes knocking on them next,
they are sure to bring some big guns with them. In the end, no one knows how history would’ve
turned out if any of the key decisions were changed, but I think the picture I’ve painted
is more or less realistic. If you’d like to add something to it or
ask me a question, feel free to do so in the comments. We also have a discord which you can join
if you want to discuss these kinds of topics with me and other interested people. Thanks a lot for watching to the end of this
unusually long video. And I will see you in the next one.
Just like Andronikos I Komnenos, or Alexios III Angelos. Those selfish idiots ruined the Empire.